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Case study of the use of API 581 on HK and HP material furnace tubes

Article  in  Journal of Pressure Vessel Technology, Transactions of the ASME · February 2005

DOI: 10.1115/1.1845475

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 Conference version of paper published in
Transactions of the ASME. Journal of Pressure Vessel Technology, 127(1), P 49-54, Feb. 2005
doi:10.1115/1.1845475

CASE STUDY OF THE USE OF API 581 ON HK AND HP MATERIAL FURNACE TUBES

Soudabeh.A.Noori
Professor John Price,
Mechanical Engineering, Monash University, PO Box 197, Caulfield East, Victoria, 3145
john.price@eng.monash.edu.au.

In the 1990s it became apparent that the lack of

1 ABSTRACT
Risk-based inspection guidelines have been created
by several technical societies, most notably the ASME and
API. The intention of API Risk Based Inspection (“RBI”)
is to be a useable and understandable tool at a plant
inspection level by simplification of complex models.
The API Base Resource Document numbered API 581
identifies RBI as an integrated risk management tool,
which provides a methodology for determining the
optimum combination of inspection methods and
frequencies. This study intends to show how API 581
assesses risk and determines inspection intervals of
furnaces tubes. The paper also explains the difficulties of
applying API 581 to furnace tubes of gas generation plant.
Key words- Risk based inspection, RBI, furnace tubes, API 581.
2 INTRODUCTION
Inspection to detect hidden failures has been an
important activity in industry for more than 100 years.
The traditional view of inspection is that it should reduce
the probability of failure of the components being
inspected. Design codes and standards in this area are
written to deal with structural integrity but they were not
as helpful for managing inspections.
uncomplicated and suitable quantitative guidance for
determining risk was a major problem for any pressure
system user trying to determine the priorities of an
inspection program. Guidance on inspection programming
had to be practical and had to take account of damage
mechanism, inspection techniques, inspection
effectiveness, rate of damage progression, and other
technical factors. In addition an approach to considering
the consequences of a failure had to be developed.
The American Petroleum Institute (API) initiated the
Risk Based Inspection (“RBI”) Project in May 1993. The
intention of API RBI is to be a useable and understandable
tool at a plant inspection level by simplification of
complex models using a practical procedure standardized
for petrochemical plants. The RBI analysis is an attempt
to analyse risk and inspection effectiveness qualitatively
and quantitatively and looks at the factors required to
develop an inspection plan including both the likelihood
and consequence of failure. The technical modules in API
581 the resource document for RBI include thinning,
stress corrosion cracking, high temperature hydrogen
attack, mechanical fatigue (piping only), long- term creep,
short-term over heating, brittle fracture, equipment linings
and external damage.
This paper is an exploration of the difficulties with
applying API RBI to furnace tubes of gas generation
plant. This study is not intended to be definitive, but to
test the various assumptions in the RBI analysis.

Risk in the formal definition is the product of
consequence and frequency. The failure of pressure
equipment can have several undesirable consequences
such as fires, toxic releases, major environmental damage
and business interruption losses. Given this it should be
the intention that not only the frequency of failure but also
the consequence of failures should be reduced by
inspection/maintenance activities.
In this study we are examining some typical reformer
tubes. Reformer tubes are generally made from cast creep
resistant austenitic steel HK grade (25 Cr, 20 Ni, 0.4 C) or
HP grade (26 Cr, 35 Ni, 0.4 C). Although the furnace
tubes are usually designed for a normal life of 100,000 h
(11.4 years), their actual service life, however, varies from
30,000 to 180,000 h, which is 5 to 20 years depending on
the service conditions and the quality of materials.[1]

1
 Table 1
Process and Design Data of HK and HP Furnace Tubes

Part name Pipe pos1/3 Return bend180 Pos12/13

Material HK40 HP
Wall Thickness mm 14 15
Design Pressure MPa 1.73 1.68
Inside Diameter mm 110 110
Design Temperature ºC 925 1015
Actual Tube Metal Temperature ºC 905 905
Allow Strength MPa 13.4*0.8(T44) 9.8*0.8(T64)
Actual Tube Stress MPa 5.49 5.17
P in MPa 1.24 1.24

