Edren L.

Mayo
JD 1A

CHI MING CHOI vs COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI

G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 2017
266 SCRA 324
TORRES, JR., J.:

FACTS:

On May 22, 1988, petitioner Chi Ming Tsoi and private respondent
Gina Lao were married at the Manila Cathedral. Gina expected to make
love or to have sexual intercourse with her husband because they were
newlyweds, but the husband just went to bed, slept on one side thereof,
then turned his back and went to sleep. In line with this, no sexual
intercourse happened on the following nights they slept together. From May
22, 1988 until March 15, 1989, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse
between them even though they slept together in the same room and on
the same bed. Meanwhile, Chi Ming Tsoi admitted that no sexual
intercourse occurred between them because according to him every time
he wanted to have sexual contact Gina, she always avoided him and
whenever he caressed her private parts she always removed his hands.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examination
to a urologist in Chinese General Hospital in 1989. The result of the
physical examination of Gina was disclosed, while the result and medicine
prescribed to her husband were kept confidential. Gina claims that the
reason why Chi Ming Tsoi married her is to maintain his residency status
here in the country. Gina does not want to reconcile with Chi Ming Tsoi
and want their marriage declared void on the ground of psychological
incapacity. On the other hand, Chi Ming Tsoi does not want to have their
marriage annulled because he loves her very much, he has no defect on
his part and is physically and psychologically capable and since their
relationship is still young, their differences can still be reconciled.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the refusal of Chi Ming Tsoi to have sexual
intercourse with his wife constitutes psychological incapacity.
HELD:
Yes. If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to
perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is
senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to
psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted
refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged
refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is
considered a sign of psychological incapacity.
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family
Code is “To procreate children based on the universal principle that
procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of
marriage.” Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the
integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless
and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital
obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the
parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and
unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied
judgment of respondent appellate court. In view of the foregoing premises,
the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is
hereby affirmed in all respects and the petition is hereby denied for lack of
merit.
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
CASE DIGEST
RODOLFO S. DE JESUS vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT G.R. No. 109023
Decided on: August 12, 1998
Ponente: PURISIMA, J.,

FACTS: Petitioners are employees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA).
Prior to July 1, 1989, they were receiving honoraria as designated members of the
LWUA Board Secretariat and the Pre-Qualification, Bids and Awards Committee.
Republic Act No. 6758 entitled ―An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and
Position Classification System in the Government and For Other Purposes, took effect.
Section 12 of said law provides for the consolidation of allowances and additional
compensation into standardized salary rates. Certain additional compensations,
however, were exempted from consolidation. Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) issued Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 (DBM-CCC No. 10),
discontinuing without qualification effective November 1, 1989, all allowances and fringe
benefits granted on top of basic salary. Pursuant to the aforesaid Law and Circular,
respondent Leonardo Jamoralin, as corporate auditor, disallowed on post audit, the
payment of honoraria to the herein petitioners. Petitioners appealed to the COA,
questioning the validity and enforceability of DBM-CCC No. 10 but were denied. Hence
the instant petition.
CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER
: DBM-CCC No. 10 is inconsistent with the provisions of Rep. Act 6758 (the law it is
supposed to implement) and, therefore, void. And it is without force and effect because
it was not published in the Official Gazette.
CONTENTION OF THE RESPONDENT
: DBM-CCC No. 10 need not be published for it is merely an interpretative regulation of
a law already published.
ISSUE
: Whether or not DBM-CCC No. 10 is legally effective despite its lack of publication in
the Official Gazette.
RULING
: No. Following the doctrine enunciated in Tanada, publication in the Official Gazette or
in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines is required since DBM-CCC No.
10 is in the nature of an administrative circular the purpose of which is to enforce or
implement an existing law. Stated differently, to be effective and enforceable, DBM-
CCC No. 10 must go through the requisite publication in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.
Philippine Veterans Bank Employees Union vs. Vega G.R. No. 105364
Decided on: June 28, 2001
Ponente: KAPUNAN, J.:

