AGRT02 21 Guide To Road Tunnels Part 2 Planning Design Commissioning

Guide to Road Tunnels Part 2:
Planning, Design and Commissioning
Sydney 2021
Guide to Road Tunnels Part 2: Planning, Design and Commissioning
Edition 3.0 prepared by: Les Louis, Michael Tziotis, Tony Peglas, Lauren Publisher
Thompson and Dickson Leow Austroads Ltd.
Level 9, 287 Elizabeth Street
Edition 3.0 project manager: Nigel Lloyd Sydney NSW 2000 Australia
Phone: +61 2 8265 3300
Abstract austroads@austroads.com.au
www.austroads.com.au
The Guide to Road Tunnels Part 2 provides guidance to those making
decisions in the planning, design, operation and maintenance of new road
tunnels in Australia and New Zealand. Principles and standards identified are About Austroads
based on both Australasian and international experience.
Austroads is the peak organisation of Australasian
Part 2 sets out the Austroads expectations regarding appropriate design for road transport and traffic agencies.
road tunnels. It discusses all aspects of planning, design and commissioning
of road tunnels including structural and geotechnical requirements, fire and Austroads’ purpose is to support our member
life safety, ventilation, lighting, traffic monitoring and control, plant monitoring organisations to deliver an improved Australasian
and control, electrical power supply and the requirements for associated road transport network. To succeed in this task, we
building structures. undertake leading-edge road and transport
research which underpins our input to policy
It is expected that the Guide will be used by engineers and technical development and published guidance on the
specialists in tunnel technology working on the planning, design and operation design, construction and management of the road
of road tunnels, proponents of road tunnel solutions, senior decision makers network and its associated infrastructure.
(in an overview role) and regulators in the various jurisdictions associated with
the construction of tunnels. Austroads provides a collective approach that
delivers value for money, encourages shared
Keywords knowledge and drives consistency for road users.
Tunnel characteristics, risk analysis, design criteria, structural requirements, Austroads is governed by a Board consisting of
geometric design, pavement design, noise, visual amenity, air quality, water senior executive representatives from each of its
quality, drainage, pollution control, fire safety, ventilation, lighting, electrical eleven member organisations:
supply, monitoring and control, operations management and control, traffic • Transport for NSW
management and control, communications, plant management and control,
services buildings and plant rooms, construction issues, tunnel • Department of Transport Victoria
commissioning. • Queensland Department of Transport and Main
Roads
Edition 3.0 February 2021
• Main Roads Western Australia
This edition includes: • Department for Infrastructure and Transport
• a systems engineering framework for delivery of new tunnels South Australia
• a standardised approach to collecting incident and crash data in and • Department of State Growth Tasmania
around tunnels • Department of Infrastructure, Planning and
• updated information related to: designing for vehicles using alternative Logistics Northern Territory
fuels; designing for security and safety; sustainability; energy efficiency; • Transport Canberra and City Services
LED lighting systems; emergency egress signage; human factors Directorate, Australian Capital Territory
considerations; ventilation assessment criteria.
• Department of Infrastructure, Transport,
Edition 2.1 published March 2019 Regional Development and Communications
Edition 2.0 published November 2015
• Australian Local Government Association
Edition 1.0 published November 2010
• New Zealand Transport Agency.
© Austroads Ltd 2021

ISBN 978-1-922382-43-6
This work is copyright. Apart from any use as
Austroads Project No. ART6151 Pages 165 permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part
Austroads Publication No. AGRT02-21 may be reproduced by any process without
the prior written permission of Austroads.
This Guide is produced by Austroads as a general guide. Its application is discretionary. Road authorities may vary their practice
according to local circumstances and policies. Austroads believes this publication to be correct at the time of printing and does not
accept responsibility for any consequences arising from the use of information herein. Readers should rely on their own skill and
judgement to apply information to particular issues.
Acknowledgements
Edition 1.0 and 2.0 prepared by: Les Louis. Edition 1.0 project managed by Ricky Cox and edition 2.0 by Mohamed
Nooru-Mohamed. The authors acknowledge the role and contribution of members of the Austroads Road Tunnels Task Force and its
invitees in providing guidance and information during the preparation of this guide. The authors also wish to acknowledge the
contributions made by members of the Guide review Project Team which included Dr Richard Yeo, Dr Anna Chevalier and Tia
Gaffney from ARRB.
Contents
1. Introduction............................................................................................................................................. 1
1.1. Structure of the Guide to Road Tunnels ................................................................................................... 1
1.2. Purpose of the Guide ............................................................................................................................... 1
1.3. Scope of the Guide to Road Tunnels Part 2 ............................................................................................ 1
1.4. Safe System ............................................................................................................................................. 2
2. Systems Engineering Framework......................................................................................................... 3

2.1. Overall Approach ...................................................................................................................................... 3
2.2. Designing for Operations .......................................................................................................................... 3
2.3. Engineering Life Cycle ............................................................................................................................. 4
2.4. Systems Engineering Activities ................................................................................................................ 5
2.4.1. Project Planning ........................................................................................................................ 6
2.5. Operational Concepts ............................................................................................................................... 6
2.5.1. Needs Assessment and Concept Definition ............................................................................. 6
2.5.2. Stakeholder Requirements ....................................................................................................... 6
2.5.3. Concept of Operations .............................................................................................................. 7
2.6. System Requirements Definition and Management ................................................................................. 7
2.6.1. System Requirements Definition............................................................................................... 7
2.6.2. Requirements Management...................................................................................................... 7
2.7. Architecture Definition .............................................................................................................................. 8
2.8. System Integration.................................................................................................................................... 8
2.9. Verification and Validation ........................................................................................................................ 9
2.9.1. Verification ................................................................................................................................ 9
2.9.2. Validation .................................................................................................................................. 9
2.10. Human Factors ......................................................................................................................................... 9
2.11. Safety ..................................................................................................................................................... 10
2.12. Guidance on Systems Engineering Outputs .......................................................................................... 10
3. General Design Requirements ............................................................................................................ 13

3.1. Road Tunnel Characteristics .................................................................................................................. 13
3.2. Overall Design Considerations ............................................................................................................... 13
3.2.1. General ................................................................................................................................... 13
3.2.2. Passage of Dangerous Goods ................................................................................................ 15
3.2.3. Human Factors Considerations .............................................................................................. 15
3.2.4. Providing for Autonomous Vehicles ........................................................................................ 17
3.2.5. Alternative Fuel Vehicles ........................................................................................................ 17
3.2.6. Designing for Safety and Security........................................................................................... 19
3.3. Risk Analysis in the Planning and Design Stage ................................................................................... 20
3.3.1. The Planning Phase ................................................................................................................ 20
3.3.2. The Design Phase .................................................................................................................. 21
3.4. Design Criteria ........................................................................................................................................ 22
3.4.1. Design Life and Optimum Life-cycle Cost ............................................................................... 22
3.4.2. Serviceability ........................................................................................................................... 23
3.4.3. Durability ................................................................................................................................. 23
3.4.4. Sustainability ........................................................................................................................... 26
3.5. Energy Efficiency .................................................................................................................................... 26
3.6. Maintenance Requirements ................................................................................................................... 27
3.7. Design Methodology and Documentation .............................................................................................. 27
3.8. Design Validation During Construction .................................................................................................. 28
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4. Structural Requirements ..................................................................................................................... 29

4.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 29
4.1.1. Role of the Structure ............................................................................................................... 29
4.1.2. Designing for Safe Construction and Use ............................................................................... 29
4.1.3. Additional Design Requirements............................................................................................. 29
4.2. The Support Function ............................................................................................................................. 30
4.3. Design for Fire and Fire Resistance ....................................................................................................... 30
4.4. Live Load Capacity ................................................................................................................................. 31
4.4.1. General ................................................................................................................................... 31
4.4.2. Permissible Development and Live Loading above the Tunnel and within
the Easement Area ................................................................................................................. 32
4.4.3. Permissible Excavation within the Easement Area................................................................. 32
4.4.4. Vehicle-induced Wind-suction................................................................................................. 32
4.5. Potential Surface Settlement due to Tunnelling ..................................................................................... 33
4.6. Tunnel Seismic Design ........................................................................................................................... 33
5. Geometric Design ................................................................................................................................. 35

5.1. General ................................................................................................................................................... 35
5.2. Sight Distance in Tunnels ....................................................................................................................... 35
5.3. Operating Speed .................................................................................................................................... 36
5.4. Horizontal Alignment .............................................................................................................................. 37
5.5. Vertical Alignment................................................................................................................................... 37
5.5.1. General ................................................................................................................................... 37
5.5.2. Vertical Curves ........................................................................................................................ 38
5.5.3. Grades .................................................................................................................................... 38
5.6. Cross-section.......................................................................................................................................... 39
5.6.1. General ................................................................................................................................... 39
5.6.2. Lane Widths ............................................................................................................................ 39
5.6.3. Shoulder Widths ...................................................................................................................... 39
5.6.4. Crossfalls ................................................................................................................................ 40
5.6.5. Auxiliary Lanes ........................................................................................................................ 40
5.6.6. Emergency Stopping Lanes .................................................................................................... 40
5.6.7. Vehicle Refuges for Tunnel Incidents ..................................................................................... 41
5.6.8. Provision for Evacuation ......................................................................................................... 41
5.6.9. Emergency Equipment Cabinets ............................................................................................ 41
5.6.10. Escape Routes ........................................................................................................................ 41
5.6.11. Traffic Barriers......................................................................................................................... 42
5.6.12. Working Width ......................................................................................................................... 43
5.6.13. Tunnel Envelope and Vehicle Clearance ................................................................................ 43
5.7. Ramp Connections/Diverges and Merges ............................................................................................. 45
5.8. Emergency and Maintenance Facilities.................................................................................................. 45
5.8.1. Vehicle Crossovers ................................................................................................................. 45
5.8.2. Turning Bays ........................................................................................................................... 45
5.8.3. Emergency Services Access and Parking .............................................................................. 46
6. Pavement Design.................................................................................................................................. 51
6.1. General ................................................................................................................................................... 51
6.2. Tunnel Structure and Pavement ............................................................................................................. 51
6.3. Health and Safety in Design ................................................................................................................... 54
6.4. Pavement Design Period ........................................................................................................................ 54
6.5. Design Traffic ......................................................................................................................................... 54
6.6. Pavement Wearing Surface ................................................................................................................... 55
6.7. Construction and Maintenance Considerations ..................................................................................... 56
6.8. Tunnel Environment ............................................................................................................................... 56
6.9. Subgrade Evaluation .............................................................................................................................. 57
6.10. Surface and Subsurface Drainage ......................................................................................................... 57
6.11. Pavement Materials ................................................................................................................................ 58
6.12. Design of Pavement ............................................................................................................................... 58
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7. Environmental Considerations ........................................................................................................... 60

7.1. Noise ...................................................................................................................................................... 60
7.1.1. Tunnel-generated External Noise ........................................................................................... 60
7.1.2. In-tunnel Noise ........................................................................................................................ 60
7.1.3. Traffic Noise ............................................................................................................................ 60
7.2. Visual Amenity Considerations ............................................................................................................... 61
7.2.1. General Considerations .......................................................................................................... 61
7.2.2. Portal Design........................................................................................................................... 64
7.2.3. Transition Zones ..................................................................................................................... 65
7.2.4. Internal Tunnel Design ............................................................................................................ 66
7.2.5. External Structures ................................................................................................................. 67
7.3. Air Quality ............................................................................................................................................... 69
7.3.1. Internal Tunnel Requirements................................................................................................. 69
7.3.2. External Air Quality Requirements .......................................................................................... 69
7.4. Water Quality .......................................................................................................................................... 70
8. Drainage Design ................................................................................................................................... 71

8.1. General ................................................................................................................................................... 71
8.2. Drainage Systems .................................................................................................................................. 72
8.2.1. Overall Requirements ............................................................................................................. 72
8.2.2. Sumps, Separators and Pumping Stations ............................................................................. 73
8.2.3. Pumping Plant ......................................................................................................................... 74
8.2.4. Discharge Piping ..................................................................................................................... 75
8.2.5. Safety Requirements in Sumps .............................................................................................. 76
8.3. Water Table Requirements .................................................................................................................... 76
8.4. Pollution Control ..................................................................................................................................... 77
8.5. Calculation of Inflows.............................................................................................................................. 77
8.5.1. General ................................................................................................................................... 77
8.5.2. Rainfall and Stormwater Run-off ............................................................................................. 77
8.5.3. Ground Water.......................................................................................................................... 78
8.5.4. Wall Washing .......................................................................................................................... 78
8.5.5. Accidental Spillage .................................................................................................................. 78
8.5.6. Fire Suppression System ........................................................................................................ 78
8.5.7. Accidental Rupture of Pumped Drainage ............................................................................... 78
8.5.8. Flood Protection ...................................................................................................................... 79
8.5.9. External Hydraulic Impacts ..................................................................................................... 79
8.6. Aquaplaning ............................................................................................................................................ 79
9. Fire Safety ............................................................................................................................................. 80

9.1. Overall Approach .................................................................................................................................... 80
9.2. Design Development .............................................................................................................................. 81
9.2.1. General Approach ................................................................................................................... 81
9.2.2. Prevention ............................................................................................................................... 83
9.2.3. Evacuation .............................................................................................................................. 83
9.2.4. Emergency Egress Signage ................................................................................................... 85
9.2.5. Evacuation Messaging ............................................................................................................ 86
10. Ventilation Design ................................................................................................................................ 87

10.1. General ................................................................................................................................................... 87
10.1.1. Overall Requirements ............................................................................................................. 87
10.1.2. Assessing Ventilation Needs .................................................................................................. 87
10.1.3. Mechanical Ventilation ............................................................................................................ 88
10.1.4. Performance Objectives .......................................................................................................... 88
10.1.5. Factors Affecting Ventilation System Performance ................................................................ 89
10.2. Systems of Tunnel Ventilation ................................................................................................................ 89
10.3. Air Quality Management ......................................................................................................................... 90
10.3.1. Internal Tunnel Requirements................................................................................................. 90
10.3.2. External Air Quality ................................................................................................................. 90
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10.4. Fans ........................................................................................................................................................ 94

10.4.1. Axial Fans ............................................................................................................................... 94
10.4.2. Centrifugal Fans ...................................................................................................................... 94
10.4.3. Jet Fans .................................................................................................................................. 94
10.4.4. Fan Reversibility...................................................................................................................... 95
10.4.5. Noise ....................................................................................................................................... 96
10.4.6. Ventilation System Safeguards ............................................................................................... 96
11. Lighting Design .................................................................................................................................... 97

11.1. Overview ................................................................................................................................................. 97
11.1.1. Solid State Lighting ................................................................................................................. 98
11.2. Lighting Zones ........................................................................................................................................ 99
11.3. Spacing and Location of Luminaires ...................................................................................................... 99
11.3.1. General ................................................................................................................................... 99
11.3.2. Centrally Mounted Luminaires ................................................................................................ 99
11.3.3. Side Mounted Luminaires ..................................................................................................... 100
11.3.4. Visual Flicker ......................................................................................................................... 100
11.4. Surface Reflectance ............................................................................................................................. 100
11.5. Other Requirements ............................................................................................................................. 101
11.5.1. Essential Lighting Supply ...................................................................................................... 101
11.5.2. Emergency and Egress Passage Lighting ............................................................................ 101
11.5.3. Luminaire Enclosures ........................................................................................................... 102
11.5.4. Lighting Control ..................................................................................................................... 102
11.5.5. Measurement of Lighting Performance ................................................................................. 102
12. Electrical Supply Design ................................................................................................................... 103

12.1. General ................................................................................................................................................. 103
12.2. Tunnel Electrical Supply System .......................................................................................................... 103
12.2.1. General ................................................................................................................................. 103
12.2.2. Security of Supply ................................................................................................................. 104
12.2.3. Design and Maintenance ...................................................................................................... 104
12.2.4. Electromagnetic Fields Minimisation..................................................................................... 105
12.2.5. Energy Efficiency .................................................................................................................. 105
12.3. High Voltage System ............................................................................................................................ 105
12.4. Low Voltage System ............................................................................................................................. 105
12.4.1. Protection Systems ............................................................................................................... 105
12.5. Uninterruptible Power Supply ............................................................................................................... 106
12.5.1. General ................................................................................................................................. 106
12.5.2. Essential Loads Network ...................................................................................................... 106
12.5.3. Types of UPS ........................................................................................................................ 106
12.5.4. UPS Design Parameters ....................................................................................................... 106
12.5.5. Back-up Generating Equipment ............................................................................................ 107
12.6. Cabling ................................................................................................................................................. 107
13. Design for Monitoring and Control ................................................................................................... 108

13.1. Operations Management and Control Systems ................................................................................... 108
13.1.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 108
13.1.2. Operator Interface ................................................................................................................. 109
13.1.3. Response Procedures .......................................................................................................... 109
13.1.4. Trainer and Back-up System ................................................................................................ 109
13.1.5. Report and Logging Requirements ....................................................................................... 110
13.1.6. Reliability and Availability ...................................................................................................... 110
13.1.7. Performance Requirements .................................................................................................. 110
13.1.8. Scope for Future Development of the OMCS ....................................................................... 111
13.2. Motorway Operations and Maintenance Centre ................................................................................... 111
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13.3. Traffic Monitoring and Control System ................................................................................................. 112

13.3.1. General ................................................................................................................................. 112
13.3.2. Regulatory Signs ................................................................................................................... 113
13.3.3. Tunnel Information Signs System ......................................................................................... 113
13.3.4. Lane Control System ............................................................................................................ 114
13.3.5. Variable Speed Limit (VSL) System...................................................................................... 114
13.3.6. Ramp Control Signs System ................................................................................................. 115
13.3.7. Variable Message Signing System ....................................................................................... 115
13.3.8. Tunnel Closures .................................................................................................................... 116
13.3.9. Remotely Controlled Barriers ................................................................................................ 118
13.3.10. Traffic Monitoring .................................................................................................................. 118
13.3.11. Closed Circuit Television ...................................................................................................... 119
13.3.12. Automatic Incident Detection ................................................................................................ 120
13.3.13. Crash and Vehicle Incident Data Collection ......................................................................... 121
13.4. Directional Signing System .................................................................................................................. 121
13.5. Communications System ...................................................................................................................... 122
13.5.1. General ................................................................................................................................. 122
13.5.2. Radio Re-broadcast .............................................................................................................. 123
13.5.3. Emergency Services Communications ................................................................................. 123
13.5.4. Public Address System ......................................................................................................... 123
13.5.5. Help Phones/Motorist Emergency Telephone System .........................................................123
13.5.6. Mobile Telephones Re-broadcast ......................................................................................... 124
13.6. Plant Management and Control System............................................................................................... 124
13.7. Tunnel Network Communication System ............................................................................................. 124
14. Services Buildings and Plant Rooms ............................................................................................... 125

14.1. General ................................................................................................................................................. 125
14.2. Design and Layout................................................................................................................................ 125
14.2.1. Space and Provision Requirements...................................................................................... 125
14.2.2. Cable and Equipment Separation ......................................................................................... 126
14.2.3. Future Maintenance .............................................................................................................. 126
14.3. Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning ............................................................................................. 126
14.4. Floor Loading........................................................................................................................................ 126
14.5. Lightning Protection .............................................................................................................................. 126
14.6. Building Security and Fire Protection ................................................................................................... 126
14.6.1. Intruder Alarm System .......................................................................................................... 126
14.6.2. Fire Alarm and Extinguishing Systems ................................................................................. 126
15. Construction Issues ........................................................................................................................... 127

15.1. Overview ............................................................................................................................................... 127
15.2. Responsibility of Designers .................................................................................................................. 128
15.3. Design Review for Construction ........................................................................................................... 129
15.4. Ventilation System for Construction ..................................................................................................... 129
15.5. Vibration ............................................................................................................................................... 130
16. Tunnel Commissioning ...................................................................................................................... 132

16.1. General ................................................................................................................................................. 132
16.2. The Commissioning Plan ..................................................................................................................... 132
16.2.1. Overall Requirements ........................................................................................................... 132
16.2.2. Personnel .............................................................................................................................. 133
16.2.3. Testing and Commissioning Protocol ................................................................................... 133
16.2.4. Acceptance Criteria ............................................................................................................... 133
16.2.5. Corrective Actions ................................................................................................................. 133
16.2.6. Documentation ...................................................................................................................... 133
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16.3. Testing and Commissioning of System Components .......................................................................... 134

16.3.1. Overall Requirements ........................................................................................................... 134
16.3.2. Fire Safety System ................................................................................................................ 135
16.3.3. Ventilation System Validation ............................................................................................... 135
16.3.4. Electrical Supply Validation ................................................................................................... 136
16.3.5. Lighting System Validation .................................................................................................... 136
16.3.6. Drainage Validation ............................................................................................................... 136
16.3.7. System Integration ................................................................................................................ 136
16.4. Commissioning Records ...................................................................................................................... 136
16.4.1. General ................................................................................................................................. 136
16.4.2. Inspection Checklists ............................................................................................................ 137
16.4.3. As-built Records .................................................................................................................... 137
16.4.4. Manuals Required ................................................................................................................. 137
16.5. Operational Readiness ......................................................................................................................... 139
16.5.1. General ................................................................................................................................. 139
16.5.2. Infrastructure Readiness ....................................................................................................... 139
16.5.3. Personnel Readiness ............................................................................................................ 139
16.5.4. Documentation Readiness .................................................................................................... 140
16.6. Continuous Improvement ..................................................................................................................... 140
References .............................................................................................................................................. 141
Appendix A Horizontal Curves and Sight Distance .............................................................................. 149
Appendix B General Classification of Ventilation Systems ................................................................ 151
Appendix C Recommended Egress Signage ........................................................................................ 154
Appendix D Typical Egress Signage Schematics ................................................................................ 164
Tables
Table 2.1: Proposed systems engineering outputs .................................................................................. 11
Table 3.1: Key differences of alternative fuel vehicle types ..................................................................... 18
Table 13.1: Performance requirements ................................................................................................... 111
Table 13.2: Proposed Electronic Regulatory Speed (ERSS) size requirements .....................................113
Table A 1: Minimum radius curve to provide car SSD (m) ..................................................................... 149
Table A 2: Minimum radius curve to provide truck SSD on left-hand curve ...........................................150
Table A 3: Minimum radius curve to provide truck SSD on right-hand curve (m) ..................................150
Table C 1: Recommended egress signage ............................................................................................ 154
Figures
Figure 2.1: Alignment with capital project development life cycle tasks ..................................................... 4
Figure 2.2: The systems engineering ‘vee’ model....................................................................................... 5
Figure 3.1: Tunnel walls with different contrasts ....................................................................................... 16
Figure 5.1: Identifying the escape route (CityLink tunnel, Melbourne) .....................................................42
Figure 5.2: Exit ramps in tunnels ............................................................................................................... 47
Figure 5.3: Exit ramps – major diverge and secondary exit on a ramp in tunnels ....................................48
Figure 5.4: Entry ramps in tunnels ............................................................................................................ 49
Figure 5.5: Branch connections in tunnels ................................................................................................ 50
Figure 6.1: Typical cross-section of a drained mined tunnel and the pavement is placed onto the
floor of the tunnel .................................................................................................................... 52
Figure 6.2: A mined tunnel under construction with the walls and ceiling being tanked before
concrete is placed ................................................................................................................... 52
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Figure 6.3: A circular (left) and elliptical (right) tunnel cross-section with common backfill profiles .........53
Figure 6.4: Cross-section of a no cell and centre cell immersed tube tunnel where the floor of the
tunnel becomes the pavement ................................................................................................ 53
Figure 6.5: Typical section through a cut-and-cover tunnel with a thick reinforced concrete
pavement ................................................................................................................................ 54
Figure 6.6: View of a wet patch and staining from a water leak occurring from the ceiling of the
tunnel ...................................................................................................................................... 56
Figure 6.7: All surface drainage pit covers should be located in the shoulder and not in the
trafficable lane ......................................................................................................................... 58
Figure 6.8: Typical pavement profile of CRCP base layer, AC7 asphalt interlayer and no fines
concrete subbase for drained tunnel ...................................................................................... 59
Figure 7.1: Portal and transition design – EastLink tunnel, Victoria .........................................................62
Figure 7.2: Entrance to Heysen tunnels – South Australia ....................................................................... 63
Figure 7.3: Entrance to the Lane Cove tunnel – Sydney .......................................................................... 63
Figure 7.4: Tunnel entrances in Austria .................................................................................................... 64
Figure 7.5: Japanese tunnel portal ............................................................................................................ 65
Figure 7.6: Typical tunnel interior .............................................................................................................. 67
Figure 7.7: Cross-city tunnel ventilation Sydney ....................................................................................... 68
Figure 7.8: Lane Cove tunnel ventilation Sydney...................................................................................... 68
Figure 9.1: HRR plot of fire from FCV compared to conventional vehicle ................................................82
Figure 10.1: ‘Idealised’ concentration profile in a longitudinal ventilated tunnel (reality may be
substantially more complex) ................................................................................................... 91
Figure 10.2: Illustrative schematic of an outlet near an exit portal .............................................................. 92
Figure 10.3: Example of multiple outlets for air exchange system.............................................................. 92
Figure 10.4: Schematic example of slots in the roof, including sound attenuators .....................................93
Figure 10.5: Natural ventilation by using large gaps ................................................................................... 93
Figure 10.6: Natural ventilation by using small repeating gaps in the roof .................................................93
Figure 11.1: Solid State Lighting with adaptive controls ............................................................................. 98
Figure 11.2: The zones in a long tunnel ...................................................................................................... 99
Figure 11.3: Example of light reflected from wall and road surfaces ........................................................101
Figure 13.1: An example of a tunnel closure treatment utilising boom gates, signals and signs .............117
Figure 13.2: Tunnel closures – signal aspects .......................................................................................... 118
Figure 13.3: Nonstandard sign shapes ..................................................................................................... 122
Figure 15.1: Tunnel under construction (CityLink tunnel, Melbourne) ......................................................128
Figure 15.2: Tunnel boring machine – Clem 7 tunnel Brisbane ................................................................ 130
Figure B 1: Longitudinal ventilation with jet fans ..................................................................................... 151
Figure B 2: Longitudinal ventilation with saccardo nozzle ....................................................................... 151
Figure B 3: Semi-transverse ventilation: during normal operating conditions: fresh air injection ............151
Figure B 4: Semi-transverse ventilation with remotely controlled dampers ............................................152
Figure B 5: Transverse ventilation system with uniform supply and extract of air ..................................152
Figure B 6: Transverse ventilation with remotely controlled dampers .....................................................152
Figure B 7: Massive point extraction system ........................................................................................... 152
Figure D 1: Typical egress point signage ................................................................................................ 164
Figure D 2: Typical fire door signage ....................................................................................................... 165
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1. Introduction
1.1. Structure of the Guide to Road Tunnels
The Guide to Road Tunnels is written in four Parts:

• Part 1: Introduction to Road Tunnels
• Part 2: Planning, Design and Commissioning
• Part 3: Operation and Maintenance
• Part 4: Retrofitting Tunnels.
While the total document has been separated into four parts, there is considerable inter-dependence
between the Parts and appropriate cross-references have been made where necessary. For example, in
designing road tunnels, the scope determined in the planning must be recognised and the way the tunnel will
be constructed and operated and how it will be maintained will be important inputs to design decisions.
1.2. Purpose of the Guide
The document provides guidance to those making decisions in the planning, design, operation and
maintenance of new road tunnels in Australia and New Zealand. Principles and standards identified are
based on experience both in Australasia and in other countries where tunnels have been constructed over a
long period of time. Practices referred to in other countries have been considered in the light of Australasian
experience and adopted (where appropriate), cognisant of Australasian conditions and legislation.
It is expected that the Guide will be used by engineers and technical specialists in tunnel technology working
on the planning, design and operation of road tunnels, proponents of road tunnel solutions, senior decision
makers (in an overview role) and regulators in the various jurisdictions associated with the construction of
tunnels.
It is intended that users of this Guide will be able to determine standards for road tunnel design and
operation acceptable to Austroads members, either directly from the Guide or from other references defined
by the Guide as providing the appropriate standards for adoption. Planners, designers and operators will be
able to ascertain the range of factors to be considered and use the defined standards to produce an
acceptable design. Senior decision makers will be able to determine the range of factors to be considered
and from that assess whether the proposal will meet the requirements of the Austroads members.
In reaching a conclusion on the acceptable requirements for a particular tunnel, designers should use a
risk-based approach to justify the parameters to be used. This approach will need to consider the issues
involved and the range of values for a parameter that will satisfy the identified issues. In some cases, this
Guide provides specific recommendations for standards for individual components to accommodate the
special needs of tunnels. Where these standards vary from those in other Austroads Guides, the
requirements of this Guide are to take precedence.
1.3. Scope of the Guide to Road Tunnels Part 2
This Part of the Guide to Road Tunnels sets out the Austroads expectations regarding appropriate design for
road tunnels. It discusses all aspects of the planning, design and commissioning of road tunnels including
structural and geotechnical requirements, human factors considerations, fire and life safety, ventilation,
lighting, traffic monitoring and control, plant monitoring and control, electrical power supply and the
requirements for associated building structures.
Austroads 2021 | page 1

This Part of the Guide also:

• discusses the expected approach to the design of the elements of the tunnel project and, where
appropriate, defines acceptable standards for those elements
It should be regarded as the benchmark for the planning and design of new road tunnels in Australia and
New Zealand. Emphasis is placed on adopting a risk management approach to the design of the
elements, stressing the importance of considering the interaction of the various components and the
effect of the total combination of the elements.
• defines the requirements for the commissioning of road tunnels, the effect this has on design and the
documentation required to ensure that all systems are functioning appropriately before operation
commences.
Part 2 does not deal with the refurbishment of existing tunnels or the retrofitting of components to existing
tunnels. For projects of that nature, Guide to Road Tunnels Part 4 (Austroads 2019g) provides the
appropriate approach to be taken and the standards to be adopted.
The technology for tunnel design and operation is continually developing and the Guide will be updated to
reflect this development.
For such a wide and developing topic, the guidance provided should not be considered as exhaustive. It is
not intended to provide any form of substitute for the specialist expertise that is needed to prepare effective
and efficient working designs for a road tunnel. Recommended further reading is provided within the
reference section of this part.
1.4. Safe System
The Guide to Road Tunnels should be considered in the broad context of road safety and the contribution
that the Guide can make to the design of safer roads. Safe System principles are acknowledged in the
National Road Safety Strategy 2011-2020 as the guiding principles for road safety programs in Australia.
The Austroads approach to Safe System design is set out in the Guide to Road Tunnels Part 1: Introduction
to Road Tunnels (Austroads 2018a).

2. Systems Engineering Framework
2.1. Overall Approach
Systems Engineering (SE) is an interdisciplinary approach governing the total technical and managerial effort
required to transform a set of stakeholder needs, expectations, and constraints into a solution and to support
that solution throughout its life (ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288: 2015). It focuses on defining stakeholder needs and
required functionality early in the development cycle, documenting requirements, then proceeding with
design and system validation while considering the full project life cycle and integrating all disciplines and
specialty groups into a team effort. Early identification of inconsistencies and shortfalls enables early
identification of risk to technical and project performance when costs and impact can be most efficiently
managed.
This section provides a framework for the application of SE methodology in a road tunnel project, to ensure
the requirements are managed and that the design is compliant. The Systems Engineering Framework (the
Framework), should be read in conjunction with Section 3.7, Design Methodology and Documentation, and
implementation tailored depending on size, complexity and timelines of a project.
As a front-end loaded process, SE provides progressive assurance that:

• project context and requirements are complete, understood, and addressed by the design
• stakeholder needs are met, such as road tunnel operators and users
• transverse disciplines such as safety and human factors are integrated
• changes are managed effectively and that the impact of changes on design can be realised easily
• decision-making and rationale are effectively captured and managed. This reduces issues associated
with project team member changes and in inconsistencies in design outputs.
2.2. Designing for Operations
A road tunnel is one element of a transport system, and the tunnel operates in the natural and built
environment to meet a range of expectations of the users and the broader community. The design of the
road tunnel cannot be carried out in isolation but must be sensitive to the context in which the tunnel will
operate.
The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA 2013) defines designing for operations as a systematic
consideration of management and operation strategies during the design process, to maximise the safety,
reliability, and efficiency of the network. Designing for operations improves the integration of operational
considerations throughout the project development life cycle and addresses some of the limitations in current
design practices, including:
• a disconnect between infrastructure design and operations
• limited or incomplete understanding by designers of the operational intent of the network, and therefore
designers unable to come up with more optimal design options.
The Framework supports the application of designing for operations, particularly in the development of projects
involving Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) (FHWA 2013). Further, the up-and-coming need to support
connected and automated vehicles brings further complexity in which vehicles play a more active part.

2.3. Engineering Life Cycle
While project development processes may vary from organisation to organisation and in different
jurisdictions, the transportation project development process tends to have the same major steps. This Guide
defines a generic life cycle which can be tailored depending on the project and serves as a reference for
highlighting how SE activities may be applied at different project phases.
The transportation project delivery process includes many important features of the SE methodology: the
system is specified in increasing detail, beginning with needs, moving to requirements, and then into design.
By taking advantage of this similarity in concepts and processes, the SE methodology can be integrated as
an extension to the organisation’s existing project development process (FHWA 2009).
When a contract ends, rather than retirement, ownership of a road tunnel or asset could return to the State or
other operator. Therefore, the State would be interested in whether the contractual requirements comply with
their requirements or with operator standards (e.g. safety and design life).
The generic life-cycle phases adopted in this Guide are based on FHWA, as outlined in the Guide to Road
Design Part 2: Design Considerations (Austroads 2019b). These include:
• Concept Exploration and Benefits Analysis
• Project Planning and Concept of Operations Development
• System Definition
• System Development and Implementation
• Validation, Operations and Maintenance, Changes and Upgrade
• System Retirement/Replacement/Handover.
Figure 2.1 shows how these generic life-cycle phases may relate to traditional, tailorable project development
life-cycle tasks.
Figure 2.1: Alignment with capital project development life cycle tasks
Source: Altered from FHWA (2009).

2.4. Systems Engineering Activities
The International Standard on Systems and Software Engineering (ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288: 2015) and Federal
Highway Administration (FWHA) resources (2009, 2013) can be used as a guide for SE activities. The
processes and activities outlined in ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288 are generically defined to cover a wide range of
industry sectors such as aerospace, defence, oil and gas, medical, automotive and transport. Therefore, the
SE technical processes require tailoring to transportation projects, and this framework provides guidance on
tailoring to suit a road tunnel project. This framework adopts the overall SE activities defined by the FWHA
(refer to Figure 2.2 which presents how the SE activities relate to the generic life cycle). The SE activities
include:
• Project Planning, SE Management Planning
• Operational Concepts
• System Requirements Definition
• Subsystem Requirements and Management
• Testing
• Subsystem/System Integration
• Subsystem/System Verification
• System Validation
• Operations and Maintenance
• Changes and Upgrades
• Retirement/Replacement.
Some proposed outputs from each project phase are presented in Section 2.12.
Figure 2.2: The systems engineering ‘vee’ model
Source: FHWA (2009).

2.4.1. Project Planning
Project planning identifies project needs and constraints and sets out activities, resources, budget, and
timeline for the project. It also helps to build an understanding and consensus among the stakeholders, such
as tunnel operators and users. It is important to engage design teams early in understanding the SE
methodology and help them to understand the value and benefits it could have to their design and program if
it is to be adopted.
To coordinate the technical activities between disciplines and organisations, each road tunnel project should
have a SE Management Plan. To ensure safety and accessibility needs are addressed, separate supporting
plans, such as a Human Factors Integration Plan and Safety Management Plan are also recommended.
The International Standard on Systems and Software Engineering: Life Cycle Management Part 4: Systems
Engineering Planning (ISO 24748: 2018) focuses on the process required for successful planning and
management of systems engineering effort of a project and provides a template and structure for preparing a
SE Management Plan.
2.5. Operational Concepts
The needs analysis and concept of operations is the process of defining the problem or opportunities and
considering the potential solutions that might address the problem (FHWA 2009, ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288: 2015).
2.5.1. Needs Assessment and Concept Definition
The needs assessment is the first process in the SE life cycle. An initial needs assessment ensures that the
tunnel system will meet the most basic needs of the stakeholders involved in the road tunnel project.
Prioritisation of conflicting needs will likely be required (FHWA 2009).
The first step in this process will be to identify stakeholders, for examples tunnel operators, maintainers and
tunnel users. The process can then commence to:
• understand, gather and record needs of the road tunnel, e.g. expected road tunnel throughput
• prioritise needs
• perform gap analysis on other systems
• analyse costs where necessary and complete a sensitivity analysis for needs.
Identifying assumptions, dependencies and constraints is important in this step, as well as identifying
evaluation criteria so that alternatives concepts can be considered and evaluated (e.g. constraint of
topography and geography).
2.5.2. Stakeholder Requirements
While the needs assessment focuses on the problem, stakeholder requirements explore stakeholder
aspirations for the road tunnel system, possibly including some requirements around performance.
Stakeholder needs can be transformed into a formal set of stakeholder requirements.
Stakeholders may include operators, users, owners, developers, maintenance, and management where
possible. Some of these stakeholders may only be available through the competitive tender process
including the construction of the asset. The availability of stakeholders should be considered early in the
design process.
Concept assessments are often performed iteratively with the stakeholder needs and requirements activity to
understand the problem space and the solution space.

2.5.3. Concept of Operations
The concept of operations, as defined by FHWA (2009), captures the environment and use of a road tunnel
system in a non-technical manner from the viewpoint of the stakeholders. It is a description of how the
system will be used and provides the connection between stakeholder needs and technical system
requirements, and ideally will be written by or with heavy involvement from the intended operator.
IEEE 29148: 2018 provides a suggested outline for a concept of operations.
Some of the reasons for developing a concept of operations include (FHWA 2009):
• getting stakeholder agreement on how the tunnel system is to be operated, who is responsible for what,
and what the lines of communication are
• defining the high-level system concept and justifying that it is superior to the other alternatives
• defining the environment in which the road tunnel system will operate
• deriving high-level requirements, especially user requirements and provide the criteria to be used for
validation of the completed tunnel system.
When the organisations that construct and operate a road tunnel are different, this can result in a tunnel that
is less efficient or sustainable to operate if operator needs are not fully considered. Close attention to
stakeholder needs and operational concepts early in the design may eliminate some of these deficiencies
during the operations life cycle phase.
2.6. System Requirements Definition and Management
2.6.1. System Requirements Definition
A system requirement is a statement that identifies a product or process’s operational, functional, or design
characteristic or constraint, which is unambiguous, testable, or measurable and necessary for product or
process acceptability (INCOSE SEBoK 2015).
The system requirements definition transforms the stakeholder view of the desired tunnel system into a
technical view of the system (ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288: 2015) and is often contractual. Requirements identify
what the project team needs to design or build and can be used to determine if the final road tunnel system
has been built correctly.
Writing requirements to focus on the purpose of a system and the performance characteristics around it
(e.g. detect fire) rather than the specification of a system (e.g. smoke detector) is not always easy to achieve.
Where a specific tunnel system is required, rationale should be provided to explain why.
ISO/IEC/IEEE 29148: 2018 provides guidance on writing good requirements.
System requirements should be captured in a system requirements specification. System requirements are
assigned attributes including rationale and classification (to clarify the purpose and intent of requirements)
and must be traced to stakeholder requirements to maintain a record of their source and the need that they
are addressing.
2.6.2. Requirements Management
Ongoing requirements management is important to manage non-conformances and changes using a

practical change management and departure process, particularly for mechanical, electrical, ITS and tunnel
systems technology, which changes at a faster pace than civil infrastructure technology. Requirements
should be allocated to the teams that own them, and allocation managed effectively to address all
requirements. For example, if a requirement for a tunnel ventilation system component becomes obsolete,
the requirement should be updated or deleted, following a configuration management process, and affected
stakeholder requirements reviewed.

Writing a good set of requirements is challenging. Therefore, if an ambiguous contractual document or

requirements set is provided at the beginning of a project, it is important to clarify requirements. Otherwise,
solution-focused requirements may become obsolete and unbounded or aspirational requirements may be
hard to verify.
The requirements management process and arrangement should be documented in a Requirements

Management Plan, a section within the SE Management Plan or other project document for smaller projects.
2.7. Architecture Definition
The purpose of system architecture definition is to select one or more architecture alternatives, for a road
tunnel in this case, that frame stakeholder needs, meet system requirements and identify system boundaries
and interfaces (ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288: 2015). Architectures are either behavioural (functional, state) or
structural (class, logical, physical) (INCOSE SEBoK 2015). INCOSE SEBoK (2015) includes a detailed
description of logical and physical architecture, and system architecture development has been covered in
detail in ISO/IEC/IEEE 42010: 2011, Systems and Software Engineering: Architecture Description.
Traditionally, the system architecture is understood by individual disciplines but may not be formally recorded
at a systemwide level. A system architecture diagram will support development of a functional description of
the tunnel system and scenarios that the system may encounter. When recorded, this enables conversation
about interfaces and cross-discipline activities, including the operator where possible. A functional design
description and system architecture will likely also be useful as evidence for tunnel safety assurance (refer to
Section 2.11).
Once a physical architecture has been developed for the tunnel system, traceability should be established
between system requirements and physical elements of the architecture, to show dependencies and
interfaces. This is a key activity to help to identify any gaps either in requirements or in the system itself.
If developed early in the project life cycle, a system architecture may be used to define design packages,
including a clear definition of scope and interfaces. It is important to identify civil infrastructure interfaces with
mechanical and electrical fit-outs early in the project life cycle, so appropriate systems can be selected and
system-wide integration considered in requirements. This will avoid rework (e.g. vibration and acoustic
requirements resulting in retrofitting of gantries suitable for CCTV equipment).
2.8. System Integration
The purpose of the system integration process is to combine system elements into a product or service that
meets system requirements, architecture and design. FHWA (2009) notes that integration planning starts
when the project activities are first defined. Integration and verification are completed iteratively until the
entire road tunnel system being considered is ready for operation. Refer to Section 16.3.7 for more
information on system integration during commissioning.
An integration plan shall be required to define the sequence in which various components should be
integrated, resources required, schedule, and coordination activities. Integration activities, such as testing,
should be defined during design when sub-systems, internal interfaces, and external interfaces are defined.
Each component of the system will need to be tested individually, then together, and finally as a whole.
Stakeholders involved should be consulted, and access sought to enabling systems or services that may be
needed to support integration, such as road operators and councils.