P out MPa 1.17 1.17

T in ºC 557 557

T out ºC 860 860

Likelihood analysis starts with calculating tube

3 SEMI_QUANTITATIVE RBI ANALYSIS
FURNACE TUBES
Semi-Quantitative RBI analysis here is done using the
organized methodology developed by API as outlined in
the API Base Resource Document API 581. API RBI
Appendix J considers the furnace tubes failures
because of creep or over-heating. Materials data provided
in API RBI Appendix J are ferritic steel (carbon steel and
low alloy steels up to 12 Cr) and austenitic stainless steel
(Types 304, 316, 321 and 347).
In this case study reducing gas furnaces tubes have
designed based on API 530 procedures but the tubes are
made of materials which are not considered in API 581,
namely HK40 and HP. Process and design data are shown
on Table 1.
3.1 Likelihood analysis
Likelihood Analysis is the result of a number of
factors but in Semi-Quantitative RBI only the technical
module sub-factor (“TMSF”) is used to determine the
probability of failure. The TMSF identifies damage
mechanisms and equipment age in current service to
estimate damage rate. “The technical module sub-factors
can range as high as 1,000 or more, while the other sub-
factors are relatively small (< 10)”.[2]
The key to understanding TMSF is found in
paragraph 9.4.3 of API 581. Here it becomes clear that if
TMSF is less than 10 then there is very little damage
going on. Over 10 and the damage rate becomes more
significant and there are increasing demands on
inspections and other preventative measures (see Tables 9-
15 to 9-17). With TMSF above 500 there is a concern that
life time may have been exhausted.
current diameter and determining tube elastic temperature
limit and elastic stress limit. If actual tube metal
temperature (“TMT”) is less than elastic temperature limit
or the actual tube stress, which calculated by considering
operating pressure and tube diameter is less than the
elastic stress limit then, long- term creep is not a concern
Long- term creep is not a concern if the following
conditions are met
TMT < T elas and S < S elas
The actual tube metal temperature, which was
determined by direct measuring is TMT=905ºC. API 581
defines elastic metal temperature limit or critical tube
metal temperature as “a Temperature at which a tube
would have 100,000 hr design life using minimum rupture
strength curve per API 530”.[2] Elastic temperature limits
for some materials are provided on table J-4 API 581.
Since the materials we are studying are not in API
581, the T elas data of identified materials from table J-4
(API RBI Appendix J) were plotted on Larson-Miller
curves in API 530 to compare and predict the elastic metal
temperature for HP and HK40. (HK40 does appear in API
530 but HP is not mentioned.) It is noticed that Larson-
Miller curves show this temperature as a point at which
elastic allowable stress line and rupture allowable stress
line meet each other.
“The elastic allowable stress is two thirds the yield
strength at temperature for ferritic steels and 90 percent of
the yield strength at temperature for austenitic steels.”[3]
For HK the Larson –Miller curves give the elastic
allowable stress greater than 100 MPa. As a

