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Infinity in Plotinus : a Reply

Author(s): W. Norris Clarke
Source: Gregorianum, Vol. 40, No. 1 (1959), pp. 75-98
Published by: GBPress- Gregorian Biblical Press
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Infinity in Plotinus : α Reply
During the year 1957 two erudite and impressive articles ap

peared in the Gregorianwn on « Infinity in Plotinus », by Leo
Sweeney, S. J.1 In the course of the second of these the conclu
sions arrived at by the author led him to question and reject the
interpretation of this doctrine which had been proposed by Fr.
de Finance and myself 2. Although I admire greatly the pains
taking scholarship with which Fr. Sweeney investigated this im
portant point in Plotinian philosophy, which so few commentators
have treated with any throughness and detail, and although I learned
much from his articles, I am ali the more convinced that the con
clusion at which he finally arrives is fundamentally incorrect and
contrary to the spirit of Plotinus' thought. Since the question is
of centrai relevance for understanding not only Plotinus himself
but his influence on the elaboration of the notion of divine infinity
in both the Fathers of the Church and the medieval Scholastics, it
seems to me a matter of some urgency to reply to Fr. Sweeney's
presentation of the case.
Since I am going to feel obliged to criticize Fr. Sweeney's
position rather radically, let me preface my answer with some
qualifying remarks. First, on whatever side the truth may He in
this question, the author has rendered us a valuable service by
bringing out the problem for explicit criticai study and by high
lighting the cruciai issue in such a clear-cut and challenging way.
Secondly, aside from one very probable mistranslation, I have
the highest esteeem for the author's scholarship in gathering and
presenting the pertinent data. He has made ali his own translations
from the Greek and they are excellent, far more accurate than any
thing we yet have in English. Both because they are so good and
1 Gregorianum XXXVIII (1957), 515-35 ; 713-32.

2 J. de Finance, S. J., E tre et agir, Paris : Beauchesne, 1945, p. 50 ; W.
N. Clarice, S. J., «The Limitation of Act by Potency: Aristotelianism or Neo
platonism?» New Scholasticism, XXVI (1952), 186-87.
76 W. NORRIS CLARKE, S. I.
to avoid disputes on secondary matters, ali the translations of Plo

tinus in this article will be those of Fr. Sweeney himself, unless
explicitly indicated otherwise. Hence the focus of my criticism will
be directed not at his scholarship or data — the latter, in fact,
afford quite ampie material for refuting his own interpretation of
them — but almost solely at his judgment in interpreting the data
he has so carefully gathered.
The interpretation of the infinity of the supreme One or Good
in Plotinus which Fr. de Finance and myself proposed — and which
is accepted explicitly or implicitly by most of the standard author
ities on Plotinus who treat of the question — is in brief as follows.
Plotinus is, if not the first (Philo seems to have been actually the
first in the order of time), at least the first great philosopher in
the West to have identified the supremely perfect principle in the
universe as positively infinite in its very nature, because, as the
ultimate source of ali forms, it is itself above and beyond ali form
and limit. This marks a decisive advance over the classical Greek
conception, predominant in the Pre-Socratics, Plato, and Aristotle.
For them, the infinite is identified with the indefinite, the incom
plete, the indeterminate, and therefore the imperfect; its typical
example is matter itself. The infinity of the One on the contrary,
is not quantitative but qualitative, and is a function of a participa
tion process where the source of perfection is considered a simple
and unlimited plenitude above ali its limited participations. This
notion of qualitative infinite perfection as proper to the ultimate
source of ali things exercised a decisive influence, both directly and
through the various channels of the Neoplatonic tradition, on the
later patristic and medieval Scholastic doctrines of divine infinity,
in particular on that of St. Thomas. Plotinus' position that the
One cannot be limited because this would imply a distinct limiting
principle and internai duality is a clear anticipation of St. Thomas'
own thesis that perfection as found in its pure unparticipated state
in a source is ipso facto infinite and can be limited only by partici
pation in a distinct limiting potency3.
3 As Fr. de Finance puts it (op. cit., p. SO) : « En demandant à quoi

l'Un devrait sa limite, Plotin affirme implicitement que la limite a besoin
d'étre justifiée, et qu'elle ne le peut que par une déchéance de Tètre. Le pro
blème du fini est pose et virtuellement résolu dans le sens de saint Thomas ».
In the first part of my article I attempted to give a brief history of the
meaning and interrelations of the terms finite and infinite from early Greek
philosophy down to St. Thomas. In addition to the standard references
INFÌNITY IN PLOTINUS : A REPLY 77
Fr. Sweeney's Critique
What Fr. Sweeney denies in this interpretation is not merely

the relation of Plotinus to St. Thomas. That is merely a conse
quence. More basically what he rejects is the foundation of the
whole position: namely, that Plotinus held at ali an intrinsic qual
itative infinity within the very nature of the One, and hence that
he can be considered in any significant way as a positive fore
runner or source of the later medieval doctrine of the infìnity of
the divine essence. The main interest of Fr. Sweeney lies, in fact,
in the history of the entrance of this notion into Christian and
especially medieval thought. His study of Plotinus is but one
chapter in a series of articles on the development of this doctrine
up to St. Thomas. The main conclusion of this study is that the
notion of the intrinsic qualitative infìnity of the divine essence in
itself did not emerge clearly and decisively among the Latin theo
logians of the West until around 1250, or just before St. Thomas
started to write4. The decisive moment in this evolution, he main
tains, occurred when it was realized that matter as potency exercises
a limiting effect on form, so that if a being is found completely
free of ali matter it will necessarily be infinite in its very nature.
given there should be added the excellent and richly documented article of
J. Moreau : « L'Un et les ètres selon Plotin », Giornale di metafisica, XI
(1956), 204-24. He sums up his analysis of the infinity of the One as fol
lows : « En développant sa conception de l'Un comme puissance infinie, Plo
tin renouvelle donc l'acception des termes traditionnels de la philosophie grec
que et prépare le langage de la théologie chrétienne. L'infini, dans l'usage
traditionnel des Grecs, enveloppe l'idée d'inachèvement, d'imperfection, et la
puissance se caractérise, dans leur philosophie, comme une modalité toujours
inférieure à l'acte. Pour eux, il n'y avait pas d'assimilation possible entre les
idées d'infini et de parfait; ils n'auraient pas considéré Dieu comme infini.
Or, c'est ce que fait précisément Plotin... Son indétermination [of the One]
n'est pas possibilité nue, indigence; il est au contraire puissance infinie,
richesse inépuisable, son apeiria n'est pas illimitation mais immensité »
(pp. 211-12).
4 «Are Apeiria and Aoristia Synonyms?» Modem Schoolman, XXXIII
(1955-56), 270"-80, a study on the terminology of Plotinus ; « Lombard, Au
gustine, and Infinity», Manuscripta (St. Louis Univ.), Feb. 1958, 24-40;
«Divine Infinity: 1150-1250», Μ od. School., XXXV (1957-58), 38-51; «Some
Medieval Opponente of Divine Infinity», Mediaeval Studies, XIX (1957),
233-45 ; « Divine Infinity according to Richard Fishacre», Μod. School., XXXV
(1957-58), 191-212. These articles will appear as the partial contents of a
book soon to be published by the author on divine infinity from Plotinus to
St. Thomas.
We cannot enter here into a discussion of this interesting and

