We resolve the “petition for certiorari with prayers (a) for the
August 2015 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence
Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 2015 > August
2015 Decisions > G.R. No. 213455, August 11, 2015 - JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON.
AMPARO M. CABOTAJE-TANG, HON. SAMUEL R. MARTIRES, AND
HON. ALEX L. QUIROZ OF THE THIRD DIVISION OF THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.:
G.R. No. 213455, August 11, 2015 - JUAN PONCE ENRILE,
Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. AMPARO M.
CABOTAJE-TANG, HON. SAMUEL R. MARTIRES, AND HON. ALEX L.
QUIROZ OF THE THIRD DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN,
Respondents.
PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
EN BANC
G.R. No. 213455, August 11, 2015
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
HON. AMPARO M. CABOTAJE-TANG, HON. SAMUEL R. MARTIRES,
AND HON. ALEX L. QUIROZ OF THE THIRD DIVISION OF THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
1
Court En Banc to act on the petition; (b) to expedite the
proceedings and to set the case for oral arguments; and (c) to issue
a temporary restraining order to the respondents from holding a
pre-trial and further proceedings in Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-
0238”1 filed by petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile (Enrile) challenging
the July 11, 2014 resolutions2 of the Sandiganbayan.
I.
THE ANTECEDENTS
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an
Information3 for plunder against Enrile, Jessica Lucila Reyes, Janet
Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim, and John Raymund de Asis before
the Sandiganbayan.
The Information reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
xxxx
In 2004 to 2010 or thereabout, in the Philippines, and within this
Honorable Court’s jurisdiction, above-named accused JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, then a Philippine Senator, JESSICA LUCILA G. REYES, then
Chief of Staff of Senator Enrile’s Office, both public officers,
committing the offense in relation to their respective offices,
conspiring with one another and with JANET LIM NAPOLES,
RONALD JOHN LIM, and JOHN RAYMUND DE ASIS, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally amass, accumulate,
and/or acquire ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least ONE
HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY
FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (Php172,834,500.00)
through a combination or series of overt criminal acts, as
follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(a)
by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES and/or her representatives
LIM, DE ASIS, and others, kickbacks or commissions under the
following circumstances: before, during and/or after the project
identification, NAPOLES gave, and ENRILE and/or REYES received,
a percentage of the cost of a project to be funded from ENRILE’S
Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF), in consideration of
ENRILE’S endorsement, directly or through REYES, to the
appropriate government agencies, of NAPOLES’ non-government
organizations which became the recipients and/or target
implementors of ENRILE’S PDAF projects, which duly-funded
projects turned out to be ghosts or fictitious, thus enabling
NAPOLES to misappropriate the PDAF proceeds for her personal
gain;
(b)
by taking undue advantage, on several occasions, of their official
positions, authority, relationships, connections, and influence to
unjustly enrich themselves at the expense and to the damage and
prejudice, of the Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Enrile responded by filing before the Sandiganbayan (1) an urgent
omnibus motion (motion to dismiss for lack of evidence on record
to establish probable cause and ad cautelam motion for bail),4 and
(2) a supplemental opposition to issuance of warrant of arrest and
for dismissal of Information,5 on June 10, 2014, and June 16, 2014,
respectively. The Sandiganbayan heard both motions on June 20,
2014.
On June 24, 2014, the prosecution filed a consolidated opposition
to both motions.
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbayan denied Enrile’s motions and
ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest on the plunder case
against the accused.6redarclaw
2
On July 8, 2014, Enrile received a notice of hearing7 informing him
that his arraignment would be held before the Sandiganbayan’s
Third Division on July 11, 2014.
On July 10, 2014, Enrile filed a motion for bill of particulars8
before the Sandiganbayan. On the same date, he filed a motion for
deferment of arraignment9 since he was to undergo medical
examination at the Philippine General Hospital (PGH).
On July 11, 2014, Enrile was brought to the Sandiganbayan
pursuant to the Sandiganbayan’s order and his motion for bill of
particulars was called for hearing. Atty. Estelito Mendoza (Atty.
Mendoza), Enrile’s counsel, argued the motion orally. Thereafter,
Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice (PJ) Amparo Cabotaje-Tang
(Cabotaje-Tang), declared a “10-minute recess” to deliberate on
the motion.
When the court session resumed, PJ Cabotaje-Tang announced the
Court’s denial of Enrile’s motion for bill of particulars essentially
on the following grounds:
(1)
the details that Enrile desires are “substantial reiterations” of the
arguments he raised in his supplemental opposition to the
issuance of warrant of arrest and for dismissal of information; and
(2)
the details sought are evidentiary in nature and are best ventilated
during trial.
Atty. Mendoza asked for time to file a motion for reconsideration,
stating that he would orally move to reconsider the
Sandiganbayan’s denial if he would not be given time to seek a
reconsideration. The Sandiganbayan then directed Atty. Mendoza
to immediately proceed with his motion for reconsideration.
Atty. Mendoza thus orally presented his arguments for the
reconsideration of the denial of Enrile’s motion for bill of
particulars. The Sandiganbayan again declared a recess to
deliberate on the motion. After five (5) minutes, PJ Cabotaje-Tang
announced the Sandiganbayan’s denial of the motion for
reconsideration.10redarclaw
The Sandiganbayan reduced its rulings into writing on Enrile’s
written and oral motions. The pertinent portion of this ruling
reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
xxxx
In today’s consideration of accused Juan Ponce Enrile’s Motion for
Bill of Particulars, the Court heard the parties on oral arguments in
relation thereto. Thereafter, it declared a ten-minute recess to
deliberate thereon. After deliberating on the said motion as well as
the arguments of the parties, the Court resolves to DENY as it
hereby DENIES the same motion for bill of particulars for the
following reasons: (1) the details desired in paragraphs 2 to 5 of
the said motion are substantially reiterations of the arguments
raised by accused Enrile in his Supplemental Opposition to
Issuance of Warrant of Arrest and for Dismissal of Information
dated June 16, 2014 x x x.
The Court already upheld the sufficiency of the allegations in the
Information charging accused Enrile, among other persons, with
the crime of plunder in its Resolution dated July 3, 2014. It finds no
cogent reasons to reconsider the said ruling.
Moreover, the “desired details” that accused Enrile would like the
prosecution to provide are evidentiary in nature, which need not
be alleged in the Information. They are best ventilated during the
trial of the case.
Counsel for accused Juan Ponce Enrile orally sought a
reconsideration of the denial of his motion for bill of particulars
3
which was opposed by the prosecution. The Court then declared
another ten-minute recess to deliberate on the said motion for
reconsideration. After deliberation thereon, the Court likewise
resolved to DENY as it hereby DENIES accused Juan Ponce Enrile’s
motion for reconsideration there being no new or substantial
grounds raised to warrant the grant thereof.
ACCORDINGLY, the scheduled arraignment of accused Juan Ponce
Enrile shall now proceed as previously scheduled.
SO ORDERED.11
Atty. Mendoza subsequently moved for the deferment of Enrile’s
arraignment. The Sandiganbayan responded by directing the
doctors present to determine whether he was physically fit to be
arraigned. After he was declared fit, the Sandiganbayan proceeded
with Enrile’s arraignment. Enrile entered a “no plea,” prompting
the Sandiganbayan to enter a “not guilty” plea on his behalf.
II.
THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
Enrile claims in this petition that the Sandiganbayan acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it denied his motion for bill of particulars
despite the ambiguity and insufficiency of the Information filed
against him. Enrile maintains that the denial was a serious
violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him.
Enrile further alleges that he was left to speculate on what his
specific participation in the crime of plunder had been. He posits
that the Information should have stated the details of the
particular acts that allegedly constituted the imputed series or
combination of overt acts that led to the charge of plunder. Enrile
essentially reiterates the “details desired” that he sought in his
motion for bill of particulars, as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Allegations of Information
Details Desired
“x x x accused JUAN PONCE ENRILE, then a Philippine Senator,
JESSICA LUCILA G. REYES, then Chief of Staff of Senator Enrile’s
Office, both public officers, committing the offense in relation to
their respective offices, conspiring with one another and with
JANET LIM NAPOLES, RONALD JOHN LIM, and JOHN RAYMUND
DE ASIS, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally
amass, accumulate, and/or acquire ill-gotten wealth amounting to
at least ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED
THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
(Php172,834,500.00) through a combination or series of overt
acts, x x x.”
a. Who among the accused acquired the alleged “ill-gotten wealth
amounting to at least ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO MILLION
EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
PESOS (Php172,834,500.00)”? One of them, two of them or all of
them? Kindly specify.
b. The allegation “through a combination or series of overt
criminal acts” is a conclusion of fact or of law. What are the
particular overt acts which constitute the “combination”? What are
the particular overt acts which constitute the “series”? Who
committed those acts?
x x x by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES and/or her
representatives LIM, DE ASIS, and others, kickbacks or
commissions under the following circumstances: before, during
and/or after the project identification, NAPOLES gave, and ENRILE
and/or REYES received, a percentage of the cost of a project to be
funded from ENRILE’S Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF), in consideration of ENRILE’S endorsement, directly or
through REYES, to the appropriate government agencies, of
NAPOLES’ non-government organizations which became the
4
recipients and/or target implementers of ENRILE’S PDAF projects,
which duly-funded projects turned out to be ghosts or fictitious,
thus enabling NAPOLES to misappropriate the PDAF proceeds for
her personal gain;
a. What was “repeatedly” received? If sums of money, the
particular amount. If on several occasions and in different
amounts, specify the amount on each occasion and the
corresponding date of receipt.
b. Name the specific person(s) who delivered the amount of
Php172,834,500.00 and the specific person(s) who received the
amount; or if not in lump sum, the various amounts totaling
Php172,834,500.00. x x x Specify particularly the person who
delivered the amount, Napoles or Lim or De Asis, and who
particularly are “the others.”
c. To whom was the money given? To Enrile or Reyes? State the
amount given on each occasion, the date when and the place
where the amount was given.
d. x x x Describe each project allegedly identified, how, and by
whom was the project identified, the nature of each project, where
it is located and the cost of each project.
e. For each of the years 2004-2010, under what law or official
document is a portion of the “Priority Development Assistance
Fund” identified as that of a member of Congress, in this instance,
as ENRILE’s, to be found? In what amount for each year is
ENRILE’s Priority Development Assistance Fund? When, and to
whom, did Enrile endorse the projects in favor of “Napoles non-
government organizations which became the recipients and/or
target implementers of ENRILE’s PDAF projects?” Name Napoles
non-government organizations which became the recipients
and/or target implementers of ENRILE’s PDAF projects. Who paid
Napoles, from whom did Napoles collect the fund for the projects
which turned out to be ghosts or fictitious? Who authorized the
payments for each project?
f. x x x what COA audits or field investigations were conducted
which validated the findings that each of Enrile’s PDAF projects in
the years 2004-2010 were ghosts or spurious projects?
x x x by taking undue advantage, on several occasions of their
official positions, authority, relationships, connections, and
influence to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense and to the
damage and prejudice, of the Filipino people and the Republic of
the Philippines.
a. Provide the details of how Enrile took undue advantage, on
several occasions, of his official positions, authority, relationships,
connections, and influence to unjustly enrich himself at the
expense and to the damage and prejudice, of the Filipino people
and the Republic of the Philippines. Was this because he received
any money from the government? From whom and for what
reason did he receive any money or property from the government
through which he “unjustly enriched himself”? State the details
from whom each amount was received, the place and the time.
Enrile posits that his ‘desired details’ are not evidentiary in nature;
they are material facts that should be clearly alleged in the
Information so that he may be fully informed of the charges
against him and be prepared to meet the issues at the trial.
Enrile adds that the grounds raised in his motion for bill of
particulars are cited in a context different from his opposition to
the issuance of a warrant of arrest. He maintains that the
resolution of the probable cause issue was interlocutory and did
“not bar the submission of the same issue in subsequent
proceedings especially in the context of a different proceeding.”
Enrile thus prays that: “(a) the Court en banc act on the present
petition; (b) by way of an interim measure, the Court issue a TRO
or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the Sandiganbayan
from holding the pre-trial and subsequent proceedings against
him in Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 during the pendency of
the present petition; (c) the Court expedite the proceedings and
set the case for oral arguments; and (d) at the conclusion of the
proceedings, the Court annul and set aside the Sandiganbayan’s
July 11, 2014 resolution and his arraignment.”
5
A. The People’s Comment
In its Comment,12 the People of the Philippines13 counters that
the Sandiganbayan did not exercise its discretionary power in an
arbitrary or despotic manner. Even assuming that the
Sandiganbayan’s denial of Enrile’s motion for bill of particulars
was erroneous, the error did not amount to lack or excess or
jurisdiction. It further maintains that the assailed Sandiganbayan
rulings were arrived at based on the procedures prescribed under
Section 2, Rule VII of the Revised Internal Rules of the
Sandiganbayan.
The People also argues that the Information already contained the
ultimate facts; matters of evidence do not need to be averred.
B. Enrile’s Reply
In his Reply, Enrile essentially claims that the right to move for a
bill of particulars is “ancillary to and in implementation” of an
accused’s rights to due process, to be heard, and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him. He maintains
that the Sandiganbayan’s denial of his motion for bill of particulars
is not “a mere denial of a procedural right under the Rules of
Court, but of rights vested in an accused under the Constitution to
ensure fairness in the trial of the offense charged.” Enrile also adds
that there could only be a fair trial if he could properly plead to the
Information and prepare for trial.
Enrile further argues that the People’s Comment did not dispute
the relevance of the details sought in the motion for bill of
particulars. He likewise claims that the “desired details” could not
be found in the bundle of documents marked by the prosecution
during the preliminary conference. Finally, Enrile maintains that
his motion for bill of particulars was not dilatory.
III.
THE COURT’S RULING
After due consideration, we resolve to partially GRANT the
petition under the terms outlined below.
A. The constitutional right of the accused to be informed
Under the Constitution, a person who stands charged of a criminal
offense has the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.14 This right has long been established in
English law, and is the same right expressly guaranteed in our
1987 Constitution. This right requires that the offense charged be
stated with clarity and with certainty to inform the accused of the
crime he is facing in sufficient detail to enable him to prepare his
defense.15redarclaw
In the 1904 case of United States v. Karelsen,16 the Court
explained the purpose of informing an accused in writing of the
charges against him from the perspective of his right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The object of this written accusation was – First. To furnish the
accused with such a description of the charge against him as will
enable him to make his defense; and second, to avail himself of his
conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution
for the same cause; and third, to inform the court of the facts
alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to
support a conviction, if one should be had. (United States vs.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542.) In order that this requirement may be
satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime
is made up of certain acts and intent; these must be set forth in the
complaint with reasonable particularity of time, place, names
(plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In short, the
complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and
6
circumstances necessary to constitute the crime charged. x x x.17
[Emphasis supplied.]
The objective, in short, is to describe the act with sufficient
certainty to fully appraise the accused of the nature of the charge
against him and to avoid possible surprises that may lead to
injustice. Otherwise, the accused would be left speculating on why
he has been charged at all.18redarclaw
In People v. Hon. Mencias, et al.,19 the Court further explained that
a person’s constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him signifies that an accused
should be given the necessary data on why he is the subject of a
criminal proceeding. The Court added that the act or conduct
imputed to a person must be described with sufficient
particularity to enable the accused to defend himself properly.
The general grant and recognition of a protected right emanates
from Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which states
that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law. The purpose of the guaranty is to
prevent governmental encroachment against the life, liberty, and
property of individuals; to secure the individual from the arbitrary
exercise of the powers of the government, unrestrained by the
established principles of private rights and distributive justice x x
x; and to secure to all persons equal and impartial justice and the
benefit of the general law.20redarclaw
Separately from Section 1, Article III is the specific and direct
underlying root of the right to information in criminal proceedings
– Section 14(1), Article III – which provides that “No person shall
be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of
law.” Thus, no doubt exists that the right to be informed of the
cause of the accusation in a criminal case has deep constitutional
roots that, rather than being cavalierly disregarded, should be
carefully protected.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan (2nd Division),21
the Court, in sustaining the Sandiganbayan’s grant of the motion
for bill of particulars of Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., held that “the facile
verbosity with which the legal counsel for the government
flaunted the accusation of excesses against the Marcoses in general
terms must be soonest refurbished by a bill of particulars, so that
respondent can properly prepare an intelligent responsive
pleading and so that trial in this case will proceed as expeditiously
as possible.”22 The Court additionally stated
that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
This Court has been liberal in giving the lower courts the widest
latitude of discretion in setting aside default orders justified under
the right to due process principle. Plain justice demands and the
law requires no less that defendants must know what the
complaint against them is all about.
x x x In the interest of justice, we need to dispel the impression in
the individual respondents' minds that they are being railroaded
out of their rights and properties without due process of law.23
B. Procedural Sufficiency of the Information
An Information is an accusation in writing charging a person with
an offense, signed by the prosecutor and filed with the court.24
The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, in implementing the
constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, specifically require
certain matters to be stated in the Information for its sufficiency.
The requirement aims to enable the accused to properly prepare
for his defense since he is presumed to have no independent
knowledge of the facts constituting the offense
charged.25redarclaw
To be considered as sufficient and valid, an information must state
the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by
the statute; the acts or omissions constituting the offense; the
name of the offended party; the approximate date of the
7
commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.26redarclaw
If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to
the section or subsection of the statute penalizing it. The acts or
omissions constituting the offense and the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances alleged must be stated in ordinary and
concise language; they do not necessarily need to be in the
language of the statute, and should be in terms sufficient to enable
a person of common understanding to know what offense is
charged and what qualifying and aggravating circumstances are
alleged, so that the court can pronounce judgment.27 The Rules do
not require the Information to exactly allege the date and place of
the commission of the offense, unless the date and the place are
material ingredients or essential elements of the offense, or are
necessary for its identification.
B.1. Ultimate facts versus Evidentiary facts
An Information only needs to state the ultimate facts constituting
the offense; the evidentiary and other details (i.e., the facts
supporting the ultimate facts) can be provided during the
trial.28redarclaw
Ultimate facts is defined as “those facts which the expected
evidence will support. The term does not refer to the details of
probative matter or particulars of evidence by which these
material elements are to be established.” It refers to the facts that
the evidence will prove at the trial.29redarclaw
Ultimate facts has also been defined as the principal,
determinative, and constitutive facts on whose existence the cause
of action rests;30 they are also the essential and determining facts
on which the court's conclusion rests and without which the
judgment would lack support in essential particulars.31redarclaw
Evidentiary facts, on the other hand, are the facts necessary to
establish the ultimate facts; they are the premises that lead to the
ultimate facts as conclusion.32They are facts supporting the
existence of some other alleged and unproven fact.33redarclaw
In Bautista v. Court of Appeals,34 the Court explained these two
concepts in relation to a particular criminal case, as
follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The distinction between the elements of the offense and the
evidence of these elements is analogous or akin to the difference
between ultimate facts and evidentiary facts in civil cases. Ultimate
facts are the essential and substantial facts which either form the
basis of the primary right and duty or which directly make up the
wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant, while evidentiary
facts are those which tend to prove or establish said ultimate facts.
x x x.35 [Emphasis supplied.]
While it is fundamental that every element of the offense must be
alleged in the Information, matters of evidence – as distinguished
from the facts essential to the nature of the offense – do not need
to be alleged. Whatever facts and circumstances must necessarily
be alleged are to be determined based on the definition and the
essential elements of the specific crimes.36redarclaw
C. Arraignment
The procedural due process mandate of the Constitution requires
that the accused be arraigned so that he may be fully informed as
to why he was charged and what penal offense he has to face, to be
convicted only on showing that his guilt is shown beyond
reasonable doubt with full opportunity to disprove the evidence
against him.37 During arraignment, the accused is granted the
opportunity to fully know the precise charge that confronts him
and made fully aware of possible loss of freedom, even of his life,
depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him.38redarclaw
8
An arraignment thus ensures that an accused be fully acquainted
with the nature of the crime imputed to him in the Information
and the circumstances under which it is allegedly committed.39 It
is likewise at this stage of the proceedings when the accused
enters his plea,40 or enters a plea of not guilty to a lesser offense
which is necessarily included in the offense charged.41redarclaw
A concomitant component of this stage of the proceedings is that
the Information should provide the accused with fair notice of the
accusations made against him, so that he will be able to make an
intelligent plea and prepare a defense.42Moreover, the
Information must provide some means of ensuring that the crime
for which the accused is brought to trial is in fact one for which he
was charged, rather than some alternative crime seized upon by
the prosecution in light of subsequently discovered
evidence.43Likewise, it must indicate just what crime or crimes an
accused is being tried for, in order to avoid subsequent attempts to
retry him for the same crime or crimes.44 In other words, the
Information must permit the accused to prepare his defense,
ensure that he is prosecuted only on the basis of facts presented,
enable him to plead jeopardy against a later prosecution, and
inform the court of the facts alleged so that it can determine the
sufficiency of the charge.
Oftentimes, this is achieved when the Information alleges the
material elements of the crime charged. If the Information fails to
comply with this basic standard, it would be quashed on the
ground that it fails to charge an offense.45Of course, an
Information may be sufficient to withstand a motion to quash, and
yet insufficiently inform the accused of the specific details of the
alleged offenses. In such instances, the Rules of Court allow the
accused to move for a bill of particulars to enable him properly to
plead and to prepare for trial.46redarclaw
C.1. Bill of Particulars
In general, a bill of particulars is the further specification of the
charges or claims in an action, which an accused may avail of by
motion before arraignment, to enable him to properly plead and
prepare for trial. In civil proceedings, a bill of particulars has been
defined as a complementary procedural document consisting of an
amplification or more particularized outline of a pleading, and is in
the nature of a more specific allegation of the facts recited in the
pleading.47 The purpose of a motion for bill of particulars in civil
cases is to enable a party to prepare his responsive pleading
properly.
In criminal cases, a bill of particulars details items or specific
conduct not recited in the Information but nonetheless pertain to
or are included in the crime charged. Its purpose is to enable an
accused: to know the theory of the government’s case;48 to
prepare his defense and to avoid surprise at the trial; to plead his
acquittal or conviction in bar of another prosecution for the same
offense; and to compel the prosecution to observe certain
limitations in offering evidence.49redarclaw
In criminal proceedings, the motion for a bill of particulars is
governed by Section 9 of Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure which provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Section 9. Bill of particulars. - The accused may, before
arraignment, move for a bill of particulars to enable him properly
to plead and prepare for trial. The motion shall specify the alleged
defects of the complaint or information and the details desired.
The rule requires the information to describe the offense with
sufficient particularity to apprise the accused of the crime charged
with and to enable the court to pronounce judgment. The
particularity must be such that persons of ordinary intelligence
may immediately know what the Information means.50redarclaw
The general function of a bill of particulars, whether in civil or
criminal proceedings, is to guard against surprises during trial. It
is not the function of the bill to furnish the accused with the
9
evidence of the prosecution. Thus, the prosecutor shall not be
required to include in the bill of particulars matters of evidence
relating to how the people intend to prove the elements of the
offense charged or how the people intend to prove any item of
factual information included in the bill of particulars.51redarclaw
C.2. Origin of bill of particulars in criminal cases52redarclaw
Even before the promulgation of the 1964 Rules of Court, when the
applicable rules for criminal procedure was still General Order No.
58,53 the Court had already recognized the need for a bill of
particulars in criminal cases. This recognition came despite the
lack of any specific provision in General Order No. 58 setting out
the rules for a bill of particulars in criminal cases.
In U.S. v. Schneer,54 the issue presented was whether a bill of
particulars was available in a criminal case for estafa after the
accused had already been arraigned. The Court essentially ruled
that there was no specific provision of law expressly authorizing
the filing of specifications or bills of particulars in criminal cases,
and held that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
We know of no provision either in General Orders, No. 58, or in the
laws existing prior thereto which requires the Government to
furnish such a bill of particulars, and we accordingly hold that it
was not error on the part of the court below to refuse to do so.
In U.S. v. Cernias,55 however, the Court formally recognized the
existence and applicability of a bill of particulars in criminal cases.
In this case, the prosecution filed an information charging Basilio
Cernias with several counts of brigandage before the Court of First
Instance of Leyte. In overruling the accused’s objection, the Court
declared that the prosecution’s act of specifying certain acts done
by the conspirators in the Information “did no more than to
furnish the defendant with a bill of particulars of the facts which it
intended to prove at the trial x x x.”56redarclaw
In sum, the Court essentially held that a detailed complaint or
information is not objectionable, and that the details it contains
may be properly considered as specifications or bill of
particulars.57redarclaw
In People v. Abad Santos,58 the court first recognized a bill of
particulars, as a right that the accused may ask for from the court.
In this case, the prosecution charged respondent Joseph Arcache
with the crime of treason before the People’s Court. The
Information filed against the accused contained, in counts 2 and 3,
the phrase “and other similar equipment.”
The counsel for the accused verbally petitioned the People’s court
to order the prosecution to “make more specific [the] phrase ‘and
other similar equipment,’” which request the People’s Court
granted. The People of the Philippines filed a petition for
certiorari, but the Court dismissed this petition.
In upholding the order of the People’s Court, the Court ruled that
“in the absence of specific provisions of law prohibiting the filing
of specifications or bills of particulars in criminal cases, their
submission may be permitted, as they cannot prejudice any
substantial rights of the accused. On the contrary, they will serve
to apprise the accused clearly of the charges filed against them,
and thus enable them to prepare intelligently whatever defense or
defenses they might have.59redarclaw
Notably, Abad Santos emphasized the importance of a bill of
particulars in criminal cases, stating that “x x x inasmuch as in
criminal cases not only the liberty but even the life of the accused
may be at stake, it is always wise and proper that the accused
should be fully apprised of the true charges against them, and thus
avoid all and any possible surprise, which might be detrimental to
their rights and interests; and ambiguous phrases should not,
therefore, be permitted in criminal complaints or informations;
and if any such phrase has been included therein, on motion of the
10
defense, before the commencement of the trial, the court should
order either its elimination as surplusage or the filing of the
necessary specification, which is but an amendment in mere
matters of form.”60redarclaw
In these cited cases, the Courts did not rely on the Rules of Court to
provide for a bill of particulars in criminal cases. A specific
provision granting the accused the right “to move for or demand a
more definite statement or a bill of particulars” was not
incorporated as a formal rule until the 1964 Rules of
Court,61under its Section 6, Rule 116. This initial provision later
became Section 10 of Rule 116 under the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure62and Section 9 of Rule 116 under the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, as amended.63redarclaw
C.3. The Distinctive Role of a Bill of Particulars
When allegations in an Information are vague or indefinite, the
remedy of the accused is not a motion to quash, but a motion for a
bill of particulars.
The purpose of a bill of particulars is to supply vague facts or
allegations in the complaint or information to enable the accused
to properly plead and prepare for trial. It presupposes a valid
Information, one that presents all the elements of the crime
charged, albeit under vague terms. Notably, the specifications that
a bill of particulars may supply are only formal amendments to the
complaint or Information.
In Virata v. Sandiganbayan,64 the Court expounded on the
purpose of a bill of particulars as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
It is the office or function, as well as the object or purpose, of a bill
of particulars to amplify or limit a pleading, specify more minutely
and particularly a claim or defense set up and pleaded in general
terms, give information, not contained in the pleading, to the
opposite party and the court as to the precise nature, character,
scope, and extent of the cause of action or defense relied on by the
pleader, and apprise the opposite party of the case which he has to
meet, to the end that the proof at the trial may be limited to the
matters specified, and in order that surprise at, and needless
preparation for, the trial may be avoided, and that the opposite
party may be aided in framing his answering pleading and
preparing for trial. It has also been stated that it is the function or
purpose of a bill of particulars to define, clarify, particularize, and
limit or circumscribe the issues in the case, to expedite the trial,
and assist the court. A general function or purpose of a bill of
particulars is to prevent injustice or do justice in the case when
that cannot be accomplished without the aid of such a
bill.65redarclaw
x x x x [Emphasis ours.]
Notably, the failure of the accused to move for the specification of
the details desired deprives him of the right to object to evidence
that could be introduced and admitted under an Information of
more or less general terms but which sufficiently charges the
accused with a definite crime.66redarclaw
Although the application for the bill of particulars is one addressed
to the sound discretion of the court67 it should nonetheless
exercise its discretion within the context of the facts and the
nature of the crime charged in each case and the right of the
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation
against him. As articulated in the case of People v. Iannone:68
It is beyond cavil that a defendant has a basic and fundamental
right to be informed of the charges against him so that he will be
able to prepare a defense. Hence the courts must exercise careful
surveillance to ensure that a defendant is not deprived of this right
by an overzealous prosecutor attempting to protect his case or his
witnesses. Any effort to leave a defendant in ignorance of the
substance of the accusation until the time of trial must be firmly
rebuffed. This is especially so where the indictment itself provides
a paucity of information. In such cases, the court must be vigilant
11
in safeguarding the defendant's rights to a bill of particulars and to
effective discovery. Should the prosecutor decide to use an
indictment which, although technically sufficient, does not
adequately allow a defendant to properly prepare for trial, he may
well run afoul of the defendant's right to be informed of the
accusations against him.
Thus, if the Information is lacking, a court should take a liberal
attitude towards its granting69 and order the government to file a
bill of particulars elaborating on the charges. Doubts should be
resolved in favor of granting the bill70 to give full meaning to the
accused’s Constitutionally guaranteed rights.
Notably, the government cannot put the accused in the position of
disclosing certain overt acts through the Information and
withholding others subsequently discovered, all of which it
intends to prove at the trial. This is the type of surprise a bill of
particulars is designed to avoid.71The accused is entitled to the
observance of all the rules designated to bring about a fair verdict.
This becomes more relevant in the present case where the crime
charged carries with it the severe penalty of capital punishment
and entails the commission of several predicate criminal acts
involving a great number of transactions spread over a
considerable period of time.
C.4. Motion to Quash vs. Motion for Bill of Particulars
A bill of particulars presupposes a valid Information while a
motion to quash is a jurisdictional defect on account that the facts
charged in the Information does not constitute an
offense.72redarclaw
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his dissent, avers that the allegations
in the information are not vague because the Information needs
only allege the ultimate facts constituting the offense for which the
accused stands charged, not the finer details of why and how the
illegal acts alleged were committed. In support of his position,
Justice Carpio cited the cases of Miguel v. Sandiganbayan,73Go v.
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,74 and People v. Romualdez,75 among
others, to support the superfluity of the details requested by
Enrile.
Justice Carpio’s reliance on these cases is misplaced for they
involve the issue of quashal of an information on the ground that
the facts charge do not constitute an offense, rather than a request
for bill of particulars. That is, these cited cases involve the critical
issue of the validity of an information, and not a request for
specificity with request to an offense charged in an information.
On the other hand, the cases of People v. Sanico,76People v.
Banzuela,77Pielago v. People,78People v. Rayon, Sr.,79People v.
Subesa,80People v. Anguac,81 and Los Bañ os v. Pedro,82 which
were likewise cited by Justice Carpio, involve the issue that an
Information only need to allege the ultimate facts, and not the
specificity of the allegations contained in the information as to
allow the accused to prepare for trial and make an intelligent
plea.83redarclaw
Notably, in Miguel,84 to which Justice Carpio concurred, this Court
mentioned that the proper remedy, if at all, to a supposed
ambiguity in an otherwise valid Information, is merely to move for
a bill of particulars and not for the quashal of an information
which sufficiently alleges the elements of the offense
charged.85redarclaw
Clearly then, a bill of particulars does not presuppose an invalid
information for it merely fills in the details on an otherwise valid
information to enable an accused to make an intelligent plea and
prepare for his defense.
12
I stress, however, that the issue in the present case involves abuse
of discretion for denying Enrile’s request for a bill of particulars,
and not a motion to quash.
If the information does not charge an offense, then a motion to
quash is in order.86redarclaw
But if the information charges an offense and the averments are so
vague that the accused cannot prepare to plead or prepare for
trial, then a motion for a bill of particulars is the proper
remedy.87redarclaw
Thus viewed, a motion to quash and a motion for a bill of
particulars are distinct and separate remedies, the latter
presupposing an information sufficient in law to charge an
offense.88redarclaw
D. The Grave Abuse of Discretion Issue
The grant or denial of a motion for bill of particulars is
discretionary on the court where the Information is filed. As usual
in matters of discretion, the ruling of the trial court will not be
reversed unless grave abuse of discretion or a manifestly
erroneous order amounting to grave abuse of discretion is
shown.89redarclaw
Grave abuse of discretion refers to the capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment that amounts or is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of
law such as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.90 For the
extraordinary writ of certiorari to lie, there must be capricious,
arbitrary, or whimsical exercise of power.
It will be recalled that the Sandiganbayan denied Enrile’s motion
for bill of particulars on two grounds, namely:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(1) the details sought were evidentiary in nature and are best
ventilated during trial; and
(2) his desired details were reiterations of the details he sought
in his supplemental opposition to the issuance of a warrant of
arrest.
We shall separately examine these grounds in determining
whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
when it denied Enrile’s motion for a bill of particulars and his
subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Sandiganbayan Ground #1:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The details sought were evidentiary in nature
D.1. The Law of Plunder
A determination of whether the details that Enrile sought were
evidentiary requires an examination of the elements of the offense
he is charged with, i.e., plunder under Republic Act No. 7080.
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, as amended, reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. — Any
public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of
his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates
or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of
overt criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the
aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos
(P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall
be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who
participated with the said public officer in the commission of an
offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be
punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the
degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
13
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code,
shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and
all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and
assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from
the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State.
[Emphasis supplied.]
Based on this definition, the elements of plunder
are:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(1)
That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates, or other
persons;
(2)
That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth
through a combination or series of the following overt or criminal
acts:
(a)
through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of
public funds or raids on the public treasury;
(b)
by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share,
percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from
any person and/or entity in connection with any government
contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the
public officer concerned;
(c)
by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets
belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions,
agencies or instrumentalities of government-owned or -controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries;
(d)
by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any
shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or
participation including the promise of future employment in any
business enterprise or undertaking;
(e)
by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies
or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and
orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests;
or
(f)
by taking undue advantage of official position, authority,
relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or
themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the
Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines; and,
(3)
That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth
amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00.
[Emphasis supplied.]
D.1.a. The Conspiracy Element and its Requested Details
Taking these elements into account, we hold that Enrile’s
requested details on Who among the accused acquired the alleged
“ill-gotten wealth” are not proper subjects for a bill of particulars.
The allegation of the Information that the accused and Jessica
Lucila G. Reyes, “conspiring with one another and with Janet Lim
Napoles, Ronald John Lim, and John Raymund de Asis x x x”
expressly charges conspiracy.
The law on plunder provides that it is committed by “a public
officer who acts by himself or in connivance with x x x.” The term
“connivance” suggests an agreement or consent to commit an
unlawful act or deed with another; to connive is to cooperate or
take part secretly with another.91 It implies both knowledge and
assent that may either be active or passive.92redarclaw
Since the crime of plunder may be done in connivance or in
conspiracy with other persons, and the Information filed clearly
alleged that Enrile and Jessica Lucila Reyes conspired with one
another and with Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim and John
14
Raymund De Asis, then it is unnecessary to specify, as an essential
element of the offense, whether the ill-gotten wealth amounting to
at least P172,834,500.00 had been acquired by one, by two or by
all of the accused. In the crime of plunder, the amount of ill-gotten
wealth acquired by each accused in a conspiracy is immaterial for
as long as the total amount amassed, acquired or accumulated is at
least P50 million.
We point out that conspiracy in the present case is not charged as
a crime by itself but only as the mode of committing the crime.
Thus, there is no absolute necessity of reciting its particulars in the
Information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offense
charged.
It is enough to allege conspiracy as a mode in the commission of an
offense in either of the following manner: (1) by use of the word
“conspire,” or its derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate,
connive, collude; or (2) by allegations of basic facts constituting
the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common
understanding would know what is intended, and with such
precision as the nature of the crime charged will admit, to enable
the accused to competently enter a plea to a subsequent
indictment based on the same facts.93redarclaw
Our ruling on this point in People v. Quitlong94 is particularly
instructive:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the
components of conspiracy or allege all the details thereof, like the
part that each of the parties therein have performed, the evidence
proving the common design or the facts connecting all the accused
with one another in the web of the conspiracy. Neither is it
necessary to describe conspiracy with the same degree of
particularity required in describing a substantive offense. It is
enough that the indictment contains a statement of the facts relied
upon to be constitutive of the offense in ordinary and concise
language, with as much certainty as the nature of the case will
admit, in a manner that can enable a person of common
understanding to know what is intended, and with such precision
that the accused may plead his acquittal or conviction to a
subsequent indictment based on the same facts. x x x95
D.1.b. The Requested Details of Enrile’s PDAF
We similarly rule that the petitioner is not entitled to a bill of
particulars for specifics sought under the questions –
For each of the years 2004-2010, under what law or official
document is a portion of the “Priority Development Assistance
Fund” identified as that of a member of Congress, in this instance,
as ENRILE’s, to be found? In what amount for each year is
ENRILE’s Priority Development Assistance Fund?
and
x x x what COA audits or field investigations were conducted
which validated the findings that each of Enrile’s PDAF projects in
the years 2004-2010 were ghosts or spurious projects?
These matters will simply establish and support the ultimate fact
that Enrile’s PDAF was used to fund fictitious or nonexistent
projects. Whether a discretionary fund (in the form of PDAF) had
indeed been made available to Enrile as a member of the
Philippine Congress and in what amounts are evidentiary matters
that do not need to be reflected with particularity in the
Information, and may be passed upon at the full-blown trial on the
merits of the case.
D.1.b(i) The yearly PDAF Allocations
Specifically, we believe that the exact amounts of Enrile’s yearly
PDAF allocations, if any, from 2004 to 2010 need not be pleaded
with specific particularity to enable him to properly plead and
prepare for his defense. In fact, Enrile may be in a better position
to know these details than the prosecution and thus cannot claim
15
that he would be taken by surprise during trial by the omission in
the Information of his annual PDAF allocations.
Thus, whether the amounts of Enrile’s PDAF allocations have been
specified or not, Enrile has been sufficiently informed that he
stands charged of endorsing Napoles’ non-government
organizations to implement spurious or fictitious projects, in
exchange for a percentage of his PDAF.
D.1.b(ii) The details of the COA Audits
The details of the “COA audits or field investigations” only support
the ultimate fact that the projects implemented by Napoles’ NGOs,
and funded by Enrile’s PDAF, were nonexisting or fictitious. Thus,
they are evidentiary in nature and do not need to be spelled out
with particularity in the Information.
To require more details on these matters from the prosecution
would amount to asking for evidentiary information that the latter
intends to present at the trial; it would be a compulsion on the
prosecution to disclose in advance of the trial the evidence it will
use in proving the charges alleged in the indictment.
D.1.c. Other Sources of Kickbacks and Commissions
We also deny Enrile’s plea for details on who “the others” were
(aside from Napoles, Lim and De Asis) from whom he allegedly
received kickbacks and commissions. These other persons do not
stand charged of conspiring with Enrile and need not therefore be
stated with particularly, either as specific individuals or as John
Does. The Court cannot second-guess the prosecution’s reason for
not divulging the identity of these “others” who may potentially be
witnesses for the prosecution.
What the Constitution guarantees the accused is simply the right
to meet and examine the prosecution witnesses. The prosecution
has the prerogative to call witnesses other than those named in
the complaint or information, subject to the defense’s right to
cross-examine them.96 Making these “others” known would in fact
be equivalent to the prosecution’s premature disclosure of its
evidence. We stress, to the point of repetition, that a bill of
particulars is not meant to compel the prosecution to prematurely
disclose evidentiary matters supporting its case.
D.2. The Overt Acts constituting the “Combination” or “Series”
under the Plunder Law
We hold that Enrile is entitled to a bill of particulars for specifics
sought under the following questions –
What are the particular overt acts which constitute the
“combination”? What are the particular overt acts which constitute
the “series”? Who committed those acts? [Emphasis ours.]
D.2.a. Reason for Requirement for Particulars of Overt Acts
Plunder is the crime committed by public officers when they
amass wealth involving at least P50 million by means of a
combination or series of overt acts.97 Under these terms, it is not
sufficient to simply allege that the amount of ill-gotten wealth
amassed amounted to at least P50 million; the manner of amassing
the ill-gotten wealth – whether through a combination or series of
overt acts under Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080 – is an important
element that must be alleged.
When the Plunder Law speaks of “combination,” it refers to at least
two (2) acts falling under different categories listed in Section 1,
paragraph (d) of R.A. No. 7080 [for example, raids on the public
treasury under Section 1, paragraph (d), subparagraph (1), and
fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the National
Government under Section 1, paragraph (d), subparagraph (3)].
On the other hand, to constitute a “series” there must be two (2) or
more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category of
16
enumeration found in Section 1, paragraph (d) [for example,
misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasury,
all of which fall under Section 1, paragraph (d), subparagraph
(1)].98redarclaw
With respect to paragraph (a) of the Information –
[(i.e., by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES and/or her
representatives LIM, DE ASIS, and others, kickbacks or
commissions under the following circumstances: before, during
and/or after the project identification, NAPOLES gave, and ENRILE
and/or REYES received, a percentage of the cost of a project to be
funded from ENRILE’S Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF), in consideration of ENRILE’S endorsement, directly or
through REYES, to the appropriate government agencies, of
NAPOLES’ non-government organizations which became the
recipients and/or target implementers of ENRILE’S PDAF projects,
which duly funded projects turned out to be ghosts or fictitious,
thus enabling NAPOLES to misappropriate the PDAF proceeds for
her personal gain x x x)] –
we hold that the prosecution employed a generalized or shotgun
approach in alleging the criminal overt acts allegedly committed
by Enrile. This approach rendered the allegations of the paragraph
uncertain to the point of ambiguity for purposes of enabling Enrile
to respond and prepare for his defense. These points are explained
in greater detail below.
The heart of the Plunder Law lies in the phrase “combination or
series of overt or criminal acts.” Hence, even if the accumulated ill-
gotten wealth amounts to at least P50 million, a person cannot be
prosecuted for the crime of plunder if this resulted from a single
criminal act. This interpretation of the Plunder Law is very clear
from the congressional deliberations.99redarclaw
Considering that without a number of overt or criminal acts, there
can be no crime of plunder, the various overt acts that constitute
the “combination” and “series” the Information alleged, are
material facts that should not only be alleged, but must be stated
with sufficient definiteness so that the accused would know what
he is specifically charged of and why he stands charged, so that he
could properly defend himself against the charge.
Thus, the several (i.e., at least 2) acts which are indicative of the
overall scheme or conspiracy must not be generally stated; they
should be stated with enough particularity for Enrile (and his co-
accused) to be able to prepare the corresponding refuting
evidence to meet these alleged overt acts.
It is insufficient, too, to merely allege that a set of acts had been
repeatedly done (although this may constitute a series if averred
with sufficient definiteness), and aver that these acts resulted in
the accumulation or acquisition of ill-gotten wealth amounting to
at least P172,834,500.00, as in this case. The Information should
reflect with particularity the predicate acts that underlie the crime
of plunder, based on the enumeration in Section 1(d) of R.A. No.
7080.
A reading of the Information filed against Enrile in the present
case shows that the prosecution made little or no effort to
particularize the transactions that would constitute the required
series or combination of overt acts.
In fact, it clustered under paragraph (a) of the Information its
recital of the manner Enrile and his co-accused allegedly operated,
thus describing its general view of the series or combination of
overt criminal acts that constituted the crime of plunder.
Without any specification of the basic transactions where
kickbacks or commissions amounting to at least P172,834,500.00
had been allegedly received, Enrile’s preparation for trial is
obviously hampered. This defect is not cured by mere reference to
the prosecution’s attachment, as Enrile already stated in his Reply
that the “desired details” could not be found in the bundle of
17
documents marked by the prosecution, which documents are not
integral parts of the Information. Hence, the prosecution does not
discharge its burden of informing Enrile what these overt acts
were by simply pointing to these documents.
In providing the particulars of the overt acts that constitute the
“combination” or “series” of transactions constituting plunder, it
stands to reason that the amounts involved, or at their ball park
figures, should be stated; these transactions are not necessarily
uniform in amount, and cannot simply collectively be described as
amounting to P172,834,500.00 without hampering Enrile’s right to
respond after receiving the right information.
To stress, this final sum is not a general ball park figure but a very
specific sum based on a number of different acts and hence must
have a breakdown. Providing this breakdown reinforces the
required specificity in describing the different overt acts.
Negatively stated, unless Enrile is given the particulars and is later
given the chance to object to unalleged details, he stands to be
surprised at the trial at the same time that the prosecution is given
the opportunity to play fast and loose with its evidence to satisfy
the more than P50 Million requirement of law.
D.2.b. Approximate Dates of Commissions or Kickbacks
Enrile should likewise know the approximate dates, at least, of the
receipt of the kickbacks and commissions, so that he could prepare
the necessary pieces of evidence, documentary or otherwise, to
disprove the allegations against him. We point out that the period
covered by the indictment extends from “2004 to 2010 or
thereabout,” of which, we again stress that different overt acts
constituting of the elements of Plunder took place during this
period.
Undoubtedly, the length of time involved – six years – will pose
difficulties to Enrile in the preparation of his defense and will
render him susceptible to surprises. Enrile should not be left
guessing and speculating which one/s from among the numerous
transactions involving his discretionary PDAF funds from 2004 to
2010, are covered by the indictment.
D.2.c. The Projects Funded and NGOs Involved
Enrile is also entitled to particulars specifying the project that
Enrile allegedly funded coupled with the name of Napoles’ NGO
(e.g., Pangkabuhayan Foundation, Inc.), to sufficiently inform
Enrile of the particular transactions referred to.100redarclaw
Be it remembered that the core of the indictment
is:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(1) the funding of nonexisting projects using Enrile’s PDAF;
(2) Enrile’s endorsement of Napoles’ NGOs to the government
agencies to implement these projects; and
(3) Enrile’s receipt of kickbacks or commissions in exchange for
his endorsement.
Under the elaborate scheme alleged to have been committed by
Enrile and his co-accused, the project identification was what
started the totality of acts constituting plunder: only after a project
has been identified could Enrile have endorsed Napoles’ NGO to
the appropriate government agency that, in turn, would
implement the supposed project using Enrile’s PDAF. Note that
without the project identification, no justification existed to
release Enrile’s PDAF to Napoles’ allegedly bogus NGO.
In these lights, the “identified project” and “Napoles’ NGO” are
material facts that should be clearly and definitely stated in the
18
Information to allow Enrile to adequately prepare his defense
evidence on the specific transaction pointed to. The omission of
these details will necessarily leave Enrile guessing on what
transaction/s he will have to defend against, since he may have
funded other projects with his PDAF. Specification will also allow
him to object to evidence not referred to or covered by the
Information’s ultimate facts.
D.2.d. The Government Agencies Serving as Conduits
The government agencies to whom Enrile endorsed Napoles’ NGOs
are also material facts that must be specified, since they served a
necessary role in the crime charged – the alleged conduits
between Enrile and Napoles’ NGOs. They were indispensable
participants in the elaborate scheme alleged to have been
committed.
The particular person/s in each government agency who
facilitated the transactions, need not anymore be named in the
Information, as these are already evidentiary matters. The
identification of the particular agency vis-à -vis Napoles’ NGO and
the identified project, will already inform Enrile of the transaction
referred to.
In Tantuico v. Republic,101 the Republic filed a case for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages
before the Sandiganbayan against former President Ferdinand
Marcos, Imelda Marcos, Benjamin Romualdez, and Francisco
Tantuico, Jr. Tantuico filed a motion for bill of particulars
essentially alleging that the complaint was couched in general
terms and did not have the particulars that would inform him of
the alleged factual and legal bases. The Sandiganbayan denied his
motion on the ground that the particulars sought are evidentiary
in nature. Tantuico moved to reconsider this decision, but the
Sandiganbayan again denied his motion.
The Court overturned the Sandiganbayan’s ruling and directed the
prosecution to prepare and file a bill of particulars. Significantly,
the Court held that the particulars prayed for, such as: names of
persons, names of corporations, dates, amounts involved, a
specification of property for identification purposes, the particular
transactions involving withdrawals and disbursements, and a
statement of other material facts as would support the conclusions
and inferences in the complaint, are not evidentiary in nature. The
Court explained that those particulars are material facts that
should be clearly and definitely averred in the complaint so that
the defendant may be fairly informed of the claims made against
him and be prepared to meet the issues at the trial.
To be sure, the differences between ultimate and evidentiary
matters are not easy to distinguish. While Tantuico was a civil case
and did not involve the crime of plunder, the Court’s ruling
nonetheless serves as a useful guide in the determination of what
matters are indispensable and what matters may be omitted in the
Information, in relation with the constitutional right of an accused
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.
In the present case, the particulars on the:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(1) projects involved;
(2) Napoles’ participating NGOs; and
(3) the government agency involved in each transaction
will undoubtedly provide Enrile with sufficient data to know the
specific transactions involved, and thus enable him to prepare
adequately and intelligently whatever defense or defenses he may
have.
We reiterate that the purpose of a bill of particular is to clarify
allegations in the Information that are indefinite, vague, or are
conclusions of law to enable the accused to properly plead and
19
prepare for trial, not simply to inform him of the crime of which he
stands accused. Verily, an accused cannot intelligently respond to
the charge laid if the allegations are incomplete or are unclear to
him.
We are aware that in a prosecution for plunder, what is sought to
be established is the commission of the criminal acts in
furtherance of the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. In the language
of Section 4 of R.A. No. 7080, for purposes of establishing the crime
of plunder, it is sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a
pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate, or acquire ill-gotten
wealth.102redarclaw
The term “overall unlawful scheme” indicates a general plan of
action or method that the principal accused and public officer and
others conniving with him follow to achieve their common
criminal goal. In the alternative, if no overall scheme can be found
or where the schemes or methods used by the multiple accused
vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to
attain a common criminal goal.103redarclaw
Lest Section 4 be misunderstood as allowing the prosecution to
allege that a set of acts has been repeatedly done (thereby showing
a ‘pattern’ of overt criminal acts), as has been done in the present
case, we point out that this section does not dispense with the
requirement of stating the essential or material facts of each
component or predicate act of plunder; it merely prescribes a rule
of procedure for the prosecution of plunder.
In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,104 we construed this procedural
rule to mean that [w]hat the prosecution needed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt was only the number of acts sufficient to form a
combination or series that would constitute a pattern involving an
amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There was no need to prove
each and every other act alleged in the Information to have been
committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate, or acquire ill-gotten
wealth.105redarclaw
If, for example, the accused is charged in the Information of
malversing public funds on twenty different (20) occasions, the
prosecution does not need to prove all 20 transactions; it suffices
if a number of these acts of malversation can be proven with moral
certainty, provided only that the series or combination of
transaction would amount to at least P50,000,000.00. Nonetheless,
each of the twenty transactions should be averred with
particularity, more so if the circumstances surrounding each
transaction are not the same. This is the only way that the accused
can properly prepare for his defense during trial.
D.3. Paragraph (b) of the Information
As his last requested point, Enrile wants the prosecution to
provide the details of the allegation under paragraph (b) of the
Information (i.e., x x x by taking undue advantage, on several
occasions, of their official position, authority, relationships,
connections, and influence to unjustly enrich themselves at the
expense and to the damage and prejudice, of the Filipino people
and the Republic of the Philippines) in the following
manner:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Provide the details of how Enrile took undue advantage, on several
occasions, of his official positions, authority, relationships,
connections, and influence to unjustly enrich himself at the
expense and to the damage and prejudice, of the Filipino people
and the Republic of the Philippines. Was this because he received
any money from the government? From whom and for what
reason did he receive any money or property from the government
through which he “unjustly enriched himself”? State the details
from whom each amount was received, the place and the time.
Our ruling on Enrile’s desired details – specifically, the particular
overt act/s alleged to constitute the “combination” and “series”
20
charged in the Information; a breakdown of the amounts of the
kickbacks and commissions allegedly received, stating how the
amount of P172,834,500.00 was arrived at; a brief description of
the ‘identified’ projects where kickbacks and commissions were
received; the approximate dates of receipt of the alleged kickbacks
and commissions from the identified projects; the name of
Napoles’ non-government organizations (NGOs) which were the
alleged “recipients and/or target implementors of Enrile’s PDAF
projects;” and the government agencies to whom Enrile allegedly
endorsed Napoles’ NGOs – renders it unnecessary to require the
prosecution to submit further particulars on the allegations
contained under paragraph (b) of the Information.
Simply put, the particular overt acts alleged to constitute the
combination or series required by the crime of plunder, coupled
with a specification of the other non-evidentiary details stated
above, already answer the question of how Enrile took undue
advantage of his position, authority, relationships, connections and
influence as Senator to unjustly enrich himself.
We also point out that the PDAF is a discretionary fund intended
solely for public purposes. Since the Information stated that Enrile,
as “Philippine Senator,” committed the offense “in relation to his
office,” by “repeatedly receiving kickbacks or commissions” from
Napoles and/or her representatives through projects funded by
his (Enrile’s) PDAF, then it already alleged how undue advantage
had been taken and how the Filipino people and the Republic had
been prejudiced. These points are fairly deducible from the
allegations in the Information as supplemented by the required
particulars.
E. The Grave Abuse of Discretion
In the light of all these considerations, we hold that the
Sandiganbayan’s denial of the petitioner’s motion for a bill of
particulars, on the ground that the details sought to be itemized or
specified are all evidentiary – without any explanation supporting
this conclusion – constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
As discussed above, some of the desired details are material facts
that must be alleged to enable the petitioner to properly plead and
prepare his defense. The Sandiganbayan should have diligently
sifted through each detail sought to be specified, and made the
necessary determination of whether each detail was an ultimate or
evidentiary fact, particularly after Enrile stated in his Reply that
the “desired details” could not be found in the bundle of
documents marked by the prosecution. We cannot insist or
speculate that he is feigning ignorance of the presence of these
desired details; neither can we put on him the burden of
unearthing from these voluminous documents what the desired
details are. The remedy of a bill of particulars is precisely made
available by the Rules to enable an accused to positively respond
and make an intelligent defense.
Justice Carpio’s reference to the voluminous 144-page
Ombudsman’s resolution (which found probable cause to indict
the petitioner and his co-accused not only of the crime of plunder,
but also for violations of several counts of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practice Act) to justify his argument that Enrile was
already aware of the details he seeks in his motion for a bill of
particulars, all the more strengthens our conclusive position that
the Information for plunder filed against Enrile was ambiguous
and glaringly insufficient to enable him to make a proper plea and
to prepare for trial. We reiterate, to the point of being repetitive,
that the purpose of the bill of particulars in criminal cases is to
supply vague facts or allegations in the complaint or information
to enable the accused to properly plead and prepare for trial.
Moreover, a resolution arising from a preliminary investigation
does not amount to nor does it serve the purpose of a bill of
particulars.
21
A bill of particulars guards against the taking of an accused by
surprise by restricting the scope of the proof;106it limits the
evidence to be presented by the parties to the matters alleged in
the Information as supplemented by the bill. It is for this reason
that the failure of an accused to move for a bill of particulars
deprives him of the right to object to evidence which could be
lawfully introduced and admitted under an information of more or
less general terms which sufficiently charges the defendants with a
definite crime.
The record on preliminary investigation, in comparison, serves
as the written account of the inquisitorial process when the fiscal
determined the existence of prima facie evidence to indict a
person for a particular crime. The record of the preliminary
investigation, as a general rule, does not even form part of the
records of the case.107 These features of the record of
investigation are significantly different from the bill of particulars
that serves as basis, together with the Information, in specifying
the overt acts constituting the offense that the accused pleaded to
during arraignment.
Notably, plunder is a crime composed of several predicate criminal
acts. To prove plunder, the prosecution must weave a web out of
the six ways of illegally amassing wealth and show how the
various acts reveal a combination or series of means or schemes
that reveal a pattern of criminality. The interrelationship of the
separate acts must be shown and be established as a scheme to
accumulate ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least P50 million.
Plunder thus involves intricate predicate criminal acts and
numerous transactions and schemes that span a period of time.
Naturally, in its prosecution, the State possesses an “effective
flexibility” of proving a predicate criminal act or transaction, not
originally contemplated in the Information, but is otherwise
included in the broad statutory definition, in light of subsequently
discovered evidence. The unwarranted use of the flexibility is what
the bill of particulars guards against.
Justice Carpio further argues that the ponencia transformed the
nature of an action from an accusation in writing charging a
person with an offense to an initiatory pleading alleging a cause of
action.
We see nothing wrong with such treatment, for a motion for a bill
of particulars in criminal cases is designed to achieve the same
purpose as the motion for a bill of particulars in civil cases. In fact,
certainty, to a reasonable extent, is an essential attribute of all
pleadings, both civil and criminal, and is more especially needed in
the latter where conviction is followed by penal
consequences.108redarclaw
Thus, even if the Information employs the statutory words does
not mean that it is unnecessary to allege such facts in connection
with the commission of the offense as will certainly put the
accused on full notice of what he is called upon to defend, and
establish such a record as will effectually bar a subsequent
prosecution for that identical offense.109redarclaw
Notably, conviction for plunder carries with it the penalty of
capital punishment; for this reason, more process is due, not less.
When a person’s life interest – protected by the life, liberty, and
property language recognized in the due process clause – is at
stake in the proceeding, all measures must be taken to ensure the
protection of those fundamental rights.
As we emphasized in Republic v. Sandiganbayan,110 “the
administration of justice is not a matter of guesswork. The name of
the game is fair play, not foul play. We cannot allow a legal
skirmish where, from the start, one of the protagonists enters the
arena with one arm tied to his back.”
22
Finally, we find no significance in Justice Carpio’s argument that
Atty. Estelito Mendoza did not previously find vague the
Information for plunder filed against President Joseph Estrada in
2001.
Under the amended Information111 against Estrada, et al., each
overt act that constituted the series or combination and
corresponding to the predicate acts under Section 1(d) had been
averred with sufficient particularity so that there was no doubt
what particular transaction was referred to.
We point out that unlike in the Information against Enrile, the
following matters had been averred with sufficient definiteness,
viz: the predicate acts that constitute the crime of plunder; the
breakdown of how the alleged amount of P4,097,804,173.17, more
or less, had been arrived at; the participants involved in each
transaction; and the specific sources of the illegal wealth amassed.
At any rate, that Atty. Mendoza did not previously question the
indictment of President Estrada via a motion for bill of particulars
does not ipso facto mean that the present Information for plunder
filed against Enrile is not vague and ambiguous.
Sandiganbayan Ground #2:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
That Enrile’s cited grounds are reiterations of the grounds
previously raised
Enrile does not deny that the arguments he raised in his
supplemental opposition to issuance of a warrant of arrest and for
dismissal of information and in his motion for bill of particulars
were identical. He argues, however, that the mere reiteration of
these grounds should not be a ground for the denial of his motion
for bill of particulars, since “the context in which those questions
were raised was entirely different.”
While both the motion to dismiss the Information and the motion
for bill of particulars involved the right of an accused to due
process, the enumeration of the details desired in Enrile’s
supplemental opposition to issuance of a warrant of arrest and for
dismissal of information and in his motion for bill of particulars
are different viewed particularly from the prism of their respective
objectives.
In the former, Enrile took the position that the Information did not
state a crime for which he can be convicted; thus, the Information
is void; he alleged a defect of substance. In the latter, he already
impliedly admits that the Information sufficiently alleged a crime
but is unclear and lacking in details that would allow him to
properly plead and prepare his defense; he essentially alleged here
a defect of form.
Note that in the former, the purpose is to dismiss the Information
for its failure to state the nature and cause of the accusation
against Enrile; while the details desired in the latter (the motion
for bill of particulars) are required to be specified in sufficient
detail because the allegations in the Information are vague,
indefinite, or in the form of conclusions and will not allow Enrile to
adequately prepare his defense unless specifications are made.
That every element constituting the offense had been alleged in
the Information does not preclude the accused from requesting for
more specific details of the various acts or omissions he is alleged
to have committed. The request for details is precisely the function
of a bill of particulars.
Hence, while the information may be sufficient for purposes of
stating the cause and the crime an accused is charged, the
allegations may still be inadequate for purposes of enabling him to
properly plead and prepare for trial.
23
We likewise find no complete congruence between the grounds
invoked and the details sought by Enrile in his motion for bill of
particulars, and the grounds invoked in opposing the warrant for
his arrest issued, so that the Sandiganbayan’s action in one would
bar Enrile from essentially invoking the same grounds.
The judicial determination of probable cause is one made by the
judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued
against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on
the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused
under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.112
Simply put, the judge determines whether the necessity exists to
place the accused under immediate custody to avoid frustrating
the ends of justice.
On the other hand, the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure grants
the accused the remedy of a bill of particulars to better inform
himself of the specifics or particulars concerning facts or matters
that had not been averred in the Information with the necessary
clarity for purposes of his defense.
Its purpose is to better acquaint the accused of the specific acts
and/or omissions in relation with the crime charged, to limit the
matters and the evidence that the prosecution may otherwise be
allowed to use against him under a more or less general averment,
and to meet the charges head on and timely object to evidence
whose inadmissibility may otherwise be deemed waived.
Based on these considerations, the question of whether there is
probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest against an accused, is
separate and distinct from the issue of whether the allegations in
the Information have been worded with sufficient definiteness to
enable the accused to properly plead and prepare his defense.
While the grounds cited for each may seemingly be the same, they
are submitted for different purposes and should be appreciated
from different perspectives, so that the insufficiency of these
grounds for one does not necessarily translate to insufficiency for
the other. Thus, the resolution of the issue of probable cause
should not bar Enrile from seeking a more detailed averment of
the allegations in the Information.
The Sandiganbayan grossly missed these legal points and thus
gravely abused its discretion: it used wrong and completely
inapplicable considerations to support its conclusion.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
a. We PARTIALLY GRANT the present petition for certiorari, and
SET ASIDE the Sandiganbayan’s resolutions dated July 11, 2014,
which denied Enrile’s motion for bill of particulars and his motion
for reconsideration of this denial.
b. We DIRECT the People of the Philippines to SUBMIT, within a
non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from finality of this
Decision, with copy furnished to Enrile, a bill of particulars
containing the facts sought that we herein rule to be material and
necessary. The bill of particulars shall specifically contain the
following:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
1. The particular overt act/s alleged to constitute the “combination
or series of overt criminal acts” charged in the Information.
2. A breakdown of the amounts of the “kickbacks or commissions”
allegedly received, stating how the amount of P172,834,500.00
was arrived at.
3. A brief description of the ‘identified’ projects where kickbacks
or commissions were received.
4. The approximate dates of receipt, “in 2004 to 2010 or
thereabout,” of the alleged kickbacks and commissions from the
identified projects. At the very least, the prosecution should state
24
the year when the kickbacks and transactions from the identified
projects were received.
5. The name of Napoles’ non-government organizations (NGOs)
which were the alleged “recipients and/or target implementors of
Enrile’s PDAF projects.”
6. The government agencies to whom Enrile allegedly endorsed
Napoles’ NGOs. The particular person/s in each government
agency who facilitated the transactions need not be named as a
particular.
All particulars prayed for that are not included in the above are
hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
Sereno, C.J., Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Perez, and
Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., Please see Dissenting Opinion.
Peralta, J., I join J. Bernabe's Opinion.
Del Castillo, J., I join the Dissent of J. Carpio.
Villarama, Jr., J., I join J. Carpio in his Dissenting Opinion.
Reyes, J., on leave.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., Please see Concurring Opinion.
Leonen, J., I join dissent of J. Carpio. see separate opinion.
Jardeleza, J., no part.
Endnotes:
1Rollo, pp. 3-92.
2 The resolutions denied petitioner Enrile’s motion for bill of
particulars and his motion for reconsideration. Both resolutions
were contained in a Minute Resolution adopted on July 11, 2014.
3Rollo, pp. 170-171.
4 Id. at 174-226. 17 Id. at 226.

