he 

War of 1812 (18 June 1812 – 17 February 1815) was a conflict fought by the United States of
America and its indigenous allies against the United Kingdom and its allies in British North America,
with limited participation by Spain in Florida. It began when the US declared war on 18 June 1812
and, although peace terms were agreed in the December 1814 Treaty of Ghent, did not officially end
until ratified by Congress on 17 February 1815.[11][12]
Tensions originated in long-standing differences over territorial expansion in North America and
British support for Native American tribes who opposed US colonial settlement in the Northwest
Territory. These escalated in 1807 after the Royal Navy began enforcing tighter restrictions on
American trade with France, exacerbated by the impressment of men claimed as British subjects,
even those with American citizenship certificates.[13] Opinion was split on how to respond, and
although majorities in both the House and Senate voted for war, they divided along strict party lines,
with the Democratic-Republican Party in favour and the Federalist Party against.[d][14] News of British
concessions made in an attempt to avoid war did not reach the US until late July, by which time the
conflict was already underway.
At sea, the far larger Royal Navy imposed an effective blockade on US maritime trade, while
between 1812 to 1814 British regulars and colonial militia defeated a series of American attacks
on Upper Canada.[15] This was balanced by the US winning control of the Northwest Territory with
victories at Lake Erie and the Thames in 1813. The abdication of Napoleon in early 1814 allowed the
British to send additional troops to North America and the Royal Navy to reinforce their blockade,
crippling the American economy.[16] In August 1814, negotiations began in Ghent, with both sides
wanting peace; the British economy had been severely impacted by the trade embargo, while the
Federalists convened the Hartford Convention in December to formalise their opposition to the war.
In August 1814, British troops burned Washington, before American victories
at Baltimore and Plattsburgh in September ended fighting in the north. It continued in
the Southeastern United States, where in late 1813 a civil war had broken out between
a Creek faction supported by Spanish and British traders and those backed by the US. Supported by
American militia under General Andrew Jackson, they won a series of victories, culminating in the
capture of Pensacola in November 1814.[17] In early 1815, Jackson defeated a British attack on New
Orleans, catapulting him to national celebrity and later victory in the 1828 United States presidential
election.[18] News of this success arrived in Washington at the same time as that of the signing of the
Treaty of Ghent, which essentially restored the position to that prevailing before the war. While
Britain insisted this included lands belonging to their Native American allies prior to 1811, Congress
did not recognize them as independent nations and neither side sought to enforce this requirement.

Contents

 1Origin
o 1.1Honour and the "second war of independence"
o 1.2Impressment, trade, and naval actions
o 1.3Canada and the US
o 1.4US policy in the Northwest Territory
o 1.5Internal American political conflict
 2Forces
o 2.1American
o 2.2British
o 2.3Indigenous peoples
 3Declaration of war
 4Course of war
o 4.1Unpreparedness
 o
4.2Great Lakes and Western Territories
 4.2.1Invasions of Upper and Lower Canada, 1812
 4.2.2American Northwest, 1813
 4.2.3Niagara frontier, 1813
 4.2.4St. Lawrence and Lower Canada, 1813
 4.2.5Niagara and Plattsburgh campaigns, 1814
 4.2.6American West, 1813–1815
o 4.3Atlantic theatre
 4.3.1Opening strategies
 4.3.2Single-ship actions
 4.3.3Privateering
 4.3.4Blockade
 4.3.5Freeing and recruiting slaves
 4.3.6Occupation of Maine
 4.3.7Chesapeake campaign
o 4.4Southern theatre
 4.4.1Creek War
 4.4.2Gulf Coast
 5Treaty of Ghent
o 5.1Factors leading to the peace negotiations
o 5.2Negotiations and peace
 6Losses and compensation
 7Long-term consequences
o 7.1Bermuda
o 7.2Canadas
o 7.3Indigenous nations
o 7.4Great Britain
o 7.5United States
 8Historiography
 9See also
 10Notes
 11References
 12Bibliography
 13Further reading
 14External links