2.9. Verification and Validation
2.9.1. Verification
The purpose of the verification process is to show that the system, sub-system, and components meet their
requirements. One of the keys to successful and effective verification is well-written and complete
requirements and design documents.
In planning, the verification tasks should be identified when requirements are written, and verification
methods (and verification procedures if required) assigned to requirements. Verification methods assigned to
requirements may include modelling (such as tunnel ventilation system modelling), simulation, mock-ups,
design reviews, independent checking and verification, inspection, testing, auditing and surveys. The
verification process is completed through the system life cycle including system integration and is iterative.
2.9.2. Validation
The purpose of the validation process is to provide evidence that the system meets the intended purpose,
objectives and needs of the system’s owner and stakeholders when in its intended operational environment: an
assessment of the operational system (FHWA 2009). All of the SE activities, including the traceability of
requirements and an overall systems architecture will help to provide a wholistic view of an integrated road
tunnel system.
Validation is used as the final demonstration that the requirements are met for system acceptance, including
requirements related to human factors and safety. Before the system acceptance is complete, the functionality
and performance of the system should be validated against the concept of operations (e.g. testing of
emergency scenarios). Test specifications for mechanical, electrical and ITS equipment and civil infrastructure
should be traced back to requirements where possible and integrated into the Systems Engineering methodology.
2.10. Human Factors
Human factors requirements (FHWA 2009) are an important input to SE activities as is the integration and
understanding of the relationship of human factors with the SE activities (INCOSE SEBoK 2015). Human
factors specialists should be introduced early to ensure that human systems requirements are ‘designed in’
rather than corrected later. Additionally, human factors specialists can develop specific human factors analysis
techniques and tests to help in the development of the road tunnel but also to make sure that the verification
tests are suitable for humans. Proper attention to human factors can enhance the safety, effectiveness and
ease of use of a road tunnel system, such as making sure signs and lights are visible and clear.
Safety and human factors requirements should be elicited through the ‘safety in design’ process early in the
design phase to incorporate safety controls into the design. This reduces the risk of identifying any significant
changes to the design late in the project life cycle. Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety (RAMS)
of tunnel requirements should also be identified for all infrastructure (not just ITS) early in the design phase.
Safety and human factors requirements should also be revisited throughout and checked at the end of the
design and at all project life-cycle phases to ensure safety issues are addressed for any changes made
during the design and construction stages.
Human factors requirements are covered by other Parts of the Austroads Guides:
• The Austroads Guide to Road Tunnels Part 1: Introduction to Road Tunnels, Section 5.5 (Austroads
2018a) covers human factors. It also notes the following: Human Factors and Road Tunnel Safety
Regarding Users (World Road Association (PIARC) (2008d) provides a comprehensive discussion of this
issue and may be used as a guide to develop more appropriate tunnel designs.
• The Austroads Guide to Road Tunnels Part 3: Operation and Maintenance (Austroads 2018b) covers
human factors.
• Section 3.2.3 addresses human factors in planning and design.

2.11. Safety
Safety requirements should be elicited through the ‘safety in design’ process early in the design phase to
incorporate safety controls into the design. This reduces the risk of identifying any significant changes to the
design late in the project cycle. Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety (RAMS) of tunnel
requirements should also be identified for all tunnel infrastructure (not just ITS) early in the design phase.
A risk management model should be used to identify and address safety and human factors issues, with
safety risks being eliminated wherever possible and the likelihood of a safety incident occurring and the
severity of an incident that does occur minimised wherever elimination is not possible. Safety and human
factors requirements should be revisited throughout and checked at the end of the design and at all project
life cycle phases to ensure safety issues are addressed for any changes made during the design and
construction stages.
The PIARC Introduction to the RAMS Concept for Road Tunnel Operations (World Road Association (PIARC)
2019c) covers RAMS and safety requirements and safety is covered by other parts of the Austroads Guides:
• The Austroads Guide to Road Tunnels Part 1: Introduction to Road Tunnels, Section 5.2 (Austroads
2018a) covers very high-level safety in design through all phases of the project life cycle, including hazard
identification and risk assessment section.
• The Austroads Guide to Road Tunnels Part 1: Introduction to Road Tunnels, Section 10 (Austroads
2018a) covers Functional Safety and Operations.
• The Austroads Guide to Road Tunnels Part 3: Operation and Maintenance (Austroads 2018b) includes
risk analysis and Safe System requirements.
• Section 3.3 covers Risk Analysis in the Planning and Design Stage.
2.12. Guidance on Systems Engineering Outputs
The proposed outputs from each project phase are presented in Table 2.1, using inputs from FHWA (2009),
ISO/IEC/IEEE 15289: 2019 and ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288: 2015. It should be emphasised that the proposed
deliverables are not essential and should be tailored, simplified and/or combined depending on the
complexity of individual projects. Refer to ISO/IEC/IEEE 15289: 2019 for a more detailed list of proposed
outputs, also covering enterprise life-cycle processes and agreement processes.

Table 2.1: Proposed systems engineering outputs
Systems
Project
engineering Proposed outputs
phase
activity
Concept • Needs • Key needs and constraints – a list of collected needs for a road tunnel,
exploration assessment their sources, and documentation of the rationale for the selection of the key
and benefits needs and any constraints which exist that may limit possible solutions to
• Concept
analysis the needs. This may be a separate document or incorporated as part of the
selection
concept of operations.
• Recommended system concept – describes the concept selected having
the best benefit for the cost.
• Feasibility assessment – the document that collects the recommendations
and the concept exploration rationale – the effectiveness and feasibility of
the recommended tunnel project concept, including justification for the
choice in terms of benefit and cost.
Project • Project • Project plan – establishes a description of the entire set of tasks that the
planning and planning/SE road tunnel project requires.
concept of planning • Supporting management plans – needed to provide additional details
operations
• Concept of about any task or group of tasks.
development operations
• Request for proposal – needed for any contract effort.
• SE management plan – defines the road tunnel project's technical tasks.
• Concept of operations – describes the operation of the road tunnel system
being developed from the various stakeholder viewpoints. It documents the
stakeholder requirements for ultimate system operations.
• System architecture description, system element description – A
diagram or model that defines the tunnel system context, boundaries and
interfaces, and addresses key stakeholder needs and system requirements.
An interface description may be considered separately.
System • System • System and sub-system requirements – used as the primary source for
definition requirements the project level architecture. Must be complete, verifiable, and validated.
definition After review and approval by the tunnel system owner and stakeholders,
these requirements are put under configuration control. These should trace
• High-level
back to stakeholder requirements.
design
• Verification plan – documents the plan to verify each road tunnel system
• Subsystem
requirement.
requirements
• Selected commercial off-the-shelf products and applications (ITS) – the
• Detailed design
results of the evaluation of commercial off-the-shelf products. Ideally done
as late as possible in the project life cycle to provide the latest technologies
at the best price. Sometimes, this may have to be done earlier because of
legacy systems or internal standards.
System • Testing • Integration plan – documents the high-level plan and process for
development integrating the system. This is part of the project plan/SE management plan.
• Sub-system/
and
system • Verification master plan – included in the project plan/SE management
implementati
integration plan to establish general guidelines for this important part of the systems
on engineering process.
• Sub-system/
system • Verification plan – documents the plan for verifying road tunnel system and
verification sub-system requirements.
• Verification procedures – details each verification step.
• Verification reports – results of each verification step.

Systems
Project
engineering Proposed outputs
phase
activity
Validation, • System • Operation, inspection and maintenance manual – Refer to
operations validation Section 16.4.4 for more information. Documents the procedures, resources,
and training, and support needed for operating and maintaining the system.
• Operations and
maintenance
maintenance • Incident management and recovery manual – Refer to Section 16.4.4 for
, changes more information.
and upgrade • Changes and
upgrades • Police, fire and emergency services manual – Refer to Section 16.4.4 for
more information.
• Requirements for next evolution – captured when identified by operations
and maintenance personnel.
• Documented legacy system – in the areas of change and upgrade. If the
legacy system has not been well documented before the change and
upgrade, document legacy tunnel system.
• Updated operation and maintenance procedures – will be developed as
the tunnel system changes over time.
• Updated system products and documentation – for the new capabilities,
as well as the impacted areas of the legacy tunnel system.
System • Retirement, • Retirement/replacement plan – part of the project plan/SE management
retirement/ replacement or plan that provides the overall strategy for retirement and replacement of the
replacement handover road tunnel system.
• Retirement/replacement/handover decision – versus upgrading and
changing the legacy road tunnel system.
• Replacement strategy documents – the way the road tunnel system or
sub-system will be replaced. This will become part of the SE management
plan for the next evolution of development.

3. General Design Requirements
3.1. Road Tunnel Characteristics
Road tunnels have a number of distinguishing characteristics such as:

• an enclosed space with horizontal, lateral and vertical visual restrictions
• they may be speed restricted
• changed driver perceptions
• the absence of parked vehicles, roadside obstacles, cyclists and pedestrians
• a controlled environment (e.g. illumination, ventilation)
• extensive fire and life safety features.
Driver behaviour in tunnels can be different from that observed on the open road and if not adequately
addressed, can lead to unsafe behaviour. Section 3.2.3 provides guidance on these issues.
However, tunnels exhibit a better crash and accident record than the open road due to a combination of
factors such as:
• drivers becoming more alert in the changed environment of the tunnel
• the absence of roadside obstacles
• their standard of construction
• extensive safety features (traffic controls and fire and life safety).
Notwithstanding this generally better safety performance, it has been observed that a substantial portion of
the crashes that do occur involve trucks with potentially severe consequences (Austroads 2018c). Safety
performance will be improved by adopting the design requirements specified in the relevant sections of this
document e.g. transitional lighting at the portals; placement and wording of static and variable message
signs; avoidance of any signs for 150 m in advance of the entrance portal.
3.2. Overall Design Considerations
3.2.1. General
It will be necessary to comply with a range of specific standards and codes for many of the elements of
tunnel design (e.g. tunnel fire safety; lighting; electrical works; building code in NZ). In addition, various
Austroads Guides, international standards, World Road Association (PIARC), European Union and other
publications provide considerable reference and guidance material.
The overarching consideration in all aspects of the design is safety and its application to all phases of the
project:
• safety during construction
• traffic safety
• safety of maintenance and operations personnel
• safety during emergency situations.
Consideration of all of these factors is an integral part of the specific sections of this document dealing with
each element of the design (refer also to Section 1.4).

Some general design considerations are:

• structural requirements
• seismic loadings
• over-height vehicles (appropriate to the road corridor)
• breakdown bays
• providing for pedestrians, and the mobility impaired (including evacuation requirements)
• design vehicle to be adopted
• dangerous goods movements
• combustible goods movements
• operating speed
• cross-section elements
• grading
• drainage
• fire and life safety
• emergency access
• ventilation
• lighting
• communications
• electrical requirements
• minimisation of lane and tunnel closures (e.g. for maintenance activities)
• operations management and control system (OMCS) requirements to suit the particular tunnel, its
associated road network and the communications with any central traffic management centre in the
jurisdiction concerned; it includes operating the deluge system, implementing traffic management plans
and reporting faults to the asset management system (refer to Austroads Guide to Road Tunnels Part 3:
Operation and Maintenance (Austroads 2018b)).
All of these issues are dealt with in detail throughout this document.
During the concept phase, a design standards report may be required to set out the key road and tunnel
design parameters selected for a particular tunnel project. The level of detail depends on the project
characteristics and level of complexity. For short tunnels this may consist of nothing more than a reference to
the Guide and a summary appendix of geometric design criteria.
Longer and more complex tunnels will require a detailed design standards report documenting the derivation
and selection of those criteria. This report should be updated regularly as the project progresses. Which
features to include will depend on a range of factors including the length of the tunnel and the traffic volume
expected. Some guidance on fire safety is provided in AS 4825: 2011 Tunnel Fire Safety. It is important to
tailor the design to the specific requirements of the particular tunnel and avoid over-specifying features that
are not necessary for those circumstances.
Mashima and Mizutani (2003) describe a classification system used in Japanese tunnels. This may provide
general guidance to practitioners on what facilities may be required in a specific tunnel under consideration.

3.2.2. Passage of Dangerous Goods
Whether a tunnel should allow the free passage of dangerous goods vehicles (placarded vehicles) operating
within the law should be determined through a risk management approach and involve all relevant
stakeholders. One consideration is that diverting such vehicles off the major road system could transfer risk
to locations that may not have facilities or ready access to deal with any emergency incident involving fire or
spillage. In addition, the costs involved in the potential damage to the tunnel and the economic costs of the
loss of significant transport corridors caused by any tunnel closure resulting from a crash involving a
placarded vehicle must be considered.
Austroads (2019d) provides a comprehensive literature review of the passage of dangerous goods
throughout the world. Austroads (2019e) provides a standardised assessment method to enable an
appropriate decision to be made on whether to allow these goods to pass through a tunnel and this should
be used to assess the situation for tunnels in Australia and New Zealand.
Further information can be obtained in the following publications, where additional guidance is required.
The OECD (2001) report Transport of Dangerous Goods through Road Tunnels provides a quantitative risk
assessment model (QRAM). The model is claimed to be applicable to all countries. The report states:
The transport of dangerous goods through tunnels implies special risks to road users, physical
structures, environment and people residing near tunnels or detour roads. Transport authorities
have to decide whether dangerous goods transport is permitted on certain routes or not. If
permitted, the safest and most practical manner for transporting these dangerous goods has to
be decided. QRAMs can assist decision makers by providing risk estimates that are both
accurate and objective for different types of dangerous goods, tunnels and transport scenarios.
World Road Association (PIARC) (2016e) address the question of transport of dangerous goods in its Road
Tunnels Manual and notes:
Banning dangerous goods from a tunnel does not eliminate the risks but modifies them and
moves them to a different location, where the overall risk may actually be greater (diverting
through a dense urban area for instance). For this reason, a joint OECD/PIARC research project
recommended that decisions on authorisation/restriction of dangerous goods in a tunnel should
be based on a comparison of various alternatives and should take into account the tunnel route
as well as possible alternative routes.
Refer to https://tunnelsmanual.piarc.org/en/safety-tools-safety-management/dg-transportrisk-assessment
Further guidance on using such a quantitative risk assessment model may be obtained in PIARC (2012b).
3.2.3. Human Factors Considerations
Central to adopting appropriate designs is an understanding of the human factors involved in the driving task
associated with tunnels. Human abilities and the limitations of these abilities, the way people react to
different situations, and their needs with respect to coping with these situations and taking the appropriate
action have a significant effect on the design of various features of the tunnel. Human Factors and Road
Tunnel Safety Regarding Users (World Road Association (PIARC) (2008d) provides a comprehensive
discussion of this issue and may be used as a guide to develop more appropriate tunnel designs.
Understanding the behaviour of drivers is essential to a proper understanding of the effects of design
features on the crash rate in tunnels and in developing a design that minimises crashes in them. World Road
Association (PIARC) (2019b) sets out the factors involved and the measures that can be adopted to prevent
crashes as far as possible and to minimise the severity of crashes that may occur.
World Road Association (PIARC) (2016c) provides guidance on human factors in general. This general
guidance is equally applicable to tunnel considerations. Of specific interest is the question of influencing
speed by the design of the tunnel walls by introducing increased contrast – see Figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1: Tunnel walls with different contrasts
Note: Tunnel walls with little contrast (left) and increased contrast (right) to influence speed.
Source: World Road Association (PIARC) (2016c).
Stress levels in drivers have been found to increase in the transition sections both entering and leaving a
tunnel. Further, variations in the internal design also affect stress levels (Miller & Ng Boyle 2015). In very
long tunnels, variations in internal décor as well as variations in lighting can reduce monotony and stress
levels. Refer to section 7.2.4 for further discussion of this matter.
Consideration of human factors affects many aspects of tunnel design and operation. World Road
Association (PIARC) (2008d) provides detailed guidance on these issues and highlights the following, which
are detailed in the report.
• Additional measures to improve safety in normal traffic conditions:
– education and information
– informing drivers approaching the last exit before a tunnel
– direction signing
– informing drivers approaching a tunnel in normal traffic situations
– design of tunnel portals
– geometric cross-section design
– interior design
– traffic guidance.
• Additional measures to prevent escalation of critical traffic conditions in tunnels:
– education and information
– road signs and signals on the approach road to a tunnel and in a tunnel in case of congestion, closure
of lanes or complete closure of the tunnel
– lay-bys and emergency stations

– radio re-broadcasting in and around tunnels

– public address systems
– alerting tunnel users in emergency cases
– escape routes and routing and emergency exits
– behind the emergency exits (appropriate signing to guide people to the outside)
– informing tunnel users in the non-incident tunnel tube (to alert them to people entering from the
escape doors).
Education of users and the required approach to informing drivers is covered in the Guide to Road Tunnels
Part 3: Operation and Maintenance (Austroads 2018b). Other effects are discussed in the specific sections of
this document dealing with each specific matter e.g. geometric cross-section design is covered in Section 5.
Where practicable and available, the effect of alternative designs on driving performance and driver
behaviour could be assessed with the aid of a driving simulator (Calvi, De Blasiis & Guattari 2012).
3.2.4. Providing for Autonomous Vehicles
Connected and Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs) are being developed, and trials of their use have been
undertaken. Safe operation of these vehicles depends on continuous and accurate information being passed
to and from the vehicles. This means that ‘dead’ spots without connectivity are not acceptable. Tunnels and
other underground facilities often have such ‘dead’ spots, and this issue must be overcome to allow safe
operation of CAVs. New technology has been trialled to achieve uninterrupted signals to CAVs
(Alexander 2019) and may provide a solution to this issue.
Designers should allow for the space to install appropriate infrastructure for such connectivity and
communication with and amongst CAVs.
3.2.5. Alternative Fuel Vehicles
Introduction
The emergence of new technology, such as electric vehicles (EVs), plug-in hybrid vehicles (PHVs) and fuel
cell vehicles (FCVs), may affect the design and operation of road tunnels. Batteries in such vehicles have the
tendency to overheat and potentially ignite. Fires in batteries are difficult to extinguish should they arise and
this has the potential to cause further issues in an enclosed road environment such as a tunnel. Hence, there
is a need to understand and eliminate or mitigate the risks associated with accidents in tunnels involving
these vehicles. Further, the presence of EVs, PHVs and FCVs in tunnels may affect the behavior of and
precautionary procedures followed by first responders in emergency situations.
Types of alternative fuel vehicles

The general term ‘alternative fuel vehicles’ includes EVs, PHVs and FCVs, which can be defined as follows
(Commonwealth of Australia n.d.):
• Electric vehicles (EVs): vehicles that contain electric motors and batteries that are recharged by external
electricity sources.
• Plug-in hybrid vehicles (PHVs): vehicles that contain electric motors and batteries that are recharged by
external electricity sources as well as an internal combustion engine (ICE).
• Fuel cell vehicles (FCVs): vehicles that contain electric motors and also contain a hydrogen fuel cell
which has hydrogen in it and reacts with oxygen in the air to produce electricity.
Table 3.1 summarises key differences of each alternative fuel vehicle.

Table 3.1: Key differences of alternative fuel vehicle types
EVs PHVs FCVs

Powered by Electricity Electricity and/or fossil fuels Electricity
Power source Any source of electricity Electricity network and/or ICE Hydrogen
Power storage Batteries Batteries and fuel tank Hydrogen
Driving mode Electric Electric and/or ICE Electric
Noise emissions Low Low (electric mode) or like ICE Low
(non-EV mode)
Tailpipe air pollution None None (electric mode) or less None
than ICE (non-EV mode)
Greenhouse gases Depends on electricity Depends on electricity source Depends on source of
source (electric mode) or less than electricity and hydrogen
ICE (non-EV mode)
Source: Gotsis (2018).
It should be noted that the tailpipe of EVs and FCVs may not emit greenhouse gases, but carbon dioxide and
other pollutants are still emitted during the production and distribution of electricity and hydrogen, which has
to be taken into account when assessing the overall impacts.
Impacts of alternative fuel vehicles

The risks posed by these vehicles in tunnels is high due to the release of toxic and flammable gases found in
alternative fuelled vehicles (due to the different construct and materials used to power these vehicles – high
voltage and chemicals) within the confined space; however the likelihood of such an incident is relatively low
when considering the approach to mitigate the risk and construction of the vehicles. Batteries in EVs can
overheat or overcharge which leads to combustion and in extreme cases of sealed cells, they can explode
violently. In fire incidents, gas emissions from FCVs increase the ambient temperature rapidly, which means
the fire would quickly spread within the tunnel. Such catalysts are dangerous, and first responders need to
be well equipped with correct incident management techniques to control fires.
A study carried out by Sun, Zhang and Xiang (2018) which explored the behaviour of EVs, PHVs and FCVs
in tunnel fires in China indicated that the combustion temperature of batteries in EVs and PHVs is extremely
high (higher than the conventional fuel flame temperature of 400 °C) and that batteries burn at a faster rate,
going from an open fire to completely burnt within a few seconds. The findings for FCVs showed that the
hydrogen was easily combustible and explosive, with a low amount of energy required for ignition and a wide
range of combustion. Furthermore, the outbreak of a fire from an alternative fuel vehicle in a tunnel was
found to spread rapidly adding complexity to the task of coordinating communications with the firefighters.
A thermal runaway in batteries within EVs produces highly flammable and toxic gases. Gehandler, Karlsson
and Vylund (2017) found that thermal runaway in conjunction with a fire may produce toxic gases, such as
hydrogen fluoride, which could go unnoticed, creating a dangerous situation for road users. This study also
deduced that there is uncertainty pertaining to how to handle the dangers posed by EVs since the
technology is relatively new and relevant precautions may not be widespread enough. It is vital that first
responders are trained on how to carry out the required emergency procedures, and that stakeholders such
as vehicle manufacturers, state and local government, are also kept up to date with published emergency
response guides.
A study by LaFleur et al. (2017) analysed scenarios that may arise in the event of an FCV crash in tunnels
and found that the most likely consequence of a crash was no additional hazard from the release of
hydrogen. However, in scenarios where the hydrogen ignites leading to a fire, the most likely occurrence was
a jet flame due to the hydrogen release caused by the heat from the hydrocarbon fire. Based on these
results, a FCV crash will most likely result in no additional hazard from the release of hydrogen, indicating
that the crash outcome may be comparable to that of a conventional vehicle.

Further details of the development of fires from these vehicles and their intensity are provided in Section 9.
The impacts on ventilation are discussed in Section 10.1.
3.2.6. Designing for Safety and Security
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (2006) and World Road Association
(PIARC) (2019d) provide analyses of the safety and security requirements of road tunnels. ‘Safety’ is
described as the protection of transport infrastructure against random, unintentional events such as
accidents, while ‘Security’ is defined as the state of relative freedom from threat or harm caused by
intentional, unwanted, hostile or malicious acts, including sabotage and espionage. Safety has been dealt
with in all the considerations for tunnel design in this document and has been the subject of development
over many decades. Security is a relatively new consideration, not generally covered in detail in design
guides.
In modern times, safety and security are closely intertwined, and without adequate security, the infrastructure
cannot be deemed ‘safe’. World Road Association (PIARC) (2019d) notes:
There is considerable overlap between safety and security methods, although the focus is
different and in some cases safety and security requirements can be in conflict. With this in
mind, it is important to understand the differences that exist between the two methods: safety is
mainly concerned with protecting the environment from the system, while security is concerned
with protecting the system from the environment. --- From a safety perspective, the threat to the
environment is the system and the systems are static. Conversely, in security, the threat to the
system is the environment and the environment is dynamic. This major difference in perspective
is one of the major stumbling blocks to integrating security and safety.
World Road Association (PIARC) (2019d) highlights the need to adopt a security minded approach,
understanding the threats and vulnerabilities of the infrastructure involved, and to adopt proportionate
countermeasures to the threats identified. The matters to be addressed include:
• governance
• personnel security
• physical security
• cyber security.
Providing infrastructure with resilience is important in designing for security as it attempts to reduce harm
while assisting the system to recover full performance as efficiently as possible. Security in design should be
a major consideration from the earliest design phases of a project. This will allow the best allocation of
resources to this part of the design and avoid unnecessarily expensive retrofitting of solutions after the
project has been largely designed or constructed.
For detailed guidance on this subject, planners and designers should consult the references:
• World Road Association (PIARC) (2019d): Security of Road Infrastructure (2019R12)
• National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine 2006: Making Transportation Tunnels Safe
and Secure. (Also published as TCRP Report 86/NCHRP Report 525.)
The latter provides case studies with extensive tables of scenarios and possible responses to guide owners,
operators, planners and designers in considering the specific circumstances of their tunnel and deriving
appropriate solutions for the case involved.

3.3. Risk Analysis in the Planning and Design Stage
The principles of risk analysis and management are described in the Guide to Road Tunnels Part 1:
Introduction to Road Tunnels (Austroads 2018a), Risk Analysis for Road Tunnels (World Road Association
(PIARC) 2008a) and Current Practice for Risk Evaluation for Road Tunnels (World Road Association
(PIARC) 2012b). These principles apply to risk analysis and management in the planning and design phase.
More recently, additional guidance on risk assessment has been given by the World Road Association
(PIARC) (2016d). Guidance on the practical application of risk-based assessments is provided below.
3.3.1. The Planning Phase
The planning phase includes feasibility studies, concept development, site and geotechnical investigations
(refer to Appendix A of Guide to Road Design Part 2: Design Considerations (Austroads 2019b),
development and evaluation of project options and any design studies to finalise the preferred option and
selection of a delivery method. It is essential that sufficient time is allowed to investigate and demonstrate the
technical viability of a project prior to proceeding to tender stage and if necessary, prepare designs
appropriate to the form of contract to be adopted.
Risk assessment and evaluation of options should consider:

• the geology and hydrogeology of the site
• tunnelling techniques appropriate to the nature of the ground and environment and the selected alignment
options
• temporary and permanent ground support systems
• ground and ground water treatment measures, their impact on the environment and on third parties
• ground movements and settlements at the ground surface, their impact on a third party or subsurface
ground movements and their impact on buried structures such as utility services, adjacent tunnels and
underground structures
• environmental considerations including dust, noise, vibrations, traffic, construction equipment movements
• traffic volumes and composition
• associated costs
• health, safety and program implications
• appropriate forms of contract
• hazardous materials including gases, chemicals, other pollutants or naturally occurring substances that
could be detrimental to health or affect durability
• functional safety of electrical systems
• operations and maintenance requirements
• all other factors relevant to the proposed project location, geology and environment.
Risk assessments and evaluations should include identifying and evaluating the hazards and consequent
risks of all the options and documenting them formally. Where possible, every effort should be made to
eliminate risks, only relying on the next highest method of preventing and mitigating the risk when elimination
is not possible. The risk register should be continually reviewed and revised through all stages of the project
to take account of the results of investigations and further and better information that becomes available
through the project development process.

3.3.2. The Design Phase
The fundamental objective of the design process is to achieve a design where the risk of failure or damage to
the tunnel works or to a third party from all reasonably foreseeable causes, including health and safety
considerations, is acceptably low during the construction and design life of the tunnel works. High
consequence but low frequency events that could affect the works or a third party are also to be considered
(International Tunnelling Insurance Group 2012).
Designers should:
• undertake a comprehensive risks/safety analysis as an aid to determine the most appropriate mix of
design response and operations procedures (safety-in-design concepts must be included)
• provide integrated monitoring and control systems that allow incidents to be detected and managed, in
order to minimise harm to people, damage to the tunnel structure and traffic disruption. The objective is to
design out as many risks as practicable and to provide systems to minimise reliance on human
processes/procedures where practicable.
It is necessary to:
• identify potential risks
• assess the causes
• determine the consequences
• provide strategies to eliminate or where this is not possible minimise risks
• provide solutions that eliminate or where this is not possible mitigate consequences
• undertake formal functional safety assessment of all electrical, electronic and programmable electronic
systems.
Factors to consider include:

• design requirements and criteria
• geotechnical issues (including seismic effects)
• intermediate stages of construction
• sensitivity of
– construction tolerances
– variation in geotechnical design values
– variation in material characteristics
– variation in workmanship and geometry
– variation in methods of construction and the implementation of mitigation/contingency measures
– natural perils exposure in the region of the project such as flood, storm, seismic or tidal effects
• potential failure of systems/processes
• extent of design checks
• constructability issues.

Appropriate references include AS/NZS ISO 31000: 2009: Risk Management: Principles and Guidelines,
Australasian Fire Authorities Council (2001): Fire Safety Guidelines for Road Tunnels, World Road
Association (PIARC) (2008a): Risk Analysis for Road Tunnels, World Road Association (PIARC) (2012b):
Current Practice for Risk Evaluation for Road Tunnels, World Road Association (PIARC) (2016d):
Experience with Significant Incidents in Road Tunnels, International Tunnelling Insurance Group (2012): A
Code of Practice for Risk Management of Tunnel Works, and AS 4825: 2011: Tunnel Fire Safety.
3.4. Design Criteria
3.4.1. Design Life and Optimum Life-cycle Cost
The design life to be adopted for various elements in the tunnel structure and ancillary infrastructure should
be determined during the planning of the tunnel. Specific assessment of the required design life of each
element in the tunnel infrastructure should be made and the optimum outcome determined. In determining
the optimum outcome, the likely replacement cycle for products and the cost involved in achieving that cycle
should be considered together with the operation and maintenance costs.
Unless otherwise specified, the following design life for the various elements should be adopted:
• permanent structural elements – 100 years
• architectural panels – 35 years
• tunnel drainage – 100 years
• temporary structural elements (required during construction) – 5 years
• fans, dampers and attenuators – 25 years
• tunnel lights and sensors
– lamps 3–4 years
– batteries 5–7 years
– lighting controllers 10 years
• luminaires, signage and other electrical equipment housings and supports – 15 years
• pumps – 10 years (fire pumps and other non-submersible installations with few running hours per year
may have a longer life)
• diesel generators – 15–20 years
• control systems and sensors (hardware and software) - 5 to 10 years as appropriate for each device or
system
• industrial process logic control (PLC) processors and peripherals – 10 years
• central/back office servers and hardware and operating system (OS) – 5 years
• application software – 10 years
• cabling – 25 years
• electrical equipment
– high voltage (HV) and low voltage (LV) switchboards, transformers – 15–20 years
– static industrial electronics (protection relays, uninterruptible power system (UPS)) – 10–15 years.
A change to the design life of a specific element may be considered if it can be demonstrated that the
life-cycle cost can be enhanced by adopting a suitable variation. When determining the design life of any
element, consideration should be given to the impact of that element on other elements during replacement
of that element (e.g. potential impact on a waterproofing membrane).

World Road Association (PIARC) (2012a) provides a methodology for determining the design life of electrical
equipment. This methodology may be of assistance in establishing a more rigorous assessment of the
design life of these components. World Road Association (PIARC) (2016a) provides a systematic process for
assessing the life cycle of technical equipment and provides a ‘best practice’ approach for this process,
including a flow chart to explain it. Sub-systems considered were:
• energy supply
• illumination
• ventilation
• signing
• monitoring systems
• Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems
• cabling
• miscellaneous.
Evaluation criteria are defined as well as the condition classes that apply to each one. It provides guidance
on how the aggregation of the overall technical system condition for a specific tunnel can be derived.
3.4.2. Serviceability
Serviceability refers to the ability of the infrastructure to perform satisfactorily and safely over the life of the
infrastructure, and includes the following matters:
• The integrity of the tunnel structure and its linings – cracking should be limited and no sections of the
linings should be dislodged during operation.
• Water should not be allowed to drip from the roof or walls onto the roadway.
• Drainage water should not encroach onto the running surface.
• Equipment should not be dislodged from its fixed site (in particular, overhead equipment) – chemical
anchors may be used provided they are not subject to long-term creep and have the appropriate fire
response.
• Systems should operate in accordance with the agreed protocols.
• Ease of access for personnel for maintenance of the various tunnel components and equipment is
essential while the tunnel is fully operational.
3.4.3. Durability
General
The design for durability of the tunnel structure and its associated elements will be determined by a
combination of factors including the tunnel profile, the material types considered for the structural support
and the working environment both within the tunnel and from the surrounding ground, and the ground water
regime (both physical and chemical).
The necessity for waterproofing and whether the tunnel is drained or undrained (fully tanked) will also
influence the final tunnel support solution. Repeated wetting and drying of the inner lining surface can lead to
a breakdown of the surface of the concrete. The degree of wetting and drying will determine the need for
waterproofing of the tunnel to overcome this problem.

Future building development around a tunnel may also be a long-term consideration as the tunnel lining may
have to accommodate increased stresses from either ground elevation (basement excavation) or an imposed
load from a future building foundation if the load is not transferred past the tunnel. Specific design criteria for
the building may have to be issued to developers.
Durability requirements should be based upon the following exposure categories:

• Metal items in tunnel: AS/NZS 2312: 2014; Category D – High.
• Concrete items generally: AS 5100.5: 2017; Category, minimum B2.
• Concrete elements in contact with saline water: AS 5100.5: 2017; Category C.
In New Zealand, concrete durability is defined in NZS 3101.1&2: 2006: Concrete Structures Standard.
Tunnel design and construction in New Zealand is subject to the requirements of the New Zealand Building
Code.
Alternative structural support methods

There are several alternative structural support systems for tunnels which can be applied alone or in
combination with other types. An outline of each type is provided below.
Permanent rock bolts

Permanent rock bolts have been used extensively in Sydney road tunnels. There are various international
standards and guidelines that could be incorporated into the tunnel specification for them (see references).
Installation and testing recommendations of the rock bolt supplier may also be applicable.
Generally, permanent rock bolts consist of a fully grouted bolt length in combination with a polyethylene
sheath. Quality assurance of installation should include verification that the grout will consistently fully
encapsulate the rock bolt. The end nut and bearing plate must be fully protected from the environment. This
may include embedment in either shotcrete or concrete. Rock bolts may also be made of stainless steel
(using one of the 316 stainless steel grades) in which case sheathing may not be required. For lighter loads,
fibreglass rock bolts may also be considered as permanent support in selected locations.
Segmental concrete linings

High-quality precast concrete segmental linings are erected in the tail shield of tunnel boring machines
(TBMs). They can be reinforced with either macro-synthetic / steel fibres and / or steel reinforcement. The
temporary jacking loads used to push the TBM forward off the last erected segmental ring are often the
highest loads the segments will experience. Gaskets at the segment joints seal the tunnel from water ingress
and are generally made of a hydrophilic material or rubber. Some gasket profiles combine the two materials
in separate strips in the one gasket.
Unreinforced in situ concrete

Unreinforced concrete arch profile tunnels are very often used for road tunnels. Staged pressure grouting of
the lining is generally required to fill voids. Any cracks in the concrete should also be repaired. The criteria for
grouting and concrete crack repair should be included in the tunnel lining specifications. There is an
increasing use of fibres in concrete linings and apart from polypropylene fibres reducing concrete spalling
under fire conditions, steel fibres can also serve as structural reinforcement. An arched profile with no, or
minimal, bending moments can be used to reduce crack widths due to shrinkage. Surface rusting of exposed
steel fibres can occur, but because the fibres are not continuous throughout the concrete mass, they provide
a durable alternative to steel reinforcement.
Where a continuous membrane is not used, the construction joints between concrete pours require particular
attention to prevent water leakage. Hydrophilic strips and green cutting of the concrete are two methods that
may be considered.

Reinforced concrete
Steel reinforced concrete design for tunnel linings should refer to the most appropriate concrete code. These
may include the bridge code AS 5100 Set-2017 (required for 100-year design life) or the concrete code
AS 3600: 2018 (applicable for a 50-year design life). Additional measures such as increased reinforcement
cover or increased concrete quality may have to be considered to achieve the required design life.
Equivalent New Zealand standards are NZS 3101.1&2: 2006: Concrete Structures Standard and NZ
Transport Agency (2013a): Bridge Manual (3rd edition).
Shotcrete linings
Permanent shotcrete linings are increasingly being accepted as permanent support in tunnels. While
Sydney, for example, has numerous road tunnels supported by a combination of permanent rock bolts and
shotcrete, there is an increasing international trend to use shotcrete alone if the tunnel section is an
appropriate arched profile. Shotcrete in this application is commonly used in combination with a spray-on
membrane to ensure a drip-free environment within the tunnel or alternatively to achieve a fully tanked
tunnel. The shotcrete may be plain, or fibre reinforced (either polypropylene or steel fibres).
There are several issues regarding the practical application of spray-on membranes. The most important
issue is the ability to apply the membrane when ground water seepage is present.
Channelling the water may be required before applying the membrane. Alternatively, where possible, it is
more desirable to use epoxy injection methods at the site of the water leakage to provide a dry surface prior
to applying the spray-on membrane.
Buried structures
Buried structures require specific design considerations that depend upon the ground conditions. Ground
anchors should be designed and installed in accordance with BS 8081: 1989: Code of Practice for Ground
Anchorages; BS EN 1537: 2013: Execution of Special Geotechnical Work: Ground Anchors,
BS 8006-1: 2010: Code of Practice for Strengthened/Reinforced Soils and other Fills and BS 8006-2: 2011:
Code of Practice for Strengthened/Reinforced Soils and other Fills: Soil Nail Design.
Piles should be designed to the requirements of the Australian piling code (AS 2159: 2009). This code has
requirements for sacrificial thickness when using steel piles and for both cover and mix design for concrete
piles. In New Zealand, the following guides and specifications are applicable: Auckland Structural
Group (2002): Piling Specification, and Institution of Civil Engineers (2007): Specification for Piling and
Embedded Retaining Walls.
All structures should be designed and constructed with a monitoring system and if not installed initially,
designed to allow a cathodic protection system to be readily implemented or installed at a later date if ground
conditions warrant such protection.
Steel members
Appropriate protection for steel members should be determined as follows:
• The tunnel environment should be considered as a humid, contaminated, environment. Durability
requirements should be designed in accordance with AS/NZS 2312: 2014; High end Category C.
• The ventilation station environment should be considered as a damp contaminated environment exposed
to outdoor conditions. Durability requirements should be designed in accordance with AS/NZS 2312:
2014; Category D – High.

Overhead fasteners
The ability of overhead fasteners to withstand the weight of the facilities (e.g. jet fans) under all conditions,
including fire, should be considered. Adhesive anchors should not be used unless an analysis of embedment
has determined that the thermodynamics of fire heat transfer of the adhesive are suitable and can withstand
the effects of the design fire. Correctly specified adhesive anchors should not suffer from creep and should
have an adequate design life.
Other tunnel components

Materials to be used for electrical and mechanical equipment, fire resistant coatings and claddings should be
designed in accordance with sound materials engineering principles and certified in accordance with the
appropriate standards as to their fitness for purpose and appropriateness for the design life expected of
those components. For the surface reflectance requirements for linings, refer to Section 11.4.
3.4.4. Sustainability
The planning and design of a tunnel should take into account the sustainability of the project. Sustainability
relies on three pillars – economic, social and environmental, all of which must be considered and a
reasonable balance between them achieved (World Road Association (PIARC) (2017)). The planning and
design phase will determine the sustainability of the project, so decisions in this phase must be carefully
weighed against these three pillars.
Economic analyses are commonly undertaken in deciding on the various features to be implemented (costs
and benefits). Further consideration could be given to wider benefits in terms of wealth creation and
improving living standards. Social factors include health and well-being, employment, education and housing.
Environmental factors include the impact on air quality, water quality, noise, use of natural resources and
consumption of energy.
While there are proven methods for assessing many of these issues, a holistic approach, while desirable,
has not been fully developed. Judgement is required to obtain the best balance in the circumstances of the
project in question. Some specific issues can be addressed:
• use of natural resources – favour materials with the lowest carbon footprint
• recycling of materials
• minimising energy consumption (production of materials, less energy intensive construction methods and
operation).
A more sustainable approach can be achieved readily in lighting, ventilation, recycling and maintenance.
These matters are addressed in Section 3.5 and in the specific sections of this document devoted to them.
3.5. Energy Efficiency
For long-term sustainability and minimisation of cost of operation, it is necessary to ensure that the solutions
adopted during the planning and design of a tunnel are as energy efficient as possible. The long life of
tunnels (often more than 100 years) means that the use of energy during operation will probably outweigh
the energy used during construction (Peeling et al. 2016).
Issues to consider include ventilation, lighting, pavement surfaces, drainage, and temperature regulation.
Peeling et al. (2016) describes a research study into potential technologies to address these issues.
Smart electricity meters can provide separate power usage for ventilation and lighting or any other function
considered necessary, allowing real-time monitoring which is invaluable in energy minimisation.
Renewable energy sources have the potential to reduce the energy demand where they can be incorporated
into the tunnel project.

