Muscovy and the Russian Empire

See also: Little Russia Office and Collegium of Little Russia (1722–27)

After the Mongol invasion of Kievan Rus', the histories of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples
diverged.[17] The former, having successfully united all remnants of Rus's northern provinces,
evolved into the Russian state. The latter came under the domination of the Grand Duchy of
Lithuania, followed by the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. Within the Commonwealth, the
militant Zaporozhian Cossacks refused polonization, and often clashed with the Commonwealth
government which was controlled by the Polish nobility.[18]
Unrest among the Cossacks caused them to rebel against the Commonwealth and seek union
with Russia, with which they shared much of their culture, language and religion. This was
eventually formalized through the Treaty of Pereyaslav in 1654.[18] Starting in the mid-17th
century, Ukraine was gradually absorbed into the Russian Empire, which entirely absorbed into
Russia by the late 18th century with the partition of Poland. Soon after the Cossack host was
forcibly disbanded by the Russian Empire and most Cossacks were relocated to
the Kuban region on the southern edge of the Russian Empire.
The Russian Empire considered Ukrainians (and Belarusians) to be ethnically Russian, and
referred to them as "Little Russians".[19] Until the end of World War I this view was only opposed
by a small group of Ukrainian nationalists.[20] Nevertheless, a perceived threat of "Ukrainian
separatism" set in motion a set of measures aimed at the russification of the "Little Russians".
[20]
 In 1804, the Ukrainian language was banned from schools as a subject and language of
instruction.[21] In 1876 Alexander II's secretary Ems Ukaz prohibited the publication and
importation of most Ukrainian language books, public performances and lectures in the Ukrainian
language, and even the printing of Ukrainian texts accompanying musical scores. [22]

Soviet Union
RSFSR-Ukrainian SSR relations

Russian SFSR Ukrainian SSR

The location of the Ukrainian SSR (red) within the Soviet Union between 1922 and 1936.

The number and share of Ukrainians in the population of the regions of the RSFSR (1926 census).

Ukrainian People's Republic

The February Revolution saw establishment of official relations between the Russian Provisional
Government and the Ukrainian Central Rada (Central Council of Ukraine) that was represented
at the Russian government by its commissar Petro Stebnytsky. At the same time Dmitry
Odinets was appointed the representative of Russian Affairs in the Ukrainian government. After
the Soviet military aggression by the Soviet government at the beginning of 1918, Ukraine
declared its full independence from the Russian Republic on 22 January 1918, as the Ukrainian
People's Republic which existed from 1917 to 1922. The two treaties of Brest-Litovsk that
Ukraine and Russia signed separately with the Central Powers calmed the military conflict
between them, and peace negotiations were initiated the same year.
After the end of World War I, Ukraine became a battleground in the Ukrainian War of
Independence, linked to the Russian Civil War. Both Russians and Ukrainians fought in nearly all
armies based on personal political beliefs.[nb 1]
In 1922, Ukraine and Russia were two of the founding members of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, and were the signatories of the treaty that terminated the union in December 1991. [nb 2]
The end of the Russian Empire also ended the ban on the Ukrainian language. [21] This was
followed by a period of korenizatsiya that promoted the cultures of the different Soviet Republics.
[23]

Holodomor
See also: Holodomor and Soviet famine of 1932–33
In 1932–1933 Ukraine experienced the Holodomor (Ukrainian: Голодомор, "Extermination by
hunger" or "Hunger-extermination"; derived from 'Морити голодом', "Killing by Starvation") which
was a man-made famine in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic that killed up to 7.5 million
Ukrainians. During the famine, which is also known as the "Terror-Famine in Ukraine" and
"Famine-Genocide in Ukraine", millions of citizens of the Ukrainian SSR, the majority being
ethnically Ukrainian, died of starvation in an unprecedented peacetime catastrophe. Scholars
disagree on the relative importance of natural factors and bad economic policies as causes of the
famine, and the degree to which the destruction of the Ukrainian peasantry was premeditated by
Soviet leaders.[24]
The Holodomor famine extended to many Soviet republics, including Russia and Kazakhstan. In
the absence of documentary proof of intent, scholars have also argued that the Holodomor was
caused by the economic problems associated with the radical changes implemented during the
period of liquidation of private property and Soviet industrialization, combined with
the widespread drought of the early 1930s. However, on 13 January 2010, Kyiv Appellate Court
posthumously found Stalin, Kaganovich, Molotov, and the Ukrainian Soviet
leaders Kosior and Chubar, amongst other functionaries, guilty of genocide against Ukrainians
during the Holodomor famine.[24]