Origin
Main article: Origins of the War of 1812

Origins of the War of 1812

 Chesapeake–Leopard affair
 Orders in Council (1807)
 Embargo Act of 1807
 Non-Intercourse Act (1809)
 Macon's Bill Number 2
  Tecumseh's War
 Henry letters
 War hawks
 Rule of 1756
 Monroe–Pinkney Treaty
 Little Belt affair
 Assassination of Spencer
Perceval

 v
 t
 e

Since the conclusion of the War of 1812, historians have long debated the relative weight of the
multiple reasons underlying its origins.[19]
During the nineteenth century, historians generally concluded that war was declared largely over
national honour, neutral maritime rights and the British seizure of neutral ships and their cargoes on
the high seas. This theme was the basis of President James Madison's war message to Congress
on June 1, 1812. At the turn of the 20th century, much of the contemporary scholarship re-evaluated
this explanation and began to focus more on non-maritime factors as significant contributing causes
as well. However, historian Warren H. Goodman warns that too much focus on these ideas can be
equally misleading.[20]
In disagreeing with those interpretations that have simply stressed expansionism and minimized
maritime causation, historians have ignored deep-seated American fears for national security,
dreams of a continent completely controlled by the republican United States, and the evidence that
many Americans believed that the War of 1812 would be the occasion for the United States to
achieve the long-desired annexation of Canada. [...] Thomas Jefferson well summarized American
majority opinion about the war [...] to say "that the cession of Canada [...] must be a sine qua non at
a treaty of peace." - Horsman[21]
Historian Richard Maass argues that the expansionist theme is a myth that goes against the "relative
consensus among experts that the primary U.S. objective was the repeal of British maritime
restrictions". He says that scholars agree that the United States went to war "because six years
of economic sanctions had failed to bring Britain to the negotiating table, and threatening the Royal
Navy's Canadian supply base was their last hope". Maass agrees that expansionism might have
tempted Americans on a theoretical level, but he finds that "leaders feared the domestic political
consequences of doing so", particularly because such expansion "focused on sparsely populated
western lands rather than the more populous eastern settlements".[22] To what extent that U.S.
leaders considered the question of pursuing territory in Canada, those questions "arose as a result
of the war rather than as a driving cause."[23] However, Maass accepts that many historians continue
to believe that expansionism was a cause.[22]
Reginald Horsman sees expansionism as a secondary cause after maritime issues, noting that many
historians have mistakenly rejected expansionism as a cause for the war. He notes that it was
considered key to maintaining sectional balance between free and slave states thrown off by
American settlement of the Louisiana Territory and widely supported by dozens of War Hawk
congressmen such as Henry Clay, Felix Grundy, John Adams Harper and Richard Mentor Johnson,
who voted for war with expansion as a key aim. However, Horsman states that in his view "the
desire for Canada did not cause the War of 1812" and that "The United States did not declare war
because it wanted to obtain Canada, but the acquisition of Canada was viewed as a major collateral
benefit of the conflict".[24]
However, other historians believe that a desire to permanently annex Canada was a direct cause of
the war.[25][26][full citation needed] Carl Benn notes that the War Hawks' desire to annex the Canadas was similar
to the enthusiasm for the annexation of Spanish Florida by inhabitants of the American South as
both expected war to facilitate expansion into long-desired lands and end support for hostile tribes
(Tecumseh's Confederacy in the North and the Creek in the South).[27]
Alan Taylor says that many Democratic-Republican congressmen such as John Adams Harper,
Richard Mentor Johnson and Peter Buell Porter "longed to oust the British from the continent and to
annex Canada". A few Southerners opposed this, fearing an imbalance of free and slave states if
Canada was annexed. Anti-Catholicism also caused many to oppose annexing the mainly Catholic
Lower Canada, believing its French-speaking inhabitants unfit "for republican citizenship".[28] Even
major figures such as Henry Clay and James Monroe expected to keep at least Upper Canada in an
easy conquest. Notable American generals such as William Hull issued proclamations to Canadians
during the war promising republican liberation through incorporation into the United States.
General Alexander Smyth similarly declared to his troops when they invaded Canada that "you will
enter a country that is to become one of the United States. You will arrive among a people who are
to become your fellow-citizens".[28] However, a lack of clarity about American intentions undercut
these appeals.[28]
David and Jeanne Heidler argue that "most historians agree that the War of 1812 was not caused by
expansionism but instead reflected a real concern of American patriots to defend United States'
neutral rights from the overbearing tyranny of the British Navy. That is not to say that expansionist
aims would not potentially result from the war".[29] However, they also argue otherwise, saying that
"acquiring Canada would satisfy America's expansionist desires", also describing it as a key goal of
western expansionists who, they argue, believed that "eliminating the British presence in Canada
would best accomplish" their goal of halting British support for tribal raids. They argue that the
"enduring debate" is over the relative importance of expansionism as a factor, and whether
"expansionism played a greater role in causing the War of 1812 than American concern about
protecting neutral maritime rights".[25]
In the 1960s, the work of Norman K. Risjord, Reginald Horsman, Bradford Perkins and Roger Brown
established a new eastern maritime consensus. While these authors approached the origins of the
war from many perspectives, they all conceded that British maritime policy was the principal cause
of the war.[30]

