Dynamic Spectrum Access Game in 5G Cognitive

IPASJ International Journal of Information Tecnology (IIJIT)
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Volume 9, Issue 3, March 2021 ISSN 2321-5976
Dynamic spectrum access game in 5G cognitive

radio networks : users’ strategies and primary
operators’ profit
Franck Arnold BAMA-SI1 , Emmanuel TONYE2 and NANGA AYISSI3
1
Research scholar, Department of Electrical and Telecommunications Engineering, National Advanced School of
Engineering, University of Yaounde I, Cameroon
2
Professor, Department of Electrical and Telecommunications Engineering, National Advanced School of Engineering,
University of Yaounde I, Cameroon
3
Research scholar, Department of Electrical and Telecommunications Engineering, National Advanced School of
Engineering, University of Yaounde I, Cameroon
ABSTRACT
This paper studies the strategic and economic interactions between secondary operators and between primary operators in
cognitive radio networks, in an opportunistic spectrum access scenario. A secondary operator wishing to transmit splits its
stream into several streams and transmits them through the available primary channels meeting performance criteria defined
by the secondary operator, and prices set by the primary operators. Primary operators compete to provide spectrum access
opportunities to secondary operators. Each primary operator aims to maximize its profit from this secondary market under the
constraint of transmission quality for its primary users and for the primary operators. The degradation in transmission quality
of primary services is considered as the cost of providing spectrum access to secondary operators. For secondary operators, we
adopt a utility function that takes into account the congestion on the primary channels, the price of access to the primary
spectrum, and the motivation of the secondary operators to obtain the amount of flows to be transmitted on the primary
channels.
We analyze the impacts of several system parameters such as the motivation of secondary operators, the number of secondary
operators and the channel quality, on the Nash equilibrium (i.e., the equilibrium pricing adopted by the primary operators, the
distribution of the secondary operators' flow through the primary channels and the profit of the primary operators).
Keywords: spectrum access, utility function, Nash equilibrium, game theory, cognitive radio, primary operator,
secondary operator, strategy.
1. INTRODUCTION
The next generation of wireless cellular networks (IoT, 5G) is characterized by:
 A mix of heterogeneous communication links,
 A dense deployment of small base stations [1].
Several technical deﬁs need to be addressed in terms of interference management and frequency allocation.
Some radio frequency bands that are currently in use are used both as backhaul links (in the case of microwave
beams) and access links, must be shared by a large number of base stations, resulting in congestion of these links. This
will increase exponentially with the deployment of 5G and IoT networks.
Other frequency bands, on the other hand, are underutilized due to the exclusive use of the licensees for these bands.
Inefficient use of available spectrum can be improved by opportunistic access to licensed bands by so-called
secondary operators without interfering with primary operators.
This work addresses the joint problem of dynamic spectrum access and pricing in cognitive radio 5G networks using
Volume 9, Issue 3, March 2021 Page 1