5 Id. at 232-261. 18 See Burgos v. Sandiganbayan, 459 Phil. 794, 806 (2003).

6 On July 24, 2014, Enrile filed a motion for reconsideration 19 150-B Phil. 78, 89-90 (1972).
assailing the Sandiganbayan’s July 3, 2014 resolution.
20 See City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr., 495 Phil. 289, 311 (2005),
7Rollo, pp. 265-267. citing 16 C.J.S., pp. 1150-1151.

8 Id. at 84-92. 21 565 Phil. 172, (2007).

9 Id. at 268-273. This motion includes Criminal Case Nos. SB-14- 22 Id. at 191-192.
CRM-0241 to 0255 for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019. 23 Id. at 192.

10 Id. at 167-A-169; see also Annexes “B,” “B-1,” and “B-2” at 93-
166.
11 Id. at 167-A-169; signed by Presiding Justice Amparo Cabotaje-
Tang and Justices Samuel Martires and Alex Quiroz.
24 Section 4, Rule 110, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
25People v. Ching, 563 Phil. 433, 443-444 (2007).
26 Id. at 443.

12 Temporary rollo, unnumbered pages. 27 See Olivarez v. Court of Appeals, 503 Phil. 421, 435 (2005).

13 Represented by the Office of the Ombudsman, through the
Office of the Special Prosecutor.
14 Section 14(2), Article III, 1987 Constitution; see Go v. Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No. 178429, October 23, 2009, 604 SCRA
322, 329.
15 See Dissenting Opinion of Justice (ret.) Dante O. Tinga in Teves
v. Sandiganbayan, 488 Phil. 311, 340 (2004), citing 21 AM JUR 2d §
325.
28People v. Romualdez, et al., 581 Phil. 462, 479-480 (2008).
29 See Salita v. Magtolis, G.R. No. 106429, June 13, 1994, 233 SCRA
100, 105.
30 See Philippine Bank of Communications v. Trazo, 531 Phil. 636,
653 (2006).
31 See Brundage v. KL House Construction Company, 396 P.2d 731
(N.M. 1964).

16 3 Phil. 223 (1904).

25
32Tantuico, Jr. v. Republic, G.R. No. 89114, December 2, 1991, 204
SCRA 428, 437, citing Womack v. Industrial Comm., 168 Colo. 364, 43 Id. See also Rule 117, Section 5.
451 P.2d 761, 764.
44 Id.
33 Id., citing Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., p. 500.
45 Section 3(a), Rule 117.
34 413 Phil. 159 (2001). This case involved a violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22. The Court held that knowledge of insufficiency 46 Section 9, Rule 116.
of funds is the ultimate fact, or element of the offense that needs to
be proved, while dishonor of the check presented within ninety 47Virata v. Sandiganbayan, 339 Phil. 47, 62 (1997).
(90) days is merely the evidentiary fact of such knowledge.
48Remmer v. United States, 9 Cir., 1953, 205 F.2d 277, 281; United
35 Id. at 175. States v. Caserta, 3 Cir., 1952, 199 F.2d 905.

36Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, 479 Phil. 265, 288-289 (2004). 49 See US v. Kelly, 92 F. Supp. 672, 673 (W.D. Mo. 1950).

37 Herrera, Remedial Law, Vol. IV (Rules 110-127), Criminal 50Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 36.
Procedure, 2007 ed., p. 591.
51US v. Kelly, supra note 49.
38 Id. at 592.
52 Philippine setting.
39 Id.
53 Criminal Procedure 1900.
40 Id.
54 7 Phil. 523, 525 (1907).
41 SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — At arraignment, the
accused, with the consent of the offended party and the 55 10 Phil. 682 (1908).
prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a
lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. 56 Id. at 690.
After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed
to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of 57 See People v. Abad Santos, 76 Phil. 746 (1946).
not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is
necessary. (Sec. 4, cir. 38-98) (Rule 116, Rules of Criminal 58 Id. at 745.
Procedure).
59 Id. at 746-747.
42 See Russell v. United States, 369 US 749.
26
60 Id. at 747. See also Bill of Particulars in Criminal Cases, by Angel
C. Cruz, PLJ volume 23, Number 1-03, Notes and Comments, p. 438. 75 581 Phil. 462 (2008).
plj.upd.edu.ph (http://www.plj.upd.edu.ph, last visited on
September 17, 2014), where the concept and origin of bill of 76 G.R. No. 208469, August 13, 2014, 732 SCRA 158.
particulars was discussed more extensively. It examined, among
others, the cases of Schneer, Cernias, Veluz and Abad Santos. 77 G.R. No. 202060, December 11, 2013, 712 SCRA 735.

61 Effective January 1, 1964. 78 G.R. No. 202020, March 13, 2013, 693 SCRA 476.

62 Promulgated on November 22, 1984; Effective January 1, 1985. 79 G.R. No. 194236, January 30, 2014, 689 SCRA 745.

63 A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC. Effective December 1, 2000. 80 G.R. No. 193660, November 16, 2011, 660 SCRA 390.

64 G.R. No. 106527, April 6, 1993, 221 SCRA 52. 81 606 Phil. 728 (2009).

65 Id. at 62-63. 82 604 Phil. 215 (2009).

66See People v. Marquez, 400 Phil. 1313, 1321 (2000). 83 Section 9, Rule 116.

67Wong Tai v. United States, 273 U.S. 77, 82, 47 S.Ct. 300, 302, 71 84Supra note 73.
L.Ed. 545 (1927).
85 Id.
68 45 N.Y. 2d 589 (1978).
86 Section 3(a), Rule 117.
69Walsh v. United States, 371 F.2d 436 (1st Cir. 1967).
87People v. Abad Santos, supra note 57.
70 See United States v. Tanner, 279 F. Supp. 457, 474 (N.D. Ill.
1967). 88Du Bois v. People, 200 Ill, 157, 66 ARR 658 (1902); Kelly v.
PeopIe, 192 Ill, 119, 61 NE (1901), 425.
71 See United States v. Covelli, 210 F. Supp. 589 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
89 See Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan (2nd Div.),
72 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. supra note 21, at 192 (2007).

73 G.R. No. 172035, July 4, 2012, 675 SCRA 560. 90 See Hegerty v. Court of Appeals, 456 Phil. 543, 548 (2003),
citing DM Consunji, Inc. v. Esguerra, 328 Phil. 1168, 1180 (1996).
74 619 Phil. 306 (2009).
27
91 See Separate Opinion of Justice (ret.) Jose C. Vitug in Atty.
Serapio v. Sandiganbayan (3rd Division), 444 Phil. 499, 507
(2003).
92 Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th edition, 1979, p. 274.
93Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 427 Phil. 820, 860 (2002).
94 354 Phil. 372 (1998).
95 Id. at 388-389.
96 See Section 1(a), Rule 116, Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure. The last sentence reads: The prosecution may call at
the trial witnesses other than those named in the complaint or
information.
97 Boado, Leonor, Notes and Cases on the Revised Penal Code
(Books 1 and 2) and Special Penal Laws, 2004 edition, p. 554.
98 Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil. 290, 351 (2001).
99 HR Committee Journal, May 7, 1991:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
xxxx
CHAIRMAN GARCIA:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
That’s series.
HON. ISIDRO:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
That is not series, it is combination.
CHAIRMAN GARCIA:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Well, however you look at it…
28
HON. ISIDRO:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Because when you say combination or series, we seem to say that
two or more, di ba?
CHAIRMAN GARCIA:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Yeah. This distinguishes it, really, from the ordinary crimes. That is
why, I said, that is a very good suggestion because if it is only one
act, it may fall under ordinary crime but we have here a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts.
xxxx
HON. ISIDRO:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
When you say combination, two different acts? Now, a series may
mean repetition of the same act?
CHAIRMAN:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Repetition.
CHAIRMAN TAÑ ADA:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Yes.
HON. ISIDRO:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
So, in other words … that’s it. When we say combination, we mean
two different acts, it cannot be a repetition of the same act.
CHAIRMAN GARCIA:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
That will refer to series.

HON. ISIDRO:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
No, no supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.
xxxx
See also Rufus B. Rodriguez, The Crime of Plunder in the
Philippines, 1st edition, 2002.
100 Per the Reflections of Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, the
year of the launching of the PDAF project, as well the intended
beneficiaries, need not anymore be stated in the Information.
101 G.R. No. 89114, December 2, 1991, 204 SCRA 428.
102 See Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 170122, October 12,
2009, 603 SCRA 349, 361.
103 See Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 98.
104 Id. at 360-361.
105 Id.
106Berger v. State, 179 Md. 410 (1941; Hunter v. State, 193 Md.
596 (1949).
107 Section 7 (b), Rule 112, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
108State v. Canova, 278 Md. 483, 498-99, 365 A. 2d 988, 997-98
(1976).
109State v. Lassotovitch, 162 Md. 147, 156, 159 A. 362, 366
(1932).
29
110Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan (2nd Division),
supra note 21.
111
AMENDED INFORMATION
The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB
Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses former PRESIDENT OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada a.k.a. “ASIONG
SALONGA” AND a.k.a “JOSE VELARDE”, together with Jose ‘Jinggoy’
Estrada, Charlie ‘Atong’ Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte,
Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan or Eleuterio Ramos
Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane
Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No.
7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as
follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PUBLIC OFFICER, BEING
THEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-
accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY
AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES,
SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE
ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY,
RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire
BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount OR TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY
SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS
[P4,097,804,173.17], more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY
ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO
THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR A series of
overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS,
described as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(a)
by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL
INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE
HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00),
MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF
GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF
PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with
co-accused CHARLIE ‘ATONG’ ANG, Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Yolanda
T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AN (sic) JOHN DOES AND JANE
DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF
ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b)
by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR
misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR
PERSONAL gain benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS [P130,000,000.00], more or
less, representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION
PESOS [P200,000,000] tobacco excise tax share allocated for the
Province of Ilocor Sur under R.A. No. 7171, BY HIMSELF AND/OR
in CONNIVANCE with co-accused Charlie ‘Atong’ Ang, Alma Alfaro,
JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy,
and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES AND JANE
DOES;
(c)
by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN
AND BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
TO PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCK MORE OR LESS,
and the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF
STOCK MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE
AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO
MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,102,965,607.50] AND
MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX
30
HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY
PESOS [P744,612,450.00], RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE
OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION
FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS
AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,847,578,057.50]; AND BY COLLECTING
OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR
IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES,
COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID
PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE
HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS [P189,700,000.00], MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE
CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE
EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME “JOSE
VELARDE;”
(d)
by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS,
SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF
PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO
HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND
SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING
THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME “JOSE VELARDE” AT THE
EQUITABLE-PCI BANK.
CONTRARY TO LAW. [Underscoring in the original.]
112 See Alfredo C. Mendoza v. People of the Philippines and Juno
Cars, Inc., G.R. No. 197293, April 21, 2014, 722 SCRA 647.
DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:

I dissent from the ponencia which partially grants petitioner’s
motion for a bill of particulars and directs the Ombudsman to file
an Amended Information containing the following
particulars:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The particular overt act/s alleged to constitute the “combination”
and “series” charged in the Information.
A breakdown of the amounts of the kickbacks and commissions
allegedly received, stating how the amount of P172,834,500.00
was arrived at.
A brief description of the ‘identified’ projects where kickbacks and
commissions were received.
The approximate dates of receipt, “in 2004 to 2010 or thereabout,”
of the alleged kickbacks and commissions from the identified
projects. At the very least, the prosecution should state the year
when the kickbacks and transactions from the identified projects
were received.
The name[s] of Napoles’ non-government organizations (NGOs)
which were the alleged “recipients and/or target implementors of
Enrile’s PDAF projects.”
The government agencies to whom Enrile allegedly endorsed
Napoles’ NGOs. The particular person/s in each government
agency who facilitated the transactions need not anymore be
named as a particular in the Information.1
These particulars do not refer to ultimate facts, but rather to
evidentiary matters which unduly expand the details specifically
required in Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court for a sufficient
Information.
Information Filed Against Petitioner Sufficient
31
An Information charging a person with an offense is sufficient if,
among others, it states “the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense,” using “ordinary and concise language.”2
The minimum requirement is that the allegations in the
Information state the basic, ultimate facts constituting the
elements of the offense (and aggravating or qualifying
circumstances3) such that if the accused is later on prosecuted for
the same offense, he can claim prior jeopardy.4 All other details
can be left out, to be supplied during the presentation of the
prosecution’s case during trial. After all, what the Constitution
guarantees to the accused is that he is informed of the “nature and
cause of the accusation against him”5 and not of the “dates, names,
amounts, and other sundry details” relating to the offense charged.
If “a person of common understanding x x x [can] know what
offense is being charged x x x,”6 then the Information is free from
any taint of deficiency.
Thus, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court (Rules) succinctly
states:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the
accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the
acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the
name of the offended party; the approximate date of the
commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile (petitioner) stands charged before the
Sandiganbayan’s Third Division (Sandiganbayan) with the offense
of plunder as defined under Republic Act No. 7080 (RA 7080). The
elements of this offense are:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(1) [T]he offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons;
(2) [H]e amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth
through a combination or series of the following overt or criminal
acts described in Section 1(d) of RA 7080 as amended; and
(3) [T]he aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth
amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00.7
In relation to the second element, the six modes of accumulating
ill-gotten wealth under Section 1(d) of RA 7080
are:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation
of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
(b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share,
percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from
any person and/or entity in connection with any government
contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the
public officer;
(c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets
belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions,
agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries;
(d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any
shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or
participation including the promise of future employment in any
business enterprise or undertaking;
(e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial
monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of
decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or
special interests; or
(f) by taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship,
connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at
32
the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people
and the Republic of the Philippines.
The Information filed against petitioner
provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
xxxx
In 2004 to 2010 or thereabout, in the Philippines, and within this
Honorable Court’s jurisdiction, above-named accused JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, then a Philippine Senator, JESSICA LUCILA G. REYES, then
Chief of Staff of Senator Enrile’s Office, both public officers,
committing the offense in relation to their respective offices,
conspiring with one another and with JANET LIM NAPOLES,
RONALD JOHN LIM, and JOHN RAYMUND DE ASIS, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally amass, accumulate,
and/or acquire ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least ONE
HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY
FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (Php172,834,500.00)
through a combination or series of overt criminal acts, as
follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(a) by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES and/or her
representatives LIM, DE ASIS, and others, kickbacks or
commissions under the following circumstances: before, during
and/or after the project identification, NAPOLES gave, and ENRILE
and/or REYES received, a percentage of the cost of a project to be
funded from ENRILE’s Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF), in consideration of ENRILE’s endorsement, directly or
through REYES, to the appropriate government agencies, of
NAPOLES’ non-government organizations which became the
recipients and/or target implementors of ENRILE’s PDAF projects,
which duly-funded projects turned out to be ghosts or fictitious,
thus enabling NAPOLES to misappropriate the PDAF proceeds for
her personal gain;
(b) by taking undue advantage, on several occasions, of their
official positions, authority, relationships, connections, and
influence to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense and to the
damage and prejudice, of the Filipino people and the Republic of
the Philippines.8
By simply juxtaposing Section 1 and Section 2 of RA 7080, on the
one hand, and the allegations in the Information, on the other
hand, it becomes immediately apparent that the Information filed
against petitioner complies with the requirements under the Rules
and the Constitution. The Information alleges, in ordinary and
concise language, all the elements of plunder as defined in RA
7080 by stating that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(1) Petitioner, an incumbent “Philippine Senator,” is a “public
officer[]”;
(2) Petitioner, together with several co-accused, in conspiracy
with them, “amass[ed], accumulated and/or acquired ill-gotten
wealth” by:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(a) receiving personally or through a co-accused “kickbacks or
commissions” from another co-accused (Janet Lim Napoles
[Napoles]) in exchange for his endorsement to Napoles’ non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) of government projects
funded by petitioner’s discretionary funds (falling under Section
1(d)(b) of RA 7080); and
(b) taking undue advantage of his official position to unjustly
enrich himself at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of
the Filipino people (falling under Section 1(d)(f) of RA 7080); and
(3) The total amount of ill-gotten wealth amassed by petitioner
and his co-accused is “at least” P172.8 million (more than triple
the floor amount of P50 million required under Section 2 of RA
7080).
Allegations in the Information not Vague
The procedural remedy, in civil or criminal proceedings, to render
vague allegations in the complaint or Information more specific is
33
the bill of particulars. The details contained in the bill enable the
respondent in the civil proceedings to “prepare his responsive
pleading,”9 and the accused in the criminal proceedings to
“properly x x x plead and prepare for trial.”10redarclaw
Petitioner’s plea for a bill of particulars is grounded on his view
that the allegations in the Information filed against him are “a
series or combination of conclusions of fact and of law” not of
“fact[s] and circumstance[s] x x x [constituting] the crime
charged.”11 He also finds the allegations relating to his receipt of
kickbacks from projects funded by his legislative discretionary
funds “a bundle of confusing ambiguity.”12redarclaw
Petitioner prays that the prosecution provide him with details
relating to the allegations in the Information on his accumulation
of ill-gotten wealth, namely, the “overt acts” constituting the
combination or series of criminal acts, the names of the persons
who received the kickbacks, the names of the persons who gave
them, the breakdown of the amounts received, the dates of receipt,
the description of the nature, location and costs of the government
projects funded by his discretionary funds, the dates of launching
of the projects he funded, and the names of the beneficiary NGOs,
among others.13redarclaw
The ponencia finds merit in petitioner’s theory and orders the
prosecution to furnish petitioner most of the details sought. As a
consequence of its ruling, the ponencia directs an amendment of
the Information filed against petitioner.
Petitioner and the ponencia have transformed the nature of an
Information from “an accusation in writing charging a person with
an offense”14 to an initiatory pleading alleging “a cause of
action.”15 Unlike a complaint in civil proceedings which must
contain all the details constituting a cause of action,16 an
Information only needs to state, in ordinary and concise language,
“the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense”
such that the accused understands the crime he is being charged
with and that when he pleads to such charge, first jeopardy
attaches. In other words, the Information only needs to allege the
ultimate facts constituting the offense for which the accused
stands charged, not the finer details of why and how the illegal
acts alleged were committed. This is a long-standing and deeply
entrenched rule, applied by this Court in an unbroken line of ever
growing jurisprudence.17redarclaw
Thus, for the past decade alone, we ruled in Miguel v.
Sandiganbayan,18Go v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas19 and People
v. Romualdez,20 all penned by Mr. Justice Brion, that the
Informations filed in those cases did not suffer from any defect as
they alleged the ultimate, material facts of the offense for which
the accused stood charged. The accused in Miguel, who stood
charged with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019
(RA 3019), had argued that the Information filed against him was
defective because the allegation of “evident bad faith and manifest
partiality” within the contemplation of such provision referred to
his co-accused. We rejected such claim, noting that the allegation
in question “was merely a continuation of the prior allegation of
the acts”21 of petitioner and following the rule that “[t]he test of
the [I]nformation’s sufficiency is x x x whether the material facts
alleged in the complaint or information shall establish the
essential elements of the offense charged as defined in the
law.”22redarclaw
We applied the same rule to reject the claim of the accused in Go,
on trial for violation of Republic Act No. 337 (General Banking
Act), that the allegations in the Information filed against him were
vague, a result of the prosecution’s “shotgun approach” in framing
the Information.23 We found the Information sufficient, as it
complied with the rule that “an Information only needs to state the
ultimate facts constituting the offense, not the finer details of why
and how the illegal acts alleged amounted to undue injury or
damage x x x,” adding that “[t]he facts and circumstances
34
necessary to be included in the Information are determined by
reference to the definition and elements of the specific
crimes.”24redarclaw
The accused in Romualdez, like the accused in Miguel, also
questioned the sufficiency of the allegations in the Information
filed against him for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019,
contending that it failed to indicate how his holding of dual
positions caused “undue injury” to the government. We dismissed
the claim, noting that “[t]he allegation of ‘undue injury’ in the
Information, consisting of the extent of the injury and how it was
caused, is complete” and that the details behind such element of
the offense are “matters that are appropriate for the trial.”25 We
based this conclusion by reiterating that “an Information only
needs to state the ultimate facts constituting the
offense.”26redarclaw
During the same decade, we applied the rule in question in People
v. Sanico27 (per Reyes, J.), People v. Banzuela28 (per Leonardo-De
Castro, J.), Pielago v. People29 (per Reyes, J.), People v. Rayon30
(per Brion, J.), People v. Subesa31 (per Mendoza, J.), People v.
Anguac32 (per Velasco, J.), Los Bañ os v. Pedro33 (per Brion, J.) and
People v. Abello34 (per Brion, J.) to determine the offense
committed (as opposed to what is stated in the caption or
preamble of the Information). The accused in Sanico was charged
with acts of lasciviousness as penalized under the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), although the allegations in the Information covered
the elements for acts of lasciviousness as penalized under Republic
Act No. 7610 (RA 7610). In sustaining the Court of Appeals’
imposition of the penalty under RA 7610, we ruled that the failure
of the prosecution to allege violation of RA 7610 is not fatal as
“[t]he character of the crime is not determined by the caption or
preamble of the information nor by the specification of the
provision of law alleged to have been violated, but by the recital of
the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or
information.”35redarclaw

In contrast with the facts in Sanico, the accused in Banzuela stood
charged with acts of lasciviousness in violation of RA 7610 but the
Information failed to allege the element under Section 5 of that law
that the victim is a “child exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse.” Thus, we held that the accused can only be
made to suffer the penalty provided for acts of lasciviousness as
penalized under the RPC because “the character of the crime is
determined neither by the caption or preamble of the
information[,] nor by the specification of the provision of law
alleged to have been violated x x x but by the recital of the ultimate
facts and circumstances in the information.”36 We applied the
same rule in Abello to hold the accused liable for acts of
lasciviousness as penalized under the RPC even though the
Information filed against him charged him with acts of
lasciviousness as penalized under RA 7610 on the ground that the
prosecution failed to allege and prove the element of coercion or
intimidation as required under Section 5(b) of the latter law.
In Pielago, we held that the amendment of the Information against
the accused changing the designation of the crime alleged from
“acts of lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b) of RA 7610” to
“the crime of rape by sexual assault penalized under Article 266-
A(2)”37 of the RPC is not prejudicial to the accused because the
original Information already alleged the elements of the latter
felony and the “character of the crime is not determined by the
caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification
of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, but by the
recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or
information.”38 We arrived at the same conclusion in Subesa
where the accused was charged with acts of lasciviousness under
RA 7610 but was held liable for rape under Article 266-A(2) of the
RPC.
The Court again applied the rule in question in Rayon which
presented a variance between the crime designated and the acts
35
alleged in the Information. In that case, the accused was charged
with violation of Section 10(1), Article VI of RA 7610 (penalizing,
among others, other acts of abuse) but the allegations in the
Information made out a violation of Section 5(b) of the same law
(penalizing sexual abuse of children). In holding the accused liable
for the latter crime, we reiterated the rule that “the character of
the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the
information x x x but by the recital of the ultimate facts and
circumstances in the complaint or information.”39redarclaw
Anguac, on the other hand, involved an accused who was charged
with violation of Section 5(1) of RA 7610 (penalizing acts relating
to child prostitution) but the acts alleged in the Information and
the evidence presented during trial made out a case for violation
of Section 5(b) of that law (penalizing sexual abuse of children). In
holding the accused liable for the latter offense, we again held that
“the character of the crime is determined neither by the caption or
preamble of the information x x x but by the recital of the ultimate
facts and circumstances in the information.”40redarclaw
Lastly, in Los Bañ os, which involved an accused who was charged
with violation of Section 261(q) of the Omnibus Election Code and
not with violation of its amendatory law, Section 32 of Republic
Act No. 7166, we considered such omission non-consequential
because both provisions punish the same act of “carrying of
firearms in public places during the election period without the
authority of the COMELEC,”41 reiterating at the same time the rule
that “the character of the crime is not determined by the caption
or preamble of the information x x x [but] by the recital of the
ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or
information.”42redarclaw
The Information filed against petitioner in the case at bar complies
with the foregoing rule. It alleged that petitioner, a public official,
conspiring with his co-accused Napoles, received from the latter,
on several occasions, kickbacks of more than P50 million from
fictitious projects he funded with his legislative discretionary fund
through conduit NGOs controlled by Napoles, unjustly enriching
himself. These allegations state the basic, ultimate facts
constituting the elements of plunder as defined under RA 7080. As
aptly observed by the Sandiganbayan:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
An objective and judicious reading of the x x x Information shows
that there is nothing ambiguous or confusing in the allegations
therein. The Information clearly alleges that accused Enrile and
Reyes committed the offense in relation to their respective public
offices and that they conspired with each other and with accused
Napoles, Lim and De Asis, to amass, accumulate, and/or acquire ill-
gotten wealth amounting to at least PhP172,834,500.00. The
combination or series of overt criminal acts that the said accused
performed include the following circumstances: before, during
and/or after the project identification, Napoles gave, and accused
Enrile and/or Reyes received, a percentage of the cost of a project
to be funded from Enrile’s PDAF, in consideration of Enrile’s
endorsement, directly or through Reyes, to the appropriate
government agencies, of Napoles’ non-government organizations
(NGOs). These NGOs became the recipients and/or target
implementors of Enrile’s PDAF projects, which duly-funded
projects turned out to be ghosts or fictitious, thus enabling
Napoles to misappropriate the PDAF proceeds for her personal
gain. Sub-paragraph (b), on the other hand, alleges the predicate
act that said accused Enrile and Reyes took undue advantage, on
several occasions, of their official positions, authority,
relationships, connections, and influence to unjustly enrich
themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice, of the
Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
The Court finds that the allegations in the subject Information
sufficiently comply with the requirements of Sections 6, 8 and 9 of
Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. These
allegations adequately apprise the herein accused of the nature
and cause of the accusations against them.43 (Emphasis supplied)
36
Interestingly, the lack of allegations in an Information for plunder
through receipt of kickbacks (among others) on the (1) the
breakdown of the total amount of kickbacks received; (2) dates of
receipt of such; (3) the names of the persons who gave the
kickbacks; (4) the names of the persons who received them; and
(5) the combination or series of acts involving the receipt of such
kickbacks, did not elicit any complaint of vagueness from an
accused whom petitioner’s counsel also represented in the
Sandiganbayan. The Information for plunder filed against former
President Joseph Estrada in 2001, then represented by Atty.
Estelito Mendoza as lead counsel, alleged that the former received
kickbacks breaching the plunder threshold of P50 million without
stating the details in question. The Information reads in relevant
parts:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then a public officer, being then
the President of the Republic of the Philippines, by himself and/or
in connivance/conspiracy with his co-accused, who are members
of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates and/or other persons, by taking undue
advantage of his official position, x x x did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire by
himself, directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate
amount or total value of four billion ninety seven million eight
hundred four thousand one hundred seventy three pesos and
seventeen centavos [P4,097,804,173.17], more or less, thereby
unjustly enriching himself or themselves at the expense and to the
damage of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines,
through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts,
or similar schemes or means, described as follows:
(a) by receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on several
instances, money in the aggregate amount of five hundred forty-
five million pesos (P545,000,000.00), more or less, from illegal
gambling in the form of gift, share, percentage, kickback or any
form of pecuniary benefit, by himself and/or in connivance with
co-accused Charlie “Atong” Ang, Jose “Jinggoy” Estrada, Yolanda T.
Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, and John Does and Jane Does, in
consideration of toleration or protection of illegal gambling;
xxxx
(d) by unjustly enriching himself from commissions, gifts, shares,
percentages, kickbacks, or any form of pecuniary benefits, in
connivance with John Does and Jane Does, in the amount of more
or less three billion two hundred thirty three million one hundred
four thousand one hundred seventy three pesos and seventeen
centavos [P3,233,104,173.17] and depositing the same under his
account name “Jose Velarde” at the Equitable-PCI Bank.44
(Emphasis supplied)
That this Court had no occasion to review the clarity of the
allegations in the Estrada Information45 for purposes of issuing a
bill of particulars is no argument to ignore the import of such
allegations to resolve the case at bar. On the contrary, Estrada’s
decision not to seek a bill of particulars can only mean that he
considered such allegations clear enough to allow him, with the
aid of his counsel, now petitioner’s counsel, to “properly x x x
plead and prepare for trial.”46redarclaw
Information Considered Together With the Preliminary
Investigation Resolution
The basis of petitioner’s indictment before the Sandiganbayan is a
144-page Resolution, dated 28 March 2014, of the Office of the
Ombudsman (Resolution, see Annex “A”), attached to the
Information and furnished to petitioner, finding probable cause to
charge him for the offense of plunder.47The Resolution contains
all the details petitioner sought in his motion for a bill of
particulars and which the ponencia grants (see comparative table
in Annex “B”). Thus, the “combination” or “series” of acts
committed by petitioner and his co-accused constituting the
37
offense of plunder, the form of kickbacks received by petitioner,
the breakdown of the total amount of kickbacks petitioner
received, the names of persons who gave and received the
kickbacks, the names of the projects funded by petitioner’s pork
barrel funds, their description, beneficiaries, costs, implementing
agencies and partner organizations controlled by petitioner’s co-
accused Janet Napoles, and the names of the government agencies
to which such projects were endorsed are all found and discussed
in the Resolution.48 Petitioner also had access to the documents
supporting the Resolution.49redarclaw
The Resolution, already in petitioner’s possession, taken together
with the allegations in the Information, provide petitioner with the
details and information he needs to “enable him properly to plead
and prepare for trial.” As an inseparable complement to the
Information, the Resolution must be read together with the
allegations in the Information to determine whether the
allegations in the Information are vague. It is only when the
allegations in the Information, taken together with the Resolution,
leave ambiguities in the basic facts constituting the elements of the
offense of plunder that a bill of particulars should issue. If, as here,
the allegations in the Information, taken together with the
Resolution, clearly make out the ultimate facts constituting the
elements of plunder, a bill of particulars is not only unnecessary
but also improper.
It will not do for petitioner to feign ignorance of the fact that the
Resolution contains the details he seeks from the prosecution in
his motion for a bill of particulars. The Resolution is based on the
affidavits of witnesses and other public documents which
petitioner thoroughly parsed and attacked in his Omnibus Motion,
dated 10 June 2014, filed before the Sandiganbayan, to dismiss the
case against him.50 For the same reason, petitioner’s
demonstrated familiarity with the details relating to the
allegations in the Information filed against him overcomes the
presumption that he has no “independent knowledge of the facts
that constitute the offense”51 of which he is charged.
Considering the ultimate facts alleged in the Information together
with the relevant facts alleged in the Resolution indisputably
involves a procedural matter, which does not encompass any
constitutional right of an accused. It is an act which every accused
expectedly undertakes in order to inform himself of the charges
against him and intelligently prepare his defense. In short, it deals
precisely with how the accused should defend himself.
Since reading the Information together with the Resolution
concerns a procedural rule, and in fact is actually practiced at all
times by every accused, there is no basis to require such practice
to be conducted prospectively, that is, only after the promulgation
of the decision in the case at bar, absent any clear showing of
impairment of substantive rights.52redarclaw
Generally, rules of procedure can be given retroactive effect. “It is
axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does
not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason for this
is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise
from, procedural laws.”53redarclaw
Further, requiring the accused to consider the allegations in the
Information together with the allegations in the Resolution does
not in any way prejudice any constitutional or substantive rights
of the accused. On the contrary, such act benefits immensely the
accused insofar as it adequately apprises him of the charges
against him and clarifies the allegations in the Information.
Jurisprudence Cited by the Ponencia Inapplicable
The cases invoked by the ponencia as precedents for granting a bill
of particulars to petitioner – Republic v.
38
Sandiganbayan,54Tantuico v. Republic55 and Virata v.
Sandiganbayan,56 among others – are not in point because none of
them involved an accused who, like petitioner, underwent
preliminary investigation where he was afforded access to
documents supporting the charge against him. All those cases
involved civil proceedings for the forfeiture of ill-gotten wealth
where the respondents had no way of knowing the details of the
government’s case against them until after they were served a
copy of the forfeiture complaints. The ambiguities in the
allegations of the complaints filed against the respondents in those
cases cannot be clarified by reference to other documents akin to a
preliminary investigation resolution. They were left with no other
recourse but to seek clarification through a bill of particulars in
order to adequately prepare their responsive pleadings.
Plunder Charge Not Unique
According to the ponencia, “conviction for plunder carries with it
the penalty of capital punishment, for this reason, more process is
due, not less.”57 The ponencia seeks to impress that those accused
of the crime of plunder must be extended special treatment,
requiring evidentiary matters to be alleged in the Information, in
view of the penalty involved, which is reclusion perpetua.
The penalty of reclusion perpetua is not imposable exclusively to
those accused and found guilty of plunder. This punishment
likewise attaches to the crimes of murder,58 serious illegal
detention,59 and rape,60 among others. Meanwhile, syndicated
estafa,61 qualified trafficking in persons,62 possession of
prohibited drugs63 and illegal recruitment in large scale64 carry
with it the penalty of life imprisonment, which is a penalty harsher
than reclusion perpetua.
The ponencia gravely implies that a plunder charge uniquely
places an accused in a more protective mantle, by requiring the
prosecution to allege in the Information very specific details of
evidentiary nature, due to the stiff penalty involved. In contrast,
the Informations for other crimes, which do not even involve
pilfering of public funds but likewise carry the penalty of reclusion
perpetua or even, life imprisonment, are merely required to
contain allegations of ultimate facts.
The ponencia exaggerates the crime of plunder by implying that it
is a very complex crime involving “intricate predicate criminal acts
and numerous transactions and schemes that span a period of
time.”65 The ponencia unreasonably classifies plunder as a crime
more complicated to commit than other crimes similarly
punishable with reclusion perpetua or with the more severe
penalty of life imprisonment. As a consequence, the ponencia
unjustifiably treats those accused of plunder extraordinarily.
There is plainly no basis for such special treatment.
Suffice it to state, plunder is no more complex than murder or
syndicated estafa, or any other crime. For instance, there is
plunder if the accused public officer acquired ill-gotten wealth by
committing two acts of malversation of public funds with a total
amount of at least P50,000,000. Murder, on the other hand,
involves killing another person attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
Meanwhile, syndicated estafa is committed by five or more
persons formed with the intention of defrauding members of
associations and misappropriating the latter's money. Simply put,
the rule requiring merely the ultimate facts to be alleged in the
Information applies equally to all types of crimes or offenses,
regardless of the nature thereof. Otherwise, to accord those
accused with plunder an exceptional treatment, by requiring the
prosecution to allege in the Information all the unnecessary finer
details in the commission of plunder, denies those charged with
similarly serious or more serious crimes the equal protection of
the law.
Pernicious Consequences in Granting the Petition
39
The ponencia’s disposition of this case to (1) set aside the ruling of
the Sandiganbayan as having been rendered with grave abuse of
discretion even though the Sandiganbayan merely followed
existing law in the proper exercise of its discretion; (2) order the
prosecution to provide petitioner with most of the details listed in
his motion for a bill of particulars even though petitioner had
access to and possess such details; and (3) direct the prosecution
to amend the Information filed against petitioner in light of its
finding that the allegations in the Information are vague even
though they are clear, throws in disarray the orderly application of
remedial rules in criminal proceedings. The ponencia turns on its
head the purpose of remedial rules of “securing a just x x x
disposition of every action x x x.”66redarclaw
More alarmingly, the ruling unwittingly opens the door for
persons presently facing prosecution to seek re-arraignment and
new trial. By mutating the nature of an Information to require
allegation not only of the ultimate facts constituting the elements
of the offense charged but also all the details substantiating them,
ostensibly to satisfy the procedural due process right of the
accused, the ponencia not only repeals Rules of Court provisions
on the nature and content of an Information,67 but also vastly
expands the breadth of the procedural due process right of the
accused to a degree unheard of since the advent of criminal
procedure in this jurisdiction. As a new doctrine favoring the
accused, the ruling hands to any person facing criminal
prosecution today a new doctrinal basis to demand re-
arraignment and re-trial on the ground of denial of due process.
The Informations filed against these persons alleged only the
ultimate facts, devoid of supporting details, following the Rules of
Court and relevant jurisprudence.
The Court foresaw and prevented a similar scenario from
unfolding in the recent case of Estrada v. Ombudsman68 where
the petitioner, also a public official undergoing prosecution for
plunder, sought to redefine the nature of preliminary investigation
to make it comparable to administrative proceedings. We rejected
such theory, cognizant of the nightmarish chaos it would unleash
on the country’s criminal justice system:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
[T]o x x x declare that the guidelines in Ang Tibay, as amplified in
GSIS, are fundamental and essential requirements in preliminary
investigations will render all past and present preliminary
investigations invalid for violation of constitutional due process.
This will mean remanding for reinvestigation all criminal cases
now pending in all courts throughout the country. No preliminary
investigation can proceed until a new law designates a public
officer, outside of the prosecution service, to determine probable
cause. Moreover, those serving sentences by final judgment would
have to be released from prison because their conviction violated
constitutional due process.69 (Emphasis supplied)
Estrada is a cautionary tale against tinkering with settled rules of
criminal procedure in the guise of affording the accused his
constitutional due process right.
On the other hand, the pernicious practical implications of the
ponencia are: (1) the discretion of trial court judges, so vital in the
performance of their day-to-day functions, will be hamstrung by
this Court’s loose application of the heightened certiorari standard
of review of grave, not simple, abuse of discretion; (2) the remedy
of a bill of particulars will become a de riguer tool for the accused
awaiting arraignment to delay proceedings by simply claiming that
the allegations in the Information filed against him are vague even
though, taken together with the preliminary investigation
resolution, they clearly state the ultimate facts constituting the
elements of the offense charged; and (3) the prosecutorial arm of
the government, already hampered with inadequate resources,
will be further burdened with the task of collating for the accused
the details on the allegations in the Information filed against him
even though such are found in the preliminary investigation
resolution.
40
The entire rubric of the rules of criminal procedure rests on the
guarantee afforded by the Constitution that “no person shall be
held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of
law.”70 The “due process of law” contemplated in this guarantee,
however, means procedure bounded by reason. It does not
envision procedure defying law, logic and common sense.
Accordingly, I vote to DISMISS the petition for lack of grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division).
Endnotes:
1Ponencia, pp. 38-39.
2 Section 9, Rule 110, Rules.
3 Section 9, Rule 110, Rules; Serapio v. People, 444 Phil. 499
(2003).
4Serapio v. People, 444 Phil. 499, 561 (2003) (Sandoval-Gutierrez,
J., dissenting) citing Battle v. State, 365 So. 2d 1035, 1037 (1979).
5 Section 14, Article III, Constitution.
6 Section 9, Rule 110, Rules.
7 See Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil. 290, 343-344 (2001).
8Rollo, pp. 170-171.
9 Section 1, Rule 12, Rules.
10 Section 9, Rule 116, Rules.
11Rollo, p. 69.
12 Id. at 66.
13 Id. at 66-67. 19 619 Phil. 306 (2009).

14 Section 4, Rule 110, Rules. 20 581 Phil. 462 (2008).

15 Section 3, Rule 6, Rules. 21 Supra at 570.

16 Under Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules, “Every pleading shall 22 Supra at 570. Emphasis supplied.
contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct
statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies 23 Supra at 313, 315.
for his claim or defense, as the case may be, omitting the statement
of mere evidentiary facts. x x x.” 24 Supra at 317. Internal citation omitted; emphasis supplied.

17 Miguel v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172035, 4 July 2012, 675 25 Supra at 484.
SCRA 560; Go v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 619 Phil. 306 (2009);
Lazarte, Jr. v Sandiganbayan, 600 Phil. 475 (2009); People v. 26 Supra at 484.
Romualdez, 581 Phil. 462 (2008); People v. Batin, 564 Phil. 249
(2007); Caballero v. Sandiganbayan, 560 Phil. 302 (2007); Cruz v. 27 G.R. No. 208469, 13 August 2014.
Sandiganbayan, 504 Phil. 321 (2005); Domingo v. Sandiganbayan,
379 Phil. 708 (2000); Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, 324 Phil. 151 28 G.R. No. 202060, 11 December 2013, 712 SCRA 735.
(1996); Gallego v. Sandiganbayan, 201 Phil. 379 (1982). For the
application of the rule to determine the crime charged, see People 29 G.R. No. 202020, 13 March 2013, 693 SCRA 476.
v. Sanico, G.R. No. 208469, 13 August 2014, 733 SCRA 158; People
v. Banzuela, G.R. No. 202060, 11 December 2013, 712 SCRA 735; 30 G.R. No. 194236, 30 January 2013, 689 SCRA 745.
Pielago v. People, G.R. No. 202020, 13 March 2013, 693 SCRA 476;
People v. Rayon, G.R. No. 194236, 30 January 2013, 689 SCRA 745; 31 G.R. No. 193660, 16 November 2011, 660 SCRA 390.
People v. Subesa, G.R. No. 193660, 16 November 2011, 660 SCRA
390; Flordeliz v. People, 628 Phil. 124 (2010); People v. Sumingwa, 32 606 Phil. 728 (2009).
618 Phil. 650 (2009); People v. Anguac, 606 Phil. 728 (2009); Los
Bañ os v. Pedro, 604 Phil. 215 (2009); People v. Abello, 601 Phil. 33 604 Phil. 215 (2009).
373 (2009); Olivarez v. Court of Appeals, 503 Phil. 421 (2005);
Malto v. People, 560 Phil. 119 (2007); Reyes v. Camilon, G.R. No. 34 601 Phil. 373 (2009).
46198, 20 December 1990, 192 SCRA 445; People v. Mendoza, 256
Phil. 1136 (1989). 35 Supra. Emphasis supplied.