in many ways qui te sound historical thesis in its entirety 5. We
shall limit ourselves to the chapter on Plotinus presented in the
Gregoriannm. The key steps in the author's argument are as fol
lows. Infinity is attributed to the One by Plotinus in two main
senses. First, the One is called infinite because, as the ultimate
source of ali form and determination, it is itself beyond and above
ali particular form, determination and limit. Infinity in Plotinus
always signifies some kind of indetermination. But this can be
either the indetermination proper to what is below ali forms be
cause lacking form — and such is the infinity of matter, whether
in the sensible or in the intelligible order; or it can be the indeter
mination proper to what is above ali particular forms because the
transcendent source of them ali — and such is the infinity of the
supreme One or Good. Now since being, for Plotinus, following
Plato, is always identified with that which has intelligible form or
essence, hence determination and limit, the One must be above being.
This infinity of the One, therefore, is called by Fr. Sweeney an
« infinity of nonentity ». Such an infinity, however, by no means
implies that the One is intrinsically infinite in its inner « being »
or nature. The term « nonentity » to which infinity is attached
merely situates the One beyond ali forms and beings and tells us
nothing about its inner reality, which might possibly be finite for
ali we know.
5 The only reservatitns which occur to me for the moment on the

general thesis of the author are the following: (1) Some believe there is
a richer understanding of infinity in Augustine than allowed by the author;
cf., for example, De Civ. Dei, XII, 18, and De natura boni, c. 3, 19, 22.
(2) The author seems to hold that the centrai and adequate metaphysical
reason for the intrinsic infinity of the divine essence, as worked out for the
first time by the thirteenth-century Scholastics, was the realization that
matter was a limiting potency and hence that complete immateriality ipso
facto rendered a form infinite. The only difficulty with this position is that
it links the explanation of the divine infinity inseparably with the theory
of the universal composition of matter and form in ali creatures — a theory
which neither St. Thomas nor Duns Scotus, the two greatest metaphysicians,
accepted. For St. Thomas, the infinity of the pure spirits deriving from their
immateriality is only a relative infinity; they remain absolutely finite because
their forms themselves are limiting recipiente of esse, whereas the absolute
infinity of the divine essence comes from the fact that it is supra-formal
subsistent esse. It is precisely this supra-formal root of the divine infinity
that puts St. Thomas in the line of Plotinus. It is dangerous to rely too
heavily on q. 7, a. 2 of the Swnma Theologica without correcting or complet
ing it by the following article and other treatments. I trust the author will
bring this out in his chapter on St. Thomas.
INFINITY IN PLOTINUS : A REPLY 79
Secondly, the One is said to be infinite in its power. But again

such an infinity tells us nothing about the inner nature of this power
as something within the One. It is attributed to the One solely be
cause it produces an infinite number of effects outside of itself.
Hence infinity belongs properly only to the effects outside the One,
and the latter is called infinite by mere « extrinsic denomination ».
In neither case, therefore, does Plotinus reach anything like a true
intrinsic infinity of the nature or being of the One.
Let us examine in turn each one of these conclusions and the
reasons presented to back them up.
Infinity of Nonbeing
With regard to the first kind of infinity the author sums up

his analysis as follows :
To Plotinus infinity has two general meanings, the first of which
has to do with nonbeing. Inasmuch as being is linked with form, limit
and determination, indetermination and infinity must be co-terminous
with some sort of nonbeing... The term gives little information on the
One in itself save that It is beyond the beings and realities of the sen
sible and intelligible universes. It says nothing of whether the unique
reality of the One may or may not itself be infinite. It merely points
out where the First Principle of the Plotinian universe dwells — that
is, above Nous and Soul... This major advance over his predecessors is,
obviously, of great significance, but the patent fact remains that such
apeiria [infinity] of its very nature is synonymous with nonbeing. Can
such a conception have directly influenced a medieval Christian in af
firming that God is infinitely perfect in His very enlityì It seems un
likely e.
Now there is no difficulty with the basic premises of this

argumentation, namely, that since for Plotinus being is linked with
form and limit, infinity must therefore be linked with what Plo
tinus technically calls nonbeing (which, in the case of the One,
as Fr. Sweeney himself repeats frequently, is a real nonbeing
not below form and being but above it). What I do protest
against strongly are the two conclusions drawn from this pre
miss : (1) infinity of nonbeing tells us nothing as to whether the
inner reality of the One is infinite or finite; and (2) it is unlikely
that the conception of God as infinite nonbeing could have in
" Art. cit., ρ. 731.
8θ W. NORRIS CLARKE, S. I.
fluenced a medieval Christian in affirming that God is infinitely

perfect in His being.
Let us take the second conclusion first, since it can be dis
posed of most briefly. The apparently unbridgeable gap between
Plotinian infinite nonbeing and Christian infinite being is largely
an artificial one, created by playing on the two terms as though
they meant the same in both climates of thought. But, as Fr.
Sweeney himself has pointed out, « being » for Plotinus has the
explicit technical meaning of limited intelligible form or particular
essence7. Hence for Plotinus to cali the One an « infinite being »
would be an open contradiction within his system. But that by
no means implies that the « nonbeing » of his One does not at
the same time signi fy — or, better, point towards —the most su
premely real and positively perfect of ali realities, precisely because
it is above ali particular limited beings as their ultimate source :
« The First is the perfect, the most perfect of ali things ... the
supreme Good ... » 8.
The term being in Christian thought, on the other hand, due
largely to the Scriptural revelation of the divine name as « I am
who am », gradually began to lose its traditional Platonic con
notation of limited, second-level reality and first to compete with,
then to replace the Good as the proper name for God. For a
long time, however, the Good was considered the primary and most
fitting name of the twoe. Only in the thirteenth century did Being
7 Ibid., pp. 527-31 ; e. g. : « Consequently, Plotinus both implicitly and