Honour and the "second war of independence"

As historian Norman K. Risjord notes, a powerful motivation for the Americans was their threatened
sense of independence and the desire to uphold national honour in the face of what they considered
British aggression and insults such as the Chesapeake–Leopard affair.[31] H. W. Brands writes: "The
other war hawks spoke of the struggle with Britain as a second war of independence; [Andrew]
Jackson, who still bore scars from the first war of independence, held that view with special
conviction. The approaching conflict was about violations of American rights, but it was also about
vindication of American identity".[32] Some Americans at the time and some historians since have
called it a "Second War of Independence" for the United States.[33][34]
The young republic had been involved in several struggles to uphold what it regarded as their rights,
and honour, as an independent nation. The First Barbary War had resulted in an apparent victory but
with the continued payment of ransoms. The Quasi-War against the French had involved single ship
naval clashes over trade rights similar to the ones about to occur with Britain. Upholding national
honour and being able to protect American rights was part of the background to the US political and
diplomatic attitudes towards Britain in the early 1800s.
At the same time, the British public were offended by what they considered insults, such as the Little
Belt affair. This gave them a particular interest in capturing the American flagship President, an act
that they successfully realized in 1815.[35] They were also keen to maintain what they saw as their
rights to stop and search neutral vessels as part of their war with France, and further ensure that
their own commercial interests were protected.