18 G.R. No. 172035, 4 July 2012, 675 SCRA 560. 36 Supra at 762. Internal citation omitted; emphasis supplied.
41
37 Supra at 487.
38 Supra at 488. Internal citation omitted; emphasis supplied.
39 Supra at 759-760. Internal citation omitted; emphasis supplied.
40 Supra at 739. Internal citation omitted.
41 Supra at 236.
42 Supra at 236. Internal citation omitted; emphasis supplied.
43 Resolution dated 3 July 2014 (denying motion to dismiss);
Comment, p. 9. In its Resolution dated 11 July 2014, denying
petitioner’s motion for a bill of particulars, the Sandiganbayan
reiterated the observation it made in its Resolution of 3 July 2014
on the sufficiency of the allegations in the Information filed against
petitioner:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The Court already upheld the sufficiency of the allegations in the
Information charging accused Enrile, among other persons, with
the crime of plunder in its Resolution dated July 3, 2014. It finds no
cogent reason to reconsider its ruling.
Moreover, the “desired details” that accused Enrile would like the
prosecution to provide are evidentiary in nature, which need not
be alleged in the Information. x x x. (Rollo, pp. 166, 168; emphasis
supplied)
44Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 7, at 423-425 (2001).
45 Estrada went to this Court to assail the constitutionality of the
plunder law (see Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, id.). It is of interest,
however, that in dismissing Estrada’s petition, the Court observed
that the Information filed against him contains “nothing x x x that
is vague or ambiguous x x x that will confuse petitioner in his
defense.” Id. at 347.
42
46 The Informations filed against Estrada’s co-accused were
substantially identical to that filed against him; none of them
sought a bill of particulars.
47Rollo, pp. 19-20; Petition, pp. 13-14.
48 Resolution, pp. 11-24, 28, 62-68, 83-103, 124-136.
49Rollo, pp. 19-20.
50 Id. at 172-226. Petitioner assailed the contents of the affidavits
and other public documents in question not because they lacked
the details substantiating the charge filed against him but because
he considered them either hearsay or without probative value.
51Balitaan v. CFI of Batangas, 201 Phil. 311, 323 (1982).
52 See Section 5 (5), Article VIII, Constitution. This provision
reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
“SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement
of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar,
and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same
grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme
Court.”
53Cheng v. Spouses Sy, 609 Phil. 617, 626 (2009), citing Tan, Jr. v.
Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 556, 559 (2002).
54 565 Phil. 172 (2007).
55 G.R. No. 89114, 2 December 1991, 204 SCRA 428.
56 G.R. No. 106527, 6 April 1993, 221 SCRA 52.
57Ponencia, p. 34.
58 Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code pertinently
provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Art. 248. Murder. – Any person who, not falling within the
provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of
murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if
committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
xxxx
59 Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code pertinently
provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. – Any private
individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other
manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
xxxx
60 Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code pertinently
provide:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
43
Article 266-A. Rape, When And How Committed. – Rape is
committed:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under
any of the following circumstances:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned
above be present.
xxxx
Article 266-B. Penalty. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next
preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
61 Presidential Decree No. 1689, dated 6 April 1980, increased the
penalty for certain forms of swindling or estafa. Section 1 thereof
provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Section 1. Any person or persons who shall commit estafa or other
forms of swindling as defined in Article 315 and 316 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, shall be punished by life imprisonment to
death if the swindling (estafa) is committed by a syndicate
consisting of five or more persons formed with the intention of
carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or
scheme, and the defraudation results in the misappropriation of
money contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks,
cooperatives, samahang nayon(s), or farmers associations, or of
funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general
public.

xxxx
62 Republic Act No. 10364, or the “Expanded Anti-Trafficking in
Persons Act of 2012” amended Sections 6 and 10 of Republic Act
No. 9208 to pertinently read as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Section 9. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby amended to
read as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
“SEC. 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. – Violations of Section 4
of this Act shall be considered as qualified
trafficking:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
“x x x
“(d) When the offender is a spouse, an ascendant, parent, sibling,
guardian or a person who exercises authority over the trafficked
person or when the offense is committed by a public officer or
employee;
“x x x
“(f) When the offender is a member of the military or law
enforcement agencies;
“(g) When by reason or on occasion of the act of trafficking in
persons, the offended party dies, becomes insane, suffers
mutilation or is afflicted with Human Immunodeficiency Virus
(HIV) or the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS);
“(h) When the offender commits one or more violations of Section
4 over a period of sixty (60) or more days, whether those days are
continuous or not; and
44
“(i) When the offender directs or through another manages the
trafficking victim in carrying out the exploitative purpose of
trafficking.”
Section 12. Section 10 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby amended
to read as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
“x x x x
(e) Any person found guilty of qualified trafficking under Section 6
shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less
than Two million pesos (P2,000,000.00) but not more than Five
million pesos (P5,000,000.00);
x x x x”
63 Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 pertinently
provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. - The penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
(P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless
authorized by law, shall possess any dangerous drug in the
following quantities, regardless of the degree of purity
thereof:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
xxxx
64 Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8042 or the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as amended by Republic Act No.
10022, pertinently provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
xxxx
(b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than
Two million pesos (P2,000,000.00) nor more than Five million
pesos (P5,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment
constitutes economic sabotage as defined therein.
Section 5(m) of the same law states that: “Illegal recruitment when
committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered as
offense involving economic sabotage.”
65Ponencia, p. 34.
66 Section 6, Rule 1, Rules.
67 Rule 110, Section 4 on the definition of an Information
provides: “An Information is an accusation in writing charging a
person with an offense x x x.” Rule 110, Section 6 states the rule on
the sufficiency of an Information: “A complaint or information is
sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the
offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of
as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place
where the offense was committed.” (Emphasis supplied)
68 G.R. Nos. 212140-41, 21 January 2015.
69 Id. at 34.
70 Section 14(1), Article III, Constitution.
COMPARATIVE TABLE ON THE DETAILS SOUGHT IN
PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS WHICH THE
PONENCIA GRANTS, THE CONTENTS OF THE OMBUDSMAN
RESOLUTION DATED 28 MARCH 2014 AND THE DISSENT OF
CARPIO, J.
Petitioner’s Motion for Bill of Particulars
Ponencia of Brion, J.
45
Ombudsman Resolution of 28 March 2014 (Resolution) and
Dissent of Carpio, J.
What are the particular overt acts which constitute the
“combination”? What are the particular overt acts which constitute
the “series”? Who committed these acts?
GRANTED. x x x x [T]he various overt acts that constitute the
“combination” and “series” the Information alleged, are material
facts that should not only be alleged, but be stated with sufficient
definiteness so that the accused would know what he is
specifically charged of and why he stands charged, so he can
properly defend himself x x x. (p. 27)
The details sought and granted are discussed on pp. 11-24, 62-68
of the Resolution.1
If [the kickbacks were received] on several occasions and in
different amounts, specify the amount on each occasion and the
corresponding date of receipt.
GRANTED. [T]he amounts involved x x x should be stated; these
transactions are not necessarily uniform in amount and cannot
simply collectively be described as amounting to P172,834,500
without hampering Enrile’s right to respond x x x. (p. 28)
The details sought and granted are found on p. 28 of the
Resolution. (Indicating the breakdown of kickbacks petitioner
indirectly received from Napoles annually during the period 2004-
2010, totaling P172,834,5002).
Enrile should likewise know the approximate dates at least of the
receipt of the kickbacks and commissions, so that he could prepare
the necessary pieces of evidence x x x to disprove the allegations
against him. (p. 28)
Describe each project identified, how and by whom identified, the
nature, location and cost of each project.
GRANTED. x x x [T]he “identified project” and “Napoles' NGO” are
material facts that should be clearly and definitely stated in the
Information to allow Enrile to adequately prepare his defense
evidence on the specific transaction pointed to. (p. 29)
The details sought and granted are found on pp. 14-16 of the
Resolution. (The list of the Napoles NGOs is found on pp. 14, 653
while a tabular list of the projects in question, their respective
beneficiaries, costs, implementing agencies and partner Napoles
NGOs is found on pp. 15-16.4)
When and to whom did Enrile endorse the projects in favor of
“Napoles [NGOs]” which became the recipients and/or target
implementors of Enrile’s PDAF Projects? Name the Napoles NGOs
which became the recipients/target implementors of Enrile’s
PDAF Projects. Who paid Napoles, and from whom did Napoles
collect the funds for the projects which turned out to be ghosts or
fictitious? Who authorized the payments for each project?
GRANTED. The government agencies to whom Enrile endorsed
Napoles’ NGOs are also material facts that must be specified, since
they served a necessary role in the crime charged – the alleged
conduits between Enrile and Napoles’ NGOs x x x. (p. 29)
The details sought and granted are found on pp. 11, 14 of the
Resolution.5redarclaw
The other details sought by petitioner are found on pp. 15-16 of
the Resolution. (see note 6)
Endnotes:
1 In its Resolution, the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman)
found that the accused’s modus operandi, encompassing the series
or combination of acts within the meaning of the Plunder Law,
consists of petitioner’s staff, either through Atty. Jessica Reyes
(Reyes) or Atty. Jose Antonio Evangelista II, tipping the camp of his
co-accused Janet Napoles (Napoles) of available pork barrel funds
for use in a pre-agreed scheme to funnel such funds to Napoles’
private organizations (NGOs) to finance ghost projects concocted
by Napoles in exchange for kickbacks or commissions indirectly
paid to petitioner and his co-accused, with Napoles and other
public officials also receiving their share of “commissions.” This
modus operandi, the Ombudsman stated, was followed in nine
projects funded by petitioner’s pork barrel funds for which
petitioner received a total kickback of at least P172,834,500.
46
2 Namely, P1,500,000 in 2004; P14,662,000 in 2005; P13,300,000
in 2006; P27,112,500 in 2007; P62,550,000 in 2008; P23,750,000
in 2009 and P30,000,000 in 2010. The Resolution stated (p. 28)
that these figures were based on the entries in the ledger kept by
Benhur Luy (Luy), a key prosecution witness. Such entries are
evidentiary matters which are properly disclosed during trial and
need not be alleged in the Information.
3 The Resolution identified these NGOs as Agri and Economic
Program for Farmers Foundation, Inc. (AEPPF); Agricultura Para
sa Magbubukid Foundation, Inc. (APMFI); Countrywide Agri and
Rural Economic Development Foundation, Inc. (CARED);
Masaganang Ani Para sa Magsasaka Foundation, Inc. (MAMFI);
People’s Organization for Progress and Development Foundation,
Inc. (POPDFI); and Social Development Program for Farmers
Foundation, Inc. (SDPFFI).
4 The Resolution listed nine (9) projects.
5 The Resolution stated that the relevant implementing agencies
are the National Agribusiness Corporation (NABCOR), National
Livelihood Development Corporation (NLDC) and Technology
Resource Center (TRC).
Republic of the Philippines
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
OMBUDSMAN BLDG., AGHAM ROAD, NORTH TRIANGLE, DILIMAN,
QUEZON CITY
-------------------------------------------------------------------
NATIONAL BUREAU OF OMB-C-C-13-0318
INVESTIGATION (NBI) FOR: VIOLATION OF RA 7080
REP. BY: Asst. Dir. MEDARDO (PLUNDER)
DE LEMOS (Criminal Case) VICTOR ROMAN COJAMCO CACAL
Paralegal
ATTY. LEVITO D. BALIGOD National Agribusiness Corporation

Complainants, ROMULO M. RELEVO

General Services Unit Head
- versus - National Agribusiness Corporation

JUAN PONCE ENRILE MARIA NINEZ P. GUAÑ IZO

Senator Bookkeeper/OIC-Accouting Division
Senate of the Philippines National Agribusiness Corporation

JESSICA LUCILA GONZALES REYES MA. JULIE A. VILLARALVO-JOHNSON

Former Chief of Staff Former Chief Accountant
Office of Senator Enrile National Agribusiness Corporation

JOSE ANTONIO EVANGELISTA II RHODORA BULATAD MENDOZA

Deputy Chief of Staff Former Director for Financial Management Services/
Office of Senator Enrile Former Vice President for Administration and Finance
National Agribusiness Corporation
ALAN A. JAVELLANA
President GREGORIA G. BUENAVENTURA
National Agribusiness Corporation Division Chief, Asset Management Division
National Livelihood Development Corporation
GONDELINA G. AMATA
President EMMANUEL ALEXIS G. SEVIDAL
National Livelihood Development Corporation Director IV
National Livelihood Development Corporation
ANTONIO Y. ORTIZ
Director General SOFIA D. CRUZ
Technology Resource Center Chief Financial Specialist/Project Management Assistant IV
National Livelihood Development Corporation
DENNIS LACSON CUNANAN
Deputy Director General CHITA C. JALANDONI
Technology Resource Center Department Manager III
National Livelihood Development Corporation
47
 JUAN PONCE ENRILE
FRANCISCO B. FIGURA Senator
MARIVIC V. JOVER Senate of the Philippines
Both of the Technology Resource Center
JESSICA LUCILA GONZALES REYES
MARIO L. RELAMPAGOS Former Chief of Staff
Undersecretary for Operations JOSE ANTONIO VALERA EVANGELISTA II
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Former Director IV/ Deputy Chief of Staff
Both of the Office of Senator Enrile
LEAH
LALAINE ALAN ALUNAN JAVELLANA
MALOU1 President
Office of the Undersecretary for Operations RHODORA BULATAD MENDOZA
All of the Department of Budget and Management Former Director for Financial Management Service/
Former Vice President for Administration and Finance
JANET LIM NAPOLES VICTOR ROMAN COJAMCO CACAL
RUBY TUASON Paralegal
JOCELYN DITCHON PIORATO MARIA NINEZ PAREDES GUAÑ IZO
MYLENE T. ENCARNACION Bookkeeper/OIC-Accouting Division
JOHN RAYMOND (RAYMUND) DE ASIS ENCARNITA CRISTINA POTIAN MUNSOD
EVELYN D. DE LEON Former Human Resources Supervisor/Manager
JOHN/JANE DOES MA. JULIE ASOR VILLARALVO-JOHNSON
Private Respondents Former Chief Accountant
SHYR ANN MONTUYA
Respondents. Accounting Staff/Assistant
All of the National Agribusiness Corporation
x----------------------------------x
GONDELINA GUADALUPE AMATA
FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE OMB-C-C-13-0396 President (Non-elective)
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN FOR: VIOLATION OF CHITA CHUA JALANDONI
SEC. 3 (e) Department Manager III
RA 3019, RA 7080 (PLUNDER) EMMANUEL ALEXIS SEVIDAL
Complainant, (Criminal Case) Director IV
OFELIA ELENTO ORDOÑ EZ
- versus - Cashier IV
FILIPINA TOLENTINO RODRIGUEZ
48
Budget Officer IV SUSAN R. VICTORINO
SOFIA DAING CRUZ LUCITA SOLOMON
Project Development Assistant IV WILBERTO P. DE GUZMAN (Deceased)
All of the the National Livelihood Development Corporation JOHN DOE
JOHN (MMRC TRADING) DOE
ANTONIO YRIGON ORTIZ MYLA OGERIO
Former Director General MARGARITA E. GUADINEZ
DENNIS LACSON CUNANAN JOCELYN DITCHON PIORATO
Director General DORILYN AGBAY FABIAN
HERNANI DITCHON
MARIA ROSALINDA MASONGSONG LACSAMANA RODRIGO B. GALAY
Former Group Manager LAARNI A. UY
AMPARO L. FERNANDO
CONSUELO LILIAN REYES ESPIRITU AILEEN PALALON PALAMA
Budget Officer IV JOHN RAYMOND (RAYMUND) DE ASIS
FRANCISCO BALDOZA FIGURA MYLENE TAGAYON ENCARNACION
Department Manager III RENATO SOSON ORNOPIA
MARIVIC VILLALUZ JOVER JESUS BARGOLA CASTILLO
Chief Accountant NOEL V. MACHA
All of the Technology Resource Center Private Respondents

JANET LIM NAPOLES Respondents.

RUBY TUASON/TUAZON
JO CHRISTINE LIM NAPOLES x------------------------------------x
JAMES CHRISTOPHER LIM NAPOLES
EULOGIO DIMAILIG RODRIGUEZ JOINT RESOLUTION
EVELYN DITCHON DE LEON
RONALD JOHN LIM For resolution by the Special Panel of Investigators2 constituted
FERNANDO RAMIREZ on 20 September 2013 by the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary
NITZ CABILAO investigation on: 1) the complaint filed on September 16, 2013
MARK S. OLIVEROS with this Office by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and
EDITHA P. TALABOC Atty. Levito Baligod (The NBI Complaint), for violation of Republic
DELFIN AGCAOILI, JR. Act (RA) No. 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of
DANIEL BALANOBA Plunder), and 2) the complaint filed on November 18, 2013 by the
LUCILA M. LAWAS-YUTOK Field Investigation Office (FIO), Office of the Ombudsman, for
ANTONIO M. SANTOS violations of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
49
Practices Act) and Plunder, in connection with the alleged Countrywide Agri and Rural Economic Development Foundation,
anomalous utilization of the Priority Development Assistance Inc.
Fund (PDAF) of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (Senator Enrile) from Evelyn Ditchon De Leon (De Leon)
2004 to 2010. Private respondent
Dennis Lacson Cunanan (Cunanan)
The NBI Complaint for Plunder, docketed as OMB-C-C-13-0318, Deputy Director General
charges the following respondents:LawlibraryofCRAlaw Technology Resource Center
Name Victor Roman Cacal (Cacal)
Position/Agency Paralegal
Juan Ponce Enrile (Enrile) National Agribusiness Corporation
Senator Romulo M. Relevo (Relevo)
Jessica Lucila Gonzales Reyes (Reyes) National Agribusiness Corporation
Chief of Staff /Office of Senator Enrile Maria Ninez Guañ izo (Guañ izo)
Jose Antonio Valera Evangelista II (Evangelista) Bookkeeper/OIC Accounting Division
Former Director V/Deputy Chief of Staff / Office of Senator Enrile National Agribusiness Corporation
Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles) Ma. Julie Asor Villaralvo-Johnson (Johnson)
Private respondent Former Chief Accountant/National Agribusiness Corporation
Ruby Tuason (Tuason) Rhodora Bulatad Mendoza (Mendoza)
Private respondent Former Director for Financial Management Services and Former
Alan A. Javellana (Javellana) Vice President for Administration and Finance/National
Former President Agribusines Corporation
National Agribusiness Corporation Gregoria G. Buenaventura (Buenaventura)
Gondelina Guadalupe Amata (Amata) National Livelihood Development Corporation
President Emmanuel Alexis Gagni Sevidal (Sevidal)
National Livelihood Development Corp. Director IV
Antonio Yrigon Ortiz (Ortiz) National Livelihood Development Corporation
Director General Sofia Daing Cruz (Cruz)
Technology Resource Center Chief Financial Specialist/Project Development Assistant
Jocelyn Ditchon Piorato (Piorato) IV/National Livelihood Development Corporation
Agricultura Para Sa Magbubukid Foundation, Inc. (APMFI) Chita Chua Jalandoni (Jalandoni)
Nemesio Pablo, Jr. (Pablo) Department Manager III
Private respondent National Livelihood Development Corporation
Mylene Tagayon Encarnacion (Encarnacion) Francisco Baldoza Figura (Figura)
Private respondent Department Manager III
John Raymond Sales De Asis (De Asis) Technology Resource Center
Marivic Villaluz Jover (Jover)
50
Chief Accountant/ Technology Resource Center National Agribusiness Corporation
Mario L. Relampagos (Relampagos) Maria Ninez Paredes Guañ izo (Guañ izo)
Undersecretary for Operations/Department of Budget and Bookkeeper/OIC Accounting Division
Management (DBM) National Agribusiness Corporation
Leah3 Encarnita Cristina Potian Munsod (Munsod)
Office of the Undersecretary for Operations/Department of Budget Former Manager of Human Resources Administrative Service
and Management (DBM) Division
Lalaine4 National Agribusiness Corporation
Office of the Undersecretary for Operations/Department of Budget Ma. Julie Asor Villaralvo-Johnson (Johnson)
and Management (DBM) Former Chief Accountant
Malou5 National Agribusiness Corporation
Office of the Undersecretary for Operations/Department of Budget Shyr Ann Montuya (Montuya)
and Management (DBM) Accounting Assistant
JOHN and JANE DOES National Agribusiness Corporation
The FIO complaint,6 on the other hand, docketed as OMB-C-C-13- Gondelina Guadalupe Amata (Amata)
0396, charges the following individuals with Plunder and violation President
of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices National Livelihood Development Corporation
Act:LawlibraryofCRAlaw Chita Chua Jalandoni (Jalandoni)
Name Department Manager III
Position/Agency National Livelihood Development Corporation
Juan Ponce Enrile (Enrile) Emmanuel Alexis Gagni Sevidal (Sevidal)
Senator Director IV
Jessica Lucila Gonzales Reyes (Reyes) National Livelihood Development Corporation
Chief of Staff /Office of Senator Enrile Ofelia Olento Ordoñ ez (Ordoñ ez)
Jose Antonio Valera Evangelista II (Evangelista) Cashier IV
Former Director V/Deputy Chief of Staff
Office of Senator Enrile National Livelihood Development Corporation
Alan Alunan Javellana (Javellana) Filipina Tolentino Rodriguez (Rodriguez)
Former President Budget Officer IV
National Agribusiness Corporation National Livelihood Development Corporation
Rhodora Bulatad Mendoza (Mendoza) Sofia Daing Cruz (Cruz)
Former Director for Financial Management Services and Former Chief Financial Specialist/Project Development Assistant IV
Vice President for Administration and Finance National Livelihood Development Corporation
National Agribusiness Corporation Antonio Yrigon Ortiz (Ortiz)
Victor Roman Cacal (Cacal) Director General
Paralegal Technology Resource Center
51
Dennis Lacson Cunanan (Cunanan)
Deputy Director General
Technology Resource Center
Maria Rosalinda Masongsong Lacsamana (Lacsamana)
Former Group Manager
Technology Resource Center
Consuelo Lilian Reyes Espiritu (Espiritu)
Budget Officer IV
Technology Resource Center
Francisco Baldoza Figura (Figura)
Department Manager III
Technology Resource Center
Marivic Villaluz Jover (Jover)
Chief Accountant
Technology Resource Center
Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles)
Private respondent
Ruby Tuason/Ruby Tuazon (Tuason)
Private respondent
Jo Christine Lim Napoles (Jo Christine)
Private respondent
James Christopher Lim Napoles (James Christopher)
Private respondent
Eulogio Dimailig Rodriguez (Rodriquez)
Private respondent
Evelyn Ditchon De Leon (De Leon)
Private respondent
Ronald John Lim (Lim)
Private respondent
Fernando Ramirez (Ramirez)
Private respondent
Nitz Cabilao (Cabilao)
Private respondent
Atty. Mark S. Oliveros (Oliveros)
Notary Public
Atty. Editha P. Talaboc (Talaboc)
52
Notary Public
Atty. Delfin Agcaoili, Jr. (Agcaoili)
Notary Public
Atty Daniel Balanoba (Balanoba)
Notary Public
Atty. Lucila M. Lawas-Yutoc (Yutoc)
Notary Public
Atty. Antonio M. Santos (Santos)
Notary Public
Susan R. Victorino (Victorino)
Certified Public Accountant
Lucita P. Solomon (Solomon)
Certified Public Accountant
Wilberto P. De Guzman (De Guzman)
Certified Public Accountant
John Doe
Proprietor of Nutrigrowth Philippines
John Doe
Proprietor of MMRC Trading
Myla Ogerio (Ogerio)
Agri and Economic Program for Farmers Foundation, Inc.
Margarita A. Guadinez (Guadinez)
Agri and Economic Program for Farmers Foundation, Inc.
Jocelyn Ditchon Piorato (Piorato)
Agricultura Para Sa Magbubukid Foundation, Inc.
Dorilyn Agbay Fabian (Fabian)
Agricultura Para Sa Magbubukid Foundation, Inc.
Hernani Ditchon (Ditchon)
Agricultura Para Sa Magbubukid Inc.
Rodrigo B. Galay (Galay)
Employee/Agricultura Para sa Magbubukid Foundation, Inc.
Laarni A. Uy (Uy)
Employee/Agricultura Para sa Magbubukid Foundation, Inc.
Amparo L. Fernando (Fernando)
Countrywide Agri and Rural Economic Development Foundation,
Inc.
Aileen Palalon Palama (Palama)
Countrywide Agri and Rural Economic Development Foundation,
Inc.
John Raymond Sales De Asis (De Asis)
Countrywide Agri and Rural Economic Development Foundation,
Inc.
Mylene Tagayon Encarnacion (Encarnacion)
Countrywide Agri and Rural Economic Development Foundation,
Inc.
Renato Soson Ornopia (Ornopia)
Masaganang Ani Para Sa Magsasaka Foundation, Inc.
Jesus Bargola Castillo (Castillo)
People’s Organization for Progress and Development Foundation,
Inc.
Noel V. Macha (Macha)
Employee/Social Development Program for Farmers Foundation,
Inc.
Having arisen from the same or similar facts and transactions,
these cases are resolved jointly.
I. THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On March 22, 2013, agents of the NBI, acting on a complaint from
the parents of Benhur Luy (Luy) that Luy had been illegally
detained, swooped down on the South Wing Gardens of the Pacific
Plaza Tower in Bonifacio Global City, Taguig City and rescued Luy.
A criminal case for Serious Illegal Detention was soon after filed
against Reynald Lim7 and his sister, Janet Lim Napoles8 (Napoles),
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City where it remains
pending.
Before the NBI, Luy claimed that he was detained in connection
with the discharge of his responsibilities as the “lead employee” of
the JANET LIM NAPOLES Corporation (JLN) which, by his account,
had been involved in overseeing anomalous implementation of
several government-funded projects sourced from, among others,
53
the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) of several
congressmen and senators of the Republic. The NBI thus focused
on what appeared to be misuse and irregularities attending the
utilization and implementation of the PDAF of certain lawmakers,
in connivance with other government employees, private
individuals and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) which
had been set up by JLN employees, upon the instructions of
Napoles.
In the course of the NBI investigation which included conduct of
interviews and taking of sworn statements of Luy along with
several other JLN employees including Marina Sula (Sula) and
Merlina Suñ as (Suñ as)9 (the whistleblowers), the NBI uncovered
the “scheme” employed in what has now been commonly referred
to as the PDAF or Pork Barrel Scam, outlined in general as
follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Either the lawmaker or Napoles would commence negotiations on
the utilization of the lawmaker's
PDAF;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The lawmaker and Napoles then discuss, and later approve, the list
of projects chosen by the lawmaker, the corresponding
Implementing Agency (IA), namely the National Agribusiness
Corporation (NABCOR), the National Livelihood Development
Corporation (NLDC), and the Technology Resource Center (TRC
[formerly Technology and Livelihood Resource Center]), through
which the projects would be coursed, and the project cost, as well
as the lawmaker's "commission" which would range between
40%-60% of either the project cost or the amount stated in the
Special Allotment Release Order
(SARO);chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
After the negotiations and upon instructions from Napoles, Luy
prepares the so-called “listing” which contains the list of projects
allocated by the lawmaker to Napoles and her NGOs, the name of
the IA, and the project cost;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The lawmaker would then adopt the “listing” and write to the
Senate President and the Finance Committee Chairperson, in the
case of a Senator, and to the House Speaker and Chair of the
Appropriations Committee, in the case of a Congressman,
requesting Budget and Management
(DBM);chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The DBM soon issues a SARO addressed to the chosen IA
indicating the amount deducted from the lawmaker’s PDAF
allocation, and later issues a Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA) to the
IA which would thereafter issue a check to the Napoles-controlled
NGO listed in the lawmaker’s
endorsement;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Napoles, who recommends to the lawmaker the NGO which would
implement the project, directs her employee to prepare a letter for
the lawmaker’s signature endorsing the selected NGO to the IA.
The IA later prepares a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
covering the project to be executed by the lawmaker or his/her
authorized staff member, the IA and the chosen
NGO;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Head of the IA, in exchange for a 10% share in the project cost,
subsequently releases the check/s to the Napoles-controlled NGO
from whose bank accounts Napoles withdraws the proceeds
thereof;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Succeeding tranche payments are released by the IA upon
compliance and submission by the NGO of the required
documents.
From 2004 to 2010, Senator Enrile, then and presently a senator of
the Republic of the Philippines,10 continuously indorsed the
implementation of his PDAF-funded livelihood and agricultural
production projects in different parts of the country to NGOs
associated with, or controlled by, private respondent Napoles.
54
From 2007 to 2009, a total of Php345,000,000.00 covered by nine
(9) SAROs was taken from his PDAF, to wit:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
1. ROCS-07-04618 dated 06 March 2007;11redarclaw
2. ROCS-08-01347 dated 31 January 2008;12redarclaw
3. ROCS-08-05216 dated 11 June 2008;13redarclaw
4. ROCS-08-07211 dated 3 October 2008;14redarclaw
5. ROCS-09-00804 dated 13 February 2009;15redarclaw
6. ROCS-09-00847 dated 12 February 2009;16redarclaw
7. ROCS-09-04952 dated 09 July 2009;17redarclaw
8. ROCS-09-04996 dated 10 July 2009;18redarclaw
9. G-09-07112 dated 25 September 2009.19
After the SAROs were released by the DBM, Senator Enrile,
through his Chief of Staff respondent Reyes,20 identified the
following Government-Owned and-Controlled Corporations
(GOCCs) as the IAs of the projects to be funded by his PDAF: a)
NABCOR, b) NLDC, and c) the TRC.
Senator Enrile, through Reyes, authorized respondent Evangelista
to act for him, deal with the parties involved in the process, and
sign documents necessary for the immediate and timely
implementation of his PDAF-funded projects.
Through Evangelista, the Senator also designated21 the following
NGOs as “project partners” in the implementation of the livelihood
projects financed by his PDAF, viz:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Agri and Economic Program for Farmers Foundation, Inc. TRC/TLRC
(AEPFFI) of which respondent Nemesio C. Pablo, Jr. was CARED
President;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary Guigaguit, Surigao del Norte
Technical Assistance Technology Transfer through Video courses
Agricultura Para sa Magbubukid Foundation, Inc. (APMFI) of (VCDs) and Printed Materials provided by TLRC
which respondent Jocelyn D. Piorato was San Benito, Surigao del Norte
President;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary 50,000.00 for each municipality
San Agustin, Surigao del Norte
Countrywide Agri and Rural Economic Development Foundation, Service Fee (3%) by TLRC
Inc. (CARED) of which Simonette Briones was 150,000.00 for each municipality
President;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary 2. ROCS-08- 01347

Masaganang Ani Para sa Magsasaka Foundation, Inc. (MAMFI) of Php25,000,000

which witness Marina Sula was Vegetable Seeds, Hand Tools, Gloves, Masks, Vest, Cap, Garden,
President;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary Tools, and Knapsack Sprayer
Passi City, Iloilo Sta. Maria, Bulacan Doñ a Remedios Trinidad,
People’s Organization for Progress and Development Foundation, Bulacan Mabuhay, Zamboanga Sibugay Dinas, Zamboanga del Sur
Inc., (POPDFI) of which witness Merlina Suñ as was President; and 5,000,000 for each municipality
NABCOR
Social Development Program for Farmer’s Foundation, Inc. POPFDI
(SDPFFI) of which witness Benhur Luy was President. 3. ROCS-08- 05216
The following table discloses the details of Senator Enrile’s
utilization of his Php345,000,000.00 PDAF:LawlibraryofCRAlaw Php50,000,000
1,294 sets of Fertilizer, Gardening Packages, and Knapsack sprayer
SARO NO. & Amount (in Php) Don Marcelino, Davao del Sur Banaybanay, Davao Oriental
Projects/ Activities Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte Magpet, North Cotabato
Beneficiaries/ LGUs 20,000,000
Total Pojects/ Activities Costs (in PHP) NABCOR
Implementing Agency MAMFI
Project Partners /NGOs General Tinio, Nueva Ecija Tuamuini, Isabela La Trinidad, Benguet
1. ROCS-07- 04618 San Juan, Batangas Boac, Marinduque
30,000,000
Php20,000,000 NABCOR
Financial Assistance Grants/Subsidies for Tools and Implements SDPFFI
Bacuag, Surigao del Norte 4. ROCS-08- 07211
4,800,000.00 for each municipality
55
 Php50,000,000 TLRC/TRC
Agricultural Production Package (knapsack sprayer, fertilizer, and APMFI
gardening tools) 7. ROCS-09- 04952
Kibungan, Benguet San Gabriel, La Union Luna, La Union
Natividad, Pangasinan Passi City, Iloilo Php50,000,000
25,000,000
NABCOR
MAMFI 604 Agricultural Improvement Livelihood Packages (sprayers,
bottles of fertilizers, rake and pick mattock)
Glan, Saranggani Maitum Saranggani Cagwait, Surigao del Sur Hingyon, Ifugao Divilacan, Isabela Umingan, Pangasinan Doñ a
Carrasacal, Surigao del Sur Remedios Trinidad, Bulacan Oas, Albay
25,000,000 25,000,000
NABCOR NLDC
SDPFFI AEPFFI
5. ROCS-09- 00804
Alubijid, Misamis Oriental Llorente, Eastern Samar Bansalan,
Php25,000,000 Davao del Sur Montevista, Compostela Valley Tupi, South Cotabato
Agricultural Production Packages (farm inputs) 25,000,000
Lagangilang, Abra Tuba, Benguet Bacnotan, La Union NLDC
15,000,000 APMFI
NABCOR 8. ROCS-09- 04996
MAMFI
Php60,000,000
Malungan, Sarangani Marihatag, Surigao del Sur 1,159 sets of Small Scale Agri Package
10,000,000 Balaoan, La Union Sta. Maria, Pangasinan Boac, Marinduque
NABCOR Pantukan, Compostela Valley
SDPFFI 40,000,000
6. ROCS-09- 00847 NLDC
CARED
Php25,000,000
Agricultural Livelihood Assistance Packages (vegetable seeds, Sablan, Benguet & Sta. Maria, Bulacan
production tools and accessories like planting materials, various 20,000,000
tools for backyard gardening, sprayers, and agricultural chemicals) NLDC
Umingan, Pangasinan Rosales, Pangasinan San Agustin, Surigao del MAMFI
Sur San Luis, Surigao del Sur San Juan, La Union 9. G-09- 07112
25,000,000
56
 Php40,000,000 SDPFFI-Luy
Bacnotan, La Union Supiden, La Union San Juan, La Union San 4. ROCS-08-07211
Gabriel, La Union
40,000,000 2 MOAs25
NLDC Evangelista
CARED NABCOR- Javellana
MAMFI-Sula
The funds representing the activities costs were transferred from Atty. Agcaoili
the IAs to the NGOs/project partners pursuant to several MOAs NABCOR- Javellana
signed by the following individuals:LawlibraryofCRAlaw SDPFFI-Luy
SARO No. & No. of MOAs 5. ROCS-09-00804
Signatories to the MOA
Notary Public 2MOAs26
Office of Senator Enrile Evangelista
Implementing Agencies NABCOR- Javellana
NGO/Project Partner MAMFI-Sula
1. ROCS-07-04618 Atty. Agcaoili
NABCOR- Javellana
4 MOAs22 SDPFFI-Luy
Evangelista 6. ROCS-09-008475
TRC-Ortiz
CARED-Encarnacion MOAs27
Atty. Talaboc Evangelista
2. ROCS- 08-01347 TRC-Ortiz
APMFI-Piorato
1 MOA23 Atty. Talaboc
NABCOR- Javellana 7. ROCS-09-04952
POPDFI-Suñ as
Atty. Balanoba 2 MOAs28
3. ROCS-08-05216 Evangelista
NLDC-Amata
2 MOAs24 AEPFFI- Pablo. Jr.
NABCOR-Javellana Atty. Santos
MAMFI-Sula NLDC-Amata
Atty. Lawas-Yutoc APMFI- Piorato
NABCOR-Javellana 8. ROCS-09-04996
57
 Undated
2 MOAs29 5,000,000
Evangelista 850457 (LBP)
NLDC-Amata TRC-CARED
CARED-Briones
Atty. Santos 01-2007 -040672
NLDC-Amata Undated
MAMFI-Sula 5,000,000
9. G-09-07112 860458 (LBP)
TRC-CARED
1 MOA30
Evangelista 01-2007 -040669
NLDC-Amata Undated
CARED-Briones 5,000,000
Atty. Santos 850460 (LBP)
After the execution of the MOAs, the agricultural and livelihood TRC-CARED
assistance kits/packages were supposed to be delivered by the
NGOs to identified beneficiaries/municipalities in different parts 01-2007-040670
of the country, but, as will be stated later, no deliveries were made. Undated
5,000,000
The NGOs/project partners were later paid in full by the IAs upon 850462 (LBP)
the NGOs’ submission of Disbursement, Progress, TRC-CARED
Accomplishment, Fund Utilization, Inspection, and Delivery ROCS-08-01347
Reports, as well as the Certificates of Acceptance. The details of 08-04-01201
payments to the NGOs/project partners are reflected in the table 11-Apr-08
below: 21,825,000
SARO No. 0000416657 (UCPB)
Disbursement Voucher (DV) No. NABCOR- POPDFI
Date of DV
Amount of DV 08-07-02312
09-Jul-08
(PhP) 2,425,000
Check No. 0000417294 (UCPB)
Paying Agency/Claimant or Payee NABCOR-POPDFI
ROCS-07-04618 ROCS-08-05216
01-2007-040671 08-09-03575
58
23-Sep-08 27-May-09
17,460,000 3,637,500
437227 (UCPB) 462922 (UCPB)
NABCOR-MAMFI NABCOR- SDPFFI

09-04-1622 09-06-2022
19-May-09 15-Jun-09
1,940,000 20,612,500
46937 (UCPB) 462938 (UCPB)
NABCOR-MAMFI NABCOR- SDPFFI
ROCS-08-05216 ROCS-09-00804
08-09-03572 09-05-1767
23-Sep-08 27-May-09
26,190,000 2,182,500
437226 (UCPB) 462919 (UCPB)
NABCOR-SDPFFI NABCOR- MAMFI

09-05-1751 09-06-2028
25-May-09 15–Jun-09
2,910,000 12,367,500
455997 (UCPB) 462939 (UCPB)
NABCOR-SDPFFI NABCOR- MAMFI
ROCS-08-07211 ROCS-09-00804
09-05-1773 09-06-1825
27-May-09 01-Jun- 09
3,637,500 1,455,000
462921 (UCPB) 462926 (UCPB)
NABCOR-MAMFI NABCOR- SDPFFI

09-06-2025 09-06-2027
15-Jun-09 15-Jun-09
20,612,500 8,245,000
462940 (UCPB) 462939 (UCPB)
NABCOR-MAMFI NABCOR- SDPFFI
ROCS-08-07211 ROCS-09-00847
09-05-1774 01-2009-040929
59
Undated 16-Dec-09
20,000,000 12,000,000
890099 (LBP) 244622 (LBP)
TLRC-APMFI CARED-NLDC

01-2009-051300 10-01-0004
04-Jun-09 07-Jan-10
2,500,000 20,000,000
917019 (BP) 244632 (LBP)
TLRC-APMFI CARED-NLDC

09-10-1530 10-01-0118
26-Oct-09 25-Jan-10
8,000,000 8,000,000
244589 (LBP) 244649 (LBP)
CARED-NLDC CARED-NLDC
ROCS-09-04996
09-09-1355 10-05-0747
23-Sept-09 06-May-10
6,000,000 4,000,000
244554 (LBP) 260944 (LBP)
MAMFI-NLDC CARED-NLDC
ROCS-09-04952
09-10-1443 09-09-1353
12-Oct-09 18 -Sep-09
10,000,000 7,500,000
244570 (LBP) 244552 (LBP)
MAMFI-NLDC NLDC-AEPFFI

09-10-1534 09-10-1444
26-Oct-09 12-0ct-09
4,000,000 12,500,000
244585 (LBP) 244571 (LBP)
MAMFI-NLDC NLDC-AEPFFI
G-09-07112
09-12-1834 09-10-1540
60
26-0ct-09 who are respondents herein, are indicated in the table
5,000,000 below:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
244590 (LBP)
NLDC-AEPFFI Signatories of the DV
ROCS-09-04952 SARO
09-09-1358 Disbursement Voucher No.
23-Sep-09 BOX A
7,500,000
244557 (LBP) (Expenses/Advances necessary, lawful, and incurred under my
NLDC-APMFI direct supervision
BOX B
09-10-1449
12-0ct-09 Supporting Documents Complete and Proper/Budget
12,500,000 Utilization/Verification /Certification as to Cash/Fund Availability
244576 (LBP) Certified by/supporting documents attached
NLDC-APMFI BOX C

09-10-1535 (Approved for Payment)

26-0ct-09 ROCS-07- 04618
5,000,000 01-2007-04057131
244592 (LBP) Figura
NLDC-APMFI Allen T. Baysa
ROCS-09-04996 Jover
09-09-1354 Ortiz
23-Sep-09
12,000,000 01-2007-04067232
244553 (LBP) Figura
NLDC-CARED Allen T. Baysa
Jover
09-10-1447 Ortiz
23-Sep-09
20,000,000 01-2007-04066933
244574 (LBP) Figura
NLDC-CARED Allen T. Baysa
Signatories to all the Disbursement Vouchers (DVs) covering Jover
payment by the IAs for the agricultural and livelihood projects, Ortiz
61
 ROCS-08-07211
01-2007-04067034 09-05-177341
Figura Cacal
Allen T. Baysa Guañ izo
Jover Javellana
Ortiz
ROCS-08-01347 09-06-202542
08-04-0120135 Cacal
Munsod Guañ izo
Johnson Javellana
Javellana ROCS-08-07211
09-05-177343
08-07-0231236 Cacal
Relevo Guañ izo
Johnson Javellana
Javellana
ROCS-08-05216 09-06-2022
08-09-0357537 Cacal
Cacal Guañ izo
Guañ izo Javellana
Javellana ROCS-09-00804
09-05-176744
09-04-162238 Cacal
Cacal Guañ izo
Guañ izo Javellana
Javellana
09-06-202845
08-09-0357239 Cacal
Cacal Guañ izo
Guañ izo Javellana
Javellana
09-06-182546
09-05-175140 Cacal
Cacal Guañ izo
Guañ izo Javellana
Javellana
62
09-06-202747 Sevidal
Cacal Ordoñ ez
Guañ izo Cruz
Javellana Amata
ROCS-09-00847
01-2009-04092948 09-10-144954
Cunanan Sevidal
Consuelo Lilian Espiritu Ordoñ ez
Jover Cruz
Ortiz Amata

01-2009-05130049 09-10-153555
Cunanan Sevidal
Consuelo Lilian Espiritu Ordoñ ez
Jover Cruz
Ortiz Amata
ROCS-09-04952 ROCS-09-04996
09-09-135350 09-09-135456
Sevidal Sevidal
Ordoñ ez Ordoñ ez
Cruz Cruz
Amata Amata

09-10-144451 09-10144757
Sevidal Sevidal
Ordoñ ez Ordoñ ez
Cruz Cruz
Amata Amata

09-10-154052 09-10153058
Sevidal Sevidal
Ordoñ ez Ordoñ ez
Cruz Cruz
Amata Amata
ROCS-09-04952
09-09-135853 09-09-135559
63
Sevidal Sevidal
Ordoñ ez Rodriguez
Cruz Cruz
Amata Amata
Details of the checks issued by the IAs in payment of the projects,
09-10-144360 and the signatories thereto are indicated in the following
Sevidal table:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Ordoñ ez SARO No.
Cruz Disbursement Voucher No.
Amata Check No.
Net Amount (Php)
09-10-153461
Sevidal (After deducting 3% management fee)
Ordoñ ez Implementing Agency/ies & Signatories of the Check
Cruz Official Receipt Issued
Amata Received Payment
G-09-07112
09-12-183462 (see DV)
Sevidal ROCS-07-04618
Ordoñ ez 01-2007-040671
Cruz LBP 85045766
Amata 4,800,000
TLRC/TRC
10-01-000463
Sevidal Figura and Ortiz
Ordoñ ez CARED
Cruz
Amata OR 023
Encarnacion
10-01-011864 01-2007-040672
Sevidal LBP 85045867
Ordoñ ez 4,800,000
Cruz TLRC/TRC
Amata
Figura and Ortiz
10-05-074765 CARED
64
 2,425,000
OR 022 NABCOR
Encarnacion
01-2007-040669 Mendoza and Javellana
LBP 85046068 POPDFI
4,800,000
TLRC/TRC OR 3765
Suñ as
Figura and Ortiz ROCS-08-05216
CARED 08-09-03575
UCPB 43722772
OR 025 17,460,000
Encarnacion NABCOR
01-2007-040670
LBP 85046269 Mendoza and Javellana
4,800,000 MAMFI
TLRC/TRC
OR 3615
Figura and Ortiz Sula
CARED 09-04-1622
UCPB 45591373
OR 021 1,940,000
Encarnacion NABCOR
ROCS-08-01347
08-04-01201 Mendoza and Javellana
UCPB 000041665770 MAMFI
21,825,000
NABCOR OR 3625
Rodriguez
Mendoza and Javellana ROCS-08-05216
POPDFI 08-09-03572
UCPB 43722674
OR 001426 26,190,000
Suñ as NABCOR
08-07-02312
UCPB 000041729471 Mendoza and Javellana
65
SDPFFI 3,637,500.00
SDPFFI
OR 214
Luy OR 267
09-05-1751 de Asis
UCPB 45599775 09-06-2022
2,910,000 UCPB 46293879
NABCOR 20,612,500
SDPFFI
Mendoza and Javellana
SDPFFI OR 301
Luy
OR 269 ROCS-09-00804
Rodriguez 09-05-1767
ROCS-08-07211 UCPB 46291980
09-05-1773 2,182,500
UCPB 46292176 MAMFI
3,637,500
NABCOR OR 3627
Sula
Mendoza and Javellana 09-06-2028
MAMFI UCPB 462937
12,367,500
OR 3628 NABCOR
Sula
09-06-2025 Mendoza and Javellana
UCPB 46294077 OR
20,612,500
NABCOR 3573
de Asis
Mendoza and Javellana ROCS-09-00804
OR 3574 09-06-1825
de Asis UCPB 46292681
ROCS-08-07211 1,455,000
09-05-1774 NABCOR
UCPB 46292278
66
 Mendoza and Javellana LBP 000024455285
OR 6,750,000
NLDC
273
Luy Jalandoni and Amata
09-06-2027 AEPFFI
UCPB 46293982
8,245,000 OR 0255
NABCOR Suñ as
09-10-1444
Mendoza and Javellana LBP 24457186
OR 12,500,000
NLDC
303
Luy Jalandoni and Amata
ROCS-09-00847 AEPFFI
01-2009-040929
LBP 89009983 OR 0256
20,000,000 Suñ as
TLRC/TRC 09-10-1540
LBP 24459087
Ortiz and Figura 5,000,000
OR NLDC

204 Jalandoni and Amata

Rodrigo B. Calay AEPFFI
01-2009-051300
LBP 91701984 OR 0257
2,500,000 Suñ as
TLRC/TRC ROCS-09-04952
09-09-1358
Ortiz and Figura LBP 24455788
OR 6,750,000
Rodrigo B. Calay NLDC
ROCS-09-04952
09-09-1353 Jalandoni and Amata
67
APMFI 09-101447
LBP 24457492
OR 20,000,000
411 NLDC
Laarni A. Uy
09-10-1449 Jalandoni and Amata
LBP 24457689 CARED
12,500,000
NLDC OR 149
de Asis
Jalandoni and Amata 09-101530
APMFI LBP 24458993
8,000,000
OR 412 NLDC
Laarni A. Uy
09-10-1535 Jalandoni and Amata
LBP 24459290 CARED
5,000,000
NLDC OR 153
de Asis
Jalandoni and Amata ROCS-09- 04996
APMFI 09-09-1355
LBP 24455494
OR 415 5,400,000
Laarni A. Uy NLDC
ROCS-09-04996
09-09-1354 Jalandoni and Amata
LBP 24455391 MAMFI
10,800,000
NLDC OR 3596
Rodriguez
Jalandoni and Amata 09-10-1443
CARED LBP 24457095
10,000,000
OR 147 NLDC
de Asis
68
 Jalandoni and Amata 10-01-0118
MAMFI LBP 24464999
4,000,000
OR 3598 NLDC
Rodriguez
09-10-1534 Jalandoni and Amata
LBP 24458596 CARED
4,000,000
NLDC OR 157
de Asis
Jalandoni and Amata 10-05-0747
MAMFI LBP 260944100
4,000,000
OR 3652 NLDC
Rodriguez
G-09- 07112 Jalandoni and Amata
09-12-1834 de Asis
LBP 24462297 Field verifications conducted by complainant FIO revealed that the
10,800,000 Php345,000,000.00 PDAF of Senator Enrile was never used for the
NLDC intended projects. It appears that the documents submitted by the
NGOs/project partners to the IAs such as Disbursement, Progress,
Jalandoni and Amata Accomplishment, Fund Utilization, Inspection, and Delivery
CARED Reports, as well as Certificates of Acceptance, were all fabricated.

OR 155 The livelihood and agricultural production kits/packages never

de Asis reached the intended beneficiaries, i.e., either there were no
10-01-0004 projects or goods were never delivered. The mayors and the
LBP 24463298 municipal agriculturists, who had reportedly received the
20,000,000 livelihood assistance kits/packages for their respective
NLDC municipalities, never received anything from the Office of Senator
Enrile, the IA, or any of the project partners. None of the mayors or
Jalandoni and Amata municipal agriculturists were even aware of the projects.
CARED
As reflected above, the signatures on the Certificates of Acceptance
OR 156 or Delivery Reports were forged, and the farmer- recipients
de Asis enumerated on the lists of purported beneficiaries denied having
69
received any livelihood assistance kits/packages. In fact, many of
the names appearing on the lists as farmer-recipients were neither
residents nor registered voters of the place where they were listed
as beneficiaries, were fictitious, or had jumbled surnames while
others were already deceased. In other words, these livelihood
projects were “ghost projects.”
The Commission on Audit (COA), through its Special Audits Office,
conducted an audit of the PDAF allocations and disbursements
covering the period 2007-2009 subject of these complaints, its
findings of which are found in the COA Special Audits Office
Report101 (the “2007-2009 COA Report”).
Among the observations of the COA were: (a) the implementing
agencies, including NABCOR, NLDC and TRC, did not actually
implement the PDAF-funded projects; instead, the agencies
released the funds to the NGOs, albeit charging a "management
fee" therefor; (b) the direct releases of PDAF disbursements to
NGOs contravened the DBM's regulations considering that the
same were not preceded by endorsements from the executive
departments exercising supervisory powers over the IAs; (c)
worse, the releases were made essentially at the behest of the
sponsoring legislator; (d) almost all of the NGOs that received
PDAF releases did not have a track record on the implementation
of government projects, and their addresses were dubious; (e) the
selection of the NGOs, as well as the procurement of the goods for
distribution to the beneficiaries, did not undergo public bidding;
and (f) some of the suppliers who allegedly provided the goods to
the NGOs denied ever having dealt with these NGOs, contrary to
the NGOs’ claims.
The COA also found that the selections of the NGO were not
compliant with the provisions of COA Circular No. 2007- 001 and
GPPB Resolution No. 12-2007; the suppliers and reported
beneficiaries were unknown or cannot be located at their given
address; the NGOs had provided non-existent addresses or their
70
addresses were traced to mere shanties or high-end residential
units without any signage; and the NGOs submitted questionable
documents, or failed to liquidate or fully document the ultilization
of funds.
Verily, the findings in the 2007-2009 COA Report jibe with the
whistle blowers testimonies and are validated by the results of the
FIO’s on-site field verification.
IN FINE, the PDAF-funded projects of Senator Enrile were “ghost”
or inexistent.
Complainants contend that the amount of Php345,000,000.00
allotted for livelihood and agricultural production projects was
instead misappropriated and converted to the personal use and
benefit of Senator Enrile in conspiracy with Napoles and the rest of
respondents.
Witnesses Luy, Sula, and Suñ as claim that the six foundation-NGOs
endorsed by Senator Enrile were all dummies of Napoles, who
operated them from her JLN office at Unit 2502, Discovery Center
Suites, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, and were created for the purpose
of funnelling the PDAF through NABCOR, NLDC, and TRC/TLRC;
the majority of the incorporators, officers, and members of these
NGOs are household helpers, relatives, employees and friends of
Napoles; some incorporators/corporators of the NGOs were aware
of their involvement in the creation thereof while others were not;
and the signatures in the Articles of Incorporation of the NGOs of
those unaware of their involvement were forged.
Luy, Sula and Suñ as add that the pre-selected President of each of
the pre-selected NGOs, in addition to being required to furnish the
names of at least 5 persons to complete the list of incorporators,
were obliged to sign an application for opening bank accounts in
the name of the NGO, and to pre-sign blank withdrawal slips; these
NGOs maintained bank accounts with either METROBANK
Magdalena Branch or LANDBANK EDSA-Greenhills Branch, from
which Napoles would withdraw and/or cause the withdrawal of
the proceeds of checks paid by the IAs to the NGOs involved.
Per Luy’s records, Senator Enrile received, through respondents
Reyes and Tuason, total commissions, rebates, or kickbacks
amounting to at least Php172,834,500.00 from his PDAF-funded
projects from 2004 to 2010: Php1,500,000.00 for 2004;
Php14,622,000.00 for 2005; Php13,300,000.00 for 2006;
Php27,112,500.00 for 2007; Php62,550,000.00 for 2008;
Php23,750,000.00 for 2009; and Php30,000,000.00 for 2010. The
“payoffs” usually took place at the JLN office in Ortigas. In fact, Luy,
Sula and Suñ as often heard Napoles refer to Senator Enrile by his
code name “Tanda” and saw Napoles hand over the money meant
for the Senator to Tuason at the premises of JLN. The cash would
come either from Luy’s vault or from Napoles herself.
On the other hand, Napoles’ share of the money from Senator
Enrile’s PDAF was by the claim of witnesses Luy, Sula, Suñ as,
delivered in cash by them, along with respondents Encarnacion
and De Asis, either at the JLN office or at Napoles’ residence at
18B, 18th Floor, North Wing Pacific Plaza Tower Condominium,
Taguig City. In the event of space constraints at her residence,
Napoles would deposit some of the cash to the bank accounts of
the following companies which she owned:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Registered Owner of the Account
Bank
Account Number
JO-CHRIS Trading
Metrobank
7255-50955-8
JO-CHRIS Trading
Metrobank
007-026-51152-2
(Checking Account)
71
JO-CHRIS Trading
Metrobank
3600024885
JLN Corporation
Metrobank
073-3-07352390-8
JLN Corporation
Metrobank
007-073-50928-5
(Checking Account)
JCLN Global Properties Development Corporation
Metrobank
007-035-52543-9
II. THE CHARGES
The NBI thus charges Senator Enrile with PLUNDER for
acquiring/receiving on various occasions, in conspiracy with his
co-respondents, commissions, kickbacks, or rebates, in the total
amount of at least Php172,834,500.00 from the “projects” financed
by his PDAF from 2004 to 2010.
The FIO, on the other hand, charges Senator Enrile and the rest of
respondents with violating SECTION 3(E) of RA 3019 as amended,
for giving unwarranted benefits to private respondent Napoles
and SDFFI, APMFI, CARED, MAMFI, POPFDI and APMFI in the
implementation of his PDAF-funded “projects,” thus, causing
undue injury to the government in the amount of
Php345,000,000.00.
By Orders dated 19 and 29 November 2013, this Office directed
respondents to file their respective counter-affidavits in these
cases. Despite receipt of said Orders, respondents Ortiz, Jalandoni,
De Leon, Piorato, Ornopia, Lim, Ramirez, Rodriguez, Napoles,
Lawas-Yutok, Guadinez, and Cabilao failed to file any counter-
affidavits, prompting this Office to consider them having waived
their right to file the same.
Despite earnest efforts, copies of the same Orders could not be
served on respondents Lacsamana and Santos, Proprietors of
Nutrigrowth Philippines and MMRC Trading, respectively, Hernani
Ditchon, Uy, Galay, Macha, Talaboc, Castillo, Balanoba, Oliveros,
Ogerio, Fabian, and Fernando, they being said to be unknown at
their last or given addresses, or had moved out and left no
forwarding address, or were non- existent.
II. RESPONDENTS’ COUNTER-AFFIDAVITS
In his Counter-Affidavit dated 20 December 2013,102SENATOR
ENRILE decries the accusations against him, alleging that it was
unfortunate that, “in the twilight years of (his) government
service, … (he) stand(s) accused of trumped up charges of
corruption” as he has never been charged with any administrative
or criminal offense in his more than 40 years in the civil service; at
the time material to the charges, the PDAF was a legitimate source
of funds for projects sponsored by legislators; the implementation
of PDAF-related projects “is the exclusive function and
responsibility of the executive department” such that the IAs and
the DBM should have strictly complied with laws and rules on
government expenditures to prevent possible misuse or
irregularities; IAs were responsible for ensuring that the NGOs
tasked to implement the projects were legitimate; and his only
involvement in the utilization of the PDAF was to endorse specific
projects for local government units.
He maintains that he did not persuade, influence or induce any
official or employee of the IAs concerned to violate existing
procurement or audit laws and rules; as a member of the
legislative branch, he has no power of control or supervision over
IAs, which are part of the executive branch; he did not endorse any
NGO as conduit for the implementation of the PDAF projects; it
72
was Napoles and her cohorts “who persuaded and influenced the
implementing agencies to violate their duties and functions;”
complainants’ witnesses never
categorically identified him as one of those who received
kickbacks arising from PDAF transactions and neither was he
mentioned as among those public officers who visited Napoles’
offices; he never authorized anyone to transact with, much less
receive commissions, kickbacks or rebates “from the Napoles
group;” he never had personal dealings related to the PDAF with
Tuason; all authorizations he issued to Reyes and Evangelista were
limited to lawful acts; and evidence allegedly showing that he
personally benefitted from the PDAF anomaly is hearsay.
For her part, REYES alleges in her Consolidated Counter-Affidavit
dated 26 December 2013,103 that the averments in the complaints
are hearsay as they are not based on personal knowledge of
complainants’ agents or their witnesses; their statements are
inadmissible based on the res inter alios acta rule; she did not
commit any illegal or prohibited act in relation to the PDAF
projects; and her signatures in eight letters and two liquidation
reports pertaining to the PDAF transactions, and which contain the
names of the IAs and NGOs allegedly tasked to implement the
projects, were forgeries; she did not receive any amount from the
PDAF nor connive with any of her co-respondents to acquire,
amass or accumulate ill-gotten wealth; and none of the “overt or
criminal acts” constitutive of Plunder has been shown to be
present.
EVANGELISTA, in his Joint Counter-Affidavit dated 20 December
2013, asserts that the complaints failed to specify the acts or
omissions committed by him which constitute the offense/s
charged and that most, if not all, statements of complainants’
witnesses are hearsay; he was impleaded because of his
association with Senator Enrile, his former superior; during his
tenure of office, “all that the office of Senator Enrile has done, or
may do, was to identify, endorse or recommend particular
projects;” it was the DBM and the IAs which handled the actual
release of the PDAF; and Senator Enrile’s office “did not have any
say in the actual implementation of any project.” He insists that his
signatures in letters addressed to the IAs as well as in MOAs
pertaining to PDAF projects were “immaterial – funds would still
have been released, the projects implemented, and the PDAF
diverted, whether or not (he) signed those documents;” some of
the signatures appearing in the PDAF documents are forgeries; he
was not among those identified by witnesses Luy and Suñ as as a
recipient of PDAF-related kickbacks; and he did not personally
know Tuason or Napoles and neither has he met with them.
In her Counter-Affidavit dated 21 February 2014,104TUASON
admits personally knowing Napoles, having met her in 2004. She
claims that because of her (Tuason) association with former
President Joseph E. Estrada, she was requested by Napoles to refer
her (Napoles) to politicians; and to accommodate Napoles, she
(Tuason) approached and informed Reyes that Napoles wished to
transact with Senator Enrile in relation to the latter’s PDAF, to
which request Reyes agreed.
She “believed that Atty. Gigi Reyes had the full authority to act for
and on behalf of Senator Enrile with respect to his PDAF
allocations;” she (Tuason) acted as the “go-between” of Napoles
and Senator Enrile’s PDAF-related arrangements; after Reyes or
Evangelista informed her (Tuason) that a budget from the PDAF
was available, she would relay the information to Napoles or Luy
who would then prepare a listing of projects available, indicating
the IAs, which would be sent to Reyes; Reyes would, thereafter,
endorse said list to the DBM, and after the listing was released by
Senator Enrile’s office to the DBM, Napoles would give her
(Tuason) a partial payment of the commission due her, which was
usually delivered by Luy or other Napoles employees; and she
relied on records kept by Luy on the amounts received because
she did not keep her own records.
73
She admits having received amounts corresponding to Senator
Enrile’s kickbacks from the PDAF projects which she personally
delivered to Reyes. To her knowledge, her commissions
represented 5% of the transaction/project amount involved, while
Senator Enrile’s share was 40%. She adds that there were times
when Napoles would withhold the release of her (Tuason)
commissions, without clear justification.
NATIONAL LIVELIHOOD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (NLDC)
RESPONDENTS
Denying any involvement in the misuse of the PDAF or of having
profited from it, AMATA, NLDC’s President, avers in her 20 January
2014 Counter-Affidavit105 that, cognizant of the possibility of
political pressure, she had at the outset “manifested…her
discomfort from (sic) the designation of NLDC as one of the
Implementing Agencies for PDAF” and “did not want to be
involved in the distribution of PDAF,” “kept a distance from the
solons and the NGOs” involved in PDAF- related transactions, and
had repeatedly requested in writing the DBM to exclude her
agency from those authorized to implement PDAF-related
projects; save for these instant complaints, she has not been
formally charged with any administrative or criminal case in her
more than 25 years in the civil service; and to ensure
transparency, she “caused the preparation of standard
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) for PDAF transactions
providing the safety nets for NLDC, as well as a Process Flow Chart
to clearly identify the responsibilities and accountabilities of the
[s]olons, the NGOs and the NLDC PDAF internal processors for
easy tracking of liabilities and irregularities that may be
committed.”
BUENAVENTURA, then a regular employee of the NLDC, avers in
her Counter-Affidavit dated 20 January 2014106 that in her
processing of documents relating to PDAF projects, she “did not do
anything illegal or violate the instructions of (her) immediate
superior”; in accordance with her functions, she “checked and
verified the endorsement letters of Senator Enrile, which
designated the NGOs that would implement his PDAF projects and
found them to be valid and authentic”; and she also confirmed the
authenticity of the authorization given by Senator Enrile to his
subordinates regarding the monitoring, supervision and
implementation of PDAF projects.
Denying any participation in the implementation of PDAF projects
or having received any personal benefit in relation to PDAF
projects, she maintains that her evaluation and verification reports
were accurate, and she was never a party to the purported
anomalies arising from PDAF-related transactions.
In her Counter-Affidavit dated 27 January 2014,107ORDOÑ EZ,
NLDC Cashier IV, argues that her participation in the PDAF
projects implemented by her office was limited to having certified
that “budgets and funds were available” in the corresponding
Disbursement Vouchers; the filing of the complaints “may be
premature because of failure to observe provisions of the 2009
COA Rules of Procedure,” considering that the COA has not yet
disallowed the PDAF-related expenditures; and she never
misappropriated, converted, misused, or malversed public funds
drawn from the PDAF nor did she take advantage of her position
to process the release of PDAF sums, let alone personally benefit
from these releases.
Claiming to have never met respondents Napoles or Enrile let
alone conspire with them, Ordoñ ez claims that as far as she is
concerned, “the PDAF transaction was known to the NLDC Board
of Trustees and top management;” she and her co-respondents,
“lowly Government employees who were dictated upon,” were
mere victims “bullied into submission by the lawmakers;” despite
their pleas, the DBM refused to help in getting the NLDC removed
from the list of agencies authorized to implement PDAF projects;
74
and she performed her duties in good faith and was “not in a
position to negate or defy these actions of the Lawmakers, DBM
and the NLDC Board of Trustees.”
In his Counter-Affidavits dated 15 and 24108 February 2014,
SEVIDAL, NLDC Director IV, denies having committed the offenses
charged. He alleges that complainant FIO submitted a false
certificate of non-forum shopping, the NBI having already filed an
earlier criminal complaint against him arising from the same set of
facts averred in the FIO’s criminal complaint; the filing of the
criminal charges was premature because the disallowances issued
by the COA are not yet final and executory; he was not among
those NLDC employees identified by complainants’ witnesses who
supposedly planned and implemented PDAF-funded projects and
points to Senator Enrile and Napoles, not NLDC employees, as the
parties responsible for the misuse of the PDAF. He insists that
Senator Enrile, through Reyes and Evangelista, were responsible
for "identifying the projects, determining the project costs and
choosing the NGOs” which was “ manifested in the letters of
Senator ENRILE”; he and other NLDC employees were merely
victims of the “political climate” and “bullied into submission by
the lawmakers; and he never derived any personal benefit from
the purported misuse of the PDAF.
NATIONAL AGRIBUSINESS CORPORATION (NABCOR)
RESPONDENTS
Denying the charges against him in his Counter-Affidavit dated 6
February 2014,109JAVELLANA, NABCOR President, states in
essence that he did not personally prepare the checks, vouchers,
memoranda of agreement and other similar documents pertaining
to NABCOR-implemented projects funded by PDAF as he merely
signed and approved the PDAF documents in good faith, after his
subordinates had signed the same and recommended their
approval to him; and he did not conspire with anyone to defraud
the government.