Austroads (2019g) discusses these issues with respect to retrofitting an existing tunnel, and the same
considerations can be applied to the planning and design of a new tunnel. The details of the potential energy
efficient methods are discussed in the sections of this document as follows:
• ventilation – refer to Section 10
• lighting – refer to Section 11
• pavement surface reflectance – refer to Section 11.4
• drainage – refer to Section 8.2.3.
3.6. Maintenance Requirements
The design should consider the implications for the maintenance tasks in all aspects of the tunnel infrastructure
and its operation. Choice of the appropriate equipment and its location can have a marked effect on the ease
and safety with which maintenance activities can be carried out. In addition, the operation of the tunnel can be
more efficient with fewer disruptions when the maintenance activities can be carried out clear of traffic. A
service tunnel should be considered to carry out routine maintenance activities to achieve this.
It is essential that maintenance can be undertaken safely with minimum disruption to traffic. If a maintenance
activity cannot be safely executed with traffic in the tunnel, the tunnel must be closed partially or totally
depending on the circumstances. It is therefore desirable that designers determine the elements of the
tunnel design with the maintenance requirements in mind. This can be applied to the items of equipment and
to the location of equipment and facilities with the objective of minimising the need for maintenance or
removing the maintenance task from the traffic in the tunnel.
Consideration should also be given to the impacts of maintenance on systems, particularly those providing
functional safety solutions. Further, where possible, the number of moving parts in the mechanical
engineering systems should be minimised to reduce the maintenance issues that arise e.g. mains pressure
water supply for deluge and hydrant mains instead of pumped systems; high voltage supply fed by ring
mains, instead of back-up generators.
Where appropriate, the maintenance issues involved with a specific part of the tunnel design are discussed
in the relevant sections of this document. Specific situations are discussed in:
• emergency and maintenance facilities – Section 5.8
• drainage systems – Section 8.2
• lighting fixtures – Section 11.3
• electrical systems – Section 12
• location of cables – Section 12.6
• signs and communication – Section 13.
Detailed maintenance requirements are dealt with in the Guide to Road Tunnels Part 3: Operation and
Maintenance (Austroads 2018b).
3.7. Design Methodology and Documentation
The design methodology is to be documented and should include:

• A description of the element to be designed.
• The design requirements and criteria to be adopted.

• A geotechnical assessment that evaluates the geological and geotechnical information available
(including the presence or generation of harmful gases, ground and ground water contamination) and
ascribes values for the assessed ground and ground water conditions. This is done for the purpose of
design with justification in the light of information provided (refer to the Guide to Road Tunnels Part 1:
Introduction to Road Tunnels (Austroads 2018a)). Available information may not be adequate to design
the works. Experienced tunnel designers who can evaluate whether the information is sufficient for the
purpose of tunnel design should be engaged to undertake such works. If additional information is
required, then the scope of the required investigations should be established, and appropriate allowances
made for time and budget.
• A description of the method of design (including reference to any applicable codes or standard).
• A description of the method(s) of analysis to be used for the design and the justification thereof.
• The serviceability requirements and the ultimate loads used in the design.
• The maintenance issues arising from specific aspects of the design and how these have been addressed.
• A design risk assessment (Section 3.3).
• The checking procedure to be implemented for the design.
3.8. Design Validation During Construction
Designers should document the monitoring procedures to be adopted during construction to ensure that the
design being implemented remains valid at all times. The monitoring required will include the performance of
ground and ground water, the tunnel works structures, and adjacent structures potentially affected by the
tunnel works.
Commissioning of the tunnel will include extensive integrated testing of all life safety systems (Section 16)
with the early involvement of the tunnel operator and fire authority.

4. Structural Requirements
4.1. Introduction
4.1.1. Role of the Structure
The tunnel structure and other structures provided undertake a variety of roles, namely to:
• facilitate the transport function throughout the design life
• provide a defined level of support to the area surrounding the tunnel
• provide sufficient structural strength and robustness to ensure fire resistance and fire separation in the
event of a fire
• facilitate maintenance activities throughout the life of the structure.
The first two functions ordinarily need an understanding of geotechnical conditions and imposed loads to
ensure a durable tunnel structure. The third requires consideration of internal conditions to aid in the
reduction of the conditions conducive to fire development, to enable detection and verification systems to
function, to create appropriate separation between fire/smoke and safe areas, to prevent such safe areas
becoming untenable and to prevent situations that may endanger emergency response personnel. The
fourth requires an understanding of the implications of maintaining the structure, equipment and systems,
which may be constrained after construction is completed.
4.1.2. Designing for Safe Construction and Use
Most jurisdictions in Australia and New Zealand require ‘safety in design’ to be applied to engineering work
(e.g. NZ Transport Agency (2016) Health and Safety in Design Minimum standard and NSW Work Health
and Safety Act 2011). It applies to all stages in the life cycle of a project commencing with the inception
stage, through the planning and design stages, followed by the construction and commissioning and ongoing
operation and maintenance stages, and in certain cases, decommissioning.
Tunnel design differs significantly from other structures because of the importance of establishing an
accurate geological, geo-mechanical and geotechnical understanding of the area to be tunnelled, including
the area excavated and the region around it that is likely to be affected.
It is essential that adequate information is obtained from site investigations to ensure an appropriate level of
information for the design (refer to the Guide to Road Tunnels Part 1: Introduction to Road Tunnels
(Austroads 2018a), Workplace Health and Safety Queensland (2011): Tunnelling: Code of Practice 2007 and
WorkCover NSW (2006): Tunnels under Construction: Code of Practice 2006). Establishing what is an
appropriate level of geotechnical and other information depends upon a range of factors including how
quickly a project has to be delivered, the budget for the project, the risk management strategy (which is
related to the contractual arrangements in place), other experience and the region involved.
4.1.3. Additional Design Requirements
Experience with tunnel design has shown that the design of the structural elements should consider the
following issues:
• The minimum hydraulic head adopted (needs to be evaluated as part of the tunnel design whether the
tunnel is fully tanked or not)
• Symmetric and asymmetric loads
• Analysis of arching (particularly where the cover is less than the width of the tunnel)

• Concrete shrinkage, creep and temperature effects

• The long-term concrete modulus (particularly in deflection assessments).
• Leakage of water into the tunnel (no water should leak or drip on the tunnel road surface e.g. the top of
the tunnel lining may require a drainage layer and waterproof membrane depending on the specific
conditions of the tunnel concerned).
4.2. The Support Function
The information obtained from the site investigation and the anticipated excavation methods should be
considered in preparing a tunnel design.
The design should include:

• details on the tunnel dimensions and allowable excavation tolerances
• the initial and/or temporary support and lining requirements for each location within the tunnel
• the permanent support and lining requirements for each location within the tunnel
• any other requirements for the finished tunnel.
It should also include information on the excavation methods and ground conditions considered in the design
in order to allow the design to be reviewed if another excavation method is chosen or the actual ground
conditions change as the excavation proceeds (refer also to Section 3.4.3).
Most tunnels and open excavations require some form of permanent ground support, which should be
designed using the geotechnical information obtained for the project and validated during construction using
appropriate testing. Support mechanisms (e.g. rock bolts) must be in ground under the control of the tunnel
owning authority (i.e. it is necessary to ensure that adequate land is available to accommodate the ground
support).
Removal of material causes unbalanced soil or rock stresses that reduce the capacity of the excavation to
support itself.
The designer should undertake a detailed analysis of existing geophysical factors in conjunction with the
design requirements (e.g. tunnel dimensions need to be considered), to identify the most appropriate ground
support that may be installed without requiring workers to work under unsupported ground.
Ground support systems require consideration of both structural design and soil/rock mechanics. Varying
geological conditions mean that different control measures may be needed during the various construction
phases.
Design specifications for engineering controls, such as shoring support structures, should be prepared by a
competent person in accordance with relevant legislative requirements, Australian Standards, and codes of
practice.
Reference should be made to Workplace Health and Safety Queensland (2011): Tunnelling: Code of
Practice 2007 and WorkCover NSW (2006): Tunnels under Construction: Code of Practice 2006.
4.3. Design for Fire and Fire Resistance
Provision for fire safety should be in accordance with AS 4825: 2011 Tunnel Fire Safety (refer to Section 9).
In addition to consideration of Life Safety addressed in the FEB process, it is also necessary to consider the
protection of the asset, the amount of damage that is sustainable and the degree of disruption to service that
can be sustained by damage to the structural system.

Structurally, in the event of a fire, tunnels should provide:

• the ability to retain the structural integrity of the tunnel, albeit with some damage, in the event of a major
fire
• a limit to structural damage in the direct area of the fire to limit the impact on assets, including adjacent
infrastructure and surrounding road networks
• retention of the structural stability as the area cools to ensure safety of personnel entering the site after
the fire
• an area near to the fire, but which may still be affected by hot smoke and radiant heat, which provides a
level of safety and access for emergency service personnel during an incident
• an area away from the fire, but which may still be affected by hot smoke where emergency equipment
continues to operate and where objects do not fall thereby making conditions safe for people trying to
escape or for emergency service response efforts accessing the incident
• fire-rated separation between the fire zone and the nearby areas of relative safety, such as a cross
passage or the adjacent tunnel.
The approach to structural fire performance should consider the entire tunnel ground support system, not just
specific individual elements of the tunnel support. Compliance to structural adequacy for fire resistance
should therefore be assessed considering the tunnel ground support as a whole system, including all support
elements such as the rockbolt reinforced rock arch in the roof and any tunnel structural lining.
Guidance for the structural fire resistance levels in road tunnels is provided in ‘ITA Guidelines for structural
fires resistance on road tunnels, 2004’ https://about.ita-aites.org/future-events/530/ita-guidelines-for-
structural-fire-resistance-on-road-tunnels.
For tunnels where Dangerous Goods Vehicles are to be accommodated or are likely to be allowed, further
guidance on fire resistance levels are provided in Austroads (2019e).
Typically, the rock/soil/concrete pillar largely creates the separation between tunnels. However, fire doors in
the cross passages and the walls built to house the doors will need to be designed to withstand the required
fire resistance. There are some situations, however, where more onerous design conditions are warranted,
such as where there is the risk of tunnel collapse or inundation. These include situations:
• where any driven tunnel ramps cross over the main tunnels
• where the driven tunnels are shallow and significant structures above may be affected
• in cut-and-cover tunnels where significant structures above the tunnel may be affected
• intermediate floor/roof levels in multilevel cut-and-cover sections
• where failure of the lining would allow the inrush of water in significant quantities which could not be
practically controlled by pumping.
In these situations, a secondary lining using a suitable passive fire protection material may be required.
Further geological investigations are required to determine the passive resistance provided by rock and soil
materials, particularly in areas of poor sub-surface materials. Fire tests may also be required to determine
the spalling effect and depth of spalling with the materials used.
4.4. Live Load Capacity
4.4.1. General
Structural components of tunnels carrying traffic loads should be designed for the standard loading according to
AS 5100: Set-2017 Bridge Design or the Bridge Manual (3rd edition) (NZ Transport Agency 2013a).

Tunnels (including the roof) should be designed for existing and known future loads (e.g. surface traffic
loads, buildings and earth pressures). Easements should be created above, below and around tunnels to
ensure that unintended loads are not imposed on the tunnel.
Development guidelines should be derived for each tunnel to reflect the particular circumstances of that
tunnel and should include a requirement for any future development in the vicinity of the tunnel to be agreed
by the tunnel authority managing it.
4.4.2. Permissible Development and Live Loading above the Tunnel and within the Easement Area
Vehicle live loads – to be applied anywhere in the road corridor

Live loading should be limited to M1600 moving traffic load, S1600 stationary traffic load, A160 axle load and
heavy load platform design load in accordance with the requirements of Australian Standard
AS 5100.2: 2017 and AS 5100.7: 2017, or the HN-HO-72 loading to NZ Transport Agency (2013a) noting
that a dynamic impact factor of 1.3 will be adopted in New Zealand. Note that live loading requirements in
New Zealand are under review.
In addition, crane outrigger loads should be limited to not exceed the additional loads listed below.
Other additional loads

These may include:
• resulting uniformly distributed working loads acting at the surface of up to 50 kPa
• natural surface level build-up of up to 1.0 m with fill equivalent to a uniformly distributed load of 20 kPa
• any loads from permitted developments above the tunnel (such as residential, commercial or industrial)
• loading due to seismic shaking.
4.4.3. Permissible Excavation within the Easement Area
Where future developments or other activities require the excavation of material from areas adjacent to,
above and below the tunnel, they should be assessed by analysis for the tunnel concerned. For any tunnel, a
three-dimensional zone around the tunnel where no work can be undertaken without approval should be
defined. Approval should only be granted where it can be demonstrated that the effect of the work on the
tunnel and the effect of the tunnel on the work is acceptable.
Designers should document the methodology used in analysing the extent of the zone required to be kept
free of any excavation or other works. They should also document the factors to be considered in any future
analysis of proposed works in the vicinity of the tunnel. Recommendations on appropriate analysis methods
and design limitations on any factors to be considered should be documented.
4.4.4. Vehicle-induced Wind-suction
Additional operational loading can occur on internal walls, claddings, false ceilings and the like due to the
wind pressures and ‘suctions’ caused by the moving vehicle traffic. Guidance on determining the design
factors for this loading is provided in Highways England 2020, Clause 2.29.

4.5. Potential Surface Settlement due to Tunnelling
Surface settlement in the general area above tunnels may occur by a variety of mechanisms (singly or in
combination) including:
• ground relaxation
• settlement
• construction disturbance and vibrations.
Where significant elastic settlement is predicted to occur in sensitive areas (for example in the portal areas
where the tunnel is shallow) mitigation measures will be required in the tunnel design and construction
methods to control or reduce the ground movements. This may be achieved by increasing the support to the
tunnel roof and/or enhancing the properties of the surrounding ground. In this way settlement may be
controlled so that damage to adjacent building structures or services is unlikely.
Settlement may occur because of changes in the ground water table (Section 8.3) and may not be limited to
the area directly above the tunnel. Consideration of the potential wider effects of changes in the ground
water level is necessary to ensure that damage to property is minimised and appropriate mitigation strategies
are put in place.
In sections of cut-and-cover tunnel in soft ground conditions, settlement adjacent to the structure may occur.
Control over this type of settlement could be achieved by limiting the deflection of the embedded wall
(contiguous pile wall or diaphragm wall) by propping, tie backs or similar measures.
4.6. Tunnel Seismic Design
The design earthquake acceleration should be based on AS 1170.4: 2007: Structural Design Actions:
Earthquake Actions in Australia or NZS 1170.5: 2004: Structural Design Actions: Earthquake Actions: New
Zealand as appropriate.
Note that seismic design in New Zealand in particular is under significant review after the Canterbury
earthquakes. Therefore, more recent guidance should also be considered, including updates to the
AS/NZS 1170 standards and notifications from the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment
regarding compliance with the NZ Building Code.
The design of the completed tunnels for seismic loading should be based on deformation/displacement
compatibility with the surrounding rock mass or soil undergoing cyclic displacement under the design
earthquake event.
The acceptance criteria for the design of tunnel structures to resist seismic loads in New Zealand is based on
the design philosophy outlined in Section 5 of the Bridge Manual (3rd edition) (NZ Transport Agency 2013a)
which is summarised below.
The primary objective of seismic design should be to ensure that the tunnel can safely perform its function of
maintaining network access/functionality after a seismic event. The extent to which this is possible will
depend on the severity of the event, and thus by implication on its return period.
For design purposes, tunnels should be categorised according to their importance, and assigned a risk or
return period factor. This will then result in an equivalent design earthquake hazard and consequent loading.
The performance of the tunnel structure should be assessed against the following criteria:
• After the design return period event (sometimes referred to in other countries as the maximum design
earthquake or MDE), the tunnel should be usable by emergency traffic, although damage may have
occurred, and some temporary repairs may be required. Permanent repair to reinstate the design
capacities for both static and seismic loading should be feasible.

• After an event with a return period significantly less than the design value (sometimes referred to in other
countries as the operating design earthquake or ODE), damage should be minor, and there should be no
disruption to traffic.
• After an event with a return period significantly greater than the design return period event (the maximum
considered earthquake), the tunnel should not collapse, although damage may be extensive. It should be
usable by emergency traffic after temporary repairs and should be capable of permanent repair, although
a reduced capacity for further seismic events may be acceptable given this is a highly infrequent event.
The design of any tunnel, located in an area which is susceptible to earthquake-induced liquefaction or
where the effects of active faults could have an impact on the tunnel, should recognise the large movements
which may result from settlements, flotation and movements. Where feasible from a practical, economic and
social consequences perspective, measures should be incorporated to eliminate, prevent or mitigate these
effects.

5. Geometric Design
5.1. General
In general, geometric design standards defined in the Guide to Road Design Part 3: Geometric Design
(Austroads 2016) should be adopted. Variations from this Guide may occur for road tunnels because of the
characteristics of tunnels, and where this occurs, the requirements of the Guide to Road Tunnels Part 2 must
prevail.
The geometry of the tunnel must also be related to the other aspects of tunnel design and operation. This
may affect tunnel geometry or require additional space beyond that needed to enclose specified carriageway
widths and traffic clearances. For example, the geometry may be influenced by the requirements for:
• ventilation (length and gradients)
• traffic movements (maintenance, emergencies)
• portals (provision for parking/turning emergency vehicles)
• operational safety (verge widths, lay-bys and long tunnels)
• transitions from the external roadway to the tunnel environment and from the tunnel environment to the
external roadway
• prevention of over-height vehicles entering the tunnel (adequate sight distance)
• traffic escort (marshalling facilities in portal areas)
• adjacent road network (disruption or queues due to tunnel closures).
The final design will be the result of consideration of all the factors in combination, taking account of their
interaction.
5.2. Sight Distance in Tunnels
Sight distance requirements in tunnels are largely the same as those for any other part of the road system
and these are described in the Guide to Road Design Part 3: Geometric Design (Austroads 2016). An
exception to this is the requirement for headlight sight distance, which is not applicable to tunnels (refer
Section 5.5). In addition, the available sight distance on the approach to the tunnel portal should be sufficient
for the approaching driver to be able to come to a stop and still have space available to turn around or be
removed, e.g. over-height vehicles that have not been diverted previously. Adequate space must be
provided for this to occur.
Research has shown that drivers experience additional stress when transitioning from the open road to a
tunnel. It has been found that drivers need about 6 seconds to adapt to the changed environment of the
tunnel (‘six second rule’) so it is necessary that any restrictions to sight distance or other requirements for
driver action be avoided for this time after entering the tunnel (World Road Association (PIARC) 2016c).
Particular attention to the effects of horizontal and vertical curvature is required where the walls, barriers and
equipment suspended from the roof and/or walls may restrict the available sight distance. The most effective
way of overcoming this problem is to adopt sufficiently large radii for the curves so that the line of sight is not
interfered with by these obstructions (Section 5.4 and Section 5.5.2).
In tunnels where the curvature cannot be improved, the posted speed limit in the tunnel will have to be
reduced to provide an adequate level of safety.

Appendix A includes tables of minimum radii to achieve appropriate sight distances based on the following
parameters:
• Perception/reaction time: 1.5 sec up to 90 km/h and 2.0 sec above 90 km/h
• Car coefficient of deceleration: 0.46 g
• Truck coefficient of deceleration: 0.29 g.
The coefficient of deceleration of 0.46 may be applied as a maximum along the length of a tunnel, except for
the 200 m length from the portal entries, where the coefficient of deceleration used is 0.36.
5.3. Operating Speed
In the absence of active enforcement, the 85th percentile operating speed for cars may be assumed to be
10 km/h more than the posted speed. Truck speeds may be less in places due to the size of horizontal
curves on ramps or because of grades (Austroads 2016). The operating speed in the tunnel is to be adopted
as the design speed of the various elements of the design.
For safety reasons, the posted speed in two-way tunnels throughout the world is generally between 60 and
80 km/h.
In one-way tunnels, the posted speed may be between 80 and 100 km/h provided conditions will allow
adequate safety of operation. Where grades create significant speed differentials between vehicles, the
posted speed should be limited to a maximum of 80 km/h. Clearances at the ‘desirable’ end of the range
should be provided in high-speed tunnels.
In urban road tunnels with high or potentially high traffic volumes, the posted speed is generally limited to
80 km/h. The design speed would then be 90 km/h in accordance with normal practice as described above
unless it can be demonstrated that the enforcement is sufficiently strong to reduce the operating speed to a
value close to the posted speed.
To improve driving performance and behaviour, it is recommended the posted speed limits remain consistent
before, inside and after the tunnel environment.
Factors to consider in determining both the design and posted speed for a tunnel include the:
• design and posted speed consistency on adjacent road segments
• speed environment on the approaches, and for on and off-ramps
• enforcement of speed limits
• number of lanes provided and tunnel cross-section
• effects of any bifurcations and junctions
• geometric limitations in the tunnel
• tolerable speed reduction between successive geometric elements
• consistency in the design and posted speeds between adjacent tunnels in a network of tunnels.
The latter requires consideration of the tunnel not in isolation but potentially as that in a network of tunnels.
For tunnels with a significant number of trucks, additional factors include:

• grades
• clearances to walls
• potential speed differential between trucks and other traffic.

5.4. Horizontal Alignment
The horizontal alignment in tunnels is to be designed in accordance with the requirements of Guide to Road
Design Part 3: Geometric Design (Austroads 2016). Specific variations to what is allowed in that Guide
include the following:
• Except for curves on ramps where the operating speed is controlled by the horizontal curve, the
maximum side friction factor to be adopted is 0.2 (for speeds up to 90 km/h) to account for possible oil
spills and of oil build-up through normal use. For design speeds greater than 90 km/h, the absolute
maximum side friction factors allowed are less than this figure.
• The minimum crossfall to be used is 2.0%.
• The maximum superelevation to be used for curves in a tunnel is 2.0%. For curves on entry and exit
ramps, superelevation may be increased to 4%.
• The crossfalls on the surface roads approaching the portals should be limited to –3.0% since the
probability of an incident increases near tunnel entrances because the geometry and environment is in
transition, which can lead to incorrect road user behaviour (OECD 1999; United Nations Economic
Commission for Europe 2001).
Horizontal sight distance may be a controlling factor on the acceptable radius of horizontal curves
(Section 5.2). It may be possible for the markings on the pavement to be arranged to reduce the shoulder
width on one side to provide an additional offset to accommodate the line of sight around a horizontal curve.
Such an adjustment could allow a smaller radius curve to be acceptable where restrictions prevent an
increase in radius.
Since the horizontal clearance in tunnels will be restricted, the radii required to provide stopping sight
distance will be the minimum allowable. This should be determined based on truck stopping distance since
there is no advantage gained by trucks because of their higher eye height. Such radii may not require curve
widening and/or superelevation, and this is an advantage in tunnels. If possible, curve radii should be large
enough to avoid the need for curve widening.
It is important to check the stopping sight distance on every horizontal curve as it depends on the length of
the curve as well as the tunnel cross-section.
Where possible, curve radii should be sufficiently large to avoid the need for superelevation (refer to
Austroads (2016) for appropriate values of side friction to be adopted in conjunction with the adverse cross
slope of 2%). Providing superelevation may have an adverse effect on the cross-section and on the provision
of service ducts under the road. Drainage requirements may also be affected.
The horizontal and vertical alignments should be coordinated in accordance with the principles described in
Guide to Road Design Part 3: Geometric Design (Austroads 2016).
5.5. Vertical Alignment
5.5.1. General
The vertical alignment in tunnels is to be in accordance with Guide to Road Design Part 3: Geometric Design
(Austroads 2016). Note that since tunnels are artificially lit, requirements based on night-time driving are not
relevant in tunnels.
Because it can be expected that drivers are in a heightened state of alertness in tunnels, the perception
reaction times as specified in Section 5.2 may be adopted for the purposes of calculating sight distances.

5.5.2. Vertical Curves
Normal stopping sight distance requirements will apply for all vertical curves, crests and sags. Since tunnels
will be artificially lit, the sight distance criteria normally applied to sag vertical curves will not apply. Desirable
comfort criteria will apply provided drainage and sight distance requirements can be accommodated.
Sag vertical curves must be designed so that overhead obstructions (e.g. lighting, signs, opacity meters,
ventilation fans) will not interfere with the line of sight. In analysing the requirements for sag curves and the
impact of the roof height available (including the effect of equipment suspended from the roof), the eye
height to be adopted is 2.4 m (truck driver eye height) with an object height of 0.8 m (car tail light).
5.5.3. Grades
In addition to the requirements of Guide to Road Design Part 3: Geometric Design (Austroads 2016),
designers must take account of a range of factors that apply to road tunnels (refer also Guide to Road
Tunnels Part 1: Introduction to Road Tunnels (Austroads 2018a)).
Designers should take account of the following:

• The effect on driver perceptions caused by the combination of grades and tunnel wall joints. Joints are
perpendicular to the grade, rather than vertical, and can distort the perception of distance. Misjudgements
on grades between 3% and 5% have been caused by this effect and have led to incidents (Transport and
Road Research Laboratory 1987).
• Oil build-up on gradients over 4% has caused heavily laden articulated vehicles to lose traction.
• Grades should be designed to maintain reasonable truck speed and limit the differential speed of trucks
within the traffic stream (grades should desirably be limited to 1–2% to achieve this – speed analysis is
required). This may be the controlling factor.
Factors to be considered in determining the grade include:

• surface tie-in point elevations
• surface alignment obstructions
• sub-surface alignment obstructions
• geology
• traffic composition (% heavy vehicles) and speed differentials created
• tunnel length
• portal flood immunity requirements
• the minimum longitudinal grade required for adequate longitudinal drainage of 0.5%.
Surface development and other constraints will often require steeper than normal grades at surface
connections particularly in urban areas and brownfield sites where existing topography can be very
constrained. Steeper grades reduce lane capacity, but as the speed environment is lower such grades may
be acceptable where their length is short, the traffic demand is relatively low, or the proportion of heavy
vehicles is also low. The alignment can be tested with vehicle simulation software (e.g. VEHSIM) to establish
an appropriate design.

5.6. Cross-section
5.6.1. General
Cross-section elements are to be designed in accordance with Guide to Road Design Part 3: Geometric
Design (Austroads 2016). Because of the tunnel environment, additional factors must be considered. The
cavern needed at ramp junctions may limit the number of lanes that are possible and may control the depth
(and hence grades) of the tunnel.
5.6.2. Lane Widths
The standard lane width is 3.5 m and should generally be adopted. These widths provide the capacity and
level of service expected of traffic lanes with appropriate clearance on each side.
The capacity of a 3.5 m lane is not reduced if the lateral clearance to a fixed object is 1.8 m. When the
clearance is less than this, and/or the lane width is less than 3.5 m, then the capacity will reduce
(Austroads 2019a). This clearance is determined by the shoulder widths in tunnels.
Curve widening may be required if the radius of the curve is sufficiently small for the design vehicle selected
(Austroads 2016). However, if the curves are sufficiently large to overcome horizontal sight distance
problems, then curve widening should not be an issue. It is desirable that curves are sufficiently large to
avoid the need for curve widening (refer Section 5.4)
If the width of traffic lanes in a tunnel is less than that of the adjoining carriageways in the open air sections
of roadway and a restricted design speed is applied, the reduction in width of the lanes and the speed limit
should commence at least 150 m, preferably 200 m before the entrance to the tunnel (Amundsen &
Sovik 1995; Amundsen, Malvaer & Panes 1997).
5.6.3. Shoulder Widths
Main tunnel
Shoulders are considered part of the hard clearance zone in conjunction with any identified need for
emergency walkways, safety barriers, and emergency stopping bays/pull-off areas. The required functional
areas/clearances must be established for the tunnel and kept continuous throughout the tunnel.
World Road Association (PIARC) recommends that the hard clearance area be ≤ 1.0 m or ≥ 2.0 m in general
traffic tunnels. Dimensions between 1.0 m and 2.0 m lead to operational problems because of potential
confusion created for drivers and potential misuse of the available road space by drivers attempting to create
an additional lane. Note, however, that any dimension less than 1.0 m may result in the driver shying away
from the side wall, thus creating an effective lane width less than 3.5 m, reducing capacity and affecting the
speed adopted by drivers.
In two-lane two-way busway tunnels, a 1.4 m minimum shoulder is typically used so that there is some space
to allow a broken-down bus to pull over and potentially allow passengers to exit. Tunnel management
procedures may then allow other buses to pass the stopped bus.
The wider the hard clearance area, the greater will be the cost of the tunnel. A balance must be sought
between the operational needs (e.g. flexibility to close lanes, ability of vehicles to stop clear of the traffic
lanes, provision of emergency response facilities) and the costs incurred in providing for them.
If the shoulder is not continuous or is narrow, parking bays or pull-off bays may be considered at intervals.
However, such bays may be ineffective as there are indications that in many cases vehicles do not actually
reach the facility on breakdown (Amundsen, Malvaer & Panes 1997).

Stationary traffic resulting from a vehicle breakdown will cause an increased demand on the ventilation
system as well as stress to drivers. It is therefore important consideration be given to a range of physical and
operational responses in the context of the tunnel design environment before settling on a solution.
Shoulders may have to be widened to provide sight distance on horizontal curves or at ramp junctions. This
may require a change in the tunnelling methods adopted.
Ramp and conflict zones

These areas require alternative treatments to the mainline tunnel due to the changed environment, types of
hazards likely to be encountered, and types of manoeuvres being undertaken with a general response being
an increase in the left-hand shoulder width to enable the passing of a stopped vehicle.
Reference should be made to Section 5.7 and to the Guide to Road Design Part 4C: Interchanges
(Austroads 2015a).
5.6.4. Crossfalls
Crossfalls in the tunnel should preferably be 2% to provide drainage of the road surface. This will require
radii sufficiently large to allow adverse superelevation (Section 5.4).
The transition between the crossfalls of the tunnel and approach roadways must be incorporated 150 m prior
to the portal of the tunnel at a rate of rotation of 0.025 radians per second.
5.6.5. Auxiliary Lanes
Auxiliary lanes (e.g. acceleration and deceleration lanes, climbing lanes) may need to be incorporated into
the cross-section if the need has been identified in the planning stages of the project. Details of auxiliary lane
design are provided in Guide to Road Design Part 3: Geometric Design (Austroads 2016). Limiting the speed
differential of vehicles is particularly important in tunnels and if possible, locating speed change facilities
away from the tunnel structure is desirable. However, these lanes will provide the appropriate means for safe
entry to and exit from through lanes where this is required.
Additional information on climbing lanes is also included in Guide to Road Design Part 3: Geometric Design
(Austroads 2016). Further, a simulation (e.g. VEHSIM) analysis may be used to fully analyse the particular
situation and establish whether an auxiliary lane for trucks should be added.
However, additional lanes in a tunnel will be more expensive and may not be able to be included if the span
(i.e. cross-sectional width) becomes too large. Where possible, the geometry should be designed to avoid
the need for auxiliary lanes. Other means of accommodating the issue may be more cost-effective
(e.g. flatter grades, traffic management systems).
5.6.6. Emergency Stopping Lanes
Emergency stopping can be provided by the addition of a lane on the left-hand side of the pavement. A width
of 2.5 to 3.0 m will provide the required function of such a lane, although a width of 2.5 m will not allow for a
vehicle to be stopped clear of the running lane. Provision of an emergency lane will reduce the stress on
drivers and will contribute to a safer tunnel environment. However, it is important that such a lane is not
mis-used as an additional traffic lane, creating additional hazards for the traffic in general.
The high additional cost of continuous emergency stopping lanes usually precludes their inclusion in the
cross-section. Where additional lanes will be required in the future, the provision of the emergency lane in
the initial construction may be appropriate for accommodating the future widening requirements. This will
allow the advantages of the extra width to be realised for a significant time.

Additional lane width or widened shoulders can provide a temporary expedient solution for passing stalled
vehicles where the full emergency lane cannot be provided.
5.6.7. Vehicle Refuges for Tunnel Incidents
A vehicle refuge or stopping bay provides space for a vehicle to stop clear of the traffic lane, thereby
preventing the traffic stream from becoming unduly congested. The initial cost of providing additional traffic
space in the tunnel cross-section to cope with incidents and breakdowns must be balanced against the
operational needs of communications, surveillance, stand-by recovery facilities, consequence of traffic
delays and pressure on the surrounding road network. Such factors will depend on the length of tunnel, its
location (e.g. rural, mountain, urban, sub-aqueous) and on traffic demand.
It may also be difficult and expensive to provide such refuges in some geotechnical conditions and where
continuity of the tunnel geometry is very desirable (e.g. submersed tube tunnels, tunnels created with tunnel
boring machines).
Advice from those experienced in the management of risks in road tunnels, as well as crash and accident
statistics, should be sought to define the need for any additional traffic standing space.
5.6.8. Provision for Evacuation
Unobstructed pedestrian access from the tunnel space to places of relative safety is required. A width of at
least 0.6 m level with the pavement is desirable and may be on the left or right side of the pavement
depending on the location of the evacuation passageways (for access to cross-passages to the other tunnel
bore, the access would usually be on the right-hand side). Note that the road surface itself will be the
predominant emergency egress pathway used.
The emergency access should be at the same level as the roadway surface and accessible to people with
mobility impairment. It may also be provided in a separate, enclosed combined services/escape void or
passage. In addition to serving as access for an emergency exit, it can also be used by maintenance and
traffic operations personnel.
If the evacuation access width is raised above the road pavement creating a walkway, a mountable kerb is
required to allow wheelchair access to the walkway. Such a space will also be available for vehicles to pull
over if required in other circumstances.
The widths available for emergency evacuation in bored tunnels will necessarily be restricted by the cost of
the tunnel construction and the normal verge widths will be used for this purpose. In shorter tunnels, wider
access ways may be feasible within the constraints of cost. A benefit-cost analysis may provide guidance on
the treatment that should be provided.
5.6.9. Emergency Equipment Cabinets
The cross-section should be designed to accommodate emergency equipment cabinets at intervals along the
tunnel as well as at all evacuation points and escape routes. The spacing of these cabinets is determined by
the requirements for spacing of emergency telephones and fire hose reels and hydrants.
5.6.10. Escape Routes
Escape routes through fire doors positioned in central walls or cross-connecting passages should be
provided (Figure 5.1) in accordance with AS 4825: 2011.
All escape route exits should be accessible to all people, including those in a wheelchair, and escape doors
able to be opened easily under all circumstances. Consideration may be given to systems that open the
escape door at the touch of a button, with a manual failsafe option in case of an electrical fault.

Where two or more tunnels are linked by cross-connections, the effect of opening one or more of those
cross-connection doors should be considered in both normal and emergency situations. The design should
incorporate features which reduce or eliminate any hazard likely to be caused by any opening of a
cross-connection. There may also be a need for protection at the cross-doors in the hard clearance area
against the other tube traffic if there is an unacceptable risk that such traffic may not have cleared the tunnel
tube or may not have been stopped when people use the escape route.
Cross-passages are also used for the accommodation of equipment for communications and systems
control. Deluge manifolds and adequate space and protection are required for them, in addition to a
passageway suitable for the movement of people during evacuation, or for maintenance and inspection
personnel. Note that while the communications and electrical equipment can be located within a
cross-passage, it must be in its own separate fire-rated space.
Figure 5.1: Identifying the escape route (CityLink tunnel, Melbourne)
Note: The access to the escape door must be at ground level and be suitable for all users including those in wheelchairs.
Source: Transurban.
5.6.11. Traffic Barriers
The design of traffic barriers to protect all tunnel or road users including vehicle occupants, as well as the
tunnel is to be in accordance with the Guide to Road Design Part 6: Roadside Design, Safety and Barriers
(Austroads 2020a). However, the characteristics of tunnels may need further consideration of the details of
the design of the barriers, and this is discussed in this section.
The geometric shape of a tunnel poses additional risks that are required to be protected by barriers. These
include:
• protecting the tunnel and other infrastructure from being impacted by vehicles
• reduced sight distances on curved sections
• reduced lateral clearances.
The cross-section of the tunnel is such that space for deflection of some types of traffic barriers is not
available. Therefore, in general, traffic barriers in tunnels should be concrete with the standard profile used
by the road agency. Some road agencies now normally use single-slope concrete barriers with a minimum
height of 1100 mm. However, an 800 mm high barrier may be considered if this helps achieve sight distance
and the operating speed for both cars and trucks is ≤ 90 km/h, and allowance for working width is made as
described in Section 5.6.12. The design should ensure that the damage resulting from a vehicle impacting
the barrier will not create an undue risk to the vehicle occupants or other road users.

The effect of the barriers on the movement of pedestrians during an emergency must also be considered, as
appropriate access to places of relative safety must be provided.
Special consideration should be given to the provision of crash cushions at tunnel entrances, approaches to
tunnels, ends of indentations for stopping bays and the like within the tunnel, and merge and diverge areas.
The confined space of the tunnel must be adequately considered when designing for crash cushions.
5.6.12. Working Width
Working width is described in Guide to Road Design Part 6: Roadside Design, Safety and Barriers
(Austroads 2020a).
If the likelihood of a vehicle travelling close to the barrier is negligible, it may be possible to reduce the
working width. These conditions may be achieved when:
• impact frequency is considered highly unlikely (low % heavy vehicles)
• shoulder widths are sufficient to reduce impact potential
• increased lateral widths are required to attain sight visibility to reduce impact potential.
In addition, consideration can be given to the following factors:

• potential damage caused during a crash will not result in any injuries and will be generally localised
• repairs to walls or cladding can be undertaken during off-peak lane closures
• maintenance requirements are not expected to be onerous.
However, the potential damage to vehicles that may impact the wall or attachments to the walls must be
considered.
The working width in the tunnel proper may not be required if:
• there is no obstacle that will snag part of a heavy vehicle that impacts the barrier
• there is a suitable transition from the area where barriers must have the working width (this is usually
achieved by sloping the top of the wall on the tunnel transition).
Note also that some tunnels have an architectural panel that will be incapable of withstanding an impact on
top of the barrier. Any other equipment within the working width must be frangible.
5.6.13. Tunnel Envelope and Vehicle Clearance
Vertical clearance
In addition to network constraints there are a number of other factors affecting the selection of tunnel height
clearances including:
• network consistency
• the likely number of vehicles over the maximum permissible vehicle height given the freight route
designation
• the availability of alternative routes that accommodate the higher vehicles
• the desirability of the higher vehicles using alternative routes
• the limited benefits of allowing the higher vehicles on the route (e.g. any forgone toll revenues, time
savings, urban amenity)

• the likely cost of including additional clearance allowances over the full length of the tunnel project. (The
direct cost of damage to a section of the tunnel lighting, ventilation, signage, structural elements, etc. of
an errant over-height vehicle entering the tunnel plus the disruption costs should be included in any
benefit-cost analysis.)
Note that tunnels will not usually be part of the high clearance network for the road system. A benefit-cost
analysis is required to justify additional height clearances if high loads are to be accommodated in a tunnel.
Alternative routes should be assessed before adopting higher clearances in the tunnel.
Appropriate allowances for the equipment required for overhead signage, lighting, fire protection jet fans and
any smoke ducting requirements must be included in determining the overall dimensions of the tunnel.
Mitigating measures may include placing the jet fans in recesses in the soffit or locating the fans in any
corners. This equipment must fit entirely within the envelope and the required clearances for protection from
compressible loads that pass under the tunnel portal, loose ropes, flapping tarpaulins and the like.
The type of construction (e.g. cut-and-cover, driven or bored) may influence a decision as the resulting
cross-sections are different. Bored tunnels are circular, driven tunnels have a somewhat flatter roof and
cut-and-cover tunnel roofs are generally flat.
Clearances should be carefully related to carriageway and side verge widths and to the minimum ‘as-built’
structural profile that the tunnel must achieve. Note also that dimensional tolerances of bored, cut-and-cover
and immersed tube tunnels are strongly influenced by the construction process.
Over-height vehicle protection
To protect tunnel equipment from damage from over-height vehicles and potential secondary incidents,
appropriate advisory signage should be incorporated within the tunnel portal and prior to the last opportunity
for a vehicle to take an alternative route (Section 13.3.9). A protection barrier is required immediately prior to
the tunnel portal to prevent the entry of vehicles that have ignored the warning messages. A virtual barrier
using hologram technology could be considered (e.g. Sydney Harbour Tunnel).
Installation of traffic signals and red-light cameras should also be considered.
Over-height barriers in advance of the portals should:

• be located on the approach side of emergency median crossings near the tunnel portal so that traffic
access to these emergency median crossings is also controlled
• be located at a distance (not less than 100 m) from the portals sufficient to:
– allow a suitable staging area for emergency services during incidents
– provide sufficient distance for the impacting vehicle to stop before the tunnel portal
– ensure that debris from the impact with the barrier does not enter the tunnel
– provide appropriate access and space for emergency services to remove the offending vehicle
• provide a physical barrier across all traffic lanes and shoulders to safely prevent over-height vehicles from
entering the tunnel
• allow the passage of emergency and maintenance vehicles
• prevent damage to signage over tunnel portals and entrance through strutting or architectural furniture
prior to the portal.
These barriers are often made of steel rail and frame construction and should comply with the load
resistance requirements of AS 5100 Set-2017 or NZ Transport Agency (2013a). The design should ensure
that the damage resulting from an over-height vehicle impacting the barrier will not create an undue risk to
the vehicle occupants or other road users.