2
 Table 2
Larson –Miller Parameter and Long-Term Failure Probability

Larson –Miller Parameter HK HP

lm 44.16 57
LM delta 0.8 0.3

LM avg 46.02481-1.88469lnS 65.05956-2.17933lnS

Long- Term Creep Analysis HK HP

FF LT (Failure Factor) >0 0

TMSF LT (Technical Module Sub-Factor) ~0.2485 ~0.2485

result, by considering the Larson-Miller curve of HK and
HP, it was established that elastic metal temperature limit
could be around 600 ºC. Hence the determination of long-
term creep is necessary because T elas is less than TMT.
“The elastic limit (proportional limit) is the greatest
load a material can withstand and still spring back to its
original shape when the load is removed.”[4] Table J-5
API 581 contains the elastic stress limit for creep
consideration for specified materials. This table does not
include the tube materials of this case study and the elastic
stress limit for HK and HP materials was calculated by
reference to data published (in advertising literature) by
the manufacturers. Elastic stress limit was estimated to be
4 to 6 MPa at the design temperature limit. Table 1 shows
that tube actual stress could be more than elastic stress
limit. From this it is evident that long-term creep should
be considered for furnace tubes.
3.1.1 Determination of Long Term Creep
Failure Probability
530. Here LM delta is calculated by using mean and
minimum Larson-Miller curves in API 530 and also the
manufacture’s data sheet. To calculate Mean Larson-
Miller parameter for HP and HK Microsoft Excel ‘Least-
Square Regression method’ is used. The results for HK
and HP were approximately same. Analysis of this data
illustrates that HP and HK have TMSF less than one for
different stresses.
API 581 introduces credits based on inspection
effectiveness to adjust TMSF LT . By considering,
inspection category of ‘usually effective’ which is defined
as “Visual inspection, UT thickness measurements of all
tubes” and N (number of inspections) equal to 1, TMSF is
adjusted for HP and HK and is about 0.2485. Results of
long- term creep analysis are shown on Table 2 as below.
3.1.2 Determination of short -term failure
probability

API 581 states that short-term failure is a result of

The equations below from API 581 Appendix J are
unpredicted conditions, such as mistakes in operation or
used for calculating long- term technical module sub-
human error and it is difficult to assess quantitatively.
factor.
Probability of short-term failure, accordingly TMSF ST is
lm =(TMT+460)*(Log t i +C)/1000 (1) calculated by considering time of exposure to over-heating
0.6723 X 3 0.2854 X 2 0.5905 X 0.3001
and excess tube metal temperature. To calculate TMSF ST
FF LT = min (1,10 ) (2)
API 581 introduces formulas as cited below:
X = (LM avg -lm)/LM delta (3)
13 FF T 5% =35.5ln(1029/t oh ) (6)
TMSF LT =0.55e (4)
0.0422 ( Toh T5% )
TMSF adjusted = TMSF LT *Inspection effectiveness FF ST =min (0.05e - , 1) (7)
13 FF
reduction factor (5) TMSF ST =0.55e (8)
T 5% = “The over-heating temperature, T 5%
lm is defined by API 581 as Larson-Miller parameter
in current operational condition. Equation (1) was used to corresponds to values of T oh that result in a 5%
calculate lm for HP and HK, at the current operating
probability of failure in the LM curves.”[2]
conditions. LM delta is defined as average difference
T oh = over-heating temperature
between mean and minimum Larson-Miller curves in API
t oh =Time exposure to over-heating