MENDOZA, in her Counter-Affidavit dated 6 March 2014, alleges
that being a mere employee of NABCOR, she “acted only upon
stern instructions and undue pressure exerted upon us by our
agency heads;” she signed checks relating to PDAF disbursements,
specifically those covered by SARO Nos. ROCS 08-01347, 08-
05216, 08-07211, 09-00804, because she was “designated and
authorized to sign” by respondent Javellana, and these checks
“were already signed by NABCOR President…JAVELLANA prior to
the signing of the herein Respondent …. and checks were released
upon the instruction of…JAVELLANA;” she “was given instruction
to process payments to suppliers and NGOs, without proper
bidding and without complete documentary requirements;”
sometime in 2011, Javellana terminated her services from
NABCOR “due to her knowledge of irregularities in NABCOR;” and
she denies having obtained any personal benefit from the alleged
misuse of the PDAF.
In his Counter-Affidavit110and Supplemental Counter-Affidavit
dated 11 December 2013 and 22 January 2014, respectively,
CACAL, NABCOR Paralegal, refutes the charges against him, which
to him are unsupported by the evidence. He claims that he signed
Box “A” of the DVs relating to SARO Nos. ROCS-08-01347, ROCS-
08-05216, ROCS-08-07211 and ROCS-09-00804 in compliance
with his official functions and pursuant to the stern directives of
his superiors, namely, Javellana and Mendoza; by the time the
vouchers are presented to him for signature, Javellana and
Mendoza have already signed Boxes "B" and "C" therein and they
have "already prepared and signed" the corresponding checks
drawn from PDAF funds, which is ”indicative of their interest to
fast track the transaction;” he never met with either the legislators
or Napoles, his interaction in relation to PDAF- related projects
having been limited to Luy; he always examined the voucher’s
supporting documents before issuing the aforementioned
certification; he previously recommended to his superiors that the
agency observe COA Memorandum Circular No. 2007-001 and
75
revise the draft MOA used in PDAF-related transactions but was
yelled at and berated by Javellana whenever he would question
some of the apparent irregularities in the PDAF documents. He
maintains that he did not personally benefit from the
implementation of PDAF projects.
In her 02 January 2014 Counter-Affidavit,111CRUZ, NLDC Chief
Financial Specialist/Project Management Assistant IV, denies the
charges, claiming that she only certified the existence, not the
authenticity of PDAF documents in the exercise of her duties; she
did not conspire with anyone to commit the offenses charged nor
did she receive anything in relation to the PDAF projects
implemented by her office; and she is unaware whether the PDAF
was abused by any or all of her co-respondents.
In her March 14, 2014 Counter-Affidavit,112JOHNSON, NABCOR
former Chief Accountant, points out that there is nothing in the
complaint “that would show, or even minutely imply that (she)
was part of an express conspiracy” to commit the offenses
charged; the complaints do not specifically allege the wrongful acts
or omissions she committed as her participation in the PDAF
transactions was merely ministerial in nature, limited to a
verification of “whether or not the documents enumerated on the
face of the disbursement voucher were attached to that
disbursement voucher;” and that her job did not include
examining the authenticity of the vouchers or the signatures
thereon.
MUNSOD, former Human Resources Supervisor/Manager, in her
Counter-Affidavit dated 27 December 2013,113 contends that she
was impleaded for having signed DV No. 08-04-0129 in 2008
pertaining to a PDAF-related project implemented by POPDFI; her
certification therein that the expense was necessary and lawful
was a purely ministerial function, and was issued only after
examining the voucher and the supporting documents because she
“did NOT find any irregularity on the face thereof that would
create in my mind any doubt as to the legality and integrity of the
said Voucher;” and she had no knowledge of “any agreement or
arrangement on the disbursement of the funds mentioned in the
Voucher.”
Claiming to have been unfairly used or exploited by those involved
in the misuse of the PDAF, MONTUYA, NABCOR Accounting Staff
Assistant, avers in her Counter-Affidavit dated 18 February
2014,114 that she was impleaded in relation to the inspection
reports she signed in relation to the project covered by SARO No.
ROCS-08-07211 and 09-08804; she was under the direct
supervision of respondent Mendoza and part of her duties was to
comply with directives issued by Mendoza, including the
processing of the release of sums drawn from Enrile’s PDAF; and
the inspection reports relating to PDAF-related projects were
merely pro-forma and stored in NABCOR computers. Montuya
relates that she once accompanied Mendoza in inspecting
fertilizers stored in a warehouse in Pandi, Bulacan and even took
pictures of these kits; only after the criminal complaints were filed
did she find out from witness Sula that these fertilizers were
owned by Napoles; she could have inspected other items for
distribution in the PDAF- related projects but Mendoza refused to
authorize her and NABCOR did not offer to defray the expenses for
such inspections; she has never met Enrile or Napoles, let alone
conspire with them to defraud the government; and did not
benefit from any of these projects.
Refuting the charges against her in her Counter-Affidavit filed on
28 January 2014, GUAÑ IZO, NABCOR Bookkeeper/OIC Accounting
Division, claims that the complaints did not specify the extent of
her participation in the assailed scheme; no substantial evidence
exists to support the charges, hence, the lack of probable cause;
and she still has remedies within the COA Rules to question the
COA report.
TECHNOLOGY RESOURCE CENTER (TRC) RESPONDENTS
76
In his Counter-Affidavits dated 20 and 24 February
2014,115CUNANAN, Deputy Director General of the TRC at the
time material to the complaints, refutes the accusations against
him, stating that to his recollection, TRC began receiving PDAF-
related disbursements sometime in 2005; it was his previous
superior, then TRC Director General Ortiz, “who directly dealt with
and supervised the processing of all PDAF[-]related projects of the
TRC;” Lacsamana, then TRC Group Manager, assisted Ortiz in the
implementation of PDAF projects and “reported directly to
Director General Ortiz’s Office in this regard;” he and other
colleagues from TRC “assumed PDAF[-]funded projects to be
regular and legitimate projects;” because of measures instituted by
Ortiz, he (Cunanan), then Deputy Director General, “did not
participate in the processing of said projects except in the
performance of (his) ministerial duty as a co-signatory of
vouchers, checks and other financial documents of TRC;” and Ortiz,
Lacsamana and Figura, TRC Department Manager III, were “the
ones who actually dealt with the Offices of the Legislators
concerned as well as the NGOs, which supposedly implemented
the projects;”
Cunanan further relates that sometime in 2006 or 2007, he met
Napoles who “introduced herself as the representative of certain
legislators who supposedly picked TRC as a conduit for PDAF-
funded projects;” at the same occasion, Napoles told him that “her
principals were then Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile, Senators
Ramon “Bong” Revilla, Jr., Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada;” in the
course of his duties, he “often ended up taking and/or making
telephone verifications and follow-ups and receiving legislators or
their staff members;” during his telephone verifications, he was
able to speak with Reyes, who was acting in behalf of her superior,
Senator Enrile; Reyes confirmed to him that she and Evangelista
“were duly authorized by respondent Enrile” to facilitate his PDAF
projects and she also affirmed to him that the signatures
appearing in communications sent to TRC were, indeed, hers and
Evangelista’s; he occasionally met with Luy, who pressured him to
expedite the release of the funds by calling the offices of the
legislators; and that after he was appointed as TRC’s Director
General in 2010, he exerted all efforts to have his agency removed
from the list of agencies authorized to implement PDAF projects.
He maintains he did not benefit from the alleged misuse of the
PDAF.
In his Counter-Affidavit dated 8 January 2014,116FIGURA, TRC
Department Manager III, denies the charges against him, stating
that he does not personally know Napoles or the legislators “who
had their PDAF’s (sic) coursed through TRC as implementing
agency;” he “talked to him (witness Luy) once over the telephone ..
and vividly remember [being berated by] him as he was name-
dropping people from DBM and Malacañ ang just to compel me to
release from the Legal Department the MOA of his foundation
which was being reviewed by my office;” when TRC began
implementing PDAF projects in 2007, he and other TRC colleagues
welcomed this development because “it would potentially
generate income for TRC which does not receive any subsidy from
the National Government” but the service fee of 1% earned by TRC
from implementing PDAF projects “was too negligible;” he was
told by TRC’s management that “legislators highly recommended
certain NGO’s(sic)/Foundations as conduit implementors and
since PDAF’s (sic) are their discretionary funds, they have the
prerogative to choose their NGO’s (sic);” TRC’s management also
warned him that “if TRC would disregard it (choice of NGO), they
(legislators) would feel insulted and would simply take away their
PDAF from TRC, and TRC losses (sic) the chance to earn service
fees;” and Cunanan was among those who objected to his (Figura)
proposal that TRC increase its service fee from 1% to 10%,
claiming that “if we imposed a 10% service fee, we would totally
drive away the legislators and their PDAF’s (sic).”
Figura adds that Ortiz issued Office Circular 000P0099, directing
him (Figura) to sign checks representing PDAF releases sometime
77
in 2007; Ortiz, however, subsequently issued Office Circular
000P0100, which increased TRC’s service fee to 5% but limited his
(Figura) office’s participation in PDAF projects to reviewing MOA;
his having signed checks and other PDAF documents were in good
faith and in compliance with his designated tasks; he did not
personally benefit from the TRC’s implementation of PDAF
projects; he is uncertain if Cunanan or Ortiz benefitted from the
projects but to his recollection, they repeatedly expressed undue
interest in the transactions; Cu nanan “would frequently
personally follow up in my office the review of the MOA or my
signature on the checks,” even name-dropping then First
Gentleman Jose Miguel Arroyo whenever “he requested me to fast
track processing of the PDAF documents;” as regards Ortiz, “his
office would sometimes inquire on the status of a particular
PDAF;” he tried his best to resist the pressure exerted on him and
did his best to perform his duties faithfully; and he and other low-
ranking TRC officials had no power to “simply disregard the
wishes of Senator Enrile,” especially on the matter of public
bidding for the PDAF projects.
JOVER, TRC Chief Accountant, alleges in her Counter-Affidavit
dated 12 December 2013,117 that she was implicated in the
instant complaints for “having certified in the Disbursement
Vouchers for the aforestated project x x x that adequate
funds/budgetary allotment of the amount is properly certified,
supported by documents;” her issuance of such certification was
ministerial in nature, considering other TRC officials already
certified, in the same vouchers, that “expenses/cash advance is
necessary, lawful and incurred under direct supervision” and
“expenses/cash advance is within budget” when these documents
were referred to her; her duty was limited to verifying if the
voucher was supported by the requisite documents; it was
“beyond (her) duty to personally have an actual field validation
and confirmed (sic) deliveries to beneficiaries or to go on the
details of the delivered items or make a rigid inspection of the
PDAF project;” she signed the vouchers “for no dishonest purpose,
nor being bias and no intent on any negligence;” and she had
nothing to do with “non-delivery or under delivery of PDAF
project.”
ESPIRITU, TRC Budget Officer IV, in her Counter-Affidavit dated 10
January 2014,118 denies the charges against her and asserts that
her participation in the PDAF-related transactions covered by
SARO No. ROCS-07-07221, ROCS-08-03024 and D-0900847 was
limited to having certified in the corresponding DVs that “the
amount is certified within budget, supported by documents;” she
issued the certifications in accordance with her ministerial
functions as a budget officer and because the vouchers were,
indeed, within the budget provided to her agency and supported
by documentation; and the certification was issued only after her
superiors, TRC’s Director General and Deputy Director General,
certified in the same vouchers that the expenses were lawful,
necessary and incurred under their direct supervision.
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT (DBM)
RESPONDENTS
In their Joint Counter-Affidavit dated 2 December 2013, Rosario
NUÑ EZ, Lalaine PAULE, and Marilou BARE,119 admitting that they
are the DBM personnel being alluded to as Leah, Lalaine and
Malou, respectively, and named as such in the caption of the NBI
and Baligod Complaint, state that their names are not specifically
mentioned in the NBI’s complaint as among those who allegedly
participated in or abated the misuse of the PDAF; and that no
probable cause exists to indict them for the offenses charged.
RELAMPAGOS, DBM Undersecretary for Operations, in his
Counter-Affidavit dated 13 December 2013, contends that the
complaint “is insufficient in form and substance;” there is neither
factual nor legal basis to indict him for Plunder as the complaint
and sworn statements of witnesses do not mention his name as
78
among those who supposedly misused the PDAF; and he
performed his duties in good faith.
OTHER RESPONDENTS
In his 15 January 2014 Counter-Affidavit,120 DE ASIS admits
having been an employee of the JLN Group of Companies from
2006-2010 in various capacities as either driver, bodyguard or
messenger, and that he received a salary of P10,000/month for
serving as the driver and “errand boy” of Napoles. He alleges that
he picked up checks for Napoles- affiliated NGOs but only because
he was instructed to do so; he has no knowledge in setting up or
managing corporations such as CARED, which he allegedly helped
incorporate; and he did not personally benefit from the alleged
misuse of the PDAF.
In her 16 January 2014 Counter-Affidavit,121ENCARNACION
denies the charges imputed against her, insisting that she was an
employee (personal assistant) of JLN Group of Companies from
2004-2008 where she received a salary of P12,000/month for
overseeing the schedule and serving as “errand girl” of Napoles;
she has no knowledge in setting up or managing corporations; she
signed the corporate papers of Napoles-affiliated NGOs because
her superiors instructed her to do so; and she derived no personal
benefit from the scheme.
Denying any involvement in the irregularities arising from PDAF-
related transactions, SOLOMON asserts in her 27 January 2014
Counter-Affidavit122 that she has never met any of her co-
respondents; in 2006, she performed auditing work for a number
of clients, she being a certified public accountant; POPDFI, one of
the NGOs allegedly affiliated with Napoles’ group, was not among
her clients; the signatures allegedly belonging to her and
appearing in the PDAF documents are markedly different from her
actual signature; and to clear her name, she is prepared to “submit
(herself) willingful[ly] to a forensic examination of (her) signature
with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).”
Denying any involvement in the alleged misuse of the PDAF,
AGCAOILI, a Notary Public, alleges in his 10 December 2013
Counter-Affidavit,123 that he never met the signatories to the
MOA, reports of disbursement, board resolutions and other PDAF
documents that he allegedly notarized; these PDAF documents
were not reflected in the notarial reports he submitted to the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; he cannot attest to the
genuineness of these records because “he has not seen them
before, nor had prior knowledge about them;” and there are
discrepancies between his actual signature and the signature
appearing in the PDAF documents that allegedly belong to him.
In their Joint Counter-Affidavit124dated 21 February 2014, Jo
Christine and James Christopher Napoles, children of Janet
Napoles, cite the FIO complaint‘s insufficiency in form and
substance for failing to specify the acts or omissions committed by
them which constitute the offenses charged, thereby failing to
allege and substantiate the elements of Plunder and violation of
Section 3(e) of RA 3019; and the affidavits of complainant’s
witnesses contain nothing more than hearsay, self-serving
statements which are “not worthy of credence.”
IV. DISCUSSION
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
Respondents Relampagos, Bare, Nuñ ez and Paule were properly
impleaded
Relampagos, Bare, Nuñ ez and Paule all insist that they should be
dropped from these proceedings because they were never
specifically named as respondents in the criminal complaints filed
by the NBI and the FIO.
79
This Office disagrees.
Among the documents attached to and made an integral part of the
NBI’s complaint is witness Luy’s Affidavit dated 12
September 2013,125 in which he identified Relampagos, Bare,
Nuñ ez and Paule as Janet Napoles’ “contacts” within the DBM who
helped expedite the release of SAROs and NCAs relating to the
PDAF:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
82:
T: Mapunta naman tayo sa pagproseso ng transaction ni JANET
LIM NAPOLES sa mga government projects, gaano naman katagal
magpropeso ng mga ito?
S: Mabilis lang po kung ikukumpara natin sa normal na transaction
sa mga government agencies.
83.
T: Alam mo ba kung paano naman ito nagagawang mapabilis ni
JANET LIM NAPOLES?
S: Opo, may mga contact persons na siya kasi sa DBM. Inuutusan
po kami ni Madame JANET LIM NAPOLES na i- follow up sa kanila
iyong mga dokumento para mapabilis ang pagpoproseso nito.
84.
T: Kilala mo ba kung sinu-sino naman itong mga contact persons ni
JANET LIM NAPOLES sa DBM?
S: Sa DBM po ay sa opisina ni Usec MARIO RELAMPAGOS kami
pinagpa-follow up ni Madame JANET LIM NAPOLES. Ang mga
tinatawagan po namin ay sina LEA, MALOU at LALAINE na naka-
assign sa office ni USEC RELAMPAGOS.
85.
T: Bakit doon kayo nagfo-follow up sa office ni USEC
RELAMPAGOS?
S: Sa pagkaka-alam ko po, doon ginagawa ang SARO. (emphasis,
italics and understanding supplied)
In other words, complainants’ witness Luy underscores that
Relampagos, Bare, Nuñ ez and Paule’s participation in the misuse
or diversion of the PDAF pertains to their expedited preparation
and release of the SAROs covering PDAF projects, albeit due to
ministrations of Napoles and her staff. It was for this reason that
this Office ordered said public respondents to submit their
counter-affidavits so that they may shed light on their supposed
involvement in the so-called PDAF scam. After all, preliminary
investigation is merely inquisitorial, and it is often the only means
of discovering whether a person may be reasonably charged with a
crime, and to enable the prosecutor to prepare his complaint or
information.126redarclaw
Notably, respondents Relampagos, Bare, Nuñ ez and Paule did not
categorically deny witness Luy’s claims of follow-ups made with
the DBM. Instead, they simply deny, in general terms, having
committed the offenses charged.
The FIO did not submit a false certificate of non-forum shopping
Sevidal claims that the FIO submitted a false certificate of non-
forum shopping in OMB-C-C-13-0396. According to him, the FIO
failed to disclose, in said certificate, that the NBI earlier filed a
criminal complaint for Plunder against him and his co-
respondents, docketed as OMB-C-C-13-0318, and the charges
alleged therein arose from the same set of facts set forth in the
FIO’s complaint.
His contention fails to persuade.
Rule 7, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, which suppletorily applies
to these proceedings,127 requires the complainant’s submission of
a valid, duly-accomplished certificate of non-forum
shopping:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Certification against forum shopping. — The plaintiff or principal
party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory
pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification
annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he
80
has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim
involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial
agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or
claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action
or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and
(c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or
claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within
five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid
complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed. (emphasis, italics
and underscoring supplied)
Based on the above provision, the complainant or initiating party
is duty-bound only to disclose the existence of an earlier action or
claim filed by him or her, and which involves the same issues. He
or she is not required to disclose the existence of pending suits or
complaints previously filed by another party.
In this case, the FIO had no obligation to disclose the existence of
OMB-C-C-13-0318 for the simple reason that it was not the
initiating party of this complaint. Rather, as Sevidal himself admits,
the NBI, and not the FIO, is the complainant in OMB-C-C-13-0318.
The FIO is not even a party to OMB-C-C-13-0318. Thus, this Office
fails to see why the FIO should be faulted for not mentioning the
existence of this particular complaint.
The filing of the complaints was not premature
Sevidal and Ordoñ ez proceed to argue that the filing of the
criminal charges against them and their co-respondents is
premature because the COA had yet to issue notices of
disallowances (NDs) on disbursements drawn from the PDAF.
The above contention, however, has been rendered moot by the
well-publicized fact that the COA had already issued several NDs
covering disbursements relating to PDAF-funded projects of
respondent Enrile, among other persons, from the period 2007 to
2009.128redarclaw

They, however, insist that the filing of the complaint remains
premature even if the COA did issue NDs. According to them, the
NDs are still appealable under the 2009 Revised Rules of
Procedure (the 2009 COA Rules) and no administrative or criminal
complaint arising from the NDs may be instituted until and unless
the issuances have become final and executory. In other words,
Sevidal and Ordoñ ez assume that the NDs, at the very least, give
rise to a prejudicial question warranting the suspension of the
instant preliminary investigation.
This argument cannot be sustained.
Under Rule 111, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, a prejudicial
question exists when the following elements are
present:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously
instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed. (underscoring supplied)
As reflected in the above elements, the concept of a prejudicial
question involves both a civil and a criminal case. There can be no
prejudicial question to speak of if, technically, no civil case is
pending.129redarclaw
Proceedings under the 2009 COA Rules, including those pertaining
to the NDs, are administrative in nature. Consequently, any appeal
or review sought by any of herein respondents with the COA in
relation to the NDs will not give rise to a prejudicial question.
Significantly, Reyna and Soria v. Commission on Audit130 teaches
that an administrative proceeding pertaining to a COA
disallowance is distinct and separate from a preliminary
investigation in a criminal case which may have arisen from the
81
same set of facts. Both proceedings may proceed independently of
each another. Thus, Reyna and Soria declares:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
On a final note, it bears to point out that a cursory reading of the
Ombudsman's resolution will show that the complaint against
petitioners was dismissed not because of a finding of good faith
but because of a finding of lack of sufficient evidence. While the
evidence presented before the Ombudsman may not have been
sufficient to overcome the burden in criminal cases of proof
beyond reasonable doubt, it does not, however, necessarily follow,
that the administrative proceedings will suffer the same fate as
only substantial evidence is required, or that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
justify a conclusion.
An absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an
administrative prosecution or vice versa. The criminal case filed
before the Office of the Ombudsman is distinct and separate from
the proceedings on the disallowance before the COA. So also, the
dismissal by Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr., Deputy Ombudsman for
Mindanao, of the criminal charges against petitioners does not
necessarily foreclose the matter of their possible liability as
warranted by the findings of the COA. (emphasis, italics and
underscoring supplied)
Moreover, nothing in existing laws or rules expressly state that a
disallowance by the COA is a pre-requisite for the filing of a
criminal complaint for Plunder,131 Malversation132 or violation
of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. In fact, an audit disallowance is not
even an element of any of these offenses.
Sevidal and Ordoñ ez’s reference to Rule XIII, Section 6 of the 2009
COA Rules also fails to impress. This provision
reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Referral to the Ombudsman. - The Auditor shall report to his
Director all instances of failure or refusal to comply with the
decisions or orders of the Commission contemplated in the
preceding sections. The COA Director shall see to it that the report
is supported by the sworn statement of the Auditor concerned,
identifying among others, the persons liable and describing the
participation of each. He shall then refer the matter to the Legal
Service Sector who shall refer the matter to the Office of the
Ombudsman or other appropriate office for the possible filing of
appropriate administrative or criminal action. (emphasis, italics
and underscoring supplied)
Evidently, this immediately-quoted COA Rule pertains to the
possible filing of administrative or criminal action in relation to
audit disallowance. Note that the tenor of the provision is
permissive, not mandatory. As such, an audit disallowance may
not necessarily result in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions or
criminal prosecution of the responsible persons. Conversely,
therefore, an administrative or criminal case may prosper even
without an audit disallowance. Verily, Rule XIII, Section 6 is
consistent with the ruling in Reyna and Soria that a proceeding
involving an audit disallowance is distinct and separate from a
preliminary investigation or a disciplinary complaint.
AT ALL EVENTS, Rule XIII, Section 6 pertains to the COA’s filing of
administrative and/or criminal cases against the concerned
parties. It has no bearing on any legal action taken by other
agencies not subject of the 2009 COA Rules, such as the NBI or the
FIO.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
The diversion or misuse of the PDAF was coursed through a
complex scheme involving participants from the legislator’s office,
the DBM, IAs and NGOs controlled by respondent Janet Napoles.
Based on the testimonial and documentary evidence presented,
the widespread misuse of the subject PDAF allotted to a legislator
was coursed through a complex scheme basically involving
projects supposed to have been funded by said PDAF which turned
out to be inexistent or “ghost” projects. The funds intended for the
82
implementation of the PDAF-funded project are, with the
imprimatur of the legislator, the IAs and NGOs, diverted to the
possession and control of Napoles and her cohorts.
The Modus Operandi
Basically, the scheme commences when Napoles first meets with a
legislator and offers to “acquire” his or her PDAF allocation in
exchange for a “commission” or kickback amounting to a certain
percentage of the PDAF.
Once an agreement is reached, Napoles would then advance to the
legislator a down payment representing a portion of his or her
kickback. The legislator would then request the Senate President
or the House Speaker as the case may be for the immediate release
of his or her PDAF. The Senate President or Speaker would then
indorse the request to the DBM.133 This initial letter-request to
the DBM contains a program or list of IAs and the amount of PDAF
to be released in order to guide the DBM in its preparation and
release of the corresponding SARO.
The kickbacks, around 50% of the PDAF amount involved, are
received by legislators personally or through their
representatives, in the form of cash, fund transfer, manager’s
check or personal check issued by Napoles.134redarclaw
After the DBM issues the SARO representing the legislator’s PDAF
allocation, the legislator would forward a copy of said issuance to
Napoles. She, in turn, would remit the remaining portion of the
kickback due the legislator.135redarclaw
The legislator would then write another letter addressed to the IAs
which would identify his or her preferred NGO to undertake the
PDAF-funded project. However, the NGO chosen by the legislator
would be one of those organized and controlled by Napoles. These
NGOs were, in fact, specifically set up by Napoles for the
purpose.136redarclaw
Upon receipt of the SARO, Napoles would direct her staff, at the
time material to the cases, including witnesses Luy, Sula and
Suñ as, to prepare the PDAF documents for the approval of the
legislator. These documents reflect, among other things, the
preferred NGO to implement the undertaking, the project
proposals by the identified NGO/s, and indorsement letters to be
signed by the legislator and/or his staff. Once signed by the
legislator or his/her authorized staff, the PDAF documents are
transmitted to the IA, which, in turn, handles the preparation of
the MOA relating to the project to be executed by the legislator’s
office, the IA and the chosen NGO.
The projects are authorized as eligible under the DBM's menu for
pork barrel allocations. Note that the NGO is directly selected by
the legislator. No public bidding or negotiated procurement takes
place, in violation of RA 9184 or the Government Procurement
Reform Act.
Napoles, through her employees, would then follow up the release
of the NCA with the DBM.137redarclaw
After the DBM releases the NCA to the IA concerned, the IA would
expedite the processing of the transaction and the release of the
corresponding check representing the PDAF disbursement. Among
those tasked by Napoles to pick up the checks and deposit them to
bank accounts in the name of the NGO concerned were witnesses
Luy and Suñ as as well as respondents De Leon and De
Asis.138redarclaw
Once the funds are deposited in the NGO's account, Napoles would
then call the bank to facilitate the withdrawal thereof. Her staff
would then withdraw the funds and remit the same to her, thereby
83
placing said amount under Napoles’ full control and
possession.139redarclaw
To liquidate the disbursements, Napoles and her staff would then
manufacture fictitious lists of beneficiaries, liquidation reports,
inspection reports, project activity reports and similar documents
that would make it appear that the PDAF-related project was
implemented.
The PDAF allocation of Senator Enrile
Based on the records, the repeated diversions of the PDAF
allocated to Senator Enrile during the period 2004 to 2010 were
coursed via the above-described scheme.
In the case of Senator Enrile’s PDAF, the NGOs affiliated and/or
controlled by Napoles that undertook to implement the projects to
be funded by the PDAF were MAMFI, POPDFI, PSDFI, AMFI,
CARED, PASEDFI, SDPFFI, AEPPF and KPMFI.140 These
organizations transacted through persons known to be employees,
associates or relatives of Napoles, including witnesses Luy, Sula
and Suñ as, as well as respondents Jo Napoles, James Napoles, De
Leon, Pioranto, Lim, Ramirez, Cabilao, Ogerio, Fabian, Ditchon,
Galay, Uy, Fernando, De Asis, Encarnacion, Palama, Ornopia,
Castillo and Macha.
Napoles, through respondent Tuason, initially approached
respondent Reyes regarding a “business proposition” relating to
Senator Enrile’s PDAF. Tuason, in her Counter-Affidavit, declared
that Reyes, who had Senator Enrile’s full trust and confidence,
accepted Napoles’ proposition:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
6. Since I was close to then President Estrada, Janet Napoles
wanted me to refer politicians to her so I approached my friend
Atty. Jessica “Gigi” Reyes, who was the Chief-of-Staff of Senator
Enrile.
7. When I told her about the business proposition of Janet Napoles,
Atty. Gigi Reyes agreed to transact the PDAF of Senator Enrile with
Janet Napoles. I believed that Atty. Gigi Reyes had the full authority
to act for and on behalf of Senator Enrile with respect to his PDAF
allocations x x x (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
Once a PDAF allocation becomes available to Senator Enrile, his
staff, either Reyes or Evangelista, would inform Tuason of this
development. Tuason, in turn, would relay the information to
either Napoles or Luy.141redarclaw
Tuason, who admitted having acted as a liaison between Napoles
and the office of Senator Enrile, confirmed that the modus
operandi described by witnesses Luy, Sula and Suñ as, indeed,
applied to the disbursements drawn from Senator Enrile’s PDAF.
Tuason’s verified statements corroborate the modus operandi in
carrying out the transactions and described by witnesses Luy, Sula
and Suñ as in their respective affidavits in support of the
complaints:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
11. It starts with a call or advise from Atty. Gigi Reyes or Mr. Jose
Antonio Evangelista (also from the Office of Senator Enrile)
informing me that a budget from Senator Enrile’s PDAF is
available. I would then relay this information to Janet
Napoles/Benhur Luy.
12. Janet Napoles/Benhur Luy would then prepare a listing of the
projects available indicating the implementing agencies. This
listing would be sent to Atty. Gigi Reyes who will endorse the same
to the DBM under her authority as Chief-of- Staff of Senator Enrile.
13. After the listing is released by the Office of Senator Enrile to
the DBM, Janet Napoles would give me a down payment for
delivery for the share of Senator Enrile through Atty. Gigi Reyes.
14. After the SARO and/or NCA is released, Janet Napoles would
give me the full payment for delivery to Senator Enrile through
Atty. Gigi Reyes.
84
15. Sometimes Janet Napoles would have the money for Senator
Enrile delivered to my house by her employees. At other times, I
would get it from her condominium in Pacific Plaza or from
Benhur Luy in Discovery Suites. When Benhur Luy gives me the
money, he would make me scribble on some of their vouchers of
even sign under the name “Andrea Reyes,” Napoles’ codename for
me. This is the money that I would deliver to Senator Enrile
through Atty. Gigi Reyes.
16. I don’t count the money I receive for delivery to Senator Enrile.
I just receive whatever was given to me. The money was all
wrapped and ready for delivery when I get it from Janet Napoles
or Benhur Luy. For purposes of recording the transactions, I rely
on the accounting records of Benhur Luy for the PDAF of Senator
Enrile, which indicates the date, description and amount of money
I received for delivery to Senator Enrile.
xxx
18. As I have mentioned above, I personally received the share of
Senator Enrile from Janet Napoles and Benhur Luy and I
personally delivered it to Senator Enrile’s Chief-of-Staff, Atty. Gigi
Reyes…..There were occasions when Senator Enrile (sic) would
join us for a cup of coffee when he would pick her up. For me, his
presence was a sign that whatever Atty. Gigi Reyes was doing was
with Senator Enrile’s blessing.
Aside from Tuason’s statement, the following set of documentary
evidence supports the modus operandi described by witnesses
Luy, Sula and Suñ as: (a) the business ledgers prepared by witness
Luy, showing the amounts received by Senator Enrile, through
Tuason and Reyes, as his “commission” from the so-called PDAF
scam;142 (b) the 2007- 2009 COA Report documenting the results
of the special audit undertaken on PDAF disbursements - that
there were serious irregularities relating to the implementation of
PDAF-funded projects, including those endorsed by Senator
Enrile;143 and (c) the reports on the independent field verification
conducted in 2013 by the investigators of the FIO which secured
sworn statements of local government officials and purported
beneficiaries of the supposed projects which turned out to be
inexistent.144redarclaw
A violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 was committed.
Under Section 3(e) of RA 3019, a person becomes criminally liable
if three (3) elements are satisfied, viz.:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
He or she must be a officer discharging administrative, judicial or
official functions;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
He or she must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or inexcusable negligence; and
His or her action: (a) caused any undue injury to any party,
including the Government; or (b) gave any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his or her functions.145
The presence of the foregoing is evident from the records.
First, respondents Senator Enrile, Reyes, Evangelista, Javellana,
Mendoza, Cacal, Guañ izo, Ortiz, Cunanan, Jover, Munsod, Relevo,
Mendoza, Amata, Buenaventura, Sevidal, Jalandoni, Guañ izo,
Ordoñ ez, Cruz, Espiritu, Relampagos, Nuñ ez, Paule, Bare and
Lacsamana were all public officers at the time material to the
charges. Their respective roles in the processing and release of
PDAF disbursements were in the exercise of their administrative
and/or official functions.
Senator Enrile himself indorsed, in writing, the Napoles- affiliated
NGO to implement projects funded by his PDAF. His trusted
authorized staff, respondents Reyes and Evangelista, then
prepared indorsement letters and other communications relating
to the PDAF disbursements addressed to the DBM and the IAs
85
(NABCOR, TRC and NLDC). These trusted staff also participated in
the preparation and execution of MOAs with the NGOs and the IAs,
inspection and acceptance reports, disbursement reports and
other PDAF documents.
The DBM, through respondents Relampagos, Nuñ ez, Paule and
Bare, then processed with undue haste the SAROs and NCAs
pertaining to Senator Enrile’s PDAF projects.
In turn, the heads of the IAs, NABCOR, NLDC and TRC, as well as
their respective staff participated in the preparation and execution
of MOAs governing the implementation of the projects. They also
facilitated, processed and approved the PDAF disbursements to
the questionable NGOs. The table below indicates the participation
of the IA officials/employees-respondents:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
NABCOR
RESPONDENT
PARTICIPATION
Alan A. Javellana
Signatory to MOAs with CARED, POPDFI, MAMFI and SDPFFI;
approved disbursement vouchers relating to PDAF disbursements;
and co-signed the corresponding checks issued to the NGOs.
Rhodora B. Mendoza
Co-signatory to checks issued to the NGOs; and attended
inspection of livelihood kits.
Victor Roman Cacal
Assisted in the preparation/review of memoranda of agreement
with NGOs; and certified in disbursement vouchers that the PDAF
releases were necessary, lawful and incurred under his direct
supervision.
Encarnita Cristina P. Munsod
Certified in disbursement vouchers that the PDAF releases were
necessary, lawful and incurred under her direct supervision.
Romulo M. Relevo
Certified in disbursement vouchers that the PDAF releases were
necessary, lawful and incurred under his direct supervision.
Ma. Ninez P. Guañ izo
Certified in disbursement vouchers that funds were available and
supporting documents were complete and proper.
Ma. Julie V. Johnson
Certified in disbursement vouchers that funds were available and
supporting documents were complete and proper.
NLDC
RESPONDENT
PARTICIPATION
Gondelina G. Amata
Signatory to MOAs with APMFI, CARED and MAMFI; approved
disbursement vouchers relating to PDAF disbursements; and co-
signed the corresponding checks issued to the NGOs.
Chita C. Jalandoni
Co-signed the corresponding checks issued to the NGOs.
Emmanuel Alexis G. Sevidal
Certified in disbursement vouchers that the PDAF releases were
necessary, lawful and incurred under his direct supervision.
Ofelia E. Ordoñ ez
Certified in disbursement vouchers that funds were available.
Sofia D. Cruz
Certified in disbursement vouchers that supporting documents
were complete and proper.
Gregoria Buenaventura
Checked and verified the endorsement letters of respondent
Enrile; confirmed the authenticity of the authorization given by
respondent Enrile to his subordinates regarding the monitoring,
supervision and implementation of PDAF projects; and prepared
evaluation and verification reports.
Filipina T. Rodriguez
Certified in disbursement vouchers that funds were available.
TRC
RESPONDENT
PARTICIPATION
86
Antonio Y. Ortiz
Signatory to MOAs with CARED and APMFI; approved
disbursement vouchers relating to PDAF disbursements; and co-
signed the corresponding checks issued to the NGOs.
Dennis L. Cunanan
Certified in disbursement vouchers that the PDAF releases were
necessary, lawful and incurred under his direct supervision.
Francisco B. Figura
Assisted in the preparation/review of memoranda of agreement
with NGOs; certified in disbursement vouchers that the PDAF
releases were necessary, lawful and incurred under his direct
supervision; and co-signed the corresponding checks issued to the
NGOs.
Marivic Jover
Certified in disbursement vouchers that funds were available and
supporting documents were complete and proper.
Ma. Rosalinda Lacsamana
Oversaw the processing of PDAF releases to NGOs; and assisted in
the preparation/review of memoranda of agreement with NGOs.
Consuelo Lilian Espiritu
Certified in disbursement vouchers that funds were available.
On the other hand, private respondents in these cases acted in
concert with their co-respondents.
From the accounts of witnesses Luy, Sula, Suñ as and respondent
Tuason, Napoles made a business proposal to Reyes regarding the
Senator’s PDAF. Senator Enrile later indorsed NGOs affiliated
with/controlled by Napoles to implement his PDAF-funded
projects. Respondents Jo Napoles, James Napoles, De Leon, Piorato,
Lim, Ramirez, Cabilao, Ogerio, Fabian, Ditchon, Galay, Uy,
Fernando, De Asis, Encarnacion, Palama, Ornopia, Castillo and
Macha were all working for Napoles and served as officers of her
NGOs which were selected and endorsed by Senator Enrile to
implement his projects. They executed MOAs relative to these
undertakings in behalf of the organizations and acknowledged
receipt of the checks issued by NLDC, NABCOR and TRC
representing the PDAF releases.
Second, Senator Enrile and respondent-public officers of the IAs
were manifestly partial to Napoles, her staff and the affiliated
NGOs she controlled.
Sison v. People146 teaches that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
“Partiality” is synonymous with “bias,” which “excites a disposition
to see and report matters as they are wished for rather than as
they are.”
To be actionable under Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, partiality must be manifest. There must be a clear,
notorious and plain inclination or predilection to favor one side
rather than the other. Simply put, the public officer or employee’s
predisposition towards a particular person should be intentional
and evident.
That Napoles and the NGOs affiliated with/controlled by her were
extended undue favor is manifest.
Senator Enrile repeatedly and directly indorsed the NGOs headed
or controlled by Napoles and her cohorts to implement his
projects without the benefit of a public bidding.
As correctly pointed out by the FIO, the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of RA 9184 states that an NGO may be contracted only
when so authorized by an appropriation law or
ordinance:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
53.11. NGO Participation. When an appropriation law or ordinance
earmarks an amount to be specifically contracted out to Non-
governmental Organizations (NGOs), the procuring entity may
enter into a Memorandum of Agreement in the NGO, subject to
guidelines to be issued by the GPPB.
National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 476,147 as amended by NBC
No. 479, provides that PDAF allocations should be directly
87
released only to those government agencies identified in the
project menu of the pertinent General Appropriations Act (GAAs).
The GAAs in effect at the time material to the charges, however,
did not authorize the direct release of funds to NGOs, let alone the
direct contracting of NGOs to implement government projects.
This, however, did not appear to have impeded Senator Enrile’s
direct selection of the Napoles-affiliated or controlled NGOs, and
which choice was accepted in toto by the IAs.
Even assuming arguendo that the GAAs allowed the engagement of
NGOs to implement PDAF-funded projects, such engagements
remain subject to public bidding requirements. Consider GPPB
Resolution No. 012-2007:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
4.1 When an appropriation law or ordinance specifically earmarks
an amount for projects to be specifically contracted out to NGOs,
the procuring entity may select an NGO through competitive
bidding or negotiated procurement under Section 53.11 of the IRR.
(emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
The aforementioned laws and rules, however, were disregarded by
public respondents, Senator Enrile having just chosen the Napoles-
founded NGOs. Such blatant disregard of public bidding
requirements is highly suspect, especially in light of the ruling in
Alvarez v. People:148
The essence of competition in public bidding is that the bidders
are placed on equal footing. In the award of government contracts,
the law requires a competitive public bidding. This is reasonable
because “[a] competitive public bidding aims to protect the public
interest by giving the public the best possible advantages thru
open competition.” It is a mechanism that enables the government
agency to avoid or preclude anomalies in the execution of public
contracts. (underlining supplied)
Notatu dignum is the extraordinary speed attendant to the
examination, processing and approval by the concerned NABCOR,
NLDC and TRC officers of the PDAF releases to the Napoles-
affiliated or controlled NGOs. In most instances, the DVs were
accomplished, signed and approved on the same day. Certainly, the
required careful examination of the transactions’ supporting
documents could not have taken place if the DV was processed and
approved in one day.
Javellana, Mendoza and Cunanan of the TRC were categorically
identified by their subordinates co-respondents as those who
consistently pressed for the immediate processing of PDAF
releases.
Cacal pointed to Javellana and Mendoza as having pressured him
to expedite the processing of the DVs:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
15. In most instances, Boxes “B” and “C” were already signed
wherein the herein Respondent was required to sing (sic) Box “A”
of the Disbursement Vouchers. Most of the times the Box “B”
and/or Box “C” of the Disbursemen t Vouchers were already
signed ahead by Niñ ez Guanizo and/or Rhodora B. Mendoza and
ALAN A. JAVELLANA respectively.
16. In other instances, the checks for PDAF releases were already
prepared and signed by NABCOR President ALAN A. JAVELLANA
and VP for Finance RHODORA B. MENDOZA attached to the
Disbursement Voucher before the herein Respond ent were made
sig ns Box “A” of the s aid Disbursement Vouchers. This is
indicative of the target5 (sic) Municipalities and immediately stern
instructions of herein Respondent’s superiors to sign the
Disbursement Voucher immediately for reasons that it is being
followed up by the concerned NGO. Furthermore, the herein
Respondent relied on the duly executed Memorandum of
Agreement by and between NABCOR, NGO and the Office of the
Legislator. According to the said MOA, initial release of funds will
be undertaken by NABCOR upon signing thereof. Hence, payment
and/or release of fund to the NGO became a lawful obligation of
NABCOR.
xxx
88
18. On many instances, sternly ordered [sic] the NABCOR VP for
Admin. and Finance RHODORA B. MENDOZA to herein Respondent
to immediately sign Box “A” of the Disbursement Voucher even if
the NGOs have not yet complied with the other documentary
requirements to be attached to the said Disbursement Voucher on
the basis on [sic] the commitment of the NGO to submit the other
required documents (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
In his Counter-Affidavit, respondent Figura claimed
that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
xxx
b) In the course of my review of PDAF documents, DDG Dennis L.
Cunanan would frequently personally follow up in my office the
review of the MOA or my signature on the checks. He would come
down to my office in the third floor and tell me that he had a
dinner meeting with the First Gentleman and some legislators so
much that he requested me to fast track processing of the PDAF
papers. Though I hate name- dropping, I did not show any
disrespect to him but instead told him that if the papers are in
order, I would release them before the end of working hours of the
same day. This was done by DDG many times, but I stood my
ground when the papers on PDAF he’s following up had
deficiencies …. (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
Worth noting too is the extraordinary speed Relampagos and his
co-respondents from the DBM processed the documents required
for the release of the PDAF as witnesses Luy and Suñ as positively
attest to, viz: the DBM’s expedited processing of the requisite
SAROs and NCAs was made possible through the assistance
provided by Nuñ ez, Paule and Bare. Relampagos being their
immediate superior, they could not have been unaware of the
follow-ups made by Napoles’ staff with regard to the SARO and
NCA.
The concerned officials of NABCOR, NLDC and TRC did not even
bother to conduct a due diligence audit on the selected NGOs and
the suppliers chosen by the NGO to provide the livelihood kits,
which supply thereof was, it bears reiteration, carried out without
the benefit of public bidding, in contravention of existing
procurement laws and regulations.
In addition to the presence of manifest partiality on the part of
respondent public officers, evident bad faith is present.
Evident bad faith connotes not only bad judgment but also
palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do
moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse
motive or ill will. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively
operating with furtive design or with some motive of self- interest
or ill will or for ulterior purposes.149redarclaw
That several respondent public officers unduly benefited from the
diversion of the PDAF is borne by the records.
As earlier mentioned, Tuason claimed that she regularly remitted
significant portions (around 50%) of the diverted sums to Reyes,
which portions represented Senator Enrile’s “share” or
“commission” in the scheme, thus:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
14. After the SARO and/or NCA is released, Janet Napoles would
give me the full payment for delivery to Senator Enrile through
Atty. Gigi Reyes.
xxx
16. I don’t count the money I receive for delivery to Senator Enrile.
I just receive whatever was given to me. The money was all
wrapped and ready for delivery when I get it from Janet Napoles
or Benhur Luy. For purposes of recording the transactions, I rely
on the accounting records of Benhur Luy for the PDAF of Senator
Enrile, which indicates the date, description and amount of money
I received for delivery to Senator Enrile. (underlining supplied)
89
Notably, Tuason admits having received a 5% commission for
acting as liaison between Napoles and respondents Enrile and
Reyes.
Aside from Enrile and Reyes, respondents Javellana, Cunanan,
Ortiz and Sevidal were identified by witness Luy as among those
who received portions of the diverted amounts:150
126.
T: May nabanggit ka na may 10% na napupunta sa president o
head ng agency, sino itong tinutokoy mo?
S: Ang alam ko nakita kong tumanggap ay sila ALLAN JAVELLANA
ng NABCOR, DENNIS CUNANAN at ANTONIO Y. ORTIZ ng TRC….
Nasabi din sa akin ni EVELYN DE LEON na may inaabot din kina
GIGI BUENAVENTURA at ALEXIS SEVIDAL ng NLDC. (emphasis,
italics and underscoring supplied)
Witness Sula, in her Affidavit dated 12 September 2013,151 also
identified Amata as among those who benefited from the PDAF
disbursements:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
k) Ms. GONDELINA AMATA (NLDC) – Nakilala ko siya noong may
sakit ang kanyang asawa na nagpapagamot sa NKTI Hospital.
Silang mag-asawa ay nagpunta din sa office sa 2502 Discovery
Center, Ortigas. Ako rin ang nagdala ng pera para sa pambayad ng
gamot. May tatlong (3) beses ko po silang dinalhan ng pera sa
hospital. (underlining supplied)
Indubitably, repeatedly receiving portions of sums of money
wrongfully diverted from public coffers constitutes evident bad
faith.
Third, the assailed PDAF-related transactions caused undue injury
to the Government in the amount of Php345,000,000.00.
Based on the 2007-2009 COA Report as well as the independent
field verifications conducted by the FIO, the projects supposedly
funded by Senator Enrile’s PDAF were “ghost” or inexistent. There
were no livelihood kits distributed to beneficiaries. Witnesses Luy,
Sula and Suñ as declared that, per directive given by Napoles, they
made up lists of fictitious beneficiaries to make it appear that the
projects were implemented, albeit none took place.
Instead of using the PDAnF disbursements received by them to
implement the livelihood projects, respondents Jo Napoles, James
Napoles, De Leon, Piorato, Lim, Ramirez, Cabilao, Ogerio, Fabian,
Ditchon, Galay, Uy, Fernando, De Asis, Encarnacion, Palama,
Ornopia, Castillo and Macha, as well as witnesses Luy, Sula and
Suñ as, all acting for Napoles, continuously diverted these sums
amounting to Php345,000,000.00 to Napoles’ control.
Certainly, these repeated, illegal transfers of public funds to
Napoles’ control, purportedly for projects which did not, however,
exist, and just as repeated irregular disbursements thereof,
represent quantifiable, pecuniary losses to the Government
constituting undue injury within the context of Section 3(e) of RA
3019.152redarclaw
Fourth, respondents Enrile, Reyes, Evangelista, Javellana,
Mendoza, Cacal, Guañ izo, Ortiz, Cunanan, Jover, Munsod, Relovo,
Mendoza, Amata, Buenaventura, Sevidal, Jalandoni, Guañ izo,
Ordoñ ez, Cruz, Espiritu, Relampagos, Nuñ ez, Paule, Bare and
Lacsamana, granted respondents Janet Napoles, Jo Napoles, James
Napoles, De Leon, Piorato, Lim, Ramirez, Cabilao, Ogerio, Fabian,
Ditchon, Galay, Uy, Fernando, De Asis, Encarnacion, Palama,
Ornopia, Castillo and Macha unwarranted benefits.
Jurisprudence teaches that unwarranted benefits or privileges
refer to those accommodations, gains or perquisites that are
granted to private parties without proper authorization or
reasonable justification.153redarclaw
In order to be found liable under the second mode of violating
Section 3(e) of RA 3019, it suffices that the offender has given
unjustified favor or benefit to another, in the exercise of his
official, administrative or judicial functions.154 Respondents
90
Senator Enrile, Reyes, Evangelista, Javellana, Mendoza, Cacal,
Guañ izo, Ortiz, Cunanan, Jover, Munsod, Relevo, Mendoza, Amata,
Buenaventura, Sevidal, Jalandoni, Guañ izo, Ordoñ ez, Cruz, Espiritu,
Relampagos, Nuñ ez, Paule, Bare and Lacsamana, did just that. That
they repeatedly failed to observe the requirements of RA 9184, its
implementing rules and regulations, GPPB regulations as well as
national budget circulars, shows that unwarranted benefit,
advantage or preference was given to private respondents. The
NGOs represented by them were chosen to undertake the
implementation of PDAF projects without the benefit of a fair
system in determining the best possible offer for the Government.
Napoles, who controlled the NGOs personally chosen by Senator
Enrile, was able to unduly profit from the fictitious transactions.
Moreover, the NGOs selected by Senator Enrile did not appear to
have the capacity to implement the undertakings to begin with. At
the time material to the charges, these entities did not possess the
required accreditation to transact with the Government, let alone
possess a track record in project implementation to speak of.
In spite of the aforesaid irregularities, respondents Javellana,
Mendoza, Cacal, Guañ izo, Ortiz, Cunanan, Jover, Munsod, Relevo,
Mendoza, Amata, Buenaventura, Rodriguez, Sevidal, Jalandoni,
Guañ izo, Ordoñ ez, Cruz, Espiritu, Relampagos, Nuñ ez, Paule, Bare
and Lacsamana, with indecent haste, processed the SAROs and
NCAs needed to facilitate the release of the funds, as well as
expedited the release of the PDAF disbursements to the NGOs
affiliated with or controlled by Napoles. These efforts to
accommodate her NGOs and allow her to repeatedly receive
unwarranted benefits from the inexistent projects are too obvious
to be glossed over.
ALL TOLD, there is probable cause to indict the following
respondents named in the table below, for 15 counts of violation of
Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, the material details of which are
indicated also in the table:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
IMPLEMENTING AGENCY/NGOs Enrile, Reyes, Evangelista, Tuason, Relampagos, Nuñ ez, Paule,
DISBURSEMENT VOUCHERS NO. Bare, Javellana, Mendoza, Cacal, Guañ izo, Janet Napoles, Jo
TOTAL AMOUNT Napoles, James Napoles, Eulogio Rodriguez, De Leon, Lim,
RESPONDENTS Ramirez, Cabilao and Macha.
TRC-CARED NABCOR-MAMFI
01-2007-040669, 01-2007-040670, 01-2007-040671, 01-2007- 09-05-1773, 09-06-2025
040672 24,250,000
20,000,000 Enrile, Reyes, Evangelista, Tuason, Relampagos, Nuñ ez, Paule,
Enrile, Reyes, Evangelista, Tuason, Relampagos, Nuñ ez, Paule, Bare, Javellana, Mendoza, Cacal, Guañ izo, Janet Napoles, Jo
Bare, Ortiz, Cunanan, Figura, Lacsamana, Espiritu, Jover, Janet Napoles, James Napoles, Eulogio Rodriguez, De Leon, Lim,
Napoles, Jo Napoles, James Napoles, Eulogio Rodriguez, De Leon, Ramirez, Cabilao and Ornopia.
Lim, Ramirez, Cabilao, Fernando, Palama, De Asis and Encarnacion. NABCOR-SDPFFI
TRC-APMFI 09-05-1774, 09-06-2022
01-2009-040929, 01-2009-051300 24,250,000
22,500,000 Enrile, Reyes, Evangelista, Tuason, Relampagos, Nuñ ez, Paule,
Enrile, Reyes, Evangelista, Tuason, Relampagos, Nuñ ez, Paule, Bare, Javellana, Mendoza, Cacal, Guañ izo, Janet Napoles, Jo
Bare, Ortiz, Cunanan, Figura, Lacsamana, Espiritu, Jover, Janet Napoles, James Napoles, Eulogio Rodriguez, De Leon, Lim,
Napoles, Jo Napoles, James Napoles, Eulogio Rodriguez, De Leon, Ramirez, Cabilao and Macha.
Lim, Ramirez, Cabilao, Pioranto, Fabian, Ditchon, Galay and Uy. NABCOR-MAMFI
NABCOR-POPDFI 09-05-1767, 09-06-2028
08-04-01201, 08-07-02312 14,550,000
24,250,000 Enrile, Reyes, Evangelista, Tuason, Relampagos, Nuñ ez, Paule,
Enrile, Reyes, Evangelista, Tuason, Relampagos, Nuñ ez, Paule, Bare, Javellana, Mendoza, Cacal, Guañ izo, Janet Napoles, Jo
Bare, Javellana, Mendoza, Munsod, Relevo, Johnson, Janet Napoles, Napoles, James Napoles, Eulogio Rodriguez, De Leon, Lim,
Jo Napoles, James Napoles, Eulogio Rodriguez, De Leon, Lim, Ramirez, Cabilao and Ornopia.
Ramirez and Cabilao. NABCOR-SDPFFI
NABCOR-MAMFI 09-06-1825, 09-06-2027
08-09-3575, 09-04-1622 9,700,000
19,400,000 Enrile, Reyes, Evangelista, Tuason, Relampagos, Nuñ ez, Paule,
Enrile, Reyes, Evangelista, Tuason, Relampagos, Nuñ ez, Paule, Bare, Javellana, Mendoza, Cacal, Guañ izo, Janet Napoles, Jo
Bare, Javellana, Mendoza, Cacal, Guañ izo, Janet Napoles, Jo Napoles, James Napoles, Eulogio Rodriguez, De Leon, Lim,
Napoles, James Napoles, Eulogio Rodriguez, De Leon, Lim, Ramirez, Cabilao and Macha.
Ramirez, Cabilao and Ornopia. NLDC-CARED
NABCOR-SDPFFI 09-10-1530
08-09-3572, 09-05-1751 8,000,000
29,100,000
91
Enrile, Reyes, Evangelista, Tuason, Relampagos, Nuñ ez, Paule,
Bare, Amata, Sevidal, Ordoñ ez, Filipina Rodriguez, Cruz, Jalandoni,
Janet Napoles, Jo Napoles, James Napoles, Eulogio Rodriguez, De
Leon, Lim, Ramirez, Cabilao, Fernando, Palama, De Asis and
Encarnacion.
NLDC-MAMFI
09-09-1355, 09-10-1443, 09-10-1534
20,000,000
Enrile, Reyes, Evangelista, Tuason, Relampagos, Nuñ ez, Paule,
Bare, Amata, Sevidal, Ordoñ ez, Filipina Rodriguez, Cruz, Jalandoni,
Janet Napoles, Jo Napoles, James Napoles, Eulogio Rodriguez, De
Leon, Lim, Ramirez, Cabilao and Ornopia.
NLDC-CARED
09-12-1834, 10-01-0004, 10-01-0118, 10-05-0747
44,000,000
Enrile, Reyes, Evangelista, Tuason, Relampagos, Nuñ ez, Paule,
Bare, Amata, Sevidal, Ordoñ ez, Filipina Rodriguez, Cruz, Jalandoni,
Janet Napoles, Jo Napoles, James Napoles, Eulogio Rodriguez, De
Leon, Lim, Ramirez, Cabilao, Fernando, Palama, De Asis and
Encarnacion.
NLDC-AEPFFI
09-091353, 09-10-1444, 09-10-1540
25,000,000
Enrile, Reyes, Evangelista, Tuason, Relampagos, Nuñ ez, Paule,
Bare, Amata, Sevidal, Ordoñ ez, Filipina Rodriguez, Cruz, Jalandoni,
Janet Napoles, Jo Napoles, James Napoles, Eulogio Rodriguez, De
Leon, Lim, Ramirez, Cabilao, Ogerio and Guadinez.
NLDC-APMFI
09-09-1358, 09-10-1449,09-10-1535
25,000,000
Enrile, Reyes, Evangelista, Tuason, Relampagos, Nuñ ez, Paule,
Bare, Amata, Sevidal, Ordoñ ez, Filipina Rodriguez, Cruz, Jalandoni,
Janet Napoles, Jo Napoles, James Napoles, Eulogio Rodriguez, De
Leon, Lim, Ramirez, Cabilao, Pioranto, Fabian, Ditchon, Galay and
Uy.
NLDC-CARED
92
09-09-1354, 09-10-1447
32,000,000
Enrile, Reyes, Evangelista, Tuason, Relampagos, Nuñ ez, Paule,
Bare, Amata, Sevidal, Ordoñ ez, Filipina Rodriguez, Cruz, Jalandoni,
Janet Napoles, Jo Napoles, James Napoles, Eulogio Rodriguez, De
Leon, Lim, Ramirez, Cabilao, Fernando, Palama, De Asis and
Encarnacion.
Probable cause for Plunder exists.
Plunder is defined and penalized under Section 2 of RA No.
7080,155 as amended:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Sec. 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. - Any public
officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his
family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires
ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt criminal
acts as described in Section 1 (d)156 hereof in the aggregate
amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos
(P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall
be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who
participated with the said public officer in the commission of an
offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be
punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the
degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code,
shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and
all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and
assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from
the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State.
As laid down in Joseph Ejercito Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan,157 the
elements of Plunder are:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other
persons;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth
through a combination or series of the following overt or criminal
acts:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation
of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
(b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share,
percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from
any person and/or entity in connection with any government
contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the
public officer;
(c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets
belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions,
agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries;
(d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any
shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or
participation including the promise of future employment in any
business enterprise or undertaking;
(e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial
monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of
decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or
special interests; or
(f) by taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship,
connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at
the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people
and the Republic of the Philippines; and,
That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth
amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00.158
(emphasis supplied)
The presence of the foregoing elements has been sufficiently
established.
93
First, it is undisputed that Senator Enrile was a public officer at the
time material to the charges.159redarclaw
Second, he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill- gotten wealth.
As disclosed by the evidence, he repeatedly received sums of
money from Napoles for indorsing her NGOs160 to implement the
projects to be funded by his PDAF. Senator Enrile, through his
authorized representative Reyes, agreed to transact his PDAF with
Napoles who acted through Tuason.161redarclaw
As outlined by witnesses Luy, Sula and Suñ as, which was
corroborated by Tuason: once a PDAF allocation becomes
available to Senator Enrile, his staff, in the person of either
respondent Reyes or Evangelista, would inform Tuason of this
development. Tuason, in turn, would relay the information to
either Napoles or Luy. Napoles or Luy would then prepare a
listing162 of the projects available where Luy would specifically
indicate the implementing agencies. This listing would be sent to
Reyes who would then endorse it to the DBM under her authority
as Chief-of-Staff of Senator Enrile. After the listing is released by
the Office of Senator Enrile to the DBM, Janet Napoles would give
Tuason a down payment for delivery to Senator Enrile through
Reyes. After the SARO and/or NCA is released, Napoles would give
Tuason the full payment for delivery to Senator Enrile through
Atty. Gigi Reyes.
It bears noting that money was paid and delivered to Senator
Enrile even before the SARO and/or NCA is released. Napoles
would advance Senator Enrile’s down payment from her own
pockets upon the mere release by his Office of the listing of
projects to the DBM, with the remainder of the amount payable to
be given after the SARO representing the legislator’s PDAF
allocation was released by the DBM and a copy of the SARO
forwarded to Napoles.