Current relations
1990s

The Russian Embassy in Kyiv

The Ukrainian Embassy in Moscow

Nuclear Disarmament
After dissolution of the Soviet Union Ukraine gained its independence and inherited the third
largest nuclear stockpile in the world, along with significant means of its design and production. [25]
[26][27]
 The country had 130 UR-100N intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) with six warheads
each, 46 RT-23 Molodets ICBMs with ten warheads apiece, as well as 33 heavy bombers,
totaling approximately 1,700 warheads remained on Ukrainian territory. [28] While Ukraine had
physical control of the weapons, it did not have operational control, as they were dependent on
Russian-controlled electronic Permissive Action Links and the Russian command and control
system. In 1992, Ukraine agreed to voluntarily remove over 3,000 tactical nuclear weapons. [25]
Following the signing of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances among the
U.S., the U.K., and Russia, as well as similar agreements with France and China, Ukraine
agreed to destroy the rest of its nuclear weapons, and to join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).[29][30][31] By 1996, Ukraine transferred all Soviet-era strategic warheads
to Russia.
Division of the Black Sea Fleet and Sevastopol
The second major dispute of early years was over the fate of the Black Sea Fleet as well as its
operating bases, mainly Sevastopol on the Crimean Peninsula.[27] The issue was exacerbated by
political posturing, Ukrainian proclamation that the entire fleet was under Russia's jurisdiction and
intention to pursue a NATO Membership Action Plan, followed by Russian politicians expressions
of territorial claims over parts of Crimea and declaration by Russian parliament that the 1954
gifting of Crimea to Ukraine was illegitimate, making the peninsula an ongoing issue in
negotiations.[27][32]
The action of transfer was attributed to Communist Party first secretary Nikita Khrushchev.
[33]
 After several years of intense negotiations the whole issue was resolved in 1997. The Partition
Treaty divided the fleet and allowed Russia to lease some of the naval bases in Sevastopol to
the Russian Navy until 2017, and Treaty of Friendship, fixed the principle of strategic partnership,
the recognition of the inviolability of existing borders, respect for territorial integrity and mutual
commitment not to use its territory to harm the security of each other. [34][35]
Economics
Another major dispute was related to the energy supplies, as several Soviet—Western Europe oil
and gas pipelines ran through Ukraine. Later after new treaties came into effect, Ukraine's gas
debt arrears to Russia were paid off by transfer of some nuclear-capable weapons that Ukraine
inherited from the USSR, to Russia such as the Tu-160 strategic bombers.[36]
While the Russian share in Ukraine's exports declined from 26.2 percent in 1997 to around 23
percent in 1998–2000, the share of imports held steady at 45–50 percent of the total. Overall,
between one third and one half of Ukraine's trade was with the Russian Federation. Dependence
was particularly strong in energy. Up to 70–75 percent of annually consumed gas and close to 80
percent of oil came from Russia. On the export side, too, dependence was significant. Russia
remained Ukraine's primary market for ferrous metals, steel plate and pipes, electric machinery,
machine tools and equipment, food, and products of chemical industry. It has been a market of
hope for Ukraine's high value-added goods, more than nine tenths of which were historically tied
to the Russian consumer.[37]
With old buyers gone by 1997, Ukraine had experienced a 97–99 percent drop in production of
industrial machines with digital control systems, television sets, tape recorders, excavators, cars
and trucks. At the same time, and in spite of the postcommunist slowdown, Russia came out as
the fourth-largest investor in the Ukrainian economy after the US, the Netherlands, and
Germany, having contributed $150.6 million out of $2.047 billion in foreign direct investment that
Ukraine had received from all sources by 1998.[37]

2000s
See also: Russia–Ukraine gas disputes

Vladimir Putin and Leonid Kuchma in December 2003.