For flat-roofed portals a steel insert may be placed on the leading edge, incorporated into a small reduction
in the height of the portal soffit (in the order of 50 mm) to provide additional protection in the event that the
impacting vehicle does reach the portal. This is not a substitute for an over-height barrier.
5.7. Ramp Connections/Diverges and Merges
In general, locating ramp connections, diverges and merges within the tunnel or close to the tunnel portals is
not desirable and if possible, the overall road layout should provide for these movements separate from the
tunnel and its portals. However, there will be cases where such connections are required as an essential part
of the road network and their design needs to recognise the characteristics of tunnels.
Entrances to and exits from the tunnel should be designed in accordance with the Guide to Road Design
Part 4C: Interchanges (Austroads 2015a), as modified by Figure 5.2, Figure 5.3, Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5.
These modifications have been made to meet the specific needs of tunnels and override the requirements of
Austroads (2015a). Note that entry ramps must enter on the left-hand side of the carriageway.
Divergence of two major carriageways should be designed in accordance with Figure 5.3 and branch
connections (convergence of two major carriageways) in accordance with Figure 5.5.
Appropriate crash attenuation devices should be used in gore areas and designed in accordance with Guide
to Road Design Part 6: Roadside Design, Safety and Barriers (Austroads 2020a) and as shown in Figure 5.2,
Figure 5.3, Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5.
5.8. Emergency and Maintenance Facilities
5.8.1. Vehicle Crossovers
Vehicle crossovers may be required on tunnel approaches to enable contra-flow operation in twin bore
tunnels, or convoy operation (i.e. one-way operation alternatively for each direction) in single bore tunnels to
meet maintenance and operational needs. If there is an intersection near the tunnel, care should be taken to
ensure that all traffic can use the crossovers. Care should also be taken that sight lines are provided through
crossovers, particularly those adjacent to widely spaced twin bores, and that suitable temporary or
permanent signing, including any necessary speed limit signs is also provided. Crossovers should also be
considered for emergency services vehicles to assist access to either tube.
During normal operation, suitable means of preventing vehicles from crossing from one carriageway to the
other must be provided to avoid a safety hazard. When implementing contra-flow operation, movable or
demountable barriers should be considered and evaluated in terms of possible reductions in maintenance
costs.
Where contra-flow operations are to be provided, ventilation and fire safety requirements need additional
consideration. In many cases, suitable alternative routes will provide a more cost-effective way of dealing
with closure of one of the tunnel bores.
5.8.2. Turning Bays
In long tunnels, consideration should be given to providing for emergency vehicles to turn around, and if this
provision is made, the effects on fire separation, ventilation and smoke control must be considered.

5.8.3. Emergency Services Access and Parking
Access for fire brigade and emergency services is essential for appropriate response to fire and other
emergencies. A staging area should be provided for the parking of emergency services and police vehicles
and equipment. This may require staging areas at each access point. While access via the portals is usual, it
may be possible to provide access by way of intermediate ventilation stations or intermediate emergency
egress facilities. Such means of emergency access should be considered in the design of the tunnel and
appropriate facilities provided.
It is essential that emergency service vehicles and personnel can access the site of the incident with
minimum delay. Survival of people injured in such incidents may depend on how long it takes for full medical
assistance to reach them. Consideration of possible alternative means of access when traffic is blocking the
entrance to the tunnel should be made. Operational plans (refer to Guide to Road Tunnels Part 3: Operation
and Maintenance (Austroads 2018b)) need to be designed with these issues in mind.

Figure 5.2: Exit ramps in tunnels

Figure 5.3: Exit ramps – major diverge and secondary exit on a ramp in tunnels

Figure 5.4: Entry ramps in tunnels

Figure 5.5: Branch connections in tunnels

6. Pavement Design
6.1. General
Pavements are categorised as:

• Surface roads – conventional granular with a thin wearing course, flexible and concrete pavements.
• Pavements within tunnels and designed as a conventional pavement.
• Pavements that are structural slabs or floors and designed like a bridge.
• The ramp leading into a tunnel is typically a ‘U’ shaped structure where the walls and base are reinforced
concrete and the pavement is the structural reinforced concrete floor with an asphalt wearing course.
Underpasses with the sole purpose of moving traffic under a carriageway or lanes, are not considered
tunnels.
Details of the pavement types in tunnels are discussed in Section 6.2. Refer to Commentary 1 in Guide to
Road Tunnels Part 1: Introduction to Road Tunnels (Austroads 2018a) for more details of the types of tunnel
construction and structures.
The following sections follow a similar sequence as the Guide to Pavement Technology Part 2: Pavement
Structural Design (Austroads 2017).
6.2. Tunnel Structure and Pavement
Unlike traditional flexible and rigid pavements where selection of the pavement is typically chosen on the
lowest whole-of-life costs, the pavement structure for a tunnel is dependent on the tunnel type. Section 3.3 of
Guide to Road Tunnels Part 1: Introduction to Road Tunnels (Austroads 2018a) notes that tunnels are
constructed in a wide range of geological and geographical conditions and environments, which will impact
on the selection of the following construction approaches:
• cut-and-cover where the tunnel ceiling is at a shallow depth below the existing ground level
• cast-in-place structure in a waterway using a coffer dam
• immersed reinforced precast concrete tube sunk into place for underwater crossings
• mined or bored tunnels where there is sufficient ground cover
• combinations of the above.
In Sydney, where there is sound sandstone rock, many of the road tunnels are mined and the walls and
ceiling of the tunnel are shotcreted, as shown in Figure 6.1. In these tunnels, the tunnel is ‘drained’ or free to
leak behind the walls and under the floor, and the pavement is constructed directly onto the floor of the
tunnel with the first pavement layer being a drainage layer. If water infiltration levels into the tunnel are high,
the tunnel is tanked and lined with cast-in-place or precast concrete walls (shown in Figure 6.2).
The shape of a tanked tunnel is either circular or elliptical for two or thee lanes in width, respectively. As
shown in Figure 6.3, a circular tunnel section requires significant backfill material compared to an elliptical
tunnel section where the backfill is less than 1.0 m in depth. In these cases, the tunnel is supported on
backfill earthworks constructed to road agency earthworks specifications and designed in accordance with a
conventional pavement design procedure with the design subgrade strength limited to 15%.

Figure 6.1: Typical cross-section of a drained mined tunnel and the pavement is placed onto the floor of the
tunnel
Shotcrete walls and ceilings
Shoulder Traffic lane Traffic lane Shoulder
Fall
Pavement layers Specific

‘Dental’ concrete in dips drainage pit
Floor of mined tunnel for tunnels
Figure 6.2: A mined tunnel under construction with the walls and ceiling being tanked before concrete is
placed
Source: George Vorobieff.

Figure 6.3: A circular (left) and elliptical (right) tunnel cross-section with common backfill profiles
Source: Highways Agency (1999).
For underwater crossing tunnels constructed by precast concrete in the form of an immersed tube sunk into
place, the pavement is integrated into the structure, such that only the wearing course is required (refer to
Figure 6.4. In some cases, the tunnel designer may require additional mass for the tunnel and a cast-in-place
mass concrete layer is included in the profile.
Figure 6.4: Cross-section of a no cell and centre cell immersed tube tunnel where the floor of the tunnel
becomes the pavement
Source: Highways Agency (1999).
The pavement structure for a cut-and-cover tunnel will vary according to the function of the floor of the tunnel
and the ground water level (refer to Figure 6.5). For example, if the ground water level is above the
pavement surface, the uplift pressure results in a thick concrete layer spanning between walls of the tunnel
and the pavement becomes the structural floor of the tunnel. Alternatively, the pavement in cut-and-cover
tunnel may consist of reinforced concrete with evenly spaced vertical ground anchors drilled into the
formation and the pavement is also under compression due to lateral loading from the earth pressure behind
the tunnel walls.
Pavement designers must always work closely with road designers, structural and geotechnical engineers,
and geologists to ensure the pavement design, including subsurface drainage where required, takes into
consideration various ground support conditions along the length of the tunnel, surface drainage details in
the tunnel and near the tunnel portals, the tunnel construction method and all operational conditions.

Figure 6.5: Typical section through a cut-and-cover tunnel with a thick reinforced concrete pavement
6.3. Health and Safety in Design
Throughout the design process, designs must include analysis of Health and Safety in Design (HSiD)
implications for both construction and all subsequent life cycle phases of the asset (commissioning,
operation, inspection and maintenance, modification, decommissioning and demolition). Pavement
engineering input may not commence until the start of the detailed design process and appropriate agency
guidelines considered at the early design stages will minimise changes to pavement configurations in the
final design.
Documentary evidence of the designer’s and project manager’s efforts and due diligence with regard to
Health and Safety in Design throughout the design stages is to be retained. The pavement designer is to
contribute to the assessment of the hazard and demonstrate that this has been addressed in the safety in
design process. Refer also to Section 4.1.2.
6.4. Pavement Design Period
The common design period of tunnels is 100 years and durable materials are sought for the tunnel structure.
However not all structural, electrical and mechanical elements in tunnels are designed for 100 years, and for
example, the design period for mechanical and electrical equipment is up to 25 years. The typical design
traffic period for heavy duty pavements is 40 years and this period is chosen to determine the estimated
number of heavy vehicle repetitions onto the pavement in order to size the base and subbase layers. The
pavement may exceed the design period of 40 years however, when built according to surface road
specifications before reconstruction with common preservation techniques.
For freeways and motorways, the project reliability is chosen at 95% (refer to Table 2.1, in Guide to
Pavement Technology Part 2 (Austroads 2017). For tunnel pavements, a higher project reliability (i.e. 97.5%)
is warranted as pavement rehabilitation would be costly and cause significant disruption to the road network.
6.5. Design Traffic
The type of vehicles that use tunnels are Austroads Classes 1 to 12. Vehicles carrying dangerous goods are
generally not permitted in tunnels (refer to Section 2.2, Guide to Pavement Technology Part 2
(Austroads 2017) for further information).
Tunnel owners and operators consider that specialised vehicles that exceed the legal axle limits and
dimensions are unlikely to use tunnels and would use surface roads. However, during construction, it is not
uncommon for sections of the pavement to be designed for high axle loads from earthmoving vehicles using
the pavement as a haul road.

Determination of the design traffic follows the same procedure as detailed in Section 7, Guide to Pavement
Technology Part 2 (Austroads 2017). Some key considerations for determining the design traffic over a
40-year design period are:
• Use the heavy vehicle daily traffic rather than a per cent of the estimated AADT in the first year.
• Estimate the annual growth of heavy vehicles and do not assume it is similar to light vehicles or that the
growth will be constant during the design period.
• Use a Traffic Load Distribution based on similar tunnel WIM data or conduct a route analysis.
• Table 7.3, Guide to Pavement Technology Part 2 (Austroads 2017) notes a Lane Distribution Factor of
1.0 for a two-lane road. It is unlikely that all heavy vehicles will use the left lane of a two-lane tunnel and it
is suggested that traffic distribution data be sought from existing local tunnels.
• Determine if the estimated design traffic over 40 years is to be reduced due to the lane capacity being
reached within the design period. For more details on calculating the lane capacity, refer to Section 7.4.6,
Guide to Pavement Technology Part 2 (Austroads 2017).
6.6. Pavement Wearing Surface
The pavement wearing surface may be either asphalt or concrete, and this will depend on:
• The design period required and taking into consideration the cost to replace the surface and possibly
reinstate joints.
• Aquaplaning potential near the entrance and exit zones of the tunnels and surface geometry and may
require specific requirements for minimum surface texture depth of transverse grooves.
• The required skid resistance at construction and intervention triggers during the operation of the tunnel
may be lowered due to the dry surface of the tunnel.
• Light or dark pavement surfaces and the reflectivity impact on lighting design (i.e. lighter road surface
requires less lighting).
• Construction equipment operational dimensional limits for pavement resurfacing.
• The susceptibility to damage by vehicle oil droppings and spills, and water leaks from the tunnel ceiling.
With the exception of the entry and exit zones near the tunnel portal and the periodic testing of the deluge
fire system, the pavement surface is continuously dry. Without the surface becoming wet and moving tyres to
assist in flushing the surface, it is likely that any surface texture may become clogged and reduce skid
resistance.
No road agencies permit open graded asphalt (OGA) surfaces as they may retain flammable or toxic
spillages arising from an incident. However, when an OGA layer is used outside the tunnel portal it should be
above the level of drain covers to allow the layer to drain into the pit. Although this causes ride discomfort at
the change in levels when pits are located in the trafficable lane, holes cut into the pit frame to drain the OGA
layer have been unsuccessful.
When using concrete pavements without an asphalt wearing surface, consideration should be given to a
longitudinal hessian drag and tining surface finish in the wet concrete or diamond grinding the surface before
opening the tunnel for operation. Most agencies require an additional 10 mm in thickness 1 in the concrete
base to allow for future diamond grinding in the trafficable lanes and feathering the grinding into the
shoulder.
1 Typically representing a 5 mm average grinding depth per treatment.

6.7. Construction and Maintenance Considerations
It is common to use road agency road making specifications for pavements in tunnels. Due to the limited
operating height in tunnels, the designer should take into consideration the cumulative positive tolerances in
specifications of various pavement layers. Although it is impractical to reduce the construction tolerances, the
tolerance could be adjusted such that the positive tolerance is set at +0.0 mm and 10 mm is added to the
critical pavement layer after the pavement analysis is completed. Specific pavement layer tolerances are to
be included in the design brief and related road making specifications.
Where movement joints occur in tunnel structures and pavements, such as for submersible units every
100 m or at the interface between different tunnel types or at portals, the design of these joints must take into
consideration future maintenance activities. For example, future diamond grinding or mill and resheeting the
asphalt wearing course should be undertaken without damaging or causing distress to the joint system.
Another issue is whether the joint can be reinstated in an efficient manner to minimise the tunnel closure
period. In some instances where the pavement wearing course is dense graded asphalt, a different asphalt
mix may be required in the wide joint slot.
Where asphalt wearing surfaces require milling operations, a safe working environment needs to be
considered where there may be dust generation and exhaust fumes from conventional equipment in the
closed environment of the tunnel.
If a waterproof membrane is required to protect the concrete structure supporting the asphalt wearing
course, consideration must be given to the life of the membrane and whether mill and resheeting operations
would have an impact on the long-term durability of the membrane.
White coloured line marking on concrete surfaces of surface roads and in tunnels is common. A technique
used to enhance the dashed line marking is to use black strips on either side of the white dash. Alternatively,
a raised marker may be used at the start of the dash.
6.8. Tunnel Environment
The climate in a road tunnel is typically constant and relatively dry, except at the entrance of the tunnel
where the sun may heat the pavement surface and wind driven rain frequently wets the pavement surface.
There is no published data for the ambient air temperature inside a tunnel; however, anecdotal evidence
indicates that the air temperature is approximately 25 °C. Unless other data is provided by the road agency,
it is suggested that 25 °C be used in lieu of the WAMPT for the site of the tunnel (refer to Appendix B, Guide
to Pavement Technology Part 2 (Austroads 2017) for more information).
In mined tunnels, water leaks are known to occur and wet patches may be visible on the pavement surface
(as shown in Figure 6.6).
Figure 6.6: View of a wet patch and staining from a water leak occurring from the ceiling of the tunnel

6.9. Subgrade Evaluation
The subgrade support strength for pavements varies in different tunnel types and moisture movement in
undrained tunnels is insignificant compared to the high levels of moisture likely to occur in wet mined tunnels.
Soils used for earthwork layers in tunnels should be durable and not breakdown due to repeated dry and
wetting, and repeated traffic loading.
The maximum permissible design subgrade strength for pavements in Guide to Pavement Technology Part 2
(Austroads 2017) is 15%. For the design of a concrete pavement, the maximum effective subgrade strength
is 75% for a 150 mm thick lean-mix concrete subbase and design subgrade strength of 5% or greater (refer
to Figure 9.1, Guide to Pavement Technology Part 2 (Austroads 2017)). Given that a minimum 200 mm thick
layer of no fines concrete subbase is generally used in drained tunnels, it is considered that this subbase
layer is equivalent to a 150 mm thick lean-mix concrete layer.
For a flexible pavement design supported on the floor of a mined rock tunnel, the maximum design subgrade
strength limit of 15% is still to be applied (refer to Section 3.6, Guide to Pavement Technology Part 2
(Austroads 2017)).
6.10. Surface and Subsurface Drainage
Detailed guidance for pavement subsurface drainage is provided in the Guide to Pavement Technology
Part 10: Subsurface Drainage (Austroads 2009c) but has limited applicability to tunnels. Although undrained
tunnels may be considered dry, the entrances to tunnels, leaking joints and the testing of the fire water
system will result in water entering the pavement and supporting layers. A subsurface drainage system
should be designed and incorporated in the lowest point of an undrained tunnel or on the low side of the
drained tunnel. A durable filter material for these subsurface drains and layers consists of no fines concrete
rather than single-size aggregate or coarse sand commonly used in trench drains for surface roads.
In NSW where the pavement is supported on sound rock in a mined tunnel, the subbase layer in a
continuously reinforced concrete pavement is no fines concrete and a trench drain is located on the low side
of the pavement. Typically, the trench drain is 300 mm wide and 300 mm deep (below the underside of the
subbase). If the supporting rock has a high fines content or likely to break down over time, a geotextile fabric
is placed on the floor of the tunnel. If the longitudinal grade exceeds 3%, such as near the entrance or exit to
a tunnel, additional transverse trench drains every 50 m are incorporated in the no fines concrete subbase to
improve moisture movement into the subsurface drainage system.
In tunnels where the pavement is the structural floor of the tunnel, subsurface drains may not be applicable
because the floor and walls may be tanked.
Most agencies do not permit drainage pits to be located in the trafficable lane and a minimum 1.0 m wide
shoulder is used to locate the pit and cover (refer to Figure 6.7). When pit covers or other utility access
covers are located in the trafficable lane, the covers are subject to tyre impact loads and a bump in the
surface occurs resulting in reduced ride quality.

Figure 6.7: All surface drainage pit covers should be located in the shoulder and not in the trafficable lane
6.11. Pavement Materials
Pavement materials used for surface roads are also suitable for pavements in tunnels; however, unbound
and modified granular materials are unlikely to be used due to the thickness required to meet the long design
life. Additional costs for excavation compared to other pavement alternatives are also an issue.
Where asphalt is used, the factors affecting the asphalt fatigue life are similar to those listed in Section 6.5.9,
of Guide to Pavement Technology Part 2 (Austroads 2017), except the operating environment is constant
and apart from the tunnel portal zone, the asphalt would not be subject to heating and cooling from solar
exposure. Although the posted speed limit in tunnels could be as high as 100 km/h, heavy vehicle speeds
are likely to be well below the posted speed limit due to traffic congestion in urban areas. Consideration
should be given to the impact on asphalt modulus from steep longitudinal grades at tunnel exits and
generally lower traffic speed.
Conventional concrete mixes used for surface concrete roads has been successfully used for concrete
pavements in tunnels. Where a drainage layer is required, it is common to use a no fines concrete mix with a
compressive strength varying from 5 to 20 MPa (Roads and Maritime Services 2016). There is no
information on the assigned design modulus of this material and laboratory testing would have to be
undertaken should a no fines concrete mix be used as a subbase in a flexible pavement.
In mined tunnels a ‘road header’ is commonly used to excavate rock and the floor of the tunnel is not always
uniform or pockets of weak material are removed. In these instances, and where the tunnel floor and walls are
not permanently lined or tanked, a lean-mix concrete (sometimes referred to as ‘dental concrete’) is placed in
these small depressions. It is unusual for lean-mix concrete to cover the full width of the tunnel floor.
6.12. Design of Pavement
The design of a flexible or rigid pavement in a tunnel is no different to the design of a surface road. The
design method outlined for flexible and rigid pavements in Sections 8 and 9 in Guide to Pavement
Technology Part 2 (Austroads 2017), respectively, is to be used.

Where asphalt is used, the selection of the binder and therefore, the design properties of the asphalt used
for the mechanistic-empirical procedure should take into consideration the potential wet environment in a
drained tunnel and that there is no sunlight (except at the tunnel portals) on the asphalt to make the binder
harden.
For rigid pavements in a drained tunnel, the concrete base layer must not be placed directly on a no-fines
concrete subbase and a 30 mm thick asphalt interlayer is commonly used to separate the base and subbase
(refer to Figure 6.8). This interlayer does not preclude the same rigid pavement design procedure detailed in
Section 9 of Guide to Pavement Technology Part 2 (Austroads 2017). With the relatively constant pavement
temperature in the tunnel (except at entry ramps), the minimum amount of longitudinal reinforcement is used
in continuously reinforced concrete base.
Figure 6.8: Typical pavement profile of CRCP base layer, AC7 asphalt interlayer and no fines concrete
subbase for drained tunnel
CRCP Min. 250 mm
AC7 interlayer Min 30 mm
No fines concrete subbase

Min. 200 mm
Design subgrade or floor

of tunnel
In some tunnels, the pavement may be the structural floor and no pavement design is required. Design
detailing is to be given to the requirement of a wearing surface and expansion joints where specified in the
design brief.

7. Environmental Considerations
7.1. Noise
7.1.1. Tunnel-generated External Noise
The source of noise emanating from a tunnel is generally that produced by the tunnel ventilation system,
namely:
• reverberant noise
• air path noise
• break-out noise
• portal noise.
The control of noise to the outside environment will depend on individual circumstances and the area
background noise levels during fan operation. The external noise generated should not exceed acceptable
standards for nearby noise-sensitive development.
Portal noise is influenced by a number of factors including engine noise (particularly trucks) and tyre noise
from the pavement. It can also be influenced by the location of fans inside the tunnel and the design will
have to consider this when deciding on the proximity of fans to the portal.
In addition, long concrete tunnels may have an effect on concentrating and directing sound energy
emanating from the tunnel. There may also be differences in the frequency of road surface noise generated
by various surface types (e.g. brushed concrete versus asphalt) and appropriate mitigation measures may
have to be implemented.
Section 10.4.6 provides guidance on the design of fans to limit the noise generated from the system.
The noise generated by the flow of traffic also has to be considered and appropriate mitigation measures
taken to limit the exposure of nearby noise-sensitive receptors. The Guide to Road Design Part 6B:
Roadside Environment (Austroads 2015b) provides guidance on controlling noise from this source. In New
Zealand, practitioners should refer to NZS 6806: 2010, and State Highway Noise Barrier Design Guide (NZ
Transport Agency 2010b).
7.1.2. In-tunnel Noise
In-tunnel noise is produced from the tunnel ventilation and other equipment as well as from the traffic using
the tunnel. Section 10.4.6 provides guidance on the acceptable level of in-tunnel noise.
7.1.3. Traffic Noise
The construction of elevated and transition structures to tunnels should incorporate elements designed to
minimise the transmission of vehicle noise to any adjacent or nearby habitable buildings.

This may include the provision of:

• noise panels in transition structures
• an open graded asphalt (OGA) surfacing – referred to as open graded porous asphalt (OGPA) in New
Zealand – on elevated and transition structures and surface roads (not in the tunnels as the OGA
conveys spills of flammable liquids into the pavement making them difficult to collect and liable to fire
which will be difficult to extinguish) curved sound-absorbent panels on the sides of portal entrances and
elevated transition structures.
Specific noise criteria should be defined on a case-by-case basis to meet local environmental requirements.
Practitioners should therefore refer to local jurisdictional guidelines for the relevant criteria and measures to
eliminate and where this is not possible mitigate the effects of noise associated with vehicles and other
tunnel operations on tunnel users and people nearby to the tunnel, including those living in, working in or
visiting the local area.
7.2. Visual Amenity Considerations
7.2.1. General Considerations
Planning for a tunnel should include consideration of the urban design implications of the project ensuring
that the principles of urban design are applied (refer to Roads and Maritime Services 2014a). This should
result in infrastructure that is not only fit for purpose but is integrated well with the surrounding environment,
is sensitive to its context and provides a visually acceptable product.
The planning should also consider the potential improvements for existing roads and connections associated
with the project, since the implementation of the project will divert traffic from these roads thereby providing
an opportunity to improve the local environment. It is also the case that providing a tunnel for an urban road
allows the surface land to be retained for higher and better uses.
The visual impact of tunnels is generally limited to the portals and structures associated with the tunnel, but
external to the tunnel (e.g. ventilation exhausts) as well as the transition areas between the open road and
the tunnel proper. A specialist in the field of landscape and urban design will be required to develop these
needs, which should be considered and resolved in the earliest stages of the project planning. Figure 7.1
and Figure 7.2 show examples of the urban design of tunnel portals.
The internal appearance of the tunnel should reassure the drivers as to the safety of the tunnel (Figure 7.3),
be well signed both for general navigation requirements and for emergency conditions, and have surfaces
conducive to good lighting conditions (Section 11).

Figure 7.1: Portal and transition design – EastLink tunnel, Victoria
Source: Linking Melbourne Authority.

Figure 7.2: Entrance to Heysen tunnels – South Australia
Source: Department of Planning, Transport and Infrastructure, South Australia.
Figure 7.3: Entrance to the Lane Cove tunnel – Sydney
Source: Roads and Maritime Services (2014a).

7.2.2. Portal Design
The tunnel portal is the transition between the above and below-ground sections of the highway where the
road user moves from one driving environment to another. The portal design should be considered from the
perspective of the user and of the external observer as both have different expectations.
From the road user perspective, the design of the portal should contribute to road safety and driver
behaviour by assisting the road user to negotiate the transition between the open road and the tunnel
environment by reassuring the driver that it is safe to proceed into the tunnel. World Road Association
(PIARC) (2008d) notes:
The design of tunnel portals should ensure that the transition from outside the tunnel to inside
the tunnel should be as smooth as possible (width, lighting, speed, steering etc), that drivers are
able to pay full attention to the tunnel entrance, that they do not change their longitudinal or
lateral driving too much and that they feel relaxed and safe when entering the tunnel.
The architecture of the portal should be designed to reassure drivers and reduce the stress that occurs when
approaching a tunnel (good defining properties, avoids a confining appearance, informative). A funnel shape
with light colours (refer to World Road Association (PIARC) (2008d), Figure 7.4 Entrance D and Figure 7.5)
tends to achieve this. Entrance D in Figure 7.4 was seen by users as the most informative, clearly laid out
and as having the best guiding properties. The Japanese portal (Figure 7.5) was designed according to the
philosophy of preventing narrow entries and providing high luminance around the portal.
Figure 7.4: Tunnel entrances in Austria
Notes:
• Entrance D was seen a s the most informative, clearly laid out and as having the best guiding properties and as the
least dangerous.
• Entrance B was assessed negatively in terms of being informative, clearly laid out and having good guiding
properties, but having the least slowing down effect.
• Entrance A was mentioned most frequently in the context of having a slowing down effect, being confining and
dangerous
• Entrance E was also assessed as having a slowing down effect, but not confining or dangerous.
Source: World Road Association (PIARC) (2008d).

Figure 7.5: Japanese tunnel portal
Source: World Road Association (PIARC) (2008d).
From the perspective of the external observer, the visual impact of the tunnel portal should be mitigated and
integrated with the surrounding environment. Attention to the architectural detailing and material selection as
well as the bulk and massing of these elements will assist in achieving these requirements.
Landscaping of the surrounding space should be undertaken in accordance with the requirements of Guide
to Road Design Part 6B: Roadside Environment (Austroads 2015b). Additional guidance may be found in
Roads and Maritime Services (2014a) and Sheridan (2009).
7.2.3. Transition Zones
The design of transition zones between the tunnel and the open road should:
• give the driver confidence in entering the tunnel environment
• provide a suitable transition from the tunnel to the external environment on leaving the tunnel
• place the tunnel infrastructure in context with reference to the tunnel approaches and the surrounding
environment.
To achieve this, the following measures, in addition to those described in Section 7.2.2 should be adopted:
• Ensure that there are no signs or signals in the zone 200 m before the tunnel entrance.
• Avoid changes in width of the roadway from the outside to the inside of the tunnel. It is likely, however,
that the width of shoulder in the tunnel will be less than that on the approach roadway. Any reduction in
lane width from the open road to the tunnel is not recommended but if it must happen, then this reduction
and the reduction in shoulder width should be achieved well in advance of the portal to allow drivers to
adjust to the new condition (a distance covered in 10 seconds at the operating speed should be adopted).
• Adopt edge marking by LED’s for 150 m in advance of and past the tunnel portal.
• Ensure that the lighting of the tunnel in the entrance zone provides an appropriate transition from the
open road to the tunnel (refer to Section 11.2).
Further guidance may be obtained from Roads and Maritime Services (2014a) and Sheridan (2009).

7.2.4. Internal Tunnel Design
Variations in tunnel space may be considered and will depend on tunnel length, and may consider:
• possibilities for interior variation
• lighting which breaks the monotony
• variations afforded by the line and geometry of the tunnel.
The design of the interior of the tunnel should:

• maintain the driver’s attention to the driving task
• enable the driver to navigate the system safely
• provide clear and unambiguous guidance during emergency situations
• ensure that lighting is appropriate and free from ‘flicker’ (Section 11.3.4)
• avoid too much stimulation from artwork on the walls.
Providing an experience different from that of the open road is an important part of the design of the tunnel
interior. The combination of the alignment, signing, lighting and wall and roof treatments can be used to
achieve the design objectives (Figure 7.6).
Bradley (2011) notes the following:

Our studies show that some drivers feel unsettled when driving through a tunnel; for some, the
feeling of discomfort is so great that they choose a different route. Studies show that such
feelings can be eliminated or reduced by using creative and good lighting, decoration, high
maintenance standards, and clear information with frequent signage.
Signs and equipment must be clearly visible and easily accessible and incorporated into the general
architecture. This also applies to emergency cabinets, boxes housing technical equipment, fire extinguishers,
doors and hatches, etc.
Equipment should be painted in a colour appropriate to the overall design and in keeping with any specific
theme being used to coordinate the design but retain consistency with the rest of the road network for
emergency, safety and commonly used items (e.g. help phones). Standard colours for safe egress points
and directions (green) and fire cabinets (red) and other emergency and safety signage should be adopted.
These colours should only be used for these reasons and for no other purpose (e.g. tunnel artwork).
Tunnel walls should be in a light colour and the ceilings should be dark to keep the driver’s visual attention
forward. Light colours are also required to provide better reflectance for the lighting system (refer to
Section 11). It is important to ensure lighting does not flicker as this may cause medical issues for some
tunnel users.
Illumination which faithfully reflects colours should be chosen where practicable. In long tunnels, attention
should be given to breaking the monotony by creating variation with the aid of illumination. One solution can
be to choose special illumination, for example in niches or emergency lay-bys (Norwegian Public Roads
Administration 2004).

Figure 7.6: Typical tunnel interior
7.2.5. External Structures
External structures should generally be in keeping with the surrounding land use and be as unobtrusive as
possible while retaining their functionality. It may be possible, however, to contribute to the architectural
interest of the area by designing a ‘landmark’ structure as a significant feature of the urban design. Specialist
design expertise will be required to create an appropriate structure in keeping with a theme for the project or
a local theme.
Structures directly associated with the tunnel operation and in close proximity to the tunnel should be
integrated with the tunnel infrastructure as far as possible.
If required, ventilation structures should be designed to ensure that there is adequate dispersion and dilution
of emissions from vehicles using the tunnel. Where possible they should be located as close to the tunnel
portal as possible so that their function is easily understood, and they ‘announce’ the entrance to the tunnel.
Ventilation structures may be significant structures in their own right and may be designed carefully to fit in
with their surroundings or may be designed as a landmark structure (Figure 7.7 and Figure 7.8). Ventilation
stacks can be an important part of the urban design that adds visual interest, reinforces a sense of place,
and ties into the design of the tunnel approaches. The size of these structures often requires such
specialised treatment. Using existing structures to incorporate the ventilation requirements is sometimes
possible, in which case, the presence of the ventilation structure is generally hidden.

Figure 7.7: Cross-city tunnel ventilation Sydney
Source: Roads and Maritime Services (2014b).
Figure 7.8: Lane Cove tunnel ventilation Sydney
Source: Roads and Maritime Services (2014b).

7.3. Air Quality
7.3.1. Internal Tunnel Requirements
The quality of the air inside the tunnel has to be suitable for its proposed use. Different exposure limits may
apply for users and for maintenance workers in different jurisdictions. Pollutants to be considered are
nitrogen dioxide, carbon monoxide and particulates arising from engine exhausts, tyre wear and dust. In
addition, sulphur dioxide and hydrocarbons which are more relevant when long duration tunnel exposures
can occur. Concentrations of particulate matter also has an adverse effect on in-tunnel visibility and should
be limited to ensure that adequate visibility is assured.
Exposure to in-tunnel levels of sulphur dioxide and hydrocarbons represent a lower risk to tunnel users
relative to the other air contaminants given the small proportion of emissions that these represent relative to
total vehicle emissions and, in the case of hydrocarbons, the period that users are exposed to such
pollutants. It can be safely assumed that adequate dilution of these emissions will be provided for by the
ventilation system (see Section 10 for details of ventilation design). However, these two pollutants are
critically important in designing for durability. Carbon dioxide is especially important and has been a potential
design driver for concrete cover over the reinforcement.
World Road Association (PIARC) (2019a) provides details of acceptable concentrations of carbon monoxide,
nitrogen dioxide and particulate matter for design purposes, for both health and visibility reasons. Further
guidance is also provided in Longley (2018), prepared for Australian conditions.
7.3.2. External Air Quality Requirements
For Australia, the National Environment Protection Council of Australia (NEPC) has determined a set of air
quality goals, which are part of the National Environment Protection Measures (NEPM). NEPM air quality
limits are specifically nominated as not applying to road or tunnel projects and are intended to apply as a
background limit. It is important to note that the standards established as part of the NEPM are designed to
provide an ‘average’ representation of general air quality and are not designed to be applied to monitoring
peak concentrations from major emission sources.
For further information relating to Australia, designers and practitioners should refer to the National
Environment Protection Council (2011): National Environment Protection (Ambient Air Quality) Measure
Review (NEPM).
The main legislation governing air quality in New Zealand is the Resource Management Act (RMA), which
was introduced in 1991. Under this Act, air quality monitoring and management are the responsibility of
regional councils. The New Zealand Ministry for the Environment develops policy and tools to help councils
such as the Good Practice Guide for Air Quality Monitoring and Data Management 2009 (Ministry for the
Environment 2009).
The NZ Ministry for the Environment has also developed a core set of national environmental indicators
including key air quality contaminants that are monitored and measured (i.e. small particulates with a
diameter less than 10 micrometres, also known as PM10, carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, ground-level
ozone and sulphur dioxide).
A major part of the design of the tunnel will be the appropriate dispersion technique adopted for vitiated air.
Tunnel dispersion techniques include:
• dispersion from portals
• mechanical longitudinal ventilation and portal dispersion
• dispersion from ventilation outlets
• dispersion by slots.

Section 10.3.2 provides guidance on these dispersion techniques. In addition, guidance may be obtained
from Road Tunnels: A Guide to Optimising the Air Quality Impact upon the Environment (World Road
Association (PIARC) 2008b).
7.4. Water Quality
Water quality issues may arise both during construction and the operation of the tunnel. The Austroads
Guide to Road Design Parts 5, 5A and 5B (Austroads 2013a, b and c), which cover drainage design, provide
guidance on the control of contaminated run-off water and should be used to design the required systems.
In addition, the design of the tunnel infrastructure must accommodate the requirements of the environmental
protection authority in the jurisdiction regarding the control of intercepted ground water or surface water.
Further discussion of the details of the design of the drainage system to accommodate contaminated water is
included in Section 8.

8. Drainage Design
8.1. General
Drainage design is to be generally in accordance with the Guide to Road Design Parts 5, 5A and 5B which
deal with drainage design (Austroads 2013a, b and c). Specific requirements for tunnels are discussed in this
section.
The longitudinal drainage system throughout the tunnel and associated ramps should be designed to
accommodate stormwater run-off corresponding to a design storm with an average recurrence interval (ARI)
which is suitable for the jurisdiction and region in which the tunnel is located. In areas subject to tidal
influence an allowance for a rise in sea level due to climate change should be considered. The critical nature
of tunnel operation is such that the risk of flooding from external sources should be eliminated or where this
is not possible minimised. A probable maximum flood should be assumed for protection of the portal from
flooding, the protection being the design of facilities to prevent the flooding or by way of operating
procedures to provide temporary protection measures such as sand bagging.
Drainage for tunnel operations (washing, ground water and seepage) should be designed to prevent ponding
on the road surface of the tunnel and to prevent aquaplaning.
The likelihood of coincident stormwater inflows and firefighting inflows should be identified through a risk
analysis approach. The results of this risk analysis will determine the magnitude of the storm event which
can be combined with firefighting flows, to formulate the credible combination inflow case. This will likely be a
frequent event such as the 1 in 1-year ARI or the 1 in 2-year ARI design storm event.
The calculation of expected inflows involves a detailed investigation of the nature and extent of:
• ground water seepage and the drainage of the tunnel structure and lining
• rainfall
• tunnel wall washing
• firefighting (including the activation of a fixed firefighting system)
• wash down following spillages of dangerous goods within the tunnel.
World Road Association (PIARC) (2008c) provides information on the assessment of fixed firefighting
systems for road tunnels.
A single drainage system should consider the following:

• Flood immunity as specified by the relevant jurisdiction.
• Collection of stormwater run-off at portals and in the tunnel should be via gullies at appropriate intervals,
with longitudinal pipe network to sumps.
• Gullies inside the tunnel are to be flameproof and explosion resistant to prevent the possibility of liquid fire
being conveyed into the sump via the drainage system. Flame traps are required as part of the tunnel
drainage system. Flame traps are integral with a drainage pit and prevent the spread of fire associated
with a flammable liquid spill along the drainage system to other drainage pits within the tunnel thereby
causing a secondary fire site. The provision of flame traps is to be in accordance with AS 4825: 2011.
• If sumps are sealed and vented to the atmosphere, duty and stand-by pumps should be provided.
• Sump and pump capacity should be designed to be compatible with the inflow rate and pump outflow
rate, for a range of possible storm durations and storm severities, up to and including the design ARI for
the tunnel’s drainage system.

• Pumps and associated control gear should be designed to operate automatically (via level switches
and/or transducers).
• Sumps should be provided with explosion-proof pumps and electrical equipment.
• If sumps are closed with forced ventilation, duty and stand-by extraction fans are required.
• Wastewater complying with effluent standards specified by the relevant authorities and drainage water
from the tunnel should be passed through appropriate gross pollutant traps or other environmental
treatment systems for capture of hydrocarbons and other undesirable pollutants prior to discharging into
waterways.
• The drainage system should be designed to be easily cleaned and maintained; in particular, adequate
space is required in all sumps to allow safe cleaning and maintenance of pipes, pumps and all associated
equipment.
• Provision should be made for pump operation and systems monitoring at the tunnel control centre.
• It is essential that the system is not undersized as upgrading of the pipes during operation of the tunnel
may not be feasible without closure of the tunnel. Care should be taken that the system is designed for all
potential inflows of water (ground water, stormwater, tunnel washing, deluge systems for firefighting).
A free-draining tunnel will deliver economies in drainage costs, but the longitudinal profile will not always be
amenable to this. Unless the vertical alignment of the road through a tunnel is a crest curve (more achievable
in mountain tunnels), it is normally necessary for a road tunnel to be provided with drainage sumps and
pumping equipment to collect water from the road surface and discharge it safely.
Where approach roads run downhill towards one or both portals it is normal to provide sumps to intercept
stormwater flowing down the approach roads and to prevent it from entering the tunnel. For such cases, the
catchment areas can be large, and consequently, portal sumps may instead provide benefits in terms of
intercepting run-off before it enters the tunnel proper. Such portal sumps must be sized to accommodate
inflow rates and pumped outflow rates for a range of possible storm durations and storm severities, up to and
including the design ARI for the tunnel’s drainage system.
In submerged tunnels (immersed tube) or tunnels with low points, grades should preferably not be less than
0.5% to allow any seepage or other water that may occur to flow to a suitably located sump and then be
pumped from the tunnel.
8.2. Drainage Systems
8.2.1. Overall Requirements
The tunnel drainage system can be an integral part of the local drainage system or be designed as a
self-contained facility. In general, sag points in tunnels will be well below the levels able to be incorporated
directly into existing stormwater drainage systems and will require automated pump-out arrangements.
Depending on the quality of the ground water, the tunnel drainage system will collect both ground water and
surface water which drains from the tunnel roadways via road gullies and longitudinal drains, and discharges
into one or more main sumps. In certain circumstances, where the ground water quality is poor, a separate
dedicated drainage system will be required to capture and convey the ground water into a separate ground
water sump. An impounding sump or hydrocarbon trap, to contain road tanker spillages and tunnel wash-
down water, which is likely to be heavily polluted should also be provided. The requirements of the relevant
environmental protection authority must be accommodated.
Pump stations and sumps are normally sited at the lowest point of a sag curve in the tunnel, and near the portals
if required. Control rooms or other buildings should not be located near sumps, due to the risk of explosion. Where
there is no alternative, full safety precautions must be incorporated into the design of such buildings.
Pump stations, sumps and separators should be sited where they have a minimum effect on the operation of
the tunnel, particularly where regular access for their maintenance is required.