game theory.
By cognitive radio networks we mean networks that can make decisions autonomously using information gathered
about the radio frequency (RF) environment through a reasoning-based model, and can also learn and plan based on
their past experience [19].
We consider several primary operators, who own spectrum and set prices for their licensed spectrum, and a set of
secondary operators who compete for access to the spectrum left available by the primary operators. Game theory is the
appropriate framework to study the interactions between these users.
Several works have addressed the spectrum detection problem. In [2], several secondary operators cooperate to
efficiently detect the primary spectrum. 3] proposes an algorithm for spectrum detection based on one-bit measurements
in a network of cognitive radio sensors. 4] presents a hybrid model for non-cooperative spectrum sensing; this approach
helps detect idle spectrum opportunistically, with better spectrum utilization in the case of non-cooperative sensing,
resulting in improved spectral efficiency. [5] presents a novel pattern recognition approach for spectrum sensing in
collaborative cognitive radio systems. In the proposed scheme, discriminative features of the received signal are
extracted at each node and used by a classifier at a central node to make a global decision on the availability of
spectrum holes for use by the cognitive radio network.
On the other hand, others have addressed the problem of sharing the primary spectrum with secondary operators: [6]
studies the spectrum access algorithm based on Cournot's game theory by taking into account the interference between
secondary operators. In [7], power constraints are applied to the secondary operator to keep the communication of the
primary operators impervious. In [8], a new common spectrum allocation and power control algorithm called cost and
connection degree based (CCB) algorithm in cognitive radio networks is proposed. A new utility function is designed to
describe the total system utility in our system model.
Few works have studied the joint problem of spectrum sharing and pricing in cognitive radio networks. [12]
addressed this problem by considering multiple secondary operators and multiple primary operators, but does not
consider transmission constraints in terms of transmission efficiency, primary channel capacity limit, and QoS
degradation. 14] also considers multiple secondary operators and multiple primary operators, takes into account the
transmission constraints of the primary operators, but does not consider the congestion between secondary operators
due to spectrum sharing.
This paper overcomes these limitations by proposing a new game-theoretic model solving the joint problem of
spectrum allocation and pricing, taking into account both multiple primary operators (POs), who set prices for their
licensed spectrum and face transmission quality and QoS requirements, and a finite set of secondary operators (SOs),
characterized by elastic traffic requirements that can be transmitted over multiple primary channels taking into account
congestion caused by the presence of multiple secondary operators.
Indeed, the following definition fully satisfies our approach [18]: a game is, in the sense of game theory, a model,
whose main ingredients are individuals ("players") who make decisions simultaneously, choosing an element from a set
whose characteristics are part of the assumptions of the model, and rules, which specify, in particular, the outcome
resulting from the various (simultaneous) possible decisions - an outcome being generally characterized by the gains it
provides to the players - and the information available to everyone.
We analyze and discuss several numerical examples illustrating the following results: (1) the variation of a secondary
operator's flow in the primary channel as a function of the number of secondary operators involved in the game and the
motivations of these secondary operators; (2) the variation of the optimal price that primary operators should charge is
independent of the number of secondary users and proportional to the average utility per unit of traffic of these users;
(2) the variation in the optimal price that primary operators should charge is independent of the number of secondary
users and proportional to the average utility per unit of traffic of those users; (3) as the number of secondary users
increases, the revenues of primary operators increase until a saturation point is reached; (3) the variation in the flow of
secondary operators, the spectrum sharing price set by primary operators, and their profits as a function of the primary
transmission quality.
SUMMARY OF THE KEY NOTATIONS AND DEFINITIONS
V Set of primary operators (POs)

N Number of primary operators
U Set of secondary operators
I Number of secondary operators (SOs)

Traffic of secondary operator i to be sent

Utility per unit of flow of i on channel l
flow transmitted by i on channel l
i spectrum access strategy
Optimal flow vector of i
Optimal flows of all secondary operators except i
Access strategies space for i
S Access strategies space for i
Primary operator bandwidth requirement
Primary operator l transmission efficienc
Total flow transmitted by the secondary operators through the primary channel l
Total availble spectrum size
Number of primary connections
, Constants that indicate the weights between the income function and the cost function
Interpreted as an additional fixed cost per unit of traffic for the use of wireless channel l
Price per unit of bandwidth for all traffic passing through channel l
Primary operator l strategy
Primary operator l profit
BER Bit Error Rate
2. PROBLEM STATMENT
Let consider an radio cognitive ecosystem constituted of N POs and I radio cognitive SOs (fig. 1). Each POl,
constitute a spectral band Fl attributed by a regulator.
Fig. 1: Access scenario to PO spectrum by SO
Each SOi, constitute a quantity a flow which it desires to transmit to primary channel. This
flow can be divided and transmitted through various primary channel. This subdivision of flow by an SOi will constitute
its strategy access to spectrums : . the set is the

strategy space of SOi and is the strategy profile of SOs, that is the conjonction of their
strategies : . We note the configuration of all others SOs except SOi .
Each OSi chooses a strategy which maximizes it degree of satisfaction, that is its objective function defined the
difference between one motivation function (utility) and disutility (insatisfaction).
On another side, each POl seeks to maximize its own profit ; it then define its own strategy of price , where
representes the price per unit of the passing bands flowing through its channel . The strategic conjunctions of all POs
. We note , the strategies of others Pos except POl.
The association , assembling the access strategies to primary spectrums by the Sos and the adopted
strategy prices by Pos, constitute the solution of game by which the SO and PO play simultaneuously.
Two games are being displayed here: a competitive game between PO and another between SO.
1) Competitive game between primary operators (POs)

POs seek to maximize their profit in the competitive manner by controling the shared strategic price of the spectrum.
The decision of each PO is influenced by the actions of others Pos and the action of one PO can be observed by other
POs.
Fig. 2: Distributive model of flow through the primary channels [20]
Two situations are being presented here :

 The POs do not face any constraint of transmission quality
In this case,the function of profit of the POl is given by [12]:
Here, we do not consider the characteristic of primary channel.

