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TYPES OF TERRORISM BY WORLD SYSTEM LOCATION

Author(s): Omar A. Lizardo and Albert J. Bergesen


Source: Humboldt Journal of Social Relations , 2003, Vol. 27, No. 2 (2003), pp. 162-192
Published by: Department of Sociology, Humboldt State University

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/23524157

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162

TYPES OF TERRORISM BY WORLD


SYSTEM LOCATION

Omar A. Lizardo
Albert J. Bergesen
University of Arizona
Abstract: Omar A. Lizardo and Albert J. Bergesen—Graduate Student
and Professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of
Arizona—offer a new typology of terrorist activity based on world
system structural location of sub-state groups and state targets. Making
use of this classification, they examine the dynamics of terrorist activity
during the past 130 years by connecting it to larger processes of world
systemic change. A clear pattern emerges from the analysis: during
waves of decolonization and system reorganization, or during periods of
hegemonic supremacy, terrorist activity is contained in either the periphery
or the core structural locations of the system, and its ideological cast is
pragmatic and relatively coherent (national liberation or radical leftist
ideology). The international community typically considers this type of
terrorist activity as internal and "domestic " and within the purview of
the disciplinary forces of the nation states affected. But the systemic
chaos produced by a shift toward a more competitive configuration of
power under conditions of hegemonic decline, produces the "spillover"
and projection of transnational terrorism from the semiperiphery to the
core, in the form of ideologically ill-defined nihilist brands of terror. This
leads toward a rhetorical re-definition of the terrorist threat, from a local
problem to a general affront "against humanity and civilization "as both
the anarchist wave of the 19'h centwy and the Arab-Islamic variant of the
current religious wave have been characterized.

Current research on terrorism1 has focused primarily on issues


of either normative definition or practical prevention. The little
social scientific inquiry that has been directed at the subject has
taken either an essentially reductionist psychological viewpoint,
or has failed to get past the level of the internal group dynamics
and idiographic case studies of isolated organizations (Reich 1990;
Crenshaw 1992; Hoffman 1992). We have recently argued that

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while approaches that focus on the micro to meso-level of social


organization are useful, the study of terrorism will not be furthered
until the level of analysis is ratcheted-up one more level, to that
of the world-system and its reproductive dynamics (Bergesen
and Lizardo 2002a). In this paper we aim to contribute recent
debates on the classification of terrorist activity assuming a wider
theoretical and historical perspective. We attempt to move beyond
extant classificatory attempts by taking into account the larger
international embedding of terrorist organizations and activities
within the structural core/semiperiphery/periphery division of the
world system. After introducing our new typology, we go on to
discuss how the history of modem terrorism ( 1870 to the present)
can be put in the context of recent historical transformations of the
world system. Through this exercise we attempt to demonstrate
that beyond specific local and organizational idiosyncrasies,
modem terrorism—just like other forms of conflict such as war—is
a systemic phenomenon inherently tied to the reproductive dynamics
of capitalism and the interstate system (Bergesen 1985).

A TYPOLOGY OF TERRORISM

Substatal terrorism2 in the modem world-system possesses


two major dimensions of variation: structural location in th
international system, and ideological justification. Structur
location varies along the three-tiered division of the world-syste
into a core, semiperiphery, and a periphery. Thus we may hav
terrorism perpetrated by core actors against core government
organizations (Type-1). We may also observe terrorism th
originates in the periphery or semiperiphery and is directed eith
at other peripheral or semiperipheral governments (Type-2) or
terrorist activity that originates in the periphery or semiperiphery
and is turned against core states (Type-3).3 In terms of the secon
dimension, the ideological variation that has been exhibited by
terrorist groups during their modem history (i.e. since the emergen

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of anarchist terror in the 1870's), it has ranged from anarchic


nihilist, to nationalist-separatist (along racial, ethnic or religious
dimensions), and radical leftist. David Rapoport ( 1999,2001 ) uses
a similar classificatory scheme in order to identify "four waves"
of terrorist activity in the western world since the last third of the
nineteenth century. A first wave of Russian inspired anarchism
(from 1879-1914) swept Europe and the United States and came to
a dramatic end by the beginning of the Second Thirty Years War4
(1914-1945) in Europe, itself sparked by an anarchist assassination.
The second wave ( 1945-1960) consisted of anti-colonial/separatist
terrorist activity in the periphery as African and Asian nationalist
movements rose up against European colonial rule and attacked
their occupants with an assortment of military tactics, including
indiscriminate terror. The third wave (1960-1989) emerged in the
European Core and the Latin American semiperiphery in the form
of radical leftist terrorist groups, and ended with the disintegration
of the Soviet Union in 1989 (Chalk 1999). The fourth wave
subsequently emerged, consisting of—primarily Arab-Islamic—
religiously inspired terrorism (1979 to the present).5 Rapoport
argues that this fourth wave of terror is qualitatively different
from the nationalist-separatist brand of terror practiced by radical
Palestinian groups to this day; its goals seem amorphous and its
justifications—theology and the right to wage holy war—hark back
to the type of religious terrorism, with which the west was familiar
before the rise of modern terror (Rapoport 1984, 1988).
We utilize a modified version of Rapoport's paradigm (See
Figure-1 for a schematic diagram). We agree that the qualitatively
different character of each wave of terrorist activity can be partially
tied to their ideological justification. However, we want to add an
emphasis on the larger international dynamics of the world system,
especially the structural origins and location of the state targets that
each wave of terrorist activity attempts to target. Hence we produce
a two dimensional typology, combining world system location with

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165

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Figure-1: Waves of Terror in the World-System

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166

ideological frame (Benford and Snow 2000). Further we dispute


Rapoport's assertion that the current wave of religious terrorist
activity represents a qualitatively different "fourth wave" of modern
terror. Instead, we contend that religiously-inspired terrorism is
simply the return—in holy disguise—of the anarchist-nihilist brand
of terror that swept Europe and the United states during the end of
the 19th century (Hoffman 1995; Joll 1979). We argue that then, as
now, the conditions of the international system foster the appearance
of this type of terrorism. In particular, the disorder and systemic
chaos that was brought about by conditions of then British, today
American hegemonic decline, help to produce the emergence of this
new type of terror (Arrighi and Silver 1999). The fact that anarchic
religious terrorism does not easily fit the received conceptual
structures to which we are accustomed (nationalism, extreme
right or left wing), reflect its direct link to the new world disorder
produced during the transition of the system from its hegemonic
unipolar moment, to a multicentric, competitive condition.