Depending on design constraints, the sumps should be outside of the tunnel rather than under the tunnel
carriageway.
A pumped system delivers drainage water through single or twin rising mains, passing along the tunnels
below the road deck, attached to the tunnel lining or by an external route. Depending on the quality of the
pump-out water and on the specific local authority regulations, the rising mains may discharge into a surface
water sewer system, into a surface mounted retention tank, into a surface stormwater drainage system or
into a watercourse.
The sizing of sumps and separators should consider constraints on available power, size of pumping main,
allowable discharge rate and the size of sump that can be accommodated. In sizing the sumps and pumps,
the design must consider a broad range of possible storm durations and severities, up to and including the
design ARI for the tunnel’s drainage system.
Transverse interceptor drains such as grated trench drains or slotted drains should not be used to remove
stormwater as they can accumulate silt and can break up under heavy traffic. Provision should be made for
adequate crossfalls in conjunction with gully pits at regular intervals to remove the water and avoid ponding
on the approaches to the tunnel.
Tunnel structure drains often become blocked, for example, by calcium compounds leaching out of concrete,
ground water salts and silt, construction site debris and build-up of iron bio-films (the specific materials
causing blockage are geology dependent and other problems occur in specific geologies such as extensive
iron oxide precipitation in Sydney sandstone tunnels). An assessment of the likelihood of clogging of the
ground water drainage system should be undertaken, based on water quality measurements. If clogging is
anticipated, then appropriate factors of safety should be applied to the calculated ground water inflow rates
and oversize drainage pipes should be provided to make allowance for such problems. A minimum pipe
diameter of 150 mm should be specified for all ground water pipes. The main tunnel drainage pipe diameter
should be a minimum of 300 mm.
Inspection chambers should be provided every 60 m to provide for ease of inspection, cleaning and flushing
of the drains regularly.
In order that maintenance and repair operations can be carried out without the need for a lane or whole
tunnel closure, gully pits should be designed to be suitable for installation in the kerb or in the road shoulder.
No part of the gully pit should encroach on the traffic lanes. Inspection chambers should be in the
verge/shoulder for better access and to avoid damage by traffic. Where this is not possible, covers should be
positioned outside of wheel tracks. Design data for gully spacing is contained in Austroads (2013b) as
modified by the following comments for road tunnels.
The drainage system should incorporate appropriate flame traps to limit the spread of any fire that may
occur. Flame traps and gullies should be installed at a maximum spacing of 30 m for tunnels accommodating
or likely to accommodate Dangerous Goods Vehicles (refer to Austroads 2019e). A maximum spacing of
40 m is acceptable in other tunnels. Details of specific locations are discussed in the following sections.
8.2.2. Sumps, Separators and Pumping Stations
The design of sumps or a series of interconnecting sumps should take account of the following factors:
• provide sufficient capacity
– volume of drainage water
– spillage of flammable and other hazardous liquids (sump accidental spillage capacity should be at
least 43 m3)
– water for fire purposes (often critical) – Section 8.1, Section 8.5.2 and Section 8.5.6
– flow in excess of maximum pumping rate (large sumps may allow smaller pumps to be used)

• be of adequate structural depth and size

– space for any foam washed into the sump
– space for any floating equipment
– allowance for correct operation of level-detection equipment
– facilities for the pumping plant (Section 8.2.3)
– minimal turbulence around the pumping plant
• include forced ventilation for closed sumps inside the tunnel
– a safe atmosphere for workers
– dilution of any potentially dangerous atmosphere (e.g. accidental spillage)
– removal of any fire extinguishing gases
• allow sumps outside the tunnel to be naturally ventilated
• minimise potential structural damage due to explosion and its transmission to any interconnected sumps.
Interceptors/separators should be:

• of sufficient size to allow adequate separation of pollutants
• designed to provide ease of cleaning
• ventilated to prevent the accumulation of dangerous gases
• designed to minimise the risk of oil or other hydrocarbon substances trapped in the separator being
flushed through under high flow conditions.
Highways England (2020) notes that:

The sizing of sumps and separators is largely an iterative process in conjunction with the pump
capacity and maximum inflow rate. Constraints on available power, size of pumping main,
allowable discharge rate and size of sump that can be accommodated all contribute to deciding
the final sump volume and pump capacity.
They also point out that large pumps which only operate for short periods use excessive amounts of energy
because of the increased starting and running current demands and recommend that the number of pump
starts per hour should not exceed 12. This will have an effect on the sizing of the elements of the system.
Sumps should be classified as hazardous areas as defined by AS/NZS 60079.10.1: 2009. All pumps and
electrical equipment located in these areas should be designed in accordance with AS/NZS 60079.14: 2009
and related standards.
8.2.3. Pumping Plant
The pumping duties required for a tunnel drainage system will be influenced by a number of factors including:
• the maximum expected inflow to the sump (arising from stormwater run-off from external catchment areas
and coincident firefighting inflows – Section 8.1)
• the average normal expected inflow to the sump (arising from stormwater run-off from external catchment
areas)
• design constraints imposed by structural works
• maximum discharge limitations and the number of pumps
• discharge system parameters
• the size of the sump.

In addition to the main pumps and electrical motors the following are normally required:
• Motor control gear, cables and transformers – all these items should be installed in a separate
non-hazardous area away from the sump.
• Water level sensing equipment to control the starting and stopping of pumps and to generate high water
level and flood alarms.
• Hydrocarbon trap or skimming equipment to remove oil or any other liquid that may float on the surface of
the water in the collecting sump.
• Hydrocarbon sensing equipment to detect the presence of hydrocarbons in the sump, thereby enabling
operator override of the pumping system if required.
• pH sensing equipment to detect the pH value of the stored water and to then identify whether the water is
allowed to be pumped to a receiving sewer (applicable to tunnel wash-down water in particular).
• Sludge pumps may be necessary to remove deposits of solid matter in the invert of the sump and thus
avoid the need for periodic cleaning by manual labour.
• A reflux (or non-return valve) and an isolating valve should be provided adjacent to each pump. The
isolating valve would normally be located downstream of the reflux valve to enable maintenance to be
carried out on the latter, as well as the pump. Valves should be situated in an accessible place within the
sump, pump room or valve pit.
• Pipe work for connection to a suitable system to permit the sump to be emptied of spillages and removed,
independently of the main pumps or discharge pipe work.
• As part of the risk analysis, consideration of the redundancy of the power supply and controls for pump
stations.
8.2.4. Discharge Piping
Discharge piping comprises the pipes, valves and fittings situated between the outlets from the pumps and
the point of discharge. It may be a single or twin pipe system and incorporate hatch boxes if mechanical
cleaning is planned. All pipework should be located to be safely accessible for maintenance with minimal
disruption to the traffic flow in the tunnel. Maintenance activities (including replacement of pipes) should be
possible without closure of the tunnel. Closure of a single lane for limited periods may be acceptable.
Hydraulic analysis should be undertaken to determine the overall operational pumping head through the
discharge piping and also to determine transient heads due to other factors such as pump trip, valve closure
and the like.
The choice of pipe material type and class must be appropriate for the operational and transient heads
throughout the discharge pipe. The adopted material must also satisfy the minimum design life requirements
applicable to the tunnel environment (Section 3.4.1).
The choice of pipe materials and protective treatments will depend upon whether the pipe work is buried,
cast into the structure or in an open situation. Other factors will be the expected contaminants in the water,
costs and ease of installation and maintenance.
The use of plastic and related materials should be avoided in a tunnel as, in the event of fire, toxic fumes
could be generated.
Where flood banks or levees form part of the civil works it will be necessary to provide discharge
arrangements to ensure that floodwaters are not allowed to flow into the tunnel.

8.2.5. Safety Requirements in Sumps
Typically, bifurcated duty and stand-by extraction fans should be provided in sump areas. Suitable ducting is
needed for the supply and exhaust air for the sump. Flame traps as necessary are required to be
incorporated.
A suitable fire protection system for the sump should be provided, and appropriate detection mechanisms
installed.
The following elements should be designed into the detection and monitoring system:
• Detection of gas at low and high concentrations should raise an alarm and should also be displayed on
the pump control panel. The alarm (high) condition should normally initiate automatic operation of the fire
extinguishing system.
• Sampling from one of the gas detection system detectors should take place just above water level.
• The fire extinguishing system should be initiated automatically upon detection by heat detectors of a rise
in temperature due to a fire in the sump and should be operable manually from a local fire control panel.
• The monitoring and surveillance systems should be used to identify spillage of hazardous or other
substances which do not give off combustible gases, but which would be undesirable to pump into local
water systems. Detection of substances that reduce the amount of oxygen in the atmosphere can be
achieved by oxygen deficiency detectors arranged to set alarms when oxygen falls below a pre-set value.
• On detection of a hazardous substance entering a sump, the detection system should switch off the plant
to allow manual operation and control.
• All detector sensors should be duplicated, and internal detectors should be capable of being replaced in
situ as they generally have a short life.
• Sensors need to be water protected.
• All detection sensors should be tested regularly to ensure they are operating correctly as per their
specifications.
Sump ventilation air supply and exhaust ducts, where connected into the tunnel atmosphere, should be provided
with flame traps. To limit flame passage through the drains in the event of a fuel spillage and fire, U-bends should
be incorporated at the inlets to the sump and at the carriageway gully pits where there is adequate access for
cleaning the drain. Alternatively, equivalent ‘fire-proof’ drainage systems may be considered.
Open sumps should be accessible to the fire brigade should it need to extinguish any fire.
Further guidance on the design of sumps can be found in Highways England (2020).
8.3. Water Table Requirements
The design should ensure that construction activities as well as operation activities are carried out so that
any impact on ground water which affects property, public amenity (including settlement that may occur) or
existing ground water users is appropriately managed. Where settlement may occur, the tolerable amount of
settlement should be assessed and the design determined within that constraint.
Permanent dewatering is not preferred. However, dewatering may be an option in sound rock tunnels where
the removal of water from the surrounding area will not create adverse environmental effects. The pumping
system for these systems should be designed with sufficient redundancy to ensure that flooding of the tunnel
pavements does not occur.
Design specifications should be written to ensure that any dewatering during the carrying out of the
construction activities is limited so that it minimises any deterioration of vegetation, ground settlement
affecting property or public amenity, and impact on the surface water flows of existing drainage systems.

Any ground water recharge program during the carrying out of the construction activities should be designed
and implemented to the satisfaction of the responsible jurisdictional authorities.
8.4. Pollution Control
Run-off from the road will be polluted to some degree from the normal process of road operation and this
water will require treatment before being discharged into the wider drainage system. As a minimum, road
run-off water should be passed through a hydrocarbon trap and gross pollutant trap prior to discharge into
surface stormwater drainage systems or into a watercourse.
Particular attention should be given to the wash-down water from cleaning and accidental spillages. Tunnel
wash-down water should be contained in a separate system from the normal stormwater and disposal to a
surface sewer is typically recommended, subject to the agreement of the relevant local authority. Accidental
spillages should be contained in a separate system or hydrocarbon trap and disposal to a licensed depot via
tanker is typically recommended.
Methods of treating polluted water are given in the Guide to Road Design Parts 5, 5A and 5B dealing with
drainage design (Austroads 2013a, b and c).
8.5. Calculation of Inflows
8.5.1. General
Inflows to the tunnel structure can arise from:

• rainfall and stormwater run-off
• ground water seepage
• wall washing
• accidental spillage of fuel from damaged vehicles and the wash-down of such products
• operation of fire suppression systems
• accidental rupture of pumped drainage, fire main or hydrant.
8.5.2. Rainfall and Stormwater Run-off
Calculation of the run-off from rainfall should be done in accordance with Austroads (2013a). The ARI
chosen for the design of the tunnel’s longitudinal drainage system will depend on the specific circumstances
of the tunnel in question, but inundation of the tunnel structure should be avoided.
Preferably, tunnel portals should have a flood immunity derived from the larger of:
• the probable maximum precipitation event plus an allowance for climate change
• mean high water spring tide, 100-year ARI flood and a 100-year ARI storm surge (where applicable) plus
an allowance for climate change
• highest astronomical tide plus an allowance for climate change.
Pump systems provided in the tunnel must be designed for the worst of a 100-year ARI storm event, the
requirements of any deluge system, wash-down requirements or for firefighting incident management.
A range of storm durations should be investigated to determine the critical storm duration throughout the
drainage system. This is particularly important in determining the optimum size of the sumps and pumps.
Each tunnel should be assessed on a case-by-case basis using a risk management approach.

8.5.3. Ground Water
Ground water ingress or seepage will occur to some degree in all tunnels. Such seepage is generally
collected via spoon drains on the top of the kerbside barriers/behind wall treatments and at the low point of
the tunnel cross-section, beneath the pavement. Once collected it should be directed to a dedicated
treatment area. Ground water treatment is usually at the surface due to the spatial and maintenance
frequency requirements of the equipment. The nature and extent of treatment that will be required depends
on the water quality and quantity.
The design should ensure that any ground water seepage into the completed tunnel and associated works is
not visible and that no water drips on to the road pavement. For a particular tunnel, the extent of water
ingress to be allowed should be assessed on the basis of the environmental requirements and the capacity
of the tunnel equipment to accommodate the flows. Ground water seepage to or from existing streams
should be such that no unacceptable change in the existing flow regimes occurs as a result of the carrying
out of the construction or operation activities. In addition, the potential for settlement occurring as a result of
ground water seepage (Section 8.2) should be assessed and appropriate mitigation measures adopted.
The design should ensure that there are no effects of ground water chemistry on the overall tunnel structural
integrity or the tunnel drainage system, including the potential for precipitation to reduce the effectiveness of
the drainage system, over the design life of the tunnel.
Appropriate treatments should be employed during construction to minimise ground water seepage.
Permanent treatments should be employed as required to ensure that any water present on internal surfaces
does not affect the safety and function of the tunnels.
8.5.4. Wall Washing
Maintenance wash-down water must be captured by the tunnel stormwater drainage system but could be
diverted and treated separately from the ‘clean’ stormwater.
The quantity of water from wall washing operations is dependent on the techniques employed. For purposes
of calculation, a water use rate of 5 l/m² of wall area can be used over the period of cleaning.
8.5.5. Accidental Spillage
Spillage of products during incidents will have to be washed down to restore the tunnel to normal operation. This
will be polluted water and should be captured separately from the clean stormwater. Most tunnels are equipped
with hydrants at frequent intervals, fed from wet fire mains running along their lengths. For such cases, a
reasonable allowance would be that two hydrants are used by the fire brigade for wash-down purposes.
8.5.6. Fire Suppression System
For the purposes of design, a deluge system should be assumed and the quantity of water calculated from
the known pressure/flow characteristics of the installed system. Alternative suppression systems are being
developed (e.g. mist systems).
8.5.7. Accidental Rupture of Pumped Drainage
In cases where a fire main or other part of the pumped drainage system could be vulnerable to damage from
a traffic incident or other event, the design of the pumping system should include capacity for the potential
outflow from a broken pipe based on its pressure/flow calculations.

8.5.8. Flood Protection
Flood protection at traffic entry points and tunnel ventilation services openings should extend to at least the
categories of stormwater and floodwater coming:
• over the sides and portal wall trough structures
• off surface-level overland drainage from connecting roads
• in through the ventilation structural openings.
Where the potential for ingress of stormwater and floodwater into transition/tunnel structures exists, the
preferred solution is in the form of a physical levee in and surrounding the carriageways. Mechanical
devices, such as floodgates, booms or raiseable barriers are generally not adopted because they involve the
risk of malfunction due to debris clogging and jamming mechanisms.
In certain circumstances, a lower level of flood protection may be considered appropriate, provided that due
allowance is made to accommodate the expected volume of stormwater which could enter the tunnel. In
such instances, the tunnel road surface and drainage system must be designed to safely convey the
expected stormwater inflows to the tunnel low point, and the low point, sump and pump arrangement must
be designed to ensure that the pumping system remains operational during an extreme storm event. This will
require an assessment of the expected depth of ponding which could occur during an extreme event, and all
mechanical and electrical equipment associated with the pumping system must be located at least 300 mm
above that ponded level.
8.5.9. External Hydraulic Impacts
Tunnel entry and exit ramps to surface streets often need to project beyond the existing natural surface
levels and therefore have the potential to affect peak water levels for the surrounding areas during flood
events. Local authorities generally regulate developments to above a ‘flood regulation level’ of a 100-year
ARI event and require developers to demonstrate that their works will not create adverse impacts upon peak
flood levels or discharges upon external properties. The appropriate ARI for a project should be determined
in consultation with the local authority and other relevant authorities.
8.6. Aquaplaning
For vehicle tyres on road surfaces the likelihood of loss of friction due to the depth of water needs to be
controlled to avoid instances of aquaplaning. A number of factors influence the potential for aquaplaning in
tunnels including location, rainfall intensity (prior to or after the tunnel portals and then carried into the
tunnel), likelihood of residual wash-water, posted speed, surface texture and geometry. Typically,
aquaplaning potential increases when lower longitudinal grades are combined with low or varying crossfalls.
Pavement texture depths used in aquaplaning calculations should be confirmed in conjunction with the
finalisation of road surface treatments.
For tunnels, a unique aquaplaning risk may become evident at the exits. It is possible that a safety risk may
arise whereby a driver enters the tunnel when the road conditions are dry, only to exit the tunnel finding that
the road conditions are wet, due to the onset of a storm while the driver was inside the tunnel. The driver
may then be in a situation where the risk of aquaplaning is immediate but has not had sufficient time to
adjust the driving style to suit the conditions. To address this possibility, it is recommended that the
maximum aquaplaning film depth be lowered to a desirable depth of 2.5 mm, for a distance of at least 50 m
along the exit, measured from the tunnel portal.
Further, it may be appropriate to maintain the tunnel posted speed for a few hundred metres beyond the
tunnel portal to allow drivers to adapt to the external conditions.
Designers should refer to the aquaplaning requirements provided in Austroads (2013b).

9. Fire Safety
9.1. Overall Approach
The Australian Standard on tunnel fire safety, AS 4825: 2011 is to be used as the basis of the design of the
fire safety system for tunnels in Australia and New Zealand. This is a performance-based standard providing
a framework for establishing appropriate fire safety systems for road, rail and bus tunnels. The standard
provides guidance in the design, construction and operation of a tunnel with respect to fire safety.
The standard:
• sets out performance requirements of the fire safety system
• provides guidance on trial concept design
• provides information on what may constitute appropriate trial concept design for various tunnels
• does not restrict innovative approaches or new technology provided that the required performance can be
demonstrated
• outlines what may be appropriate analysis methodology
• allows for both deterministic and probabilistic (risk-based) analysis and approach
• specifies what may constitute appropriate acceptance criteria
• provides general guidelines on system installation and maintenance, which is intended to facilitate making
appropriate assumptions in the engineering analysis
• refers to other standards providing greater detail where appropriate.
The standard also states that it does not prescribe an acceptable level of fire safety. It is intended to provide
guidance on process and systems to allow the stakeholders to make informed decisions on tunnel fire safety.
Some key elements of the standard include:

• a fire engineering process to guide stakeholders to an acceptable fire safety system
• development of appropriate levels of documentation including but not limited to a fire engineering brief
(FEB), a fire engineering report (FER), a tunnel ventilation report and a fire resistance report
• guidance on issues and design considerations for tunnel fire safety
• performance requirements specific to tunnel fire safety measures
• acceptance criteria for fire safety design
• design-fire information
• fire protection system integration
• details of fire safety systems including related standards and design guides
• installation and construction issues
• testing and commissioning
• maintenance
• emergency management and fire brigade intervention.

9.2. Design Development
9.2.1. General Approach
Tunnel fire safety should be assessed, and an appropriate fire safety system should be developed in
accordance with AS 4825: 2011.
The intention of the design is to determine the most appropriate combination of measures to achieve the
objectives of the tunnel in question. Adopting one set of measures may allow others to be omitted.
AS 4825: 2011 notes several strategies for developing an appropriate fire response. These include deluge,
detection systems, suppression systems, ventilation and smoke extraction. It should be noted that the
important outcome for the tunnel under design is the holistic response under the trial design and conditions
generated by following the Australian Standard rather than a comparison of the merits of individual systems.
Comparisons of individual systems may not provide the required design solution.
The design fire to be considered must be assessed carefully. Guidance can be obtained from several
sources including NFPA 502: 2020, World Road Association (PIARC) (2016a, 2016b), Austroads (2019e),
Kashef et al. (2012) and Casey (2020).
The smoke management system must account for the presence of wind (see also Section 10).
The duration of the deluge operation is to be determined through the FEB process, but is to be a minimum of
1 hour (note that a typical project requirement is for the fire water supply system to be capable of
simultaneously supplying a minimum of 3 to 4 deluge zones for 1 hour and 2 hydrant lines for 4 hours). The
deluge zone area should comply with the FER requirements. The deluge valves must be protected from the
effects of heat and fire such that the operation is assured to occur for at least 1 hour.
The following documents may provide some additional guidance on what should be considered, but it should
be remembered that Australasian conditions may be different:
• Maevski (2011)
• Hall (2006).
Alternative fuel vehicles

Section 3.2.5 discusses the impacts of alternative fuel vehicles on tunnel design and operation. The following
provides some guidance on the characteristics of fires generated by these vehicles.
Seike et al. (2019) presents a heat release rate (HRR) estimation method for a carrier loaded with FCVs
trapped in a tunnel fire to compare the thermal fume of FCVs with conventional vehicle fires in an inclined
tunnel. Figure 9.1 is the temporal HRR plot of the fires from one FCV and one conventional vehicle. It
illustrates the peak HRR of 10.2 MW at roughly t = 300 seconds for the FCV while the maximum HRR was a
steady 5.0 MW for the conventional vehicle. Where there was no longitudinal inclination, the thermal fume of
the FCV fire travelled faster than that of the conventional vehicle fire, specifically 1 minute faster at a
distance of 200 m and over 4 minutes faster at a distance of 250 m (Seike et al. 2019). At an inclination of
2% and 4%, the thermal fume of the FCV fire still travelled faster. This study showed that regardless of the
fire scenarios with different inclinations from the normal in a tunnel, the thermal fumes from the FCV fire
always travelled faster, creating a riskier and more dangerous situation for drivers in the event of a fire
involving FCVs.

Figure 9.1: HRR plot of fire from FCV compared to conventional vehicle
Source: Seike et al. (2019).
Severe damage of EV lithium-ion batteries has the potential to lead to fires with high-energy release and
strong smoke generation (Mellert et al. 2018 – Hagerbach test tunnel in Switzerland). Testing on the thermal
failure of batteries found that the higher the charging level of the battery, the more gas was released. The
vented gas composition was made up of mostly flammable materials creating a higher potential for ignition
since the combustion range was broader (Colella et al. 2016). Fires ignited due to damage to batteries in
EVs involve high-energy release and therefore create dangerous situations for road users (Mellert et al. 2018
and Colella et al. 2016).
Li (2018) investigated the types of fire hazards that exist for various alternative fuel vehicles (EVs, FCVs,
liquefied fuels (LNG, LPG), liquid fuels (ethanol, methanol) and compressed gas (CNG)) and explored peak
overpressure in the case of an explosion within a tunnel. The results demonstrated that flash fires and gas
explosions could occur in incidents with any type of fuel. In terms of fire size, liquefied fuels were the most
hazardous, while liquid fuels generated similar or lower fire hazards compared to traditionally used fuels.
Further, heat release rates for hydrogen vehicles were significantly higher than those for CNG tanks
(Li 2018).
Hand-held fire extinguishers

Austroads (2019f) indicates that hand-held extinguishers (installed in the tunnel or carried in vehicles) have
been used to extinguish approximately 40% of tunnel fires in Australia and New Zealand. There does appear
to be merit in retaining this equipment, given this level of use. However, the changing nature of vehicle
propulsion is introducing greater numbers of electrically powered vehicles and fires associated with these
vehicles require the addition of a different type of extinguisher.
For an electrical vehicle fire, a Halotron Fire Extinguisher is required. This would have to be made available
in addition to the standard extinguisher. The average public user may not be able to distinguish which one to
use, even with adequate signage, and it may be safer to restrict the use of all extinguishers for the tunnel to
emergency personnel only. This would also avoid the need for a driver to leave the vehicle unnecessarily.
The alternative is to omit hand-held extinguishers from the tunnel and rely on the other forms of fire control
(hydrants and deluge systems). In any case, clear signs showing what types of extinguisher would
be suitable for use in these instances are required.

9.2.2. Prevention
Prevention of incidents is preferable to dealing with the consequences. Prevention techniques to be

considered in the design include:
• careful design of tunnel cross-section and alignment including sight lines and grades
• suitable lighting levels and portal illumination
• limiting the amount of combustibles and using fire retardant materials
• driver warning systems (e.g. radio re-broadcast)
• operational response to transport of hazardous materials
• education of users
• physical prevention of vehicles entering the tunnel by movable barriers
• management of Dangerous Goods Vehicles (DGV’s) by
– requiring vehicles carrying higher risk goods (Class 1 and/or Class 2.1) to travel through the tunnel at
a time when no other vehicles are present
– reducing posted speed limits when higher risk DG’s are allowed to travel through the tunnel
– prohibiting DGV’s changing lanes in the tunnel
– prohibiting DGV’s from entering the tunnel
– requiring enhanced Operator surveillance when DGV’s transit the tunnel – a DGV detector is required
prior to the tunnel portal (an appropriate procedure must be documented)
– ensuring that a vehicle of standard size (including a fire truck) can overtake an oversize vehicle
proceeding through the tunnel
• over-height barriers in advance of the portals
• nomination and enforcement of speed restrictions (including permanently installed speed cameras)
• high system reliability including back-up systems and redundancy such as dual water supplies, dual and
uninterruptible power supplies.
9.2.3. Evacuation
Fire separation
An evacuation strategy should be based on moving to a ‘place of ultimate safety’ and this may be
undertaken in stages reducing the risk at each stage. In twin tube tunnels this strategy is based on moving
from the incident to non-incident tunnel tube using cross-passages; hence fire separation between tunnel
tubes is necessary.
Other tunnel types, or where the non-incident tube is inaccessible, may require a dedicated emergency
escape tunnel or a direct escape path to the surface.
In short tunnels, the tendency will be for the road users to exit through the portals in times of emergency. An
adequately lit route (walkway and/or roadway) to the portals should be provided and preferably signalisation
provided to stop entry into the tunnel.

Entry control
Control of traffic entering the tunnel may be required for a range of reasons, for example:
• during periods of maintenance in the tunnel
• at times when congestion may threaten to overload the ventilation system
• when relief is required in the event of an incident.
The means of this control should be determined by the specific requirements of the site and may include
traffic signals and signs positioned to stop traffic from using one, two or all lanes in the tunnel.
Appropriate signals and signs remote from the tunnel (prior to the decision point to use the tunnel) may also
be required to divert traffic to alternative routes in times of closure of the tunnel.
When cross-passages are used, the traffic in the incident-free tube also may need to be stopped so that any
evacuees may enter that tube safely. This needs to be balanced with the need for emergency services to
access the fire from the non-incident tunnel. Opening of the cross-passage doors to the other tube may be
controlled by the tunnel control centre and telephones in the cross-passages may be used to communicate
with evacuees and advise them when it is safe to open the doors. Alternatively, the doors may be located in
a recess in the tunnel wall providing some protection from any vehicles that may still be in the adjacent tube.
The option used will depend on the tunnel characteristics, time of day, traffic density, type of incident, etc.
For busway tunnels, direct communication with bus drivers should be available to control the movement of
buses (e.g. diverting them to alternative routes when excessive delays in the tunnel occur for whatever reason).
Pedestrians
Pedestrian walkways, cross-passages and longitudinal passages in vehicular tunnels are generally provided
as a path for exit in an emergency and lead to other locations to achieve a place of ultimate safety.
Pedestrian emergency escape tunnels parallel to the vehicular tunnel and pedestrian refuge areas with
independent air from the surface have been provided in some major tunnels. In some circumstances,
remaining in the vehicle may be the preferred option but only if directed to do so by the tunnel control centre.
This allows drivers to hear radio re-broadcast (where provided) or loudspeaker broadcast of emergency
instructions.
Weaving through stopped traffic to an emergency cross-passage may also be difficult for evacuees on foot
as:
• shoulders and walkways may be unusable due to vehicles not stopping directly within a lane
• spacing between stopped vehicles may not permit wheelchairs to pass through
• vehicle doors may be left open blocking the path between lanes to a cross-passage
• vehicles may try to undertake U-turns and cause disruption.
Emergency exits and escape routes should be marked clearly with appropriate signage and marking – refer
to Section 11.5.2. They should also be provided with hands-free emergency telephones, which provide
evacuees with a direct line to the traffic control personnel.
Cyclists
In those rare cases where cyclists are permitted to use a tunnel, their means of evacuation will be the same
as those for pedestrians.

Mobility impaired persons

It is essential that the design provides an emergency walkway that is accessible to road users who may have
mobility impairment (drivers or passengers). Refer also to the section on pedestrians above and World Road
Association (PIARC) (2019e).
Holding areas
Where holding areas for mobility impaired persons and others are provided, the cross-passage and/or stairs
are no longer just transit zones but become akin to a refuge. Therefore, positive ventilation is required to
prevent the ingress of smoke and other toxic gases.
Holding areas should be equipped with accessible hands-free emergency telephones and CCTV cameras
(refer also to Section 13.3).
9.2.4. Emergency Egress Signage
For most motorists, a road tunnel is an unfamiliar environment for evacuation activities. While fire drills are
conducted for buildings to familiarise occupants with evacuation routes, this is not possible for the users of
tunnels. Additionally, most buildings follow a standard evacuation process which involves descending a fire
stair to the ground level and exiting the building. Due to the length, varying alignment and arrangement of
road tunnels, there can be numerous evacuation route types occupants are exposed to. Providing clear
instruction and direction to tunnel occupants during an incident is vital for successful self-evacuation
activities. The provision of egress signage and consistency of signage between road tunnels is a key
component to provide this direction (refer to Suggested Good Practice for Road Tunnel Emergency Egress
Signage (Austroads 2018d)).
A list of recommended emergency evacuation signage for use with Australasian road tunnels is provided in
Appendix C. Schematics showing typical locations of egress signage are provided in Appendix D.
Egress signage has been categorised by the overall objective of the signage in supporting the evacuation
process as follows:
• egress route identification
• egress point identification
• egress passages
• refuge space indication.
Furthermore, additional signage has been identified that provides a supporting function to the overall tunnel
evacuation process as follows:
• in-tunnel emergency facility signage
• in-tunnel positioning signs.
Emergency egress signage has been classified as one of the following:

• Regulatory – provision of signage is required for compliance with existing Standards.
• Recommended – provision of signage is highly recommended based on qualitative assessment of benefit
to evacuation process.
• Special Consideration – provision of signage should be considered for a unique and/or complicated
situation where additional clarity of evacuation requirements is warranted.

It is noted that the emergency egress strategy for road tunnels is documented as part of the fire engineering
design process for each tunnel and specific requirements may exist. Therefore, any signage provided for
emergency egress within road tunnels must ultimately be reviewed and agreed with all relevant stakeholders
for the tunnel project and with safety of all tunnel users in mind.
9.2.5. Evacuation Messaging
Clear and concise audio evacuation messages are essential in supporting evacuation commencement. Key
requirements include:
• consistency between audio messages (e.g. the same message on the public address (refer to
Section 13.5.4) and radio rebroadcast systems (refer Section 13.5.2))
• simple and concise message instructions (e.g. too much information may delay the commencement of the
evacuation process)
• clear transmission of the public address system to achieve acceptable speech intelligibility levels.
For public address system messages, common stimuli from building evacuations may support the tunnel
occupants understanding of the need to evacuate. ISO 8210: 2017 specifies the international signal which
unequivocally means ‘evacuate the building immediately’. Within New Zealand, NZS 4512: 2010 identifies
evacuation tone requirements.
In the event of egress to the non-incident tunnel, the non-incident tunnel public address system should be
used to provide further instruction and to assist the evacuees to proceed in the correct direction to the
designated assembly point. The instructions should be used in combination with appropriate wayfinding
signage (refer to Section 9.2.4).
An additional method of providing messaging to evacuees to assist in the commencement of evacuations is

sending a SMS which could be distributed to tunnel occupant’s phones via the tunnels mobile phone
rebroadcast systems (refer to Section 13.5.2). The emergency systems at exit locations (e.g. flashing lights
or strobe lighting; refer to Section 11.5.2) should be consistent with the message provided in the public
address and the radio rebroadcast systems to assist in the identification of the emergency exit location.

10. Ventilation Design
10.1. General
The general requirements for ventilation design are described in the Guide to Road Tunnels Part 1:
Introduction to Road Tunnels (Austroads 2018a). This section provides details of the design required
including standards to be achieved and preferred systems of ventilation for Australian and New Zealand
tunnels. Further guidance may be obtained from World Road Association (PIARC) (2019a): Vehicle
Emissions and Air Demand for Ventilation as well as World Road Association (PIARC) (2011): Operating
Strategies for Emergency Ventilation.
10.1.2. Assessing Ventilation Needs
An assessment of the needs of a tunnel ventilation system should be based on:

• providing a safe environment for tunnel users with adequate protection from the effects of vehicle
emissions
• providing adequate visibility for the purposes of collision avoidance and wayfinding, by preventing the
accumulation of particulates arising from vehicle exhausts, tyre wear and dust (note that amenity
concerns may be raised at lower levels)
• providing a tenable environment for tunnel users during a fire while minimising the risk of fire growth and
fire spread
• controlling the dispersal of tunnel pollutants to the atmosphere.
As part of the analysis of factors that determine fresh air requirements for the dilution of vehicle pollutants,
consideration should be given to establishing the tunnel ventilation capacity available to control the direction
of smoke and assist evacuation and firefighting procedures, including pressurisation of cross-passages. This
should also consider the peak ventilation energy consumption and its effect on the likely electricity tariff with
a view to optimising the system.
A detailed discussion of the objectives of ventilation in both normal and emergency operation is provided in
World Road Association (PIARC) (2011).
World Road Association (PIARC) (2019a) provides a detailed method for calculating emissions and provides
emission factors appropriate to Australia and New Zealand for CO, NOx and particulate matter (PM) as well
as appropriate factors for non-exhaust particle emissions for passenger cars, light-duty commercial vehicles
and heavy goods vehicles. It discusses two approaches to estimating vehicle emissions:
• The standard approach is based on the emission estimations for the base year and the application of
different influencing factors for the year of operation, altitude of the tunnel and vehicle mass (for Heavy
Goods Vehicles (HGV) only).
• The fleet-specific approach allows an emission calculation when the vehicle fleet data is known in detail,
using specific tables of emission rates for single model years – this approach is applied if the fleet
composition is different from that assumed for the standard approach.
Practitioners may use World Road Association (PIARC) (2019a) for assessing ventilation needs in tunnels.
Ridley (2019) suggests that this method underestimates the NOx and NO2 pollutant outcomes where a large
percentage of the fleet is diesel powered. The second of the above two approaches may be applicable in
these circumstances.

The impact of fire and smoke from alternative fuel vehicles must also be considered (refer Section 3.2.4 and
Section 9.2.1). Severe damage of EV batteries has the potential to lead to fires with high-energy release and
strong smoke generation. Additionally, if tunnel ventilation is inadequate, EV fires may produce chemical
hazards such as heavy metals (cobalt, lithium, etc) (Mellert et al. 2018).
10.1.3. Mechanical Ventilation
A mechanical ventilation system is an important facility for maintaining acceptable in-tunnel air quality and
safe conditions in the event of a tunnel fire.
The relationship between the following factors is relevant in deciding the most appropriate ventilation regime:
• the length of the tunnel
• distance to emergency exits
• highway gradients
• the traffic (one-way, two-way, volume and composition with respect to percentage of heavy vehicles)
• transport of dangerous goods
• safety installations
• the planned response to emergencies.
The actual number of vehicles in a tunnel at any one moment will depend on the average vehicle speed and
the traffic density. Typically, as traffic slows, the total number of vehicles within a tunnel will increase. The
vehicle-induced air movement referred to as ‘the piston effect’ is significantly reduced at lower traffic speeds.
A larger number of vehicles will increase the total drag resistance to air movements and the generation of
exhaust fumes. Many tunnels are likely to be self-ventilating for long periods when traffic is flowing freely but
can lose almost all of their self-ventilating capacity when traffic speeds are reduced, during peak hours,
breakdowns or other incidents.
In general, a minimum of four broad operational regimes need to be considered for ventilation design:
• free-flowing traffic (for example, average speeds of 50–80 km/h)
• network constraint-driven congestion (for example, average speeds of 20–40 km/h)
• incident/breakdown-driven congestion (for example, average speeds less than 20 km/h on a sustained
basis)
• smoke control during a fire incident (refer also to Section 9.2.1).
It should be noted that the first two cases do not result in any credible potential smoke exposure to motorists
downstream of a fire in a longitudinally ventilated system but that the third case needs careful consideration
in the event of fires behind an initial incident/breakdown.
In addition, vehicle operation is less efficient in congested conditions, increasing pollution rates.
10.1.4. Performance Objectives
The tunnel ventilation system should meet the air quality requirements described in the recommendations of
the World Road Association (PIARC) 2, jurisdictional work safe exposure standards and environmental
requirements as defined in relevant regulatory authority approvals. In the event of any inconsistencies
between these requirements, the appropriate value relevant to the circumstances of the tunnel in question
should be adopted.
2 The NZ in-tunnel air quality requirements are incorporated in the Guide to Road Tunnels (NZ Transport Agency 2013b).

The tunnel ventilation system should be able to be operated to meet specified in-tunnel and external air
quality requirements under credible atmospheric and traffic flow scenarios (refer to Section 10.3). Care
should always be taken to ensure that the combination of requirements is reasonably credible and not just
that each requirement is credible in itself (e.g. a major fire with a combination of an HV power failure with an
adverse wind event may not be really credible even though each sub-event is credible on its own). Risk
analysis should be undertaken to establish the credible scenarios.
10.1.5. Factors Affecting Ventilation System Performance
Meteorological effects
Meteorological records for the area should be obtained, so that the ventilation system performance can be
assessed in the worst likely conditions of wind, wind direction, humidity and extremes of temperature. The
effect of the immediate local topography should also be considered.
The cases to be studied should include:

• weather conditions adversely affecting the tunnel environment
• weather conditions adversely affecting the dispersion of airborne pollutants from the tunnel.
The former is likely to happen at high wind speeds (often more than 10 m/s) and the latter at comparatively
low wind speeds (often around 2 m/s). The atmospheric stability cannot be assumed only to be neutral.
Relevant historical data such as wind roses can be useful for analysis.
Ambient wind conditions will need to be considered for the design ventilation capacity. Ambient wind is
particularly relevant for short tunnels where the wind effects may completely dominate the designed
ventilation system. To limit ambient wind effects, strategies such as modifying the tunnel alignment relative to
the prevailing wind or providing wind protection around the portals may be used.
The background levels of ambient air contamination should be considered when assessing pollution levels.
These levels may be obtained by a local survey and applying appropriate design year predictions. The levels
assumed should be clearly stated and agreed with the appropriate regulating authority. It should be noted that
background levels are highly variable and a reasonably representative value (e.g. 75th – 90th percentile or
similar) rather than an absolute peak value should be used to avoid overstating the background contribution.
10.2. Systems of Tunnel Ventilation
There are several types of ventilation systems that have been proven effective in use. Many factors have an
influence on the choice of a ventilation system and should be taken into account in accordance with their
relative importance to a particular scheme. The end result for a ventilation system is that it is
aerodynamically sound, provides satisfactory environmental conditions inside the tunnel and adjacent to it,
manages smoke in the event of fire, has acceptable capital and running costs, and satisfies the operator in
terms of control, maintenance and cleaning. Smoke ducts may be required to control smoke where there is a
likelihood of stopped traffic and a fire.
Types of ventilation systems are:

• vehicle piston effect
• longitudinal
• fully transverse
• semi transverse
• hybrid (combination).

Refer also to World Road Association (PIARC) (2011). Appendix B includes the general classification system
adopted by World Road Association (PIARC) (2011).
10.3. Air Quality Management
10.3.1. Internal Tunnel Requirements
Section 7.3.1 discusses the factors to be considered for in-tunnel air quality. The design of the ventilation
system should consider these factors.
10.3.2. External Air Quality
Section 7.3.2 provides guidance on the requirements for external air quality. Dispersion of vitiated air from
the tunnel will need to be designed to meet these requirements. Dispersion methods are also discussed in
Section 7.3.2.
Dispersion from portals

The acceptability of the portal dispersion performance will depend upon the air quality standards which must
be met. Dispersion of emissions from portals is commonly considered to be an acceptable way of dealing
with the disposal of pollutants. Even for some long tunnels (refer to Section 2.2 of the Guide to Road Tunnels
Part 1: Introduction to Road Tunnels (Austroads 2018a), disposal in this way may result in acceptable air
quality at sensitive receptors provided they are at a sufficient distance from or appropriately located relative
to the portals, particularly during periods of low traffic flow (e.g. at night) or periods of good dispersion
conditions (World Road Association (PIARC) 2008b). Rational analysis based on realistic design scenarios
without excessive conservatism is required for good decision making on this topic.
Mechanical longitudinal ventilation and portal dispersion

In one-way tunnels the combination of vehicle-driven ventilation caused by the ‘piston effect’ and mechanical
ventilation leads to a concentration profile as shown in Figure 10.1.
Where air velocities are in the range of 3–5 m/s mechanical longitudinal ventilation can raise the ventilation
velocity to approximately 6–8 m/s, although plant requirements and energy consumption rise at an
exponential rate with increasing design velocity. This will lower the concentration of emissions at the exit
portal, although the environmental costs in terms of energy consumption and noise protection should be
considered (World Road Association (PIARC) 2008b).
Due to safety concerns and energy considerations in one-way tunnels, it is not advised to ventilate against
the direction of traffic in order to manage dispersal at the entrance portal.
In two-way tunnels it is, in principle, possible to utilise the longitudinal ventilation system to control the
dispersion of air at either portal. However, the safety implications should be considered.

