Polytechnic University of the Philippines

Sta. Mesa Manila

The Faux Man of the Masses:

Disproving the Notion of Ramon Magsaysay as the “Best President”

MAGSOMBOL, Janzen Alaine G.

BACR 1-1N
Prof. Aljon Concillado
March 2022
 The Faux Man of the Masses:
Disproving the Notion of Ramon Magsaysay as the “Best President”

In a world where honest and efficient leaders seem obsolete, how can someone be
considered as the best president his own country has ever had? Try Google searching “the best
president in the Philippines” and three notable people will show up: Ferdinand E. Marcos, Sr.,
Rodrigo Duterte, and Ramon Magsaysay. The late dictator Marcos and President Duterte’s
regimes have always been part of several debates because of the controversies manifested while
they were in position. On the other hand, the public discourse regarding Ramon Magsaysay’s
governance has always been sunshine and rainbows as he was known to be the champion of the
masses and the savior of democracy; in the words of Jose Veloso Abueva, the late president’s
governance was “the yardstick by which Filipino presidents should be judged.” 1 Magsaysay's
presidency was commonly referred to as the Philippines' "Golden Years" because of its clean and
corruption-free government. His campaign for fairness and justice, which was represented in his
ideology: "Those who have less in life should have more in law,” was one of the reasons why he
was named as the “man of the masses.” While Ramon Magsaysay did so much for our country,
to the point where he is a human virtue to Filipinos, he still should not be considered as the best
president we Filipinos have ever had. Magsaysay collaborated with the torturous crackdown of
the left-wing, he proposed ingenuine agrarian reform, and most importantly, he was a puppet of
American imperialism.

On Magsaysay’s Successful Counter-Insurgency Operation Against the Huks

Ramon Magsaysay was best-known for successfully ending the communist-led

Hukbalahap movement. Several sources show that Magsaysay led one of the “most effective
anti-guerrilla battles in recent history.” In order to do this, Magsaysay reorganized the Armed
Forces of the Philippines into combat teams and modified the strategies and tactics they have to
implement against the rebellion. In Magsaysay’s own words, "The Huks are fighting an
unorthodox war," therefore they should combat them "in unorthodox ways." 2 Recognizing that
the Huks could not survive without popular support, he sought to gain their trust by giving them
land as long as they joined the government’s side. 3 Eventually, the Huks began to feel the
serious challenge of defeat. On May 17, 1954, Luis Taruc, the leader of the Huks, surrendered
himself after a negotiation facilitated by Ninoy Aquino and Manuel Manahan which followed a
mass surrender from the remaining members of the rebellion.4

Granted all Magsaysay’s efforts in ending the communist rebellion, these sources
however failed to emphasize the role of the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States in
ending the Hukbalahap insurgency in the country. In 1950, Elpidio Quirino appointed
1
Magat, Mario. “Ramon Magsaysay's Continuing Relevance.” INQUIRER.net, March 16, 2013.
https://opinion.inquirer.net/48883/ramon-magsaysays-continuing-relevance.
2
Greenberg, Lawrence M. “Chapter V: Ramon Magsaysay, Edward Landsdale, and the JUSMAG.” Essay. In The
Hukbalahap Insurrection: A Case Study of a Successful Anti-Insurgency Operation in the Philippines, 1946-1955, 87.
Washington, D.C.: Analysis Branch, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2005.
3
Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopedia. "Ramon Magsaysay." Encyclopedia Britannica, August 27, 2021.
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Ramon-Magsaysay.

4
“The Philippines: Surrender of a Communist.” Time. Time Inc., May 24, 1954.
http://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,823404-1,00.html.
Magsaysay to the position of Secretary of National Defense at the request of the head of the Joint
US Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) and the US Ambassador. A week after the
proclamation, Lt. Col. Edward G. Lansdale arrived in the Philippines. Lansdale, who was
seemingly just an American military expert sent to advise Magsaysay as the new Secretary of
National Defense, was in actual fact the country's chief of CIA clandestine and paramilitary
operations.5 With Manuel Roxas and Elpidio Quirino’s failure in ending the resistance of the
Huks, the CIA stepped in to conduct the dirty trick and it was Edward Lansdale’s task to fulfill
the mission. From that moment forward, the CIA subjected the Philippines to an unsettling part
of psychological warfare during the covert war against communism led by the United States.