FACTS:
In 1985, Central Bank of the Philippines filed a petition for assistance in the
liquidation of the Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB). Thereafter, the PVB employees
union, herein petitioner, filed claim for accrued and unpaid employee wages and
benefits. On January 2, 1992, RA 7169 (An Act to Rehabilitate the PVB) which was
signed into law by Pres. Corazon Aquino and which was published in the Official
Gazette on February 24, 1992. Thereafter, petitioners filed with the labor tribunals their
residual claims for benefits and for reinstatement upon reopening of the bank. In May
1992, Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing the PVB to reopen despite
the late mandate for rehabilitation and reopening, respondent Judge Vega continued
with the liquidation proceedings of the bank alleging further that RA 7169 became
effective only on March 10, 1992 or 15 days after its publication in the Official Gazette
on February 24, 1992.
CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER
: With the passage of R.A. 7169, the liquidation court became functus officio, and
no longer had the authority to continue with liquidation proceedings.
ISSUE
: Whether or not RA 7169 became effective on January 2, 1992.
RULING
: The Supreme Court upheld that while as a rule laws take effect after 15 days
following completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines, the legislature has the authority to provide for
exceptions as indicated in the clause “unless otherwise provided.” Citing Tanada vs
Tuvera, this clause refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication, which cannot in any event be omitted. The reason is that such omission
would affect due process in so far as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that
are supposed to govern it.
De Roy vs Court of Appeals G.R. No. 80718
Decided on: January 29, 1988
Ponente: CORTES, J.:

FACTS
: The firewall of a burned out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the
tailoring shop occupied by the family of the private respondents resulting in injuries to
private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its
proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do. In the RTC, petitioners were
found guilty of gross negligence. On the last day of the 15 days period to file an appeal,
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was again denied. The Supreme
Court finds that Court of Appeal did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it
denied petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid down in
Habulayas vs Japzon. Counsel for petitioner contends that the said case should not be
applied non-publication in the Official Gazette.
CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER
: The rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to apply to the case at
bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of
the time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated.
CONTENTION OF THE RESPONDENT
: There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official
Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective.
ISSUE
: Whether or not Supreme Court decisions must be published in the Official Gazette
before they can be binding.
RULING
: No. There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decision in the Official
Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is
bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of
the Supreme Court, particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently
reiterated and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions and in such
publications as the SCRA and law journals.
UNCIANO PARAMEDICAL COLLEGE vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 100335
Decided on: April 7, 1993
Ponente: NOCON, J.:

FACTS
: Private respondents Elena Villegas and Ted Magallanes (nursing students), thru their
mothers, filed a petition for injunction and damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction against petitioners Unciano Paramedical College, Inc. They
alleged that they were not admitted for the second semester for organizing a student
body council which was not allowed by the school which was allegedly a violation of the
school regulations. The school argued that under the Alcuaz Doctrine, schools have the
discretion to admit students for the second semester because upon enrolment of a
student in the first semester, the contract was for that semester only. However, a new
doctrine was later on promulgated which abandoned the Alcuaz doctrine which is now
the NON doctrine.
CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER
: Under the Alcuaz Doctrine, schools have the discretion to admit students for the
second semester because upon enrolment of a student in the first semester, the
contract was for that semester only.
CONTENTION OF THE RESPONDENT
: The new doctrine should be applied retroactively.
ISSUE
: Whether or not the new Non doctrine be applied retroactively to the case.
RULING
: No. The new doctrine shall be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties
who relied on the old doctrine and acted on faith thereof. Although said doctrine was
later abandoned in Non, et al. v. Dames II, et al., supra, this case was promulgated
much later, or on May 20, 1990, when the termination of the contract between them had
long become fait accompli. Settled is the rule that when a doctrine of this Court is
overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine is applied prospectively, and
should not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof
Thus, the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was issued by the trial court with
grave abuse of discretion. The ruling in the Non case should not be given a retroactive
effect to cases that arose before its promulgation on May 20, 1990, as in this case,
which was filed on April 16, 1990. If it were otherwise, it would result in oppression to
petitioners and other schools similarly situated who relied on the ruling in the Alcuaz
case, promulgated on May 2, 1988, which recognized the termination of contract theory.
 CONSTI LAW
Mabanag vs Lopez Vito
Facts:
Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were
suspended by senate due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not
allowed to take their seat in the lower House except in the election of the House
Speaker. They argued that some senators and House Reps were not considered in
determining the required ¾ vote (of each house) in order to pass the Resolution
(proposing amendments to the Constitution) – which has been considered as an
enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already entered into the Journals
of the respective House. As a result, the Resolution was passed but it could have been
otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these members of Congress had been counted,
the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the
necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. Petitioners filed or the
prohibition of the furtherance of the said resolution amending the constitution.
Respondents argued that the SC cannot take cognizance of the case because the Court
is bound by the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. Whether or not
the said resolution was duly enacted by Congress.
Held:
As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from
each House and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of
the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the
enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in
either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The SC
found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother
itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It
did not do what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into
the journals behind the enrolled copy in order to determine the correctness of the latter,
and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with
each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the two documents
and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it
would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly
certified copies “shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due
enactment thereof.”
GONZALES vs COMELEC
FACTS:
In June 1967, Republic Act 4913 was passed. This law provided for the
COMELEC to hold a plebiscite for the proposed amendments to the Constitution. It was
provided in the said law that the plebiscite shall be held on the same day that the
general national elections shall be held (November 14, 1967). This was questioned by
Ramon Gonzales and other concerned groups as they argued that this was unlawful as
there would be no proper submission of the proposals to the people who would be more
interested in the issues involved in the general election rather than in the issues
involving the plebiscite.
Gonzales also questioned the validity of the procedure adopted by Congress
when they came up with their proposals to amend the Constitution (RA 4913). In this
regard, the COMELEC and other respondents interposed the defense that said act of
Congress cannot be reviewed by the courts because it is a political question.