Impressment, trade, and naval actions

Britain was the largest trading partner of the United States, receiving 80 percent of
American cotton and 50 percent of all other American exports. The British public and press resented
the growing mercantile and commercial competition.[36] Historian Reginald Horsman states that "a
large section of influential British opinion [...] thought that the United States presented a threat to
British maritime supremacy".[37]
During the Seven Years' War, Britain introduced rules governing trade with their enemies. The Rule
of 1756, which the US had temporarily agreed to when signing the Jay Treaty, stated that a neutral
nation could not conduct trade with an enemy, if that trade was closed to them before hostilities had
commenced.[38] Since the beginning of Britain's war with France in 1793, the US merchant marine
had been making a fortune continuing trading with both nations,[39] America's share of trans-Atlantic
trade growing from 250 thousand tons in 1790 to 981 thousand tons in 1810, in the process.[40] Of
particular concern to the British was the transport of goods from the French West Indies to France,
something the US would have been unable to do, due to French rules, during times of peace.[41] The
United States' view was that the treaty they had signed violated its right to trade with others, and in
order to circumvent the Rule of 1756, American ships would stop at a neutral port to unload and
reload their cargo before continuing to France. These actions were challenged in the Essex case of
1805.[42] In 1806, with parts of the Jay Treaty due to expire, a new agreement was sought.
The Monroe–Pinkney Treaty offered the US preferential trading rights, and would have settled most
its issues with Britain but did not moderate the Rule of 1756 and only offered to exercise "extreme
caution" and "immediate and prompt redress" with regard to impressment of Americans. Jefferson,
who had specifically asked for these two points to be extirpated, refused to put the treaty before the
senate.[43] Later, in 1806, Napoleon's Berlin Decree declared a blockade of the British Isles, forbade
neutral vessels harbour in British ports and declared all British made goods carried on neutral ships
lawful prizes of war. The British responded in 1807 with Orders in Council which similarly forbade
any shipping to France.[44] By 1807, when Napoleon introduced his Milan Decree, declaring all ships
touching at British ports to be legitimate prizes of war, it had become almost impossible for the US to
remain neutral.[45] Between 1804 and 1807, 731 American ships were seized by Britain or France for
violation of one of the blockades, roughly two thirds by Britain.[citation needed] Since the Jay Treaty, France
had also adopted an aggressive attitude to American neutrality.[46] Whereas Britain, through a
process known as pre-emption, compensated American ship owners for their losses, France did not.
[47]
 French frigates burned American grain ships heading for Britain and treated American sailors as
prisoners of war. US–French relations had soured so much, that by 1812, Madison was also
considering war with France.[46]
As a result of these increasing trade volumes during the Napoleonic Wars the United States
Merchant Marine became the world's largest neutral shipping fleet.[48] Between 1802 and 1810,[48] it
nearly doubled, which meant that there were insufficient experienced sailors in the United States to
man it. To overcome this shortfall, British seamen were recruited, who were attracted by the better
pay and conditions. It was estimated that 30% (23,000) of the 70,000 men employed on American
ships were British.[49] During the Napoleonic Wars, the British Royal Navy expanded to 600 ships,
requiring 140,000 sailors.[50] The Royal Navy could man its ships with volunteers in peacetime, but in
wartime, competing with merchant shipping and privateers for the pool of experienced sailors, it
turned to impressment from ashore and at sea. Since 1795 the Quota System had been in use to
feed men to the navy but it was not alone sufficient. Though most saw it as necessary, the practice
of impressment was detested by most Britons. It was illegal under British law to impress foreign
sailors; but it was the accepted practice of the era for nations to retrieve seamen of their own
nationality from foreign navies during times of war.[51] However, in the nineteen years Britain was at
war with France prior to the war of 1812 some ten thousand American citizens were impressed into
the British navy.[52][e]
The American ambassador in London, James Monroe, under President Thomas Jefferson, protested
to the British Foreign Office that more than fifteen thousand Americans had been impressed into the
Royal Navy since March 1803.[54] When asked for a list however, the Madison administration was
only able to produce one based on hearsay, with 6,257 names, many of which were duplicated, and
included those that had legitimately volunteered to serve.[55] By 1804 the incidents of impressment of
Americans had sharply increased. Underlying the dispute was the issue that Britain and the United
States viewed nationality differently.[56] The United States believed that British seamen, including
naval deserters, had a right to become American citizens. In reality few actually went through the
formal process.[57] Regardless Britain did not recognize a right for a British subject to relinquish his
citizenship and become a citizen of another country. The Royal Navy therefore considered any
American citizen subject to impressment if he was born British. American reluctance to issue
formal naturalization papers and the widespread use of unofficial or forged identity or protection
papers among sailors[58] made it difficult for the Royal Navy to tell native born-Americans from
naturalized-Americans and even non-Americans, and led it to impress some American sailors who
had never been British. Though Britain was willing to release from service anyone who could
establish their American citizenship, the process often took years while the men in question
remained impressed in the British Navy.[59] However, from 1793 to 1812 up to 15,000 Americans had
been impressed[60] while many appeals for release were simply ignored or dismissed for other
reasons.[61] There were also cases when the United States Navy also impressed British sailors.
[62]
 Once impressed, any seaman, regardless of citizenship, could accept a recruitment bounty and
was then no longer considered impressed but a "volunteer", further complicating matters.[52]
American anger with Britain grew when Royal Navy frigates were stationed just outside American
harbours in view of American shores to search ships for goods bound to France and impress men
within the United States territorial waters.[63] Well-publicized events outraged the American public
such as the Leander affair and the Chesapeake–Leopard affair.[64]
The British public were outraged in their turn by the Little Belt affair in which the
larger USS President in search of HMS Guerriere instead clashed with a small British sloop,
resulting in the deaths of 11 British sailors. While both sides claimed that the other fired first, the
British public particularly blamed the United States for attacking a smaller vessel, with calls in some
newspapers for revenge.[65] President had sighted and chased HMS Little Belt trying to determine her
identity throughout the afternoon.[66] The first shot took place after an exchange of hails had still failed
to identify either ship to the other in the growing dusk.[67] After 45 minutes of battle, taking place in
darkness, Little Belt had received much damage, with several holes to her hull near the water-line
and her rigging "cut to pieces".[68] President's Captain Rodgers claimed Little Belt had fired first; but
he did not ascertain her size or country of origin until dawn. After sending over a boat, Rodgers
expressed regret and apologized for the 'unfortunate affair'.[69] Little Belt's Captain Bingham claimed
the opposite: President had fired first and had been manoeuvring in such a way as to make him think
she was planning an attack.[70] Historian Jonathon Hooks echoes the view of Alfred T. Mahan and
several other historians, that it is impossible to determine who fired the first shot.[71] Both sides held
inquiries which upheld their captain's actions and version of events.[72] Meanwhile, the American
public regarded the incident as just retribution for the Chesapeake–Leopard affair and were
encouraged by their victory over the Royal Navy, while the British regarded it as unprovoked
aggression.[73]

Canada and the US

Upper and Lower Canada, circa 1812
Whether the annexation of Canada was a primary American war objective has been debated by
historians. Some argue it was an outcome of the failure to change British policy through economic
coercion or negotiation, leaving invasion as the only way for the US to place pressure on Britain.
[74]
 This view was summarised by Secretary of State James Monroe, who said "[i]t might be
necessary to invade Canada, not as an object of the war but as a means to bring it to a satisfactory
co