Accounts supporting Magsaysay praised his warfighting triad in defeating the Huks,
“Find Em, Fight Em, Fool Em” which is a combination of intelligence, combat operations, and
psychological warfare.6 Coincidentally, Lansdale and the CIA believed that insurgencies could
be defeated using the same tricks that were used to sell soap, a strategy dubbed as "psychological
warfare." 7 In a separate account, Lansdale disclosed that many measures against the Huks were
discreetly discussed in Magsaysay's residence in Sampaloc, Manila. He revealed that he and
Magsaysay would hold seminar sessions together to discuss the Huks, the armed forces, their
tactics, and the best method to handle the rebellion. 8 These accounts further prove that
Magsaysay collaborated with Lansdale and enabled the CIA’s torturous crackdown against the
Huks.

As part of the operation in ending the rebellion, Lansdale and his team carefully studied
Philippine folklores, taboos, and myths in hopes of obtaining clues for them to use in their
counter-insurgency operations. Such unconventional search and destroy tactics against the rebels
which made use of Filipinos’ superstitions include the Aswang. Considering the fact that
Filipinos have a superstitious nature, some would conclude that belief in these entities persists to
this day. As a result, the aswang became an ideal target for the CIA to exploit. In his memoir,
Lansdale described how he created a simple yet profound plan on eliminating the rebels.
Knowing that the Huks would frequently attack government forces from the town's surrounding
woodland area, he dispatched a squad to mimic the Aswang legend. The squad kidnapped a
combatant, poking holes in their necks which resembles an aswang bite, draining their blood,
and leaving their body where it could be easily found. The horrifying sight convinced anybody
who saw it, even the Huks, that the horrible act was performed by the dark monsters of Filipino
folklore, causing the rebels to relocate and leave the region.9

5
Blum, William. “Chapter 4. The Philippines 1940s and 1950s.” Essay. In Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA
Interventions since World War II, 41. Monroe, Me.: Common Courage Press, 2012. https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad-
compound/13/130AEF1531746AAD6AC03EF59F91E1A1_Killing_Hope_Blum_William.pdf.

6
Venus Zoleta, and Rod Michael Perez. “6 Reasons Why Ramon Magsaysay Was the Best President Ever.” FilipiKnow,
January 21, 2022. https://filipiknow.net/reasons-why-ramon-magsaysay-was-the-best-president-ever/.

7
Blum, Killing Hope, 41

8
Oliveros, Benjie. “Untold Stories of a CIA Mole: Lansdale Papers Declassified.” Bulatlat, February 4, 2011.
https://www.bulatlat.com/2008/01/12/untold-stories-of-a-cia-mole-lansdale-papers-declassified/2/.

9
Blum, Killing Hope, 41
 Indeed, the Central Intelligence Agency will go to extraordinary lengths to defeat its
adversaries. The CIA is not beyond employing ingenious and often cruel tactics to achieve its
objectives, and Ramon Magsaysay aided them in perpetrating such heinous plans against
peasants whose aim was just effective land reform.