Figure 10.1: ‘Idealised’ concentration profile in a longitudinal ventilated tunnel (reality may be substantially
more complex)
Source: World Road Association (PIARC) (2008b).
Dispersion from ventilation structures
In broad terms, collecting emissions and venting them via ventilation outlets, as illustrated in Figure 10.2, is a
very efficient way of dispersing pollutants. Comparative studies show that the process of removing surface
traffic from heavily trafficked roads and disposing of the same amount of pollution from, for example, a 20 m
ventilation outlet results in substantially lower concentrations at all sensitive receptors (World Road
Association (PIARC) 2008b).
Discharges of vehicle emissions via appropriately designed ventilation structures will ensure that emissions
are dispersed and diluted so that there is minimal or no measurable effect on local ambient air quality. The
location, height, and efflux velocity of ventilation structures largely control their effectiveness in terms of air
pollution control. To ensure adequate dispersion and dilution, ventilation structures should be sufficiently
higher than surrounding buildings (proximity of these buildings is an important factor). Actual outlet heights
need to be established with consideration of local conditions such as topography and urban form. For
example, it is particularly important to avoid valleys and other areas of poor dispersion and locating outlets
(ventilation structures) in sensitive receiving environments (e.g. near residences, schools, etc.) or other
locations with unfavourable meteorological characteristics, e.g. street canyons.
Ventilation structures are generally only required for longer tunnels in urban areas with high traffic flows due
to the potential for elevated levels of vehicle emissions to accumulate inside the tunnel at certain times.
For tunnels with a ventilation structure, at times of free-flowing traffic co-incident with low traffic volumes and
favourable external weather and air quality conditions, it may be appropriate to limit the use of the ventilation
structure and discharge emissions via the portals. Poor architectural design of the ventilation structure and
associated buildings will create a visual intrusion which may accentuate public concerns regarding air quality
associated with the tunnel.
Short tunnels will generally not need a ventilation structure where one or more of the following characteristics
are met: free-flowing traffic, relatively low traffic volumes; few, if any, highly sensitive air pollution land uses
nearby; or located where there is good background ambient air quality. In such circumstances, portal
emissions are the most appropriate means of discharging vehicle emissions to the external atmosphere.
Significant cost savings can be made by avoiding inappropriate ventilation system design requirements, for
example ‘no portal emissions’ where such a restraint is unnecessary and through the energy-efficient use of
the ventilation system during normal operation.
For many single-direction tunnels the piston effect is frequently sufficient to ensure compliance with in-tunnel
air quality criteria and the use of the ventilation system can be minimised. It is essential that the use of the
ventilation system is carefully managed and monitored to ensure efficient and effective operation.

Figure 10.2: Illustrative schematic of an outlet near an exit portal
** Airflow depending on the tunnel design. In some situations, portal emissions are permitted.
Note: d = 6 – 8 hydraulic diameters (hydraulic diameter = 4 x cross-sectional area/perimeter).
Source: Modified from World Road Association (PIARC) (2008b).
It is rare that only one ventilation outlet is used for a long tunnel. Multiple outlets are an option to spread the
vitiated air over several dispersion points and are usually required for long tunnels (refer to Austroads Guide
to Road Tunnels Part 1: Introduction to Road Tunnels, Section 2.2, Austroads 2018a) due to the practical
limitations on achievable longitudinal airflows within a practically constructible tunnel cross-section
(illustrated in Figure 10.3). Complicating factors such as social concerns, terrain and high-rise buildings can
constrain the location of outlets.
Figure 10.3: Example of multiple outlets for air exchange system
Note: This type of system is used for very long tunnels, or those with high ventilation demands. These outlets may also
be included in semi-transverse systems.
Dispersion by slots
Open slots provide an opportunity to vent a tunnel by natural ventilation. The position and dimensions of the
slots should result in acceptable air quality near each slot and the tunnel portals. This option provides a
favourable solution if stacks are impossible or undesirable. The option does not provide a substantial benefit
over an open roadway from an air pollution point of view although it may have other benefits such as
reduced noise and improved social amenity. Figure 10.4 provides one example. Both dispersion of emissions
and fire performance would need extensive modelling to ensure adequate performance under all conditions.

Figure 10.4: Schematic example of slots in the roof, including sound attenuators
Sound barriers (optional)
The use of large openings in the tunnel roof provides opportunities for large volumes of air to be vented in a
fire. Although dispersion of contaminants is similar to a surface road, the satisfactory performance of the
tunnel in terms of fire safety by the use of buoyancy-driven natural airflows alone can be achieved with a
high degree of reliability in some cases with careful design. Such an approach would require regular and
frequent openings. Figure 10.5 illustrates this. If such openings are accessible to the public, then appropriate
measures should be implemented to ensure the safety of people. It is preferable to ensure that the public
cannot access the areas involved and may need security fencing or similar protection.
Figure 10.5: Natural ventilation by using large gaps
An example using many small gaps is shown in Figure 10.6.
Figure 10.6: Natural ventilation by using small repeating gaps in the roof

10.4. Fans
10.4.1. Axial Fans
Axial flow main fans are used in ventilating major road tunnels. Capacities are typically in excess of
100 m3/s. The large diameter fans are located in fan rooms with connecting shafts supplying and extracting
air to or from the tunnel system. Such fans may supply or extract air for a tunnel section or its full length
depending on tunnel parameters (e.g. length, geometry, location, traffic volume).
An axial fan is one in which air passes between aerodynamically shaped blades to enter and exit axially to
the direction of rotation. Reverse flow may be achieved by reversing the direction of rotation of the motor. An
axial fan with blades set to be optimised for a specific flow direction will produce a reduced volume when the
motor is reversed and may have a limited design life for this duty. Volume control and reversibility can also
be achieved using fans with variable pitch blades. Variable speed drives are another method of providing
volume control.
10.4.2. Centrifugal Fans
Centrifugal fans have different pressure, flow and spatial characteristics from axial fans. Typically, centrifugal
fans have not been used in modern tunnel airflow control as they require more space than axial fans of the
same duty, and reverse airflow can only be achieved by use of dampers and a reversing duct arrangement.
Centrifugal fans have some advantages over axial fans as they are more efficient and less noisy and provide
higher pressure capability.
10.4.3. Jet Fans
Jet fans are relatively small in output and size and can be housed in groups within the tunnel, spaced
lengthwise in series to give a multi-fan longitudinal air flow, or at the tunnel entrance as blowers. The fans
are of the horizontally mounted, axial impulse type and maintain a longitudinal velocity of air within a tunnel.
A jet fan increases the velocity of the air mass that the ‘air jet’ passes through. The subsequent exchange of
momentum between the high velocity jet (typically between 30 and 35 m/s) and the slow-moving air within
the traffic space is used to maintain the required overall air velocity for ventilation and smoke movement. The
following should be noted:
• Jet fans are not as efficient as axial fans operating in a ducted system. However, low capital cost and
simplicity of installation and maintenance may justify their use.
• The distance between fans in the longitudinal direction of the tunnel requires careful consideration and
should be spaced to prevent the flow from one fan reducing the performance of another. Similarly, signs
and other equipment should be located to avoid reducing the performance of the fans.
• Fans should be provided with anti-vibration mountings which should be fail safe, e.g. by providing safety
chains to prevent the fans falling onto traffic in the event of failure of a fixing. Vibration monitoring for
determining service requirement purposes should be considered as follows
– care should be taken to avoid galvanic and other corrosion of any fixings
– water entering a jet fan from any source (e.g. washing activities) will need to drain out
– sealed-for-life bearings should also be considered
– self-cleaning blade shapes may be beneficial in reducing maintenance needs.
• Jet fans act by the combined effect of many fans. The design should make provision for a loss of output
from a certain number of fans (in maintenance and fire conditions) without jeopardising the overall
minimum airflow. That is, some redundant fans need to be included in the system.

• Jet fans can be located at various places in the tunnel cross-section. They are most efficient when
located at a distance of three fan diameters from a continuous surface. Fans in ceiling or wall recesses
are not desirable for loss of ventilation efficiency reasons, and particularly at corner locations, but may be
justified economically compared with alternatives that incur higher civil construction costs, particularly for
immersed tube tunnels. Deflector blades at the air jet exit can be beneficial in reducing energy losses at
such locations. Inclining fans at a small angle (around 5–10 degrees) may increase efficiency. For
reverse flow, a facility to reverse the inclination angle would be required.
• A comprehensive ventilation study should be undertaken to balance
– initial, maintenance and operational costs for a given traffic flow
– the probabilities of each critical scenario occurring simultaneously
– collective fan noise.
• The study should take into account
– the effect on all possible aspects of safety of the proposed ventilation design
– the number of fan groups
– their transverse alignment or staggering, together with details of any niche recess shapes
– all efficiency losses, ensuring local re-circulation does not occur
– cabling and maintenance requirements
– any functional loss during a fire.
Highways England (2020) provides the following guidance on assessing redundancy and loss of fans during
a fire:
For design purposes the following redundancy levels may be used as indicative:
1) normal operation: 2 fans or 10% of the fans (to the next whole number), whichever is the
greater; and
2) tunnel fire conditions: jet fan unavailability due to fire incident proximity (where tunnel air
temperatures exceed jet fan fire rating) can be calculated using the following, where X =
distance in metres, M = fire magnitude in MW:
a) Upstream: X = (-0.0017M2) + (0.45M) + 1.667
b) Downstream: X = (-0.0067M2) + (1.8M) + 6.667
10.4.4. Fan Reversibility
Fans for tunnel air control may need to be reversible in order to:
• provide for the case where one tube of a twin tunnel must be used for two-way traffic or one-way traffic in
the other direction
• provide for air-flow reversal in a two-way tunnel to accommodate significant changes in the direction of
the predominant traffic flow
• allow for smoke extraction in an emergency
• maintain over-pressure in the non-incident tunnel.

10.4.5. Noise
Ventilation equipment can be a major source of noise in tunnels and therefore limitation of noise emission is
an important factor in the choice of fans. Acoustic treatment by means of inlet and outlet silencers and/or
casings with sound-absorbent lining may be required in order to reduce the amount of fan noise transmitted
to the outside environment. ‘Break-out’ noise may occur in vent stations and other structures housing
equipment and this will have to be limited to achieve the required noise environment.
Careful attention to the detailed design of ventilation equipment will achieve the required sound levels at
lower cost to the end user than the use of sound-attenuating equipment. The sound power level of a fan
increases very rapidly with increasing tip speed. For a given volume of air, a larger and slower rotating fan
will be quieter (but more susceptible to stall). Similarly, reductions in mechanical noise can be achieved from
such things as efficient design of motor couplings, driving gear and adequate stiffening of the casing.
Reduction in air path noise is obtained by careful duct design with the minimum amount of turbulent flow
from sharp bends and obstructions.
Mounting of machinery on insulated bases will reduce transmission of noise and other vibrations through the
ground.
For jet fans, additional sound-absorbent material in the fan casing, and inlet or outlet silencers should be
considered. Any increased head loss caused by a silencer, in some designs, can only be compensated for
by increased fan energy consumption and hence higher potential noise levels. Lower jet velocities of 20 m/s
are quieter but increase the size and number of fans. A balance has to be determined during the design.
To avoid interference with emergency communication systems, fan noise inside road tunnels should not
exceed a maximum noise rating of NR85 at a plane 1.5 m above the road surface. In-tunnel noise
requirements need to be coordinated with the tunnel public address and evacuation system to ensure that
the emergency messages produced are intelligible to all tunnel users.
It should also be noted that the silencers on jet fans may become blocked with solid particulates over time.
When this occurs, the silencer’s attenuation properties may be adversely affected. To greatly simplify the
removal of jet fans for silencer cleaning, or routine maintenance, each jet fan should have its own dedicated
local electrical isolation switch and a waterproof electrical connection plug.
Reference should also be made to Section 7.1 for discussion on environmental considerations.
10.4.6. Ventilation System Safeguards
The essential nature of the ventilation system requires that it be kept operational under almost all
circumstances. It is therefore necessary to build in reasonable safeguards to avoid unplanned closure or
undue restrictions on traffic flow. The following features should be considered:
• redundancy of essential equipment
• two separate sources of electricity supply (Section 12)
• stand-by fans to account for fan breakdown or unavailability
• redundancy to accommodate a fire situation (refer to 10.4.3 above).
Operational requirements are discussed in detail in Guide to Road Tunnels Part 3: Operation and
Maintenance (Austroads 2018b).

11. Lighting Design
11.1. Overview
A high standard of lighting is provided in road tunnels to enable users of the tunnel to see their way and to
identify potential hazards quickly.
The lighting systems for road tunnels will include lighting the tunnel interior, tunnel approaches and parting
zones, emergency access passages, and plant and equipment rooms.
The elements of a road tunnel lighting system include:

• external road lighting (AS/NZS 1158.1.1: 2005)
• tunnel lighting system (AS/NZS 1158.5: 2007)
• emergency cross passage and egress passage lighting (AS 2293: Set-2005)
• building lighting (AS/NZS 1680.1: 2006; AS/NZS 1680.2.1: 2008; AS/NZS 1680.2.2: 2008;
AS/NZS 1680.2.4: 1997).
System components include:

• tunnel luminaires (AS/NZS 60598.2.3:2015, SA/SNZ TS 1158.6:2015 and AS/NZS 60598.1: 2003;
AS/NZS 60598.2.1: 2014; AS/NZS 60598.2.22: 2005) including Light Emitting Diode (LED) systems
(Section 11.1.1)
• photometers
• lighting sub-circuits
• miscellaneous tunnel lighting
• lighting distribution boards
• lighting control system.
The tunnel classification in Table 2.1 of AS/NZS 1158.5: 2007 is intended only for the purpose of lighting
design and should not influence the classification of tunnels for the Guide.
Decisions relating to tunnel length, location, orientation, cross-sectional profile, approach-road conditions,
design speed, surface finishes and the structure and form of the portals are important factors that affect the
detailed design and cost of tunnel lighting. Early consideration should be given to these factors and tunnel
operation and maintenance procedures. The quality and height of the reflective interior wall or lining finishes
together with the lighting design strongly influence the driver’s sense of safety and comfort about
tunnel-driving safety.
There are three commonly used lighting systems in tunnels:

• Symmetric lighting: where the light falls equally on objects in directions with and against traffic.
• Counter-beam lighting: where the light falls on objects from the opposite direction to the traffic.
• Pro-beam lighting: where the light falls on objects in the same direction as the traffic.
Symmetric lighting provides the best quality of tunnel lighting and the best level of comfort and visibility for
drivers and is recommended for all tunnels.

11.1.1. Solid State Lighting
Recent advances in lighting technology has seen the emergence of Solid-State Lighting (SSL) in the form of
LEDs, which have been installed in several tunnels around the world. Current systems using High Intensity
Discharge (HID) luminaires have limitations in the distribution of the light, controls, and adaptability, which
are addressed in the LED technology, which use lower energy, reduce maintenance, improve colour, and
can be easily dimmed and controlled (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine 2020,
Wierer 2018).
Some advantages of using LEDs (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine 2020) are:
• LEDs can be customised for their intended use. They can:
– be acutely dimmed to specific levels
– be turned on and off rapidly without a need for a warm-up period
– be fine-tuned for colour output during the manufacturing process to achieve a range of Correlated
Colour Temperatures (CCTs)
– allow precise cut-offs to be implemented to increase the control of the light’s focus.
• The colour rendering capabilities and luminous efficacy of LEDs give an improvement in visibility
performance.
The method for determining the required light levels in the tunnel does not change with the use of LEDs but
adopting them allows for better and more precise control of the lighting levels in the tunnel. This allows the
lighting level to be tailored to the ambient lighting conditions of the time of year, time of day and weather
conditions outside the tunnel. Adaptive control technology with a luminance meter outside the tunnel portal
can be used to achieve this. Significant energy savings can be achieved with this system (Salata et al. 2015,
Peeling et al. 2016, National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine 2020).
Detailed guidance on the design of LED lighting for tunnels can be found in Solid-State Roadway Lighting
Design Guide published by National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine (2020).
Figure 11.1: Solid State Lighting with adaptive controls
Source: National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine (2020).

11.2. Lighting Zones
Tunnel entrance (consisting of threshold and transition zones), interior and exit zones should provide the
various lighting levels respectively in accordance with AS/NZS 1158.5: 2007. This standard also addresses
the lighting of the access and parting zones immediately outside of the tunnel portals. The lighting design in
entry zones should provide high levels of lighting corresponding to the daylight intensity to assist
driver-viewing adaptation from bright daylight to the relatively darker tunnel environment. Booster lighting is
provided at exit portals to assist rear-view visibility (Figure 11.2).
Luminaires in these zones should therefore be controlled and the lighting levels automatically regulated by
photometers monitoring the real-time ambient light levels outside the tunnel entry portals. The plant
management and control system (PMCS) should provide an alternative backup ‘time of day’ clock system
based on seasonal and latitudinal variations of lighting in case of photometer failure.
Figure 11.2: The zones in a long tunnel
Source: Based on Figure 3.1 of AS 1158.5: 2007.
11.3. Spacing and Location of Luminaires
11.3.1. General
The objective of the placing of luminaires is to produce as even a distribution of light as possible on the road
and walls of the tunnel.
Luminaires should be located so as to permit simple and easy access for cleaning, re-lamping and complete
replacement when required. Luminaires should also be appropriately placed to minimise shadowing by tall
vehicles.
11.3.2. Centrally Mounted Luminaires
For basic lighting, fluorescent luminaires mounted continuously end to end, can provide a high-quality
lighting system with good comfort and visibility for drivers. Lighting utilising only LEDs or high-pressure
sodium (HPS) luminaires is also used successfully in tunnels.
Additional lighting required to reinforce the entrance and exit zones is achieved by the addition of further
adjacent lines of luminaires. LED or HPS luminaires can be used for boost lighting at the portals.
In a two-lane tunnel, access to luminaires is likely to require complete closure of the tunnel since both lanes
may be obstructed. Offset lighting may avoid this issue if it is practicable to use it.

11.3.3. Side Mounted Luminaires
Side mounted luminaires, with luminaires mounted on both sides of the tunnel, are often used when there is
restricted vertical clearance. Mounting luminaires on each side of the carriageway offers the additional
benefit of maintenance access if safety considerations permit traffic flow in the remaining lanes.
11.3.4. Visual Flicker
Visual flicker (impression of flashing lighting), caused by spacing luminaires at certain intervals, may lead to
medical issues, discomfort or distress for those passing through the tunnel, in particular drivers. Accordingly,
the lighting design should comply with the requirements of AS/NZS 1158.5: 2007, Part 5, Clause 3.3.8.
11.4. Surface Reflectance
The efficient lighting of the tunnel depends on the reflectance of the wall and road surfaces to provide an
acceptable distribution of the light. Figure 11.3 shows an example of a tunnel where light is reflected from the
walls and pavement.
Design of the tunnel approach areas is an important consideration in the tunnel entrance luminance
requirements. Factors including urban design, low reflectance of portal surrounding surfaces, retaining walls,
asphalt road surfaces, trees and extended facades, assist in the reduction of the tunnel entrance luminance
requirements with consequent energy saving.
At the tunnel entrance the proportion of the sky visible to the driver is a significant factor in the determination
of the tunnel entrance lighting level. Therefore, the approach gradients, shielding and other provisions should
be considered.
Effects of low sun angles should be considered in the tunnel orientation and portal design as this can have a
marked effect on visibility for drivers entering and/or leaving the tunnel.
The design of the entire tunnel lighting should achieve and maintain the required luminance under normal
operating conditions making due allowance for luminaire performance reduction (due to life-cycle
depreciation factors) and variations to tunnel wall reflectance values.
The tunnel wall linings should be of high reflectivity and semi-specular finish. The choice of road surface has
significant impact on the luminance yield in the tunnel. For instance, a concrete surface (reflectance R1, refer
to AS/NZS 1158.1.2: 2010) will only require 70% of the light required for an R3 asphalt surface. This leads to
significant power savings and will reduce the number of luminaires required. The effect on lighting
reflectance should be taken into account with any proposal to change the road surface from that for which
the lighting was originally designed. Some agencies have used specially designed asphalt with a high
reflectance coefficient to reduce the cost of lighting (refer to Salata et al. 2015).
The visible tunnel lining may be either a structural concrete lining or a secondary lining and must be of the
same appearance on both sides of the carriageway.
The tunnel lining and road surface materials should be selected considering their surface reflection
characteristics.
Where a secondary lining is used, including any fixing system, it should:

• be continuous above the traffic barrier or footway to a height sufficient to provide the reflectance required
above the roadway
• be durable, non-distorting and appropriately surfaced to provide surface reflectance greater than 60% for
the entire service life of the lining (vitreous enamel coating or suitable painting).

Figure 11.3: Example of light reflected from wall and road surfaces
11.5. Other Requirements
11.5.1. Essential Lighting Supply
The electrical supply should comply with AS/NZS 1158.5: 2007, Section 5, which specifies lighting power
supply requirements for various types of tunnels. For long tunnels, the lighting sub-circuits should be
arranged so that half of the tunnel lighting (each alternate luminaire or alternate adjacent rows of luminaires)
within any one electrical distribution zone remains unaffected by loss of power supply from any one
substation main distribution board.
Since total failure of the power supply will result in total loss of tunnel lighting, careful consideration should
be given to the probability of supply failure and the operational requirements in such an event. The mains
failure lighting provisions of AS/NZS 1158.5: 2007, Clause 5.1.7 apply. These provisions will provide
sufficient light for safe evacuation of the tunnel, but not for continued operation with traffic.
Where tunnel closure is unacceptable, sufficient standby lighting should be provided to permit the safe
passage of traffic, with an appropriate signed speed restriction.
11.5.2. Emergency and Egress Passage Lighting
Both the route to the egress and the entrance to the egress should be clear to users. The egress passage
must also be adequately lit to allow the safe exit of evacuating people. These conditions may be achieved by
application of the following requirements.
Emergency egress door lighting should include:

• exit lighting designed to AS 2293: Set-2005
• strobe lights at each door location (where specified, door location lights above the door and either side of
the door using white strobe lights with a strength no less than 300 ecd; strobe lights at either side of the
door must be no higher than 1.5 m from the top of the pavement level)
• a downlight at each door location.

Passage and stair lighting should include:

• general lighting designed to AS/NZS 1680.1: 2006
• exit, emergency and directional lighting designed to AS 2293: Set-2005
• connections to separate essential lighting circuits
• local controls and remote controls through the PMCS.
In addition to these requirements, a separate low-level emergency lighting system complying with
AS 2293: Set-2005 should be provided (note that this implies that the system is connected to an
uninterruptible power supply – UPS). This system should be effective without any contribution from the
overhead general lighting system and will generally incorporate fluorescent lighting on both sides of the
vehicular tunnels. The luminaires should be fully recessed into the tunnel architectural panels (or positioned
to ensure they are not a hazard to pedestrians) and each located to adequately light the footpath. A sign
should be fixed to the barrier directly below the luminaire location, advising of the distances in both directions
to the closest egress.
11.5.3. Luminaire Enclosures
Luminaire enclosure rating should conform to IP 65 over its entire life in accordance with AS 60529: 2004.
11.5.4. Lighting Control
The monitoring and control of tunnel lighting based on measuring external lighting values, using luminance
(i.e. light incidence on surfaces) should be adopted as this method is more precise for energy cost control. A
monitoring system using appropriate measuring equipment should be designed to provide for the
requirements set out in the Guide to Road Tunnels Part 3: Operation and Maintenance (Austroads 2018b).
11.5.5. Measurement of Lighting Performance
The effectiveness of a tunnel lighting system depends on the performance of the luminaires combined with
the reflectance of the pavement and walls of the tunnel. Maintaining the quality of these components is
important in ensuring the continued satisfactory performance of the lighting system. The standards to which
they should be maintained are provided in the relevant Australian/New Zealand Standards.
Greffier et al. (2015) describe an automatic measuring system for road and tunnel lighting performance,
developed in France.

12. Electrical Supply Design
12.1. General
A wide range of electrical/mechanical equipment is installed within many road tunnels to maintain the
required level of safety for road users, operational and maintenance personnel and emergency services
personnel. The main equipment typically comprises high voltage (HV) and low voltage (LV) switchgear,
transformers, distribution boards and uninterruptible power supply (UPS) systems. Substation spacing is
generally driven by a balance of civil engineering costs, cable costs and electrical load distribution.
In many cases, the high voltage supply is from the main grid HV supply at a voltage determined by HV
system design and approved by the electrical supply authorities. It is important that the HV supply is from two
separate supply authority substations or different zones of the grid. The low voltage is generally 400 V
(415 V), although higher voltages have been used in Australia due to the type of loads.
Risk assessment cognisant of the relevant project-based constraints may determine the power distribution
configuration particularly for shorter or remote tunnels.
Incoming supplies and key items of equipment such as main distribution cables and transformers must be
duplicated with an automatic changeover facility, and appropriately sized so that if one is out of service,
either because of a fault or for maintenance, service can be maintained via the other for as long as
necessary.
In addition, arrangements should be made to ensure continuity of supply in the event that both sources of
supply fail and that essential equipment remains operable for a suitable time.
The electrical requirements should be assessed for each main area of demand (lighting, ventilation, pumping
and the remainder of the installation) to determine the total connected demand load in kVA and the likely
maximum demand. This will enable the supply capacity and the ratings of the plant (transformers, switchgear
and cabling) to be established. Supply authorities should be consulted at the planning stage about the
estimated installed load for all tunnel electrical equipment (lighting, pumps, fans, etc.). Information for
discussion should include sufficient predicted load profiles, plotted against time over typical 24-hour periods
and any seasonal variations as well as peak demands during an emergency. This will then allow the most
appropriate connection points to the electricity grid to be determined and the power authority to
accommodate the planned tunnel loads in power network grid upgrades.
A power supply report should be produced addressing the following issues:

• supply arrangements for critical, essential and non-essential loads
• supply arrangements during the various emergency scenarios
• standby generating equipment interlocks with normal mains supply.
12.2. Tunnel Electrical Supply System
12.2.1. General
Two HV supplies from the supply authority to the LV distribution board should be sized so that full tunnel and
roadway operations are maintained in the event of the failure of one supply.
Sufficient UPS capacity should be provided to allow safe egress and safe shutdown of tunnel and roadway
operations in the event of the failure of both supplies.
The cables associated with these services should be separately routed for maximum security of supply
(Section 12.6).

12.2.2. Security of Supply
Careful consideration should be given to ensure that faults on one supply cannot affect the second supply.
Two separate supplies may be prohibitively expensive. Risk assessment, in conjunction with the supply
authority, should establish the interrelationship/redundancy between the two supplies where they are derived
from a common HV substation.
Furthermore, failure of the supply at the HV level (e.g. by damage to overhead lines), could lead to loss of
both incoming supplies and this possibility should be taken into account when assessing standby or
duplicate supply requirements.
The general requirement for the electrical system design is that the electrical system including supply should
be not less than 99.995% reliable with any power supply outage event to be less than one-hour duration in
any 1 -year period. Supply should be designed for maintainability such that any individual plant room supply
outage event will have a duration of less than one hour.
In the event of a total mains electricity supply failure, UPS should be provided to meet the following
requirements (refer also to Section 12.5):
• essential lighting, designated signs, communications, emergency power outlets, closed circuit television,
traffic and environment sensors and ancillary equipment for a minimum period of 30 minutes
• essential supply in the tunnel control building/room including tunnel management control system (TMCS)
and plant management control system (PMCS) servers for a minimum period of 4 hours
• emergency lighting and exit signs in tunnel and egress routes illuminated for a minimum of 90 minutes.
All variable message signs (VMS) external to the tunnel and vehicle over-height detection devices
associated with the tunnel’s safety will also require a back-up system but this is not necessarily part of the
tunnel essential services supply. AS 4852.1: 2009 describes the back-up requirements for such VMSs.
Standby generators may or may not be used in conjunction with the UPS. A whole-of-life costing approach to
the provision of standby power is valuable to balance the high costs of installing and maintaining full UPS
systems against those of partial UPS with standby generator plant.
12.2.3. Design and Maintenance
The following requirements for electrical installation should be met:

• Conduit, cubicles, trunking, cable tray boxes, metal work and cabling must be designed to withstand a
tunnel environment, and should be fire resistant, non-flammable, low smoke, halogen free and corrosion
resistant. Certain cable support systems are required to be fire resistant depending on the service
provided.
• Exposed conduits that are not in a fire rated enclosure and all cables must be low smoke halogen free.
Conduit and other wire way materials within the tunnel envelope must meet the fire safety requirements
for tunnels.
• All electrical equipment and cabling must be installed in accordance with the relevant standards and
codes, and must address safety, segregation, adequate rating for maximum demands, voltage drop
limitations, durability and operational safety.
• The electrical installation design must ensure continuity of supply, safe working conditions, performance,
proper operating sequences and physical measures to combat a hostile environment. The design of the
electrical system should take into account the whole life cycle from installation to decommissioning
including refurbishment (e.g. provisions for removal and replacement of the major components at the end
of useful life). The system should be capable of being safely checked and maintained while minimising
impacts to the tunnel operations.

• All plant, equipment, fittings and any other component of the permanent installation within the tunnel and
other areas affected by the tunnel environment should be protected to the International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC) Category IP65.
• The automatic changeover equipment must have its own independent back-up supply to enable
changeover during mains power failure.
12.2.4. Electromagnetic Fields Minimisation
Electrical interference arising from electromagnetic fields caused by design and operation of any temporary and
all permanent electrical supply and distribution systems for all tunnel services equipment should be controlled
by selection of appropriate equipment complying with electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) standards.
12.2.5. Energy Efficiency
Being able to monitor energy usage in real time is invaluable in energy minimisation. To do this, ‘smart’
meters should be installed to provide details of energy usage for ventilation and lighting systems. These
systems should be monitored separately and include the means to make automatic adjustments to their
operation to optimise energy usage (refer also to Austroads Guide to Road Tunnels Part 4 Section 11
(Austroads 2019g)).
12.3. High Voltage System
The high voltage distribution system should incorporate:

• dual HV supplies to all distribution transformers in conjunction with automatic load transfer on the low voltage
• independently routed cables, with routes to be geographically separated where possible to prevent a
single point of failure (Section 12.6)
• encapsulated dry-type transformers where located underground
• equipment selections to suit the relevant electricity supply authority’s fault level requirements.
Transformers should be continuously rated for 120% of design load.
12.4. Low Voltage System
The low voltage distribution system should include as a minimum:

• equipment selection to suit HV distribution system fault level requirements
• automatic changeover of the two incoming supplies at the main LV switchboards
• facilities to enable the automatic transfer of loads between substation transformers
• main switchboards constructed to minimum Form 3B separation as defined by AS/NZS 3439.1: 2002
• distribution boards constructed to minimum Form 2 separation as defined by AS/NZS 3439.1: 2002
• dustproof and vermin proof switchgear cubicles constructed to minimum IP65 in tunnels and minimum
IP41 in switch rooms.
12.4.1. Protection Systems
System protection and monitoring should include:

• monitoring through the plant management and control system (PMCS)
• Type 2 coordinated protection grading from HV to field devices in accordance with
AS/NZS 3947.4.3: 2000.

12.5. Uninterruptible Power Supply
12.5.1. General
To support required emergency response such as tunnel evacuation, an uninterruptible power supply (UPS)
with appropriate autonomy must maintain power to essential operational and safety systems in the event of a
mains electrical supply failure.
The tunnel characteristics and/or operating philosophy may require/allow additional loads supported by the
UPS.
A standby generator may also be provided to augment the UPS.
12.5.2. Essential Loads Network
The electrical design report should list and quantify the essential loads and load shedding schedule. The
essential loads should be permanently connected to the UPS equipment so that in the event of a mains
failure their supply is maintained. Components of the essential load include:
• tunnel mains failure lighting in compliance with AS/NZS 1158.5: 2007
• control room lighting (to allow continued operation)
• operations management and control system (OMCS)
• CCTV and other designated traffic monitoring systems (Traffic management/ITS control)
• communications network switching and management equipment
• lighting (other than emergency lighting compliant with AS 2293: Set-2005)
• radio and public address (PA) systems
• fire brigade power tool sockets (if required by the fire brigade)
• other relevant components specific to the tunnel under consideration
• equipment which cannot tolerate any interruption during switching operations or while any standby
generator is starting up.
It is essential that some level of lighting is maintained throughout the whole of the initial period of supply
failure (Section 11.5.1).
12.5.3. Types of UPS
Static-type systems with a no-break reversion to the mains supply on failure are adequate for tunnel
applications using appropriate battery capacity. Rotary types may be considered.
12.5.4. UPS Design Parameters
Each UPS system design should take account of the following factors:
• the type of load to be fed and the characteristics of the load
• acceptable limits of harmonics fed back into the power supply network, particularly where a standby
generator is installed
• compatibility with standby generator plant, where provided
• the minimum period of time the UPS is required to operate under full load after mains supply failure
(Section 12.2.2)

• operational and physical compatibility with other electrical equipment

• recharging times after discharge – batteries should be capable of being fully recharged, from the
discharge state, in seven hours, automatically
• a battery monitoring system for automatic detection and reporting to OMCS of any individual failing
batteries
• control equipment to be provided
• a maintenance bypass facility to enable maintenance (replacement of batteries) online.
12.5.5. Back-up Generating Equipment
Where it is likely that drainage pumps or ventilation plant will need to be operated under mains failure
conditions to maintain the security of the tunnel systems and structure, such loads may be beyond the
capacity of a UPS. For such cases, automatic start, back-up generating equipment should be considered.
Separate accommodation, with a 4-hour fire protected enclosure, should be provided for the back-up
generating equipment, fuel tanks and associated equipment.
The back-up generating equipment should provide adequate power, including start-up requirements, for the
essential loads supplied by the UPS. Additional loads may be connected in accordance with the fire
engineering brief, such as:
• pumping system loads including fire main pressure pumps
• essential ventilation plant
• lighting and heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) equipment in services buildings
• limited tunnel lighting according to the design requirements.
Separate, safe accommodation for the back-up generating equipment is required, with appropriate
connection to control systems to ensure automatic start-up of the generators when required. A 12-hour fuel
supply should be provided for the back-up equipment.
12.6. Cabling
Cabling should be designed in accordance with the latest edition of AS/NZS 3000: 2007. Cabling is usually
an in-buried conduit nest in Australia although one or two tunnels use alternative configurations of similar
degree of fire isolation. Cables directly exposed to the tunnel environment must be fire resistant,
non-flammable, low smoke and halogen free.
It is essential that in twin bore tunnels, the HV cabling reticulation provides for the A and B supplies to be
located in separate tubes. Similarly, the redundant LV reticulation and dual redundant fibre network should
be separated in the two tubes.
Cables feeding services in the tunnel should be run, so far as is possible, in the verge ducts on either side of
the bore. Preference should be given to lighting sub-mains being run in the verge duct adjacent to the
left-hand carriageway side. Where ventilation using jet fans is employed, cables feeding these fans should
be located in the verge opposite to that containing the lighting cables.
Communication cables should not be installed within 0.5 m of electricity supply cables, other than those
supply cables associated solely with the communications system.
The maintenance requirements of the cables should be considered in deciding their location and preference
should be given to a location that does not require the tunnel to be closed for that maintenance to be safely
carried out.

13. Design for Monitoring and Control
13.1. Operations Management and Control Systems
13.1.1. Introduction
Tunnels are usually important links in road networks, and the monitoring and control of tunnel approach
roads must be coordinated with the operations management and control of the tunnel. In this regard the
Guide to Traffic Management Part 9: Traffic Operations (Austroads 2019a) provides relevant guidance on
systems and procedures for network monitoring, maintaining serviceability and traffic control.
Tunnels will vary in their needs for management and control systems depending on the location, size and
significance of the tunnel. Major urban tunnels carrying significant volumes of traffic require careful
management and will need extensive and comprehensive operations management and control systems
(OMCS). This includes the continuous monitoring of the tunnel operation from the tunnel control centre.
However, rural tunnels, low traffic volume tunnels, short tunnels, long underpasses and some highly
regulated tunnels carrying high volumes of traffic may not require extensive management and control
systems.
Each tunnel should be assessed in the planning stage for the level of operational monitoring and control that
is required to provide an appropriate level of safety and operational efficiency for the operation of that tunnel
in an economical way. This should be undertaken using a risk management approach. AS 61508.1: 1999
describes a comprehensive, risk-based design process.
An OMCS will be required to ensure the effective management of major tunnel operations. The OMCS
should:
• facilitate the effective management of incidents in the tunnel and on the approach roadways through the
integrated management of the whole facility control, monitoring and communication systems
• optimise the traffic flow
• monitor and control traffic systems and traffic movements in the tunnel and on the approach roadways,
including any ramps (an automatic video incident detection system should be considered)
• provide accurate and timely driver information about traffic conditions and incident situations
• monitor and control tunnel plant, equipment and communication systems
• provide a high level of automation
• provide the timely presentation of relevant information to the operators at the control centre
• provide support to the operators via a real-time expert system
• include:
– a traffic management and control system (TMCS)
– a plant management and control system (PMCS)
– both supported by the tunnel network communication system (TNCS).
SCADA and data systems should be designed to provide easy extraction of real-time performance data,
including history and trending information to better inform maintenance and renewal strategies (refer also to
Austroads Guide to Road Tunnels Part 3: Operation and Maintenance (Austroads 2018b)).

To facilitate effective and efficient automatic operations of detectors and monitoring systems connected via
the TNCS, the OMCS may be supported by a range of additional and separate systems enabling
communication between the drivers, operators and emergency services personnel such as an operation and
maintenance telephone system for tunnel control staff, fire control co-ordination telephone system and public
announcement/address (PA) and break-in facility in the radio re-broadcast (RRB) system.
It is important that all the systems are fully integrated to ensure that all components work together and that
consequent changes in one system emanating from a change in another system occur seamlessly.
Simplification of operations can also be achieved (e.g. camera numbers, cross passages, fire boxes using
logical identifiers – e.g. Fire box B23 is located with CCTV 923 near cross passage 23).
13.1.2. Operator Interface
The interface of the OMCS with the operators (also known as Human Machine Interface – HMI) should:
• be integrated into a map-based graphical user interface (GUI)
• provide all alarms in real time
• display the current status of all devices to allow an operator to assess all displays to motorists
• provide automatic operation together with manual over-ride facilities for each system and system element
• allow monitoring and control of a single system or multiple systems through operator selection
• provide all relevant alarms and warnings in a clearly visible pop-up window classified by type (e.g. traffic
incident alerts, fire, plant, maintenance, environmental factors such as CO, NOx) and severity and in a
consolidated log (all alarms must be visible and selected alarms audible)
• record all alarms into a database that allows for real time integration
• include response procedures to assist operators with the management of all devices.
13.1.3. Response Procedures
A comprehensive set of response procedures should be developed for the management of incidents and
events and for user training (refer also to Austroads Guide to Road Tunnels Part 3: Operation and
Maintenance (Austroads 2018b)).
The response procedures should be automatically displayed for the relevant alarm or warning, if appropriate.
13.1.4. Trainer and Back-up System
An OMCS trainer/back-up system should:

• provide for training functions
• act as a back-up OMCS in the event of a failure of the primary OMCS
• be maintained in an operational state at all times and able to function in OMCS back-up mode within
three minutes of any failure of the primary OMCS
• be capable of simulating all incident and operations managed by the system
• provide a user interface identical to the primary OMCS
• provide an environment where modifications to the OMCS can be developed and tested
• when operating in trainer mode, be easily distinguished from the on-line system.

The same set of servers may act as both a trainer and back-up system. However, if the back-up is achieved
through a remote OMCS disaster recovery system/site, the (remote) training capability should be removed
from the operations area.
13.1.5. Report and Logging Requirements
All significant events occurring on the facility should be logged in an OMCS event log file. The event log file
must provide a record sufficient for audit purposes and the review of event sequences.
Event log files should be organised on a day boundary. Event logs for the previous day should be
incorporated into an historic log area with access services available for the review of all historic log file data
and retrieval for a minimum preceding period as required by the relevant road agency.
The OMCS should provide comprehensive reporting facilities including full search functionality for the
management review of all activity on the OMCS.
The OMCS should have the capability to generate reports on all stored data for any selectable time interval.
13.1.6. Reliability and Availability
All components of the OMCS computer system should be duplicated for redundancy unless specifically
exempted for the particular project. Some components may be impractical to duplicate (e.g. video switcher)
and a decision on the duplication required should be based on the outcome of the design process for a
redundant configuration to achieve the specified availability figure.
The OMCS software architecture should be designed to minimise the risk of cascading failures as the result
of a fault in one software module or task.
The failure of any component or software module of the traffic monitoring control system (TMCS), plant
monitoring control system (PMCS) or tunnel network communications system (TNCS) should not cause the
failure of any other component or software module of the OMCS. For example, the PMCS and TMCS should
be able to operate independently in case of failure of the other.
The availability of all OMCS functions should be appropriate to the design requirements, and in any case,
greater than 99.995% where availability is defined as (Equation 1):
(MTBF-MTTR)/MTBF 1
where
MTBF = mean time between failures
MTTR = mean time to repair.
The MTTR should be less than three hours.
13.1.7. Performance Requirements
The OMCS should, as a minimum, satisfy the performance requirements included in Table 13.1.

Table 13.1: Performance requirements
Action Time
requirement
The period between the FCC* operator’s request for a display and the completion of the display < 1.0 sec
build
The period between the change of state of an alarm circuit at any location and the consequent < 1.0 sec
display of the alarm at the FCC*
The period between the FCC* operator’s command and the consequent change of state of the < 1.0 sec
selected output at the roadside controller or other remote device
The period between an analogue change in state of a roadside controller or other remote device and < 1.0 sec
the display of the changed status in the FCC*
The period between a change in an analogue input signal where it deviates outside the low and high < 0.5 sec
alarm limits at a roadside controller or other remote device and the consequent display of the alarm
at the FCC*
* Freeway Control Centre.