Although disputes prior to the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election were present including the
speculations regarding accidental shooting down of a Russian airliner by the Ukrainian military
and the controversy with the Tuzla Island, relations with Russia under the latter years of Leonid
Kuchma improved. In 2002, the Russian Government participated in financing the construction of
the Khmelnytskyi and the Rivne Nuclear Power Plants.[38] In 2003, Russia attempted to integrate
Ukraine into a new Russian-led Single Economic Space with Russia. However, with
president Viktor Yushchenko in power, several problems resurfaced including the Russia–
Ukraine gas disputes due to Ukraine's growing cooperation with the EU and bid to join NATO.
The overall perception of relations with Russia in Ukraine differs largely on regional factors.
Many Russophone eastern and southern regions, which are also home to the majority of
the Russian diaspora in Ukraine welcome closer relations with Russia.[39] However further central
and particularly western regions (who were never a part of Imperial Russia) of Ukraine show a
less friendly attitude to the idea of a historic link to Russia [40][41][42][43] and the Soviet Union in
particular.[44]
Russia has no intention of annexing any country.
Russian President Putin (24 December 2004)[45]

In Russia, there is[when?] no regional breakdown in the opinion of Ukraine, [46] but on the whole,
Ukraine's recent attempts to join the EU and NATO were seen as change of course to only a pro-
Western, anti-Russian orientation of Ukraine and thus a sign of hostility and this resulted in a
drop of Ukraine's perception in Russia[47] (although President of Ukraine Viktor
Yushchenko reassured Russia that joining NATO was not meant as an anti-Russian act, [48] and
Putin said that Russia would welcome Ukraine's membership in the EU [49]). This was further
fuelled by the public discussion in Ukraine of whether the Russian language should be given
official status[50] and be made the second state language.[51][52] During the 2009 gas
conflict the Russian media almost uniformly portrayed Ukraine as an aggressive and greedy
state that wanted to ally with Russia's enemies and exploit cheap Russian gas. [53]
Further worsening of relations was provoked by belligerent statements made in 2007–2008 by
both Russian (e.g. the Russian Foreign Ministry,[54] the Mayor of Moscow Yury Luzhkov[55] and
then President Vladimir Putin[48][56]) and Ukrainian politicians, for example, the former Foreign
Minister Borys Tarasiuk,[57] deputy Justice Minister of Ukraine Evhen Kornichuk [uk][58] and then
leader of parliamentary opposition Yulia Tymoshenko.[59]
The status of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol remained a matter of disagreement and
tensions.[46][60]
Second Tymoshenko government
Main article: Second Tymoshenko government

Vladimir Putin and Viktor Yushchenko in February 2008

In February 2008 Russia unilaterally withdrew from the Ukrainian–Russian intergovernmental

agreement on SPRN signed in 1997.[61]
During the Russo-Georgian War, relations between Ukraine and Russia soured, due to Ukraine's
support and selling of arms to Georgia, as well as, the new Ukrainian regulations for the Russian
Black Sea Fleet, which sent vessels and marines to the war, such as the demand that Russia
obtain prior permission when crossing the Ukrainian border, which Russia refused to comply
with.[62][63] Further disagreements over the position on Georgia and relations with Russia were
among the issues that brought down the Our Ukraine–People's Self-Defense Bloc + Bloc Yulia
Tymoshenko coalition in the Ukrainian parliament during September 2008[64] (on 16 December
2008 the coalition did remerge with a new coalition partner, the Lytvyn Bloc[65]). This rekindled
controversy over Russian military presence in Crimea,
On 2 October 2008, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin accused Ukraine of supplying arms to
Georgia during the South Ossetia War. Putin also claimed that Moscow had evidence proving
that Ukrainian military experts were present in the conflict zone during the war. Ukraine has
denied the allegations. The head of its state arms export company, Ukrspetsexport, said no arms
were sold during the war, and Defense Minister Yuriy Yekhanurov denied that Ukraine's military
personnel fought on the side of Georgia. [66]
Prosecutor General of Ukraine Oleksandr Medvedko confirmed on 25 September 2009 that there
was no personnel of the Ukrainian Armed Forces participated in the 2008 South Ossetia War, no
weapons or military equipment of the Ukrainian Armed Forces were present at the conflict, and
no help was given to the Georgian side. Also in the declaration the Ukrainian officials informed
that the international transfers of the military specialization equipment between Ukraine and
Georgia during the 2006–2008 were conducted in accordance with the earlier established
contracts, the laws of Ukraine, and the international treaties. [67]
The US supported Ukraine's bid to join NATO launched in January 2008 as an effort to obtain
the NATO Membership Action Plan.[68][69][70] Russia strongly opposed any prospect of Ukraine and
Georgia becoming NATO members.[nb 3][71][72][73] According to the alleged transcript of Putin's speech
at the 2008 NATO–Russia Council Summit in Bucharest, Putin spoke of Russia's responsibility
for ethnic Russians resident in Ukraine and urged his NATO partners to act advisedly; according
to some media reports he then also privately hinted to his US counterpart at the possibility of
Ukraine losing its integrity in the event of its NATO accession. [74] According to a document in
the United States diplomatic cables leak Putin "implicitly challenged the territorial integrity of
Ukraine, suggesting that Ukraine was an artificial creation sewn together from territory of Poland,
the Czech Republic, Romania, and especially Russia in the aftermath of the Second World
War."[75]
Vladimir Putin and Yulia Tymoshenko in November 2009