TYPE-1 TERROR: TERROR IN THE CORE

Type-1 terrorism is familiar to students of collective violence in


the West, as it has manifested itself in the form of relatively sudde
popular violence and revolt in core states facing crisis, as during the
world revolutions of 1848 and 1968.6 It has also taken the shap
of more protracted stmggles between smaller, left or right leanin
factions that have specific ideological grievances against particular cor
governments. These groups are usually active for several decades, after
which their resource and support base becomes exhausted, resulting i
either a turn toward less radical action and more traditional forms o

contention—as in the case of the Klan, or a cease fire and comple


dissolution—as happened to the German Red Army and various other
radical leftist terrorist organizations after the revolutions of 1989 tha
swept the communist semiperiphery. The wave of Leftist-Marxi
terrorist activity that inaugurated the postwar resurgence of modem

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167

terrorism in the core European states after 1968 is the prototypical


example of this kind of terrorist activity (Pluchinsky 1993).
As with all types of terrorist activity, Type-1 terror can assume
one of the three ideological forms discussed above: an ethnic
separatist garb, as with the Basque Struggle in northern Spain
led by the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) group; radical leftist
organizations such as the Japanese Red Army, Germany's Red
Army Faction, or the Italian Red Brigades; or an anarchic-nihilist
variant of core origin/core target terror such as the Japan-based
millenarian group Aum Shinrikyo which released a nerve gas attack
on the Tokyo subways in 1995. Type-1 terrorism of either the leftist
radical or ethnic separatist brand is characterized by a high degree
of ideological coherence and militancy. Terrorist groups of this type
have very clear belief systems guiding their actions (whether these
are right or left leaning). Current government structures are seen as
too compromised by multiple contradictory interests to effectively
serve the populace. These organizations thus operate according to
the Gramscian logic of serving or standing for the general interest.
Their primary goal is to garner the type of popular support that will
result in an ultimate take-over of state power. They usually practice
a form of relatively controlled and targeted form of terrorist activity,
choosing their targets carefully in order to maximize their symbolic
value. They prefer to avoid the shock of indiscriminate attacks on the
general populace, directing their violence instead to representatives
of the corrupt state order that they oppose as well as architectural
or private corporate structures. Their activities are stereotyped and
well organized, with routine protocols in terms of issuing warnings,
releasing manifestos, and claiming responsibility.
These core-based radical leftist or ethnic separatist terrorist
organizations are not anti-state per se, but they stand against the
currently dominant state organizations in the core. These are
perceived as too corrupt and uninterested in the welfare of the people
to be of any use. Bruce Hoffman contrasts this type of terrorism

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to the new terrorism (religious anarchic-nihilist) that has become


prominent since the end of the Cold War:

In the past, terrorism was practiced by a group of


individuals belonging to an identifiable organization
with a clear command and control apparatus who had a
defined set of political, social, or economic objectives.
Radical leftist organizations.. .as well as ethno-nationalist
terrorist movements...reflected this stereotype of the
traditional terrorist group. They issued communiqués,
taking credit for—and explaining—their actions and
however disagreeable or distasteful their aims and
motivations were, their ideology and intentions were at
least comprehensible. Most significantly however, these
familiar terrorist groups engaged in highly selective and
mostly discriminate acts of violence. They bombed
various "symbolic" targets representing the source of their
animus (e.g., embassies, banks, national airline carriers) or
kidnapped and assassinated specific persons whom they
blamed for economic exploitation or political repression
generally in order to attract attention to themselves and
their causes (2001,417-418).

Anarchic-nihilist Type-1 terrorists, however, do not share the high


degree of ideological coherence and specificity of targets of the Marxist
and separatist groups7. Their ideologies are usually vague and general,
and they seem to stand for no particular political or social program. This
type of terror has recently been dubbed the new or postmodem terrorism
(Laqueur 1999, 1996). The recent emergence of this type of terror in
core countries however is far from new. Indiscriminate anarchist attacks

swept Europe during the 19lh century, and just like the new postmodem
terrorists, anarchists stood for ill-defined political and social programs.
They seemed to revel in violence and bloodshed for their own sake, and
their degree of coordination and organization was low or non-existent
(Geifman 1993; Joli 1979; Laqueur 1977).

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169

TYPE-2 TERRORISM:
STRUGGLING AGAINST OPPRESSION

Type-2 terrorism constitutes the bulk of terrorist activity in


the world system. Terrorist groups that arise in the periphery
and semiperiphery and attempt to attack local governments ar
the springboard from which all other forms of modern terrori
group—including Type-1 terrorists—have developed by diffusion
and imitation.