On Magsaysay’s Land Reform Program

Previous economic colonial practices and policies severely affected the land tenancy and
distribution patterns in the country. Given that the Philippines is mainly an agricultural country,
land reform continues to be a national priority. According to a study focusing on Philippine land
reform cycles, the agricultural sector employs 45.2% or over half of all workers. However, the
sector’s output accounts for barely one-fourth of the GDP. The disproportion between
employment and production reveals a significant inefficiency in agricultural production, leading
to the emergence of the armed peasant movement that is pressuring the government to implement
land reform.10 All things considered, Magsaysay incorporated land reform with his strategies in
ending the Hukbalahap insurgency. Ramon Magsaysay, along with his advisor Edward Lansdale,
devised an integrated method with the hopes of ending the insurgency. He founded the Economic
Development Corps (EDCOR) in December 1950 and used this project to gain the Huks’ trust
with the hopes of ameliorating the peasantry's situation to prevent significant peasant unrest,
which he successfully did.11 Through EDCOR, farmers were given ownership of the land on the
condition that they improve the land and reside in it. This program eventually became crucial for
the settlers, as most of them had never had access to such power before. The deal was enough for
applicants to outnumber the available plots in the EDCOR site located in Luzon. Consequently,
by February 22, 1951, Magsaysay established the second EDCOR project and the first site in
Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte in Mindanao.12 EDCOR's success went faster than planned,
exceeded all expectations, and provided Magsaysay with excellent publicity for his future
endeavors. When Ramon Magsaysay was elected for president, he further widened the
beneficiaries of his “Land to the landless program” through NARRA or the National
Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration. Magsaysay’s NARRA program provided land
to civilians, not just the Huks, who were in need.13

With EDCOR and the NARRA, Ramon Magsaysay's image as a "man of the people" and
his "land to the landless" campaign easily acquired popularity when he was elected president.
Despite the number of accounts commending Magsaysay’s successful land reform, these
however failed to recognize the problems associated with his resettlement and land redistribution
projects. One of these problems includes the drastic change in the demographic composition in
Mindanao. The influx of NARRA’s Christian settlers from Luzon and Visayas radically changed
the balance of demographics in Mindanao, with only five of the twenty-five states in the region
being Muslims. From a quantitative perspective, from about over 50% of the population in 1903,

10
Martin, Aurora L. Almeda. “Philippine Land Reform Cycles: Perpetuating U.S. Colonial Policy.” Philippine Studies 47,
no. 2 (1999): 181–205. http://www.jstor.org/stable/42634313.
11
Abaya-Ulindang, Faina. “Land Resettlement Policies in Colonial and Post-Colonial Philippines: Key to Current
Insurgencies and Climate Disasters in Its Southern Mindanao Island.” In BRICS Initiatives for Critical Agrarian Studies
(BICAS), 2015. 4. wwww.iss.nl/bicas.
12
Ibid.
13
Abaya-Ulindang, Faina, and Lloyd Ranises. “Land as Central in the Struggle of Mindanawons (1950’s to the Present): the
Role of Philippine Populist Presidents Magsaysay, Estrada and Duterte, a Comparative Historical Study.” Dissertation, The
Emancipatory Rural Politics Initiative, 2018. https://www.tni.org.
the indigenous peoples and Moros have been reduced to a mere 27% in 1980. In 1912, Moros
made up the majority of landowners in Mindanao and Sulu, but by 1982, they only accounted for
around 18% of overall land ownership.14

Many Muslims and indigenous peoples were forced to the inland and outlying areas of
Mindanao, while newly arrived Christians settled in the rich, fertile, and easily accessible
lowland and coastal areas of the region. In addition to this, despite the project being intended for
the surrendered Huk rebels, an account revealed that most of the beneficiaries of the EDCOR
program in Mindanao were not former rebels, but former military troops along with their
relatives who had been placed there on purpose to act as neutralizers. 15 Thus, nullifying the
program’s objective to give land to the landless. A separate narrative also discussed how the
Magsaysay administration used the resettlement program as a Trojan horse to exploit the natural
resources of Mindanao for economic and national development as well as to incorporate the
Christian culture amongst the Moros.16