3
 API 581 states that the temperature factor can be up Table 3
to 149ºC more than design tube metal temperature for 10- Short term over heating Failure Factor and TMSF ST
1000 hours and it depends on plant history of over- without considering online monitoring
heating, heavy coking, operation or burner control
problems. Table 2 shows failure factor and TMSF ST for Over- Over- heating FF ST TMSF ST
over-heating at 100, 50 and 10ºC for one day, one week heating
Temperature C
and one month without considering online monitoring. For Period
overheating around 10ºC for one month the TMSF ST is One day 100 17 Very high
50 0.4 0.82
more than 10. By using on-line monitoring method 10 0.019 0.56
consisting of daily visual and burner adjustment by
One week 100 330 Very high
operators, TMSF ST will be reduced to 0.24. 50 7.40 906
10 0.35 0.78
In this study, there was not any organized historical One 100 2923 -
data to provide information on plant over-heating month
problems or unpredicted conditions. It is assumed 50 65 Very high
overheating up to 40ºC for 20-30 hours might be happen 10 3.14 12
by operating condition or human error. Short-term
technical module sub-factor (TMSF ST ), in this range is
less or equal to 1. API 581 states that ‘On-line To calculate release rate, initially it is identified that
release occurs in gas form. Gas flows through an orifice at
Monitoring Factor’ should be used to adjust TMSF ST . sonic or subsonic velocity. Equation (9) is used to find out
Table J-9 in Appendix J is used to calculate ‘On-line the nature of gas flow. The result from equation (9) shows
Monitoring Factor’. If the on-line monitoring method is P trans =0.17 MPa. As process data shows upstream
daily visual and burner adjustment by operation, TMSF ST pressure is equal to 1.24 MPa, which is greater than
is reduced to 0.02. P trans , so gas discharge at sonic velocity.
3.2 Consequence Analysis
k
Having examined likelihood of failure as represented k 1 k 1
by the TMSF and its effects, the other half of risk analysis P trans =P a ( ) (9)
is consequence analysis. Consequence analysis starts with 2
determination of representative fluid and its properties, Release rate is calculated for each hole size by using
calculation of possible release rate, identification release equation (10)
type and phase after release. Finally, release mass is
1
determined for each of the hole sizes to calculate k 1 2
flammable and toxic consequence area. KM g c 2 k 1
W g (sonic) = C d AP
Consequence analysis of furnace tube does not
RT 144 K 1
considered vapour cloud explosion (“VCE”), fireball or
flash fire outcomes because of firebox as a source of
ignition and approval of continuous model for furnaces
API 581 models all releases as an immediate or
release, which decrease the possibility of cloud of vapour continuous form and has established a simplified method
over 10000 lb.
for modeling release by identifying hole size and amount
of release in 3 minutes. In this study amount of release in
At first, it should be noted that, it is difficult to find
3 minuets was calculated to confirm the type of release
out all necessary data of a mixture for RBI analysis.
and it was found to be less than 10,000 lb in 3 minutes.
Reducing gas is not a pure material. So it is recommended This supports Appendix J the release type for furnace
by API 581 to choose one material base on material’s tubes is in continuous form. We have calculated release
properties in mixture. API 581 recommends selecting a
rates and amount of release in 3 minutes for each hole size
representative fluid with a lower normal boiling point
for Hydrogen are shown on Table 5.
(“NBP”) than the fluid being considered. In this case, the
hydrogen has the highest percentage in reducing gas, with
lowest NBP in this mixture, so after elimination of inert
materials as an alternative for modeling. The
representative fluid here is modeled as hydrogen
representative fluid properties are shown on Table 4.

4
 Table 4
Reducing Gas Composition and Properties for Radiant and Convection Section

Reducing gas VOL% MW **AIT **NBP C Density kg/m³ *C p *K

Composition C
H2 52.37 2 400 -252 71 kg/m³ 1.64E+01 1.14E+00

CH 4 24.03 16 595 59.4 1.81 1.43E+01 1.16E+00

CO 2 3.33 44.01 n/a -78.5 1.954 -7.38E-01 2.71E-01

CO 9.39 28 620 -191.6 0.961 2.61E-01 -1.51E-01
H 2O 1.53 18 n/a 100 997.95 1.95E-01 -1.09E-02
N2 9.24 28.02 n/a 195.7 1.16 1.69E-01 -9.27E-01
H 2S 25 ppmv 34.08 260 -59.4 61.993 - -

**Property mix 11.8533 410.67 -118.8 C 1.62 kg/m³ 3.06E+01 2.22E+00

2 3
*C p =A+BT+CT +DT , K=C p /C p -R, R=1.987BTU/(lb mole)( F)