explicitly predicates aoristia or apeiria of the One-Good, thereby pointing
out Its supra-entitative and hyper-formal status and emphasizing its per
fection » (p. 531).
8 Enneads, V, 4, 1 ; my own translation adapted from E. Brehier's text
and translation, Piotiti: Ennéades, 2e éd., Paris, 1951. What Armstrong
(The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe according to Plotinus, Cam
bridge University Press, 1940) has called the «positive theology» of Plo
tinus runs ali through the Enneads, interwoven with the « negative theology ».
The latter does not contradict or cancel out the former but remains constanti}'
in dialectical tension with it as a stimulus to the mind to soar beyond ali
finite concepts to a supra-concepìual intellectual union with the One.
9 St. John Damascene (ca. 730) stands about midway in this evolution.
In a text constantly quoted by the Scholastics he says : « It seetns that the
primary name of ali those said about God is ' He who is ' ; for He contains
within His embrace the totality of being, as it were an infinite and indeter
minate ocean of substance. But, as Blessed Dionysius says, He is the Good.
For it is not fitting to say of God first that He is Being, then that He is
the Good » (De fide orthodoxa, I, c. 9 ; P. G., XC1V, 835). On this whole
development see E. Gilson, L'esprit de la philosophie médiévale, 2e éd., Paris,
1944, pp. 53-58, though for unconvincing reasons Gilson keeps insisting that
INFINITY IN PLOTINUS : A REPLY 8l
finally take decisive precedence over it. Thus there has indeed
been a great evolution — and great progress — in the metaphysics
of God between Plotinus and St. Thomas. But the basic change
that has taken place has been in the metaphysic of being, not in
the meaning of infinity. Surely it would not be sound history to
ignore the immense influence of the « negative theology », stemming
principally from Plotinus and mediated to the West through the
Pseudo-Dionysius and other channels, on the thought of ali the
great medieval thinkers. St. Thomas himself incorporates, even
while going beyond it, the authentic but incomplete insight of Neo
platonism when he remarks in his commentary on the Liber de
Causis :
The First Cause according to the Platonists is above being inso

far as the essence of goodness and unity, which is the First Cause, ex
ceeds being-in-itself [considered by Proclus to be the first participa
tion]... But according to the truth of the matter the First Cause is
above being insofar as it is infinite subsistent existence (ipsum esse
infinitum) : for being signifies that which participates existence in a
finite manner, and it is this which is the proportionate object of our
intellect10.
In the light of the above remarks, let us return now to the main
thesis of Fr. Sweeney:
The term [infinite] gives little information on the One in itself
save that It is beyond the beings and realities of the sensible and in
telligible universes. It says nothing of whether the unique reality of
the One may or may not itself be infinite. It merely points out where
the First Principle of the Plotinian universe dwells — that is, above
Nous and Soul [italics mine],
What he is equivalently asserting is that despite ali that Plo

tinus has said about the One's being infinite because above ali form,
determination, and limit, the latter might stili be limited and finite
in its own inner reality or « nature ». But the whole purpose of
this negative dialectic is precisely to exclude ali determination and
limit from the One. As Fr. Sweeney himself has noted, form,
being (== intelligible essence), determination and limit are ali cor
relative and inseparable functions of each other. Whatever is
limited or determined becomes by that very fact an intelligible es
as long as God was conceived of primarily as the Good instead of Being

His essence could not be considerai infinite.
10 In Lib. de Causis, lect. 6 (ed. Saffrey, Louvain 1954, p. 47).
« Gregorianutn » XL (1959) - voi. XL.
82 w. NOEBIS CLARKE, S. I.
sence — and vice versa. Hence, precisely because such entities

have to be determined by a higher cause and because, as limited,
they imply an inner duality of limit and limited, limit and deter
mination can never be found in the ultimate reality but only in
derived and secondary things. Let us listen for a moment to Plo
tinus himself as he expresses this basic insight:
The entity which is generated from the One is Form... The One
therefore must be without form and hence is not an entity, for an entity
must always be a « this » and, hence, determined. But it is impossible to
apprehend the One as a « this », for then it would not be a principle
but only the « this » which one says of it... Now since such realities
are beings and being, the One is beyond being. This phrase, « beyond
being », does not mean that that One is some « this » (for it makes
no positive statement about it) and is not Its name, but only implies
that the One is not a « this » or a « that ». That expression does not
at ali encompass the One, for to seek to encompass Its immense na
ture is ridiculous 11.
He possesses infinity inasmuch as He is not more than one and
inàsmuch as He has nothing which will in any way limit Him. Because
He is the One, He is unmeasurable and unnumerable. Consequently
He is limited neither with reference to others nor to Himself — this
latter because otherwise He would be at least doublé [i. e., a composite
of limit and limited]. Accordingly, He involves no framework, be
cause He has no parts, nor has He form12.
Bring something under intelligible form and present it to the soul :
at once it seeks something beyond which formed it. Reason testifies
that that which has form, and form and idea too, is something entirely
measured, and that this is not ali of reality nor self-suflìcient nor beau
tiful of itself, but is something mixed. AH such things must indeed
be beautiful. But the authentic beauty, or the beyond-beauty, cannot be
measured, and hence can be neither form nor idea. The primary exis
tent and the first beauty must therefore be formless, and its beauty is
simply the nature of the intellectual Good.13.
Does ali this sound compatible with Fr. Sweeney's contention

that the inner reality of the One might stili be finite in itself ? He
insists that attributes like formless, nonbeing, indeterminate, etc.,
teli us nothing about the positive mode of existence of that to
which they are applied. Quite trae; but there is one thing which
this negative theology certainly does profess to do, and that is to
11 Enneads, V, S, 6.
12 Enneadi, V, 5, 11.
13 Enneadi, VI, 7, 33 (my own translation following S. MacKenna, Plo
tinm: The Enneadi, rev. by B. Page, New York: Pantheon, 1956, but
brought closer to the Greek).
INFINITY IN PLOTINUS: A REPLY 83
exclude from the reality of the One the modes of being which are
here negated. And since forni, essence, and intelligible determi
nation or limit are the most intrinsic and constitutive elements con
ceivable in the entities in which they are found, so too their ex
clusion from the One must be equally intrinsic. Το allow that
Plotinus' negative dialectic merely excludes form and limit ex
trinsically from the One while stili allowing them intrinsically
(whatever that could mean) is quite simply to rob the whole neg
ative theology of ali point and efficacy. It should not be forgotten
that for St. Thomas, too, the infinity of the divine essence, though
undeniably intrinsic, is nonetheless explicitly declared by him to
be a negative attribute, whose meaning is to exclude ali limiting
factors from this essence14.
How, then, are we to judge the following reasoning of
Fr. Sweeney in which he attempts to show how Plotinian infinity
is only an extrinsic denomination stili compatible, presumably even
in the One, with intrinsic limitation?
Is not something which has no extrinsic limit automatically infinite
and infinitely perfect? Infinity for Plotinus, as well as for Aquinas,
would thus be the normal condition of a perfection left to itself. By
no means, we answer, for limit and determination can be embedded in
the very nature of the thing, as the Greek author himself makes clear
when applying this same sort of « relative » infinity to intelligible num
ber. How, he asks, is such number apeiron? In the same way as ali
true beings and intelligibles are — only inasmuch as they have nothing
outside limiting, measuring and containing them. Are they, then, with
out limit and measure? Not at ali, for these they have from them
selves, from what they are, from their very natures. Obviously, infin
ity has not yet become the inevitable companion of ali pure perfection
nor does limit necessarily connote imperfection. Far from foreshadow
ing a Christian or Thomistic notion of infinity, Plotinus' texts rather
emphasize that the Grecian notion of peras [limit] remains supreme and
is accepted without question15.
In the first place, the text to which the author refers is an

obscure and diflkult one on intelligible number, which begins, as
a matter of fact, with the affirmation (in Fr. Sweeney's own trans
lation) that « Number in the intelligible realm is limited ». The
lack of limit also attributed here to these ideal numbers, as well
as to the other intelligible forms, seems to refer to some kind
14 De Potentia, q. 1, a. 2; C. Gentiles, I, 43.