Significantly, after the DBM issues the SARO, Senator Enrile,
through his staff members Reyes or Evangelista, would then write
another letter addressed to the IAs which would identify and
indorse Napoles’ NGOs as his preferred NGO to undertake the
PDAF-funded project,163 thereby effectively designating in
writing the Napoles-affiliated NGO to implement projects funded
by his PDAF. Along with the other PDAF documents, the
indorsement letter of Senator Enrile is transmitted to the IA,
which, in turn, handles the preparation of the MOA concerning the
project, to be entered into by the Senator’s Office, the IA and the
chosen NGO.
As previously discussed, such indorsements enabled Napoles to
gain access164 to substantial sums of public funds. The collective
acts of Senator Enrile, Napoles, et al. allowed the illegal diversion
of public funds to their own personal use.
It cannot be gainsaid that the sums of money received by Senator
Enrile amount to “kickbacks” or “commissions” from a government
project within the purview of Sec. 1 (d) (2)165 of RA 7080. He
repeatedly received commissions, percentage or kickbacks,
representing his share in the project cost allocated from his PDAF,
from Napoles or her employees or cohorts in exchange for his
indorsement of Napoles’s NGOs to implement his PDAF-funded
projects.
Worse, the evidence indicates that he took undue advantage of his
official position, authority and influence to unjustly enrich himself
at the expense, and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino
people and the Republic of the Philippines, within the purview of
Sec. 1 (d) (6) of RA 7080.166 He used and took undue advantage of
his official position, authority and influence as a Senator of the
Republic of the Philippines to access his PDAF and illegally divert
the allocations to the possession and control of Napoles and her
94
cohorts, in exchange for commissions, kickbacks, percentages from
the PDAF allocations.
Undue pressure and influence from Senator Enrile’s Office, as well
as his indorsement of Napoles’ NGOs, were brought to bear upon
the public officers and employees of the IAs.
Figura, an officer from TRC, claimed that the TRC management told
him: “legislators highly recommended certain NGOs/Foundations
as conduit implementors and since PDAFs are their discretionary
funds, they have the prerogative to choose their NGO’s”; and the
TRC management warned him that “if TRC would disregard it
(choice of NGO), they (legislators) would feel insulted and would
simply take away their PDAF from TRC, and TRC losses (sic) the
chance to earn service fees.” Figura claimed that he tried his best
to resist the pressure exerted on him and did his best to perform
his duties faithfully; [but] he and other low-ranking TRC officials
had no power to “ simply disregard the wishes of Senator Enrile,”
especially on the matter of disregarding public bidding for the
PDAF projects.167redarclaw
Cunanan,168 another public officer from the TRC, narrates that he
met Napoles sometime in 2006 or 2007, who “introduced herself
as the representative of certain legislators who supposedly picked
TRC as a conduit for PDAF-funded projects;” at the same occasion,
Napoles told him that “her principals were then Senate President
Juan Ponce Enrile, Senators Ramon “Bong” Revilla, Jr., Sen. Jinggoy
Ejercito Estrada;” in the course of his duties, he “often ended up
taking and/or making telephone verifications and follow-ups and
receiving legislators or their staff members;” during his telephone
verifications, he was able to speak with Reyes, who was acting in
behalf of her superior, public respondent Enrile; Reyes confirmed
to him that she and public respondent Evangelista “were duly
authorized by respondent Enrile” to facilitate his PDAF projects
and she also affirmed to him that the signatures appearing in
communications sent to TRC were, indeed, hers and Evangelista’s;
and he occasionally met with witness Luy, who pressured him into
expediting the release of the funds by calling the offices of the The PDAF was allocated to Senator Enrile by virtue of his position,
legislators. hence, he exercised control in the selection of his priority projects
and programs. He indorsed Napoles’ NGOs in consideration for the
NLDC’s Amata also mentioned about undue pressure surrounding remittance of kickbacks and commissions from Napoles. These
the designation of NLDC as one of the IAs for PDAF.169 Her fellow circumstances were compounded by the fact that the PDAF-funded
NLDC employee, Buenaventura170 adds that in accordance with projects were “ghost projects” and that the rest of the PDAF
her functions, she “checked and verified the endorsement letters allocation went into the pockets of Napoles and her cohorts.
of Senator Enrile, which designated the NGOs that would Undeniably, Senator Enrile unjustly enriched himself at the
implement his PDAF projects and found them to be valid and expense, and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people
authentic;” she confirmed the authenticity of the authorization and the Republic of the Philippines.
given by Enrile to his subordinates regarding the monitoring,
supervision and implementation of PDAF projects; and her Third, the amounts received by Senator Enrile through kickbacks
evaluation and verification reports were accurate. and commissions, amounted to more than Fifty Million Pesos
(P50,000,000.00).
Another NLDC officer, Sevidal,171 claimed that Senator Enrile and
Napoles, not NLDC employees, who were responsible for the Witness Luy’s ledger173 shows, among others, that Senator Enrile
misuse of the PDAF; Senator Enrile, through Reyes and received the following amounts as and by way of kickbacks and
Evangelista, were responsible for “identifying the projects, commissions:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
determining the project costs and choosing the NGOs” which were Year
“manifested in the letters of Senator Enrile;” and that he and other Sums received by Senator Enrile
NLDC employees were victims of the “political climate,” “bullied 2004
into submission by the lawmakers.” PhP 1,500,000.00
2005
NLDC’s Ordoñ ez172 claimed that as far as she was concerned, she PhP 14,622,000.00
and her co-respondents, “lowly Government employees who were 2006
dictated upon,” were victims, “bullied into submission by the PhP 13,300,000.00
lawmakers;” and she performed her duties in good faith and was 2007
“not in a position to negate or defy these actions of the PhP 27,112,500.00
Lawmakers, DBM and the NLDC Board of Trustees.” 2008
PhP 62,550,000.00
The corroborative evidence evinces that Senator Enrile used and 2009
took undue advantage of his official position, authority and PhP 23,750,000.00
influence as a Senator to unjustly enrich himself at the expense 2010
and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the PhP 30,000,00.00
Republic of the Philippines. Total:
95
Php 172,834,500.00
The aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth
amassed, accumulated or acquired by Senator Enrile stands at
PhP172,834,500.00, at the very least.174redarclaw
The sums were received by the Senator through his Chief of Staff,
Reyes, as earlier discussed.
Napoles provided these kickbacks and commissions. Witnesses
Luy and Suñ as, and even Tuason, stated that Napoles was assisted
in delivering the kickbacks and commissions by her employees
and cohorts, namely: John Raymund de Asis,175 Ronald John
Lim176 and Tuason.
Senator Enrile’s commission of the acts covered by Section 1 (d)
(2) and Section 1 (d) (6) of R.A. No. 7080 repeatedly took place
over the years 2004 to 2010. This shows a pattern – a combination
or series of overt or criminal acts – directed towards a common
purpose or goal which is to enable the Senator to enrich himself
illegally.
Senator Enrile, taking undue advantage of official position,
authority, relationship, connection or influence as a Senator acted,
in connivance with his subordinate and duly authorized
representative Reyes, to receive commissions and kickbacks for
indorsing the Napoles NGOs to implement his PDAF-funded
project, and likewise, in connivance with Napoles assisted by her
employees and cohorts Tuason, John Raymund de Asis, and Ronald
John Lim who delivered the kickbacks to him. These acts are
linked by the fact that they were plainly geared towards a common
goal which was to amass, acquire and accumulate ill-gotten wealth
amounting to at least PhP172,834,500.00 for Senator Enrile.
Probable cause therefore exists to indict Senator Enrile, Reyes,
Napoles, Tuason, de Asis and Lim for Plunder under RA No. 7080.
96
Conspiracy is established by the evidence presented.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it.177redarclaw
Direct proof of conspiracy is rarely found because criminals do not
write down their lawless plans and plots. Nevertheless, the
agreement to commit a crime may be deduced from the mode and
manner of the commission of the offense, or inferred from acts
that point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and
community of interest.178 Conspiracy exists among the offenders
when their concerted acts show the same purpose or common
design, and are united in its execution.179redarclaw
When there is conspiracy, all those who participated in the
commission of the offense are liable as principals, regardless of the
extent and character of their participation because the act of one is
the act of all.180redarclaw
As extensively discussed above, the presence of conspiracy among
respondents Enrile, Reyes, Evangelista, Javellana, Mendoza, Cacal,
Guañ izo, Ortiz, Cunanan, Jover, Munsod, Relevo, Mendoza, Amata,
Buenaventura, Rodriguez, Sevidal, Jalandoni, Guañ izo, Ordoñ ez,
Cruz, Espiritu, Relampagos, Nuñ ez, Paule, Bare, Lacsamana,
Tuason, Janet Napoles, Jo Napoles, James Napoles, De Leon,
Pioranto, Lim, Ramirez, Cabilao, Ogerio, Fabian, Ditchon, Galay, Uy,
Fernando, De Asis, Encarnacion, Palama, Ornopia, Castillo and
Macha is manifest.
To be able to repeatedly divert substantial funds from the PDAF,
access thereto must be made available, and this was made possible
by Senator Enrile who indorsed NGOs affiliated with or controlled
by Napoles to implement his PDAF-related undertakings. Reyes
and Evangelista prepared the requisite indorsement letters and
similar documentation addressed to the DBM and the IAs which
were necessary to ensure that the chosen NGO would be awarded
the project.
Relampagos, Paule, Bare and Nuñ ez, as officers of the DBM, were
in regular contact with Napoles and her staff who persistently
followed up the release of the coveted SAROs and NCAs. It was on
account of their persistence that the DBM immediately released
the SAROs and NCAs to the concerned IAs. In turn, Javellana,
Mendoza, Cacal, Guañ izo, Ortiz, Cunanan, Jover, Munsod, Relevo,
Mendoza, Amata, Buenaventura, Sevidal, Jalandoni, Guañ izo,
Ordoñ ez, Cruz, Espiritu and Lacsamana, as officers of the IAs,
prepared, reviewed and entered into the MOAs governing the
implementation of the projects. And they participated in the
processing and approval of the PDAF disbursements to the
questionable NGOs. The funds in question could not have been
transferred to these NGOs if not for their certifications, approvals,
and signatures found in the corresponding DVs and checks.
Once the fund releases were successfully processed by the IAs, Jo
Napoles, James Napoles, De Leon, Pioranto, Lim, Ramirez, Cabilao,
Ogerio, Fabian, Ditchon, Galay, Uy, Fernando, De Asis, Encarnacion,
Palama, Ornopia, Castillo and Macha, in behalf of the NGOs in
question and under the direction of Janet Napoles, would pick up
the corresponding checks and deposit them in accounts under the
name of the NGOs. The proceeds of the checks would later be
withdrawn from the banks and brought to the offices of Janet
Napoles, who would then proceed to exercise full control and
possession over the funds.
Jo Napoles, James Napoles, De Leon, Pioranto, Lim, Ramirez,
Cabilao, Ogerio, Fabian, Ditchon, Galay, Uy, Fernando, De Asis,
Encarnacion, Palama, Ornopia, Castillo and Macha, again on orders
of Janet Napoles, would prepare the fictitious beneficiaries list and
other similar documents for liquidation purposes, to make it
appear that the projects were implemented.
97
For their participation in the above-described scheme, Senator
Enrile, Javellana, Cunanan, Amata, Buenaventura and Sevidal were
rewarded with portions of the PDAF disbursements from Napoles.
Senator Enrile's share or commission was coursed by Napoles
through Tuason who, in turn, delivered the same to and received
by Reyes.
ALL TOLD, there is a cohesion and interconnection in the above-
named respondents’ intent and purpose that cannot be logically
interpreted other than to mean the attainment of the same end
that runs through the entire gamut of acts they perpetrated
separately. The role played by each of them was so indispensable
to the success of their scheme that, without any of them, the same
would have failed.
There is no evidence showing that the signatures of respondents
Enrile, Reyes or Evangelista in the PDAF documents were forged.
Reyes and Evangelista argue that the signatures appearing in the
letters, MOAs, liquidation reports and similar PDAF documents
attributed to them and Senator Enrile are mere forgeries. They
deny having signed these documents and disclaim any
participation in the preparation and execution thereof.
In support of her claim, Reyes submitted an Affidavit dated 6
December 2013 executed by Rogelio G. Azores (Azores), who
claims to be a former NBI document examiner and now works as a
freelance consultant, and who represents himself to be an expert
in the examination of documents “to determine their authenticity
and the genuineness of signatures appearing thereon.”
Azores stated that his services were engaged by Reyes to
“determine whether or not the signatures of Ms. Reyes appearing
in certain documents were her true and genuine signatures;” in the
course of his engagement, he gathered samples of Reyes’
signatures appearing in several documents she signed during her
tenure as Enrile’s chief-of-staff; he compared these sample
signatures with the signatures appearing in the PDAF documents
which are attributed to Reyes; based on his examination, there
were “ significant differences in habit handwriting characteristics
existing between the questioned signatures of ‘Atty. Jessica Lucila
G. Reyes’ on one hand, and the standard signatures of Atty. Jessica
Lucila G. Reyes on the other hand;” and in his opinion, the
signatures allegedly belonging to Reyes and appearing in the PDAF
documents are forgeries.
Respondents Reyes and Evangelista's claim fails to convince.
Forgery is not presumed; it must be proved by clear, positive and
convincing evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party
alleging forgery.181redarclaw
It bears stressing that Senator Enrile, in his Letter dated 21 March
2012,182confirmed to the COA that: (a) he authorized
respondents Reyes and Evangelista to sign letters, MOAs and other
PDAF documents in his behalf; and (b) the signatures appearing in
the PDAF documents as belonging to respondents Reyes and
Evangelista are authentic. The pertinent portion of the Senator’s
letter reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
I confirm that Atty. Jessica L. G. Reyes, Chief of Staff, Office of the
Senate President, and Mr. Jose A. V. Evangelista II, Deputy Chief of
Staff, Office of the Senate President, have been authorized to sign
pertinent documents to ensure the proper implementation of such
livelihood projects subjects to pertinent government accounting
and auditing laws, rules and regulations. The signatures appearing
in the documents enumerated are those of my authorized
representatives. (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
It bears noting at this juncture that the Senator has not disclaimed
authorship of the 21 March 2012 letter. That the Senator readily
authenticated Reyes and Evangelista’s signatures is not difficult to
understand, the two having been members of his confidential staff
for many years.
98
Nonetheless, Reyes and Evangelista strongly deny having signed
the PDAF documents and insist that they did not participate in the
preparation or execution thereof. Mere denial is insufficient,
however, to disprove the authenticity of their signatures
appearing in the PDAF documents.183 This holds true especially
in Evangelista’s case. The MOAs bearing his questioned signatures
are notarized documents that enjoy the presumption of regularity
and can be overturned only by clear and convincing
evidence.184redarclaw
Besides, respondent Evangelista, in his Letter dated 2 August
2012185 to the COA, admitted the authenticity of his signatures
appearing in the PDAF documents, save for those found in
documents relating to PDAF disbursements of another legislator.
His letter reads, in part:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
As confirmed in the letter of the Senate President dated 21 March
2012, Atty. Jessica L. G. Reyes, Chief of Staff, Office of the Senate
President, and I have been authorized to sign pertinent documents
to ensure the proper implementation of livelihood projects subject
to pertinent government accounting and auditing laws, rules and
regulations.
However, please be informed that the subject signatures on the
following documents submitted regarding the livelihood projects
implemented by the 3rd District of Davao City (in the total amount
of P15 Million Pesos released to the National Agribusiness
Corporation on 9 July 2009 as requested by former Rep. Ruy Elias
Lopez) are not my signatures:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
a) Certificate of Acceptance dated 4 May 2010 (Annex 16)
b) List of Beneficiaries by Barangay (Annex 17) (emphasis, italics
and underscoring supplied)
Regarding affiant Azores’ assertion that the signatures of Reyes in
the PDAF documents were forgeries because they and Reyes’
standard signatures had “significant differences in habit
handwriting characteristics,” the same deserves scant
consideration.
Mere variance of the signatures in different documents cannot be
considered as conclusive proof that one is forged. As Rivera v.
Turiano186 teaches:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
This Court has held that an allegation of forgery and a perfunctory
comparison of the signatures by themselves cannot support the
claim of forgery, as forgery cannot be presumed and must be
proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence, and the burden
of proof lies in the party alleging forgery. Even in cases where the
alleged forged signature was compared to samples of genuine
signatures to show its variance therefrom, this Court still found
such evidence insufficient. It must be stressed that the mere
variance of the signatures cannot be considered as conclusive
proof that the same were forged. (emphasis, italics and
underscoring supplied)
Moreover, the observations of affiant Azores in his Affidavit and
Examination Report dated 10 October 2013 do not meet the
criteria for identification of forgery as enunciated in Ladignon v.
Court of Appeals:187
The process of identification, therefore, must include the
determination of the extent, kind, and significance of this
resemblance as well as of the variation. It then becomes necessary
to determine whether the variation is due to the operation of a
different personality, or is only the expected and inevitable
variation found in the genuine writing of the same writer. It is also
necessary to decide whether the resemblance is the result of a
more or less skillful imitation, or is the habitual and characteristic
resemblance which naturally appears in a genuine writing. When
these two questions are correctly answered the whole problem of
identification is solved. (underlining supplied)
In his Affidavit and Examination Report, affiant Azores simply
concluded that the signatures in the PDAF documents and Reyes’
sample signatures “were not written by one and the same person.”
99
AT ALL EVENTS, this Office, after a prima facie comparison with
the naked eyes of the members of the Panel of Investigators
between the signatures appearing in the PDAF documents that are
attributed to respondents Senator Enrile, Reyes and Evangelista
and their signatures found in their respective counter-affidavits,
opines that both sets of signatures appear to have been affixed by
one and the same respective hands.188 In the absence of clear and
convincing evidence, this Office thus finds that the questioned
signatures on the relevant documents belong to respondents
Enrile, Reyes and Evangelista.
The Arias doctrine is not applicable to these proceedings.
Javellana argues that he cannot be held accountable for approving
the PDAF releases pertaining to those projects assigned to
NABCOR because he only issued such approval after his
subordinates, namely, respondents Mendoza, Cacal, Relevo and
other NABCOR officials involved in the processing and/or
implementation of PDAF-funded projects, examined the
supporting documents, assured him of the availability of funds and
recommended the approval of the disbursements.
Similarly, Cunanan claims that he approved the PDAF releases
relating to projects assigned to TRC only after his subordinates at
the agency recommended such approval.
Simply put, Javellana and Cunanan invoke the ruling in Arias v.
Sandiganbayan.189 Reliance thereon is misplaced.
Arias squarely applies in cases where, in the performance of his
official duties, the head of an office is being held to answer for his
act of relying on the acts of his subordinate:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
We would be setting a bad precedent if a head of office plagued by
all too common problems - dishonest or negligent subordinates,
overwork, multiple assignments or positions, or plain
incompetence - is suddenly swept into a conspiracy conviction
simply because he did not personally examine every single detail,
painstakingly trace every step from inception, and investigate the
motives of every person involved in a transaction before affixing
his signature as the final approving authority.
xxx
We can, in retrospect, argue that Arias should have probed
records, inspected documents, received procedures, and
questioned persons. It is doubtful if any auditor for a fairly sized
office could personally do all these things in all vouchers
presented for his signature. The Court would be asking for the
impossible. All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent
on their subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare
bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations. x x x There has
to be some added reason why he should examine each voucher in
such detail. Any executive head of even small government agencies
or commissions can attest to the volume of papers that must be
signed. There are hundreds of documents, letters, memoranda,
vouchers, and supporting papers that routinely pass through his
hands. The number in bigger offices or departments is even more
appalling.
There should be other grounds than the mere signature or
approval appearing on a voucher to sustain a conspiracy charge
and conviction.190 (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
The above pronouncement readily shows that the Arias doctrine
does not help the cause of Javellana and Cunanan.
First, the Arias doctrine applies only if it is undisputed that the
head of the agency was the last person to sign the vouchers, which
would show that he was merely relying on the prior certifications
and recommendations of his subordinates. It will not apply if there
is evidence showing that the head of agency, before a
recommendation or certification can be made by a superior,
performs any act that would signify his approval of the
100
transaction. In other words, the Arias doctrine is inapplicable in
cases where it is the head of agency himself or herself who
influences, pressures, coerces or otherwise convinces the
subordinate to sign the voucher or recommend the approval of the
transaction.
In Javellana’s case, Cacal stated in his Counter-Affidavit that he
signed the disbursement vouchers pertaining to PDAF
disbursements because Javellana directed him to do so. In support
of his claim, Cacal submitted a document entitled “Authorization”
issued and signed by respondent Javellana which
states:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
In order to facilitate processing of payments and in the exigency of
the service, MR. VICTOR ROMAN CACAL, Paralegal, this Office is
hereby authorized to sign BOX A of the Disbursement Vouchers of
all transactions related to PDAF Project.
This authorization takes effect starting August 20, 2008.
(underscoring supplied)
Cacal, in his Supplemental Affidavit, also claimed that Javellana,
among others, already signed the checks and other documents
even before he (Cacal) could sign Box “A” of the disbursement
vouchers:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
15. In most instances, Boxes “B” and “C” were already signed
wherein the herein Respondent was required to sing (sic) Box “A”
of the Disbursement Vouchers. Most of the times the Box “B”
and/or Box “C” of the Disbursement Vouchers were already signed
ahead by Niñ ez Guanizo and/or Rhodora B. Mendoza and ALAN A.
JAVELLANA respectively.
16. In other instances, the checks for PDAF releases were already
prepared and signed by NABCOR President ALAN A. JAVELLANA
and VP for Finance RHODORA B. MENDOZA attached to the
Disbursement Voucher before the herein Respond ent were made
sig ns Box “A” of the said Disbursement Vouchers. This indicative
of the target5 (sic) Municipalities and immediately stern
instructions of herein Respondent’s superiors to sign the
Disbursement Voucher immediately for reasons that it is being
followed up by the concerned NGO. Furthermore, the herein
Respondent relied on the duly executed Memorandum of
Agreement by and between NABCOR, NGO and the Office of the
Legislator. According to the said MOA, initial release of funds will
be undertaken by NABCOR upon signing thereof. Hence, payment
and/or release of fund to the NGO became a lawful obligation of
NABCOR.
xxx
18. On many instances, sternly ordered [sic] the NABCOR VP for
Admin. and Finance RHODORA B. MENDOZA to herein Respondent
to immediately sign Box “A” of the Disbursement Voucher even if
the NGOs have not yet complied with the other documentary
requirements to be attached to the said Disbursement Voucher on
the basis on [sic] the commitment of the NGO to submit the other
required documents (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
Cacal added that he was constrained to sign the disbursement
vouchers due to pressure exerted by his
superiors:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
19. In many instances wherein the Respondent questioned the
attachments/documents in the said vouchers regarding the
disbursements of the PDAF of legislators the respondent was
herein threatened and/or coerced by his superiors. (emphasis,
italics and underscoring supplied)
Since the subordinate himself vehemently disputes having
recommended the approval of the fund release to his superior, this
Office in not inclined to apply the Arias doctrine. Note that the
Arias doctrine is only applied in cases where it is undisputed that
the recommendation of the subordinate preceded the superior’s
approval, and not in situations where it is the superior who
persuades or pressures the subordinate to favorably recommend
approval.
101
Second, the Arias doctrine, even assuming that it is applicable,
does not ipso facto free the heads of agencies from criminal, civil
or administrative liability. The ruling merely holds that the head of
agency cannot be deemed to be a co- conspirator in a criminal
offense simply because he signed and/or approved a voucher or
document that facilitated the release of public funds.191redarclaw
In the present cases, the liability of Javellana and Cunanan is not
based solely on their approval of the vouchers and other papers
relating to PDAF projects implemented by NABCOR and/or TRC,
but on their own overt acts showing their undue interest in the
release of PDAF funds. In short, Javellana and Cunanan’s actions
indicate that they wanted the funds released as soon as possible,
regardless of whether applicable laws or rules governing the
disbursements had been observed or complied with.
As discussed above, Javellana’s own subordinate stated that the
latter actually pre-signed the checks pertaining to PDAF releases
even before the DVs were duly accomplished and signed.
Figura declared in his Counter-Affidavit that Cunanan constantly
followed up with him (Figura) the expedited processing of PDAF
documents:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
b) In the course of my review of PDAF documents, DDG Dennis L.
Cunanan would frequently personally follow up in my office the
review of the MOA or my signature on the checks. He would come
down to my office in the third floor and tell me that he had a
dinner meeting with the First Gentleman and some legislators so
much that he requested me to fast track processing of the PDAF
papers. Though I hate name- dropping, I did not show any
disrespect to him but instead told him that if the papers are in
order, I would release them before the end of working hours of the
same day. This was done by DDG many times, but I stood my
ground when the papers on PDAF he’s following up had d
eficiencies x x x (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, witness Luy in his Sworn Statement dated 12 September
2013192 stated that Javellana and Cunanan were among those he
saw receive a percentage of the diverted PDAF sums from
Napoles:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
126.
T: May nabanggit ka na may 10% na napupunta sa president o
head ng agency, sino itong tinutukoy mo?
S: Ang alam ko nakita kong tumanggap ay sila Allan Javellana ng
NABCOR, DENNIS CUNANAN at ANTONIO Y. ORTIZ ng TRC ....
emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
Furthermore, this Office takes note of the fact that witness Luy,
during the legislative inquiry conducted by the Senate Committee
on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee) on 7 November 2014, testified that he
personally knew Javellana as among those who benefited from
Napoles for his role in the PDAF releases, viz:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Luy said he saw Napoles giving money to officials of implementing
agencies at her office.
“When Ms. Napoles gives the instruction to prepare the money and
their 10-percent commission, I will so prepare it. I will type the
voucher and have it checked by my seniors or by her daughter Jo
Christine,” Luy said. “I will bring the money to her office and there
are instances when she and I will meet the person and give the
money contained in a paper bag.”
Luy said he saw Alan Javellana, a former president of the National
Agribusiness Corp., and Antonio Ortiz, former head of the
Technology Resource Center, receive their respective payoffs.193
(emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
On 6 March 2014, witness Luy again testified before the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee that Cunanan was among those who
received undue benefits from the PDAF scam through kickbacks
given by Napoles:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
102
The principal whistleblower in the pork barrel scam Benhur Luy
said Thursday that Dennis Cunanan, the former chief of the
Technology Resource Center who wants to turn state witness,
personally received P960,000 in kickbacks from Janet Lim
Napoles, contrary to his claims.
In the continuation of the Blue Ribbon Committee hearings on the
pork barrel scam, Luy said he personally saw Cunanan carrying a
bagful of money after meeting Napoles at the JLN Corp. office at
the Discovery Suites in Ortigas, Pasig City.
Luy said he was instructed by Napoles to prepare the P960,000
intended for Cunanan, representing his commission for the pork
barrel coursed through the TRC. He then handed the money to his
co-worker, Evelyn De Leon, who was present at the meeting room
with Napoles and Cunanan.
“When Dencu (referring to Dennis Cunanan) emerged out of the
conference room, I saw him carrying the paper bag,” Luy said.
Asked if he saw Cunanan receive the money, Luy answered: “After
the meeting, I saw the paper bag. He was carrying it.” (emphasis,
underscoring and italics supplied)194
The immediately-quoted chronicle of the testimonies of Luy
indubitably indicates that respondents Javellana and Cunanan did
not approve the PDAF releases because they relied on the
recommendation of their subordinates; rather, they themselves
wanted the funds released of their own volition.
IN FINE, this Office holds that the Arias doctrine is not applicable
to the heads of agencies impleaded in these proceedings including
Javellana and Cunanan.
There is no probable cause to indict public respondent Montuya.
Montuya, an Accounting Assistant at NABCOR, is impleaded for
allegedly preparing the inspection reports pertaining to livelihood
projects funded by PDAF and covered by SARO Nos. ROCS-08-
0516,195 ROCS-08-07211196 and ROCS-08-00804.197 She,
however, denies having participated in the misuse of the PDAF and
insists that she actually did conduct physical inspections of the
agricultural packages at warehouses and prepared the
corresponding reports. She alleges that she was supervised in her
inspection by her superior, respondent Mendoza.
This Office finds in favor of Montuya.
The Office takes note that her inspection of the livelihood kits took
place after NABCOR released the PDAF disbursements to SDPFFI.
In other words, her actions were unrelated, let alone necessary, to
NABCOR’s improper transfer of public funds to SDPFFI.
Indeed the Office finds no fault in Montuya’s actions. Her
inspection reports simply reflect what she saw during the
inspection, i.e., that there were livelihood kits at the Bulacan
warehouses where Mendoza brought her. Montuya, in the course
of her inspection, was not duty-bound to inquire beyond the
existence of the livelihood kits as her job was limited to conducting
a physical inspection of the items in question. Mendoza brought
her to the Bulacan warehouses and showed her (Montuya) the
livelihood kits subject of the inspection. In fact, she (Mendoza)
even co-signed the inspection report in relation to the livelihood
project covered by SARO Nos. ROCS-08-0516. She was given
instructions by Mendoza on how to conduct the inspections and
prepare the corresponding reports.
In any event, Montuya was under the full supervision and control
of her superior Mendoza during the inspections.
Unlike Mendoza, however, there is no evidence indicating that
Montuya was unduly interested in the PDAF releases, received any
particular benefit therefrom or was involved in NABCOR’s
103
processing/facilitation of PDAF disbursements to SDPFFI. The
criminal charges against her must thus be dismissed.
There is no probable cause to indict private respondents Oliveros,
Talaboc, Agcaoili, Balanoba, Lawas-Yutok, Santos, Victorino and
Solomon.
Respondents Oliveros, Talaboc, Agcaoili, Balanoba, Lawas- Yutok
and Santos, who were supposed to be notaries public at the time
material to the charges, are impleaded in these proceedings for
having allegedly allowed Napoles and her staff to use their notarial
seals in notarizing MOAs and other similar PDAF documents.
Likewise, respondents Victorino and Solomon were impleaded
because they prepared independent auditor’s reports for some of
the Napoles-affiliated NGOs which received funds drawn from
Senator Enrile’s PDAF.
The criminal charges against the above-named notaries public and
certified public accountants must also be dismissed.
As notaries public, Oliveros, Talaboc, Agcaoili, Balanoba, Lawas-
Yutok and Santos’ duty in relation to the notarial act of
acknowledgment of public instruments is to make sure that: (a)
the parties acknowledging the instrument personally appear
before them at the time of the notarization; and (b) said parties
are personally known to them and, for this purpose, require the
presentation of competent evidence of identity.198 They are not
required to inquire as to the contents of the instrument, let alone
the motives of the acknowledging parties who executed said
document. This Office cannot, therefore, assume that respondents
Oliveros, Talaboc, Agcaoili, Balanoba, Lawas-Yutok and Santos
were aware of the contents of the PDAF documents when they
notarized the same.
Similarly, respondents Victorino and Solomon were implicated
because they prepared the independent auditor’s reports of some
of the NGOs used in the diversion of the PDAF. The preparation of
these reports, however, is not directly related to or an act
necessary to carrying out the irregular transfer of funds from the
IAs to the NGOs involved. There is no indication that either
Victorino or Solomon knew that the reports they prepared would
be used for nefarious purposes, let alone evidence showing that
they were actively involved in the systematic diversion of the
PDAF.
Respecting the subject notaries public, even if they, indeed,
allowed other persons to use their notarial seals and notarize
documents in their names, these acts are not indispensable to the
commission of Plunder or violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. If
at all, the acts complained of constitute violations of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice.199 Similarly, any irregularity in the
public accountants’ preparation of the audit reports may render
them liable for violation of RA 9298200 or other similar laws or
rules.
The criminal charges against respondents Oliveros, Talaboc,
Agcaoili, Balanoba, Lawas-Yutok, Santos, Victorino and Solomon
must thus be dismissed for insufficient evidence. The dismissal of
said charges, however, is without prejudice to any action that may
be taken against them by the appropriate body or office in relation
to any possible violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice,
R.A. No. 9298, or other applicable laws or rules.
Respondents’ defenses are best left to the trial court’s
consideration during trial on the merits.
Respondent public officers insist that they were motivated by good
faith, and acted in accordance with existing laws and rules, and
that the disbursements from the PDAF were all regular and above
board.
104
During preliminary investigation, this Office does not determine if
the evidence on record proves the guilt of the person charged
beyond reasonable doubt. It merely ascertains whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed; that the respondent charged is probably
guilty thereof, and should be held for trial; and that based on the
evidence presented, the Office believes that the respondent’s
assailed act constitutes the offense charged.201redarclaw
Public respondents’ claims of good faith and regularity in their
performance of official functions fail.
As earlier reflected, the sworn statements of witnesses, the
disbursement vouchers, the indorsed/encashed checks, the MOAs
with NGOs, the written requests, liquidation reports, confirmation
letters and other evidence on record indubitably indicate that
respondents Senator Enrile, Reyes, Evangelista, Javellana,
Mendoza, Cacal, Guañ izo, Ortiz, Cunanan, Jover, Munsod, Relevo,
Mendoza, Amata, Buenaventura, Sevidal, Jalandoni, Guañ izo,
Ordoñ ez, Cruz, Espiritu, Relampagos, Nuñ ez, Paule, Bare and
Lacsamana, as well as respondents Tuason, Janet Napoles, Jo
Napoles, James Napoles, De Leon, Pioranto, Lim, Ramirez, Cabilao,
Ogerio, Fabian, Ditchon, Galay, Uy, Fernando, De Asis, Encarnacion,
Palama, Ornopia, Castillo and Macha, conspired with one another
to repeatedly raid the public treasury through what appears to be
the drawing of cash advances from the PDAF allocated to
respondent Enrile, albeit for fictitious projects.
Consequently, they must be deemed to have illegally conveyed
public funds in the amount of Php345,000,000.00, more or less, to
the possession and control of questionable NGOs affiliated with
Napoles, and thereafter allowed Enrile to acquire and amass ill-
gotten proceeds through kickbacks in the sum of
Php172,834,500.00, which is in excess of Php50,000,000.00.
At any rate, specifically with respect to Plunder, good faith is
neither and element or a defense.
AT ALL EVENTS, respondents Senator Enrile, Reyes, Evangelista,
Javellana, Mendoza, Cacal, Guañ izo, Ortiz, Cunanan, Jover, Munsod,
Relevo, Mendoza, Amata, Buenaventura, Sevidal, Jalandoni,
Guañ izo, Ordoñ ez, Cruz, Rodriguez, Espiritu, Relampagos, Nuñ ez,
Paule, Bare and Lacsamana’s claims of good faith and regularity in
the performance of their duties are defenses in violation of R.A. No.
3019 which are best raised during trial proper. As explained in
Deloso v. Desierto:202
We agree with public respondents that the existence of good faith
or lack of it, as elements of the crimes of malversation and
violation of Section 3 (e), R. A. No. 3019, is evidentiary in nature.
As a matter of defense, it can be best passed upon after a full-
blown trial on the merits. (emphasis and italics supplied)
It bears reiterating that, indeed, preliminary investigation is a
merely inquisitorial mode of discovering the persons who may be
reasonably charged with a crime.203 It is not the occasion for the
full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence, including
respondents-movants’ respective defenses.204 Precisely there is a
trial on the merits for this purpose.
WHEREFORE, this Office, through the
undersigned:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(a) FINDS PROBABLE CAUSE to indict for:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
[PLUNDER- 1 Count]
i.
Juan Ponce Enrile, Jessica Lucila G. Reyes, Ruby C. Tuason, Janet
Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim and John Raymund De Asis, acting
in concert, for PLUNDER (Section 2 in relation to Section 1 (d) 1, 2
and 6 of R. A. No. 7080, as amended), in relation to Enrile’s ill-
gotten wealth in the aggregate sum of Php172,834,500.00,
105
representing kickbacks or commissions received by Enrile from
Napoles in connection with Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF)-funded government projects and by reason of his office or
position;
[VIOLATION OF SECTION 3 (E) OF R.A. NO. 3019 – 15 Counts]
Juan Ponce Enrile, Jessica Lucila G. Reyes, Jose Antonio V.
Evangelista II, Ruby C. Tuason, Mario L. Relampagos, Rosario
Nuñ ez, Lalaine Paule, Marilou Bare, Antonio Y. Ortiz, Dennis L.
Cunanan, Francisco B. Figura, Ma. Rosalinda Lacsamana, Consuelo
Lilian R. Espiritu, Marivic V. Jover, Janet Lim Napoles, Jo Christine
L. Napoles, James Christopher L. Napoles, Eulogio D. Rodriguez,
Evelyn D. De Leon, Ronald John Lim, Amparo L. Fernando,
Fernando Ramirez, Nitz Cabilao, Aileen Palama, John Raymund De
Asis and Mylene T. Encarnacion, acting in concert, for VIOLATION
OF SECTION 3 (E) OF R.A. NO. 3019 in relation to fund releases
amounting to Php20,000,000.00 drawn from Enrile’s PDAF and
coursed through the Technology Resource Center (TRC) and
Countrywide Agri and Rural Economic and Development
Foundation, Inc. (CARED), as reflected in Disbursement Voucers
(DV) No. 01- 2007-040669, 01-2007-040670, 01-2007-040671
and 01-2007-040672;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Juan Ponce Enrile, Jessica Lucila G. Reyes, Jose Antonio V.
Evangelista II, Ruby C. Tuason, Mario L. Relampagos, Rosario
Nuñ ez, Lalaine Paule, Marilou Bare, Antonio Y. Ortiz, Dennis L.
Cunanan, Francisco B. Figura, Ma. Rosalinda Lacsamana, Consuelo
Lilian R. Espiritu, Marivic V. Jover, Janet Lim Napoles, Jo Christine
L. Napoles, James Christopher L. Napoles, Eulogio D. Rodriguez,
Evelyn D. De Leon, Ronald John Lim, Amparo L. Fernando,
Fernando Ramirez, Nitz Cabilao, Jocelyn D. Piorato, Dorilyn A.
Fabian, Hernani Ditchon, Rodrigo B. Galay and Laarni A. Uy, acting
in concert, for VIOLATION OF SECTION 3 (E) OF R.A. NO. 3019 in
relation to fund releases amounting to Php22,500,000.00 drawn
from Agricultura Para sa Magbubukid Foundation, Inc. (APMFI), as
reflected in DV No. 01-2009-040929 and 01-2009-
051300;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Juan Ponce Enrile, Jessica Lucila G. Reyes, Jose Antonio V.
Evangelista II, Ruby C. Tuason, Mario L. Relampagos, Rosario
Nuñ ez, Lalaine Paule, Marilou Bare, Alan A. Javellana, Rhodora B.
Mendoza, Encarnita Christina P. Munsod, Romulo Relevo, Maria
Julie A. Villaralvo-Johnson, Janet Lim Napoles, Jo Christine L.
Napoles, James Christopher L. Napoles, Eulogio D. Rodriguez,
Evelyn D. De Leon, Ronald John Lim, Fernando Ramirez and Nitz
Cabilao, acting in concert, for VIOLATION OF SECTION 3 (E) OF
R.A. NO. 3019 in relation to fund releases amounting to
Php24,250,000.00 drawn from Enrile’s PDAF and coursed through
the National Agribusiness Corporation (NABCOR) and People’s
Organization for Progress and Development Foundation, Inc.
(POPDI), as reflected in DV No. 08-04-01201 and 08-07-
02312;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Juan Ponce Enrile, Jessica Lucila G. Reyes, Jose Antonio V.
Evangelista II, Ruby C. Tuason, Mario L. Relampagos, Rosario
Nuñ ez, Lalaine Paule, Marilou Bare, Alan A. Javellana, Rhodora B.
Mendoza, Victor Roman C. Cacal, Ma. Ninez P. Guañ izo, Janet Lim
Napoles, Jo Christine L. Napoles, James Christopher Napoles,
Eulogio D. Rodriguez, Evelyn D. De Leon, Ronald John Lim,
Fernando Ramirez, Nitz Cabilao and Renato S. Ornopia, acting in
concert, for VIOLATION OF SECTION 3 (E) OF R.A. NO. 3019 in
relation to fund releases amounting to Php19,400,000.00 drawn
from Enrile’s PDAF and coursed through NABCOR and
Masaganang Ani Para sa Magsasaka Foundation, Inc. (MAMFI), as
reflected in DV No. 08-09-3575 and 09-04-
1622;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Juan Ponce Enrile, Jessica Lucila G. Reyes, Jose Antonio V.
Evangelista II, Ruby C. Tuason, Mario L. Relampagos, Rosario
Nuñ ez, Lalaine Paule, Marilou Bare, Alan A. Javellana, Rhodora B.
Mendoza, Victor Roman C. Cacal, Ma. Ninez P. Guañ izo, Janet Lim
106
Napoles, Jo Christine L. Napoles, James Christopher Napoles,
Eulogio D. Rodriguez, Evelyn D. De Leon, Ronald John Lim,
Fernando Ramirez, Nitz Cabilao and Noel V. Macha, acting in
concert, for VIOLATION OF SECTION 3 (E) OF R.A. NO. 3019 in
relation to fund releases amounting to Php29,100,000.00 drawn
from Enrile’s PDAF and coursed through NABCOR and Social
Development Program for Farmers Foundation, Inc. (SDPFFI), as
reflected in DV No. 08-09-3572 and 09-05-
1751;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Juan Ponce Enrile, Jessica Lucila G. Reyes, Jose Antonio V.
Evangelista II, Ruby C. Tuason, Mario L. Relampagos, Rosario
Nuñ ez, Lalaine Paule, Marilou Bare, Alan A. Javellana, Rhodora B.
Mendoza, Victor Roman C. Cacal, Ma. Ninez P. Guañ izo, Janet Lim
Napoles, Jo Christine L. Napoles, James Christopher Napoles,
Eulogio D. Rodriguez, Evelyn D. De Leon, Ronald John Lim,
Fernando Ramirez, Nitz Cabilao and Renato S. Ornopia, acting in
concert, for VIOLATION OF SECTION 3 (E) OF R.A. NO. 3019 in
relation to fund releases amounting to Php24,250,000.00 drawn
from Enrile’s PDAF and coursed through NABCOR and MAMFI, as
reflected in DV No. 09-05-1773 and 09-06-
2025;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Juan Ponce Enrile, Jessica Lucila G. Reyes, Jose Antonio V.
Evangelista II, Ruby C. Tuason, Mario L. Relampagos, Rosario
Nuñ ez, Lalaine Paule, Marilou Bare, Alan A. Javellana, Rhodora B.
Mendoza, Victor Roman C. Cacal, Ma. Ninez P. Guañ izo, Janet Lim
Napoles, Jo Christine L. Napoles, James Christopher Napoles,
Eulogio D. Rodriguez, Evelyn D. De Leon, Ronald John Lim,
Fernando Ramirez, Nitz Cabilao and Noel V. Macha, acting in
concert, for VIOLATION OF SECTION 3 (E) OF R.A. NO. 3019 in
relation to fund releases amounting to Php24,250,000.00 drawn
from Enrile’s PDAF and coursed through NABCOR and SDPFFI, as
reflected in DV No. 09- 05-1774 and 09-06-
2022;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Juan Ponce Enrile, Jessica Lucila G. Reyes, Jose Antonio V.
Evangelista II, Ruby C. Tuason, Mario L. Relampagos, Rosario
Nuñ ez, Lalaine Paule, Marilou Bare, Alan A. Javellana, Rhodora B.
Mendoza, Victor Roman C. Cacal, Ma. Ninez P. Guañ izo, Janet Lim
Napoles, Jo Christine L. Napoles, James Christopher Napoles,
Eulogio D. Rodriguez, Evelyn D. De Leon, Ronald John Lim,
Fernando Ramirez, Nitz Cabilao and Renato S. Ornopia, acting in
concert, for VIOLATION OF SECTION 3 (E) OF R.A. NO. 3019 in
relation to fund releases amounting to Php14,550,000.00 drawn
from Enrile’s PDAF and coursed through NABCOR and MAMFI, as
reflected in DV No. 09- 05-1767 and 09-06-
2028;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Juan Ponce Enrile, Jessica Lucila G. Reyes, Jose Antonio V.
Evangelista II, Ruby C. Tuason, Mario L. Relampagos, Rosario
Nuñ ez, Lalaine Paule, Marilou Bare, Alan A. Javellana, Rhodora B.
Mendoza, Victor Roman C. Cacal, Ma. Ninez P. Guañ izo, Janet Lim
Napoles, Jo Christine L. Napoles, James Christopher Napoles,
Eulogio D. Rodriguez, Evelyn D. De Leon, Ronald John Lim,
Fernando Ramirez, Nitz Cabilao and Noel V. Macha, acting in
concert, for VIOLATION OF SECTION 3 (E) OF R.A. NO. 3019 in
relation to fund releases amounting to Php9,700,000.00 drawn
from Enrile’s PDAF and coursed through NABCOR and SDPFFI, as
reflected in DV No. 09-06-1825 and 09-06-
2027;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Juan Ponce Enrile, Jessica Lucila G. Reyes, Jose Antonio V.
Evangelista II, Ruby C. Tuason, Mario L. Relampagos, Rosario
Nuñ ez, Lalaine Paule, Marilou Bare, Gondelina G. Amata,
Emmanuel Alexis G. Sevidal, Ofelia E. Ordoñ ez, Filipina T.
Rodriguez, Sofia D. Cruz, Chita C. Jalandoni, Janet Lim Napoles, Jo
Christine L. Napoles, James Christopher L. Napoles, Eulogio D.
Rodriguez, Evelyn D. De Leon, Ronald John Lim, Amparo L.
Fernando, Fernando Ramirez, Nitz Cabilao, Aileen Palama, John
Raymund De Asis and Mylene T. Encarnacion, acting in concert, for
VIOLATION OF SECTION 3 (E) OF R.A. NO. 3019 in relation to fund
107
releases amounting to Php8,000,000.00 drawn from Enrile’s PDAF
and coursed through the National Livelihood Development
Corporation (NLDC) and CARED, as reflected in DV No. 09-10-
1530;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Juan Ponce Enrile, Jessica Lucila G. Reyes, Jose Antonio V.
Evangelista II, Ruby C. Tuason, Mario L. Relampagos, Rosario
Nuñ ez, Lalaine Paule, Marilou Bare, Gondelina G. Amata,
Emmanuel Alexis G. Sevidal, Ofelia E. Ordoñ ez, Filipina T.
Rodriguez, Sofia D. Cruz, Chita C. Jalandoni, Janet Lim Napoles, Jo
Christine L. Napoles, James Christopher Napoles, Eulogio D.
Rodriguez, Evelyn D. De Leon, Ronald John Lim, Fernando
Ramirez, Nitz Cabilao and Renato S. Ornopia, acting in concert, for
VIOLATION OF SECTION 3 (E) OF R.A. NO. 3019 in relation to fund
releases amounting to Php20,000,000.00 drawn from Enrile’s
PDAF and coursed through NLDC and MAMFI, as reflected in DV
No. 09-09-1355, 09-10-1443 and 09-10-
1534;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Juan Ponce Enrile, Jessica Lucila G. Reyes, Jose Antonio V.
Evangelista II, Ruby C. Tuason, Mario L. Relampagos, Rosario
Nuñ ez, Lalaine Paule, Marilou Bare, Gondelina G. Amata,
Emmanuel Alexis G. Sevidal, Ofelia E. Ordoñ ez, Filipina T.
Rodriguez, Sofia D. Cruz, Chita C. Jalandoni, Janet Lim Napoles, Jo
Christine L. Napoles, James Christopher L. Napoles, Eulogio D.
Rodriguez, Evelyn D. De Leon, Ronald John Lim, Amparo L.
Fernando, Fernando Ramirez, Nitz Cabilao, Aileen Palama, John
Raymund De Asis and Mylene T. Encarnacion, acting in concert, for
VIOLATION OF SECTION 3 (E) OF R.A. NO. 3019 in relation to fund
releases amounting to PHP44,000,000.00 drawn from Enrile’s
PDAF and coursed through the NLDC and CARED, as reflected in
DV No. 09- 12-1834, 10-01-0004, 10-01-0118 and 10-05-
0747;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Juan Ponce Enrile, Jessica Lucila G. Reyes, Jose Antonio V.
Evangelista II, Ruby C. Tuason, Mario L. Relampagos, Rosario
Nuñ ez, Lalaine Paule, Marilou Bare, Gondelina G. Amata,
Emmanuel Alexis G. Sevidal, Ofelia E. Ordoñ ez, Filipina T.
Rodriguez, Sofia D. Cruz, Chita C. Jalandoni, Janet Lim Napoles, Jo
Christine L. Napoles, James Christopher L. Napoles, Eulogio D.
Rodriguez, Evelyn D. De Leon, Ronald John Lim, Fernando
Ramirez, Nitz Cabilao, Myla Ogerio and Margarita P. Guadinez,
acting in concert, for VIOLATION OF SECTION 3 (E) OF R.A. NO.
3019 in relation to fund releases amounting to Php25,000,000.00
drawn from Enrile’s PDAF and coursed through the NLDC and Agri
and Economic Program for Farmers Foundation, Inc. (AEPFFI), as
reflected in DV No. 09-091353, 09-10-1444 and 09-10-
1540;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Juan Ponce Enrile, Jessica Lucila G. Reyes, Jose Antonio V.
Evangelista II, Ruby C. Tuason, Mario L. Relampagos, Rosario
Nuñ ez, Lalaine Paule, Marilou Bare, Gondelina G. Amata,
Emmanuel Alexis G. Sevidal, Ofelia E. Ordoñ ez, Filipina T.
Rodriguez, Sofia D. Cruz, Chita C. Jalandoni, Janet Lim Napoles, Jo
Christine L. Napoles, James Christopher L. Napoles, Eulogio D.
Rodriguez, Evelyn D. De Leon, Ronald John Lim, Amparo L.
Fernando, Fernando Ramirez, Nitz Cabilao, Piorato, Fabian,
Hernani Ditchon, Galay and Laarni A. Uy, acting in concert, for
VIOLATION OF SECTION 3 (E) OF R.A. NO. 3019 in relation to fund
releases amounting to Php25,000,000.00 drawn from Enrile’s
PDAF and coursed through the NLDC and APMFI, as reflected in
DV No. 09- 09-1358, 09-10-1449 and 09-10-
1535;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Juan Ponce Enrile, Jessica Lucila G. Reyes, Jose Antonio V.
Evangelista II, Ruby C. Tuason, Mario L. Relampagos, Rosario
Nuñ ez, Lalaine Paule, Marilou Bare, Gondelina G. Amata,
Emmanuel Alexis G. Sevidal, Ofelia E. Ordoñ ez, Filipina T.
Rodriguez, Sofia D. Cruz, Chita C. Jalandoni, Janet Lim Napoles, Jo
Christine L. Napoles, James Christopher L. Napoles, Eulogio D.
Rodriguez, Evelyn D. De Leon, Ronald John Lim, Amparo L.
Fernando, Fernando Ramirez, Nitz Cabilao, Aileen Palama, John
108
Raymund De Asis and Mylene T. Encarnacion, acting in concert, for
VIOLATION OF SECTION 3 (E) OF R.A. NO. 3019 in relation to fund
releases amounting to Php32,000,000.00 drawn from Enrile’s
PDAF and coursed through the NLDC and CARED, as reflected in
DV No. 09- 09-1354, 09-10-1447;
and accordingly RECOMMENDS the immediate filing of the
corresponding Informations against them with the Sandiganbayan;
(b)
DISMISSES the criminal charges against Mark S. Oliveros, Editha P.
Talaboc, Delfin Agcaoili, Jr., Daniel Balanoba, Lucila M. Lawas-
Yutok, Antonio M. Santos, Montuya for insufficiency of evidence;
(c)
FURNISHES copies of this Joint Resolution to the Anti- Money
Laundering Council for its appropriate action on the possible
violations by the above-named respondents of the Anti-Money
Laundering Act, considering that Plunder and violation of Section
3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 are considered unlawful activities under this
statute;
(d)
FURNISHES copies of this Joint Resolution to the Supreme Court,
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Professional Regulation
Commission for appropriate action on the alleged misconduct
committed by notaries public Oliveros, Talaboc, Agcaoili,
Balanoba, Lawas- Yutok and Santos, Solomon and Victorino; and
(e)
DIRECTS the Field Investigation Office to conduct further fact-
finding investigation on the possible criminal and/or
administrative liability of Javellana, Mendoza, Ortiz, Cunanan,
Amata, Sevidal and other respondents who may have received
commissions and/or kickbacks from Napoles in relation to their
participation in the scheme subject of these cases.
SO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Philippines, 28 March 2014.