The prototypical modern terrorist group, the Narodnaya Voly


(People's Will), was formed in Russia, a semiperipheral empire, i
the wake of radical struggle against the tsarist regime during the la
third of the 19th century. The emergence of the Narodnaya Vol
stands as a watershed event in the history of modern terrorism
No other organization did more to define and lay down a templa
of how to conduct and organize terrorist activities (Berges
and Lizardo 2002b, Rapoport 2001). Even after its demise, th
People's Will became a model for countless terrorist organization
throughout the world (Joll 1979).
The more popular and media-covered forms of terrorism, s
popularized because they directly affect core states (Type-land
Type-3), represent the tip of the terrorist iceberg in comparison to
Type-2 domestic terrorism in the periphery and semiperipery. T
vast amount of death and destruction occasioned by type-2 terrorist
activity, while vast, is essentially impossible to measure, primari
because it leaves little trace in the form of media coverage or offici
documentation. Suffice to say, that in Turkey one semiperipher
country, over 10,000 people have died from domestic terror, mo
than in all episodes of transnational terrorist activity combine
since the 1960's (Johnson 2001). Type-2 terrorists seldom espous
complex Marxist or Neo-Fascist ideologies.8 These are the terrori
groups around which most researchers of terrorism developed their
frustration and deprivation theories in the 1960's and 1970's (Gu
1970). Their plight is clear, their grievances are straightforwar

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170

and their targets are oppressive, undemocratic governments that


sustain rule through the ruthless use of state violence.
The peripheral governmental organizations against which Type-2
terrorist groups aim their attacks are usually the leftovers of previous
colonial empires. They are not nation states in the same political mold as
the core states, but protectorates or simply dejure state entities established
by the major powers with little internal legitimacy. Due to this set of
circumstances, most of this type of terrorist activity blends in with the
revolutionary violence of anti-colonial and separatist-emancipatory
movements and their ideology takes the tinge of nationalism and ethnic
recognition in the international community. These goals are usually
either actively or tacitly supported by the rising world power, eager to
secure the destruction of the old hegemon's colonial regime and the
institution of its own neo-colonial order based of expansive rights to
national self-determination.

Type-2 terrorism can occur either at the beginning of the


breakdown of a hegemonic colonial-systemic order or at the end
of one. The initial breakdown phase is a period marked by rising
systemic instability in the semiperiphery, where multiethnic quasi
empires previously supported by the declining world power begin to
splinter. Major powers struggle to gain control by taking advantage
of the instability produced in this zone, a situation that usually leads
to a 30-year conflict known as a major power war.9 After the war,
we enter the end of the breakdown crisis. This is a restructuring
period that is also characterized by instability, this time due to
the shedding of the remnants of the previous order and the laying
down of the infrastructure of the new system by the leading post
war power. If it occurs at the beginning of the hegemonic crisis,
national liberation terrorist activity may be used to demarcate the
area of the international state system that is referred to as a problem
by the principal core states, such as the Prussian principalities in
the 17th century, the Ottoman Empire in the 19lh century, or the
Middle East today.

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Core states usually fight wars of succession and try to control


the interstate system using the disruption produced by Type-2
terrorism in the semiperiphery as an excuse. The event that sparked
the beginning of the Second Thirty Years War, for instance, was
the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand by a Bosnian
anarchist. Territorial core powers usually view the instability caused
at this kind of terrorism in semiperipheral areas as an opportunity
to extend their zone of influence, while the reigning commercial
sea-power views this kind of meddling by a competing core state
in a sensitive area of the world system as a challenge to its global
dominance. This was the situation between Spain and the Dutch/
French alliance vis a vis the Prussian principalities in the 17th century
and between the British and the German-Austro-Hungarian Alliance
in relation to the Balkans during World War I. Today, American
influence in the Middle East is similarly challenged by attempts on
the part of members of the European Union (especially France) and
the Soviet Union to extend their influence in the area.
After World War II, terrorism arose again, this time harnessed
toward the cause of completing the "liberation" of the ethnic/religious
groups that was initiated in the pre-war phase, but concentrated in
the peripheral areas of the system. In the semiperiphery, the obsolete
protectorate/quasi-imperial structures of domination espoused by
the old hegemon before the war are finally scrapped and replaced
with legally-recognized nation states following the model of the
core states in the system (Bergesen and Lizardo 2002b). Thus,
the Holy Roman Empire did not survive the post Thirty-year war
reconstitution of the European interstate system under the Treaty
of Westphalia, and neither did the Ottoman or Austro-Hungarian
empires survive the onslaught of the Second Thirty Years War of
1914-1945 (Bergesen and Lizardo 2002b). Similarly, the peripheral
Latin American colonies were decolonized after the Napoleonic
Wars and the peripheral African and Asian colonies shared the
same fate at the end of the Second Thirty Years War. Today the

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most internally illegitimate and politically obsolete structures are


the petro-monarchies and autocratic governments of the Middle
East, remnants of the attempts made by U.S. to procure political
stability in the area in the wake of the Cold War struggle for regional
supremacy in the interstate system. This is the area of the world
that has produced not only a large share of type-2 terrorism, but
has also produced the most notable current variant of transnational
(Type-3) terrorist activity in the world system.
Type-2 terrorism does not usually present itself in the anarchic
nihilist ideological mode, but takes either an ethnic-separatist cast
in the prewar phase of destabilization and subsequent breakdown
of the international system, and primarily affects semiperipheral
multiethnic empires and protectorates that gained their support
from the old hegemonic order. In its postwar form, in contrast,
Type-2 terror accompanies the peripheral anti-colonial liberation
movements in line with the system reorganization espoused by the
new world leader.