15 Art. cit., pp. 722-23.
84 W. NORRIS CLARICE, S. t.
of external boundary, at the risk of contradicting the innu

merable other passages where form and idea are linked with limit
and measure and require some measurer above them 1β. But what
ever be the interpretaiion of this knotty passage, Fr. Sweeney has
overlooked the key point that makes it inapplicable to the One.
The reason why the intelligible beings stili remain internally limited
is precisely because their very nature is constituted of form and
determination. But this is just what is explicitly excluded from
the One as we have seen in the texts quoted above. The One,
accordingly, must be absolutely infinite in every possible respect,
since ali form and limit denote a secondary level of reality.
The only conclusion, it seems to me, that can be drawn from
the foregoing analysis of Fr. Sweeney's interpretation of the in
finity of nonbeing in the One is that he has failed seriously to do
justice to the full power and depth of the dialectic of limit and
infinity in Plotinus and to capture the full originality and signi
ficance of the new supra-formal infinity of positive perfection which
the latter has posited at the opposite pole of the universe from the
old Greek infinity of incompleteness, imperfection and matter.
Infinity of Power
The second foundation for the infinity of the One according

to Plotinus (if indeed it is really distinct from the first at ali) is
its power. This is repeatedly said to be boundless, and always for
the same basic reason : because it is the ultimate source of ali other
things. Let us recali here the principal texts — which, by the way,
are much less numerous than those on infinity of nonbeing :
He is simple and first, because He is the principle and from Him
come ali things... But He is not limited, for by what could He be?
Nor is He infinite as a quantity would be, for where would He have
to extend? Or what could accrue to Him who needs nothing? But
His power has infinity, for He can never be found wanting, since beings
which are adequate are so through Him 17.
The One is the greatest of ali things, not in physical magnitude
but in power, for that which is without extension is great through
power... We must also insist that It is infinite not as though intra
16 Enneadi, VI, 6, 18; we are following Brehier's interpretation in his

introduction to this treatise, p. 15..
17 Enneads, V, 5, 10.
versable either in extension or in number but by the boundlessness of

Its power18.
You see the splendor over ali the manifold forms or ideas; well
might we linger here. But amid ali these things of beauty we cannot
but ask whence they come and whence their beauty. Their source can
be none of the beautiful objects; were it so it would be something
among them and only a part... It must stand above ali the powers, ali
the forms. The origin of ali this must be the formless — formless not
as lacking form but as the source of even intellectual form... It can
be none of existing things ; yet it is ali ; none, in that beings are later ;
ali, since they ali come from It. He who is thus capable of making
ali things, what greatness would He have? He is infinite, and, if so,
would have no physical magnitude... The Principle would be great in
this sense that nothing is more powerful than He nor even equally
so... Love of Him is measureless, for love here is without determina
tion because that which is loved is unlimited and, thus, the love itself
is infinite19.
Note especially the last text, which we have quoted at length

in order to show how Plotinus combines in a single rich sweep of
thought the infinity of nonbeing, of power, and of lovableness.
The full power and signifìcance of this passage is lost when the
section on power is isolated from the rest, as it is in Fr. Sweeney's
presentation 20.
Now it is Fr. Sweeney's contention that the infinity described
above signifies nothing more than an infinity attributed to the One
by pure extrinsic denomination. This means that it tells us noth
ing about the intrinsic nature or quality of this power as within
the One itself but refers only to the infinite number of effects
produced from it. In his own words:
What agente are said to have infinite powers? The One, as well
as Intelligence and Soul... They are characterized by the same brand
of infinity — that of extrinsic denomination. Ali three are termed
infinite as the source of effects which are infinitely numerous because
they are caught up in endlessly recurring world-cycles. Such infinity
is directly apropos only to the effects and remains extrinsic to the
source... But may not Plotinus ... be predicating infinity of the One's very
nature when he speaks of His power as infinite? By no means, for
infinity is then attributed to the First Principle merely through extrinsic
denomination : He is powerful enough to be the source of effects which
are somehow infinite and which alone the epithet directly characterizes.
« VX 9, 6.
19 VI, 7, 32 (the last f our sentences, f rom « He who is thus capable »,
are Fr. Sweeney's translation; what precedes is my own).
20 Art. cit., p. 719.
86 W. NORRIS CLARICE, S. I.
No indication whatever is thereby given that the unique reality of the

One Himself is infinite21.
In the face of the above texts the author's conclusion is, to

say the least, surprising, especially since nowhere in these main
texts does Plotinus assert or imply that infinity is attributed to the
One only by extrinsic denomination, nor even because its effects
are infinite in number. Let us examine the reasons advanced by
the author to back up his contention.
First, he adduces one text which, in his translation, categor
ically states that the infinity of the One is not in Him but only
in His activity:
In the intelligibles, matter is also infinite and is hrought forth
from the One's infinity, which either belongs to His power or to His
eternity and which is not in the One himself but only in His activity 22.
Unfortunately, inspection of the Greek text and of the three

best known translations reveals that the above is neither the only
nor the most probable translation of the underlined clause. Brehier
the newly revised MacKenna, and the excellent recent Italian ver
sion of V. Cilento ali translate the clause in almost exactly the same
way — and ali quite differently from Fr. Sweeney: «and that
infinity [referring not to the One but back to the previously men
tioned infinity of matter which is the main subject under discussion]
is not in the One but is the effect of His production, engendered
by Him » 2S. The strici literal translation would go like this : « an
infinity which is not in the One but of Him as making, or produc
ing (poiountos) ». Now the last phrase, « of Him as making»,
is a frequent condensation in Plotinus for « the effect of His
making », and this is far more probably the meaning here than « in
His activity ». Hence the infinity referred to can hardly be that
of the One's own power or eternity, which could scarcely be said
to be the effect of his production, but must refer back to the main
21 Ibid., pp. 731-32.