**Property mix = xi * Property i , AIT = auto ignition temperature, NBP =normal boiling point

Finally, to determine release, the inventory category
is found from Table B-3 appendix B API 581. The
inventory category is B, so 5,000 lb as an inventory is
used to calculate consequence area. In addition to
inventory data the analyst should be notice to
representative fluid auto ignition temperature to calculate
the consequence area of flammable and toxic
consequence. In this case the release is in continuous form
and auto ignition temperature of Hydrogen is 400ºC. API
581 states that auto-ignition is not likely if process
temperature is less than auto-ignition temperature plus
27 C . From the process data, it is found that in this case
auto-ignition is likely.
Considering toxic consequences in this case, it was
necessary to consider that Hydrogen Sulphide is very
toxic by inhalation and may cause damaging effects to the
nervous system. Reducing gas includes 25 ppmv H2S.
The exposure limit value for H2S is identified from the
Material Safety Data Sheet (“MSDS”) to be 10 ppm.
From this it is found that Hydrogen Sulphide may cause
toxic effects after release. Release rate and duration was
used to determine consequence area for this toxic gas. The
results of consequence analysis are shown in Table 7.
Table 5
Release Rates for Each Hole Size for Hydrogen

Prior to calculating the consequence area, release rate Hydrogen

should be adjusted for mitigation, detection and isolation *C d =0.85
systems, which may reduce consequence area. In this case Amount of gas Time to
plant detection systems is designed to detect release by W release in 3 Deinventory
changes in operating in the system and also shutdown Hole lbs/sec minutes (min)
systems intended to be activated without operator 1 inch 0.84 151.2 99.15
involvement. The adjusted release rate is introduced as 4 inch 13.44 2419.2 6.19
X correct in table 6. API 581 gives adjusted consequence Rupture 30.25 5445 2.75
area for mitigation system, which in this case, is assumed *C d = Discharge coefficient
to be firewater deluge system and monitors, 20% less than
calculated values. Adjusted consequence area is showed
as A correct in table 6. An event tree is used to determine
the probability of out comes for flammable consequence.
By considering the event tree and probabilities from API
581, it is found that probability of jet fire is 0.18.

5
 Table 6
Total release mass and consequence area for each hole size

2
X= total release rate or mass, A= area ft Hydrogen
Continuous release Auto ignition likely
Area of Equipment A*=1146X a Area of Fatalities A=3072X a
X=0.84 X correct =0.21 A=240.66 A correct =48.13 X=0.84 X correct =0.21 A=645.12 A correct =129.02
X=13.44 A=3850.56 X=15.5 A=10321
X=30.25 X correct =3.36 A=8666.62 A correct =770.11 X=35.25 X correct =3.36 A=23232 A correct =2064.36
X correct =7.56 A correct =1733.3 X correct =7.56 A correct =4646.4
Probabilities of outcome Processed above AIT
Ignition Jet fire Flash fire VCE
0.9 0.9 Negligible Negligible

Table 7
Consequence Analysis for Each hole Size

Consequence analysis for Each Hole Size

Hole size 1 in 4 in Rupture

Generic failure frequency Long term creep 4.62 10
6
1.32 10
6
6.60 10
7

Fraction contribution for each hole size 0.7 0.2 0.1

Flammable Consequence (Equipment) 55.58 891.58 2006.07
Flammable Consequence (Equipment)For each hole Size 38.90 178.31 200.60
Flammable Consequence (Fatalities) 148.92 2390.01 5377.53
Flammable Consequence (Fatalities) For each hole Size 104.24 478.00 537.75
Toxic consequence ~7000 ~100000 -
Toxic consequence For each hole Size ~4900 ~20000 -
Sum of the failure Frequencies 6 10
6
6 10
6
6 10
6

Flammable consequence area (equipment) 417.82 417.82 417.82

Flammable consequence area (fatalities) 1119.99 1119.99 1119.99
Toxic consequence area 24900 24900 24900

Table 9
Summary of RBI Results

Semi-Quantitative Results (Appendix B) HK HP

FF LT >0 0

TMSF LT ~0.2485 ~0.2485

TMSF ST ~0.02 ~0.02

Flammable Consequence category (Equipment)
Flammable consequence Category (Fatalities)
Toxic consequence category
Likelihood category
Simple Qualitative Results (Appendix A)
Overall Consequence category
Likelihood category
C C
D D
E E
1 1
D D
2 2