TYPE-3 TERRORISM:
THE TRANSNATIONAL TURN

Type-3 terrorism is projected from one area of the world system


core/periphery structural division of labor onto another. In terms of
direction, it is perpetrated by groups located in the semiperiphery, bu
is directed at core targets, either at core outposts (military bases or
embassies) throughout the world, core citizens in the semiperiphery,
or civilian and governmental targets and architectural structures in
the core states themselves (Bergesen and Lizardo 2002a). This typ
of terrorist activity is usually referred to as transnational, becau
core elites did not start to notice terrorist activity that crossed state
boundaries until it was exported from semiperipheral states (mostly
the Middle East) toward European core states in the 1960's. This i
what has been dubbed spillover terrorism (Pluchinsky 1987). But the
transnational character of terrorism cuts across all types. As Davi

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Rapoport observes: (2001: 422). "Every [terrorist] wave contains


international ingredients, namely group commitments to international
revolution the willingness of foreign governments and publics to
help, and the sympathies of Diaspora populations."
Thus, there is transnational terrorist activity that is internal
to both the core (Type-1) and the periphery and semiperiphery
(Type-2), and that crosses state boundaries within those structural
divisions (Type-3). One example is the network of leftist terrorist
organizations that flourished in Europe and Latin America during
the 1960'sand 1970's. The transnational character of Type-3 terror
becomes accentuated because it crosses both national and structural

locations. Two waves of Type-three terror have been recorded in


the history of modern terrorism: anarchist terrorism that spread
from Russia at the end of the 19th century and the current wave
of religious terrorism, that began during the last third of the 20th
century (Bergesen and Lizardo 2002a, 2002b). Both waves began
in the semiperiphery (the Russian empire and the Middle East
respectively) and were projected toward Western Europe and the
United States.
Type-3 terror has a long history, probably starting as early as the
conflict between the Sicarii Jewish Zealot group and the Romans
troops occupying ancient Palestine (Rapoport 1984). In its modern
guise, it arises in the last third of the 19th century as an outgrowth of
the anarchist terrorist activity originating in Russia. Major anarchist
figures crossed state lines to either assassinate public figures in
other states, or to orchestrate civilian attacks, primarily in France
by Russian and Italian anarchists:

Between 1894 and 1900 four European heads of states—a


President of France, the Prime Minister of Spain, the
Empress of Austria, and the King of Italy—were
assassinated by professed anarchists. Then, on September
6, 1901, President William McKinley, visiting the Pan
American exposition in Buffalo, was fatally wounded by
Leon Czolgosz, who declared prior to his execution: "I

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don't believe we should have any rulers. It is right to kill


them." But these assaults, committed with daggers and
revolvers, were less unnerving than dynamite attacks on
"bourgeois" cultural and institutional centers. In France
and Spain during the 1890's, bombs were flung into
an opera house, a police station, a church, a mining
company's Paris office, and the Chamber of deputies.
Innocent bystanders, women and children, were blown
to bits. Such episodes justified the used of the term
terrorism. Nothing could be more paralyzing—literally
more full of terror—to the average citizen, far removed
from power, than the fear of death or mutilation at any
moment, in any place, at the hands of an unknown
fanatic. In the United Sates the image of the terrorist
as a whiskered foreigner, holding a round bomb with a
sputtering fuse, became a fixture of cartoonists' repertoires
and the public's onsciousness. After McKinley's death,
President Theodore Roosevelt declared that anarchism
was "a crime against the whole human race" and asked
that the immigration laws be amended to exclude persons
"teaching disbelief in or opposition to...organized
government" (Weisberger 1993).

The recent wave of Arab-Islamic terror has followed a similar


pattern, starting as a purely national liberation variant in Palestine
and domestic grievance-induced terror (Type-2) in other Middle
Eastern countries such as Syria, Saudi-Arabia, and Pakistan. It
began to internationalize with the aid of state sponsors like Libya
in the 1970's and 1980's, and it has recently produced organizations
strictly dedicated to transnational terror such as al Qaeda.
The two major waves of semiperiphery to core terrorist activity
in the modern world system—the anarchist wave of 1870-1914
and the current Arab-Islamic religious wave—have so far been
characterized by their primarily anarchic-nihilist ideological
component. As Niall Ferguson notes:

Since the 1860s, men like the Russian anarchist


Sergei Nechaev had been preaching a doctine of
terrorism in which violence—notionally to further the
revolution— came close to becoming an end in itself.

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175

It was Nechaev who wrote Principles of Revolution,


which grimly declared, 'We recognize no other activity
but the work of extermination.' As far as his tactics
are concerned, Osama bin Laden owes a bigger debt to
the nineteenth-century Russian nihilists and narodniki
than he does to the CIA...The obvious objection is
that there is a profound difference between pre-1900
nihilism and the Islamic fundamentalism espoused by
bin Laden and his al Qaeda organization. Yet it would
be a grave mistake to overstate the difference. One
of the dangers of Huntington's 'clash of civilizations'
thesis is that it exaggerates the homogeneity of Islam
as a world religion. It might be more illuminating to
regard al Qaeda as the extremist wing of a political
religion.. .That is not to imply, as some writers on the
left have hastened to claim, that al Qaeda, or indeed
the Taliban regime, represents some kind of 'Islamo
fascism'... 'Islamo-nihilism' would be nearer the mark,
or perhaps "Islamo-bolshevism"—for we should not
forget that in their early years Lenin and Stalin were
also terrorists in Nechaevian tradition. Indeed there is
more than a passing resemblance between 'Hereditary
Nobleman Ulyanov' as the young Lenin liked to style
himself, hatching his plans for the overthrow of tsarism
from dingy Swiss hotels, and the renegade Saudi
millionaire orchestrating mayhem from an Afghan
cave (2001: 119-120).

In a similar manner, 19th century anarchist radicals can be


considered the extremist wing of a political movement (leftist
populism) that readily acquired religious and millenarian overtones.
Radical anarchist pamphlets of the time written by major figures such
as Michael Bakunin, Karl Heinzen, and Sergei Nechaev explicitly
mixed in religious themes taken from the Christian apocalyptic
tradition. Some deified the anarchist perpetrator; others sanctified
the cause of cleansing the world from what where perceived as the
evil embodied in government and the ruling classes. In reference
to Bakunin's theory of revolution, Walter Laqueur (1977) writes:

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The revolutionaries, however, should show indifference


toward the lamentations of the doomed, and were not
to enter into any compromise. Their approach might
be called terroristic but this ought not to deter them.
The final aim was to achieve revolution, the cause
of eradicating evil was holy, Russian soil would be
cleansed by sword and fire.