22 II, 4, 15; cf. art. cit., p. 718, n. 85.
23 The translation given above is a dose paraphrase of the common con
tent of ali three translations (thè one of Cilento is Plotino : Enneadi, Bari,
1947-49). The Greek text reads thus : ΈπεΙ και έν τοΤς νοητοίς ή ΰλη τό
δπειρον και ειη άν γεννηθέγ έκ της τοΰ Ινός απειρίας η δυνάμεως ή τοΰ
άεί, οΰκ ούσης έν έκείνφ απειρίας άλλα ποιοΰντος.
The text used is the new criticai edition of P. Henry and H. Schwyzer,
Plotini Opera, I, Paris : Desclée de Brouwer, 1951.
infinity under discussion, that of matter. This would then be only

one more case of Plotinus' notoriously casual grammar and
vagueness of reference. At least the translation we have given is
both possible and apparently more próbable in the judgment of the
three other translators. In such a case it does not seem sound
exegetical procedure to build an argument on so dubious a basis,
or at least to maintain, as does Fr. Sweeney immediately after his
translation: « Note the clear statement that the One is not infinite
in Himself but only in His activity or power ».
The main argument of the author, however, is not based on
any direct statement of Plotinus but rather on a philosophical in
ference or speculation made by the author himself on what Plo
tinus' thought must be on the matter. It runs as follows : How
do we know the nature and extent of an active power in an agent?
By observing its effects, as Plotinus himself asserts following
Aristotle. The argument then proceeds:
What, then, would be an infinite power? In the light of what pre
cedes, must we not conclude that it is a power from which has pro
ceeded an infinite effect? Here again, the path of knowledge and pred
ication leads from without to within. The effect is somehow infinite
and, accordingly, the power producing it can also be termed infinite,
but only with reference to that effect and, hence, only through what
might be termed « extrinsic denomination ». In speaking of an « in
finite power», then, we mean one so strong as to be the source of in
finite effects (which, for Plotinus, are infinitely recurrent cycles of
things) 2i.
The key step to note in this reasoning, of course, is the

author's introduction of the principle that inference to the power
of an agent from its effects can result only in predicati on by ex
trinsic denomination. This principle, taken as evident without any
further examination, is now used constantly throughout the rest of
the article as the touchstone for interpreting ali texts on the in
finity of power, frequently in the form of a rhetorical question.
For example :
How can an operative power be infinite except through extrinsic
denomination?
He is termed infinitely powerful... because He is capable of making

ali things. Is not this a description through extrinsic denomination
and, hence, consonant with our previous and provisionai conclusions?
24 Art. cit., pp. 717-18.
The power is named apeiron, true enough, but only in view of its ef
fects, which alone would be directly and properly so classified.
The information which Plotinus explicitly furnishes on infinity
of power in his First Principle agrees with our initial discovery —
namely, infinity is predicated of power only through what might be
called «extrinsic denomination». When one asserts the Good is in
finitely powerful, the meaning apparently is that He is powerful enough
to be the source of absolutely everything, even of endlessly recurring
cycles of things, which alone are directly and intrinsically termed in
finite 25.
What is to be said of the validity of such a principle for the

interpretation of Plotinus? First of ali, from a metaphysical point
of view the principle itself is extremely dubious. It is quite true
that when we are attempting to discover the power of an agent the
ordinary way is to begin from its effects and argue back to the
agent. But, as the author himself very aptly puts it, the path of
knowledge and predication begins from without and leads to within.
What he has done, on the contrary, is to begin from without and
then refuse ever to move within. If this principle were applied
rigorously, it would short-circuit the whole traditional method used
by St. Thomas himself of inferring a posteriori and analogically
from the perfections of creatures to the intrinsic perfections of
God as their cause. If this inference is valid for other perfections,
why must it be completely invalid for this one attribute of power?
Does not Duns Scotus draw his main arguments for the intrinsic
qualitative infinity of the divine essence itself from the fact that
His intellect and will can know and produce an infinite number of
effects?26 In fact, Plotinus himself gives us an example of how
effects produced without manifest the power hidden within an agent :
So then the soul, though it is divine and comes from above, enters
into body... manifesting its powers... Nor would the soul itself have
known its powers if they had not come out and been revealed... As
things are, everyone wonders at what is within because of the varied
25 Ibid., ρρ. 718; 720 ; 724, respectively.

26 For example, in his De Primo Principio, c. 4 (ed. and trans, by
E. Roche, St. Bonaventura, Ν. Y. : Franciscan Institute, 1949). I do not
wish to endorse Scotus's argument as completely satisfactory, since it is
difficult to prove that the numher of possibles is infinite before establishing
the divine infmity of essence or power, I only want to point out that an
astute metaphysician like Scotus does not consider it at ali evident — quite
the contrary — that inference from an infinite number of effects to the
power of their cause can conclude only to an infinity of pure extrinsic deno
mination.
splendor of the outside and admires the greatness of soul because of

these fine things which it does 27.
This principle, then, wielded so uncompromisingly by our author,

is far from being the immediately evident, universally accepted meta
physical commonplace which he apparently presumes it to be.
Nor — what is more to the point — does Plotinus ever commit
himself to it. There are indeed philosophers who seem to have
understood infinity of power in God as a purely extrinsic denomi
nation. Thus Aristotle, although he held the supreme perfection
of the universe to be form, nevertheless argued that the Prime
Mover must have infinite power on the explicit grounds that it is
capable of moving throughout infinite time28. Certain thirteenth
century Scholastics, too, fearful lest the infinity of the divine es
sence should carry with it the incomprehensibility of this essence
even to the blessed in the beatific vision, held for a short time that
the divine power was infinite whereas the divine essence itself was
finite29. But ali the great Scholastics hastened to repudiate this
metaphysical faux pas on the grounds of the absolute identity of
the divine essence and the divine power. In any case, the point
is that we have no right to presume that a given philosopher under
stands infinity of power as a pure extrinsic denomination unless
he himself gives definite grounds in his own writings for such a
presumption.
Does Plotinus actually give such grounds in his texts for pre
suming this narrow interpretation ? Quite the contrary, it seems
to me. In the first place, nowhere in any text does he asserì:, either
explicitly or by clear implication, that infinity is attributed to the
power of the One — or, for that matter, of any agent — only by
extrinsic denomination. The reader can very easily verify this for
himself in the major texts quoted above. This rigid Scholastic
distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic denomination simply does
not come up here in the case of a negative attribute like infinity.
What Plotinus actually does is to pass back and forth from the
outer to the inner angle of vision on the One in a single continuous
movement of thought.
« IV, 8, 5.
28 Metaphysics, XII, 7, 1073 a S. Yet even here he argues from the
infinite power of the Prime Mover to the intrinsic property of immateriality.
29 Cf. Fr. Sweeney's valuable article, « Some Medieval Opponents of
Divine Infinity», Μ ed. S tudies, XIX (1957), 233-45.
Nor, secondly, is the very basis for the author's reasoning to