Source: EastLink Project Documents – Victoria.
13.1.8. Scope for Future Development of the OMCS
The OMCS design and configuration should be scalable to meet future and short-term demand for additional
functionality, scope and dimensions of OMCS functions.
13.2. Motorway Operations and Maintenance Centre
The functional requirements described in Section 3.1 can be met with the provision of a tunnel control centre
where appropriate. The design of the control centre will need to provide for these functions in an efficient and
effective way. Designers should consult with the proposed operators of the tunnel to determine the specific
needs of the personnel expected to use the facilities. It should be noted that the needs of shift workers may
be significantly different from those of other personnel. Issues that need to be addressed include:
• Fatigue management
• Screen based equipment
• Noise
• Ergonomic design
• Lighting
The most comprehensive and integrated configuration for such a centre would include:
• An operations room where trained staff monitor and control as required using various systems such as
electronic signage, public address or radio re-broadcast systems. The operators should also dispatch
breakdown vehicles to help remove vehicles that have stopped in the tunnel or on adjacent roads. There
should also be interlinking and liaison with other relevant road and transport agencies.
• Facilities and staff to monitor tunnel plant and equipment so that it continues to operate reliably as
required under all traffic and emergency conditions. This should include scheduling and management of
maintenance and repairs.
• Special incident response facilities available to the police, fire services, ambulance and other emergency
services.
• Support staff and management.
• Integration with related facilities operating other parts of the road network.

A centre such as this would incorporate:

• an operations (traffic and plant) monitoring and control room/facility
• a dedicated incident control room
• a tolling management system if required (this could be on or off site)
• associated ICT facilities including dedicated, secure computer server room(s) distinct from other building
facilities
• general offices
• amenities
• workshops
• a dedicated incidents control room
• parking and marshalling areas for staff, maintenance and emergency vehicles.
Facilities such as marshalling areas for breakdown and emergency vehicles as well as supplementary
incident control rooms plus associated radio and phone communication systems may also be required at
locations such as the other tunnel portals and emergency egress locations to provide the requisite level of
redundancy.
A wide range of tunnel control centre functions can be remote from the tunnel itself in separate and/or
dedicated facilities. For example, a single control centre could monitor and control a number of tunnels and
other road systems, although marshalling and incident response facilities would still be required adjacent to
the tunnel itself.
The final configuration of a tunnel control centre and how a network of tunnels and individual tunnel systems
is managed will depend upon:
• the facilities that are currently available or could be expanded
• the timing of tunnel construction
• contractual arrangements
• operator preferences
• coordination arrangements between the authorities controlling different tunnels.
13.3. Traffic Monitoring and Control System
13.3.1. General
A primary goal of the design and operation of a tunnel is the safe and efficient operation of the tunnel and
surrounding road system. Minimising incidents within this system is essential in meeting this goal. In addition to
the human trauma caused by such incidents, they also have a significant effect on traffic operation, both within
the tunnel and on surrounding roadways. Traffic monitoring and control systems should be designed to:
• ensure rapid access to an incident site by medical personnel to provide immediate assistance to injured
people, thus minimising the severity of the crash outcome
• manage the traffic flows to reduce the likelihood of further incidents, delays and minimise drivers avoiding
the tunnel, using alternative routes and thereby increasing the crash risk on those routes.

The efficient and safe operation of a tunnel will depend on suitable traffic monitoring and control systems.
These include CCTV and other roadside intelligent transport systems (ITS) such as lane control, speed limit,
directional information, traveller information and emergency information. A traffic monitoring and control
system (TMCS) should be provided in the tunnels and on adjacent roadways so that traffic flow into, through
and out of the tunnels can be optimised in a safe, consistent and coordinated manner. These systems
should be designed following specific risk assessment and typically have high levels of redundancy built in.
Equipment and functionality should be distributed along the tunnel and impervious to control room incidents
to minimise single points of failure. Wherever practicable, provisions for redundancy should be installed in
separate locations to achieve the need for continuing operation from the disaster recovery site.
Equipment forming part of the TMCS should be designed and mounted in accordance with Freeway Design
Parameters for Fully Managed Operations (Austroads 2009b). It should be integrated with the overall system
employed in the road network to enable seamless management of the total system.
Lane control equipment may include movable barriers to redirect traffic from one lane to another. These are
effective when lane and tunnel bore closures are put in train.
Further guidance on managed motorways/freeways may be obtained from Austroads (2014) and from
VicRoads (2014, 2017 and 2019).
13.3.2. Regulatory Signs
Regulatory signs should be installed in accordance with the requirements of the Manual of Uniform Traffic
Control Devices (MUTCD) (Australia) and Manual of Traffic Signs and Marking (MOTSAM) (New Zealand).
Smaller sized signs may be required because of the restricted dimensions of a tunnel. In general, static sign
size and design should be in accordance with AS 1742.4: 2008 and AS 1743: 2018. Electronic Regulatory
Speed Signs (ERSS) should be designed in accordance with both of these standards as well as the
requirements of AS 5156: 2010. In tunnels, smaller sizes may be required and should be in accordance with
Table 13.2.
Table 13.2: Proposed Electronic Regulatory Speed (ERSS) size requirements
Locations Size
School/Shopping zones Size B1
Tunnels Size B through Size A can be used where size constraints prohibit use of Size B
Managed motorways Size C
Other Size B for all other uses
1. The minimum size of enhanced school zone signs (i.e. when flashing annulus and flashing wig-wags are incorporated
with static speed limit signs for school zones) could be size A (not relevant for tunnels)
Source: Austroads (2015c).
13.3.3. Tunnel Information Signs System
The purpose of the information signs is to ensure that drivers have appropriate information and time to make
good decisions and operate safely. Location of the signs and their design must be based on this premise and
is to be in accordance with Austroads Guide to Traffic Management Part 10 (Austroads 2019c), as modified
by the following requirements.
The tunnel information signs system should be designed to display short messages to motorists advising of
emergencies, on-road incidents, lane closures or other relevant information. Typically, these are short,
single-line dot-matrix variable message signs (VMS) and/or predefined changeable message signs (CMS).
The system should incorporate the ability to automatically default to blank and/or display a set message
when a major system failure occurs. Some jurisdictions refer to these signs as tunnel message signs (TMS)
since they are specifically designed to convey messages about tunnel incidents.

Each tunnel information sign should be:

• mounted above the carriageway such that it is clearly visible from the lane to which the sign applies
• positioned at approximately 120 m intervals along the tunnel to ensure that drivers of stopped vehicles
can read the sign
• capable of being individually addressed (i.e. within the driver’s capacity to see, comprehend and process
the information provided)
• capable of displaying operator formed or pre-programmed messages.
13.3.4. Lane Control System
A lane use signal (LUS) or lane control sign (LCS) system sometimes combined with a variable speed limit
(VSL) system may be implemented for the tunnel, on the approaches to the tunnel and at other locations
where it is regularly required to indicate to motorists whether or not a traffic lane is open and the appropriate
speed limit.
These in turn may be interlinked with the tunnel information signs system and/or VMS system to provide
supporting traveller information. The traffic management plan should be aligned with the corresponding
CCTV cameras.
The lane control system may also be required for temporary lane closures in the tunnel for maintenance
activities or to control traffic during incidents that may occur. In addition, where it is necessary to use a
one-way tunnel as a two-way road during maintenance or incidents, the lane control system will be required
to guide traffic safely in both directions. In this case with contra-flow traffic provisions the double sided/faced
LUS/LCS should be provided.
The lane control system should incorporate as a minimum:

• centralised control of each sign from the control centre
• detection of sign failures
• lane use conflict control logic
• confirmation of the correct lane control settings at all times to the control centre
• failure to set as expected alerts to the control centre.
The status of the lane control system should be clearly displayed in real time on a traffic operations display at
the control centre.
Each sign should be positioned such that, as a minimum, drivers are able to read one downstream signal for
their respective lane at all times. Where appropriate, the sign should also comply with Best Practice for
Variable Speed Limits: Best Practice Recommendations (Austroads 2009a).
Consideration should be given to the maintenance implications when locating the signs and adjustments
should be made where possible to ensure that maintenance functions can be performed safely with minimal
traffic disruption.
13.3.5. Variable Speed Limit (VSL) System
The purpose of the VSL system is to reduce the variability of travel speed between drivers with consequent
reduction in crashes by reducing the desire for lane changing and overtaking. In addition, it allows for speed
limits to be varied to suit the prevailing traffic and environmental conditions, leading to improved traffic flow
and lower crash rates.

The VSL system should as a minimum:

• comprise the VSL and a computer control system to control and monitor all variable speed limits and log
the status of the variable speed limit at any time
• be integrated with the lane control system
• be designed to interface with any permanent speed cameras installed on the system.
VSL signs should:

• be capable of displaying the posted speed in variable increments
• comply with Austroads (2009a)
• be in accordance with the relevant jurisdictional legislation and policy and be able to flash inner rings of
the red annulus and/or conspicuity devices as specified
• apply to all lanes open for traffic at that point.
The status of the VSL system should be clearly displayed in real time on a traffic operations display at the
control centre.
The VSL system should meet the requirements of Austroads (2019c) (Austroads Guide to Traffic
Management Part 10).
13.3.6. Ramp Control Signs System
A ramp control signs system may be required to inform motorists when access to or egress from the tunnel
or the approach road has been closed (see Section 13.3.8 regarding managing ramp closures in
combination with traffic diversion management plans).
The ramp control signs system should consist of a primary and secondary sign on each side-road connection
to the approach road and the tunnel.
13.3.7. Variable Message Signing System
A variable message signing system will be required on the approach roads to most tunnel systems. Variable
message signs (VMS) should be located to meet the requirements of the traffic control and monitoring
system and relevant traffic diversion management plans. The tunnel and neighbouring road network
operators should consider developing operational processes to deliver co-ordinated incident response
messages to road users.
Consideration should be given to safely managing ramp closures and traffic diversion management plans as
one system, using a combination of both VMS and other traffic management subsystems and devices, such
as ramp control signs, VSLS, LUS and moveable barriers. VMS must be located prior to major
decision/diversion points on tunnel approaches.
The system should be capable of displaying pre-determined and operator entered messages from the tunnel
control centre and report real-time status and fault data to the tunnel control centre about each VMS.
VMS should be:

• mounted adjacent to or above a carriageway such that they are clearly visible to drivers from each lane to
which each sign applies
• designed to provide legible, changeable, alpha-numeric and graphic information relating to the operation
of the tunnel.

VMS should be located to meet the requirements of the traffic control and monitoring system and relevant
traffic diversion management plans.
Consideration should be given to managing ramp closures and traffic diversion management plans as one
system, using a combination of both VMS and ramp control signs. Signage must be located prior to major
decision/diversion points on tunnel approaches.
Traveller information may be displayed on these signs and may be considered to provide motorists with
destination information, estimated travel times and congestion levels on the approach roads to the tunnel
and in the tunnel itself.
The VMS system should meet the requirements of Austroads (2019c).
13.3.8. Tunnel Closures
A tunnel closure system is required to allow (or enable) the tunnel to be closed to traffic.
In addition, the approaching traffic must be warned of the traffic stopped ahead and provided with advice of
an alternative route (or routes) where available. VMS (or changeable message signs) should be placed 1 km
and 0.5 km before the tunnel closure indicators and prior to the diversion route where one is available. A
VMS is also required 150 m in advance of the tunnel portal in a position able to be read by approaching
traffic.
Tunnel closure indicators (typically flashing red stop signals) may be located at one or more of three
alternative places, namely:
• in front of the tunnel portal
• in turning points in the tunnel
• immediately downstream of the place defined as a diversion route prior to the tunnel.
In certain circumstances it can be appropriate to erect signals at all of these alternative places
(Section 13.3.10).
The tunnel closure system may be activated:

• by a remote control from a traffic control centre (where a tunnel has a dedicated 24-hour traffic control
centre monitoring the tunnel and its operations, the tunnel closure indicators should not be automatically
activated)
• locally through control panels on the equipment.
Figure 13.1 illustrates an example of a tunnel closure on the approach to a portal utilising boom gates, signs
and a turn-around facility in the median. This treatment should also be supplemented by appropriate traffic
management measures upstream of the closure designed to efficiently divert traffic from the motorway.
The tunnel closure system should be linked to the local traffic control system to prevent phases being called
up on the local connecting roads that would otherwise feed the tunnel. Where an approach to the tunnel is
controlled by a signalised intersection, the tunnel closure system should prevent such phases being called.
Additional signage should be located at and before the intersection and activated automatically upon tunnel
closure. The approach road to the tunnel is not part of this system.
Full tunnel closure (i.e. all lanes) should only occur as a last resort, given the difficulties for traffic
management that arise from this action. However, provision for such an eventuality must be included in the
design and implementation of the project to account for major disasters (e.g. fires, major crashes). Detailed
procedures for all types of closures are included in the Austroads Guide to Road Tunnels Part 3: Operation
and Maintenance (Austroads 2018b).

Figure 13.1: An example of a tunnel closure treatment utilising boom gates, signals and signs
Notes:
The turn-around facility is usually located relatively close to the tunnel portal (e.g. within 200 m). Where practicable a
dedicated emergency exit ramp may be provided in advance of this treatment.
In the event of a closure, the motorway management system or additional traffic management measures should be
activated upstream of the tunnel closure to direct traffic to exit the motorway via normal exit ramps.
Source: Based on Queensland Department of Transport and Main Roads (2020).

13.3.9. Remotely Controlled Barriers
Physical barriers can give a clear indication of the operational status of the tunnel and/or approach ramps.
The need for physical barriers at locations remote from the tunnel (e.g. on approach ramps or roadways)
should be considered on the basis of expected frequency of use. However, they should be provided at all
tunnel portals as close as reasonably practical to the portal considering the specific operational requirements
of the tunnel, to physically prevent tunnel entry in the event of a fire and life safety event.
The need for remote-controlled barriers should be evaluated as part of the automatic traffic control system
(for example CCTV surveillance) for traffic redirection, or to undertake certain critical measures with regard
to safety. Also, experience shows that open, manually operated barriers can conflict with operation of the
tunnel closure indicators, and thereby confuse the operational status of the tunnel. Therefore, only remote-
controlled physical barriers should be used in combination with tunnel closure indicators. However, remote-
controlled barriers should also be able to be operated manually at the site.
The barrier and VMS should be co-located with overhead LCS or LUS to reinforce tunnel closures and the
aspects on the overhead gantry would appear as shown in Figure 13.2. Flashing red conspicuity lanterns on
the barrier should be considered for this application, similar to railway boom gates.
Figure 13.2: Tunnel closures – signal aspects
The barrier should be long enough to clearly indicate that the entry lane is blocked but designed such that it
is possible for emergency vehicles to access the tunnel.
Remote-controlled barriers may be of the raise/lower type or as horizontal swinging barriers. Consideration
should be given to the speed impact threshold at which the barriers should bend/collapse.
When remote-controlled barriers are used, they should be equipped with a control function to ensure that
vehicles are not situated under the barrier when it is lowered, and that the operator is always aware of the
position of the barrier. This should be visually verified by an operator.
The remote-controlled barrier should not be able to be operated automatically unless sufficient advance
warning has been given by the red stop signals linked to the barrier. If there is a malfunction with the OMCS,
and warning lights are not available, then the barrier needs to be able to be operated manually, regardless of
lights/signs.
13.3.10. Traffic Monitoring
Automatic traffic monitoring, vehicle detection and counting
A system for the collection of real-time traffic data, in a suitable form, should be provided. The data required
will usually include:
• speed of vehicles – the average speed of the vehicles in each lane during the collection period in km/h in
the traffic monitoring time interval
• volume of vehicles – the total number of vehicles in each lane in the traffic monitoring time interval
• occupancy of lanes – the amount of time each lane is occupied at the collection point during the traffic
monitoring time interval as a percentage of the total time.

Data collection stations should also be placed at all entry and exit ramps, intersections, merges and
diverges, and strategically located within the tunnel proper.
Vehicle measuring
It may also be beneficial to provide a vehicle detection system to monitor the various classes of vehicle using
the facility. A suitable system would:
• classify vehicles on all lanes on each carriageway
• be continuously operational (except for maintenance purposes)
• be located where the longitudinal grade is less than 1% and crossfall is less than 3%
• meet the technical requirements
• classify all vehicles to the 12 vehicle classes identified in the Guide to Traffic Management Part 3: Traffic
Studies and Analysis (Austroads 2020b).
Over-height vehicle detection and control
Over-height vehicle detection systems should be located prior to and after the last exit/diversion point for
over-height vehicles. The detection point prior to the last exit/diversion point will provide proactive notification
to the driver to divert and alert the tunnel operator of the approaching vehicle. The detection point after that
exit will confirm for the tunnel operator that the over-height vehicle has not diverted and is tunnel bound,
prompting immediate closure of the tunnel (Section 13.3.8).
Arrangements for the vehicle to exit the portal approach area should be provided for those vehicles that
proceed to that point. Parking areas may also be required to store such vehicles temporarily.
Dangerous goods vehicle control
Where it is necessary to divert vehicles carrying dangerous goods (placarded vehicles), appropriate signage
will be required at locations where it is desired to divert the vehicle to another route as well as at the portal to
prevent the vehicle from entering the tunnel.
Arrangements for the vehicle to exit the portal area should be provided for those vehicles that proceed to that
point. Parking areas may also be required to store such vehicles temporarily.
13.3.11. Closed Circuit Television
Closed circuit television (CCTV) surveillance is generally applicable to tunnels with a high-capacity usage
throughout much of the day, such that those incidents requiring traffic regulation measures, and where
queues and other possible incidents arise, may be immediately and efficiently recognised.
Remote tunnels located some distance from any emergency services also benefit from the use of CCTV as
operators can use the CCTVs to verify an incident call or automatic alarm before implementing response
procedures. CCTVs are commonly used as the technology is so readily available, even for remote sites.
CCTV surveillance therefore necessitates links to a traffic/tunnel control centre. Consideration should be
given to the requirements for recording CCTV images and management of recorded images.
Local CCTV surveillance is required to verify operation of remote-controlled barriers (Section 13.3.9),
stopped traffic (even before any incident occurs), broken-down vehicles (before the vehicle owner calls in on
an emergency phone), wayward pedestrians or animals, and operation of emergency equipment.

The CCTV system should continuously view all road and road-related areas within the tunnel, entry and exit
ramps and associated approaches and departures. It should also allow visual confirmation of sign displays
and other traffic management indicators. When used for incident detection, line of sight visibility is required to
all areas to be viewed.
CCTV within the tunnel should be spaced at intervals that provide clear and legible viewing of all tunnel
traffic lanes to facilitate the timely identification of incidents, breakdowns, accidents and the operation of the
deluge system. Spacing will be affected by the tunnel horizontal and vertical curvature and the mounting
height, location and type of equipment, resulting in a spacing of 30 to 150 m when incident detection is
required. If monitoring only is required (typically for remote and/or minor tunnels), then spacing up to 200 m
may be appropriate depending on the geometry and cross-section of the tunnel.
CCTV should be a mixture of fixed and Pan Tilt Zoom (PTZ) cameras, fixed cameras at 60 m intervals,
supplemented by PTZ cameras. The direction of the fixed cameras will depend on the systems to be used.
The aims of TV systems are to:
• allow 100% of the tunnel to be viewed at all times
• site the CCTV such that the operator and video recordings capture the cause and results of incidents for
the purposes of debriefing and training
• allow the accurate deployment of deluge and therefore there should be at least one CCTV camera for two
deluge zones of 30 m each.
The CCTV system should be designed to meet the operational requirements specified in the Guide to Road
Tunnels Part 3: Operation and Maintenance (Austroads 2018b).
13.3.12. Automatic Incident Detection
The traffic monitoring systems and queue detection algorithms may be used to provide automatic detection
of traffic incidents. As well as detecting incidents, they can be used to automatically reduce speeds for traffic
queues to prevent secondary accidents.
CCTV may be used for both incident detection and incident verification. The cameras can be connected to
the automatic incident detection (AID) system to allow operators to locate the incident and provide vision of it
after being alerted. Operators can also rapidly verify incidents, changes in traffic flow and dangerous or
abnormal road conditions. Accordingly, the design should provide the necessary interfaces with the traffic
control system where appropriate.
Video processing hardware and software to detect incidents should be provided and interfaced with
computers located in the control centre. Video software algorithms are currently available to detect issues in
tunnels such as stopped vehicles, congestion and changes in the direction of vehicle travel, pedestrians and
dropped objects/debris. Video AID systems also provide some traffic information (speed and volumes) during
off-peak or low traffic volume conditions and may provide smoke detection based on visibility within the
tunnel, and fire detection based on thermal imaging (World Road Association (PIARC) 2004).
In major tunnels, the AID system should be designed as an integral part of the control systems. The
elements of the whole system are included in the individual components described in this section and the
sections on fire and life safety, electrical, ventilation and lighting. These must be designed as an integrated
system to provide the level of incident detection and communications links and interfaces between the
communication system elements, as required (Section 13.5).

13.3.13. Crash and Vehicle Incident Data Collection
Road tunnels are major pieces of infrastructure that form a crucial part of the road network. To ensure
consistencies and compatibilities with crash data collected and analysed by road agencies, with other parts
of the road network and ideally between tunnels across networks, it is necessary that crash and near-miss
vehicle crash incident data associated with tunnels be collected in a manner that is similar to that of the
jurisdiction within which the tunnel is operated.
The standardisation of crash and incident data in this manner will enable jurisdictions to analyse crash
causation factors and remedial measures in a consistent manner across their road network. Guidance for
practitioners investigating crashes may be found in the Austroads Guide to Road Safety Part 8: Treatment of
Crash Locations (Austroads 2015d) and Measures to Reduce Crashes within and Adjacent to and Within
Tunnels (Austroads 2018c).
A key tool used when investigating crashes and crash clusters involves the preparation of a collision
diagram. Collison diagrams enable practitioners to readily examine pictorially the magnitude, the
reoccurrence of crash types, and other features associated with collisions (and near misses/incidents), that
may have occurred. This information plays a major role in the identification of factors that may have
contributed to crash occurrence and crash severity, while also assisting in identifying remedial treatments.
The preparation of collision diagrams requires practitioners to code crashes according to the specific type of
crash that may have occurred (e.g. rear-end and sideswipe collisions). It should be noted that the coding
convention adopted across Australian jurisdictions and New Zealand vary; therefore the coding of crashes
for tunnels when investigated, will be required to adopt those that are used within the jurisdiction within which
the tunnels are operated. Crash code conventions used in Australia and New Zealand are provided in Road
Safety Part 8: Treatment of Crash Locations (Austroads 2015d). For example, Victoria, Queensland and
Tasmania use Definitions for Classifying Accidents, (DCA), NSW and Western Australia use Road Users
Movements (RUM), while in New Zealand Vehicle Movement Codes (VMC) are used.
The attributes of crash (and incident) data that may be collected, consistent with those attributes collected by
road agencies, within which the tunnels are operated include, but are not limited to:
• location of crash (and incidents)
• time-of-day, day-of-week and month- of-year
• crash type (e.g. DCA, RUM and VMC)
• vehicle direction
• type of vehicle involved (e.g. car, rigid-truck, articulated-truck, bus and bicycle)
• crash severity
• road surface (wet / dry)
• if the crash (or incident) occurred adjacent to the tunnels
– light conditions (light/dark/dusk or dawn)
– weather conditions (e.g. clear, raining and foggy)
• traffic control.
13.4. Directional Signing System
Desirably, major direction signing should be accomplished outside the confines of the tunnel, but this may
not be possible on longer tunnels and those associated with interchanges. Direction signs are relatively large
and adequate space will have to be designed into the tunnel to accommodate them, the signs designed to fit
the tunnel envelope or a combination of these approaches. The provision of traveller information should be
considered for decision points which may be located a significant distance from the actual tunnel.

Design of direction signs should be in accord with AS 1742.15: 2019 in Australia, and NZ Transport
Agency (2010a) in New Zealand. For signs inside tunnels, specific designs will be required to ensure that the
reduced sign size available is sufficiently visible to allow drivers to take the necessary decisions sufficiently in
advance of the actions required. Nonstandard sign shapes may be appropriate to cater for the reduced
clearances in tunnels.
Figure 13.3: Nonstandard sign shapes
Source: Austroads Road Tunnels Task Force.
All static road signs within tunnels may be internally lit where appropriate.
13.5. Communications System
13.5.1. General
To provide appropriate levels of safety over the full range of operating conditions, facilities for traffic
management and tunnel communication should be fully integrated with the operation of systems installed to
monitor and control the tunnel environment. Tunnel systems should interface with the communication and
signalling systems used on the adjoining freeway/motorway or other major road networks, at the level
appropriate to the location and size of the tunnel. System interfaces should utilise an open, industry
standard.
In rural and minor tunnels where only basic monitoring and control systems are used, communication will
generally be limited to the emergency telephone system. The full range of services will only be required in
major, highly trafficked urban road tunnels. The level of communication systems required for a specific
project should be determined in the planning of the tunnel.
Where installed, the communication system should allow the tunnel operators to communicate with tunnel
users. Automated systems must be capable of being manually operated. In the event of an emergency, it is
desirable that at least two channels of communication be used to convey messages to people in the tunnel.
Possible channels include radio re-broadcast (RRB), public address system, variable message signs (VMS)
(or tunnel message signs (TMS) for some jurisdictions), flashing emergency exit signs and auditory alarms.
At least one visual and one auditory channel must be used.
The communication system may include:

• a tunnel radio re-broadcast system with the break-in facility
• a tunnel public address system compatible with the radio re-broadcast system
• a tunnel mobile telephone coverage system
• a help or motorist emergency telephone system (METS)
• other communication systems including an operation and maintenance telephone system, and fire control
co-ordination telephone system
• radio communication system coverage including emergency services, police, ambulance, government
radio network
• static GPS beacons.

13.5.2. Radio Re-broadcast
The radio re-broadcast (RRB) system should re-broadcast in seamless operation and at no cost to the radio
broadcasters agreed by the road agency for the area where the tunnel is located. Typically, only the most
popular stations will be re-broadcast.
Where installed, the radio re-broadcast system should:

• provide sufficient signal strength on the re-broadcast stations to ensure that all users within the tunnel
(including equipment rooms, emergency exit areas and cross-passages) are capable of receiving
re-broadcasts
• enable the tunnel operator locally or remotely to temporarily interrupt all live radio channels in the tunnel
to transmit live or pre-recorded messages
• be configured so that each tunnel tube can be separately interrupted
The RRB should be segmented such that different sections/carriageways can receive messages specific
to them (i.e. for each direction and cross-passages).
• allow for the re-broadcast of digital radio stations.
The RRB break-in facility is regarded as part of the safety and emergency evacuation system of the tunnel
and can only be used in response to incidents that have occurred and that relate to the operation of the
tunnel. Where RRB is installed, consideration should also be given to re-broadcasting traffic data used by
GPS navigation devices.
13.5.3. Emergency Services Communications
Methods of maintaining emergency services communications within the tunnel should be discussed with the
relevant authorities.
13.5.4. Public Address System
The public address system should be able to be used in conjunction with the radio re-broadcast system.
The tunnel public address system should be audible in all areas throughout the tunnel environment under all
traffic operating conditions (refer to Section 10.4). It should also be capable of addressing specific areas of
the tunnel and the cross-passages.
Because of the acoustic properties of the tunnel, specialist advice will be required in the design of the tunnel
interior and the system to achieve an acceptable quality of sound from the system. A simple message to turn
radios on to hear more detailed messages would give a good combination of public address system and
radio.
As described in Section 13.5.1, it is necessary to use at least two channels of communication in

emergencies, and the public address system should not be used alone.
13.5.5. Help Phones/Motorist Emergency Telephone System
Help phones (METS) are to be provided in tunnels to allow motorists to contact the relevant control centre or
other help location. They should be located according to the relevant authority requirements (typically 60 m
intervals) and may be adjacent to (or in) the emergency cabinets.
These telephones may not be required in short tunnels where the approach road system provides an
adequate service. A telephone will be required in the tunnel if there is no other help phone available within
200 m of each tunnel portal.

The help phone system should interface with the CCTV system to automatically display live images of the
respective phone to the operator who answers the call.
Reference should also be made to the Guide to Road Design Part 6B: Roadside Environment
(Austroads 2015b) for details of help telephone requirements.
13.5.6. Mobile Telephones Re-broadcast
Designers should provide for a tunnel mobile telephone system and provide continuity of service for all
mobile phone carriers where terrestrial mobile telephone coverage is available.
13.6. Plant Management and Control System
A plant management and control system (PMCS) should be designed as part of the OMCS. The PMCS
integrates monitoring and control of all mechanical and electrical plant associated with the safe and efficient
operation and maintenance of the tunnel and approach roadways as appropriate. The PMCS should
interface with the TMCS as necessary to coordinate traffic and plant management in response to incidents in
both systems. For example, the ‘CO exposure over travel time alerts’ must be based on algorithms and
inputs from air-quality monitoring stations (PMCS) and real-time traffic monitoring data (TMCS inputs), tightly
integrated to achieve this functionality.
The PMCS must be designed so that no single point of failure causes:

• major performance degradation of one or more elements
• total unavailability of operational functions, which would necessitate the closure of the tunnel.
The PMCS should be capable of showing the status, alarms and faults of all plant, equipment and other
operating systems, and provide a consolidated user interface to the operator. Further details of the plant and
equipment are described throughout the Guide.
The PMCS should be supported by secondary and/or manual systems (e.g. for deluge control) to allow
tunnels to be safely operated in a mode involving a higher degree of operator involvement in the event of
system failure.
13.7. Tunnel Network Communication System
Where installed, the OMCS should utilise a dual-ring automatic optical fibre ethernet network (with built-in
redundancy) which supports network management. The internet protocol (IP) and CCTV networks should
avoid cables of the redundant path being located within the same tunnel or cable containment structure.

14. Services Buildings and Plant Rooms
14.1. General
Tunnel services buildings and plant rooms house the main electricity substation and temporary tunnel control
centre (if required). Additional structures may be required for substations and plant rooms at other locations
adjacent to the tunnel. Plant rooms should be sized not only to accommodate the plant and associated
systems to be installed initially at the tunnel, but also to provide for any foreseeable future requirements.
Building layout should facilitate effective management of operations and maintenance and fully reflect the
system of tunnel management to be adopted (e.g. staffed or unstaffed tunnels). If the services buildings are
normally unstaffed, they should be suitable for occasional use as a temporary control facility during
maintenance and emergency operations.
In addition to the facilities required for the tunnel equipment and systems, maintenance workshops, stores,
messing and toilet facilities may be required for operational, maintenance and contractors’ staff. The specific
needs of different cohorts of personnel (e.g. shift workers) must be considered (refer also to Section 13.2).
Access to the services buildings should be strictly controlled and access facilities managed to detect and
prevent unauthorised entry and operation of plant. Adequate security arrangements should be provided to
protect all materials and equipment.
As well as normal lighting, the provision of emergency lighting (for escape under mains failure conditions),
full standby lighting and heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) to permit continued normal use of
selected areas such as the control room if normal power fails should also be provided.
All buildings are to be designed in accordance with the relevant Australian/New Zealand Standards
(e.g. International Code Council 2015) and any particular requirements of the jurisdiction in which the tunnel
is being constructed.
14.2. Design and Layout
14.2.1. Space and Provision Requirements
Space and suitable cable access may be required for each of the following:
• control room
• electricity supply authority intake and metering
• HV switchgear
• transformer pens
• diesel generator, fuel tanks and dump tank
• UPS and battery equipment
• LV switchgear including control and interface panels for lighting and ventilation systems
• fire protection systems
• HVAC plant
• drainage pumping equipment and associated electrical equipment
• computer, control systems and peripherals
• radio and telephone communications equipment (possibly also a secure area for police network)

• mobile phones and related mobile communication services in tunnels by mobile telephone communication
carriers
• protected mains sockets for portable tools and test equipment.
14.2.2. Cable and Equipment Separation
To minimise the risk of radiated interference, communications equipment and cables should be located as far
as possible from high voltage and low voltage switchgear, cabling and generator plant.
14.2.3. Future Maintenance
Dirt and grime cause major maintenance problems for control panels and technical equipment in tunnel
services buildings and plant rooms in tunnels. The design of the services buildings should be such as to
avoid the ingress of tunnel air into these locations.
14.3. Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning
The room where the control panel is situated and other rooms with technical equipment should have an
operating temperature related to the requirements of the installed equipment. Air conditioning may be
required to maintain the temperature at acceptable levels and an automatic warning system should be
installed to warn of any failure of the air conditioning plant.
A ventilation system will be required to prevent any dangerous build-up of gas that may be emitted from
batteries.
14.4. Floor Loading
The structural design should consider the need for a false floor to allow cabling to be located under the floor
which should be designed to accommodate the expected loading caused by the equipment being installed.
Cables must not be run beneath the floor in battery rooms. Floors in battery rooms must be of solid
construction and finished with a dust and alkali resistant surface. These floors should have drainage outlets
to allow for electrolyte and cleaning water removal to an appropriate treatment and disposal area.
14.5. Lightning Protection
An assessment of the need for lightning protection should be carried out using a risk management approach
in accordance with AS/NZS 1768: 2007.
14.6. Building Security and Fire Protection
14.6.1. Intruder Alarm System
An intruder alarm system should be installed and connected to the control centre. An external self-contained
alarm bell with its own battery unit should also be provided.
14.6.2. Fire Alarm and Extinguishing Systems
A fire alarm and automatic fire extinguishing system should be provided in the service buildings to a standard
satisfactory to the relevant fire authority in the jurisdiction concerned.

15. Construction Issues
15.1. Overview
In the planning process for tunnels, the potential construction methods to be used should be considered to
ensure that the design proposed would be able to be constructed economically and safely. The design of the
tunnel should be undertaken with full knowledge of the construction methods to be used and the form of
project delivery.
All construction activity has to be undertaken in accordance with relevant legislation and in some
jurisdictions, a specific code of practice for tunnels (e.g. WorkCover NSW 2006; Workplace Health and
Safety Queensland 2011). The design must take account of the requirements of any such codes and ensure
that the tunnel is able to be constructed in accordance with those requirements.
Tunnelling, separate to mining, is an industry with high risks that need to be managed (note that tunnel
construction in NZ is covered by mining regulations whilst the tunnel is being excavated).
The codes of practice provide practical guidance to safe tunnel construction and apply to the construction of
underground tunnels, shafts and passageways. They also apply to cut-and-cover excavations, both those
physically connected to ongoing underground construction tunnels and those cut-and-cover operations that
create conditions characteristic of underground construction.
The purpose of the codes is to provide a health and safety framework, including technical criteria and
guidance, to help plan the tunnel construction. The code gives health and safety guidance with specific
requirements to assist in achieving compliance with Acts of parliament, Regulations and subordinate health
and safety legislation.
These requirements include:

• geological and geotechnical exploration requirements
• construction work relating to tunnels and shafts
• tunnel design considerations
• geo-mechanical analysis
• design of tunnel linings
• instrumentation and monitoring during the construction and fit-out phase of tunnel construction.
Specific tunnelling hazards that must be eliminated or minimised include:

• reduced natural ventilation and light
• difficult and limited access and egress
• exposure to airborne contaminants
• fire
• explosion.
Particular attention should be given to the risks associated with temporary works and they should be
designed with the same rigour applied to the final structure. Figure 15.1 shows an example of a tunnel under
construction.

Figure 15.1: Tunnel under construction (CityLink tunnel, Melbourne)
Source: Transurban.
15.2. Responsibility of Designers
Designers should ensure that:

• to the extent that they have control over a particular section of design work, the tunnel structure (or plant)
can be safely erected, used, repaired, cleaned, maintained and demolished (life cycle), so that the health
and safety of any person is not put at risk by the design (refer also to Section 4.1.2)
• information is provided to the client about the health and safety aspects of the design.
Designers should also ensure that hazards associated with the following are identified before commencing
construction work:
• the design of the structure (permanent or temporary)
• systems of work required to erect, repair, clean and maintain the structure
• the intended safe use of the structure, including in emergency situations
• materials needed in the construction of the structure
• the demolition and life cycle of the structure.
Where there is more than one designer, critical aspects of the project should be documented and
consultation carried out between all of the designers, to ensure the safe integration of all of the different
design aspects in the work. When risks remain in the design work, information should be included with the
design information to alert others to the risks.

The designer should document the assumed geotechnical conditions used in the design to enable exposed
conditions to be compared against the design assumptions as the tunnelling progresses. This allows for
monitoring of the conditions and a reassessment of the design, where the geotechnical conditions differ from
that assumed in the design. This applies to plant likely to be affected by such a change, as well as the tunnel
and associated ground support systems.
15.3. Design Review for Construction
The initial tunnel design should be reviewed before construction commences, usually by or in consultation
with the designer and principal contractor, and should be amended, if necessary, in line with the construction
needs before excavation commences.
This review should consider a range of construction issues, such as:

• the excavation method
• additional excavation for temporary access
• accessibility to emergency personnel
• ventilation
• spoil removal
• refuges
• rail sidings (if required)
• loadings from roof-mounted spoil conveyors and ventilation systems.
As well as amending the tunnel design itself, the design review should produce concept designs which may
include:
• ground support
• the ventilation system
• the construction electrical system
• the materials handling system.
Safe tunnel design and construction go hand-in-hand, and their suitability to the ground and environmental
conditions is more safety-critical in underground work than in any other construction activity. Consequently,
continuity in engineering practices at the planning, investigation, design and construction stages is
considered necessary.
This can be achieved more effectively by the involvement of a single organisation throughout.
However, if the designer’s direction changes, a way should be devised to ensure that the essential continuity
is maintained and that the total planning, investigation, design and construction process is not fragmented.
15.4. Ventilation System for Construction
The ventilation system should be designed to provide adequate ventilation levels throughout the tunnel
during construction, including providing additional localised extraction ventilation to deal with the production
of dust, heat or fumes from the excavation process, operation of large plant or other activities, such as
maintenance.
The design should allow for the need to install ventilation equipment or ducting as the excavation progresses
to maintain adequate air supply to the working face.

As far as possible, this system should be designed to be compatible with the final ventilation system required
for the tunnel while in operation.
Figure 15.2: Tunnel boring machine – Clem 7 tunnel Brisbane
Source: River City Motorway.
15.5. Vibration
Vibration caused by construction activities should be considered and appropriate mitigation measures
undertaken. This will require consideration of the method of construction combined with the surrounding
ground conditions and property development. The sensitivity of receptors to the vibration that may be caused
should also be considered.
Special ground conditions in close proximity to the tunnel and other special circumstances may require
separate risk analyses. The geological structure of areas adjacent to the site and for some distance from the
site should be examined to determine whether any particular strata will convey the vibrations to buildings or
other sensitive receptors remote from the site.
Inspection and registration of buildings should be undertaken prior to any work proceeding and must be
undertaken in the presence of the owner and conducted by an independent, appropriately qualified,
competent person. The description should be supplemented by photographs and/or video film.
In areas where specified limits have been determined, vibration measurements should always be
undertaken. The guidelines in the Standards Norway publication NS 8141-1: 2012 and NS 8141-2: 2013
state the required specifications of the investigation equipment and how the vibration should be measured
and reported. Cenek, Sutherland and McIver’s (2012) research report, Ground Vibration from Road
Construction, also provides some information on tunnel construction.

The effects of ground vibration are classified into three categories – human exposure, building contents, and
building structures.
Human exposure
Australian Standard AS ISO 2631.2: 2014 provides guidelines on the effect of various levels of vibration on
human perceptions. These guidelines may be used when considering measures that may be required to
mitigate the effect of vibrations caused by construction activities.
Continuous and shock-induced vibration in buildings has been adopted as the relevant standard for nuisance
vibration levels. The standard provides a collection of curves that specify acceptable vibration levels, at each
frequency, for different circumstances.
Building contents
While there is currently no Australian Standard covering ground vibration from construction sites, limiting
ground vibration to no more than 5.0 mm/s at the closest sensitive structure is a common guideline used by
road construction authorities and is a limit that is generally acceptable to the community and well below
levels at which structural damage may occur.
Structural damage to buildings

There is no Australian Standard currently for assessment of building damage caused by vibration energy.
However, the British Standard BS 7385-2: 1993 can be used as a guide to assess the likelihood of building
damage from ground vibration.
BS 7385-2: 1993 suggests levels at which ‘cosmetic’, ‘minor’ and ‘major’ categories of damage might occur.
Further to this, the German Standard DIN 4150-3: 1999 also provides recommended maximum levels of
vibration to minimise the likelihood of building damage caused by vibration.

16. Tunnel Commissioning
16.1. General
Commissioning is a vital part of the development of the tunnel to ensure that it will function as planned and
provide the operator with a robust operating system. This requires the early involvement of the operator to
ensure all factors are considered. Planning of the construction and hand-over process must allow adequate
time for the commissioning process and the changes and modifications that may be required as a result.
The commissioning process requires enough time to be completed thoroughly, and this time should not be
reduced to accommodate over-runs in the construction schedule. Inadequate completion of the
commissioning process may lead to operational problems after opening, with safety and cost consequences.
Priority must be given to successfully completing the commissioning process before the tunnel is opened to
traffic, notwithstanding the desire to make use of the investment as soon as possible.
Complete records of the commissioning process and testing undertaken (with the results) must be kept.
16.2. The Commissioning Plan
The testing and commissioning plan should be prepared prior to undertaking any testing and commissioning
activities. The plan should provide a structured approach to the testing and commissioning and produce all
necessary documentation to demonstrate the satisfactory performance of the tunnel systems as standalone
systems and as an integrated system.
The testing and commissioning plan should demonstrate that the system meets its planned design
performance. In addition, a number of assumptions may have been made during the design, and the plan
should test each of these assumptions. Where the results of the plan do not verify the assumptions made in
the design process, the commissioning team should re-assess the performance of the design and determine
if it complies with the design intent. If this is not possible, the construction and installation should be rectified.
The commissioning plan should include:

• defining the components to be tested and inspected appointing appropriately qualified and competent
personnel to undertake the testing and inspection, to witness the testing and to verify the testing;
operators should be part of the witness testing of equipment to provide feedback
• establishing the testing and commissioning protocols
• defining the acceptance criteria
• undertaking the testing required
• training the operating personnel in the required procedures
• undertaking corrective actions revealed by the testing process
• documenting the testing, results and actions taken
• establishing a system for continuous review and improvement of the systems.