Laqueur adds that the most famous revolutionary document


of the time was written by Bakunin and came to be known as the
"Revolutionary Catechism." In it a mixture of propaganda and
tactical advice is mixed with a theory of revolution that seemed to
sanctify violent struggle (Laqueur 1977). It is not difficult to see
the parallels between Bakunin's dream of cleansing Russian and
European soil from what he deemed the illegitimate usurpers of
power, and Bin Laden's similar claims regarding American bases
in Saudi Arabia desecrating the holly lands of Islam. Rather than
concentrating on the "civilizational" (Huntington 1997) differences
between Arab-Islamic fundamentalism and 19th century anarchist
revolutionary theory, it is more useful to view both as similar
variants of nihilist political religions. If the current wave of Arab
Islamic terror uses religion to cover up its nihilist politics, 19th
century anarchism used nihilist politics to conceal its religious
apocalyptic overtones.
Type-3 terrorist organizations surface out of the failure
and frustration of radical domestic (type-2) terrorism in the
semiperiphery, and therefore their ideology and plans of action
acquire a darker cast. No longer content with the more limited
goal of trying to gain political power in the oppressive local state
from which they appeared, anarchist terrorists shift their attention
toward more general and diffuse targets, including state structures
in the core, which are deemed to be corrupt because of their larger
cultural, political, and military influence and reach. Transnational
anarchists in the 19th century, for example, emerged out of the
violent state response in Russia, Italy, and Spain against anarchist

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organizations tied to left-leaning labor movements. Their demands


and worldview became radicalized to such an extent that they started
to view their mission as one of ridding the world of the oppressive
power of state structures in general. Therefore, their targets become
the more "advanced" (western European and American) states of
the time.

Both 19th century anarchists and the currently active Arab


Islamic terrorist organizations view the secular state model of
the Euro-American core of the world system as an essentially
illegitimate and oppressive institution and therefore do not wish
to redeem it, but simply to further its destruction. To that effect,
they become increasingly indiscriminate in their choice of targets,
and do not practice the type of measured terrorist activity of the
other two types (Laqueur 1999; Hoffman 2001), but rather practice
a kind of "total terror" that can in principle be directed at anyone
that is associated with the putatively oppressive core government
institutions in question. Nineteenth century anarchists were limited
by the low degree of development and availability of objects that
could be turned into weapons of mass destruction, whereas Arab
Islamic anarchic terrorists of today have not only all of the lessons
learned from 130 years of modern terrorism, but also a plethora
of potentially available technological artifacts that can be used to
cause mass casualties (Laqueur 1999). Such was the confluence of
conditions that lead to the attacks on the World Trade Center and

the Pentagon on September 11th.

STRUCTURAL LOCATION, IDEOLOGY, AND


SYSTEMIC TRANSFORMATION

While any type of terror has the potential to acquire any of the
three ideological forms, the history of modern terrorism has shown
more regular patterns, with the emergence of waves of terroris
activities characterized by similar ideological themes concentrate
on particular areas of the world system. The anticolonial wave o

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terrorist activity ( 1945-1960) concentrated in the periphery, and the


leftist radical wave (1960-1979) concentrated in the core European
states. The Anarchist-religious waves (1879-1914 and 1979 to
the present) are distinctive because both start in the semiperiphery
(Russia and the Middle East) and become prevalent in the core at
a later time: France and the United States in the 1890's and all of

western Europe and the United States today (Bergesen and Lizardo
2002a, 2002b). We can thus think of the history of modern terror
as two distinct terrorist waves, one ethnic separatist and the other
Marxist radical, sandwiched between two anarchist-religious
waves (Figure-1). During each, the state of the world system
is going through specific periods of recurrent organization and
restructuring.
During the anticolonial terrorist wave of 1945-1960, the former
colonies of the war-exhausted European powers revolted against
foreign rule. This change was indirectly fostered by the reigning
world power (the U.S.), which was attempting to transform the
system from one based on formal colonialism to one structured
around the ideology of national self-determination and ethnic/
national recognition in the international community. The new
system was undergirded by the emergence of transnational
organizations such as the United Nations, which provide legal
recognition for those states that are able to shake off colonial rule.
Decolonization, of course is synchronized with the expansionary
"A" phase of the world economy underwritten by the rising world
power of the United States (Bergesen and Schoenberg 1980). The
end of the restrictive colonial rule fostered by the defeated European
powers was beneficial for the free trade system instituted by the
United States after the war. The previous system based on formal
colonialism centered in the European core, was in this way replaced
with a neo-colonial system centered in the American core.
The leftist radical wave of terror in the European core (1960
1989) marks the emergence of contemporary terrorism. This

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179

terrorist wave produces many of the features which are later


adopted by the Arab-Islamic religious wave, such as major state
sponsorship (from the Soviet Union during until 1989) and high
degrees of networking and decentralized organizational structures.10
The international context under which this wave emerges, is of
course, that of the Cold War bipolar world order. But the bipolarity
of the interstate system during this time would turn out to be a
nothing but a mirage. The Soviet Union and its satellite states were
no match for the economic-productive power of the U.S. and its
multinational, vertically-integrated corporations (Arrighi, 1994). It
is no surprise, therefore, that Marxist ideology plays an important
role during this wave, as it is the only ideological system that seems
to be able to stand against the global economic integration and mass
consumption oriented organizational modes of capitalist production
espoused by the United States.
This wave of radical leftist terror is concentrated along those
core states with the closest proximity to the Soviet Union's region
of influence (Germany, Italy, France, and Spain). The terrorist
organizations exemplary of this wave propose coherent plans of
social change and stand against the liberal-democratic consensus
organized by U.S.-lead capitalist expansion. But after the U.S.
led world economic expansion came to an end in the 1970's, the
semiperipheral command economies of the USSR and its satellites
began to encounter serious difficulties.11 Core countries abandoned
the American program of global integration and open markets, and
entered a phase of increased protectionism and bloc formation (e.g.
European integration). Semiperipheral economies, the Soviet Union
included, reacted to the pressure toward change by turning inward
and reforming their autocratic regimes and command economies
(Bergesen 1992a, 1992b). This process led tothe implosion and
disintegration of the Soviet Union. With the demise of the Soviet
Union, the so-called "bipolar" world order also comes to an end.
This development dealt a grave blow to the radical leftist terrorist