 The POs face constraints
o Satisfaction of communicatin needs of SOs : this constraint is translated by transmission efficiency of
SO linked to modulation qualities and the channel quality.
o Quality communication of POs
Here, the cost of the sharing of the spectrum is defined as degradation of the transmission quality. POs constantly adjust
their stategies of prices of the spectrum to acheive the maximum of their own profit.
If the demand of the SO spectrum can be satisfied by the POs, that is the available resource spectrum of Pos is grater to
the demand of the SOs spectrum, the profit function of the POl is given by [14] :

is the POl income and the cost function of the shared

spectrum.
is the total quantity of flow of SO flowing through the channel l. the POl will choose the strategy
which maximize its objective function.
, are constants the weights between the function of the income and the function of the cost, is the
requirement of the flowing band of the PO, is the total size of the available spectrum, is the number of primary
connections and is the transmission efficiency of the POl.
Game between primary operators Comment

Game type Competitive game POs are selfish, everyone seeks to
maximize their profit
Players Primary operators
The price per unit of bandwidth for all
Strategy of a traffic passing through its channel l
player
When no transmission quality constraint
is considered
Objective When taking into account the
function transmission quality constraints, it is not
considered
Each PO seeks to maximize its profit by adjusting the price of the sharing of its channel.
2) Competitive game between secondary operators (SOs)

The strategy of SOi is defined by the distribution of its traffic through primary channels: .
The SOi will then choose which maximize its strategic function by considering the strategies oh others SOs, that is
.
The objective function of the SO is defined by [12]:
The expression translate the motivation function of the SO, based on the quality of the primary channels.
translate the disutility due to the congestion with others SOs.
translate the disutility due to the cost of primary channel.
designate the utility to transmit the quantity of flow through the primary channel l. This utility which means
the motivation of the SO to transmit its flow through wireless channe is based on performing indicators linked to
wireless communications.
We propose two possible definitions of the utility:
i. is the transmission efficiency defined as follows :
Where is the Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) at the level of the receptor and
with is the target Bit Error Rate.

ii. is the linear combination of various simple utilities in relation to the performing indicators of the
communication channels : throughput, delay, reliability.
Table 1 : simple utility functions [15]
Utility functions Parameters
Exponential utility :
Logarithmic utility :
r is the transmission rate, A, B and C are the parameters
Transmission rate :
of the utility function; D <1 and 0 <C <1
Power utility :
Transmission delay
B> 1 and d is the transmission delay
:
l and L denote the number of information bits and the
total number of bits in a packet, r is the transmission rate,
Signal to
γ denotes the SIR and P denotes the transmission power.
interference ratio
(SIR) :
Probability of
connection
b is the probability of blocking
blocking :
Et is the total amount of energy available for each node,

Energy consumption
and e is the energy required to complete the transmission
:
Equity of public
A is an adjustable parameter to control fairness, r the
services :
transmission rate
Related-Application t is the web browsing time, A is a constant and τ is the
utility: maximum session length
(5)
The weights coefficients is given by:
is fixed by the SOi

Supposing that the SOs have the same data collected values and the same learning engine, we can say that
is the threshold utility defined by us which is the maximum value of the utility for the criteria considered
(Transmission rate, Transmission delay, …)
The performance indicators are determined from the environmental data collected by the radio cognitive secondary
operator.
These implies: jitter, signal to noise ratio, packet loss, throughput, delay, reliability.
These data are recognized as the quality of service (QoS) indicators in telecommunication network.
Once the data collected, radio cognitive secondary operator can then predict primary channel performance
indicators with the help of the learning engine constituted by a multi-layer neural network:

Fig. 3: Neural network for predicting channel performance indicators
Congestion disutility is based on a congestion cost function adopted in the context of road traffic modeling [12]. Such
costs have appealing properties that lead to predictable and efficient network flows, ensuring the uniqueness of the
Nash equilibrium point. The Nash equilibrium is presented like a situation where each player adopt the best response
meanwhile considering other’s choices.
More specifically, we assume that each wireless channel l is characterized by the following cost function:
This expression represents the unit cost of flow perceived by SOi on channel l, it is the congestion cost.
are channel-specific positive parameters as defined above, and is the total amount of flow that is
transmitted over wireless channel l.
The additive term here can be interpreted as an additional fixed toll per traffic unit for the use of wireless channel l.
A possible interpretation of in the context of telecommunication networks is that it is the expected delay of a packet
in a light traffic regime.
is the price fixed by the PO for its channel access.
Game between secondary operators Comment