SPECIAL PANEL
PER OFFICE ORDER NO. 349, SERIES OF 2013
(Sgd.) M.A. CHRISTIAN O. UY
Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer IV
Chairperson
(Sgd.) RUTH LAURA A. MELLA
Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II
Member
(Sgd.) FRANCISCA M. SERFINO
Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II
Member
(Sgd.) ANNA FRANCESCA M. LIMBO
Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II
Member
(Sgd.) JASMINE ANN B. GAPATAN
Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer I
Member
APPROVED/DISAPPROVED
(Sgd.) CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Ombudsman
Copy Furnished:
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Complainant
NBI Bldg., Taft Avenue, Ermita, Manila
LEVITO D. BALIGOD
109
Complainant
Villanueva & Baligod, 3/F The Lydia Bldg.
39 Polaris St., Bel-air, Makati
FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE
Complainant
4th Floor, Ombudsman Building
Agham Road, Quezon City 1100
PONCE ENRILE REYES AND MANALASTAS
LAW OFFICE
Counsel for respondent Juan Ponce Enrile
Vernida IV Bldg, 128 L.P. Leviste St.,
Makati City 1200
LAW FIRM OF DIAZ DEL ROSARIO AND ASSOCIATES
Counsel for respondent Jessica Lucila G. Reyes
6th Floor, Padilla Building, F. Ortigas, Jr. Road,
Ortigas Center, Pasig City
EDWARDSON L. ONG and MERCEDES ISABEL B. MAYORALGO
Counsel for respondent Jose Antonio Evangelista II
Vernida IV Bldg, 128 L.P. Leviste St., Makati 1200
DENNIS P. MANALO
Counsel for respondent Ruby C. Tuason
9-10th Floors, LPL Tower, 112 Legaspi St.
Legazpi Village, Makati City
DE GUZMAN DIONIDO CAGA JUCABAN & ASSOCIATES
Counsel for respondents Mario L. Relampagos,
Lalaine Paule, Malou Bare and Rosario Nuñ ez
Rm. 412, Executive Building Center, Gil
Puyat Ave cor. Makati Ave., Makati City
ALENTAJAN LAW OFFICE
Counsel for respondent Antonio Y. Ortiz
24 Ilongot St., La Vista, Quezon City
THE LAW FIRM OF CHAN ROBLES AND ASSOCIATES
Counsel for respondent Dennis L. Cunanan
Suite 2205, Philippine Stock Exchange Center,
East Tower, Ortigas Center, Pasig City
FRANCISCO B. FIGURA
Respondent
Unit 5-A, 5th Floor, Valero Tower, 122 Valero St.,
Salcedo Village, Makati City
MARIA ROSALINDA LACSAMANA
Respondent
Unit 223, Pasig Royale Mansion, Santolan
Pasig City
CONSUELO LILIAN R. ESPIRITU
Respondent
5306 Diesel St., Bgy. Palanan, Makati City
MARIVIC V. JOVER
Respondent
3 Gumamela St., Ciudad Licel, Banaba,
San Mateo, Rizal
ACERON PUNZALAN VEHEMENTE AVILA & DEL PRADO LAW
OFFICE
Counsel for respondent Alan A. Javellana
31st Floor, Atlanta Center Annapolis,
Greenhills, San Juan City
RHODORA B. MENDOZA
Respondent
Lot 2, Block 63, Bright Homes Subd., Bgy. Cay Pombo,
110
Sta. Maria, Bulacan
ENCARNITA CRISTINA P. MUNSOD
Respondent
14 Saturn St., Meteor Homes Subdivision
Bgy. Fortune, Makati City
VICTOR ROMAN C. CACAL
Respondent
4 Milkyway St., Joliero Compound, Phase 1- D,
Moonwalk Village, Talon V, Las Piñ as City
MA. JULIE A. VILLARALVO-JOHNSON
Respondent
509 Mapayapa St., United San Pedro Subd.
San Pedro, Laguna
MIRANDA, ANASTACIO & LOTERTE LAW OFFICES
Counsel for respondent Ma. Ninez P. Guañ izo
Penthouse B., Venture Bldg., Prime St.
Madrigal Business Park, Ayala Alabang
Muntinlupa City
PUBLIC ATTORNEY’S OFFICE – QUEZON CITY
Counsel for respondent Romulo Relevo
B-29, Quezon City Hall of Justice Bldg.,
Quezon City
ATENCIA LAW OFFICES
Counsel for respondent Shyr Ann Montuya
Upper 1st Floor, 101 Corinthian Executive Regency,
Ortigas Avenue, Ortigas Center
GONDELINA G. AMATA
Respondent
c/o National Livelihood Development Corporation,
7th Floor, One Corporate Plaza
845 Arnaiz Ave., Makati City BRUCE V. RIVERA
Counsel for respondents Evelyn D. De Leon and Jocelyn Piorato
BALGOS, GUMARU AND JALANDONI 15 Nicanor Tomas St., BF Homes, Phase 6-A,
Counsel for respondents Chita C. Jalandoni and Bgy. BF, Parañ aque City 1720
Filipina T. Rodriguez Road,
Unit 1009, West Tektite Tower, Exchange EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ
Ortigas Center, Pasig City Respondent
JLN Corporation Offices, Discovery Suites
OFELIA E. ORDOÑ EZ Ortigas Center, Pasig City
Respondent
c/o National Livelihood Development Corporation, FERNANDO RAMIREZ
7th Floor, One Corporate Plaza Respondent
845 Arnaiz Ave., Makati City 635 San Isidro St., Ayala Alabang
Muntinlupa City
EMMANUEL ALEXIS G. SEVIDAL
Respondent NITZ CABILAO
18 Kasing-Kasing St., East Kamias, Quezon City Respondent
Block 10, Lot 5, Daet St., South City Homes
JOSE P. VILLAMOR Biñ an, Laguna
Counsel for respondent Gregoria G. Buenaventura
Unit 3311 One Corporate Center, Julia MARK S. OLIVEROS
Vargas Avenue cor. Meralco Ave., Ortigas Center, Pasig City Respondent
Suite 2604 PSE East Tower, Exchange Road
CALILUNG LAW OFFICE Ortigas, Pasig City
Counsel for respondent Sofia D. Cruz
24 J. P. Rizal St., Davsan Subd., Sindalan EDITHA P. TALABOC
San Fernando, Pampanga Respondent
Mezzanine Floor, Café Adriatico Bldg.
EVITA MAGNOLIA I. ANSALDO Adriatico cor. Padre Faure Sts., Manila
Counsel for respondents Janet Lim Napoles,
Jo Christine L. Napoles, James Christopher L. Napoles DELFIN AGCAOILI, JR.
and Ronald John Lim Respondent
Suite 1905-A, Philippine Stock Exchange 13 Caimito St., Payatas, Quezon City
Center, West Tower, Ortigas Center
Pasig City LUCILA M. LAWAS-YUTOK
111
Respondent Bgy. Sta. Fe, Bacolod City, Negros Occidental
686-B Shaw Blvd., Kapitolyo, Pasig City
RODRIGO B. GALAY
SUSAN VICTORINO Respondent
Respondent Block 23, Lot 24 Dumaguete Street, South City Homes,
132 M. H. Del Pilar St., Sto. Tomas, Pasig City Biñ an, Laguna or 5270 Romero St., Bgy. Dionisio,
Parañ aque City
LUCITA P. SOLOMON
Respondent LAARNI A. UY
33-C Matiaga St., Teachers’ Village, Quezon City Respondent
Block 23, Lot 24 Dumaguete Street, South City Homes,
PROPRIETOR OF NUTRIGROWTH PHILIPPINES, MPC Biñ an, Laguna or 5270 Romero St., Bgy. Dionisio,
Respondent Parañ aque City
949 Instruccion St., Sampaloc, Manila
AMPARO L. FERNANDO
PROPRIETOR OF MMRC TRADING Respondent
Respondent 14-O Samson St., Baritan, Malabon City
88 Buklod ng Nayon, Sangandaan, Caloocan City
AILEEN P. PALAMA
MYLA OGERIO Respondent
Respondent 16-A Guevarra St., Paltok, Quezon City or 712 San Gabriel
285-F or Apt. 9005-15F, 17th St. Compound,
Villamor Air Base, Pasay City Llano Novaliches, Caloocan City

MARGARITA GUADINES RENATO S. ORNOPIA

Block 24, Lot 9, Iligan St., Phase I, EP Village, Respondent
Taguig City or Block 23, Lot 1, Road 18 Street, 495 ME Ilang-Ilang St., T. S. Cruz, Almanza 2, Las Piñ as or
AFPOVAI, Phase 2, Western Bicutan, Taguig City A. Calauan St., Cataingan, Masbate

DORILYN A. FABIAN JESUS B. CASTILLO

Respondent Respondent
Block 34, Lot 27 Iligan Street, South City Homes, Block 23, Lot 59, Phase 2, EP Village, Taguig City or Alim,
Biñ an, Laguna Hinobaan,
Negros Occidental
HERNANI DITCHON
Respondent NOEL V. MACHA
112
Respondent 3 See note 116 which identifies her as Rosario Nuñ ez.
Unity Drive, Crispin Atilano St., Tetuan, Zamboanga City or
2502 Discovery Center, 25 ADB Avenue, 4 See note 116 which identifies her as Lalaine Paule.
Ortigas, Pasig City or Block 40,
Lot 28 Iligan St., South City 5 See note 116 which identifies her as Marilou Bare.
Homes, Biñ an, Laguna
6 Records, pp. 5-157, Blue Folder, OMB-C-C-13-0396.
MYLENE T. ENCARNACION
Respondent 7 Still at large.
Blk. 4, Lot 18, Almandite St., Golden City
Taytay, Rizal 8 Presently detained at Fort Sto. Domingo, Sta. Rosa, Laguna.

JOHN RAYMOND DE ASIS 9 Luy, Sula and Suñ as have been admitted into the Department of
Respondent Justice’s Witness Protection Program.
Blk. 20, Lot 9, Phase III, Gladiola St.,
TS Cruz, Almanza 2, Las Piñ as 10 Records, pp. 165-167, Folder 1, OMB-C-C-13-0396.

HEIRS OF WILBERTO P. DE GUZMAN 11 Records, p. 547, Folder 3, OMB-C-C-13-0396 (Annex W-10).

Respondent
Block 1, Lot 30, 3118 Sto. Rosario St. Metrovilla Center, Mapulang 12 Id. at 581.
Lupa
Valenzuela City 13 Id. at 597.

MENDOZA NAVARRO-MENDOZA & PARTNERS LAW OFFICES 14 Id. at 600.

Counsel for respondent Ma. Julie A. Villaralvo-Johnson
Units 205 & 501 Amberland Plaza, 15 Id. at 702.
Dona Julia Vargas Ave. & Jade Drive,
Ortigas Center, Pasig City 1605 16 Id. at 706.
Endnotes:
17 Id. at 627.
128 193 194
18 Id. at 643.
1 See note 116.
19 Id. at 665.
2 Per Office Order No. 349, Series of 2013.

113
20 Records, pp. 717,739, 764, 784, 806, 888, Folder 4, OMB-C-C-
13-0396. 35 Id. at 2006.

21 Records, pp.740, 757-758, 765-766, 785, 805, 818, 874, 887, 36 Id. at 2008.
Folder 4, OMB-C-C-13-0396.
37 Records, p. 2111, Folder 12, OMB-C-C-13-0396.
22 Records, pp. 1964-1967, 1971-1974, 1978-1981, 1985-1988,
Folder 11, OMB-C-C-13-0396. 38 Id. at 2116.

23 Id. at 2064-2066. 39 Id. at 2329.

24 Records, pp. 2118-219 & 2213-2214, Folder 12, OMB-C-C-13- 40 Id. at 2326.
0396.
41 Records, p. 2624, Folder 13, OMB-C-C13-0396.
25 Id. at 2482-2486 & 2541-2545.
42 Id. at 2631.
26 Records, pp. 2696-2701 & 2780-2784, Folder 14, OMB-C-C-13-
0396. 43 Id. at 2624.

27 Records, pp. 2862-2886, Folder 15, OMB-C-C-13-0396. 44 Id. at 2694.

28 Records, pp.2935-2940 & 3046-3051, Folder 16, OMB-C-C-13- 45 Id. at 2707.

0396.
46 Id.at 2775.
29 Records, pp. 3325-3330 & 3461-3466, Folder 17, OMB-C-C-13-
0396. 47 Id. at 2707.

30 Records, pp. 3577-3582, Folder 18, OMB-C-C-13-0396. 48 Records, p. 2825, Folder 15, OMB-C-C-13-0396.

31 Records, p. 1935, Folder 11, OMB-C-C-13-0396. 49 Id. at 2831.

32 Id. at 1938. 50 Records, p. 2933, Folder 16, OMB-C-C-13-0396

33 Id. at 1941. 51 Id. at 2950.

34 Id. at 1944. 52 Id. at 2955.

114
53 Id. at 3044. 71 Id. at 2009.

54 Id. at 3062. 72 Records, p. 2112, Folder 12, OMB-C-C-13-0396.

55 Id. at 3070. 73 Id. at 2115.

56 Records, p. 3323, Folder 17, OMB-C-C-13-0397. 74 Id. at 2330.

57 Id. at 3336. 75 Id. at 2327.

58 Id. at 3350. 76 Records, p. 2625, Folder 13, OMB-C-C-13-0396.

59 Id. at 3459. 77 Id. at 2632.

60 Id. at 3478. 78 Id. at 2535.

61 Id. at 3486. 79 Id. at 2547.

62 Records, p. 3576, Folder 18, OMB-C-C-13-0397. 80 Records, p. 2694, Folder 14, OMB-C-C13-0396.

63 Id. at 3594. 81 Id. at 2776.

64 Id. at 3602. 82 Id. at 2788.

65 Id. at 3612. 83 Records, p. 2823, Folder 15, OMB-C-C-13-0396.

66 Records, p. 1933, Folder 11, OMB-C-C-13-0396. 84 Records, p. 2830, Folder 15, OMB-C-C-13-0396.

67 Id. at 1936. 85 Records, p. 2932, Folder 16, OMB-C-C-13-0396.

68 Id. at 1939. 86 Id. at 2949.

69 Id. at 1942. 87 Id. at 2954.

70 Id. at 2007. 88 Id. at 3043.

115
89 Id. at 3061. 107 Records, pp. 727-760, Folder 21, OMB-C-C-13-0396.

90 Id. at 3069. 108 Records, pp. 845-1042, Folder 21, OMB-C-C-13-0396.

91 Records, p. 3322, Folder 17, OMB-C-C13-0396. 109 Records, pp.780-825, Folder 21, OMB-C-C-13-0396.

92 Id. at 3335. 110 Records, pp. 685-689, Folder 21, OMB-C-C-13-0396.

93 Id. at 3349. 111 Id. at 180-269.

94 Id. at 3458. 112 Id. at 1278-1294.

95 Id. at 3477. 113 Records, pp. 177-181, Folder 21, OMB-C-C-13-0396.

96 Id. at 3485. 114 Id. at 826-844.

97 Records, p. 3574, Folder 18, OMB-C-C-13-0369. 115 Id. at 1060-1062.

98 Id. at 3593. 116 Id. at 384-408.

99 Id. at 3601. 117 Id. at 15-39.

100 Id. at 3611. 118 Id. at 409-430.

101 SAOR No. 2012-03
102 Records, pp. 40-109, Folder 21, OMB-C-C-13-0396.
103 Records, pp. 276-383, Folder 21, OMB-C-C-13-0396.
119 Were not originally impleaded in the caption of the
complaints as respondents by the NBI and Baligod. In the course of
the preliminary investigation, the Panel of Investigators ordered
them to submit counter-affidavits in light of the impression that
they were the parties to the scheme.

104 Records, pp. 1296-1306, Folder 21, OMB-C-C-13-0396. 120 Records, pp. 431-447.

105 Records, pp. 448-520, Folder 21, OMB-C-C-13-396. 121 Id. at 431-438.

106 In OMB-C-C-13-0318. 122 Records, pp. 720-726.

116

123 Id. at 1-14.
124 pp. 1043-1059, ibid.
125 Records, p. 382, OMB-C-C-13-0318.
126Pilapil v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 101978, April 7, 1993.
127 Rule V, Section 3 of Ombudsman Administrative Order No. 7,
Series of 1990.
128 TJ Burgonio, “Return pork, 4 solons told,” Philippine Daily
Inquirer, electronically published on February 1, 2014 at
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/572215/return-pork-4-solons-told
and last accessed on March 18, 2014.
129 Trinidad v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 166038, December 4, 2007.
130 G.R. No. 167219, February 8, 2011.
131 As defined and penalized by RA 7080, as amended.
132 As defined and penalized by Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code.
133 Records, p. 217, OMB-C-C-13-0318.
134 Id. at 221.
135 Id. at 218.
136 Ibid.
137 Id. at 219.
117
138 Id. at 219.
139 Ibid.
140 Records, p. 12, OMB-C-C-13-0318.
141 Paragraph 11, respondent Ruby Tuason’s Counter-Affidavit
dated 21 February 2014.
142 Records, pp. 240-241, OMB-C-C-13-0318.
143 Id at 850-1065.
144 Records, pp. 35-104, OMB-C-C-13-0396.
145 Catacutan v. People, G.R. No. 175991, August 31, 2011.
146 G.R. Nos. 170339, 170398-403, March 9, 2010, 614 SCRA 670.
147 Otherwise known as “Guidelines for the Release and
Utilization of the PDAF for FY 2001 and thereafter.”
148 G.R. No. 192591, June 29, 2011.
149 People v. Atienza, G.R. No. 171671, June 18, 2012.
150 Records, p. 392, OMB-C-C-13-0318.
151 Id. at 268.
152 Llorente v. Sandiganbayan, 350 Phil. 820 (1998).
153 Gallego v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-57841, July 30, 1982 and
Cabrera, et. al. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 162314-17, October 25,
2004.
154 Sison v. People, G.R. No. 170339, 170398-403, March 9, 2010.
155 Republic Act No. 7080, July 12, 1991, as amended by R.A 7659,
December 13, 1993.
156 Section 1 (d) of the same statute stated in Section 2 above
reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
d) Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, property, business enterprise
or material possession of any person within the purview of Section
Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through
dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business
associates by any combination or series of the following means or
similar schemes:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation
of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share,
percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from
any person and/or entity in connection with any government
contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the
public officer concerned;
3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets
belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions,
agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or -controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries;
4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any
shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or
participation including promise of future employment in any
business enterprise or undertaking;
5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial
monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of
decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or
special interests; or
118
6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority,
relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or
themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the
Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
157 G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001.
158 The terms “combination,” “series,” and “pattern” were
likewise defined in Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, supra, as
follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is
referring to at least two (2) acts falling under different categories
of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public
treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance
of assets belonging to the National Government under Sec. 1, par.
(d), subpar. (3).
On the other hand, to constitute a "series" there must be two (2) or
more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category of
enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation,
malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall
under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature
intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and
"series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically providing
for it in the law.
As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the
Sandiganbayan 9 that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in
relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 —
“. . . . under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in
subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of
the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards a
common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there
must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to
achieve said common goal. As commonly understood, the term
'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or
method' which the principal accused and public officer and others
conniving with him, follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal.
In the alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where the
schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary, the overt or
criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common
goal.”
159 He was a Senator from 2004 to 2010 and was reelected in
2010; his term ends in 2016.
160 To repeat, these NGOs were MAMFI, POPDF, PSDFI, AMPFI,
CARED, PASEDFI, SDPFFI, AEPPF and KPMFI.
161 As narrated by Tuason, who admitted having acted as a
liaison between private respondent Janet Napoles and the office of
respondent Enrile:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Napoles, through respondent Tuason, initially approached Reyes
regarding a “business proposition” relating to respondent Enrile’s
PDAF; and Reyes, who had Enrile’s full confidence, accepted
Napoles’ proposition to transact the PDAF of Senator Enrile with
Janet Napoles.
162 This “listing” is a letter from the legislator containing a
program or list of implementing agencies and the amount of PDAF
to be released as to guide the DBM in its preparation and release
of the corresponding SARO. This is also a formal request of the
legislator to the DBM for the release of his or her PDAF.
163 Upon receipt of the SARO, respondent Janet Napoles would
direct her staff, then including witnesses Luy, Sula and Suñ as, to
prepare the PDAF documents for the approval of the legislator
and reflecting the preferred NGO to implement the undertaking,
including: (a) project proposals by the identified NGO/s; and (b)
indorsement letters to be signed by the legislator and/or his staff.
119
Enrile’s trusted staff, Reyes and Evangelista, then signed the
indorsement letters and other communications relating to the
PDAF disbursements addressed to the DBM and the implementing
agencies (NABCOR, TRC and NLDC). They also participated in the
preparation and execution of memoranda of agreement with the
NGO and the implementing agency, inspection and acceptance
reports, disbursement reports and other PDAF documents.
164 After indorsement by Senator Enrile and processing by the
implementing agencies, the projects are authorized as eligible
under the DBM's menu for pork barrel allocations; Napoles,
through her employees, would then follow up the release of the
NCA with the DBM. After the DBM releases the NCA to the
implementing agency concerned, the latter would expedite the
processing of the transaction and the release of the corresponding
check representing the PDAF disbursement.
Once the funds are deposited in the NGO’s account, respondent
Janet Napoles would then call the bank to facilitate the withdrawal
thereof. Her staff would then withdraw the funds involved and
remit the same to her, thus placing said amount under Napoles’
full control and possession.
From her 50% share, Napoles then remits a portion (around 10%)
thereof to officials of the implementing agencies who facilitated
the transaction as well as those who served as her liaison with the
legislator’s office.
165 Section 1. Definition of terms. - As used in this Act, the
term:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
d. "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business
enterprise or material possession of any person within the
purview of Section two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or
indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates
and/or business associates by any combination or series of the
following means or similar schemes:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share,
percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from
any person and/or entity in connection with any government
contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the
public officer concerned;
166 Section 1. Definition of terms. - As used in this Act, the term:
d. "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business
enterprise or material possession of any person within the
purview of Section two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or
indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates
and/or business associates by any combination or series of the
following means or similar schemes:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority,
relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or
themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the
Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
167 Counter-Affidavit dated 8 January 2014.
168 Counter-Affidavit dated 20 February 2014.
169 Counter-Affidavit dated 20 January 2014.
170 Counter-Affidavit dated 20 January 2014.
171 Counter-Affidavit dated 15 January 2014.
172 Counter-Affidavit dated 27 January 2014.
173 See the Business Ledgers attached to Luy, Suñ as, Gertrudes
Luy, Batal-Macalintal, Abundo and Lingo’s Pinagsamang
Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 11 September 2013.
174 It is ncdoted that Luy and Suñ as claimed that the total
commissions received by Senator Enrile was PhP363,276,000.00,
representing 50% of PhP726,550,000.00 of Enrile’s PDAF
allocations. However, Luy was only able to record in his ledger the
120
aggregate amount PhP 172,834,500.00. He explained that
sometimes transactions are not recorded in his ledger because
Napoles herself personally delivers the commissions to the
legislators or their representatives outside the JLN Corporation
office.
Hence, there are no signed vouchers presented to him (Luy);
nevertheless, in these cases, Napoles merely informs him that the
lawmaker’s commission has been paid completely. See
Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 11 September 2013,
Records, p. 8, OMB-C-C-13-0318.
175 According to witnesses Luy and Suñ as: De Asis and Lim, along
with witnesses Luy and Suñ as, prepares the money to be
delivered to the legislators and/or their representatives. See p.3
of Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 11 September 2013,
Records, (OMB-C-C- 13-0318).
176 According to witnesses Luy and Suñ as: De Asis and Lim, along
with witnesses Luy and Suñ as, prepares the money to be
delivered to the legislators and/or their representatives. See p.3
of Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 11 September 2013,
Records, (OMB-C-C- 13-0318).
177 Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code.
178 People v. Hapa, G.R. No. 125698, July 19, 2001, 361 SCRA 361.
179 People v. Olazo and Angelio, G.R. No. 197540, February 27,
2012, citing People v. Bi-Ay, Jr., G.R. No. 192187, December 13,
2010, 637 SCRA 828, 836.
180 People v. Forca, G.R. No. 134938, June 8, 2000.
181 JN Development Corporation v. Philippine Export and Foreign
Loan Guarantee Corporation, G.R. No. 151060 and Cruz v.
Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation, G.R.
No. 151311, August 31, 2005, 468 SCRA 555, 569-570.
182 Records, p. 1073, OMB-C-C-13-0318.
183Supra, JN Development Corporation v. Philippine Export and
Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation. Also Ladignon v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 122973, July 18, 2000.
184 Delfin, et al. v. Billones, et al., G.R. No. 146550, March 17, 2006.
185 Records, p. 1075, OMB-C-C-13-0318.
186 G.R. No. 156249, March 7, 2007.
187 G.R. No. 122973. July 18, 2000.
188 Vide Fernando v. Fernando, G.R. No. 191889, January 31,
2011.
189 259 Phil. 794 (1989).
190 Ibid.
191 Vide Jaca v. People, Gaviosa v. People, Cesa v. People, G.R. Nos
166967, 166974 and 167167, January 28, 2013.
192 Records, p. 392, OMB-C-C-13-0318.
193 Norman Bordadora and TJ Burgonio, “Benhur Luy upstages
Napoles in Senate hearing,” electronically published by the
Philippine Daily Inquirer at its website located at
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/522831/benhur-luy-upstages-
napoles-in-senate-hearing#ixzz2wqP0PnoP on November 8, 20.
121
194 Macon Ramos-Araneta, “Cunanan got pork cuts,” electronically
published by Manila Standard Today at its website located at
http://manilastandardtoday.com/2014/03/07/-cunanan- got-
pork-cuts-i-saw-him-carry- bag-with-p-9m-benhur/ last March 7,
2014 and last accessed on 24 March 2014.
195 Records, p. 1836, OMB-C-C-13-0318.
196 Id. at 1914.
197 Id. at 1950.
198 Rule IV, Section 2 (b) (1) and (2), A.M. No. 02-8 -13-SC.
199 A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC.
200 Otherwise known as the "Philippine Accountancy Act of
2004."
201 Deloso, et al. v. Desierto, et al., G.R. No. 129939, September 9,
1999.
202 Supra at note 198.
203 Paderanga v. Drilon, G. R. No. 96080 April 19, 1991, 196 SCRA
93, 94.
204 Drilon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115825, July 5, 1996.
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

I concur with the ponencia that petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile’s
(Enrile) motion for a bill of particulars should be partially granted
on the matters herein discussed.
I.
The sufficiency of every Informationis ordained by criminal due
process, more specifically under the right of the accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
stated under Section 14, Article III of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to
be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial,
and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment,
trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused
provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable.
The remedy against an insufficient Information in that it fails to
allege the acts or omissions complained of as constitutingthe
offense is a motion to quash on the ground that the allegations of
the Information do not constitute the offense charged, or any
offense for that matter,1 under Section 3 (a), Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Its civil case counterpart is a
motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint fails to state a
cause of action.2Note that when the rules speak of “the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense,”they
122
actuallypertain to the ultimate facts that comprise the alleged
crime’s component elements. In civil procedure, the term “ultimate
facts” means the essential facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of
action.3 A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out without
leaving the statement of the cause of action insufficient.4Ultimate
facts are important and substantial facts which either directly
form the basis of the primary right and duty, or which directly
make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant.5
Ultimate facts should be distinguished from evidentiary facts. In
Bautista v. Court of Appeals,6 a criminal case that involved a
violation of Batas PambansaBilang 22,7 the Court distinguished an
ultimate fact from an evidentiary fact as
follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The distinction between the elements of the offense and the
evidence of these elements is analogous or akin to the difference
between ultimate facts and evidentiary facts in civil cases. Ultimate
facts are the essential and substantial facts which either form the
basis of the primary right and duty or which directly make up the
wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant, while evidentiary
facts are those which tend to prove or establish said ultimate
facts.8 (Emphasis supplied)
In order to give full meaning to the right of the accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
not only should the Information state the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense (or the ultimate facts
that comprise the crime’s component elements), the rules also
require certain facts to be stated in the Information to be deemed
sufficient, namely, the name of the accused, the designation of the
offense given by the statute, the name of the offended party, the
approximate date of the commission of the offense, and the place
where the offense was committed9 (other requisite facts).Absent
any of these essential facts, then the accused’s right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him would be
violated.
While not necessary to preserve said constitutional right, for as
long as there is compliance with the above-stated bare minimums,
the accused is given the procedural option to file a motion for bill
of particulars to specify the vague allegations in the Information.
In State v. Collett,10 the office of a bill of particulars in criminal
cases was described as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
That it contemplates something over and beyond the mere
essentials of the averments necessary to state an offense is, in our
judgment, ascertainable from the statute itself, which requires that
the bill set up specifically the nature of the offense charged. x xx.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Section 9, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
explicitly states the motion’s two-fold
objective:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Section 9.Bill of particulars. – The accused may, before
arraignment, move for a bill of particulars to enable him properly
to plead and prepare for trial. The motion shall specify the alleged
defects of the complaint or information and the details desired.
(Emphasis supplied)
Note that a motion under the foregoing rule is different from a
motion for bill of particulars filed in a civil case under Rule 12 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure, which purpose is for a party (whether
plaintiff or defendant) to properly prepare his responsive
pleading.11 In a criminal case, there is no need to file a responsive
pleading since the accused is, at the onset, already presumed
innocent, and thus it is the prosecution which has the burden of
proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The plea entered by
the accused during his arraignment is not the criminal case
counterpart of a responsive pleading in a civil case. Arraignment is
a peculiar phase of a criminal case which formally ensures the
right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. Thus, before arraignment, a motion for bill
of particulars is available so that the accused can properly enter
his plea, and also to later prepare his defense. On the other hand,
in a civil case, which operates under the evidentiary threshold of
preponderance of evidence, a motion for bill of particulars is
123
available so that the defendant can intelligently refute the
allegations in the complaint in his responsive pleading.
In a civil case, the bill later becomes relevant because, as a general
rule, the trial therein will only be based on the allegations stated in
the pleadings submitted by the parties. Meanwhile, in a criminal
case, because of the standing presumption of innocence, the
delimitation of what is to be pleaded to during arraignment and
proved during trial is based on the allegations in the Information
and thus operates only against the prosecution. If the Information
is vague (albeit sufficient), then the accused has the remedy of a
motion for bill of particulars to delimit the allegations of the
Information through the bill’s function of specification and, in so
doing may be able to properly enter his plea and later prepare his
defense.
However, in both criminal and civil cases, it is a truism that it is not
the office or function of a bill of particulars to furnish evidential
information, whether such information consists of evidence which
the pleader proposes to introduce or of facts which constitute a
defense or offset for the other party or which will enable the
opposite party to establish an affirmative defense not yet
pleaded.12redarclaw
Thus, in dealing with a motion for a bill of particulars in a criminal
case, judges should observe that: (a) the remedy is distinct from a
motion to quash in the sense that it presupposes that the acts or
offenses constituting the offense (or the ultimate facts that
comprise the crime’s component elements) are already stated in
the Information, albeit may be couched in vague language; (b) the
remedy is, as mentioned, not meant to supply evidential
information (or evidentiary facts); and (c) the particulars to be
allowed are only those details that would allow a man of ordinary
intelligence, as may be reasonable under the circumstances, to,
again, properly plead during his arraignment and to prepare his
defense for trial. Accordingly, the analysis involved in motion for
bill of particulars should go beyond a simple ultimate facts-
evidentiary facts dichotomy.
Also, it is significant to point out that in a situation where the
accused has moved for a bill of particulars, but such motion is
denied by the trial court, absent any restraining order from the
propercourt,the arraignment of the accused should still proceed;
otherwise, it would be fairly easy for every accused to delay the
proceedings against him by the mere expedient of filing a motion
for a bill of particulars. Thus, the accused, on the scheduled date of
arraignment, must enter a plea, and if he refuses upon his
insistence for a bill of particulars, then, in accordance with Section
1 (c),13 Rule 116 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the trial court
shall enter a plea of not guilty for him.However, if the trial court’s
denial of such motion is later reversed by a higher court, then the
accused may manifest that he is changing his plea upon
consideration of the bill of particulars submitted, which,by
suppletory application of the Rules of Civil Procedure, forms part
of the Information.14 It should be stressed that since a motion for
bill of particulars is not an objection on the sufficiency but on the
vagueness of the Information, then the Information remains valid.
As there is no objection on the validity of the Information, then the
arraignment and the plea entered during the proceedings whether
by the court or the accused should equally be deemed valid and
therefore, not set aside.
II.
Enrile is charged with Plunder specifically in relation to the
anomalous scheme behind the utilization of his Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF).15 Statutorily defined,
Plunder is committed bya “public officer who, by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons,
amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a
combination or series of overt criminal acts as described in Section
124
1 (d) [of Republic Act No. 7080,16 or the Plunder Law], in the
aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos
(P50,000,000.00).”17 It is comprised of the following
elements:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
First, that the offender is a public officer;
Second, that he amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth
through a combination or series18of overt or criminal acts
described in Section 1(d); and
Third, that the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten
wealth is at least ?50,000,000.00.
Plunder’s peculiar nature as a composite scheme employed by a
public officer to loot the coffers of the government translates into
the proposition that the accused should be able to “dissect” the
parts which make up the whole. Thus, only by affording the
accused a reasonable opportunity to intelligently refute each
component criminal act would he then be able to disprove that
there exists a combination or series thereof or, if so existing, the
combination or series of acts did not allow him to amass or
accumulate the total amount of at least 50,000,000.00.
A Plunder charge takes on a more complicated complexion when
made in the context of the PDAF. In such an instance, each
predicate overt act would pertain to the transaction wherein the
kickback or commission has been acquiredby the accused (PDAF
transaction). Due to its complexity, an Information for a Plunder
PDAF charge should contain the following details so that the
accused may properly plead and prepare his defense thereto: (a)
the ghost or fictitious project which was supposedly funded by the
PDAF; (b) the amount (or a reasonable approximate thereof) of the
kickback or commission supposedly involved in the PDAF
transaction; (c) the date or approximate date on which the PDAF
transaction had transpired; (d) if coursed through an NGO, the
name of the NGO through which the PDAF kickbacks were
furtively facilitated; and (e) if so involving another government
agency, the name of the agency to whom the PDAF was endorsed.
As an alternative, the Information may also make explicit
reference to the Prosecutor’s Resolution finding probable cause
against the accused. However, the Prosecution must cite in the
Information the specific portions of its Resolution referred to so as
not to confuse the accused on what details are being alluded to
when the Information is read to him in open court, to which he
bases his plea during arraignment.19 While it is recognized that
the accused, who participates in a preliminary investigation,
cannot feign ignorance of the finer details stated in the
Prosecutor’s Resolution, courts cannot assume that said details are
automatically integrated in the Information. This is because the
Prosecutor’s Resolution is a product of a preliminary investigation
proceeding meant only to determine if probable cause exists and
thusly, if the Prosecution should file the corresponding
Information before the court. Besides, the filing of an
Informationis an executive function; thus, it is up to the
Prosecution to incorporate thereto the details for which it desires
to proceed its case against the accused.
III.
The Information againstEnrile reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
In 2004 to 2010 or thereabout, in the Philippines, and within this
Honorable Court’s jurisdiction, above-named accused JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, then a Philippine Senator, JESSICA LUCILA G. REYES, then
Chief of Staff of Senator Enrile’s Office, both public officers,
committing the offense in relation to their respective offices,
conspiring with one another and with JANET LIM NAPOLES,
RONALD JOHN LIM, and JOHN RAYMUND DE ASIS, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally amass, accumulate,
and/or acquire ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least ONE
HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO MILLION EUGHT HUNDRED THIRTY
FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (Php172,834,500.00)
125
through a combination or series of overt criminal acts, as
follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(a) by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES and/or her
representatives LIM, DE ASIS, and others, kickbacks or
commissions under the following circumstances: before, during
and/or after the project identification, NAPOLES gave, and ENRILE
and/or REYES received, a percentage of the cost of a project to be
funded from ENRILE’S Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF), in consideration of ENRILE’S endorsement, directly or
through REYES, to the appropriate government agencies, of
NAPOLES’ non-government organizations which became the
recipients and/or target implementers of ENRILE’S PDAF projects,
which duly-funded projects turned out to be ghosts or fictitious,
thus enabling NAPOLES to misappropriate the PDAF proceeds for
her personal gain; and
(b) by taking undue advantage, on several occasions of their
official positions, authority, relationships, connections, and
influence to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense and to the
damage and prejudice, of the Filipino people and the Republic of
the Philippines.
With the Information merely confined to these allegations and to
the end that the accused may properly plead and prepare his
defense during trial, I, similar to theponencia, thereforefind it
proper to partially grant Enrile’s motion for bill of particulars, and
concomitantly have the prosecution submit such bill to reflect the
following matters:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
1. “The particular overt act/s alleged to constitute the
“combination” and “series” charged in the Information.”20
This should not be construed as a particular, but rather a broad
statement that encapsulates the motion’s prayer. Each “overt act”
pertains to each PDAF transaction which particulars are sought for
in the more specific statements below.
2. “A breakdown of the amounts of the kickbacks and commissions
allegedly received stating how the amount of ?172,834,500.00 was
arrived at.”21
The amountof kickbacks and commissions isessentialto each PDAF
transaction, which, in turn, forms part of the whole Plunder
scheme allegedby the prosecution. In order for the accused to
identify the PDAF transaction attributed to him, for which he bases
his plea during arraignment, he must be informed of the amount
involved in each transaction. Because a Plunder conviction
necessitates that the total PDAF transactions breach the ?
50,000,000.00 threshold, knowledge of such amounts is vital to
thedefense. It also guides the trial court to render the proper
judgment.
There is no need to specify the nature of the ill-gotten wealth the
accused allegedly amassed, accumulated, or acquired. As I see it,
the type of ill-gotten wealth is only an evidentiary fact which
supports the ultimate fact that the accused had amassed,
accumulated, or acquired more than ?50,000,000.00 in kickbacks
and commissions. What is essential is that the ill-gotten wealth,
regardless of its form, breaches the ?50,000,000.00 threshold, the
necessary details of which may be sufficiently supplied by the
breakdown above- discussed.
3.“The approximate dates of receipt of the alleged kickbacks and
commissions since the overt acts to which the kickbacks and
commissions relate, allegedly took place from 2004 to 2010. At the
very least, the prosecution should state the year when the
kickbacks and transactions had been received.”22
Similar to the ponencia,23 I find that it is insufficient for the
Information to just provide a broad time frame of six (6) years,
more or less, to situate the occurrence of all the alleged PDAF
transactions. In Rocaberte v. People,24 the Court ruled that the
Theft Information against the accused therein was seriously
defective, for “[i]t places on him and his co-accused the unfair and
unreasonable burden of having to recall their activities over a span
126
of more than 2,500 days [(or 6 years)]. It is a burden nobody
should be made to bear.”25 The same logic obtains here.
The year of the launching of each PDAF project need not be
specified, as the ponencia now agrees. The year of launching of the
PDAF project may not necessarily be the same as the year in which
the PDAF is diverted. A project may last for several years from
launching and the PDAF kickbacks may have been sporadically
diverted throughout its course. It must be recalled that the charge
here involves the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth by receiving a
portion of the PDAF as commission and kickbacks. Thus, what is
relevant is the year when the PDAF is diverted, not the year when
the “cover project” is launched.
4. “A brief description of the ‘identified’ projects where kickbacks
and commissions were received.”26
Project identification stands at the core of every PDAF transaction:
it is the preliminary and necessary step to cast a veil of ostensible
legitimacy to the scheme. Because it is the transaction’s primary
identifier, it is essential that the accused, during his arraignment,
be informed of what project the PDAF transaction he is charged of
is connected to. In this regard, it is also obvious that the name of
the project is significant in the preparation of his defense.
Only the project name should be stated. There is no need to go
beyond this and providea brief description of the project (its
nature, e.g., farm inputs, equipment, and the year it was launched),
and the intended beneficiaries, to which the ponenciaaccedes. At
best, these are evidentiary facts which support the conclusions
from which the ultimate fact, i.e., the name of the project, is
premised on.
5. “The name of Napoles’ NGOs which were the alleged recipients
and target implementors of Enrile’s PDAF projects.”27
The Napoles’ NGOs were used basically as shell entities to which
the PDAF kickbacks were fraudulently funneled. As such, they
figure into a significantrole in each PDAF transaction. Stating the
vehicle of facilitation provides the accused basic information of the
means by which the PDAF transaction in which he was supposedly
involved was employed. The ponencia correctly pointed out that
“only after a project has been identified could Enrile endorse
Napoles’ NGOs to the appropriate government agency that, in turn,
would implement the supposed project using Enrile’s PDAF.”28
The alleged interplay of Enrile’s office and Napoles’ NGO’s was
taken judicial notice by the Court in Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr.:29
Recently, or in July of the present year [(i.e., 2013)], the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began its probe into allegations that
"the government has been defrauded of some P10 Billion over the
past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of
lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of ghost
projects." The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six
(6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation – "JLN"
standing for Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles) – had swindled billions
of pesos from the public coffers for “ghost projects” using no fewer
than 20 dummy NGOs for an entire decade. While the NGOs were
supposedly the ultimate recipients of PDAF funds, the whistle-
blowers declared that the money was diverted into Napoles‘
private accounts. Thus, after its investigation on the Napoles
controversy, criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder [(among
others, Enrile)], and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation,
Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints
are some of the lawmakers‘ chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the
heads and other officials of three (3) implementing agencies, and
the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.30
(Emphases and words in brackets supplied; citations omitted)
Accordingly, an identification of the NGOs (and, as below
discussed, the government agencies) involved in each PDAF
transaction is therefore integral to the defense.
6. “The government agencies to whomEnrile allegedly endorsed
Napoles’ NGOs. We reiterate that the particular person/s in each
government agency who facilitated the transactions need not
anymore be named in the Information.”31
127
As aptly observed by the ponencia,32 government agencies have
been allegedly used as conduits between Enrile and the Napoles’
NGOs. The justification behind their inclusion is the same as that of
the above.
The names of the public officer’s agents or employees through
which he courses through the “groundwork” of his scheme, i.e., the
actual exchange of money, need not be provided. These involve
mere evidentiary facts that only tend to prove the ultimate fact
that the public officer concerned indeed received kickbacks and
commissions. In this case, what remains paramount is that the
Information state that Enrile received kickbacks from Napoles, et
al. in connection with the ghost projects wherein the former’s
PDAF was disbursed through the facility of his office. Regardless of
who delivered and received the actual amounts, it is clear from the
Information that Enrile’s office as Philippine Senator was used to
operate the scheme.
IV.
As a final point, it should be elucidated that“[t]he factual premises
for the allegation that Enrile took undue advantage of his official
position in order to enrich himself to the damage and prejudice of
the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines x xx”33
should not be provided by the prosecution.
The facts already alleged in the Information and the particulars
granted are already sufficient to make out how Enrile took undue
advantage of his official position. It will be recalled that the
Information already alleges that Enrile, in his capacity as Senator
from 2004-2010, conspired with Reyes, Napoles, Lim and De
Asisin accumulating, amassing or acquiring ?172,834,500.00 in ill-
gotten wealth by receiving kickbacks and commission from
projects funded by his PDAF, by endorsing Napoles-controlled
NGOs to government agencies. From these allegations alone, the
charge already conveys how Enrile supposedly took undue
advantage of his office (for how else is he alleged to have diverted
the funds) to the damage of the Filipino people (by depriving them
of the public funds). In other words, it is fairly deducible from the
allegations in the Information that Enrile must have taken undue
advantage of his official position as Philippine Senator in order to
manipulate the disposition of his PDAF and to obtain numerous
kickbacks from Napoles. The damage and prejudice to the Filipino
people and the Republic are also self-evident from the context of
the Plunder charge, more so, one specifically on the PDAF scheme.
While the prosecution may have indeed quoted Section 1(d) (6) of
the Plunder Law,34the language of the phrase “[b]y taking undue
advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection
or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the
expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people
and the Republic of the Philippines,”35 is –according to its natural
import –fully descriptive of the Plunder PDAF charge. It is common
understanding that such an offense pertains to the act of taking
undue advantage of a member of Congress of his PDAF, through
his post-enactment authority. Since public funds are
misappropriated, damage and prejudice has been obviously
caused to the Filipino People. Therefore, it is unnecessary to split
hairs on what this phrase means.As instructed in Potter v. U.S.:36
The offense charged is a statutory one, and while it is doubtless
true that it is not always sufficient to use simply the language of
the statute in describing such an offense, x xx yet if such language
is, according to the natural import of the words, fully descriptive of
the offense, then ordinarily it is sufficient.
ACCORDINGLY, subject to the qualifications herein made, I vote to
PARTIALLY GRANT the petition.
Endnotes:
1 “As a general proposition, a motion to quash on the ground that
the allegations of the information do not constitute the offense
charged, or any offense for that matter, should be resolved on the
128
basis alone of said allegations whose truth and veracity are
hypothetically admitted. The informations need only state the
ultimate facts; the reasons therefor could be proved during the
trial.
The fundamental test in reflecting on the viability of a motion to
quash under this particular ground is whether or not the facts
asseverated, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the
essential elements of the crime defined in the law. In this
examination, matters aliunde are notconsidered. However, inquiry
into facts outside the information may be allowed where the
prosecution does not object to the presentation thereof.” (Valencia
v. Sandiganbayan, 477 Phil. 103, 112 2004; citations omitted)
2 Section 1 (g), Rule 16, RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
3 Tantuico, Jr. v. Republic, G.R. No. 89114, December 2, 1991, 204
SCRA 428, 437 (1991), citing Remitere v. Yulo, 123 Phil. 57, 62
(1966).
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 413 Phil. 159 (2001).
7 Entitled “AN ACT PENALIZING THE MAKING OR DRAWING AND
ISSUANCE OF A CHECK WITHOUT SUFFICIENT FUNDS OR CREDIT
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES”
(approved on April 3, 1979).
8 Bautista v. Court of Appeals, supra note 6, at 175.
9 Section 6, Rule 110, REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.
10 58 N.E.2d 417 (1944).
11 Section 1, Rule 12 of the RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
states:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Section 1.When applied for; purpose. – Before responding to a
pleading, a party may move for a definite statement or for a bill of
particulars of any matter which is not averred with sufficient
definiteness or particularity to enable him properly to prepare his
responsive pleading. If the pleading is a reply, the motion must be
filed within ten (10) days from service thereof. Such motion shall
point out the defects complained of, the paragraphs wherein they
are contained, and the details desired.
12 Tan v. Sandiganbayan, 259 Phil. 502, 513 (1989), citing 71 C.J.S.
Pleading S 376.
13 Section 1. Arraignment and plea; how made. –
xxxx
(c) when the accused refuses to plead or makes a conditional plea,
a plea of not guilty shall be entered for him.
14 Section 6, Rule 13 of the RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
states:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Section. 6. Bill a part of pleading. – A bill of particulars becomes
part of the pleading for which it is intended.
15 See Information;rollo, pp.170-171.
16 “AN ACT DEFINING AND PENALIZING THE CRIME OF
PLUNDER” (approved on July 12, 1991).
17 As amended by RA 7659 entitled “AN ACT TO IMPOSETHE
DEATH PENALTY ON CERTAIN HEINOUS CRIMES, AMENDING
FOR THAT PURPOSE THE REVISED PENAL LAWS, AS AMENDED,
OTHER SPECIAL PENAL LAWS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES”
(approved on December 13, 1993).
18 In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan (421 Phil. 290, 351 [2001]), it was
explained:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
129
Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or
process of combining. To combine is to bring into such close
relationship as to obscure individual characters.
Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming one
after another in spatial and temporal succession.
That Congress intended the words “combination” and “series” to
be understood in their popular meanings is pristinely evident from
the legislative deliberations on the bill which eventually became
RA 7080 or the Plunder Law.
19 Section 1 (a), Rule 116 of the REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE states:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Section 1.Arraignment and plea; how made. —
(a) The accused must be arraigned before the court where the
complaint or information was filed or assigned for trial. The
arraignment shall be made in open court by the judge or clerk by
furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint or
information, reading the same in the language or dialect known to
him, and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The
prosecution may call at the trial witnesses other than those named
in the complaint or information.
20Ponencia, p. 32.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 24.
24 271 Phil. 154 (1991).
25 Id. at 160.
 notice required so that he can enter his plea. When he entered his
26Ponencia, p. 33. plea, the details of the facts that would lead to proof of his
culpability could be further specified in pre-trial or during the trial
27 Id. itself. Furthermore, I see no impediment for petitioner to avail
himself of discovery procedures.
28 Id. at 24.
Therefore, the Petition should be denied, there being no grave
29 G.R. Nos. 208566, 208493 & 209251, November 19, 2013, 710 abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan.
SCRA 1.
The ponencia initially enumerated ten (10) matters, sufficient
30 Id. at 80. particulars on which “the prosecution must provide [petitioner]
with . . . to allow him to properly enter his plea and prepare for his
31Ponencia, p. 33. defense.”1redarclaw

32 Id. at 27. Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe, in her Concurring and Dissenting

Opinion, agreed with the first five (5) items of these enumerated
33 Id. at 33. matters, partly agreed with the sixth,2 and disagreed with the
others.
34 Id. at 27.
The revised ponencia then adopted Justice Perlas-Bernabe’s
35 See Information; rollo, p. 171. position except for the last item3 in the original ten (10) matters.
The list was limited accordingly.
36 155 U.S. 438; 15 S. Ct. 144; 39 L. Ed. 214; (1894); citation
omitted. I maintain my position that within its discretion, the
Sandiganbayan did not make an error in allowing either the
amendment by the prosecution or the filing of bill of particulars on
the six (6) matters enumerated by Justice Perlas-Bernabe, which
DISSENTING OPINION were adopted in the revised ponencia. Further clarity in the facts
LEONEN, J.: would have been desirable but not necessary for due process
requirements.