The rapid migration of Christians from Luzon and the Visayas into the "land of promise,"
especially in the post-colonial period, transformed not only Mindanao's demography but also the
concept of land ownership. In a book written by Cesar Majul, he briefly discussed how Muslim
lands and properties were commonly held without titles. 17All unregistered lands in Mindanao
were categorized as “public property” or military reservations under postcolonial land
regulations, thus, the government had no trouble in grabbing the land from the Muslims. As a
result, when the Christian settlers arrived in the area, many Muslims lost their lands to their
datus or to these settlers because the majority of them were unfamiliar with paying processing
fees and taxes.18 Majul’s account also explained that it was difficult to persuade Muslims that
government programs were not intended to benefit Christians at the expense of Muslims because
the settlers’ communities tend to have better infrastructures such as roads and schools. To add,
Christian-owned farms also had better livestock and agricultural instruments, and they benefited
from government-funded irrigation projects.19 Hence, resulting in the escalation of tensions
between Muslims and Christians. Land problems and disputes among the Moros and the settlers
had arisen eventually with Magsaysay’s settler program.

The abundant supply of land on the island during the first few years of the settlement
program enabled the Moros, IPs, and the Christian settlers to live harmoniously. However, as
years passed by, the resettling of Christians from Luzon and Visayas to Mindanao eventually
became one of the grounds of their disenchantment as the Moros and the IPs tried to seize their
ancestral territories. With the rising tension between the NARRA settlers and the Moros, land
conflicts often took place between the two communities in the late 1950s. One of which
happened in August 1956 when 264 Muslim families and 163 Christian families almost
developed a bloody encounter because of the unproportioned land distribution. According to a
14
Fernandez, Maria, et. Al., Land: Territory, Domain, and Identity, World Bank, Washington, DC. Retrieved from
https://policycommons.net/artifacts/1273792/land/1859438/ on 27 Feb 2022. CID: 20.500.12592/j74mhh.
15
Ibid.
16
Adriano, Fermin, and Thomas Parks. The Contested Corners of Asia: Subnational Conflict and International Development
Assistance: The Case of Mindanao, Philippines. Asia Foundation, 2013.
17
Majul, Cesar Adib. "The Moro struggle in the Philippines." Third World Quarterly (1988): 900
18
Salazar, Virgemarie A. "The Moro Identity and the Rise of Separatist Movements in Mindanao." Available at SSRN
2672836 (2009).
19
Majul, "The Moro struggle in the Philippines." 900
paper Prof. Abaya-Ulindang presented, a certain Datu Sangke insisted on a claim of the 650-
hectare land where a NARRA settlement was located. Datu Sangke explained that this land was
one of the few remaining places the natives can reside on as the government have already
resettled the Christian settlers on their previous lands like Koronadal and Allah Valley.20

In the following years, disagreements increased and turned into larger disputes among the
Moros. By the 1970s, as the numbers of settlers increased, the land for new settlements
eventually became scarce. Thus, the tension between the Muslim and Christian settlers escalated
even worse as a result of the scarcity of land and resources. These brewing tensions then ignited
into impending native resistance. Secessionist movements in Mindanao started to form,
spearheaded by the Moro National Liberation Front, later by the autonomous Moro Islamic
Liberation Front, then the terrorists Abu Sayyaf during the Martial Law period up to the present.
Eventually, the once defeated communists reformed into a new party, the Communist Party of
the Philippines' New People's Army, because of the dissent taking place in the regions and the
failure of the government to implement genuine agrarian reform.21

Magsaysay was known for his impressive rural development programs and for uplifting
the oppressed. However, if Magsaysay was truly for genuine land reform and helping the people,
how come dissent and land problems still arose despite the programs he founded? Perhaps the
main goal of these programs was only to improve the army and its commander's public image.
They simply gave a brief glance at the agrarian situation. Furthermore, granted Magsaysay’s
efforts to help end the Huks’ longing for land distribution, one must not forget that his settlement
programs displaced the Moro and the indigenous peoples in Mindanao and caused greater
conflicts in the long run.