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180

organizations in Europe, which in an amazingly short span of


time (1989-1992), withered away and ultimately disappeared as a
credible threat. The "cease fire" put forth by the most famous and
deadly of these organizations, the German Red Army Faction in
1992, best symbolizes this process which essentially brought the
end of the Marxist terrorist wave (Pluchinsky 1993).
The end of the Soviet Union, therefore, is strictly correlative to
the end of the U.S.-led expansion of the world economy (Bergesen
1992b) and the beginning of American hegemonic decline and loss
of economic dominance (Bergesen and Sonnett, 2000). By 1989,
the United States had already gone from being the world's largest
creditor to the world's largest debtor nation as its Cold War was
predominantly financed with foreign capital (Arrighi and Silver
1999). In addition, the American ability to project global order
had already been seriously deflated by its defeat in the Vietnam
War and alternative productive regimes of capital accumulation
and production that emerged in East Asia, seriously challenged the
economic dominance of the U.S.. Japanese post-war growth had
been unmatched in modem economic history and the "Asian Tigers"
newly industrialized economies along with mainland China, were
beginning to follow suit (Arrighi and Silver 1999). In other words,
the conditions for hegemonic stability had already been seriously
challenged and the system was starting to enter into a multicentric
phase, characterized by rising competition and the decline of the
previous hegemonic center (Arrighi 1994).
The fact that a "new" wave of nihilist religious terror emerges
from the Middle East at about this time, beginning in 1979 and
rising to prominence after 1989 (Enders and Sandler 1999, 2001,
2002), is no coincidence. The international system had found itself
in almost the same conditions under which the Russian anarchist
wave of the 19th century had emerged (Bergesen and Lizardo
2002b). Then the economic, political and military supremacy of
the British complex began to encounter serious challenges. The

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181

rapidly industrializing German state began to challenge England's


military supremacy in the Europe, while the newly industrializing
United States, a continental nation that dwarfed the British Island
in terms of size and potential productivity, was beginning to exert
its economic and financial muscle. The standard ideological
divisions of Marxist inspired labor movements versus British-led
free trade liberal economic policy had broken down with the defeat
of the workers revolutions of 1848, and the nationalist turn of the
workers movement after a period of growing international class
formation. Similar to the manner in which anarchist radicalism

filled in the ideological vacuum produced by the breakdown of


the liberal regime espoused by Britain in the 19th century, today's
"Islamo-nihilism" (Ferguson 2001) emerges to fill the vacuum left
after the defeat of the communist alternative to American global
capital after 1989 (Barber 1995).

CONCLUDING REMARKS: TERROR AND THE


NATION STATE IN THE WORLD-SYSTEM

This analysis of modern terror aims to show the useful


of a classification of terrorist activity that takes into accoun
structural location and more dynamic system processes. In
above considerations however, one aspect of modern sub
terrorism was purposefully left underdeveloped: its conne
to the rise of the nation state. In fact, terror use by representa
of state power—by Robespierre during the French Revolutio
become the model by which most autocratic states secure
hold over the civilian population (Carr 1996). Insofar as the
pillars of the modern nation state correspond to its monopol
the means of violence and its monopoly over international tr
only substatal entities recognized by the state are able to e
in commerce with representatives of other nation states)1
continuing viability will depend upon securing its hold over
monopolies. Terrorism by challenging one of them (the right of

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182

state to engage in targeted violence) thus represents a direct affront


to the international order that first developed in Europe after the
First Thirty Years War (1618-1648) with the peace of Westphalia
and that was extended to the rest of the world after U.S.-led post
war decolonization (Arrighi and Silver 1999).
Thus as Wallerstein (1995, 1999), has noted, the socio-political
stability of the modern world system, has rested on the precarious
balance between centrist liberalism, the hierarchical-conservative
right wing and the socialist-egalitarian left wing. The liberal elite in
the core of the world system has, for the most part, been able to bring
both the conservatives and the socialists of the core into collusion,
thus temporarily deferring a major systemic crisis. But radical
anarchism has always been the element that has not had a proper place
in the geo-cultural triad. It is no surprise, therefore, that the protracted
post-1848 crisis in Western Europe and the Ottoman Empire—the last
time that the balance between these three components of the world
system's geo-culture was radically in peril—was characterized by
the emergence of this strand of terrorist political activity. However,
the Bolshevik revolution in the Russian semiperiphery, coupled with
the beginning of the Second Thirty Years War, constituted the two
major developments that helped forestall major systemic crisis. First,
the development of socialism as a powerful political force after 1848
and of state socialism in Russia after 1917, forced the liberal centrist
compromise in the Western European and American core. This came
in the form of the double package of extensive political participation
rights and the welfare state. Second, the beginning of the war gave
a major push to the reactionary forces of nationalism and hierarchy,
thus appeasing the adherents of conservative ideology. To Lenin's
dismay, the socialist political forces in the core were also swept up in
war-induced nationalism, thus consolidating the centrist compromise
between the three components of the geoculture.
After World War I, the United States once again took up the
centrist liberal leadership vacated by a now war-exhausted Great