Game type Competitive game
Players Secondary operators SOs are selfish, everyone seeks to maximize their
objective function
Strategy of a Distribution of its traffic through the various
player primary channels
Utility or
motivational
function
Disutility or
demotivation
function
Objective
function
3) Existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium
Now, we demonstrate the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium point (NEP), by considering the
polynomial cost function (4) defined above.
Note the secondary operator objective function on wireless channel l which is equal to:
The SOi objective function on channel l (9) is continuous and concave in .

In fact,

These properties (10) ensure the existence of the Nash equilibrium according to Kakutani's fixed point theorem [16].
After solving the question of the Nash equilibrium point existence, we can show that the equilibrium point is effectively
unique in the appropriated conditions [17].
3. DETERMINATION OF THE SOLUTIONS OF COMPETITIVE GAMES BETWEEN SOS AND BETWEEN POS
The SOi objective function is given by the expression :
Each SO seeks to maximize its objective function which depends not only form its strategy, but also that of the others
SOs engaged in the game.
By deriving this objective function, we obtain:
That permit to calculate the total flow transmitted by SOs through primary channels:
Knowing that , we have:
Which give the limited value of price to be fixed by the PO for the access of its spectrum.

Thus, the price that must be defined by the POl must not be grater than . The objectif of PO is not to defined this
maximal price by default, otherwise, it can see the SOs not choosing its channel to transmit their flows. The PO will
then search the value which maximize its profit by considering SOs, but also the POs engaged in the game. Two
cases present themselves:
1)Case of primary operators with no transmission quality constraints

The objective function of POl in this case is given by:
Replacing by the expression (6), we have:
Deriving this function with respect to , we obtain:
The solution of this equation gives the value of that maximizes the profit of :
is the strategy expression of which depends on the utilities of the secondary users and their number.
Note that (14) which is the maximum price that the PO must not exceed for sharing its channel, otherwise the
SOs will not choose its channel to transmit.
The optimal total flow of SOs is then given by formula (13):
Replacing by its expression (17), we have:

Knowing that we have:
is the residual cost due to the use of the primary operator channel l. the primary operator must not set this cost
beyond the value which reflects the average utility of the secondary operators, otherwise he will risk having no
secondary operator requesting his channel without thread.
We then calculate the optimal flow that the SOi will have to transmit on the primary channel l to maximize its
objective function.
Formula (20) is the expression of the strategy of SOi , that is its flow to be transmitted through primary channel l.
2)Case of primary operators facing transmission quality constraints

The profit of the primary operator defined by its objective function is given in this case by:
Replacing by (6), we have:
And by deriving this expression with respect to , we obtain:
With

We show that the equation admits a unique solution .

Indeed, if we pose , equation (8) amounts to solving .
Deriving the function with respect to , we obtain:
These three expressions (22), (23) and (24) show that there exists such that , that is is the price of
the primary channel l which maximizes the profit of .
For , we have:
The optimal total flow of SOs is then given by:
is the residual cost due to the use of the primary operator's channel l.
The access strategy of SOi is given by:
It is sufficient to replace by its value found by solving equation (21).
4. ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF THE NUMBER OF SECONDARY USERS AND THEIR UTILITIES ON ACCESS AND
PRICING STRATEGIES
We evaluate the number and SOs’ utilities impact on the SOs’ strategies (i.e. distribution of their flows through the
primary channels) and on the POs’ strategies, that is, the prices of the channels adopted by the POs.
The comparison is made between the situations of POs with transmission quality constraints and POs with no
transmission quality constraints.
Suppose ;
1) Secondary Operator strategy