On Magsaysay Being the “Man of the Masses”

The Filipino people loved Ramon Magsaysay, even referred to him as the “Champion of
the Common Man” because he was, unlike any other politician, humble and levelheaded. His
upfront demeanor, modesty, and genuine concern for his countrymen helped him in developing a
bond with the Filipino. He toured every day over his country, visiting military stations and
civilian towns equally, asking questions, and listening to what his people had to say, to ensure
that the people know what he was striving for. According to Greenberg’s book, before
Magsaysay was even elected president, he would visit 1,100 Barrios and talk for about 3,000
hours of important issues for his countrymen: corruption, negligence, poverty, and land reform. 22
Filipinos also remember Magsaysay for opening the doors of the Malacañang Palace to the
public and referred to it as the “house of the people.” In fact, a source described it as a
“miniature Divisoria” because of the number of people who swarmed inside the lawns of the
palace.23

The people’s president indeed caught the heart of many Filipinos before, during, and
even after Magsaysay’s presidency, however, these accounts showing his pro-Filipino stance
20
Abaya-Ulindang, “Land Resettlement Policies.” 6.
21
Ibid. p. 9-10
22
Greenberg, The Hukbalahap Insurrection, p. 138.
23
Venus Zoleta, and Rod Michael Perez. “6 Reasons Why Ramon Magsaysay Was the Best President Ever.” FilipiKnow,
January 21, 2022. https://filipiknow.net/reasons-why-ramon-magsaysay-was-the-best-president-ever/.
failed to highlight his affiliations with the Central Intelligence Agency and how the Americans
groomed the supposed “Man of the Masses” to be the president of the Philippines. The CIA's
deep operations in the Philippines were part of the US cold war strategy of addressing the global
"communist menace." The Huk movement posed a clear danger to the Philippines' neocolonial
position, the American sphere of influence, and Philippine interests that profited from the current
system.24 Such operations the CIA performed include the dispatch of Lt. Col. Edward Lansdale
to advise and tutor Ramon Magsaysay on the art of psychological warfare, which they
successfully implemented with their anti-Huk strategies in the early 1950s. From William
Blum’s Killing Hope, he revealed that the Economic Development Corps, the settlement
program discussed earlier, was not Magsaysay’s idea alone as it was also a part of Lansdale’s
tactics in luring the Huks.25

Blum’s account revealed a great deal of the CIA’s interference with the Philippines.
Perhaps the most treacherous part of the agency’s intervention took place in 1953, specifically in
the height of the presidential elections. The book described how Lansdale used an American-
style campaign, such as devising the “Magsaysay Is My Guy” slogan, in propelling Magsaysay to
the presidency. In fact, Lansdale himself admitted in helping write the campaign song “Mambo
Magsaysay” which pioneered the use of jingles in campaigns. 26 Furthermore, Blum also revealed
that Lansdale manipulated the U.S. press into dubbing Magsaysay as the "Eisenhower of the
Pacific.” Lansdale played an important role in amplifying Magsaysay’s public image, even he
claimed credit for “inventing Magsaysay.” Along with the U.S.-backed campaigns, Lansdale and
the agency also established and funded the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL)
in 1951. The imperialists built the organization in order to raise campaign funds from the U.S.
and help Magsaysay under the premise of promoting “free and clean elections.” Moreover,
NAMFREL made sure that Magsaysay would win the elections as they developed a national
network of poll watchers to prevent Quirino loyalists from stealing the elections from
Magsaysay.27

Still, amid the presidential race, the CIA further proved that they would go to any length
to ensure that things went their way. Edward Lansdale continued his arsenal of dirty tricks and
performed, conceivably, the most insidious one during the campaign. Several accounts revealed
that the agency drugged President Quirino, Magsaysay’s opponent before he gave his speech so
he would appear incoherent. In another instance, when Magsaysay attempted to give a speech
prepared by a Filipino rather than one written by Americans, Lansdale became enraged and
struck Magsaysay so hard that he was knocked out. As if everything was not enough, Lansdale
and the CIA also smuggled in guns and arsenals that they may use in case Magsaysay loses the
elections. 28