In particular, it was not necessary for the prosecution to state the

I concur with the dissenting opinion of Senior Associate Justice
Antonio Carpio. I join his view that the text of the Information, in
the context of the entire process participated in by petitioner
(accused in the Sandiganbayan), sufficiently provides him with the
130
approximate dates or the exact year when the alleged kickbacks
were received. Plunder, unlike ordinary crimes, is not committed
through one isolated act, but rather, through a combination or
series of overt acts.4redarclaw

Informations for plunder should be treated differently from
informations for other crimes like murder. Murder is only
committed once. A person accused of the crime may have a
credible alibi, and in order to adequately prepare for his or her
defense, the information must state with particularity the
approximate date and time of the commission of the offense.
By its nature, plunder is committed in increments over time. It
may be committed by amassing, accumulating, or acquiring ill-
gotten wealth every year from the start of the first commission or
kickback. The statement of a range of years in the Information,
such as “2004 to 2010,” is sufficient to inform the accused that the
series of overt or criminal acts were committed within this period
of time.
I dissent from the majority position requiring the last matter of
fact as this is already evidentiary. Thus, this is not allowed by the
Rules. Upholding petitioner’s request will make it more difficult
for prosecutions of public officers charged with offenses that imply
betrayal of public trust.
Even the ponente, at one point, agreed that a relaxation of
technical rules may be necessary to enforce accountability among
public officers who hold the public’s trust. In his Separate
Concurring Opinion in Re: Allegations Made Under Oath at the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing Held on September 26,
2013 Against Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, Sandiganbayan,5
Justice Arturo Brion states that the strict application of the hearsay
rule was detrimental to this court’s sworn duty to discipline its
ranks:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
[T]he unnecessarily strict application of hearsay in administrative
proceedings of judges has crippled this Court’s capability to
discipline its ranks. An examination of bribery cases involving
judges show our extreme wariness in declaring that a judge had in
fact been bribed, often using the hearsay rule to conclude that
131
insufficiency of evidence prevents us from finding the judge liable
for bribery. We would, however, still penalize these judges and
dismiss them from office because of acts constituting gross
misconduct.
I cannot help but think that we so acted because, at the back of our
minds, we might have believed that the respondent judge had
indeed been guilty of bribery, but our over-attachment to the
hearsay rule compelled us to shy away from this reason to support
our conclusion. Hence, we try to find other ways to penalize the
erring judge or justice.
While this indirect approach may ultimately arrive at the desired
goal of penalizing erring judges and removing the corrupt from
our roster, we should realize that this approach surrenders the
strong signal that a finding of guilt for bribery makes.
It must not be lost on us that we send out a message to the public,
to the members of the judiciary, and to the members of the bar,
every time we decide a case involving the discipline of judges: we
broadcast, by our actions, that we do not tolerate the acts for
which we found the erring judge guilty. This message is lost when
we penalize judges and justices for gross misconduct other than
bribery, when bribery was the real root cause for the disciplinary
action.
I believe that the time has come for this Court to start calling a
spade a spade, and make the conclusion that bribery had taken
place if and when the circumstances sufficiently prove its
occurrence. In making this conclusion, we should not be unduly
hindered by technical rules of evidence, including hearsay, as we
have the resources and experience to interpret and evaluate the
evidence before us and the information it conveys.
We must not likewise get lost as we wander in our search for the
proper degree of supporting evidence in administrative
proceedings. This quantum of evidence should be substantial
evidence because this standard provides the necessary balance
and flexibility in determining the truth behind the accusations
against a respondent judge, without sacrificing the necessary
fairness that due process accords him and without sacrificing what
is due to the institution we serve and the Filipino people.6
(Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
In addition, I am of the view that the nature of the privileges that
petitioner enjoyed while allegedly committing the offense puts
him in a different class from other accused.
The Constitution is a document that necessarily contains the
fundamental norms in our legal order. These norms are articulated
in various provisions. These provisions are not separate from each
other. They all contribute to an ideal, which is our duty to
articulate in interpretations occasioned by actual controversies
properly brought before us. These provisions cannot be
disembodied from each other.
Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution enshrines the right to
due process:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws.7
At the same time, Section 1 of Article XI of the Constitution
unequivocally mandates:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency,
act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.8
This is a unique feature of our Constitution. These words are not
empty rhetoric.
Those who qualify for public office hold their title in trust. Their
tenure is defined but not inherently entrenched in their person.
132
Their temporary occupation of these offices is not a right vested in
them but a privilege from the sovereign.
Public officers carry this privilege with an additional burden. “At
all times[,]”9 they are required “to be accountable to the
people.”10 They are to serve in their position with “utmost”11
integrity.
The interpretation and application of the constitutionally
guaranteed individual right to due process must also be read
alongside the constitutional duty of public accountability and
utmost integrity.
Public officers who hold powerful offices can potentially provide
opportunities to enrich themselves at the expense of the taxpaying
public. They are not in the same class as individuals charged with
common offenses. The impact of the malfeasances of government
officers is far-reaching and long-lasting. Plunder of the public
coffers deprives the poor, destitute, and vulnerable from the
succor they deserve from their government. Economic resources
that are diverted to private gain do not contribute to the public
welfare. Plunder weakens and corrupts governance, thus resulting
in incalculable costs for future generations. It contributes to the
denial of the very basis of government—the same government that
is supposed to ensure that all laws are enforced fairly and
efficiently.
There is no question that all elements of the offense have been
pleaded. The question is whether the language in the Information
is specific enough. All words are open-textured, and there is
always a hierarchy of specificity required by the context of the
author and the reader.
I would have readily joined my colleagues who would advocate a
stricter scrutiny—and, therefore, a restriction of a trial court’s
discretion—in assessing whether the language of the Information
representing ultimate facts is specific enough if this were a
common crime.
For instance, if this were the usual crime charging an unlettered
member of our urban slums with selling less than one-tenth of a
gram of shabu, or the sordid offense in informal settlements of
rape committed by fathers on their daughters, or even the usual
crime of snatching a mobile phone by a desperate accused, I would
have agreed to more specificity in the language contained in the
Information.
But this is a different offense, one allegedly committed by a sitting
public officer. The offense, if true, as well as his participation, if
proven beyond reasonable doubt, is the probable contributing
cause for the destitution of millions of Filipinos.
Public officers are also entitled to the constitutional guarantee of
due process. In my view, the language in the Information in
question sufficiently lists the ultimate facts constitutive of the
offense for petitioner. Its level of specificity and the amount of
discretion we should give the Sandiganbayan should be
commensurate with his right to due process and with his duties as
a public officer, which are mandated in the Constitution.
We can choose to narrow our vision and exact the strictest rigors
of notice on a narrow and specific part of the criminal procedure’s
process. Alternately, we can view the entire context for petitioner
who comes before us to assess whether he has been fairly given
the opportunity to know the charges against him. The
constitutional requirement favoring petitioner should not be read
as requiring an inordinate burden and exacting cost on the
prosecution, such that it becomes a deterrent to move against
erring public officials with powerful titles. After all, the People,
represented by the prosecution, is also entitled to fairness and
reasonability. The prosecution is also entitled to due process. Our
doctrines should thrive on the realities of present needs.
133
Rightly so, we should be concerned with technical rules. Also as
important is that we do not lose sight of the context of these
technical rules.
In this case, petitioner was properly informed. He was given
sufficient information to enter his plea.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to dismiss the Petition.
Endnotes:
1 Ponencia, p. 38.
2 Id. at 38–39. In J. Perlas-Bernabe’s Concurring and Dissenting
Opinion, she qualified her agreement with the following
matters:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
1. The particular overt act/s alleged to constitute the
“combination” and “series” charged in the Information.
2. A breakdown of the amounts of the kickbacks and commissions
allegedly received, stating how the amount of ?172,834,500.00
was arrived at.
3. A brief description of the ‘identified’ projects where kickbacks
and commissions were received.
4. The approximate dates of receipt, “in 2004 to 2010 or
thereabout,” of the alleged kickbacks and commissions from the
identified projects. At the very least, the prosecution should state
the year when the kickbacks and transactions from the identified
projects were received.
5. The name of Napoles’ non-government organizations (NGOs)
which were the alleged “recipients and/or target implementors of
Enrile’s PDAF projects.”
6. The government agencies to whom Enrile allegedly endorsed
Napoles’ NGOs. The particular person/s in each government
agency who facilitated the transactions need not anymore be
named in the Information.
3 Ponencia as of August 4, 2015, p. 43. The item reads: “The factual
premises for the allegation that Enrile took undue advantage of his
official position, authority, relationships, connections and
influence in order to enrich himself to the damage and prejudice of
the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines. If done on
several occasions, the overt acts done on each occasion must be
specified.”
5 A.M. No. SB-14-21-J [Formerly A.M. No. 13-10-06-SB], September
23, 2014, 736 SCRA 12 [Per Curiam, En Banc].
6 J. Brion, Separate Concurring Opinion in Re: Allegations Made
Under Oath at the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing Held on
September 26, 2013 Against Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong,
Sandiganbayan, A.M. No. SB-14-21-J [Formerly A.M. No. 13-10-06-
SB], September 23, 2014, 736 SCRA 12, 123–124 [Per Curiam, En
Banc].
7 CONST., art. III, sec. 1.

4See Rep. Act No. 7080, sec. 2, which defines plunder 8 CONST., art. XI, sec. 1.
as:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
9 CONST., art. XI, sec. 1.
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. — Any
public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of 10 CONST., art. XI, sec. 1.
his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates 11 CONST., art. XI, sec. 1.
or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of
overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof in the
aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (?
50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be Back to Home | Back to Main
punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who
participated with the said public officer in the commission of an
offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be chanrobles.com
punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the
degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and Custom Search
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code,
shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and
all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and
assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from ChanRobles Professional Review, Inc.
the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State.
(As amended by RA 7659, approved Dec. 13, 1993.) ChanRobles Professional Review, Inc. :
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134

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August-2015 Jurisprudence
G.R. No. 197709, August 03, 2015 - JOSE YULO AGRICULTURAL
CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES PERLA CABAYLO DAVIS
AND SCOTT DAVIS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 200969, August 03, 2015 - CONSOLACION D. ROMERO
AND ROSARIO S.D. DOMINGO, Petitioners, v. ENGRACIA D.
SINGSON, Respondent.
135
G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015 - JUAN PONCE ENRILE,
Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
A.C. No. 8708 (CBD Case No. 08-2192), August 12, 2015 - SPOUSES
BYRON AND MARIA LUISA SAUNDERS, Complainants, v. ATTY.
LYSSA GRACE S. PAGANO-CALDE, Respondent.
G.R. No. 177803, August 03, 2015 - SPOUSES EMILIANO L. JALBAY,
SR. AND MAMERTA C. JALBAY, Petitioners, v. PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK, Respondent.
G.R. No. 201365, August 03, 2015 - THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MANUELA FLORES Y SALAZAR
@ WELLA Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 198908, August 03, 2015 - VIRGINIA OCAMPO, Petitioner,
v. DEOGRACIO OCAMPO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 195175, August 10, 2015 - COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, Petitioner, v. TOLEDO POWER COMPANY, Respondent.;
G.R. NO. 199645 - TOLEDO POWER COMPANY, Petitioner, v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
G.R. No. 213233, August 05, 2015 - BLISS DEVELOPMENT
CORP./HOME GUARANTY CORPORATION, Petitioner, v.
MONTANO DIAZ, DOMINGO TAPAY, AND EDGAR H. ARREZA,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 197953, August 05, 2015 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (2ND DIVISION), QUINTIN
SALUDAGA Y BORDEOS, ARTHUS ADRIATICO Y ERUDA AND
ROMEO DE LUNA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 187524, August 05, 2015 - SPOUSES MARIA BUTIONG
AND FRANCISCO VILLAFRIA, SUBSTITUTED BY DR. RUEL B.
VILLAFRIA, Petitioners, v. MA. GRACIA RIÑ OZA PLAZO AND MA.
FE RIÑ OZA ALARAS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 209447, August 11, 2015 - PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION
ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), Petitioner, v. HON. WINLOVE M.
DUMAYAS, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH
59, MAKATI CITY AND UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK
(UCPB), Respondents.; G.R. NO. 210901 - PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), Petitioner, v. HON.
WINLOVE M. DUMAYAS, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 59, MAKATI CITY AND UNITED COCONUT
PLANTERS LIFE ASSURANCE CORPORATION (COCOLIFE),
Respondents.
G.R. No. 188739, August 05, 2015 - BENJAMIN E. RAVAGO,
Petitioner, v. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY,
SUBSTITUTED BY BRIGHT VENTURES REALTY, INC., Respondents.
G.R. No. 215714, August 12, 2015 - OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, v. EFREN BASAL CAYAS, Accused-Appellant.
A.M. No. 11238-Ret., August 18, 2015 - IN RE: EXPIRATION OF
FIXED TERM OF OFFICE OF ATTY. SAADUDDIN A. ALAUYA,
OFFICE OF THE JURISCONSULT, ZAMBOANGA CITY
G.R. No. 167838, August 05, 2015 - JOSE V. TOLEDO, GLENN
PADIERNOS AND DANILO PADIERNOS, Petitioner, v. COURT OF
APPEALS, LOURDES RAMOS, ENRIQUE RAMOS, ANTONIO RAMOS,
MILAGROS RAMOS AND ANGELITA RAMOS AS HEIRS OF
SOCORRO RAMOS, GUILLERMO PABLO, PRIMITIVA CRUZ AND
A.R.C. MARKETING CORPORATION, REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRESIDENT, ALBERTO C. DY, Respondents.
A.C. No. 10635, August 26, 2015 - NOEL S. SORREDA, Complainant,
v. ATTY. DAVID L. KHO, Respondent.
136
A.M. No. P-14-3253, August 19, 2015 - NICETAS TANIEZA-
CALAYOAN, Complainant, v. ELMER JERRY C. CALAYOAN,
PROCESS SERVER, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 2,
BANGUED, ABRA, Respondent.
A.C. No. 8084, August 24, 2015 - PATROCINIA H. SALABAO,
Complainant, v. ATTY. ANDRES C. VILLARUEL, JR., Respondent.
A.C. No. 9834, August 26, 2015 - SAMUEL B. ARNADO,
Complainant, v. ATTY. HOMOBONO A. ADAZA, Respondent.
A.C. No. 7314, August 25, 2015 - MARY ANN T. FLORES,
Complainant, v. ATTY. JOVENCIO LL. MAYOR, JR., Respondent.
A.M. No. CA-12-26-P, August 17, 2015 - OFFICE OF THE COURT
ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, v. ANA MARIE ABARENTOS,
RECORDS OFFICER IV, COURT OF APPEALS, CEBU CITY,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 206220, August 19, 2015 - LUIS UY, SUBSTITUTED BY
LYDIA UY VELASQUEZ AND SHIRLEY UY MACARAIG, Petitioner, v.
SPOUSES JOSE LACSAMANA AND ROSAURA* MENDOZA,
SUBSTITUTED BY CORAZON BUENA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 214865, August 19, 2015 - ROSVEE C. CELESTIAL,
Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 201822, August 12, 2015 - MARINA PORT SERVICES, INC.,
Petitioner, v. AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE CORPORATION,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 202967, August 05, 2015 - ALICIA Y. LAUREL,
SUBSTITUTED BY HER SOLE HEIR AND LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE
JUAN MIGUEL Y. LAUREL, Petitioner, v. FERDINAND M.
VARDELEON, Respondent.
G.R. No. 183869, August 03, 2015 - LEONARDO L. VILLALON,
Petitioner, v. RENATO E. LIRIO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 179751, August 05, 2015 - HERMINIA L. MENDOZA, IN
HER CAPACITY AS OIC OF THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LUCENA
CITY, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES ARMANDO AND ANGELA GARANA
AND FAR EAST BANK & TRUST CO., INC., Respondents.
G.R. No. 208320, August 19, 2015 - GRACE DAVID Y CESAR,
Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 174542, August 03, 2015 - KAREN GO, Petitioner, v.
LAMBERTO ECHAVEZ, Respondent.
G.R. No. 196875, August 19, 2015 - TEDDY MARAVILLA, Petitioner,
v. JOSEPH RIOS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 205113, August 26, 2015 - HONORLITA ASCANO-CUPINO
AND FLAVIANA ASCANO-COLOCADO, Petitioners, v. PACIFIC
REHOUSE CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 205823, August 17, 2015 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Appellee, v. REGIE BREIS Y ALVARADO AND GARY YUMOL Y
TUAZON,* Appellants.
G.R. No. 198643, August 19, 2015 - MARSMAN & COMPANY AND
QUIRINO R. ILEDAN, Petitioners, v. ARTEMIO M. LIGO,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 214054, August 05, 2015 - NG MENG TAM, Petitioner, v.
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, Respondent.
A.M. No. P-11-2982 (Formerly O.C.A. IPI No. 08-2913-P), August
17, 2015 - FORMER JUDGE FERNANDO VIL PAMINTUAN,
Complainant, v. SALVADOR G. COMUYOG, JR., CLERK III,
Respondent.
137
G.R. No. 187882, August 24, 2015 - PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK,
Petitioner, v. SPOUSES HIPPOCRATES AND MELANIE PIMENTEL,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 190984, August 19, 2015 - ACOMARIT ACOMARIT
LIMITED, PHILS., AND/OR HONGKONG, Petitioners, v. GOMER L.
DOTIMAS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 170706, August 26, 2015 - PRUDENCIO CARANTO,
Petitioner, v. BERGESEN D.Y. PHILS. AND/OR BERGESEN D.Y.
A.S.A., Respondents.
G.R. No. 194617, August 05, 2015 - LA TONDEÑ A, INC., Petitioner,
v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES Respondent.
G.R. No. 206612, August 17, 2015 - TOYOTA ALABANG, INC.,
Petitioner, v. EDWIN GAMES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 203142, August 26, 2015 - THE PHILIPPINE PORTS
AUTHORITY (PPA), Petitioner, v. COALITION OF PPA OFFICERS
AND EMPLOYEES, REPRESENTED BY HECTOR E. MIOLE, ET AL.,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 182157, August 17, 2015 - ANLUD METAL RECYCLING
CORPORATION, AS REPRESENTED BY ALFREDO A. DY, Petitioner,
v. JOAQUIN ANG, Respondent.
A.C. No. 5161, August 25, 2015 - RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE
PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT OF ROLANDO S. TORRES AS A
MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE BAR.
G.R. Nos. 191370-71, August 10, 2015 - RODOLFO BASILONIA,
LEODEGARIO CATALAN AND JOHN BASILONIA, Petitioners, v.
HON. DELANO F. VLLLARUZ, ACTING IN HIS CAPACITY AS
PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, ROXAS CITY,
BRANCH 16, AND DIXON ROBLETE, Respondents.
G.R. No. 165146, August 12, 2015 - SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION AND VERNETTE G. UMALI, Petitioners, v. BAGUIO
COUNTRY CLUB CORPORATION, Respondent.; G.R. N0. 165209 -
RAMON K. ILUSORIO AND ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, Petitioners, v.
BAGUIO COUNTRY CLUB CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 203066, August 05, 2015 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RODELIO LLOBERA Y OFIZA, Accused-
Appellant.
G.R. No. 190892, August 17, 2015 - VICENTE H. MANULAT, JR.,
Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 183370, August 17, 2015 - NATION PETROLEUM GAS,
INCORPORATED, NENA ANG, MARIO ANG, ALISON A. SY,
GUILLERMO G. SY, NELSON ANG, LUISA ANG, RENATO C. ANG,
PAULINE T. ANG, RICKY C. ANG,1 AND MELINDA ANG, Petitioners,
v. RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, SUBSTITUTED
BY PHILIPPINE ASSET GROWTH ONE, INC., Respondent.
G.R. No. 213455, August 11, 2015 - JUAN PONCE ENRILE,
Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. AMPARO M.
CABOTAJE-TANG, HON. SAMUEL R. MARTIRES, AND HON. ALEX L.
QUIROZ OF THE THIRD DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 201405, August 24, 2015 - LIWAYWAY ANDRES, RONNIE
ANDRES, AND PABLO B. FRANCISCO, Petitioners, v. STA. LUCIA
REALTY & DEVELOPMENT, INCORPORATED, Respondent.
G.R. No. 153810, August 12, 2015 - WINSTON R. GARCIA, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER OF THE
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), Petitioners,
138
v. ANGELITA TOLENTINO, EDELITO ZOLLO EDRALINDA,
KATHLYN A. UMALI, VIVIAN ROSIELLE CERVANTES, EDITH
MEDINA, ROMELO CABANGON, ET AL., Respondents.; G.R. NO.
167297 - MELINA I. GARCIA, CECILIA V. LAS, NIMFA PENALOSA,
ROSANA R. ZEPEDA, RACHELLE L. JACOB, MARIBEL B. TENA, AND
EDUVIGIS S. ANGELES (IN LIEU OF ANGELITA TOLENTINO FOR
THE NATIONAL FORESTATION DEVELOPMENT OFFICE-
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
ET AL.), Petitioners, v. WINSTON GARCIA, ET AL., Respondents.
G.R. No. 192943, August 12, 2015 - UNITED DUMANGAS PORT
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. PHILIPPINE PORTS
AUTHORITY, ATTY. OSMAR M. SEVILLA, GENERAL MANAGER,
ATTY. FERNANDO B. CLAVERINA, PORT MANAGER, PORT
MANAGEMENT OFFICER-ILOILO; AND RAUL T. SANTOS, PORT
DISTRICT MANAGER, PORT DISTRICT OFFICE-VISAYAS,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 200114, August 24, 2015 - SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM,
Petitioner, v. DEBBIE UBAÑ A, Respondent.
G.R. No. 177168, August 03, 2015 - NAVY OFFICERS' VILLAGE
ASSOCIATION, INC. (NOVAI), Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 163598, August 12, 2015 - AGRARIAN REFORM
BENEFICIARIES ASSOCIATION (ARBA), AS REPRESENTED BY
ISAIAS "ACE" NICOLAS IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT, VIOLETA
BATADHAY, JESUS F. DANAO, DOMINADOR RIOSA, EVA I.
FLORIDO, VIRGINIA CARIAS, WILLIAM D. DORONELA, ELSA
MENGOLIO, FEDELINA AMENGYAO, REBECCA REBAMBA, MELANI
CADAG, SOFRONIA SABORDO, MYRNA SANTIAGO, JOSELYNDA
MANALANZAN, NORA I. REBUZANO, NATIVIDAD PLACIDO,
ALGERICO L. GAEGUERA, RUBEN G. ACEBEDO, MARGIE M.
VALDEZ, HELEN S. BUNI, EMELINDA FERNANDEZ, JULIETA J.
AVENGONZA, VIOLETA C. ASIS, CARINA C. CABRERA, EDUARDO M.
DILAY, SIMEONA V. ROLEDA, EVELYN SANTO ELEUTERIA A.
NOLASCO, TERESA CRUZ, MELBA ABRENICA, BESAME
VILLACORTA, ROSALINA HERNANDEZ, VERONICA DOMULOT,
LUCIA SOUN, ILUMENADA RONQUILLO, REGINA LOPEZ, AMPARO
GREY, HIPOLITO MANDAO, JUAN DELA VEGA, PRESCILIANA
LLEMIT, LEBERETA IGNACIO, FRANCISCO VALDEMOR,
Petitioners, v. FIL-ESTATE INC., PROPERTIES, Respondent.; G.R.
NO. 164660 - THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
ADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB), AGRARIAN REFORM
BENEFICIARIES, INC., ET AL., Petitioners, v. KINGSVILLE
CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORP. AND JOHNSON ONG,
Respondents.; G.R. NO. 164779 - AGRARIAN REFORM
BENEFICIARIES ASSOCIATION (ARBA), VIOLETA BATADHAY,
NATIVIDAD PLACIDO, JESUS F. DANAO, EVA I. FLORIDO, VIRGINIA
CARIAS, WILLIAM D. DORONELA, ELSA MENGOLIO, ROBERTO
ISIP, REBECCA REBAMBA, SOFRONIA SABORDO, MYRNA
SANTIAGO, JOSELYNDA MANALANZAN, NORA I. REBUZANO,
ALGERICO L. GALQUERA, RUBEN G. ACEBEDO, MARGIE M.
VALDEZ, HELEN S. BUNI, JULIETA J. AVENGONZA, VIOLETA C.
ASIS, CARINA C. CABRERA, EDUARDO M. DILAY, ELEUTERIA A.
NOLASCO, TERESA CRUZ, MELBA ABRENICA, VERONICA
DOMULOT, LUCIA SUN, ILUMENADA RONQUILLO AND
PRESCILIANA LLEMIT, Petitioners, v. KINGSVILLE
CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND
JOHNSONONG, Respondent.
G.R. No. 164974, August 05, 2015 - CHARLIE TE, Petitioner, v.
HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE PRESIDING
JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, 11TH JUDICIAL REGION,
BRANCH 10, DAVAO CITY; U R. BAHINTING, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
SPECIAL INVESTIGATOR OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, SARANGGANI DISTRICT OFFICE; AND PRYCE
GASES, INC., Respondents.
G.R. No. 211302, August 12, 2015 - PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE
CARRIERS, INC., CARLOS C. SALINAS, AND NORWEGIAN CREW
139
MANAGEMENT A/S, Petitioners, v. CESAR C. PELAGIO,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 210164, August 18, 2015 - ROMMEL C. ARNADO,
Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND FLORANTE
CAPITAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 211649, August 12, 2015 - AQA GLOBAL CONSTRUCTION,
INC., Petitioner, v. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK, Respondent.;
G.R. No. 211742 - JE-AN SUPREME BUILDERS AND SALES
CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 203355, August 18, 2015 - LEO R. ROSALES, EDGAR SOLIS
JONATHAN G. RANIOLA, LITO FELICIANO, RAYMUNDO DIDAL, JR.,
NESTOR SALIN, ARNULFO S. ABRIL, RUBEN FLORES, DANTE
FERMA AND MELCHOR SELGA, Petitioners, v. NEW A.N.J.H.
ENTERPRISES & N.H. OIL MILL CORPORATION, NOEL AWAYAN,
MA. FE AWAYAN, BYRON ILAGAN, HEIDI A. ILAGAN AND AVELINO
AWAYAN, Respondents.
A.M. No. RTJ-14-2383 (Formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I No. 05-2301-RTJ),
August 17, 2015 - DR. CORAZON D. PADERANGA, DULCE P.
GUIBELONDO, PATRIA P. DIAZ, CARMENCITA P. ORSENO, AND DR.
AMOR P. GALON, Complainants, v. HONORABLE RUSTICO D.
PADERANGA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 28, IN MAMBAJAO, CAMIGUIN,
Respondent.; A.M. No. RTJ-07-2033 (FORMERLY A.M. OCA I.P.I No.
06-2485-RTJ) - PATRIA PADERANGA DIAZ, Complainant, v. HON.
RTC JUDGE RUSTICO D. PADERANGA, AS THE PRESIDING JUDGE
OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 28, IN MAMBAJAO,
CAMIGUIN, Respondent.
G.R. No. 160924, August 05, 2015 - TERELAY INVESTMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. CECILIA TERESITA
J. YULO, Respondent.

G.R. No. 213286, August 26, 2015 - MAMERTA LOPEZ CLAUDIO,
EDUARDO L. CLAUDIO, ASUNCION CLAUDIO-CONTEGINO, ANA
CLAUDIO-ISULAT, DOLORES CLAUDIO-MABINI, AND FERMIN L.
CLAUDIO, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES FEDERICO AND NORMA
SARAZA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 200295, August 19, 2015 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EDGAR BOLO Y FRANCO, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 209331, August 24, 2015 - DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE,
REPRESENTED BY HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS SECRETARY, AND THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS,
REPRESENTED BY HON. ROZZANO RUFINO B. BIAZON, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS,
Petitioners, v. HON. MARINO M. DELA CRUZ, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY
AS EXECUTIVE JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MANILA, HON.
FELICITAS O. LARON-CACANINDIN, IN HER CAPACITY AS
PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MANILA, BRANCH
17, RONNIE C. SILVESTRE, EDWARD P. DELA CUESTA, ROGEL C.
GATCHALIAN, IMELDA D.CRUZ, LILIBETH S. SANDAG, RAYMOND
P. VENTURA, MA. LIZA S. TORRES, ARNEL C. ALCARAZ, MA.
LOURDES V. MANGAOANG, FRANCIS AGUSTIN Y. ERPE, CARLOS T.
SO, MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS, CARMELITA M. TALUSAN,1]
AREFILES H. CARREON,2] AND ROMALINO G. VALDEZ,
Respondents.
A.C. No. 6738, August 12, 2015 - GABRIELA CORONEL, Petitioner,
v. ATTY. NELSON A. CUNANAN, Respondent.
G.R. No. 170671, August 19, 2015 - FILADELFA T. LAUSA, LORETA
T. TORRES, PRIMITIVO TUGOT AND ANACLETO T. CADUHAY,
Petitioners, v. MAURICIA QUILATON, RODRIGO Q. TUGOT,
PURIFICACION T. CODILLA, TEOFRA T. SADAYA, ESTRELLITA T.
GALEOS AND ROSITA T. LOPEZ, Respondents.
140
G.R. No. 202322, August 19, 2015 - LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT
AUTHORITY, Petitioner, v. ROMULO S. MENDOZA, FRANCISCO S.
MERCADO, ROBERTO M. REYES, EDGARDO CRISTOBAL, JR., AND
RODOLFO ROMAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 198751, August 19, 2015 - FLOR CAÑ AS-MANUEL,
Petitioner, v. ANDRES D. EGANO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 181111, August 17, 2015 - JACKSON PADIERNOS Y
QUEJADA, JACKIE ROXAS Y GERMAN AND ROLANDO MESINA Y
JAVATE, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 202645, August 05, 2015 - FORTUNATO R. BARON,
MANOLO B. BERSABAL, AND RECTO A. MELENDRES, Petitioners,
v. EPE TRANSPORT, INC. AND/OR ERNESTO P. ENRIQUEZ,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 211263, August 05, 2015 - OKS DESIGNTECH, INC.
REPRESENTED BY ZAMBY O. PONGAD, Petitioner, v. MARY JAYNE
L. CACCAM, Respondent.
G.R. No. 175098, August 26, 2015 - ISMAEL V. CRISOSTOMO,
Petitioner, v. MARTIN P. VICTORIA, Respondent.
A.M. No. CA-15-33-P [Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-207-CA-P], August
24, 2015 - TERESITA R. MARIGOMEN, CLERK OF COURT, COURT
OF APPEALS, MANILA, Complainant, v. RONELO G. LABAR,
DRIVER, MAILING AND DELIVERY SECTION, COURT OF APPEALS,
CEBU STATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 168157, August 19, 2015 - HILARIO P. SORIANO,
Petitioner, v. DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR LUZON VICTOR C.
FERNANDEZ, FLORIZA A. BRIONES, GRAFT INVESTIGATION AND
PROSECUTION OFFICER II, DONNA B. PASCUAL, GRAFT
INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OFFICER II, AND ATTY.
ADONIS C. CLEOFE, Respondents.

G.R. No. 200841-42, August 26, 2015 - CE LUZON GEOTHERMAL
POWER COMPANY, INC., Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
G.R. No. 171582, August 19, 2015 - ALBERTO T. LASALA,
PREVIOUSLY DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE STYLE PSF SECURITY
AGENCY, Petitioner, v. THE NATIONAL FOOD AUTHORITY,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 169343, August 05, 2015 - SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES,
INC., Petitioner, v. BF HOMES, INC., Respondent.
G.R. No. 166102, August 05, 2015 - MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY,
Petitioner, v. THE CITY ASSESSOR AND CITY TREASURER OF
LUCENA CITY, Respondents.
A.M. No. 99-7-01-SC, August 18, 2015 - RE: REQUEST OF RETIRED
SUPREME COURT AND COURT OF APPEALS JUSTICES FOR
INCREASE/ADJUSTMENT OF THEIR DECEMBER 1998 PENSIONS
A.M. No. RTJ-15-2439 (Formerly: OCA I.P.I. No. 12-3989-RTJ),
August 26, 2015 - ARIEL "AGA" MUHLACH, Complainant, v.
EXECUTIVE JUDGE MA. ANGELA ACOMPAÑ ADO-ARROYO,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN JOSE CITY, CAMARINES SUR,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 169385, August 26, 2015 - TEOFILO GIANGAN, SANTOS
BONTIA (DECEASED), AND LIBERATO DUMAIL (DECEASED),
Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 205722, August 19, 2015 - REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, Petitioners, v. LEGAL
HEIRS OF JOSE L. AFRICA, Respondents.
141
G.R. No. 169710, August 19, 2015 - REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. JOSE ALBERTO ALBA, REPRESENTED
BY HIS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, MANUEL C. BLANCO, JR., Respondent.
G.R. No. 162692, August 26, 2015 - NILO V. CHIPONGIAN,
Petitioner, v. VICTORIA BENITEZ-LIRIO, FEODOR BENITEZ
AGUILAR, AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 206032, August 19, 2015 - JOSE RUDY L. BAUTISTA,
Petitioner, v. ELBURG SHIPMANAGEMENT PHILIPPINES, INC.,
AUGUSTEA SHIPMANAGEMENT ITALY, AND/OR CAPTAIN
ANTONIO S. NOMBRADO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 208354, August 26, 2015 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICARDO BACUS, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 168258, August 17, 2015 - RICARDO V. QUINTOS,
Petitioner, v. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Respondents.
G.R. No. 181111, August 17, 2015 - JACKSON PADIERNOS Y
QUEJADA, JACKIE ROXAS Y GERMAN AND ROLANDO MESINA Y
JAVATE, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 202645, August 05, 2015 - FORTUNATO R. BARON,
MANOLO B. BERSABAL, AND RECTO A. MELENDRES, Petitioners,
v. EPE TRANSPORT, INC. AND/OR ERNESTO P. ENRIQUEZ,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 175098, August 26, 2015 - ISMAEL V. CRISOSTOMO,
Petitioner, v. MARTIN P. VICTORIA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 211263, August 05, 2015 - OKS DESIGNTECH, INC.
REPRESENTED BY ZAMBY O. PONGAD, Petitioner, v. MARY JAYNE
L. CACCAM, Respondent.
A.M. No. CA-15-33-P [Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-207-CA-P], August
24, 2015 - TERESITA R. MARIGOMEN, CLERK OF COURT, COURT
OF APPEALS, MANILA, Complainant, v. RONELO G. LABAR,
DRIVER, MAILING AND DELIVERY SECTION, COURT OF APPEALS,
CEBU STATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 168157, August 19, 2015 - HILARIO P. SORIANO,
Petitioner, v. DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR LUZON VICTOR C.
FERNANDEZ, FLORIZA A. BRIONES, GRAFT INVESTIGATION AND
PROSECUTION OFFICER II, DONNA B. PASCUAL, GRAFT
INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OFFICER II, AND ATTY.
ADONIS C. CLEOFE, Respondents.
G.R. No. 200841-42, August 26, 2015 - CE LUZON GEOTHERMAL
POWER COMPANY, INC., Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
G.R. No. 171582, August 19, 2015 - ALBERTO T. LASALA,
PREVIOUSLY DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE STYLE PSF SECURITY
AGENCY, Petitioner, v. THE NATIONAL FOOD AUTHORITY,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 169343, August 05, 2015 - SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES,
INC., Petitioner, v. BF HOMES, INC., Respondent.
G.R. No. 166102, August 05, 2015 - MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY,
Petitioner, v. THE CITY ASSESSOR AND CITY TREASURER OF
LUCENA CITY, Respondents.
A.M. No. RTJ-15-2439 (Formerly: OCA I.P.I. No. 12-3989-RTJ),
August 26, 2015 - ARIEL "AGA" MUHLACH, Complainant, v.
EXECUTIVE JUDGE MA. ANGELA ACOMPAÑ ADO-ARROYO,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN JOSE CITY, CAMARINES SUR,
Respondent.
142
A.M. No. 99-7-01-SC, August 18, 2015 - RE: REQUEST OF RETIRED
SUPREME COURT AND COURT OF APPEALS JUSTICES FOR
INCREASE/ADJUSTMENT OF THEIR DECEMBER 1998 PENSIONS
G.R. No. 169385, August 26, 2015 - TEOFILO GIANGAN, SANTOS
BONTIA (DECEASED), AND LIBERATO DUMAIL (DECEASED),
Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 205722, August 19, 2015 - REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, Petitioners, v. LEGAL
HEIRS OF JOSE L. AFRICA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 169710, August 19, 2015 - REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. JOSE ALBERTO ALBA, REPRESENTED
BY HIS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, MANUEL C. BLANCO, JR., Respondent.
G.R. No. 162692, August 26, 2015 - NILO V. CHIPONGIAN,
Petitioner, v. VICTORIA BENITEZ-LIRIO, FEODOR BENITEZ
AGUILAR, AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 206032, August 19, 2015 - JOSE RUDY L. BAUTISTA,
Petitioner, v. ELBURG SHIPMANAGEMENT PHILIPPINES, INC.,
AUGUSTEA SHIPMANAGEMENT ITALY, AND/OR CAPTAIN
ANTONIO S. NOMBRADO,* Respondents.
G.R. No. 208354, August 26, 2015 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICARDO BACUS, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 200751, August 17, 2015 - MONICO LIGTAS, Petitioner, v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 168258, August 17, 2015 - RICARDO V. QUINTOS,
Petitioner, v. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Respondents.
G.R. No. 215568, August 03, 2015 - RICHARD N. RIVERA, G.R. No. 163504, August 05, 2015 - BERLINDA ORIBELLO,
Petitioner, v. GENESIS TRANSPORT SERVICE, INC. AND RIZA A. Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FORMER TENTH
MOISES, Respondents. DIVISION), AND REMEDIOS ORIBELLO, Respondents.

G.R. No. 172301, August 19, 2015 - PHILIPPINE NATIONAL

CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. ASIAVEST
MERCHANT BANKERS (M) BERHAD, Respondent. Copyright © 1995 - 2020 REDiaz

G.R. No. 210554, August 05, 2015 - DAVID YU KIMTENG, MARY L.

YU, WINNIE L. YU, VIVIAN L. YU, ROSA GAN, LILIAN CHUA WOO
YUKIMTENG, SANTOS YU, MARCELO YU, AND SIN CHIAO YU LIM,
Petitioners, v. ATTY. WALTER T. YOUNG, ANASTACIO E. REVILLA,
JR., ATTY. JOVITO GAMBOL, AND ATTY. DAN REYNALD R. MAGAT,
PRACTICING LAW UNDER THE FIRM NAME, YOUNG REVILLA
GAMBOL & MAGAT, AND JUDGE OFELIA L. CALO, PRESIDING
JUDGE OF BRANCH 211 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
MANDALUYONG CITY, Respondents.
Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No. 171804, August 05, 2015 - THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF SUPREME COURT
Manila
NEGROS OCCIDENTAL AND THE NATIONAL TREASURER OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners, v. OSCAR ANGLO, SR.,
SECOND DIVISION
AND ANGLO AGRICULTURAL CORPORATION, REPRESENTED BY
OSCAR ANGLO, JR., Respondents. G.R. No. 174461               September 11, 2013

G.R. No. 205705, August 05, 2015 - DOMINADOR M. APIQUE,
Petitioner, v. EVANGELINE APIQUE FAHNENSTICH, Respondent.
G.R. No. 195990, August 05, 2015 - HEIRS OF RAFAEL GOZO
REPRESENTED BY CASTILLO GOZO AND RAFAEL GOZO, JR.,
Petitioners, v. PHILIPPINE UNION MISSION CORPORATION OF
THE SEVENTH DAY ADVENTIST CHURCH (PUMCO), SOUTH
PHILIPPINE UNION MISSION OF SDA (SPUMCO) AND SEVENTH
DAY ADVENTIST CHURCH AT SIMPAK, LALA, LANAO DEL NORTE
REPRESENTED BY BETTY PEREZ , Respondents.
143
LETICIA I. KUMMER, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We decide the appeal tiled by petitioner Leticia I. Kummer assailing the
April 28, 2006 decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
27609. The CA decision affirmed the July 27, 2000 judgment 2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, finding
the petitioner and her co-accused Freiderich Johan I. Kummer guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide in Criminal Case No.
1130.
The Facts
The prosecution's evidence revealed that on June 19, 1988, between
9:00 and 10:00 p.m., Jesus Mallo, Jr., accompanied by Amiel Malana,
went to the house of the petitioner. Mallo knocked at the front door with a
stone and identified himself by saying, "Auntie, ako si Boy Mallo."
The petitioner opened the door and at this point, her son and co-accused,
Johan, using his left hand, shot Mallo twice using a gun about six (6)
inches long.3 Malana, who was with Mallo and who witnessed the
shooting, immediately ran towards the west, followed by Mallo. When
Malana turned his back, he saw the petitioner leveling and firing her long
gun at Mallo, hitting the latter’s back and causing him to fall flat on the
ground.4
Thereafter, the petitioner went inside the house and came out with a
flashlight. Together with her co-accused, she scoured the pathway up to
the place where Mallo was lying flat.5 At that point, the petitioner
uttered,"Johan, patay na," in a loud voice.6 The petitioner and her co-
accused putdown the guns and the flashlight they were holding, held
Mallo’s feet and pulled him to about three (3) to four (4) meters away
from the house. Thereafter, they returned to the house and turned off all
the lights.7
The following morning, policeman Danilo Pelovello went to the
petitioner’s house and informed her that Mallo had been found dead in
front of her house. Pelovello conducted an investigation through inquiries
among the neighbors, including the petitioner, who all denied having any
knowledge of the incident.
The prosecution filed an information8 for homicide on January 12,1989
against the petitioner and Johan, docketed as Criminal Case No.
1130.Both accused were arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. They waived the pre-trial, and the trial on the merits accordingly
followed.
The petitioner denied the charge and claimed in her defense that she and
her children, Johan, Melanie and Erika, were already asleep in the
144
evening of June 19, 1988. She claimed that they were awakened by the
sound of stones being thrown at their house, a gun report, and the
banging at their door.
Believing that the noise was caused by the members of the New People’s
Army prevalent in their area, and sensing the possible harm that might be
inflicted on them, Johan got a .38 cal. gun from the drawer and fired it
twice outside to scare the people causing the disturbance. The noise
continued, however, with a stone hitting the window and breaking the
glass; another stone hit Melanie who was then sick. This prompted Johan
to get the shotgun placed beside the door and to fire it. The noise
thereafter stopped and they all went back to sleep.
In its judgment dated July 27, 2000, the RTC found the prosecution’s
evidence persuasive based on the testimonies of prosecution
eyewitnesses Ramon Cuntapay and Malana who both testified that the
petitioner shot Mallo. The testimonial evidence, coupled by the positive
findings of gunpowder nitrates on the left hand of Johan and on the
petitioner’s right hand, as well as the corroborative testimony of the other
prosecution witnesses, led the RTC to find both the petitioner and Johan
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
Johan, still a minor at the time of the commission of the crime, was
released on the recognizance of his father, Moises Kummer. Johan
subsequently left the country without notifying the court; hence, only the
petitioner appealed the judgment of conviction with the CA.
She contended before the CA that the RTC committed reversible errors in
its appreciation of the evidence, namely: (1) in giving credence to the
testimonial evidence of Cuntapay and of Malana despite the
discrepancies between their sworn statements and direct testimonies; (2)
in not considering the failure of the prosecution to cite the petitioner’s
motive in killing the victim; (3) in failing to consider that the writer of the
decision, Judge Lyliha L. Abella-Aquino, was not the judge who heard the
testimonies; and (4) in considering the paraffin test results finding the
petitioner positive for gunpowder residue.
The CA rejected the petitioner’s arguments and affirmed the RTC
judgment, holding that the discrepancies between the sworn statement
and the direct testimony of the witnesses do not necessarily discredit
them because the contradictions are minimal and reconcilable. The CA
also ruled that the inconsistencies are minor lapses and are therefore not
substantial. The petitioner’s positive identification by the eyewitnesses as
one of the assailants remained unrefuted. The CA, moreover, held that
proof of motive is only necessary when a serious doubt arises on the
identity of the accused. That the writer of the decision was not the judge
who heard the testimonies of the witnesses does not necessarily make
the decision erroneous.
In sum, the CA found Malana and Cuntapay’s positive identification and
the corroborative evidence presented by the prosecution more than
sufficient to convict the petitioner of the crime charged.
On further appeal to this Court, the petitioner submits the issue of
whether the CA committed a reversible error in affirming the RTC’s
decision convicting her of the crime of homicide.
In essence, the case involves the credibility of the prosecution
eyewitnesses and the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence.
Our Ruling
We find the petition devoid of merit.
The petitioner’s conviction is anchored on the positive and direct
testimonies of the prosecution eyewitnesses, which testimonies the
petitioner submits to be both inconsistent and illogical. The petitioner
essentially impugns the credibility of the witnesses on these grounds. The
petitioner moreover claims that her conviction was based on doctrinal
precepts that should not apply to her case.
Variance between the eyewitnesses’
testimonies in open court and their
affidavits does not affect their
credibility
In her attempt to impugn the credibility of prosecution eyewitnesses
Malana and Cuntapay, the petitioner pointed to the following in
consistencies: First, in paragraph 7 of Malana’s July 21, 1988 affidavit, he
stated that after hearing two gunshots, he dived to the ground for cover
and heard another shot louder than the first two. This statement is
allegedly inconsistent with his declaration during the direct examination
145
that he saw the petitioner and Johan fire their guns at Mallo. Second, the
July 22, 1988affidavit of Cuntapay likewise stated that he heard two burst
of gun fire coming from the direction of the petitioner’s house and heard
another burst from the same direction, which statement is allegedly
inconsistent with his direct testimony where he claimed that he saw the
petitioner shoot Mallo. Third, in his affidavit, Malana declared that he ran
away as he felt the door being opened and heard two shots, while in his
testimony in court, he stated that he ran away after Mallo was already hit.
According to the petitioner, these and some other trivial and minor
inconsistencies in the testimony of the two witnesses effectively
destroyed their credibility.
We find these claims far from convincing. The Court has consistently held
that inconsistencies between the testimony of a witness in open court, on
one hand, and the statements in his sworn affidavit, on the other hand,
referring only to minor and collateral matters, do not affect his credibility
and the veracity and weight of his testimony as they do not touch upon
the commission of the crime itself. Slight contradictions, in fact, even
serve to strengthen the credibility of the witnesses, as these may be
considered as badges of truth rather than indicia of bad faith; they tend to
prove that their testimonies have not been rehearsed. Nor are such
inconsistencies, and evenimpro babilities, unusual, for no person has
perfect faculties of senses or recall.9
A close scrutiny of the records reveals that Malana and Cuntapay
positively and firmly declared in open court that they saw the petitioner
and Johan shoot Mallo. The inconsistencies in their affidavit, they
reasoned, were due to the oversight of the administering official in typing
the exact details of their narration.
It is oft repeated that affidavits are usually abbreviated and inaccurate.
Oftentimes, an affidavit is incomplete, resulting in its seeming
contradiction with the declarant’s testimony in court. Generally, the affiant
is asked standard questions, coupled with ready suggestions intended to
elicit answers, that later turn out not to be wholly descriptive of the series
of events as the affiant knows them. 10 Worse, the process of affidavit-
taking may sometimes amount to putting words into the affiant’s mouth,
thus allowing the whole statement to be taken out of context.
The court is not unmindful of these on-the-ground realities. In fact, we
have ruled that the discrepancies between the statements of the affiant in
his affidavit and those made by him on the witness stand do not records before her, in the way that appellate courts do when they review
necessarily discredit him since ex parte affidavits are generally the evidence of the case raised on appeal. 16 Thus, a judgment of
incomplete.11 As between the joint affidavit and the testimony given in conviction penned by a different trial judge is not erroneous if she relied
open court, the latter prevails because affidavits taken ex-parte are on the records available to her.
generally considered to be inferior to the testimony given in court. 12
Motive is irrelevant when the
In the present case, we find it undeniable that Malana and Cuntapay
positively identified the petitioner as one of the assailants. This is the accused has been positively identified
critical point, not the inconsistencies that the petitioner repeatedly refers
to, which carry no direct bearing on the crucial issue of the identity of the by an eyewitness
perpetrator of the crime. Indeed, the inconsistencies refer only to minor
details that are not critical to the main outcome of the case. Moreover, the
We agree with the CA’s ruling that motive gains importance only when
basic rule is that the Supreme Court accords great respect and even
the identity of the assailant is in doubt. As held in a long line of cases, the
finality to the findings of credibility of the trial court, more so if the same
prosecution does not need to prove the motive of the accused when the
were affirmed by the CA, as in this case.13 We find no reason to break this
latter has been identified as the author of the crime. 17
rule and thus find that both the RTC and the CA were correct in giving
credence to the testimonies of Malana and Cuntapay.
Once again, we point out that the petitioner was positively identified by
Malana and Cuntapay. Thus, the prosecution did not have to identify and
It is not necessary for the validity of
prove the motive for the killing. It is a matter of judicial knowledge that
the judgment that it be rendered by
persons have been killed for no apparent reason at all, and that
the judge who heard the case
friendship or even relationship is no deterrent to the commission of a
crime.18
The petitioner contends that the CA, in affirming the judgment of the
RTC, failed to recognize that the trial court that heard the testimonies of
The petitioner attempts to offer the justification that the witnesses did not
Malana and Cuntapay was not the same court that rendered the
really witness the shooting as their affidavits merely attested that they
decision.14
heard the shooting of Mallo (and did not state that they actually witnessed
it). We find this to be a lame argument whose merit we cannot recognize.
We do not share this view.