extrinsic denomination present in the texts. He insists repeatedly
that the One is termed infinite in power by Plotinus only because
of the infinite number of its effects, which are alone termed properly
infinite. This insistence is truly astonishing. For not only is the
infinite number of the One's effects never put down as the only
reason for callmg the power of the One infinite — either in the
texts quoted above or in any other texts ; it is in fact never put
down as the reason at ali. The one text explicitly referred to by
the author deals not with the One at ali but with the Intelligence
considered as the stable, ever-sufficient cause presiding over the
« always recurring » cycles of things in time30. But even here
Plotinus neither speaks of the Intelligence as infinite in power nor,
a fortiori, attributes this infinity to the infinite number of its effects.
In fact, the term infinite (unless one identifies « always recurring »
or eternai with infinite) simply never occurs here at ali, though it
does occur elsewhere in a participation context, as we shall see.
Surely, if this argument from the infinite number of effects were
so cruciai in the analysis of the infinity of power of the One, it
would seem naturai that Plotinus should mention it explicitly at least
in the main passages treating of the question.
What, then, is the positive explanation for the infinity of power
of the One which he actually does elaborate in his texts? It is
always the same basic analysis, whether he is dealing with the
absolute infinity of the One or with the relative infinity, each in
its own order, of the second and third divine hypostases, the In
telligence and the Soul. The One is called infinitely powerful, not
because it is the cause of an infinite number of effects, but because
it is the originative source of, and has power over, ali the things
which come after it. What is the point here? It is precisely this :
that since the cause is at the same time one and unique and yet
the source of ali that comes after it, it itself cannot be any one
among these determinate forms or beings ; it cannot be another
particular like them. It must, therefore, be above and beyond the
whole order of particular, limited entities proceeding from it, as a
perfectly simple, unparticularized (hence undetermined, hence infi
nite) fullness of power containing virtually or supereminently ali
its products.
30 IV, 3, 12.
INFINITY IN PLOTINUS : A REPLY ζ)Ι
The infinity of power of the One is thus not a quantitative

denomination derived from the number of its effects, but a purely
qualitative one flowing from its concentrated fullness as a source
and its consequent superiority to the whole order of its particular
effects. Whether the number of its effects happens to be infinite
or not is beside the point. The point is that the power of a single
source to produce ali the varied determinate entities of a lower order
must itself be a simple concentrated plenitude above ali the particular
determinations of any of its effects and hence infinite precisely be
cause of this all-pregnant unity and simplicity.
Thus the infinity of nonbeing and the infinity of power in
the First Principle are really not adequately distinct attributes at
ali : they are but two facets of the same dynamic emanation and
participation structure of the universe. This is brought out ad
mirably in the third text on power quoted above, combining in a<
single sweep infinity of supra-formal nonbeing, of power, and of
intrinsic lovableness as infinite Goodness and Super-Beauty. The
end of the latter text alone, in fact, should be enough to clinch the
case of the intrinsic infinity or the One : « Love of Him is measure
less... because that which is loved is unlimited and, thus, the love
itself is infinite »81. Since love always goes to its object as it is
intrinsically in itself, and not to a mere extrinsic denomination, an
infinite love drawn by an infinite object surely presupposes that
the infinity of the beloved resides in its own inner reality as it is
in itself.
The above analysis is confirmed further when we come to study
the manner in which Plotinus describes the productive power of the
First Principle. Fr. Sweeney himself admits that the cruciai ques
tion here is whether or not Plotinus presente this power as « identical
with the agent's very -being, which is elsewhere affirmed to be in
finite ». He answers, however, in the negative, because the One
is called infinite only as nonbeingS2. We have already discussed the
significance of the latter expression. As to the identity of the One's
power with its nature there can be no question. In Plotinus' own
words : «'
Do not even remark that It is in such and such a way, because

such language would determine It and make it become a particular
tliing... whereas It really is other than ali such beings... He who
31 VI, 7, 32; see above, n. 19.

32 Art. cit., p. 718.
92 W. N0RRIS CLARKE, S. I.
beholds it... having seen that It is indeterminate, can enumerate ali

the beings which come after It and then say that It is nothing of ali
of them but that lt is Τotal Power which is really master of Itself 33.
But especially do not look upon It through the medium of other
things. If you do, you will see only its traces and not Itself. But
reflect upon what It is, that is, take It in Itself in Its purity without
mixture. Ali things participate in It, but none of them possesses It ...
Who could lay hold of Its power in ali its totality (or concentrated
fullness) at once? If one could, how could he be other than identical
with It?34.
Surely we could not ask for a more explicit identification of

the power of the One with its inner reality or « being », as Fr. Swee
ney requires — understanding « being », of course, not in Plotinus'
technical sense of determinate essence, which would be an obvious
contradiction, but in our own later more general sense of the term.
Further light on this intrinsic character of the One's power is
thrown by Plotinus' favorite metaphor in describing it : an inex
haustible spring of inner life which constantly pours over its life
to others without ever diminishing in the least the inner plenitude
of the spring itself :
What will such a Principle be? The potency of ali things, the
power whose nonexistence would be the nonexistence of ali things ...
Imagine a spring that has no source outside itself. It gives life to ali
rivers yet is never exhausted by what they take, but remains integrally
as it was ... Or think of the life coursing through some mighty tree
while its principle remains unmoved and undispersed but, as it were,
vested in the root... Thus we are always brought back to the One...
their principle and fountainhead and power...35.
Evidently Plotinus looks on this power as a kind of intense

concentration of inner life which is in the Primary Source first
and then pours over to its participations. To interpret such a con
ception of power as a mere extrinsic denomination seems to me
an impoverishment of Plotinus' thought quite alien to the texts
themselves.
33 VI, 8, 9; italics mine.

34 V, 5, 10; my translation, following Brehier and checked with the
Greek. Cf. VI, 8, 10 and 17.
35 III, 8, 10; my translation.
INFINITY IN PLOTINUS : A reply 93
Infinity in the Intelligence and the Soul
Plotinus also attributes infìnity of power, life, and even of

nature to the second and third divine hypostases, the supreme
Intelligence, from which flow directly ali the particular intelligible
forms and ideas, and the supreme Soul, from which flow ali par
ticular souls or vital principles. Fr. Sweeney makes much of this
« relative infinity », since Plotinus finds it quite compatible with
the fact that both of these principles are limited with reference
to the principle above them. He concludes that infinity in the
Intelligence and the Soul can signify nothing more than an extrinsic
denomination based on the infinite number of effects flowing from
each. He also argues in tura from this that infinity of power even
in the One need mean no more than extrinsic denomination36.
But such « relative infinity » of originative principles on dif
ferent levels of reality is a standard gambit in ali Neoplatonic par
ticipation metaphysics37. Its most obvious interpretation is by
analogy with the infinity of the Primary Principle, since it is based
on exactly the same reasons. Though both the Intelligence and the
Soul are limited with respect to what is above them — the Soul
to the Intelligence and the latter to the One — stili each one is
the unique immediate source of ali the multiplicity of particularized
emanations that come after it. Precisely because it is such a single
originative principle of ali the beings in this order of reality, it
cannot itself be particularized or determined like its effects but
must be an unparticularized simple fullness of power superior to
them ali. Hence, though stili limited with reference to what is
above it, it possesses a relative infinity with reference to its own
products below it.
Thus the Intelligence is the immediate source of ali the dis
tincti multiplicity of intelligible beings or ideas, and, precisely as
a power able to produce them ali within itself, is an infinity of in
tellectual potency with respect to each one of them 38. So, too, the
Soul is the immediate source of ali particular vital principles, and,
as such, is an infinity of vital power with respect to each particular
36 Art. cit., pp. 724-30. The revelant texts can be found here.
37 Cf. my own article, « The Meaning of Participation in St. Thomas »,
Proc. of Amer. Cath. Phil. Assoc., XXVI (1952), 147-57.
33 Cf. V, 8, 9; VI, 2, 21-22; VI, 5, 4 and 12; VI, 6, 7.
94 w. NORRIS CLARKE, S. I.
soul flowing from it89. Such an infinity, analogically similar in