Lansdale deviously orchestrated his candidate's triumph with a million dollars from the
CIA, even admitting that the CIA director offered him $5 million but he declined and indicated
that $1 million was sufficient. Large contributions from firms like Coca-Cola also aided in the
24
Blum, “Killing Hope”, p. 39
25
Ibid. p. 42
26
Tollast, Robert. “Did the CIA Use Pop Music to Help Get President of the Philippines Elected?” The National, 2022.
https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/2022/01/21/did-the-cia-use-pop-music-to-help-elect-president-of-the-philippines/.
27
Cullather, Nick. "America's Boy? Ramon Magsaysay and the Illusion of Influence." Pacific Historical Review 62, no. 3
(1993): 326.
28
Blum, “Killing Hope”, p. 42
success that encouraged continued American intervention. 29 Magsaysay received a record
number of votes, thus, giving Lansdale the moniker "Col. Landslide." Once in office, the CIA
took care of everything for their guy. Several accounts presented that the agency themselves
wrote the presidential speeches of Magsaysay, guided him in foreign policy, and even paid
journalists and editors to make sure the press supported his domestic policies and participation in
the US-led anti-communist war in Southeast Asia, as well as attacks on anti-US newspaper
columnists.30

The CIA planned everything meticulously and comprehensively, even including the loss
of an election to create a positive image of Magsaysay. Everything worked out nicely, and it was
a major PR victory for him because he was now seen as the most honest leader in a country
where ruling parties are known for electoral fraud. He was hailed as the man of the year, a
national hero by the media, and anointed the next President by Time magazine, which featured
him on its cover, thanks entirely to the efforts of the CIA.

Taking everything into consideration, it should be established that Magsaysay was just
like any other politician the Philippines had in the past decades. While Magsaysay is best
recognized for his makamasa appeal and success in crushing the Huk revolt, we should not
forget that he was also a well-known anti-Huk campaigner who aided the Americans in the
torturous crackdown of the revolutionary mass movement. In addition to this, as the Moros and
indigenous peoples seized their ancestral territories, his poorly planned settlement program
divide-conquered the island of Mindanao causing land disputes among the settlers, Moros, and
the indigenous peoples. No one could have predicted it at the time, but it would eventually spiral
into the Moro conflict in the following years. Finally, his unwavering pro-American position and
ties to the CIA added to the prevalence of neocolonialism and U.S. imperialism in the
Philippines, which we now bear. Despite the number of U.S. propaganda, it is crystal clear that
Magsaysay was no different – Magsaysay joined the string of puppet presidents the imperialist
Americans controlled.

Now, the question remains – “Who is the best president the country has ever had?” The
answer is simple, none of them. The hard-to-swallow truth is the Filipinos or any other nation,
will never be able to acquire the greatest leader their country has ever had. As long as the
imperialist, feudal, and bureaucrat capitalist system continues to paralyze the nation, a great
leader is far from reach. With this systemic malaise, the system itself must be changed. This, on
the other hand, is a story for another day. Taking everything into account, it all boils down to one
thing – treating political candidates as heroes and gods do not help democracy. People must stop
putting these political figures on pedestals because just like any other human, they make
mistakes despite all the good they have done. Remember, this mentality of crowning someone as
the Messiah paved the way for a strongman like Rodrigo Duterte to lead the country. To quote
Mao Zedong, “The people, and the people alone, are the motive force in the making of world
history.”

29
“Ramon Magsaysay Award: Established by Two CIA Linked American Organisations in Memory of a CIA Groomed
Philippines President.” OpIndia, August 2, 2019. https://www.opindia.com/2019/08/ramon-magsaysay-award-
established-by-two-cia-linked-american-organisations-in-memory-of-a-cia-groomed-philippines-president/.
30
Blum, “Killing Hope”, p. 42
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———. “Land Resettlement Policies in Colonial and Post Colonial Philippines: Key to Current
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