ISSUE:

I. Whether or not the act of Congress in proposing amendments is a political question.

II. Whether or not a plebiscite may be held simultaneously with a general election.

HELD:

I. No. The issue is a justiciable question. It must be noted that the power to amend as
well as the power to propose amendments to the Constitution is not included in the
general grant of legislative powers to Congress. Such powers are not constitutionally
granted to Congress. On the contrary, such powers are inherent to the people as
repository of sovereignty in a republican state. That being, when Congress makes
amendments or proposes amendments, it is not actually doing so as Congress; but
rather, it is sitting as a constituent assembly. Such act is not a legislative act. Since it is
not a legislative act, it is reviewable by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has the
final say whether or not such act of the constituent assembly is within constitutional
limitations.

II. Yes. There is no prohibition to the effect that a plebiscite must only be held on a
special election. SC held that there is nothing in this provision of the [1935] Constitution
to indicate that the election therein referred to is a special, not a general election. The
circumstance that the previous amendment to the Constitution had been submitted to
the people for ratification in special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it
best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to
submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections.
Note: **Justice Sanchez and Justice JBL Reyes dissented. “Plebiscite should be
scheduled on a special date so as to facilitate “Fair submission, intelligent consent or
rejection”. They should be able to compare the original proposition with the amended
proposition.
AGLIPAY vs RUIZ
Facts:
Petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition against respondent Director
of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd
International Eucharistic Congress. Petitioner contends that such act is a violation of the
Constitutional provision stating that no public funds shall be appropriated or used in the
benefit of any church, system of religion, etc. This provision is a result of the principle of
the separation of church and state, for the purpose of avoiding the occasion wherein the
state will use the church, or vice versa, as a weapon to further their ends and aims.
Respondent contends that such issuance is in accordance to Act No. 4052, providing
for the appropriation funds to respondent for the production and issuance of postage
stamps as would be advantageous to the government.
Issue:
Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom to religion.
Held:
What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious freedom and not mere
religious toleration. It is however not an inhibition of profound reverence for religion and
is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an
active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And in so far as
it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and
highly appreciated. The phrase in Act No. 4052 “advantageous to the government” does
not authorize violation of the Constitution. The issuance of the stamps was not inspired
by any feeling to favor a particular church or religious denomination. They were not sold
for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. The postage stamps, instead of showing
a Catholic chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the
location of Manila, with the words “Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress.” The
focus of the stamps was not the Eucharistic Congress but the city of Manila, being the
seat of that congress. This was to “to advertise the Philippines and attract more
tourists,” the officials merely took advantage of an event considered of international
importance. Although such issuance and sale may be inseparably linked with the
Roman Catholic Church, any benefit and propaganda incidentally resulting from it was
no the aim or purpose of the Government.