The rule is settled that the validity of a judgment is not rendered

erroneous solely because the judge who heard the case was not the
same judge who rendered the decision. In fact, it is not necessary for the
validity of a judgment that the judge who penned the decision should
actually hear the case in its entirety, for he can merely rely on the
transcribed stenographic notes taken during the trial as the basis for his
decision.15

Thus, the contention - that since Judge Lyliha L. Abella-Aquino was not
the one who heard the evidence and thereby did not have the opportunity
to observe the demeanor of the witnesses - must fail. It is sufficient that
the judge, in deciding the case, must base her ruling completely on the
146
That Malana and Cuntapay have been eyewitnesses to the crime
remains unrefuted. They both confirmed in their direct testimony before
the RTC that they saw the petitioner fire a gun at Mallo. This was again
re-affirmed by the witnesses during their cross examination. The fact that
their respective affidavits merely stated that they heard the gunshots
does not automatically foreclose the possibility that they also saw the
actual shoot in gas this was in fact what the witnesses claimed truly
happened. Besides, it has been held that the claim that "whenever a
witness discloses in his testimony in court facts which he failed to state in
his affidavit taken ante litem motam, then an inconsistency exists
between the testimony and the affidavit" is erroneous. If what were stated
in open court are but details or additional facts that serve to supplement
the declarations made in the affidavit, these statements cannot be ruled
out as inconsistent and may be considered by the court.
Thus, in light of the direct and positive identification of the petitioner as
one of the perpetrators of the crime by not one but two prosecution eye
witnesses, the failure to cite the motive of the petitioner is of no moment.
At any rate, we find it noteworthy that the lack or absence of motive for
committing the crime does not preclude conviction where there are
reliable witnesses who fully and satisfactorily identified the petitioner as
the perpetrator of the felony, such as in this case.
There is no absolute uniformity
nor a fixed standard form of human
behavior
The petitioner imputes error to the CA in giving credence to the
testimonies of Malana and Cuntapay on the claim that these are riddled
not only by inconsistencies and contradictions, but also by improbabilities
and illogical claims. She laboriously pointed out the numerous
improbabilities that, taken as a whole, allegedly cast serious doubt on
their reliability and credibility.
She alleged, among others: (1) that it was abnormal and contrary to the
ways of the farmers in the rural areas for Cuntapay to go home from his
corral at about 9:00 p.m., while everybody else goes home from his farm
much earlier, as working late in the farm (that is, before and after sunset)
is taboo to farming; (2) that the act of the petitioner of putting down her
gun in order to pull the victim away does not make any sense because a
147
criminal would not simply part with his weapon in this manner; (3) that it is
highly incredible that Malana, who accompanied Mallo, was left
unharmed and was allowed to escape if indeed he was just beside the
victim; (4) that it is unbelievable that when Malana heard the cocking of
guns and the opening of the door, he did not become scared at all; (5)
that Malana and Cuntapay did not immediately report the incident to the
authorities; (6) that it was highly improbable for Malana to turn his head
while running; and (7) that it was unusual that Cuntapay did not run away
when he saw the shooting.
We rule, without descending to particulars and going over each and every
one of these claims, that without more and stronger indicators, we cannot
accord them credit. Human nature suggests that people may react
differently when confronted with a given situation. Witnesses to a crime
cannot be expected to demonstrate an absolute uniformity and conformity
inaction and reaction. People may act contrary to the accepted norm,
react differently and act contrary to the expectation of mankind. There is
no standard human behavioral response when one is confronted with an
unusual, strange, startling or frightful experience. 19
We thus hold that the CA was correct in brushing aside the
improbabilities alleged by the petitioner who, in her present plight, can be
overcritical in her attempt to seize every detail that can favor her case.
Unfortunately, if at all, her claims refer only to minor and even
inconsequential details that do not touch on the core of the crime itself.
Public documents are admissible in
court without further proof of their
due execution and authenticity
A public document is defined in Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court as follows:
SEC. 19. Classes of Documents. – For the purpose of their presentation
in evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public
officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
 (b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last
wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, or private documents
required by law to be entered therein.
All other writings are private. [emphasis and underscore ours]
The chemistry report showing a positive result of the paraffin test is a
public document. As a public document, the rule on authentication does
not apply. It is admissible in evidence without further proof of its due
execution and genuineness; the person who made the report need not be
presented in court to identify, describe and testify how the report was
conducted. Moreover, documents consisting of entries in public records
made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein.20
In the present case, notwithstanding the fact that it was Captain Benjamin
Rubio who was presented in court to identify the chemistry report and not
the forensic chemist who actually conducted the paraffin test on the
petitioner, the report may still be admitted because the requirement for
authentication does not apply to public documents. In other words, the
forensic chemist does not need to be presented as witness to identify and
authenticate the chemistry report. Furthermore, the entries in the
chemistry report are prima facie evidence of the facts they state, that is,
of the presence of gunpowder residue on the left hand of Johan and on
the right hand of the petitioner. As a matter of fact, the petitioner herself
admitted the presence of gunpowder nitrates on her fingers, albeit
ascribing their presence from a match she allegedly
lighted.21 Accordingly, we hold that the chemistry report is admissible as
evidence.
On the issue of the normal process versus the actual process conducted
during the test raised by the petitioner, suffice it to say that in the
absence of proof to the contrary, it is presumed that the forensic chemist
who conducted the report observed the regular procedure. Stated
otherwise, the courts will not presume irregularity or negligence in the
performance of one’s duties unless facts are shown dictating a contrary
conclusion. The presumption of regularity in favor of the forensic chemist
compels us to reject the petitioner’s contention that an explanation has to
be given on how the actual process was conducted. Since the petitioner
148
presented no evidence of fabrication or irregularity, we presume that the
standard operating procedure has been observed.
We note at this point that while the positive finding of gunpowder residue
does not conclusively show that the petitioner indeed fired a gun, the
finding nevertheless serves to corroborate the prosecution eyewitnesses’
testimony that the petitioner shot the victim. Furthermore, while it is true
that cigarettes, fertilizers, urine or even a match may leave traces of
nitrates, experts confirm that these traces are minimal and may be
washed off with tap water, unlike the evidence nitrates left behind by
gunpowder.
Change in the date of the
commission of the crime, where the
disparity is not great, is merely a
formal amendment, thus, no
arraignment is required
The petitioner claims that she was not arraigned on the amended
information for which she was convicted. The petitioner’s argument is
founded on the flawed understanding of the rules on amendment and
misconception on the necessity of arraignment in every case. Thus, we
do not see any merit in this claim.
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court permits a formal amendment
of a complaint even after the plea but only if it is made with leave of court
and provided that it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of
the accused. Section 14 provides:
Section 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may
be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time
before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a
formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can
be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of
the offense charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or
information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice
to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its
reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished
all parties, especially the offended party.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made
in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original
complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper
offense in accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused
would not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the
witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial. [emphasis and
underscore ours]
A mere change in the date of the commission of the crime, if the disparity
of time is not great, is more formal than substantial. Such an amendment
would not prejudice the rights of the accused since the proposed
amendment would not alter the nature of the offense.
The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the
amendment of a complaint or information is when a defense under the
complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be
available after the amendment is made, when any evidence the accused
might have would no longer be available after the amendment is made,
and when any evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to
the complaint or information, as amended.22
In People, et al. v. Borromeo, et al.,23 we ruled that the change of the date
of the commission of the crime from June 24, 1981 to August 28, 1981 is
a formal amendment and would not prejudice the rights of the accused
because the nature of the offense of grave coercion would not be altered.
In that case, the difference in the date was only about two months and
five days, which difference, we ruled, would neither cause substantial
prejudice nor cause surprise on the part of the accused.
It is not even necessary to state in the complaint or information the
precise time at which the offense was committed except when time is a
material ingredient of the offense.24 The act may be alleged to have been
committed at any time as near as to the actual date at which date the
offense was committed, as the information will permit. Under the
circumstances, the precise time is not an essential ingredient of the crime
of homicide.
Having established that a change of date of the commission of a crime is
a formal amendment, we proceed to the next question of whether an
arraignment is necessary.
149
Arraignment is indispensable in bringing the accused to court and in
notifying him of the nature and cause of the accusations against him. The
importance of arraignment is based on the constitutional right of the
accused to be informed.25 Procedural due process requires that the
accused be arraigned so that he may be informed of the reason for his
indictment, the specific charges he is bound to face, and the
corresponding penalty that could be possibly meted against him. It is at
this stage that the accused, for the first time, is given the opportunity to
know the precise charge that confronts him. It is only imperative that he is
thus made fully aware of the possible loss of freedom, even of his life,
depending on the nature of the imputed crime.26
The need for arraignment is equally imperative in an amended
information or complaint. This however, we hastily clarify, pertains only to
substantial amendments and not to formal amendments that, by their
very nature, do not charge an offense different from that charged in the
original complaint or information; do not alter the theory of the
prosecution; do not cause any surprise and affect the line of defense; and
do not adversely affect the substantial rights of the accused, such as an
amendment in the date of the commission of the offense.
We further stress that an amendment done after the plea and during trial,
in accordance with the rules, does not call for a second plea since the
amendment is only as to form. The purpose of an arraignment, that is, to
inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, has already been attained when the accused was arraigned the first
time. The subsequent amendment could not have conceivably come as a
surprise to the accused simply because the amendment did not charge a
new offense nor alter the theory of the prosecution.
Applying these rules and principles to the prevailing case, the records of
the case evidently show that the amendment in the complaint was from
July 19, 1988 to June 19, 1988, or a difference of only one month. It is
clear that consistent with the rule on amendments and the jurisprudence
cited above, the change in the date of the commission of the crime of
homicide is a formal amendment - it does not change the nature of the
crime, does not affect the essence of the offense nor deprive the accused
of an opportunity to meet the new averment, and is not prejudicial to the
accused. Further, the defense under the complaint is still available after
the amendment, as this was, in fact, the same line of defenses used by
the petitioner. This is also true with respect to the pieces of evidence
presented by the petitioner. The effected amendment was of this nature
and did not need a second plea.
To sum up, we are satisfied after a review of the records of the case that
the prosecution has proven the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable
doubt. The constitutional presumption of innocence has been
successfully overcome.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision dated April
28, 2006, convicting the petitioner of the crime of homicide, is hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner Leticia I. Kummer.
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice * In lieu of Associate Justice Mariano C. del Castillo per Raffle
dated September 4, 2013.
WE CONCUR:
1
 Rollo, pp. 11-28; penned by Associate Justice Vicente S. F.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Veloso, and concurred in by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez,
Associate Justice Jr. and Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino.
Chairperson
2
 Id. at 85-94; penned by Judge Lyliha L. Abella-Aquino.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
BERNABE 3
 TSN, November 21, 1989, p. 6.
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
4
 Id. at 11.
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN*
Associate Justice 5
 Id. at 12.

ATTESTATION 6
 Id. at 13.

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in 7
 Ibid.
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division. 8
 Rollo, p. 82.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO 9
 People v. Perreras, 414 Phil. 480, 488 (2001).
Associate Justice
Chairperson

150
  People v. Quiming, G.R. No. 92847, May 21, 1993, 222 SCRA
10
Republic of the Philippines
371, 376. SUPREME COURT
Manila
 People v. Dumpe, G.R. Nos. 80110-11, March 22, 1990, 183
11

SCRA 547, 552. SECOND DIVISION

 People v. Marcelo, G.R. No. 105005, June 2, 1993, 223 SCRA

12
G.R. Nos. 172476-99               September 15, 2010
24, 36.
BRIG. GEN. (Ret.) JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., Petitioner,
 People v. Lucero, G.R. No. 179044, December 6, 2010, 636
13
vs.
SCRA 533, 540. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

14
 Rollo, p. 351. DECISION

15
 People v. Cadley, 469 Phil. 515, 524 (2004). CARPIO, J.:

16
 Villanueva v. Judge Estenzo, 159-A Phil. 674, 681 (1975). The Case

 People v. Canceran, G.R. No. 104866, January 31, 1994, 229

17
This is a special civil action for certiorari1 seeking to annul the 5 April
SCRA 581, 587. 2006 Resolution2 of the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division in Criminal Case
Nos. 25122-45. The assailed Resolution denied petitioner’s motion to set
18
 People v. Paragua, 326 Phil. 923, 929 (1996). aside his arraignment on 26 February 2006 pending resolution of his
motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause
19
 People v. Roncal, 338 Phil. 749, 755 (1997). against him.

20
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, Section 23. The Facts

21
 Rollo, p. 50. Petitioner Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr. was a retired officer of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP), with the rank of Brigadier General, when he
served as President of the AFP-Retirement and Separation Benefits
 People v. Casey, No. L-30146, February 24, 1981, 103 SCRA
22
System (AFP-RSBS) from 5 April 1994 to 27 July 1998.3
21, 31-32.
During petitioner’s term as president of AFP-RSBS, the Board of
23
 208 Phil. 234, 237-238 (1983).
Trustees of AFP-RSBS approved the acquisition of 15,020 square meters
of land situated in General Santos City for development as housing
24
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 110, Section 11. projects.4
25
 Id., Rule 115, Section 1(b). On 1 August 1997, AFP-RSBS, represented by petitioner, and Atty. Nilo
J. Flaviano, as attorney-in-fact of the 12 individual vendors,5 executed
26
 Borja v. Judge Mendoza, 168 Phil. 83, 87 (1977). and signed bilateral deeds of sale over the subject property, at the
151
agreed price of ₱10,500.00 per square meter. Petitioner forthwith caused
the payment to the individual vendors of the purchase price of
₱10,500.00 per square meter of the property.
Subsequently, Flaviano executed and signed unilateral deeds of sale
over the same property. The unilateral deeds of sale reflected a purchase
price of only ₱3,000.00 per square meter instead of the actual purchase
price of ₱10,500.00 per square meter. On 24 September 1997, Flaviano
presented the unilateral deeds of sale for registration. The unilateral
deeds of sale became the basis of the transfer certificates of title issued
by the Register of Deeds of General Santos City to AFP-RSBS.6
On 18 December 1997, Luwalhati R. Antonino, the Congresswoman
representing the first district of South Cotabato, which includes General
Santos City, filed in the Ombudsman a complaint-affidavit7 against
petitioner, along with 27 other respondents, for (1) violation of Republic
Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act; and (2) malversation of public funds or property through falsification
of public documents. The case was docketed as Case No. OMB-3-98-
0020.
After preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman, in its 20 January 1999
Resolution,8 found petitioner probably guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of
RA 3019 and falsification of public documents, thus:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Office finds and so holds
that the following crimes were committed and that respondents, whose
names appear below, are probably guilty thereof:
xxxx
4. JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., WILFREDO PABALAN, NILO FLAVIANO,
conspirators for twelve (12) counts of falsification of public documents
relative to the twelve (12) unilateral Deeds of Sale;
xxxx
6. JOSE RAMISCAL, JR. WILFREDO PABALAN, and NILO FLAVIANO
twelve (12) counts of violation of section 3(e) of RA 3019 for short-
changing the government in the correct amount of taxes due for the sale
of Lot X to AFP-RSBS;9
152
On 28 January 1999, the Ombudsman filed in the Sandiganbayan 12
informations10 for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and 12
informations11 for falsification of public documents against petitioner and
several other co-accused.
Petitioner filed his first motion for reconsideration dated 12 February
1999,12 with a supplemental motion dated 28 May 1999,13 of the
Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him. In its 11 June 1999
Order,14 the Sandiganbayan disposed of petitioner’s first motion for
reconsideration, thus:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution is given 60 days from today within which
to evaluate its evidence and to do whatever is appropriate on the Motion
for Reconsideration dated February 12, 1999 and supplemental motion
thereof dated May 28, 1999 of accused Jose Ramiscal and to inform this
Court within the said period as to its findings and recommendations
together with the action thereon of the Ombudsman.
In a memorandum dated 22 November 2001, the Office of the Special
Prosecutor (OMB-OSP) recommended that petitioner be excluded from
the informations. On review, the Office of Legal Affairs (OMB-OLA), in a
memorandum dated 18 December 2001, recommended the contrary,
stressing that petitioner participated in and affixed his signature on the
contracts to sell, bilateral deeds of sale, and various agreements,
vouchers, and checks for the purchase of the subject property. 15
The memoranda of OMB-OSP and OMB-OLA were forwarded for
comment to the Office of the Ombudsman for Military (OMB-Military). In a
memorandum dated 21 August 2002, the OMB-Military adopted the
memorandum of OMB-OSP recommending the dropping of petitioner’s
name from the informations. Acting Ombudsman Margarito Gervacio
approved the recommendation of the OMB-Military. However, the
recommendation of the OMB-Military was not manifested before the
Sandiganbayan as a final disposition of petitioner’s first motion for
reconsideration.
A panel of prosecutors16 was tasked to review the records of the case.
After thorough review, the panel of prosecutors found that petitioner
indeed participated in and affixed his signature on the contracts to sell,
bilateral deeds of sale, and various agreements, vouchers, and checks
for the purchase of the property at the price of ₱10,500.00 per square
meter. The panel of prosecutors posited that petitioner could not feign
ignorance of the execution of the unilateral deeds of sale, which indicated
the false purchase price of ₱3,000.00 per square meter. The panel of
prosecutors concluded that probable cause existed for petitioner’s
continued prosecution. In its 19 December 2005 memorandum, 17 the
panel of prosecutors recommended the following:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, undersigned prosecutors
recommend the following:
1. The August 2002 approved Recommendation of the
Ombudsman-Military be set aside and the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by Ramiscal (petitioner) be DENIED;
2. Another information for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 be
filed against Ramiscal and all the other accused for causing
damage to the government when it caused the payment of the
amount of Php 10,500.00 per square meter for the subject lots
when the actual amount should only be Php 3,000.00 per square
meter.18 (Emphasis supplied)
Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez approved the recommendation
of the panel of prosecutors. Upon receipt of the final findings of the
Ombudsman, the Sandiganbayan scheduled the arraignment of
petitioner.
Meanwhile, on 26 January 2006, petitioner filed his second motion for
reconsideration19 of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against
him.
On 26 February 2006, petitioner was arraigned. For his refusal to enter a
plea, the Sandiganbayan entered in his favor a plea of not guilty . On 9
March 2006, petitioner filed a motion to set aside his
arraignment20 pending resolution of his second motion for reconsideration
of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him.
The Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
The Sandiganbayan pointed out that petitioner’s second motion for
reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against
him was a prohibited pleading. The Sandiganbayan explained that
153
whatever defense or evidence petitioner may have should be ventilated in
the trial of the case. In its assailed 5 April 2006 Resolution, the
Sandiganbayan denied for lack of merit petitioner’s motion to set aside
his arraignment, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Set Aside Arraignment is hereby DENIED
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.21
The Issue
Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied
petitioner’s motion to set aside his arraignment pending resolution of his
second motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s finding of
probable cause against him?
The Court’s Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman should have excluded him from
the informations. He claims lack of probable cause to indict him
considering the prior findings of the Ombudsman recommending the
dropping of the cases against him. Petitioner claims that heads of offices
have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and that there
should be grounds other than the mere signature appearing on a
questioned document to sustain a conspiracy charge.
Respondent Sandiganbayan counters that it correctly denied petitioner’s
motion to set aside his arraignment. Respondent court argues that
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, filed on 26 January 2006 and
pending with the Ombudsman at the time of his arraignment, violated
Section 7, Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman, as amended. Respondent court maintains that the
memorandum of the panel of prosecutors finding probable cause against
petitioner was the final decision of the Ombudsman.
The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by
Administrative Order No. 15, Series of 2001, 22 sanction the immediate
filing of an information in the proper court upon a finding of probable
cause, even during the pendency of a motion for reconsideration. Section
7, Rule II of the Rules, as amended, provides:
Section 7. Motion for Reconsideration. –
a) Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation of an
approved order or resolution shall be allowed, the same to be
filed within five (5) days from notice thereof with the Office of the
Ombudsman, or the proper Deputy Ombudsman as the case may
be, with corresponding leave of court in cases where the
information has already been filed in court;
b) The filing of a motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation shall
not bar the filing of the corresponding information in Court on the
basis of the finding of probable cause in the resolution subject of
the motion. (Emphasis supplied)
If the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the resolution finding
probable cause cannot bar the filing of the corresponding information,
then neither can it bar the arraignment of the accused, which in the
normal course of criminal procedure logically follows the filing of the
information.
An arraignment is that stage where, in the mode and manner required by
the Rules, an accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity to
know the precise charge that confronts him. The accused is formally
informed of the charges against him, to which he enters a plea of guilty or
not guilty.23
Under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8493,24 otherwise known as the
Speedy Trial Act of 1998, the court must proceed with the arraignment of
an accused within 30 days from the filing of the information or from the
date the accused has appeared before the court in which the charge is
pending, whichever is later, thus:
Section 7. Time Limit Between Filing of Information and Arraignment and
Between Arraignment and Trial. - The arraignment of an accused shall
be held within thirty (30) days from the filing of the information, or
from the date the accused has appeared before the justice, judge or
154
court in which the charge is pending, whichever date last occurs. x x
x (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(g), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which implements Section 7
of RA 8493, provides:
Section 1. Arraignment and plea; how made. –
(g) Unless a shorter period is provided by special law or Supreme Court
circular, the arraignment shall be held within thirty (30) days from the
date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(g), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court and the last clause of
Section 7 of RA 8493 mean the same thing, that the 30-day period shall
be counted from the time the court acquires jurisdiction over the person
of the accused, which is when the accused appears before the court.
The grounds for suspension of arraignment are provided under Section
11, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which applies suppletorily in matters
not provided under the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman or the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, thus:
Sec. 11. Suspension of arraignment. – Upon motion by the proper party,
the arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental
condition which effectively renders him unable to fully understand
the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such
case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if
necessary, his confinement for such purpose.
(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is
pending at either the Department of Justice, or the Office of the
President; provided, that the period of suspension shall not
exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with
the reviewing office.25
Petitioner failed to show that any of the instances constituting a valid
ground for suspension of arraignment obtained in this case. Thus, the
Sandiganbayan committed no error when it proceeded with petitioner’s
arraignment, as mandated by Section 7 of RA 8493.
Further, as correctly pointed out by the Sandiganbayan in its assailed
Resolution, petitioner’s motion for reconsideration filed on 26 January
2006 was already his second motion for reconsideration of the
Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him. The Ombudsman,
in its 19 December 2005 memorandum, has already denied petitioner’s
first motion for reconsideration,26 impugning for the first time the
Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him. Under Section 7,
Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman,
petitioner can no longer file another motion for reconsideration
questioning yet again the same finding of the Ombudsman. Otherwise,
there will be no end to litigation.
We agree with the Sandiganbayan that petitioner’s defenses are
evidentiary in nature and are best threshed out in the trial of the case on
the merits. Petitioner’s claim that the Ombudsman made conflicting
conclusions on the existence of probable cause against him is baseless.
The memorandum of the OMB-Military, recommending the dropping of
the cases against petitioner, has been effectively overruled by the
memorandum of the panel of prosecutors, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, undersigned prosecutors
recommend the following:
1. The August 2002 approved Recommendation of the Ombudsman-
Military be set aside and the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
Ramiscal be DENIED;27 (Emphasis supplied)
As the final word on the matter, the decision of the panel of prosecutors
finding probable cause against petitioner prevails. This Court does not
ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman’s finding of probable
cause.28 The Ombudsman is endowed with a wide latitude of investigatory
and prosecutory prerogatives in the exercise of its power to pass upon
criminal complaints.29 As this Court succinctly stated in Alba v. Hon.
Nitorreda:30
155
Moreover, this Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the
exercise by the Ombudsman of his constitutionally mandated
investigatory and prosecutory powers. Otherwise stated, it is beyond the
ambit of this Court to review the exercise of discretion of the Ombudsman
in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it. Such initiative and
independence are inherent in the Ombudsman who, beholden to no one,
acts as the champion of the people and preserver of the integrity of the
public service.31
In Ocampo, IV v. Ombudsman,32 the Court explained the rationale behind
this policy, thus:
The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and
prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the
Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the
courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the
dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same
way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they could be
compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or
prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court
or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant. 33
Significantly, while it is the Ombudsman who has the full discretion to
determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in the
Sandiganbayan, once the case has been filed with said court, it is the
Sandiganbayan, and no longer the Ombudsman, which has full control of
the case.34
1avvphi1
In this case, petitioner failed to establish that the Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it denied petitioner’s motion to set aside his
arraignment. There is grave abuse of discretion when power is exercised
in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility so patent and gross as to amount to evasion
of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.35
Absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion, this Court will not interfere
with the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction and control over a case properly
filed before it. The Sandiganbayan is empowered to proceed with the trial
of the case in the manner it determines best conducive to orderly
proceedings and speedy termination of the case.36 There being no Associate Justice Associate Justice
showing of grave abuse of discretion on its part, the Sandiganbayan
should continue its proceedings with all deliberate dispatch. ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
We remind respondent to abide by this Court’s ruling in Republic v.
Sandiganbayan,37 where we stated that the mere filing of a petition for ATTESTATION
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court does not by itself merit a
suspension of the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan, unless a
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
issued against the Sandiganbayan. Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of
the Court’s Division.
Court so provides:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Section 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. – The court in which
Associate Justice
the petition [for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus] is filed may issue
Chairperson
orders expediting the proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction for the preservation of
the rights of the parties pending such proceedings. The petition shall CERTIFICATION
not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
against the public respondent from further proceeding in the Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
case. (Emphasis supplied) Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the assailed 5 April
2006 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 25122-45, RENATO C. CORONA
which denied petitioner’s motion to set aside his arraignment. This Chief Justice
Decision is immediately executory.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED. Footnotes

ANTONIO T. CARPIO * Designated additional member per Special Order No. 883 dated
Associate Justice 1 September 2010.

WE CONCUR: ** Designated additional member per Special Order No. 886

dated 1 September 2010.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.*
Associate Justice 1
 Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN**

156
  Rollo, pp. 264-269. Penned by Associate Justice Rodolfo A.
2 17
 Rollo, pp. 564-570.
Ponferrada, with Associate Justices Jose R. Hernandez (Acting
Chairman) and Roland B. Jurado (Sitting as Special Member per 18
 Id. at 570.
Administrative Order No. 25 dated 24 March 2006), concurring.
19
 Id. at 572-578.
3
 Id. at 338.
20
 Id. at 579-581.
4
 Id. at 565.
21
 Id. at 268.
5
 Alex Guaybar, Jack Guiwan, Mad Guaybar, Oliver Guaybar,
Jonathan Guaybar, Miguela Cabi-ao, Jose Rommel Saludar, Joel 22
 Signed on 16 February 2001.
Teves, Rico Altizo, Martin Saycon, Johnny Medillo, and Jolito
Poralan,
 Albert v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 164015, 26 February 2009,
23

580 SCRA 279.

6
 Rollo, p. 565.
 AN ACT TO ENSURE A SPEEDY TRIAL OF ALL CRIMINAL
24
7
 Id. at 359-375. CASES BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, MUNICIPAL TRIAL
8
 Id. at 393-425. COURT, AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT,
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER
9
 Id. at 423-424. PURPOSES. Approved on 12 February 1998.

10
 Id. at 426-461.  Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Effective 1 December
25

2000.
11
 Id. at 462-485.
 Dated 12 February 1999, with a supplemental motion for
26

12
 Id. at 498-525. reconsideration dated 28 May 1999.

13
 Id. at 526-559.
27
 Rollo, p. 570.

14
 Id. at 560.
28
 Venus v. Desierto, 358 Phil. 675 (1998).

15
 Id. at 561, 566.  Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Desierto, 445
29

Phil. 154 (2003).

16
 Consisting of Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor Wendell E.
Barreras-Sulit, Acting Director of the Prosecution Bureau John
30
 325 Phil. 229 (1996).
I.C. Turalba, and Assistant Special Prosecutor Almira A. Abella-
Orfanel. 31
 Id. at 244.

157
 32
 G.R. Nos. 103446-47, 30 August 1993, 225 SCRA 725. On June 26, 2004, an information for violation of Section 3(b) of R.A.
3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was filed against
33
 Id. at 730. petitioner and her co-accused Bonifacio C. Balahay. The information
alleged:
34
 Nava v. National Bureau of Investigation, 495 Phil. 354 (2005).
That on or about 08 August 2000 in the Municipality of Barobo, Surigao
 Fuentes, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 164865, 11
35 del Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
November 2005, 474 SCRA 779. above-named accused, BONIFACIO C. BALAHAY, then Mayor of the
Municipality of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, a high ranking public official, with
the use of his influence as such public official, committing the offense in
36
 Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, 444 Phil. 499 (2003).
relation to his office, together with JOCELYN CABO, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously receive and accept the amount of ONE
37
 G.R. No. 166859, 26 June 2006, 492 SCRA 74 HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SIXTY TWO PESOS
AND 31/100 (P104,162.31) from said JOCELYN CABO, Business
Manager of Orient Integrated Development Consultancy, Inc. (OIDCI), a
consultancy group charged with conducting a feasibility study for the
Community-Based Resource Management Project of the Municipality of
Barobo, with accused Cabo giving and granting the said amount to
accused Balahay in consideration of the said accused having officially
EN BANC intervened in the undertaking by the OIDCI of such contract for
consultancy services with the Municipality of Barobo.
G.R. No. 169509             June 16, 2006
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
JOCELYN E. CABO, Petitioner,
vs. Claiming that she was deprived of her right to a preliminary investigation
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, FOURTH DIVISION, THE SPECIAL as she never received any notice to submit a counter-affidavit or
PROSECUTOR OF THE OMBUDSMAN and THE COMMISSION ON countervailing evidence to prove her innocence, petitioner filed a motion
AUDIT, REGION XIII, Respondents. for reinvestigation2 before the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan,
where the case was raffled and docketed as Criminal Case No. 27959.
The Sandiganbayan subsequently granted petitioner’s motion on March
DECISION 29, 2004 and directed the Office of the Special Prosecutor to conduct a
reinvestigation insofar as petitioner is concerned. 3
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Meanwhile, petitioner filed a motion seeking the court’s permission to
This is a special civil action for certiorari filed by petitioner Jocelyn E. travel abroad for a family vacation. 4 The Sandiganbayan granted the
Cabo seeking to nullify the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan, Fourth same in an order dated May 14, 2004 that reads:
Division, dated May 4 and July 20, 2005 in Criminal Case No. 27959.
Acting on the Motion With Leave Of Court To Travel Abroad dated May
The following are the antecedent facts: 11, 2004 filed by accused Jocelyn E. Cabo through counsel, Atty. Tomas
N. Prado, and considering the well-taken reason therein stated, the same
is hereby GRANTED.
158
However, considering that this case is still pending reinvestigation/review
before the Office of the Special Prosecutor; considering further that the
accused has not yet been arraigned by reason thereof; and considering
finally that there is a need for the Court to preserve its authority to
conduct trial in absentia should the accused fail to return to the
Philippines, accused Jocelyn E. Cabo, with her express conformity, is
hereby ordered arraigned conditionally. If upon such
reinvestigation/review, it shall be found that there is no probable cause to
proceed against said accused, the conditional arraignment this morning
shall be with no force and effect. However, if it should be found that there
is a need to amend the present indictment or to pave the way for the filing
of some other indictment/s, then the accused shall waive her right to
object under Section 14, Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure and her constitutional right to be protected against double
jeopardy.
When arraigned, the Information having been read in a language known
and familiar to her, accused Jocelyn E. Cabo, duly assisted by her
counsel, Atty. Tomas N. Prado, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged
in the Information.
Accused Jocelyn E. Cabo, duly assisted by her counsel, shall affix her
signature in the minutes of the proceedings to signify her conformity to
her acceptance of the conditional arraignment and the legal
consequences thereof as herein explained.
SO ORDERED.5
Petitioner returned from abroad on May 24, 2004. Thereafter, the Special
Prosecutor concluded its reinvestigation and found probable cause to
charge her with violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019. 6 Petitioner filed
a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. 7 Thus, the
Sandiganbayan set anew the arraignment of petitioner and her co-
accused on October 12, 2004.8
On the day before the scheduled arraignment, petitioner filed an Urgent
Manifestation With Motion9 praying that "she be allowed to [re]iterate on
her previous plea of ‘not guilty’ x x x entered during her conditional
arraignment held last May 14, 2004, so that she may be excused from
attending the scheduled arraignment for October 12, 2004." It does not
appear, however, that the Sandiganbayan acted upon the said motion.
159
The following day, petitioner’s co-accused Balahay failed to appear for
arraignment. This prompted the Sandiganbayan to order the arrest of
Balahay as well the confiscation of his bail bond. 10 Upon motion for
reconsideration of Balahay, however, the Sandiganbayan recalled the
warrant for his arrest and reinstated the bail bond. 11 His arraignment was
subsequently reset for November 30, 2004.12
On November 24, 2004, Balahay, through counsel, filed a motion to
quash the information on the ground that the same does not charge any
offense.13 While Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 penalizes the act of
"(d)irectly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share,
percentage, or benefit, for himself or for another, from any person, in
connection with any transaction between the Government and any other
party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene
under the law," the information alleged only in general terms that Balahay
"intervened in the undertaking by the OIDCI of such contract for
consultancy services with the Municipality of Barobo." In other words, the
information failed to allege that Balahay had to intervene in the said
contract under the law, in his official capacity as municipal mayor.
On January 18, 2005, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution 14 sustaining
Balahay’s contention that the facts charged in the information do not
constitute the offense of violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019. Apart
from the failure to allege that Balahay had to officially intervene in the
transaction pursuant to law, it also failed to allege that Balahay accepted
and received the money "for himself or for another." The information was
thus defective in that it failed to allege every single fact necessary to
constitute all the elements of the offense charged.
The Sandiganbayan, however, did not order the immediate quashal of the
information. It held that under Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court,
"if the motion to quash is based on the ground that the facts charged in
the information do not constitute an offense x x x the (c)ourt should not
quash the information outright, but should instead direct the prosecution
to correct the defect therein by proper amendment. It is only when the
prosecution fails or refuses to undertake such amendment, or when
despite such amendment the information still suffers from the same vice
or defect,"15 that the court would be finally justified in granting the motion
to quash. The Sandiganbayan thus gave the prosecution a period of 15
days from notice within which to file an amended information that is
sufficient as to both form and substance.
On February 7, 2005, the prosecution filed an amended information
which incorporated all the essential elements of the crime charged, to wit:
That on or about 08 August 2000, in the Municipality of Barobo, Surigao
Del Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused BONIFACIO C. BALAHAY, then Mayor of the
Municipality of Barobo, Surigao Del Sur, a high ranking public official, in
the performance of his official functions, taking advantage of his official
position, with grave abuse of authority, and committing the offense in
relation to his office, conspiring and confederating with JOCELYN CABO,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously receive and accept
the amount of ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
SIXTY TWO PESOS AND 31/100 (P104,162.31) for his own benefit or
use from said JOCELYN CABO, Business Manager of Orient Integrated
Development Consultancy, Inc. (OIDC), a consultancy group charged
with conducting a feasibility study for the Community-Based Resource
Management Project of the Municipality of Barobo, with accused Cabo
giving and granting said amount to accused Balahay in consideration of
the contract for said feasibility study, which contract accused Balahay in
his official capacity has to intervene under the law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.16
Consequently, Balahay was sent a notice for his arraignment on the
amended information. Petitioner was likewise notified of her re-
arraignment which was set on April 14, 2005.17 However, on April 11,
2005, petitioner filed a Motion to Cancel Second Arraignment 18 on the
ground that the amended information pertained to Balahay alone.
Petitioner claimed that she could no longer be re-arraigned on the
amended information since substantial amendment of an information is
not allowed after a plea had already been made thereon.
On May 4, 2005, the Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed resolution
denying petitioner’s motion for lack of merit, to wit:
[T]he arraignment of accused Cabo on the original information was only
conditional in nature and that the same was resorted to as a mere
accommodation in her favor to enable her to travel abroad without this
Court losing its ability to conduct trial in absentia in the event she decides
to abscond. However, as clearly stated in the Court’s Order of May 14,
2004, accused Cabo agreed with the condition that should there be a
160
need to amend the information, she would thereby waive, not only her
right to object to the amended information, but also her constitutional
protection against double jeopardy. Now that the original information has
been superseded by an amended information, which was specifically filed
by the prosecution, and thereafter admitted by this Court, on the basis of
Section 4, Rule 117 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, accused
Cabo is already estopped from raising any objection thereto. 19
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration 20 from the foregoing resolution
on the additional ground that double jeopardy had already set in. She
asserted that her conditional arraignment under the original information
had been validated or confirmed by her formal manifestation dated
October 7, 2004, wherein she reiterated her plea of "not guilty." Thus, her
arraignment on the original information was no longer conditional in
nature such that double jeopardy would attach.
The Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in the
second assailed resolution dated July 20, 2005. 21 Consequently,
petitioner filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court alleging that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion in holding that her arraignment on the original information was
conditional in nature and that a re-arraignment on the amended
information would not put her in double jeopardy.
The issue here boils down to whether double jeopardy would attach on
the basis of the "not guilty" plea entered by petitioner on the original
information. She argues that it would, considering that her arraignment,
which was initially conditional in nature, was ratified when she confirmed
her "not guilty" plea by means of a written manifestation. In other words,
the trial court could no longer assert that she waived her right to the filing
of an amended information under the terms of her conditional
arraignment because she has, in effect, unconditionally affirmed the
same.
Petitioner’s assertions must fail.
Initially, it must be pointed out that the Sandiganbayan’s practice of
"conditionally" arraigning the accused pending reinvestigation of the case
by the Ombudsman is not specifically provided in the regular rules of
procedure.22 In People v. Espinosa,23 however, the Court tangentially
recognized the practice of "conditionally" arraigning the accused,
provided that the alleged conditions attached thereto should be
"unmistakable, express, informed and enlightened." The Court ventured
further by requiring that said conditions be expressly stated in the order
disposing of the arraignment. Otherwise, it was held that the arraignment
should be deemed simple and unconditional. 24
In the case at bar, the Sandiganbayan Order dated May 14, 2004
unequivocally set forth the conditions for petitioner’s arraignment pending
reinvestigation of the case as well as her travel abroad. Among the
conditions specified in said order is "if it should be found that there is a
need to amend the present indictment x x x, then the accused shall waive
her right to object under Section 14, Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure and her constitutional right to be protected against
double jeopardy." Petitioner was duly assisted by counsel during the
conditional arraignment and was presumably apprised of the legal
consequences of such conditions. In fact, she signed the minutes of the
proceedings which could only signify her informed acceptance of and
conformity with the terms of the conditional arraignment.
Thus, petitioner cannot now be allowed to turn her back on such
conditions on the pretext that she affirmed her conditional arraignment by
means of a written manifestation. To begin with, there is no showing that
the Sandiganbayan ruled on her written manifestation and motion that
she be allowed to merely confirm her previous plea on the original
information. It is likewise doubtful that petitioner may legally confirm her
conditional arraignment by means of a mere written motion or
manifestation. Section 1(b), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court explicitly
requires that "(t)he accused must be present at the arraignment and must
personally enter his plea."
At any rate, with or without a valid plea, still petitioner cannot rely upon
the principle of double jeopardy to avoid arraignment on the amended
information. It is elementary that for double jeopardy to attach, the case
against the accused must have been dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a
valid information sufficient in form and substance and the accused
pleaded to the charge.25 In the instant case, the original information to
which petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty" was neither valid nor
sufficient to sustain a conviction, and the criminal case was also neither
dismissed nor terminated. Double jeopardy could not, therefore, attach
161
even if petitioner is assumed to have been unconditionally arraigned on
the original charge.
It should be noted that the previous information in Criminal Case No.
27959 failed to allege all the essential elements of violation of Section
3(b), R.A. No. 3019. It, in fact, did not charge any offense and was, to all
intents and purposes, void and defective. A valid conviction cannot be
sustained on the basis of such information. Petitioner was resultantly not
placed in danger of being convicted when she entered her plea of "not
guilty" to the insufficient indictment.
Moreover, there was no dismissal or termination of the case against
petitioner. What the Sandiganbayan ordered was for the amendment of
the information pursuant to the express provision of Section 4, Rule 117,
which states:
SEC. 4. Amendment of complaint or information.- If the motion to quash
is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or information which can
be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be
made.
If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense, the prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity to
correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall be granted if the
prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the complaint or information
still suffers from the same defect despite the amendment. (Emphasis
supplied)
The Sandiganbayan correctly applied the foregoing provision when
petitioner’s co-accused filed a motion to quash the original information on
the ground that the same does not charge an offense. Contrary to
petitioner’s submission, the original information can be cured by
amendment even after she had pleaded thereto, since the amendments
ordered by the court below were only as to matters of form and not of
substance. The amendment ordered by the Sandiganbayan did not
violate the first paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, which provides:
SEC. 14. Amendment or substitution. – A complaint or information may
be amended, in form or in substance, without leave court, at any time
before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a
formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can
be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
xxxx
In Poblete v. Sandoval,26 the Court explained that an amendment is only
in form when it merely adds specifications to eliminate vagueness in the
information and does not introduce new and material facts. Amendment
of an information after the accused has pleaded thereto is allowed, if the
amended information merely states with additional precision something
which is already contained in the original information and which,
therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged.
In the case at bar, while certain elements of the crime charged were
missing in the indictment, the amended information did not change the
nature of the offense which is for violation of Section 3(b), R.A. No. 3019.
The amended information merely clarified the factual averments in the
accusatory portion of the previous information, in order to reflect with
definiteness the essential elements of the crime charged.
An examination of the two informations in this case would justify the
preceding observation. While the first information alleged that Balahay
committed the offense "with the use of his influence as such public
official" "together with" petitioner, the amended information stated that he
did so "in the performance of his official functions, taking advantage of his
official position, with grave abuse of authority" while "conspiring and
confederating" with petitioner. Then too, while it was averred previously
that Balahay received and accepted the money from petitioner, with the
latter "giving and granting the said amount to accused Balahay in
consideration of the said accused having officially intervened in the
undertaking by the OIDCI of such contract for consultancy services", the
amended information simply specified that Balahay received the money
"for his own benefit or use" and that the contract mentioned in the first
information was one that Balahay, "in his official capacity has to intervene
under the law."
Consequently, even if we treat petitioner’s arraignment on the original
information as "unconditional," the same would not bar the amendment of
the original information under Section 14, Rule 110. Re-arraignment on
the amended information will not prejudice petitioner’s rights since the
162
alterations introduced therein did not change the nature of the crime. As
held in People v. Casey:27
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment of an
information has been said to be whether a defense under the information
as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made,
and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally
applicable to the information in the one form as in the other. A look into
Our jurisprudence on the matter shows that an amendment to an
information introduced after the accused has pleaded not guilty thereto,
which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein, does not
expose the accused to a charge which could call for a higher penalty,
does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive
the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been
held to be one of form and not of substance – not prejudicial to the
accused and, therefore, not prohibited by Section 13 (now Section 14),
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Likewise, it is not necessary, as petitioner suggests, to dismiss the
original complaint under the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110,
which states:
xxxx
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made
in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original
complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper
offense in accordance with section 11, Rule 119, provided the accused
would not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the
witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
The afore-cited rule is inapplicable to the case at bar for the simple
reason that there was no mistake in charging the proper offense in the
original information. As correctly observed by the Sandiganbayan:
[I]t is hardly necessary for this Court to order the dismissal of the original
information and then direct the filing of a new one "charging the proper
offense". The reason for this is obvious. The prosecution did not commit
a mistake in charging the proper offense; rather, it merely failed to file an
information sufficient to charge the offense it intended to charge, namely,
violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019. Section 14, Rule 110 of the
2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure apparently relied upon by accused
Cabo contemplates a situation where the accused will be charged with an ANGELINA SANDOVAL-
offense different from or is otherwise not necessarily included in the ANTONIO T. CARPIO
GUTIERREZ
offense charged in the information to be dismissed by the Court. In the Asscociate Justice
Associate Justice
case at bar, however, accused Cabo will not be charged with a different
offense or with an offense that is not necessarily included in the offense
charged in the original information, but with the very same offense that
the prosecution intended to charge her in the first place, that is, violation MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-
RENATO C. CORONA
of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019. 28 MARTINEZ
Asscociate Justice
Associate Justice
All told, the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion
when it ordered the re-arraignment of petitioner on the amended
information. Double jeopardy did not attach by virtue of petitioner’s CONCHITA CARPIO- ROMEO J. CALLEJO,
"conditional arraignment" on the first information. It is well-settled that for MORALES SR.
a claim of double jeopardy to prosper, the following requisites must Associate Justice Asscociate Justice
concur: (1) there is a complaint or information or other formal charge
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the same is
filed before a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) there is a valid
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA
arraignment or plea to the charges; and (4) the accused is convicted or
Associate Justice Asscociate Justice
acquitted or the case is otherwise dismissed or terminated without his
express consent.29 The first and fourth requisites are not present in the
case at bar.
MINITA V. CHICO-
CANCIO C. GARCIA
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. NAZARIO
Asscociate Justice
Associate Justice
SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

WE CONCUR: CERTIFICATION

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby
Chief Justice certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court.
LEONARDO A.
REYNATO S. PUNO ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
QUISUMBING
Associate Justice Chief Justice
Asscociate Justice

163
 17
 Records, Vol. I, pp. 402-404.

18
 Rollo, pp. 60-63.
Footnotes
19
 Id. at 18-19
1
 Rollo, p. 34.
20
 Records, Vol. I, pp. 439-444.
2
 Records, Vol. I, pp. 71-74.
21
 Rollo, pp. 20-31.
3
 Id. at 139.
22
 See People v. Espinosa, 456 Phil. 507, 515 (2003).
4
 Id. at 169-170.
23
 Id.
 Id. at 191. Penned by Associate Justices Gregory S. Ong, Jose
5

R. Hernandez and Efren N. De la Cruz. 24

 Id. at 519.

6
 Id. at 215-223. 25
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 117, Sec. 7.

7
 Id. at 278-281. 26
 G.R. No. 150610, March 25, 2004, 426 SCRA 346, 356.

8
 Rollo, p. 36. 27
 No. L-30146, February 24, 1981, 103 SCRA 21, 31-32.

9
 Records, Vol. I, pp. 293-294. 28
 Rollo, pp. 29-30.

10
 Id. at 296.  Alonto v. People, G.R. No. 140078, December 9, 2004, 445
29

SCRA 624, 641.

11
 Id. at 312.

12
 Id. at 314. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
13
 Rollo, pp. 41-45.

 Id. at 46-56. Penned by Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong and

14

concurred in by Associate Justices Jose R. Hernandez and Republic of the Philippines

Rodolfo A. Ponferrada. SUPREME COURT
Manila
15
 Id. at 55.
THIRD DIVISION
16
 Id. at 57-58.
164
G.R. No. 192898               January 31, 2011
SPOUSES ALEXANDER TRINIDAD and CECILIA
TRINIDAD, Petitioners,
vs.
VICTOR ANG, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner spouses
Alexander Trinidad and Cecilia Trinidad (petitioners) to challenge our
Resolution of September 29, 2010. Our Resolution denied the petition for
review on certiorari for its failure to state the material dates of receipt of
the order1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 44, Masbate City,
and of filing the motion for reconsideration, in violation of Sections
4(b)2 and 5,3 Rule 45, in relation to Section 5(d),4 Rule 56 of the Rules of
Court.
Antecedent Facts
On September 3, 2007, the Office of the City Prosecutor, Masbate City,
issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an Information for
Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against the petitioners. On
October 10, 2007, the petitioners filed with the Department of Justice
(DOJ) a petition for review challenging this Resolution.
On March 3, 2009, the Office of the City Prosecutor filed before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Fifth Judicial Region, Masbate
City, an Information for Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against
the petitioners. As the case was covered by the Rules on Summary
Procedure, the MTCC ordered the petitioners to submit their counter
affidavits and to appear in court within 10 days from receipt of the said
order.
The petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion to Defer Arraignment and
Proceedings and Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrants of
Arrest5 praying, among others, for the deferment of their arraignment in
view of the pendency of their petition for review before the DOJ.
165
The MTCC, in its Order6 dated May 28, 2009, granted the motion,
"subject x x x to paragraph c[,] Section 11, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure." On August 10, 2009, the MTCC reconsidered this
order, and set the petitioners’ arraignment on September 10, 2009. 7
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC, docketed as
SCA No. 05-2009. The RTC, in its decision8 of January 6, 2010, denied
this petition. The petitioners moved to reconsider this decision, but the
RTC denied their motion in its order9 dated July 5, 2010.
The RTC held that the MTCC judge did not err in setting the arraignment
of the petitioners after the lapse of one (1) year and ten (10) months from
the filing of the petition for review with the DOJ. It explained that the
cases cited by the petitioners were decided before the amendment of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. After the amendment of the Rules
on December 1, 2000, the Supreme Court applied the 60-day limit on
suspension of arraignment in case of a pendency of a petition for review
with the DOJ.
The petitioners filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari
essentially claiming that the 60-day limit on suspension of arraignment is
only a general rule. They cited several cases to show that the
arraignment of an accused should be deferred until the petition for review
with the DOJ is resolved.
As earlier stated, we denied the petition for its failure to state the material
dates of receipt of the assailed RTC order and of filing the motion for
reconsideration.
The Motion for Reconsideration
In the present motion for reconsideration, the petitioners claim that the
date of receipt of the assailed RTC order was stated in the petition. The
petitioners further state that they filed the motion for reconsideration on
January 2, 2010.
The Court’s Ruling
We grant the motion for reconsideration and reinstate the petition for
review on certiorari.
A careful examination of the petition reveals that it stated the date when
the petitioners received a copy of the RTC’s assailed order. In addition,
the petitioners’ failure to state the material date of filing the motion for
reconsideration is only a formal requirement that warrants the relaxation
of the rules in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of
Court and in the interest of justice.
Nevertheless, we resolve to deny the petition for its failure to show any
reversible error in the challenged RTC order.
lapsed. This period was way beyond the 60-day limit provided for by the
Rules.
In addition, the cases cited by the petitioners – Solar Team
Entertainment, Inc. v. How,11 Roberts, Jr. v. CA,12 and Dimatulac v.
Villon13 – were all decided prior to the amendment to Section 11 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which took effect on December 1,
2000. At the time these cases were decided, there was no 60-day limit on
the suspension of arraignment. 1âwphi1

The grounds for suspension of arraignment are provided under Section WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:
11, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
(1) GRANT the present motion for reconsideration, and
SEC. 11. Suspension of Arraignment. – Upon motion by the proper party, REINSTATE the petition for review on certiorari; and
the arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases:
(2) DENY the said petition for petitioners’ failure to show any
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental reversible error in the challenged RTC order.
condition which effectively renders him unable to fully understand
the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such SO ORDERED.
case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if
necessary, his confinement for such purpose; ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and
WE CONCUR:
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is
pending at either the Department of Justice, or the Office of the CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
President; Provided, that the period of suspension shall not Associate Justice
exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with
the reviewing office.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
In Samson v. Daway,10 the Court explained that while the pendency of a
petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the
aforecited provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It Associate Justice
follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial court is
bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment. ATTESTATION

In the present case, the petitioners filed their petition for review with the I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in
DOJ on October 10, 2007. When the RTC set the arraignment of the consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
petitioners on August 10, 2009, 1 year and 10 months had already the Court’s Division.

166
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES xxxx
Associate Justice
Chairperson (d) Failure to comply with the requirements regarding
proof of service and contents of and the documents which
CERTIFICATION should accompany the petition[.]

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division 5
 Rollo, pp. 24-28.
Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was 6
 Id. at 30.
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
7
 Id. at 31-33.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice 8
 Copy of the RTC decision is not attached to the rollo.

9
 Rollo, pp. 21-22.

10
 G.R. Nos. 160054-55, July 21, 2004, 434 SCRA 612.
Footnotes
11
 G.R. No. 140863, August 22, 2000, 338 SCRA 511.
1
 Dated July 5, 2010.
12
 G.R. No. 113930, March 5, 1996, 254 SCRA 307.
2
 SECTION 4. Contents of petition. – The petition shall be filed in
eighteen (18) copies, with the original copy intended for the court 13
 G.R. No. 127107, October 12, 1998, 297 SCRA 679.
being indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall x x x (b)
indicate the material dates showing when notice of the judgment
or final order or resolution subject thereof was received, when a
motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed and when
notice of the denial thereof was received[.]

3
 SECTION 5. Dismissal or denial of petition. – The failure of the
petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements
regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees,
deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents
of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall
be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.

4
 SECTION 5. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. – The appeal may
be dismissed motu proprio or on motion of the respondent on the
following grounds:

167