6
 Table 8
Inspection Methods and Intervals for Furnace Tubes based on TMSF
Inspection Intervals
3.2.1.1.1 Inspection
20 Years
10 Years
5 Years
4 RISK CALCULATION
API 581 provides a semi-quantitative method of
assessing the risk for each component. This analysis uses
a matrix with Frequency on the vertical axis (listed in
categories 1 to 5 with 5 the highest frequency event) and
consequences on the horizontal axis (listed as A to E with
E having the highest consequences. Parts of the matrix is
indicated to have a high, medium high, medium and low
risk, which is shown by the letters H, MH, M, L on risk
matrix. This matrix is a reinterpretation of the Farmer
curve first published as a risk criterion in 1967 [9].
The risk matrix for this case for four different types of
consequences is shown on Figure 1. The result of this
analysis is not really discussed in enough detail in API
581 though the result has more than just a comparative
importance between different parts of the same plant.
Clearly equipment operating in the H or high risk area
could potentially be dangerous. If we look at the Major
Hazard Regulations for Victoria Guidance Note 19[10]
also gives a similar graph in Appendix 1. Here however
the upper reaches of the graph are identified as not being
acceptable “societal risks” in the state of Victoria.
Comparison of the API 581 and the Victorian criteria
(which are based on UK criteria) has not yet been done.
The results of the work based on all clauses of API
581 are also shown on Table 9. The simplified method of
Appendix A only is also shown.
5 INSPECTION INTERVALS
To plan inspection intervals API 581 recommends
inspections intervals for furnace tubes based on TMSF
less or greater than 10. “If the current TMSF is less than
10, increment ti (operating hours) by 10000 (-1 year) until
a TMSF of 10 is reached. The number of increments is the
time to the next inspection, T insp .”[2] In this case TMSF
is less than ten by increasing operating hours the TMSF
was not changed. Considering API RBI Table 9-16 the
inspection plan is shown on Table 8.
3.2.1.1.2 Nature of inspection
Highly Effective
Usually Effective
Fairly Effective
6 DISCUSSION
6.1 How simplified is the method?
API 581 claims to be a simplified method for Furnace
RBI analysis. The document is very useful but has some
gaps.
Many materials are modeled in API 581 but
some are missing
A predefined set of hole sizes is used for the
likelihood analysis
A consequence model of flammable, toxic,
environmental, and business interruption events
is included. This is very helpful for such
modelling is not easily available in open
literature. The consequence model includes:
o A simple method for modeling the
release
o An approach for modeling releases of
mixtures
o A simple procedure to determine the
mass of fluid that is released in the
event
o A method for determining the area that
is effected by each release type
o Standardised event trees are used
o Developing a simplified methodology
for assessing the effectiveness of
various types of mitigation systems
o Providing simple guideline to calculate
the Inventory
Using risk matrix which considers both
consequence and likelihood to assign risk
Some materials such as HP and HK40 have used to
manufacture furnace tubes are not modelled in API 581. A
number of activities such as searching the literature, using
manufacturer’s data were used in this paper to generate
the necessary data. It is noticeable that RBI analysis in
this way is time-consuming method and the data may not
be accurate.
The process considered contains H2S and hydrogen at
an operating temperature higher than 200°C. API 581
states that general thinning mechanism H2S/H2 for high
temperature should be considered to find out the effect on
wall thickness and accordingly on actual stress.
7
Likelihood

5
MH MH MH H H
4
(I) Flammable Consequence (equipment)
M M MH MH H (II) Flammable Consequence (facilities)
3 (III) Toxic Consequence category
(IV) Qualitative RBI Result
L L M MH H
2 M
L L (IV) M MH
1 M M MH
L L (I) (II) (III)