meaning and foundation to that of the One, is not a pure extrinsic
denomination derived front the quantitative norm of the infinite
number of its effects. As in the case of the One, it is a strictly
qualitative attribute flowing from the position and role of an origi
native principle in a participation structure. This seems to me the
most obvious and naturai interpretation of the texts, which one
should have very solid and explicit reasons for rejecting.
It is true that in the case of these lower first principles Plo
tinus speaks frequently of infinite cycles of time proceeding from,
and under the providence of, the Intelligence, and of infinite numbers
of individuals proceeding from the Soul. But the affirmation of
infinite number in the realm of the intelligible world of the Intel
ligence and the Soul is always hedged around with careful qualifica
tions. In both cases he takes special care to reassure us that the
infinity within the originating principles themselves is not in any
way quantitative but simple and indivisible. Thus speaking of the
infinity of the Soul:
We must not be perturbed about this infinity in the intelligible
world ; for it resides entirely in simple indivisibility, and proceeds forth,
so to speak, whenever it acts 40.
Speaking of the Intelligence :

This unity [of the one life of the universe through its endlessly
recurring cycles] he will not know from without but through his own
operation, for that which is thus infinite is always with him, or rather
accompanies him, who contemplates it with a knowledge which is in
nate. For just as he knows his own infinity of life, so he also knows
the single activity which he exercises in the universe, although not as
it is being exercised there 41.
This passage seems to me especially illuminating, since it con

trasts explicitly the inner infinity of life in the Intelligence with the
outer infinity of its effects in the universe. To interpret « his own
39 Cf. VI, 4, 14; VI, 5, 9; V, 7, 1. In addition to the simple infinity

of power of the Intelligence and the Soul as originative principles, there
is also present in them the explicit multiplicity of their intelligible products,
ideas and souls, sometimes called infinite, though usually with qualifications.
Fr. Sweeney may possibly not have distinguished clearly between these two
infinities, one in the active power or life of the agent, the other in its im
manent products.
40 V, 7, 1 (my translation). Cf. VI, 6, 18.
« IV, 4, 9.
infinity of life » as a mere extrinsic denomination is surely doing

violence to the message Plotinus is trying to convey.
The same implication of intrinsic infinity in the Intelligence as
.the source of ali particular intelligibles is borne out even more
strongly by the frequent descriptions of this infinity as an infinity
of nature. For example :
If we say that the divine nature [of the Intelligence] is infinite
in that it is not limited, then what would that be except that He can
never be deficient? But if this latter is true, then He is present to
each, for if He were not able to be present to each He would experience
a deficiency ... 42.
How then is the Intelligence present? As one life, for life in a
living thing... is everywhere. If anyone again wants to know how,
he should remember its power. It is not just so much, but if you go
on dividing it mentally to infinity it has always the sanie power, fun
damentally infinite (or infinite to its depths), for it has no matter in
itself to make it diminish along with the size of the body's bulk. If
then you understand its everflowing spring of infinity — namely its
nature, which is unwearying and unwearing and nowhere fading, boil
ing over with life in itself... [Ali things] depend on Him and move
to unity in His infinity which is without physical magnitude 43.
The above texts on the « infinite nature » of the Intelligence

are so strong and explicit, in fact, that Fr. Sweeney feels obliged
to warn us that we must not take the term « nature » literally but
should interpret it as a mere synonym for «power», which, of
course, we already know to be infinite only by extrinsic denomina
tion But surely this is doing violence to the texts in order to
preserve his thesis intact. Nature ali through Plotinus, following
Aristotle, is related, indeed, to power and action in a being, but
always as its intrinsic principle. To attempt to interpret « infinite
nature » as a pure extrinsic denomination is a tour de force of
« VI, 5, 4.
« VI, 5, 12. ·
44 Art. cit., p. 727, n. 13: «One should beware of reading too much
into such an expression as 'the divine nature is infinite'. In certain authors
and in certain contexts, the expression mav indeed mean that God's very
nature and being is infinite in Itself. But it can also mean, as here, simply
that God's power is infinite, since in Plotinus (and perhaps also in other
neoplatonists) divine power and divine nature are equivalente. — But if the
author admits that the divine power and the divine nature are equivalent,
is it not equally, if not more, legitimate to assimilate the power into the
nature rather than, as he does, to reduce the nature to nothing more than
a power conceived in terms of extrinsic denomination?
exegesis so extreme that this alone should have induced the author
to hesitate and reconsider his own basic hypothesis.
Conclusion
Let me sum up briefly the points I have made in my criticism

of Fr. Sweeney's position. Infinity of the One in Plotinus, he
maintains, cannot be interpreted as a genuine intrinsic infinity of
the very being (inner reality) of the One, because it is predicated
of the One only as associated either with its nonbeing or with its
power. Neither yields anything more than an infinity of extrinsic
denomination : the first, because nonbeing merely locates the One
as above and other than the realm of intelligible being, and tells
us nothing about its own inner reality, which might well be finite ;
the second, because infinity is applied to power in an agent solely
because it produces an infinite number of effects outside of itself,
which effects alone can properly be termed infinite.
My answer was : (1) The positive perfection or reality of
the One must remain nameless for Plotinus, since « being » for him
signifies limited intelligible essence. But the whole point of the
negative dialectic by which Plotinus concludes that the One must
be both nonbeing and infinite is to exclude completely from the
One every trace of form, determination and limit, since the latter
always imply a derived, secondary state of being and the ultimate
source must be above ali such particularity. Hence it would be
internally contradictory for the One to exclude ali form and limit
from itself « extrinsically » and yet allow the same « intrinsically »
within itself. Form, essence, etc. are either intrinsic constitutive
principles or nothing at ali. (2) Infinity is attributed to the power
of the One not because of mere extrinsic denomination deriving
from the infinite number of its effects ; this interpretation and the
reason alleged for it simply do not occur in the texts themselves,
but are the result of hypothetical speculation on the part of the
author as to what Plotinus must have meant. The positive reason
given in the texts is that the power of the One as supreme source
of ali other beings is to be understood as a simple, concentrated
fullness or wellspring of inner life containing supereminently the
perfection of ali the particular, determinate, and limited participa
tions which emanate from it, and hence remaining superior to ali
particular determinations and forms. The same analysis is found
INfiNitY in plotinus : a reply 97
analogically in the relative infinity at a lower level of both Intel