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183

Britain and was able to temporarily bring the world-system's geo


culture back into its precarious pre-war balance. But that would be a
short-lived development: the 1968 rejection of the American double
package of mass consumerism in the core and developmentalism
in the semiperiphery, coupled with the turn against the bland
multicultural ideology that replaced radical leftist politics, brought
the world-system's geoculture into its second post-1789 crisis. And
just like the post-1848 crisis, the present one is characterized by
the emergence of anarchic terrorist trends—in the form of religious
fundamentalisms—emerging out the semiperiphery, the fourth
element that seems to appear whenever the liberal-conservative
leftist geocultural balance enters a period of crisis.
As we have seen during waves of decolonization (Bergesen
and Schoeberg 1980) and system restructuring, or during periods of
hegemonic dominance, the threat of terrorism is contained within
the periphery or the core divisions of the system respectively and
its ideological cast is pragmatic and relatively coherent (national
liberation or radical leftist ideology). This type of terrorist
activity can thus be safely classified as internal and "domestic"
and within the purview of the disciplinary forces of the nation
states affected. But the systemic chaos produced by a shift toward
a more competitive multicentric configuration under conditions
of hegemonic decline, produces the "spillover" and projection of
transnational terrorism from the semiperiphery to the core, in the
form of ideologically ill-defined nihilist brands of terror. This leads
toward a rhetorical re-definition of the terrorist threat, from a local
problem to a general affront "against humanity and civilization" as
both the anarchist wave of the 19th century and the current religious
wave have been characterized.
One of the advantages of the above typology is that it explains
why terrorism has been such a difficult phenomenon to identify and
categorize and why there is so little agreement among researchers
and policymakers when it comes to the proper characterization of

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the phenomenon (Crenshaw 1992). Inasmuch as the character of


terrorist activity covaries with the structure of the international
system within which it is embedded, it will present a wide and
sometimes contradictory array of features. Those who think of
terrorists as "rational actors" and "freedom fighters" who choose
to use terror because it is the only available "weapon of the weak"
are taking as their prototype the type of violent terror more likely
to occur during periods of decolonization and system restructuring.
Theories of terrorism and revolution emphasizing deprivation and
autocratic exploitation (Gurr 1970) were developed with this type
of terrorist organization in mind.
In contrast, those who think of terrorists as urban guerrillas,
composed of loose cells with internally differentiated ranks, and
who stand for complex radical ideologies aiming at "changing
the system", take as their model the sort of terrorist activity that
emerged in Europe during the 1960's under the auspices of the Cold
War American hegemonic order. It is hard to apply the paradigm
of exploitation and deprivation consonant with Type-2 terrorists to
this group; after all, this type of terrorism emerges in core states
where liberal democratic freedoms prevail. Many of the theories
of terrorism that emphasized psychology, indoctrination, and the
"terrorist personality" popular during the 1960's and 1970's were a
direct outgrowth of this type of terrorism. Researchers were able to
get close to the subject through interviews and direct observation,
due to the sudden availability of first-world terrorists across the
European landscape.
With the demise of radical terrorists in the core after 1979, a new
breed of theories of terrorism emerge that emphasize the extreme
fanaticism, mass destruction rhetoric, and the "ad hoc" (Chalk
1999), indiscriminate and random character of the new postmodem
terror (Laqueur 1999; Stem 1999; Jurgensmeyer 2000). This shift
is concomitant with the decline of ideologically-motivated Marxist
terrorism and the rise of religious terrorist organizations. But this

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185

emphasis on the novelty and irrationality of religious terror represents


a theoretical regression, back to 19th century theories of terrorism
which conceived of (anarchist) terror as a senseless phenomenon,
primarily perpetrated by sick and deranged individuals. The
pathologization of terrorism is thus strictly correlative to its religious
nihilist turn in the world system today. But indiscriminate targeting,
dreams of mass destruction, and heroism through suicide are not
a new development in the terrorist imaginary. As the 19th century
anarchist theorist Karl Heinzen proclaimed:

If you have to blow up half a continent and pour


a sea of blood in order to destroy the party of the
barbarians, have no scruples of conscience. He is no
trae republican who would not gladly part with his life
for the satisfaction of exterminating a million barbarians
(as quoted in Laqueur, 1977: 26).

While the anarchist terrorists that put these kind of theories into
practice did engage in indiscriminate acts of terror against civilians
(such as throwing bombs in crowded cafes and other public venues),
they were never able to perpetrate acts of mass destruction. But
this was relative to the technological limitations of the time and not
by a lack of motivation or ideological justification.
Both the anarchist and the current religious waves of terror
have been spurred by rising waves of globalization (in the form of
increasing flows of international trade) and economic integration
in the world system. The first came on the heels of a globalization
wave extending from the 1850's to the 1880's , and the current
wave appears at the peak of third modern wave of globalization—
beginning after 1945, but reaching its highest levels after 1985
(Chase-Dunn, Kawano, and Brewer 2000). Thus, the current
religious-anarchist wave of terrorism interacts with rising degrees
of global integration through telecommunications and transportation
technology. In this sense, the increasing globalization trend has
provided a double boost to religious terrorists. First, the threat

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186

of homogenization and loss of communal identity becomes one


of the principal motivational catalysts for their action. Second,
the increased technological dependence of most nation states also
facilitates the religious-anarchist terrorist process by providing
them with more opportunities for indiscriminate mass targeting.
As Magnus Ranstorp observes:

As such, the virtual explosion of terrorism in recent


times is part and parcel of a gradual process of what
can be likened to neocolonial liberation straggles. This
process has trapped religious faiths within meaningless
geographical and political boundaries and constraints,
and had been accelerated by grand shifts in the global
political, economic, military and socio-cultural setting,
compounded by difficult local indigenous conditions
for the believers. The uncertainty and unpredictability
of the present environment as the world searches for a
new world order, amidst and increasingly complex global
environment with ethnic and nationalist conflicts, provide
many religious terrorist groups with the opportunity and
the ammunition to shape history according to their divine
duty, cause and mandate while they indicate for others
that the need of time itself is near (1996: 58).

The last wave of anarchist terror became interrupted by the


beginning of the Second Thirty-Years War. This wave of Islamic
religious anarchism may lead the major powers down a similar
path, or in the absence of major power confrontation and alliance
formation, may become along with the other recurrent sources
of system chaos engendered by American hegemonic decline, a
protracted source of instability in the international system.