A B C D E
Consequence Category

Figure 1 –Semi-Quantitative and Qualitative Risk Matrix for

HK and HP tubes
This calculation actually turns out to be quite
complicated because it has to be repeated several times
during life. A computer program is available but we have
not included these calculations in the current paper.
6.2 Inspections
Risk in API 581 is used to recommend inspection
frequency based on both the consequences and likelihood
of failure. API RBI introduces inspection intervals based
on TMSF or likelihood analysis. The main factor in
finding TMSF is mean Larson-Miller parameter, which
cannot be accurately determined by using manufacturer’s
data.
In the formulas for calculating TMSF for long term
creep the only factor which changes during time is
‘operating hours’ which is used for finding time to next
inspection. In the case studied in this paper the operating
hours up to 100 years was calculated but the TMSF was
approximately constant at less than 1. As a result for
furnace tubes with medium risk highly effective
inspection is recommended only at 20 years. This is a
long period of time and would be attractive to operators.
However the question remains what exactly is being
proposed.
The highly effective inspection proposed in API 581
is defined as UT thickness measurements of all tubes, and
strapping at UT measurement locations and FMR at
various locations.
Questions concerning these inspection regimes
immediately present themselves.
UT thickness measurements are not normally a
measure of creep damage, so the question of
what is being tested for has to be raised.
Strapping is not described in the standard, but if
it means applying mechanical straps; the purpose
and long- term survival of such straps is not
clear.
“FMR” is not defined in API 581. “FMR” is used
in a paper by Valbuena et al.[5] to mean Field
Metallographic Replication. This is a method of
detecting creep damage but in one of the authors
(JP) experience it is also highly unreliable unless
used frequently, say at one year interval and also
only if a sample of original, non-creep affected
material is available.
The inspections proposed do not include
diameter measurement, oxide measurement or
crack measurement each of which could be
decisive in detecting creep problems.
Once this detail is considered it is not clear how the
inspection regimes are an effective response to the
different risk categories, especially those in the High or H
area. Clearly other responses are required, such as
operational or process changes, if high risk items were
identified. This would certainly be the implication of the
Victorian Major Hazard Facility Regulations.

8
 7 CONCLUSIONS 9 NOTATION
We have applied API 581 to a furnace tube example. 2
A = cross-section area (in )
The furnace tubes considered were not listed in the code AIT = auto ignition temperature
and API 581 was quite difficult to apply. In the case C= Larson-Miller constant
studied, the main result is that TMSF is less than 10 for a
very long period so that the only inspections required were C d =discharge coefficient (for gas C d = 0.85 to l)
“Highly Effective” inspections every 20 years. Since the FF= Failure factor
creep life calculations are generally done for 20 years g c = Conversion factor from lb f to lb m =32.2 lb m -ft/
operation this means that even these moderately high risk 2
tubes may never be inspected. lb f -sec
K = Cp/Cv,= usually 1.4 for air
In practice this inspection schedule seems very optimistic, LMP= Larson-Miller parameter
20 years is a long time not to inspect a furnace operating Lm = Larson Miller Parameter at the current operating
in the creep range. The resulting inspections proposed are conditions
not adequately defined so that we may not be confident
LM delta = Average difference between mean and
that we are conducting “Highly Effective” inspections.
minimum Larson-Miller curves in API 530
LM avg = Mean Larson-Miller parameter
8 REFERENCES
M = MW=molecular weight (lb/lbmol)
1. Ashok Kumar Ray, S.K.S., Yogendra Nath NBP =normal boiling point
Tiwari, Jagannathan Swaminathan, Gautam Das,
P trans = transition pressure (psia)
Satyabrata Chaudhuri, Raghubir Singh, Analysis
of failed reformer tubes. Engineering Failure P = upstream pressure (psia)
Analysis, 2003. 10: p. 351-362. Pa = atmospheric pressure (psia),
2. American Petroleum Institute, Risk-Based R = gas constant (10.73 ft3-psia/lb-molºR)
Inspection, Base Resource Document, API 581, T = upstream temperature (ºR)
API Publishing Services, Washington, May TMT = tube metal temperature
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