16.2.2. Personnel
Competent and suitably qualified personnel should undertake, witness, verify and approve the testing and
commissioning. Second party witnessing and third-party verification should be undertaken as necessary to
gain confidence in the satisfactory performance of the systems.
16.2.3. Testing and Commissioning Protocol
The protocol should:

• include the starting conditions, details of any intermediate steps, the deployed condition and, where
appropriate, the recovery from the deployed condition
• include the measurements, observations and calculations required at each step and should not specify
subjective measures
• define the conditions under which the tests should be carried out and the calibration and accuracy of all
test equipment
• be adequately refined to obtain reproducibility and repeatability within the permitted tolerance
• address the occupational health and safety requirements of test participants and the environmental
management plans that may be required.
16.2.4. Acceptance Criteria
For each test and each step of the test, the minimum performance criteria should be established with a clear
and measurable pass/fail criterion defined in terms of the testing and commissioning plan and the
measurements taken during the plan.
The acceptance criteria should cover the range of expected performance criteria, the tolerance and
treatment of measurement uncertainty and should be specified prior to undertaking the testing and
commissioning. Any non-conformances should be documented.
16.2.5. Corrective Actions
Corrective actions should be raised where a component and/or system fails part or all of the testing
procedure. Upon completion of the corrective action, the component and/or system should be re-tested.
16.2.6. Documentation
Prior to undertaking any commissioning, a document should be prepared setting out the following:
• details of component/systems to be tested or commissioned
• the commissioning process
• the test and verification protocol to be applied
• the acceptance criteria
• action to be taken in case of non-conformance
• a suitable pro-forma for recording commissioning measurement and data
• name of the testing body.

16.3. Testing and Commissioning of System Components
The testing and commissioning of system components is usually undertaken using factory acceptance
testing (FAT). Factory acceptance testing is the primary tool for the verification of individual components prior
to site installation. Depending on the component, the extent of the FAT phase will vary. For standard
off-the-shelf components the extent of FAT may be limited to sampling and type testing. The FAT for
bespoke or non-standard equipment may be exhaustive.
Particular importance should be placed on the FAT phase if a component or the particular application is
unusual or unique. Where reliance is placed on an unproven component or application, every effort should
be made to demonstrate the successful performance early in the project cycle.
The sampling and type-testing criteria of FAT include the following:

• Sampling and type testing should be consistent with the criticality of the equipment. Full non-destructive
testing may be appropriate for critical equipment.
• Less critical equipment may be subject to a sampling protocol that ensures an appropriate confidence
level is obtained for the entire batch.
• Results of sample testing should demonstrate consistency with the type-approved prototype.
In addition to factory acceptance testing, a range of functionality tests (site acceptance testing and site
integrated acceptance testing) are required to be undertaken in the completed tunnel. This is essential
testing to ensure that the whole project functions safely and effectively.
Site acceptance testing is the testing performed on an individual system to verify compliance with approved
design documents and to verify installation in accordance with governing laws, regulations, codes, and
standards.
Site integrated acceptance testing seeks to confirm that all systems function together, as required, to ensure
proper operation of these systems.
The results of acceptance tests should be fully documented. The documentation and reports should have the
following information:
• model and description of item tested including batch and serial numbers
• test protocol
• test conditions
• results of measurements and calculations
• manufacturer’s name
• testing authority name
• date of test
• witness to the test
• any departure from the testing protocol
• statement regarding meeting the acceptance criteria or otherwise
• any pertinent observation.

16.3.2. Fire Safety System
Commissioning of the fire safety system should be in accordance with the procedures described in the
Australian Standard Tunnel Fire Safety (AS 4825: 2011).
16.3.3. Ventilation System Validation
The commissioning process for the ventilation system should determine the tests required to meet the
objectives described by World Road Association (PIARC) (2007) and further developed in World Road
Association (PIARC) (2011) to ensure that the system as designed meets the required operating needs. It
will not be possible to perform tests at the scale of the design fires, but it may be necessary to conduct real
tests at a lesser scale to ensure that the systems do respond adequately. These tests may also be used as a
training medium for operators and staff.
World Road Association (PIARC) (2007) states:

Because the ventilation system plays a major role in tunnel safety, it is essential that it operates
properly and effectively at all times. To achieve this goal, sets of tests have to be defined and
adapted to specific tunnel specifications.
The objectives of road tunnel ventilation system testing are to:

• verify the functionality of all elements of the system, both at the time of ordering (factory and acceptance
testing) and in situ (functionality testing at specified intervals)
• verify the in situ performance of the system and its component parts by comparing it to the design
specifications.
Three kinds of tests may be performed in order to check the equipment and the safety objectives of the
ventilation system, namely:
• Factory acceptance tests – aimed at checking that the equipment’s actual performance matches the
specified requirements using appropriate procedures, usually defined in the test guidelines.
• On-site unit tests – aimed at checking that equipment operation is in accordance with the project
specifications.
• Integration tests – aimed at checking that the safety objectives match, especially with regard to smoke
control. The first set of integration tests may be performed without a fire in order to quantify the ventilation
capacity, and a second set of tests may involve a calibrated fire in order to account for the buoyancy
effects and to visualise the smoke development.
Hall (2006) notes the following:

As it may be impracticable to test the performance of the ventilation system against severe fires
in the tunnel, the performance of the ventilation system should be evaluated against a
representative set of cold flow cases, which have been identified and analysed during design.
The site tests should include the:

• functional testing of individual items of equipment
• performance of individual items of equipment, including start-up time, the measurement of noise and
vibration levels if applicable, installation effects, power consumption, etc.
• integrated operation of systems, including the coordinated operation of individual items of equipment and
their interlocks
• performance of the system, operating in each of its design modes or configurations, including noise
measurements etc. (the same tests used for the individual items of equipment)

• air velocity measurements should be taken at appropriate locations along the tunnel, depending on the
configuration of the tunnel in question. At each location along the tunnel, measurements should be taken at
a suitable number of points in the cross-section, for example, in accordance with ISO 5802: 2001 Industrial
Fans – Performance Testing In situ, in order to determine the bulk mean airflow velocity and volumetric flow.
The commissioning procedure must include this range of tests.
16.3.4. Electrical Supply Validation
The electrical power provider should undertake its normal commissioning process and ensure that the supply
is appropriate in both normal and emergency situations. UPS and stand-by systems must also be proven.
16.3.5. Lighting System Validation
Appropriate testing should be undertaken to ensure that lighting levels are as required for the various
conditions encountered in both day and night in the different zones of the tunnel in accordance with the relevant
Australian Standards. The system should also be tested to ensure that the stand-by lighting, designed for
evacuation, functions as required. The visibility of exits and the pathways to the exits should be assessed.
16.3.6. Drainage Validation
While it may not be feasible to test for the design flood, it is appropriate to test the drainage system for flows
associated with washing and firefighting. Such flows should be applied and appropriate observations and
measurements undertaken to ensure that all networks are functioning appropriately. The flame traps
incorporated in the system should also be tested. Drain pumps should be tested to the design specifications.
16.3.7. System Integration
It is necessary to test that the various operating systems are properly integrated and operating in concert
with each other. Real-time physical trial scenarios should be enacted to ensure that the systems will cater for
foreseeable incidents and that the police, fire services, emergency services and tunnel operator teams are
familiar with, and can perform their required roles in the event of an incident.
Where individual components are controlled by and/or interface with the control system, the testing needs to
ensure components can be operated as required, and that the interfaces function as designed. In addition,
and where appropriate, the failure modes for each of the components should be tested.
16.4. Commissioning Records
16.4.1. General
Upon completion of a commissioning stage and prior to commencement of the next stage of commissioning,
a document should be prepared and signed by a competent person, setting out the following:
• details of component/systems tested or commissioned
• results of any measurements
• any pertinent observations during commissioning
• actions taken to rectify any non-conformance (corrective actions)
• statement as to conformance with acceptance criteria
• date of tests undertaken and date of the report
• signature of person responsible.

Commissioning records should include descriptions of the procedures adopted and the results. All records
should be designed to provide appropriate information and guidance to the operators of the tunnel. Where
possible, the records should be designed in a format to facilitate the documentation of the ongoing inspection
and testing regime during operation of the tunnel.
The documentation should be provided in a form that assists the operator in the day-to-day safe operating
needs as well as the needs of periodic inspection.
All manufacturers’ documentation including operating and maintenance manuals, performance specifications
and warranty certificates should also be provided as part of the total commissioning package.
16.4.2. Inspection Checklists
Appropriate checklists for all testing procedures (inspection and test plans) should be developed for the
commissioning process. The format of the checklists should be such as to provide a suitable recording
system for future maintenance and checking processes. The checklists should be designed for clear and
simple entry of testing results.
16.4.3. As-built Records
The verified as-built records for the tunnel and its equipment are required to provide the baseline for future
maintenance, operation and enhancement of the facility and its systems. Part of the commissioning process
should be to ensure that all as-built records are available and properly executed.
As-constructed drawings should contain but not be limited to:

• foundation details
• variations/modifications during construction
• works constructed outside tolerance
• updated geotechnical reports based on actual profile as determined during excavation
• location of all rock anchors including identifying whether the anchors are short-term or long-term
• service/public utility plant (PUP) locations.
16.4.4. Manuals Required
General
It is essential that detailed operating and maintenance manuals be developed for all elements of plant and
equipment with in-built procedures for continual improvement based on experience in using them.
Operating and maintenance manuals should cover:

• drawings, including as-constructed drawings
• systems architecture
• systems descriptions
• systems performance
• software architecture and design information
• equipment description
• manufacturers’ technical literature
• any supplementary data available
• operations procedures
• maintenance procedures including expected replacement intervals of parts, test certificates and test reports.

These manuals can be more easily prepared at the design stage in conjunction with the operating personnel
than at later stages of the process. They must include any matters that have been included in the design and
that are critical to the success of the design in practice. Detailed operation figures/parameters may have to
be obtained during the commissioning stage.
Detailed operational procedures at times of emergency must always be readily available to staff.
Operation, inspection and maintenance manual
The operation, inspection and maintenance manual should include but not be limited to:
• operational information on all structures, equipment, systems and procedures (mechanical, electrical, ITS, etc.)
• operational requirements
• inspection frequency (all components)
• details of inspection access requirements (including any confined-space access requirements)
• design life of all components and sub-components – for any component or sub-component that has a
design life less than the specified design life of the structure, details for replacement frequency and
method for the (sub-) component are required
• routine maintenance schedule including, but not limited to cleaning, wash-down, failed light replacement,
incident response systems testing
• scheduled maintenance program including but not limited to
– description of item
– description of defect
– intervention level for undertaking the repair of the defect
– standard to which the defect is to be repaired
– if appropriate, the inspection time interval required
• details of how routine and scheduled checks, tests and maintenance will be undertaken.
Incident management and recovery manual
An incident management and recovery manual should be prepared and should include, but not be limited to:
• vehicle breakdown
• crashes
• tunnel user medical incident
• debris on carriageway
• spills
• lost loads
• over-height vehicles
• external electrical supply failure
• flood
• water on pavement
• fire
• explosion
• serious release of noxious liquid or gas
• contingency and disaster management plans
• incident management training (including any in-tunnel incident trials/simulations/tests).

Police, fire and emergency services manuals
A manual for the guidance of police, fire and emergency services expected to attend the tunnel in
emergencies should be prepared. The manual should describe the principal features of the tunnel, including
the operational procedures, and detail the facilities available to assist them in dealing effectively with
incidents and emergencies in the tunnel.
Each service should contribute to the development of the operating manual to cover the specific
requirements for response to emergencies in the tunnel involved, making reference as appropriate to any
relevant service manuals.
16.5. Operational Readiness
16.5.1. General
The commissioning process requires ensuring that the tunnel is in operational readiness and that it will
perform safely and effectively. This requires the infrastructure, the personnel and the documentation to be
ready. Until all three are achieved, the tunnel should not be opened to traffic.
16.5.2. Infrastructure Readiness
Infrastructure readiness means that the installation, testing and commissioning of all components of the
tunnel has successfully been completed and all remedial actions closed out.
The tunnel should not be opened to traffic until all of the components and/or systems have been tested and
proven acceptable, the operating personnel have been trained appropriately and the required documented
procedures are completed.
The commissioning process may reveal systems, procedures and equipment that are not functioning or
functioning at a lesser level than required. Such deficiencies should be rectified before opening but it may be
possible to devise an operational strategy that allows the tunnel to operate safely while the rectification is
carried out. Appropriate procedures must be developed and documented prior to opening to allow this to
happen. Such arrangements are an interim measure and the rectification process should be completed as
quickly as possible after opening to allow normal operations to be implemented in an agreed time frame.
This process should be a last resort to allow earlier usage of the investment in the tunnel infrastructure and may
only be used for non-critical issues. If a suitable safe work-around procedure cannot be devised to overcome an
issue before the defect is rectified, then the tunnel should not be opened to traffic until it is resolved.
16.5.3. Personnel Readiness
Personnel include the owners, operators, maintainers and users of the completed infrastructure, including
emergency services. For operational readiness, each of these groups will require recruitment, training and/or
access to information.
Prior to opening a tunnel an exercise should be conducted with the emergency services and should be
considered part of the pre-incident planning for emergency services, and familiarisation and training of the
operators and other involved parties. The exercise should, as far as possible, replicate the likely genesis of a
real incident (e.g. fire), including the operator response and emergency services response. Video and written
records should be retained for training and familiarisation of current and future personnel.
Control room operators should be trained to the Australian National Qualification TLI42513 – Certificate IV in
Traffic Operations. As a minimum to operate unsupervised, the control room operator should attain and
demonstrate the competencies of the core units. The remainder of the competencies should be attained
within 18 months of employment.

Early involvement of an experienced tunnel operator can assist with operational readiness and familiarity
with the tunnel operational systems.
16.5.4. Documentation Readiness
The documentation consists of records that are required to own, operate, maintain and use the completed
infrastructure as described in Section 16.2.6, Section 16.3.1 and Section 16.4 as well as the records required
by this section. Each project will attract its own set of documentation requirements such as statutory
approvals and licences.
16.6. Continuous Improvement
The commissioning process may reveal areas where the design and/or operating procedures can be
improved and should be modified to achieve improvement. It is necessary to have a procedure in place to
provide for the improvements to be documented and implemented as the tunnel operates. Such a procedure
should also include a commitment to seeking continual improvements in the operating regime over the life of
the facility. Procedures should be developed in accordance with AS/NZS ISO 10005: 2006.
Part of this process should include a project debrief for all project participants to be held no longer than
six months after final commissioning. The debrief should not be conducted before some months of actual usage
have elapsed to allow teething problems to have been addressed, and normal operations to be occurring.

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OECD 2001, Safety in tunnels: transport of dangerous goods through road tunnels, OECD, Paris, France.
Peeling, J, Wayman, M, Mocanu, I, Nitsche, P, Rands, J & Potter, J 2016, ‘Energy efficient tunnel solutions’,
Transportation Research Procedia, vol. 14, pp. 1472–81.
Queensland Department of Transport and Main Roads 2020, Traffic and road use manual: volume 1, part 9,
section 7.2.4-1: traffic management procedures for tunnel closures, TMR, Brisbane, Qld.
Ridley, P 2019, Overview of Australian urban road tunnels, ITLS- WP-19-21, Institute of Transport and
Logistics Studies, Sydney, NSW.
Roads and Maritime Services 2014a, Beyond the pavement: urban design policy procedures and design
principles, RMS, Sydney, NSW.
Roads and Maritime Services 2014b, Road tunnel ventilation systems, RMS, Sydney, NSW.
Roads and Maritime Services 2016, No fines concrete subbase specification, IC-QA-R81, RMS, Sydney,
NSW.
Salata, F, Golasi, I, Bovenzi, S, Vollaro, E, Pagliaro, F, Cellucci, L, Coppi, M, Gugliermetti, F & Vollaro, A
2015, ‘Energy optimisation of road tunnel lighting’, Sustainability, vol. 7, issue 7, pp. 9664–680.
Seike, M, Kawabata, N, Hasegawa, M & Tanaka, H 2019, ‘Heat release rate and thermal fume behaviour
estimation of fuel cell vehicles in tunnel fires’, International Journal of Hydrogen Energy, vol. 44, no. 48,
pp. 26597–608.
Sheridan, M 2009, ‘An urban design approach to tunnels’, Australasian Tunnelling Society: tunnel design
and construction short course, 2009, Sydney, New South Wales, Australasian Tunnelling Society,
Sydney, NSW.
Sun, J, Zhang, H & Xiang, F 2018, ‘Challenges of new energy vehicles in tunnel fire and discussion on
emergency rescue technology’, Informatics, environment, energy and applications conference, 7th, 2018,
Beijing, China, Association for Computing Machinery, Beijing, China, pp. 88-92.
Transport and Road Research Laboratory 1987, Planning and design considerations for road tunnels: the
influence of operation and maintenance, report CR41, TRRL, Crowthorne, UK.
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 2001, Recommendations of the group of experts on safety
in road tunnels: final report, Inland Transport Committee, UNECE, Geneva, Switzerland.
VicRoads 2014, Managed freeway policy, VicRoads, Kew, Vic.
VicRoads 2017, Managed motorways framework: network optimisation & operations rationale and technical
requirements, VicRoads, Kew, Victoria.
VicRoads 2019, Managed motorway design guide, VicRoads, Kew, Victoria.
Wierer, A 2018, ‘LED Lighting in ASFINAG road tunnels’, Routes/Roads – PIARC Magazine, no.378,
pp 58–62.
WorkCover NSW 2006, Tunnels under construction: code of practice 2006, WorkCover, Gosford, NSW.
Workplace Health and Safety Queensland 2011, Tunnelling: code of practice 2007, Workplace Health and
Safety & Department of Justice and Attorney General, Brisbane, Qld.
World Road Association (PIARC) 2004, Traffic incident management systems used in road tunnels,
05.15.BEN, Technical Committee 5 Road Tunnels, World Road Association (PIARC), Paris, France.
World Road Association (PIARC) 2007, Systems and equipment for fire and smoke control in road tunnels,
05.16.BEN, Technical Committee 5 Road Tunnels, World Road Association (PIARC), Paris, France.
World Road Association (PIARC) 2008a, Risk analysis for road tunnels, 2008R02, Technical Committee 3.3
Road Tunnel Operations, World Road Association (PIARC), Paris, France.

World Road Association (PIARC) 2008b, Road tunnels: a guide to optimising the air quality impact upon the
environment, 2008R04, Technical Committee 3.3 Road Tunnel Operations, World Road Association
(PIARC), Paris, France.
World Road Association (PIARC) 2008c, Road tunnels: an assessment of fixed firefighting systems,
2008R07, Technical Committee 3.3 Road Tunnel Operations, World Road Association (PIARC), Paris,
France.
World Road Association (PIARC) 2008d, Human factors and road tunnel safety regarding users, 2008 R17,
Technical Committee 3.3 Road Tunnel Operations, Paris, France.
World Road Association (PIARC) 2011, Operating strategies for emergency ventilation, 2011R02, Technical
Committee 3.3 Road Tunnel Operations, World Road Association (PIARC), Paris, France.
World Road Association (PIARC) 2012a, Life cycle aspects of electrical road tunnel equipment, 2012R14,
PIARC Technical Committee C.4, Road Tunnel Operations, World Road Association, Paris, France.
World Road Association (PIARC) 2012b, Risk evaluation, current practice for risk evaluation for road tunnels,
2012R23, Technical Committee C.4 Road Tunnel Operations, World Road Association (PIARC), Paris,
France.
World Road Association (PIARC) 2016a, Best practice for the life cycle analysis for tunnel equipment
(2016R01), Technical Committee 3.3 Road Tunnel Operations, Paris, France.
World Road Association (PIARC) 2016b, Fixed firefighting systems in road tunnels: current practices and
recommendations 2016R03, Technical Committee 3.3 Road Tunnel Operations, Paris, France.
World Road Association (PIARC) 2016c, Human factors guidelines for a safer man-road interface, 2016R20,
PIARC Human Factors Working Group, Paris, France.
World Road Association (PIARC) 2016d, Experience with significant incidents in road tunnels, 2016R35,
Technical Committee 3.3 Road Tunnel Operations, Paris, France.
World Road Association (PIARC) 2016e, Road tunnels manual, PIARC, Paris, France.
World Road Association (PIARC) 2017, Road tunnel operations: first steps towards a sustainable approach,
2017R02, Technical Committee 3.3 Road Tunnel Operations, Paris, France.
World Road Association (PIARC) 2019a, Road tunnels: vehicle emissions and air demand for ventilation,
2019R02, Technical Committee D.5 Road Tunnel Operations, Paris, France.
World Road Association (PIARC) 2019b, Prevention and mitigation of tunnel related collisions, 2019R03,
Technical Committee D.5 Road Tunnel Operations, Paris, France.
World Road Association (PIARC) 2019c, Introduction to the RAMS concept for road tunnel operations,
2019R05, Technical Committee D.5 Road Tunnel Operations, Paris, France.
World Road Association (PIARC) 2019d, Security of road infrastructure, 2019R12, Task Force C.1
Infrastructure Security, Paris, France.
World Road Association (PIARC) 2019e, General principles to improve accessibility for persons with reduced
mobility in road tunnels, 2019R20, Technical Committee D.5 Road Tunnel Operations, Paris, France.
Australian and New Zealand Standards
AS 1170.4: 2007, Structural design actions: earthquake actions in Australia.
AS 1319: 1994, Safety signs for the occupational environment.
AS 1428.1: 2009, Design for access and mobility – General requirements for access – New building work.
AS 1742.4: 2008, Manual of uniform traffic control devices: Speed controls.
AS 1742.15: 2019, Manual of uniform traffic control devices: direction signs, information signs and route
numbering.
AS 1743: 2018, Road Signs: Specifications.
AS 2159: 2009, Piling: design and installation.

AS 2293: Set-2005, Emergency escape lighting and exit signs (set).

AS 2444: 2001, Portable fire extinguishers and fire blankets – Selection and location.
AS 3600: 2018, Concrete structures.
AS 4825: 2011, Tunnel fire safety.
AS 4852.1: 2009, Variable message signs: fixed signs.
AS 5100: Set-2017, Bridge design (set).
AS 5100.2: 2017, Bridge design: design loads.
AS 5100.5: 2017, Bridge design concrete.
AS 5156: 2010, Electronic speed limit signs.
AS 5100.7: 2017, Rating of existing bridges.
AS 60529: 2004, Degrees of protection provided by enclosures (IP Code).
AS 61508.1: 1999, Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems:
general requirements, (superseded).
AS ISO 2631.2: 2014, Mechanical vibration and shock: evaluation of human exposure to whole-body
vibration: vibration in buildings (1 Hz to 80 Hz).
AS/NZS 1158.1.1: 2005, Lighting for roads and public spaces: vehicular traffic (category V) lighting:
performance and design requirements.
AS/NZS 1158.1.2: 2010, Lighting for roads and public spaces: vehicular traffic (category V) lighting: guide to
design, installation, operation and maintenance.
AS/NZS 1158.5: 2007, Lighting for roads and public spaces: tunnels and underpasses.
AS/NZS 1680.1: 2006, Interior and workplace lighting: general principles and recommendations.
AS/NZS 1680.2.1: 2008, Interior and workplace lighting: specific applications: circulation spaces and other
general areas.
AS/NZS 1680.2.2: 2008, Interior and workplace lighting: specific applications: office and screen-based tasks.
AS/NZS 1680.2.4: 1997, Interior lighting: industrial tasks and processes.
AS/NZS 1768: 2007, Lightning protection.
AS/NZS 2312: 2014, Guide to the protection of structural steel against atmospheric corrosion by the use of
protective coatings, (superseded).
AS/NZS 3000: 2007, Electrical installations (known as the Australian/ New Zealand wiring rules).
AS/NZS 3439.1: 2002, Low-voltage switchgear and control gear assemblies: type-tested and partially
type-tested assemblies.
AS/NZS 3947.4.3: 2000, Low-voltage switchgear and control gear: contactors and motor starters: A.C.
semiconductor controllers and contactors for non-motor loads.
AS/NZS 60079.10.1: 2009, Explosive atmospheres: classification of areas: explosive gas atmospheres,
(IEC 60079-10-1, ed.1.0(2008) MOD).
AS/NZS 60079.14: 2009, Explosive atmospheres: electrical installations design, selection and erection,
(IEC 60079-14, ed. 4.0(2007) MOD).
AS/NZS 60598.1: 2013, Luminaires: general requirements and tests, (IEC 60598-1, ed. 7.0(2008) MOD).
AS/NZS 60598.2.1: 2014, Luminaires: particular requirements: fixed general purpose luminaires.
AS/NZS 60598.2.3: 2015 Luminaires: particular requirements: luminaires for road and street lighting,
(IEC 60598-2-3, ed. 3.1 (2011) MOD).

AS/NZS 60598.2.22: 2005, Luminaires: particular requirements: luminaires for emergency lighting,
(IEC60598-2-22, ed. 3.1(2002) MOD).
AS/NZS ISO 10005: 2006, Quality management systems: guidelines for quality plans.
AS/NZS ISO 31000: 2009, Risk management: principles and guidelines.
NZS 1170.5: 2004, Structural design actions: earthquake actions: New Zealand.
NZS 3101.1&2: 2006, Concrete structures standard.
NZS 4512: 2010, Fire detection and alarm systems in buildings.
NZS 6806: 2010, Acoustics: roads: traffic noise: new and altered roads.
SA/SNZ TS 1158.6: 2015, Lighting for roads and public spaces: luminaires: performance.
International Standards
BS 7385-2: 1993, Evaluation and measurement for vibration in buildings: guide to damage levels from
groundborne vibration.
BS 8006-1: 2010, Code of practice for strengthened/reinforced soils and other fills.
BS 8006-2: 2011, Code of practice for strengthened/reinforced soils and other fills: soil nail design.
BS 8081: 1989, Code of practice for ground anchorages.

BS EN 1537: 2013, Execution of special geotechnical work: ground anchors.
ISO 5802: 2001, Industrial Fans – Performance testing insitu.
ISO 8210: 2017, Alarm systems – Audible emergency evacuation signal – Requirements.
DIN 4150-3: 1999, Vibration in buildings: part 3: effects on structures.
ISO 10007: 2003, Quality management systems: guidelines for configuration management, (withdrawn).
ISO 24748: 2018, The international standard on systems and software engineering: life cycle management:
part 4: systems engineering planning.
ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288: 2015, Systems and software engineering: system life cycle processes.
ISO/IEC/IEEE 15289: 2019, Systems and software engineering: content of life-cycle information items
(documentation).
ISO/IEC/IEEE 29148: 2018, International standard: systems and software engineering: life cycle processes:
requirements engineering.
ISO/IEC/IEEE 42010: 2011, Systems and software engineering: architecture description.
NFPA 502: 2020, Standard for road tunnels, bridges, and other limited access highways.
NS 8141-1: 2012+A1: 2013, Vibration and shock: guideline limit values for construction work, open-pit mining
and traffic: part 1: effect of vibration and air blast from blasting on constructions, including tunnels and
rock caverns, (in Norwegian).
NS 8141-2: 2013, Vibration and shock: guideline limit values for construction work, open-pit and pit mining
and traffic: part 2: effects of vibration on construction works from construction activities other than
blasting, and from traffic, (in Norwegian).
Recommended Further Reading

World Road Association (PIARC) 2012, Road tunnels: vehicle emissions and air demand for ventilation,
2012R05, Technical Committee C.4 Road Tunnel Operations, World Road Association (PIARC), Paris,
France.
World Road Association (PIARC) 2016, Lay-bys and protection against lateral obstacles: current practices in
Europe 2016R16, Technical Committee 3.3 Road Tunnel Operations, Paris, France.

World Road Association (PIARC) 2016, Road tunnels: complex underground networks 2016R19, Technical
Committee 3.3 Road Tunnel Operations, Paris, France.
World Road Association (PIARC) 2016, Experience with significant incidents in road tunnels: appendix,
2016A35, Technical Committee 3.3 Road Tunnel Operations, Paris, France.
World Road Association (PIARC) 2019, Large underground interconnected infrastructure, 2019R24,
Technical Committee D.5 Road Tunnel Operations, Paris, France.

Appendix A Horizontal Curves and Sight Distance
In Table A 1, Table A 2 and Table A 3:

• V denotes the design speed in km/h
• SSD denotes the stopping sight distance.
Designers are referred to the Guide to Road Design Part 3: Geometric Design (Austroads 2016) for detailed
information on design speed and sight distance.
The tables have been developed using the following parameters:

• Perception/reaction time: 1.5 sec. up to 90 km/h and 2.0 sec. above 90 km/h
• Car deceleration rate: 0.46 g
• Truck deceleration rate: 0.29 g.
Note that the type and height of concrete barrier may improve the available sight distance and allow a
consequent reduction in the minimum curve radius when the vertical alignment is on a constant grade or on
a sag vertical curve. The effect of this is difficult to calculate and assistance from visualisation software may
be needed.
Table A 1: Minimum radius curve to provide car SSD (m)
Eye position in centre of lane, object in centre of lane
0.5 m 1.0 m 1.5 m 2.0 m 2.5 m 3.0 m

V, km/h Car SSD, m
shoulder shoulder shoulder shoulder shoulder shoulder
40 30 51 42
50 42 99 81 69 59 52
60 56 173 142 120 104 92 82
70 71 280 230 194 169 149 133
80 88 430 353 299 259 228 204
90 107 635 519 439 380 336 300
100 141 1105 906 766 664 586 524
110 165 1505 1233 1043 904 798 714

Table A 2: Minimum radius curve to provide truck SSD on left-hand curve
Eye position 0.6 m right of centre of lane, object in centre of lane
Truck SSD, 0.5 m 1.0 m 1.5 m 2.0 m 2.5 m 3.0 m

V, km/h
m shoulder shoulder shoulder shoulder shoulder shoulder
40 38 72 60 52 45
50 55 147 123 106 93 82 74
60 74 268 224 192 168 150 135
70 96 449 375 322 283 252 227
80 120 708 592 509 446 397 358
90 147 1066 891 766 671 597 538
100 177 1543 1290 1108 972 865 779
110 210 2164 1809 1554 1362 1213 1093
Table A 3: Minimum radius curve to provide truck SSD on right-hand curve (m)
Eye position 1.1 m right of centre of lane, object in centre of lane
Truck SSD, 0.5 m 1.0 m 1.5 m 2.0 m 2.5 m 3.0 m

V, km/h
m shoulder shoulder shoulder shoulder shoulder shoulder
40 38 108 84 68 58 50 44
50 55 221 170 139 117 101 89
60 74 401 310 253 213 184 162
70 96 673 520 424 358 309 273
80 120 1063 821 669 565 488 430
90 147 1599 1236 1007 849 735 647
100 177 2315 1789 1457 1230 1064 937
110 210 3246 2508 2044 1724 1491 1314

Appendix B General Classification of Ventilation Systems
The following general classification of road tunnel ventilation systems is sourced from World Road
Association (PIARC) (2011): Operating Strategies for Emergency Ventilation.
Longitudinal ventilation
Figure B 1: Longitudinal ventilation with jet fans
Figure B 2: Longitudinal ventilation with saccardo nozzle
Semi-transverse ventilation
Figure B 3: Semi-transverse ventilation: during normal operating conditions: fresh air injection

Figure B 4: Semi-transverse ventilation with remotely controlled dampers
Transverse ventilation
Figure B 5: Transverse ventilation system with uniform supply and extract of air
Figure B 6: Transverse ventilation with remotely controlled dampers
Note: In case of fire, only the dampers near to the fire are opened. All others are closed.
Massive point extraction
Figure B 7: Massive point extraction system

Combined ventilation systems

A tunnel can include several ventilation methods. For example, the length of the tunnel may be subdivided
into sections e.g. one section with jet fans for longitudinal ventilation and another section with transverse
ventilation. In such cases the ventilation systems in the sections adjacent to the fire incident location would
be used to optimise the smoke management.

Appendix C Recommended Egress Signage
Table C 1: Recommended egress signage
Sign/Identifier Category Position/Details Recommended size Applicable Standard/s Example image

Egress route identification signage
Internally illuminated Regulatory Tunnel wall on same side as egress Refer to Standards for AS 2293*, BCA* and NZ
directional exit signs points at a maximum 30 m spacing sizing Building Code as
with dynamic control; Recommended height between top applicable
or of traffic barrier and 1.8 m above
Externally illuminated road level
directional exit signs
Egress point identification signage

Triangular emergency Regulatory Clearly visible above exit door Refer to Standards for AS 2293*, BCA* and NZ
exit sign (internally locations sizing Building Code as
illuminated) applicable
May be combined with downlight
and white strobe
Pictographic exit sign Recommended External face of emergency exit A minimum AS 2293
doors 600 mm x 600 mm size
is recommended


Slide to open Recommended Both sides of all sliding emergency 300 mm wide x N/A
exit doors 100 mm high is
recommended
Fire door do not Recommended Both sides of all fire doors A minimum AS 1319
obstruct 380 mm wide x 225 m
m high
Emergency exit door Recommended Face of emergency exit doors 300 mm wide x 150 m N/A
alarmed m high is
recommended
Enlarged exit Recommended Tunnel wall on both sides of egress A minimum AS 2293
pictographic point 1000 mm x 1000 mm
size is recommended
Green colouring Recommended Green colouring is recommended to N/A N/A N/A

surrounding the exit extend a distance of at least 2.5 m
points either side of the exit door and at
least 0.5 m above the door


Egress passage signage
You are in a safe Recommended Prominent position immediately A minimum N/A
place (cross inside entrance to cross passage 1000 mm x 1000 mm
passage) size is recommended
Safe place lettering
should be a minimum
100 mm character
height
You are in a safe Recommended Prominent position immediately A minimum N/A

place (longitudinal inside entrance to longitudinal 1000 mm x 1000 mm
egress passage) egress passage size is recommended
should be a minimum
100 mm character
height
Emergency exit sign Regulatory Above all exit doors within egress Refer to Standards for AS 2293*,
(internally illuminated) passages sizing BCA* and NZ Building
Code as applicable


Emergency exit and Regulatory Located above path of travel with Refer to Standards for AS 2293*,
directional exit clear line of sight between each sizing BCA* and NZ Building
signage (internally adjacent sign Code as applicable
illuminated) Pictograph to depict direction as
required
Emergency exit Recommended Installed at emergency egress Refer to Standards for AS 2293
directions (retro- points and mid-way between egress sizing
reflective) points
Recommended height 1.5 m above

floor level
Danger look out for Recommended Inside (egress passage side) face of 450 mm wide x AS 1319
moving vehicles any door leading into a traffic tunnel 300 mm high is
recommended
Slide to open Recommended Both sides of all sliding emergency 300 mm wide x N/A
exit doors 100 mm high is
recommended


Fire door do not Recommended Both sides of all fire doors A minimum AS 1319
obstruct 380 mm wide x 225 m
m high
No exit Recommended Face of any door that is not an exit A minimum N/A
450 mm wide x 200 m
m high size is
recommended
No pedestrian access Recommended Face of any doors that are A minimum AS 1319
emergency services access 300 mm wide x 450 m
passages only m high size is
recommended.
Directional exit – Special Located above path of travel (back A minimum N/A
wrong way consideration of emergency exit and direction exit 450 mm wide x 200 m
signage) to suit egress strategy m high size is
(e.g. longitudinal egress passages recommended
where one egress direction only is
required)
Only visible to evacuees travelling in
the wrong direction


Refuge space signage
Refuge area/mobility Recommended Disable access symbol painted on A minimum AS 1428.1
impaired person floor 800 mm wide x 1300 m
waiting area m deep size is
recommended
You are in a safe Recommended Located at any refuge space, clearly A minimum N/A
place (refuge space) visible to occupants 1000 mm x 1000 mm
size is recommended
should be a minimum
100 mm character
height


Emergency telephone Recommended Provided above emergency A minimum N/A
communication facilities at refuge 300 mm wide x 450 m
space m high size is
recommended
Emergency telephone Recommended Provided next to emergency A minimum N/A

instructions communication facilities at refuge 300 mm wide x 450 m
space m high size is
recommended
Size may depend on
motorist phone cabinet
size if located within
cabinet
Emergency assembly Recommended Prominently located at designated A minimum N/A

point emergency assembly points 750 mm wide x 1000 m
m high size is
recommended


In-tunnel emergency facility signage
Emergency stopping Regulatory On tunnel wall adjacent bay at start A minimum Road authority guidelines
bay signage of bay (arrow adjusted to suit) 1100 mm wide x 1500 relating to regulatory
. mm high size is signs
recommended
Fire phone Recommended Located at fire phone locations, Refer to Standards for AS 1319
generally on the face of emergency sizing
equipment cabinets
Fire extinguisher Regulatory Located at fire extinguisher Refer to Standards for AS 2444
locations, generally on the face of sizing
emergency equipment cabinets (1)
Fire extinguisher type Regulatory Located on or adjacent to fire Refer to Standards for AS 2444
extinguisher sizing


Fire hydrant and hose Recommended Located at fire hydrant and hose Refer to Standards for AS 1319
reel reel locations, generally on the face sizing
of emergency equipment cabinets
Cabinet identification Recommended Located on the face of emergency A minimum 100 mm Project specific
number equipment cabinet lettering height is
recommended
Size will depend on
Asset code length
Motorist emergency Recommended Provided above motorist emergency A minimum N/A
telephone (where motorist telephone locations 300 mm wide x 450 m
emergency Location shall consider the safety of m high size is
telephones motorists in an operating road recommended
provided) environment


Motorist emergency Recommended Provided next to motorist A minimum N/A
telephone instructions (where motorist emergency telephone locations or 300 mm wide x 450 m
emergency within motorist help phone m high size is
telephones enclosure recommended
provided) Location shall consider the safety of Size may depend on
motorists in an operating road motorist phone cabinet
environment size if located within
cabinet
In-tunnel positioning signage

Egress passage Recommended Both sides of exit point on tunnel A minimum lettering N/A
identification walls, clearly visible to tunnel height of 200 mm is
occupants and tunnel operators via recommended
CCTV Sign size will depend
on length of
identification ID
Wayfinding Recommended Opposite cross passage exits, either A minimum lettering N/A
on the tunnel wall or roadside height of 100 mm is
barrier so that evacuees will recommended
immediately view the sign when Size of sign will vary
they enter the non-incident tunnel depending on required
and will be able to understand the text
evacuation direction being provided
by the public address
system/evacuation messages
1. Where emergency equipment cabinets contain fire hydrants, it is recommended that a blue raised reflective marker (cats’ eye) and reflective triangular road marker be provided
in the road pavement to visually identify the location of hydrants to fire crews.
* As required by AS 4825 2011.

Appendix D Typical Egress Signage Schematics
Figure D 1: Typical egress point signage

Figure D 2: Typical fire door signage

AGRT02 21 Guide To Road Tunnels Part 2 Planning Design Commissioning

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Guide to Road Tunnels Part 2:

Planning, Design and Commissioning

© Austroads Ltd 2021

2. Systems Engineering Framework......................................................................................................... 3

3. General Design Requirements ............................................................................................................ 13

Austroads 2021 | page i

4. Structural Requirements ..................................................................................................................... 29

5. Geometric Design ................................................................................................................................. 35

Austroads 2021 | page ii

7. Environmental Considerations ........................................................................................................... 60

8. Drainage Design ................................................................................................................................... 71

9. Fire Safety ............................................................................................................................................. 80

10. Ventilation Design ................................................................................................................................ 87

Austroads 2021 | page iii

10.4. Fans ........................................................................................................................................................ 94

11. Lighting Design .................................................................................................................................... 97

12. Electrical Supply Design ................................................................................................................... 103

13. Design for Monitoring and Control ................................................................................................... 108

Austroads 2021 | page iv

13.3. Traffic Monitoring and Control System ................................................................................................. 112

14. Services Buildings and Plant Rooms ............................................................................................... 125

15. Construction Issues ........................................................................................................................... 127

16. Tunnel Commissioning ...................................................................................................................... 132

Austroads 2021 | page v

16.3. Testing and Commissioning of System Components .......................................................................... 134

References .............................................................................................................................................. 141

Appendix A Horizontal Curves and Sight Distance .............................................................................. 149

Appendix B General Classification of Ventilation Systems ................................................................ 151

Appendix C Recommended Egress Signage ........................................................................................ 154

Appendix D Typical Egress Signage Schematics ................................................................................ 164

Austroads 2021 | page vi

Austroads 2021 | page vii

1.1. Structure of the Guide to Road Tunnels

The Guide to Road Tunnels is written in four Parts:

1.2. Purpose of the Guide

1.3. Scope of the Guide to Road Tunnels Part 2

Austroads 2021 | page 1

This Part of the Guide also:

1.4. Safe System

Austroads 2021 | page 2

2. Systems Engineering Framework

2.1. Overall Approach

As a front-end loaded process, SE provides progressive assurance that:

2.2. Designing for Operations

Austroads 2021 | page 3

2.3. Engineering Life Cycle

Source: Altered from FHWA (2009).

Austroads 2021 | page 4

2.4. Systems Engineering Activities

Figure 2.2: The systems engineering ‘vee’ model

Source: FHWA (2009).

Austroads 2021 | page 5

2.4.1. Project Planning

2.5. Operational Concepts

2.5.1. Needs Assessment and Concept Definition

2.5.2. Stakeholder Requirements

Austroads 2021 | page 6

2.5.3. Concept of Operations

2.6. System Requirements Definition and Management

2.6.1. System Requirements Definition

2.6.2. Requirements Management

Ongoing requirements management is important to manage non-conformances and changes using a

Austroads 2021 | page 7