END NOTES

1 There are numerous types of terrorism occurring in the world and


various attempts at typology and definition of the phenomenon have
already been attempted (Cooper 2001; Ganor 2001; Gibbs 1989; Ruby
2002). Therefore, we will not add to the cacophony here. As a working
definition, we lean on Peter Chalk's conceptualization of terrorism as "the

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187

systematic use of illegitimate violence that is employed by sub-state actors


as means of achieving specific political objectives, these goals differing
according to the group concerned." (Chalk 1999, p. 151, italics added).
We endorse this definition because it differentiates terrorism by sub-state
actors from state terrorism, which we acknowledge as a phenomenon
of great importance in its own right. However, our focus here is upon
substatal terrorism proper.
2 The term substatal terrorism is used to refer to terrorist activity that
originates from groups of individuals that are not directly connected to
governmental agents and are thus located below the level of the state
as such. While substate terrorists may receive support from external
government agents they remain under our definition as long as they
continue to act on their own interests and not as representatives of some
existing government.
3 A fourth type, terrorist actions that originate with a substatal core agent
that attacks a semiperipheral government, is a residual category that while
not rare, rarely occurs without the support of the core government to
which that substate actor subscribes. Most CIA "intelligence" operations
in weak semiperipheral and peripheral governments that aid and abet
coups and popular revolts against unpopular leaders in Washington, fit
into this category.
4Otherwise known as World Wars I and II.
5 We do not mean to imply that the rise of recent religious terror is an
exclusively Arab-Islamic phenomenon. As has previously been pointed
out (Hoffman, 1995; Ranstorp, 1996), the new holy terror is a general
phenomenon that cuts across religious divides. Thus, there exist Sikh
separatist groups in India and Christian identity cells in the United States.
Further, not all Islamic terror emanates from the Middle East: the Tamil
Tigers of Sri Lanka have become notorious for their relentless use of the
suicide attack method. Middle Eastern Islamic terrorist groups, however,
stand out because they are the most self-consciously transnational of all the
religious terrorist groups, having been able to produce the most audacious
attacks against highly charged symbolic targets of the U.S. international
order, such as military installations, embassies, and the September 11th'
2002 attacks on Washington and the World Trade Center.
6 Contemporary theorizing in world systems analysis postulates that in
addition to localized revolutions at the level of nation states, the modern
world system has experienced two episodes that qualify as world
revolutions, consisting of massive unrest and political crisis in the core.

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These are usually referred to as the revolutions of 1848 and 1968 (see
Boswell and Chase-Dunn 2001, chapter 2 for details), even though the
1848 revolutions did not abate until at least 1865 and the 1968 revolutions
did not culminate until 1989 (Boswell and Chase-Dunn 2001; Arrighi,
Hopkins, and Wallerstein 1992).
7 Type-1 ethnic separatist terrorists, however, may also direct their attacks
at civilians, but these usually belong to different ethnic or religious groups,
as the populist ideology of right-wing terrorists is less inclusive than that
of left-wing terrorists. Right-wing terrorists only extend their populism
to those belonging to their racial, ethnic or religious group and therefore
everybody else may become fair game. In that sense, 1 terrorists may
exhibit more indiscriminate behavior than left leaning Type-lgroups (as
in the Oklahoma City bombings).
8 The Marxist terrorist groups that spread all across the periphery and
semiperiphery of the world system during the post-colonial wave of
leftist terror, represented simply the surface manifestation of Type-2
terrorism during the Cold War. While receiving intensive coverage from
the Western press, semiperipheral terrorist groups with Marxist leanings
never represented more than a new wave of peasant unrest across the
underdeveloped world. Most major terrorist activity in the periphery
and semiperiphery has actually been composed of separatist ethnic and
proto-nationalist movements, such as Turkish PKK (Kurdish Workers
Party), the radical Sikh factions in India, or the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka.
The fact that most Marxist groups in the Latin American semiperiphery
were composed of self-consciously identified indigenous groups fighting
for particular rights, precluded unification between them and the more
ideologically motivated core Marxist terrorist organizations in Europe,
which was by an d large a middle class radical movement. When speaking
of Type-1 core terror, therefore, we refer to those groups located in Europe
and not to the indigenous identity peasants movements that emerged in
the periphery in a Marxist garb.
9 The three major examples of this type of conflict in the European interstate
system are the First Thirty Years War (1618-1648), the Napoleonic Wars
(1789-1815), and the Second Thirty Years War (1914-1945), otherwise
known as World War I and II (Boswell and Chase-Dunn, 2001).
10 State sponsorship may have been present during the anarchist terror
wave of the 19"1 century especially, those terrorist organizations operating
in the Balkans (such as the Serbian Black Hand) against Ottoman rule that
were supported by Czarist Russia.

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11 This is evidence against the alleged bipolarity of the world at that time.
Since the Socialist command economies were always part of the larger
capitalist world system, once the Western economies encountered trouble,
the socialist countries followed in their wake, making the post-1970's
economic crisis a truly global one (Frank 1977, 1998).
12 Pirates are the primary substatal agents that have challenged this
monopoly during the modern history of the capitalist world economy.
Semi-feudal drug lords operating in areas of Colombia outside of
government control, are a close contemporary approximation of the pirates
of yesteryear. Piracy was done away with after the British assumed full
hegemony at the beginning of the 19th century. The British used their
superior naval power to destroy any ability of pirates to freely function,
thus freeing the seas from any trade disruption. The current U.S.-led
international "war on drugs" has had less effective results today. The
reason that pirates and drug lords have drawn such a strong and costly
response on the parts of state agents has to be imputed not to some inherent
evil in their activity—after all the British used "piracy" in order to break
down the Chinese imperial ban on the import of opium—but simply to
their direct challenge to the state monopoly on international trade.

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