ligence and Soul with respect to the multiplicity of particular effects
beneath them. The infinite number of the effects of these prin
ciples outside of them, where this is the case, does indeed manifest
the infinite fecundity within them. But the infinite number as such
is not properly the reason for the inner infinity; the reason is
simply the superiority of a unique source to ali the varied particular
determinations in the lower order of its effects.
I feel, therefòre, that Fr. Sweeney's interpretation of Plotinus
does not do adequate justice to the full power and depth of this
extraordinary metaphysical genius's thought. It attempts to con
strict within too narrow and rigid a Scholastic category a movement
of metaphysical and spiritual reflection whose richness constantly
breaks through the artifìcial limits imposed upon it. And despite
the unquestionably high level of technical scholarly competence dis
played by the author in ali the other details of his work, I do
not think the method he has followed, that of filling in the silences
of Plotinus' texts by his own philosophical speculation on what the
latter must have meant, is reliable enough to deliver fìrmly ground
ed historical conclusions.
It is my conjecture that the author has been unduly influenced
in his interpretation of Plotinus by the results of his own much
more fìrmly grounded research into the notion of divine infinity
in its development throughout later Christian thought in the West,
especially among the early Scholastics. I believe he has made a
convincing case in his other valuable and richly documented ar
ticles for the fact that early Scholastic thought — possibly even
St. Augustine, as he maintains following Gilson — is surprisingly
thin and meagre in its analysis of the divine infinity and does not
seem to arrive at a full awareness of the infinity of the divine
essence as such until the middle of the thirteenth century. (I think
he would find the story quite different, however, if he explored
the Greek patristic tradition stemming from men like Gregory of
Nyssa and others who were influenced by the school of Plotinus).
But in any case it is not sound historical method to argue that
because later writers — above ali, early medieval writers in the
West — did not clearly possess a given concept, therefòre no one
else before them could have either. There is no need for Fr. Swee
ney to fear lest the conclusions of his own excellent and trail-blazing
historical research into the notion of divine infinity in medieval
7 — « Gregorianum » XL (1959) - voi. XL.
Q8 w. norkis clarke, s. i.
thought will be undermined unless the earlier achievement of Plo

tinus be somehow discredited or depreciated 45.
Finally, Plotinus is a subtle, profound and often obscure
writer, one very difficult to interpret with precision and by no means
always consistent with himself, but for ali that a very great and
influential thinker. I am sincerely grateful to Fr. Sweeney for
having gone to such trouble to bring out for public discussion such
an important aspect of Plotinus' thought and exploit to its fullest
possibilities an interpretation which I believe to be inadequate.
I submit my own interpretation, in turn, which is also that of
Fr. de Finance and, I believe, of most Plotinian scholars, not as
demonstrated apodictically, but simply as most probable, ali things
considered.
Fordham University (U.S.A.)
W. Norris Clarke, S. I.
45 I am aware that Prof. Gilson also holds the same thesis as that pro
posed by Fr. Sweeney. But I cannot escape the impression— shared by many
others, I might add — that the distinguished historian of medieval thought
has always been a little hard on Plotinus and underestimated his positive
metaphysical achievements. Thus, despite the many accurate analyses and
remarkably penetrating observations he makes on Plotinus in his Being and
Some Philosophers (2nd ed., Toronto, 1952, Ch. I), he repeatedly speaks of
the One as though it were not merely «non-being» in the technical Plotinian
sense but not even « real » at ali in the most general sense possible (for which
Plotinus has various paraphrases and equivalents but no technical term).
But this is both to force the latter's thought beyond his own texts and to
focus solely on his negative theology to the exclusion of the less obvious
but ever-present positive theology. For the opposite view far more typical
among historians of Greek philosophy, see the quotation from Moreau in
note 3 above.

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Infinity in Plotinus : a Reply

During the year 1957 two erudite and impressive articles ap

1 Gregorianum XXXVIII (1957), 515-35 ; 713-32.

to avoid disputes on secondary matters, ali the translations of Plo

3 As Fr. de Finance puts it (op. cit., p. SO) : « En demandant à quoi

Fr. Sweeney's Critique

What Fr. Sweeney denies in this interpretation is not merely

We cannot enter here into a discussion of this interesting and

5 The only reservatitns which occur to me for the moment on the

Secondly, the One is said to be infinite in its power. But again

With regard to the first kind of infinity the author sums up

Now there is no difficulty with the basic premises of this

" Art. cit., ρ. 731.

fluenced a medieval Christian in affirming that God is infinitely

7 Ibid., pp. 527-31 ; e. g. : « Consequently, Plotinus both implicitly and

The First Cause according to the Platonists is above being inso

What he is equivalently asserting is that despite ali that Plo

as long as God was conceived of primarily as the Good instead of Being

sence — and vice versa. Hence, precisely because such entities

Does ali this sound compatible with Fr. Sweeney's contention

In the first place, the text to which the author refers is an

14 De Potentia, q. 1, a. 2; C. Gentiles, I, 43.

of external boundary, at the risk of contradicting the innu

The second foundation for the infinity of the One according

16 Enneadi, VI, 6, 18; we are following Brehier's interpretation in his

versable either in extension or in number but by the boundlessness of

Note especially the last text, which we have quoted at length

No indication whatever is thereby given that the unique reality of the

In the face of the above texts the author's conclusion is, to

Unfortunately, inspection of the Greek text and of the three

21 Ibid., pp. 731-32.

infinity under discussion, that of matter. This would then be only

The key step to note in this reasoning, of course, is the

He is termed infinitely powerful... because He is capable of making

24 Art. cit., pp. 717-18.

What is to be said of the validity of such a principle for the

25 Ibid., ρρ. 718; 720 ; 724, respectively.

splendor of the outside and admires the greatness of soul because of

This principle, then, wielded so uncompromisingly by our author,

Nor, secondly, is the very basis for the author's reasoning to

The infinity of power of the One is thus not a quantitative

Do not even remark that It is in such and such a way, because

31 VI, 7, 32; see above, n. 19.

beholds it... having seen that It is indeterminate, can enumerate ali

Surely we could not ask for a more explicit identification of

Evidently Plotinus looks on this power as a kind of intense

33 VI, 8, 9; italics mine.

Infinity in the Intelligence and the Soul

Plotinus also attributes infìnity of power, life, and even of

soul flowing from it89. Such an infinity, analogically similar in

Speaking of the Intelligence :

This passage seems to me especially illuminating, since it con

39 Cf. VI, 4, 14; VI, 5, 9; V, 7, 1. In addition to the simple infinity

infinity of life » as a mere extrinsic denomination is surely doing

The above texts on the « infinite nature » of the Intelligence

Let me sum up briefly the points I have made in my criticism

analogically in the relative infinity at a lower level of both Intel

thought will be undermined unless the earlier achievement of Plo

Fordham University (U.S.A.)

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