Figures 5 and 6 show the variation of the flow of SO as a function of the number and utilities of SOs in case of

unconstrained and constrained POs respectively.
Fig. 5: Evolution of the flow of SO as a function of the number and utilities of the SO for unconstrained POs
Calculating the limit of when , we obtain:
It then emerges that from a certain number of secondary operators, the SO strategy (that is to say its flow on any
primary channel) no longer depends on the others involved in the game, but of his motivation weighted by a
coefficient .
Fig. 6: Evolution of the flow of SO as a function of the number and utilities of SOs for POs with constraints
In case where POs with transmission quality constraints, the flow of SO on a primary channel may decrease to zero
when the number of SOs increases.
This can be explained by taking into account the cost of degradation of the channel, the limited capacities of the
primary channels.
2) Strategies of primary operators

Figures 7 and 8 give the variation of the optimal price adopted by a PO as a function of the number and the utilities
of the SOs in the case of unconstrained POs and of POs with constraints respectively.
Fig. 7: Evolution of the optimum price adopted by a PO as a function of the number and utilities of the SOs in the
case of unconstrained POs
Here, the utilities of the SOs do not matter, but rather their number which influences the strategies of the primary
operators.
The strategies adopted by the primary operators do not depend on the individual motivations of the SOs, but on the
number of secondary operators wishing to use the primary channels.
This is because for which is the limit value of the residual cost of using the
primary spectrum.
A primary operator can then only receive flows of up to 111 SOs.

In case of a PO with transmission quality constraints, its pricing strategy is given by:
Fig. 8: Evolution of the optimum price adopted by a PO as a function of the number and utilities of the SOs in a PO
under constraint

We see a strong dependence on the motivations of the SO in the calculation of the spectrum sharing prices, but this
price is very quickly stabilized when the number of SO increases:
From a certain number of SOs for a fixed utility of the SO, the price that the PO must set remains constant. Thus, he
has no interest in admitting more SO into its channel.
This number of SOs threshold is of the order of .
It is then clear that the number of SOs that can access a primary channel is reduced when the PO faces transmission
quality requirements and its channel capacity is limited.
3) Profit of primary operator

When POl does not face any constraint, its optimal profit is given by formula (20):
Fig. 9: Evolution of the profit of a PO as a function of the number and utilities of the SOs in the case of POs without
constraints
Figures 9 and 10 show the variation in the income of a PO as a function of the number and utilities of SOs in the case
of unconstrained POs and constrained POs respectively.
The PO profit grows with the number of SOs until it stabilizes at a maximum value given by equation (33):
It does not depend on the motivations that the SOs may have to transmit their flows on the primary channels.
Once this maximum value of profit has been reached, the primary operator will therefore no longer have an interest in
admitting other secondary operators into its network, since its gain will no longer increase.
When the POl faces transmission quality constraints, its optimal profit is given by:

Fig. 10 : Evolution of the profit of PO according to the number and utilities of the SOs in the case of POs with
constraints
The profit of the POl grows as a function of the number of SOs until it stabilizes at a maximum value given by:

This optimal profit depends on the characteristics of the primary channels and the motivations of the secondary
operators.
Once this maximum value of income has been reached, the primary operator will therefore no longer have an interest in
admitting other secondary users into his network, since his gain will no longer increase.
5. ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF TRANSMISSION QUALITY AND UTILITIES ON ACCESS AND PRICE STRATEGIES
Figure 11 shows the variation of secondary operator flow as a function of transmission quality and secondary operator
utilities. We see a growth of SO flow as a function of utility. However, there is a minimum value of the flow reached
when the transmission efficiency has a certain value. The SO can then adjust its flow outside this value of transmission
efficiency.
Fig. 11: Variation of the flow of SO according to the transmission efficiency and the utility of the SOs

Figure 12 shows the variation of the spectrum sharing price set by the primary operator as a function of the
transmission quality and utilities of the secondary operators. We see a growth of the PO's spectrum sharing price as a
function of the SOs' utilities. However, this price does not grow indefinitely with transmission efficiency, but peaks
before decreasing again. As a result, an PO may set a higher price with lower transmission efficiency.
Fig. 12: Variation of spectrum sharing price according to transmission efficiency and SO utilities
Figure 13 shows the variation in primary operator profit as a function of transmission quality and secondary operator
utilities. The profit of the PO grows rapidly as a function of the SOs' motivations. This profit increases as a function of
transmission efficiency until it reaches a maximum. This value of transmission efficiency can be considered as an ideal
value for the PO, since at this value the PO sets a low spectrum sharing price and obtains a large profit. But it is not
ideal for the SOs since it imposes a minimum flow to be transmitted.
Fig. 13: Variation in the profit of a PO according to the transmission efficiency and the utility of the SO