During a January 2009 dispute over natural gas prices, exports of Russian natural gas through
Ukraine were shut.[76] Relations further deteriorated when Russian Prime Minister Putin during
this dispute said that "Ukrainian political leadership is demonstrating its inability to solve
economic problems, and [...] situation highlights the high criminalization of [Ukrainian]
authorities"[77][78] and when in February 2009 (after the conflict) Ukrainian President Yushchenko [79]
[80]
 and the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry considered Russian President Dmitry Medvedev's
statement that Ukraine must compensate for gas crisis losses to the European countries an
"emotional statement which is unfriendly and hostile towards Ukraine and the EU member-
states".[81][82] During the conflict the Russian media almost uniformly portrayed Ukraine as an
aggressive and greedy state that wanted to ally with Russia's enemies and exploit cheap
Russian gas.[53]

Videoblog of the address by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to Ukrainian President Viktor

Yushchenko on 11 August 2009. (Transcript in English).

After a "master plan" to modernize the natural gas infrastructure of Ukraine between the EU and
Ukraine was announced (on 23 March 2009) Russian Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko told an
investment conference at which the plan was unveiled that it appeared to draw Ukraine legally
closer to the European Union and might harm Moscow's interests.[83] According to Putin "to
discuss such issues without the basic supplier is simply not serious". [83]
In a leaked US diplomatic cable (as revealed by WikiLeaks) regarding the January 2009
Russian–Ukrainian gas crisis, the US Ambassador to Ukraine William Taylor was
quoting Ambassador of Ukraine to Russia Kostyantyn Hryshchenko as expressing his opinion
that Kremlin leaders wanted to see a totally subservient person in charge in Kyiv (a regency in
Ukraine) and that Putin "hated" the then-President Yushchenko and had a low personal regard
for Yanukovych, but saw then-Prime Minister Tymoshenko as someone perhaps not that he can
trust, yet with whom he could deal.[84]
On 11 August 2009, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev posted a videoblog on
the Kremlin.ru website, and the official Kremlin LiveJournal blog, in which he criticised
Yushchenko for what Medvedev claimed was the Ukrainian president's responsibility in the
souring of Russia–Ukraine relations and "the anti-Russian position of the current Ukrainian
authorities".[nb 4] Medvedev further announced that he would not send a new ambassador to
Ukraine until there was an improvement in the relationship. [85][86][nb 5][87] In response, Yushchenko
wrote a letter which noted he could not agree that the Ukrainian–Russian relations had run into
problems and wondered why the Russian president completely ruled out the Russian
responsibility for this.[88][89][nb 6]
Analysts said Medvedev's message was timed to influence the campaign for the 2010 Ukrainian
presidential election.[85][91] The U.S. Department of State spokesman, commenting on the message
by Medvedev to his Ukrainian counterpart Yuschenko, said, among other things: "It is important
for Ukraine and Russia to have a constructive relationship. I'm not sure that these comments are
necessarily in that vein. But going forward, Ukraine has a right to make its own choices, and we
feel that it has a right to join NATO if it chooses."[92]
On 7 October 2009, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said the Russian government
wanted to see economy prevail in Russian–Ukrainian relations and that relations between the
two countries would improve if the two countries set up joint ventures, especially
in small and medium-sized businesses.[93] At the same meeting in Kharkiv, Lavrov said the
Russian government would not respond to a Ukrainian proposal to organize a meeting between
the Russian and Ukrainian presidents,[94] but that "Contacts between the two countries' foreign
ministries are being maintained permanently." [95]
On 2 December 2009, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Petro Poroshenko and Lavrov agreed on
gradually abandoning the compilation of lists of individuals banned from entering their countries.
[96]