Figure 14 shows the PO profit as a function of the spectrum price. As the spectrum price increases, the profit
increases because more income is generated due to a higher price. However, after a certain point, as the demand for the
secondary operator decreases, this profit decreases. The price that results in the highest profit is the best answer. In
other words, given the prices of other primary operators, the best response for a particular primary operator is the price
for which profit is maximized. Furthermore, we observe that a higher price offered by primary operator results in a
higher value of the best response (i.e., the spectrum price) for primary operator. This is because when the spectrum
price increases, the demand for the spectrum increases. As a result, a primary operator may offer a higher price to
obtain a higher profit.
Fig. 14: variation of the PO's profit as a function of the spectrum sharing price
6. CONCLUSION
This study focuses on the economic interaction between secondary and primary operators in cognitive radio
networks. Secondary operators, which are characterized by elastic traffic and a learning engine to predict primary
channel performance indicators, face spectrum access costs set by operators as a result of a competitive game between
them and congestion due to the presence of other secondary operators. Cognitive radio secondary operators are engaged
in a competitive game to determine the allocation of their traffic across primary channels. Primary operators facing
transmission quality, QoS and channel quality degradation requirements allocate the available spectrum by setting
appropriate prices to maximize their profits. An adaptation of the strategies of the different actors could be interesting
depending on the arrival and departure dynamics of secondary users.
Among the salient results, we obtained experimentally in the case of primary operators' strategies: (a) that a primary
operator without QoS constraints can then only receive flows from up to 111 secondary operators and (b) that a primary
operator with QoS constraints can then only receive flows from up to 80 secondary operators. Beyond these values, the
profit of the primary operator remains constant.
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[8] Shweta Pandit, Ghanshyam Singh « Spectrum Sharing in Cognitive Radio Networks - Medium Access Control
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mobile cognitive radio network architecture." Telecommunication Systems 59.1 (2015): 63-75.
[14] Dusit Niyato, Ekram Hossain : « Competitive Pricing for Spectrum Sharing in Cognitive Radio Networks:
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[15] Ekram Hossain, Dusit Niyato, Zhu Han: « Dynamic Spectrum Access and Management in Cognitive Radio
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IPASJ International Journal of Information Tecnology (IIJIT)

Web Site: http://www.ipasj.org/IIJIT/IIJIT.htm

Dynamic spectrum access game in 5G cognitive

Volume 9, Issue 3, March 2021 Page 1

SUMMARY OF THE KEY NOTATIONS AND DEFINITIONS

V Set of primary operators (POs)

Volume 9, Issue 3, March 2021 Page 2

Traffic of secondary operator i to be sent

Fig. 1: Access scenario to PO spectrum by SO

Volume 9, Issue 3, March 2021 Page 3

1) Competitive game between primary operators (POs)

Fig. 2: Distributive model of flow through the primary channels [20]

Two situations are being presented here :

Here, we do not consider the characteristic of primary channel.

Volume 9, Issue 3, March 2021 Page 4

is the POl income and the cost function of the shared

Game between primary operators Comment

2) Competitive game between secondary operators (SOs)

with is the target Bit Error Rate.

Volume 9, Issue 3, March 2021 Page 5

Et is the total amount of energy available for each node,

The weights coefficients is given by:

is fixed by the SOi

Volume 9, Issue 3, March 2021 Page 6

Fig. 3: Neural network for predicting channel performance indicators

Game between secondary operators Comment

3) Existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium

The SOi objective function on channel l (9) is continuous and concave in .

Volume 9, Issue 3, March 2021 Page 7

Knowing that , we have:

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1)Case of primary operators with no transmission quality constraints

Replacing by the expression (6), we have:

Deriving this function with respect to , we obtain:

Replacing by its expression (17), we have:

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Knowing that we have:

2)Case of primary operators facing transmission quality constraints

Replacing by (6), we have:

And by deriving this expression with respect to , we obtain:

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We show that the equation admits a unique solution .

The optimal total flow of SOs is then given by:

It is sufficient to replace by its value found by solving equation (21).

1) Secondary Operator strategy

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unconstrained and constrained POs respectively.

Calculating the limit of when , we obtain:

2) Strategies of primary operators

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A primary operator can then only receive flows of up to 111 SOs.

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3) Profit of primary operator

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