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Urban Warfare

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Running head: URBAN WARFARE

Urban Warfare

Umer Khan

University of Buckingham, MK18 1BY, Buckingham, UK

Zoha Waseem

November 10, 2018

Key Words: Urban Warfare, Urban Operations, Urbanization, Immigrants, Urban Areas,

Counter Insurgency, Counter Terrorism, Radical beliefs, Threat, Military Intelligence,

Intelligence Preparation of Battlefield, Population, Economy, Governance, Adversaries,

Conventional, Sub conventional, Non-state, Alliance, Wars, Policy, Strategy, Doctrine,

Resilience
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URBAN WARFARE

Introduction

―There is no instance for a nation benefitting from prolonged warfare‖

Sun Tzu, (Tzu, 1994)

Globally the urban areas are expanding in size and density due to increase in urban

population. Urbanization is not a new phenomenon; it is a natural process due to economics

related to cities. Yet, massive influx of refugees from troubled areas has added to its growth. A

UN report highlights some interesting facts about increase in urban population of the world.

World urban population has increased from 751 million in 1950 to 4.2 billion in 2018. About

2.5 billion population is predicted to be added to world cities by 2050, 90 % of this growth

will be happening in Asia and Africa (UN DESA, 2018, p. 1).

Keny-Guyer article titled ―Conflict Is Reshaping the World. Here‘s How We Tackle‖

became part of World Economic Forum Annual Meeting. The article apprises that there are

currently about 402 conflicts taking place in the world. These conflicts destroy houses,

industry, civilian infrastructure and livelihood. The agriculture cycle gets disturbed, medical

supplies consumed and consequently people die of famine and diseases even if they

fortunately survive bullets and bombs. To last, countless people flee the conflict areas using

risky channels. Two decades ago, 80% of humanitarian aid was provided to people affected by

natural disaster but now the same percentage is being given as aid to people affected by

violent conflict. In 2018, about 65.6 million people were displaced from their homes due to

violence in Syria, South Sudan, Afghanistan and Ukraine (Keny-Guyer, 2018, para. 2-4). Over

passage of time such haphazard growth of urban areas gives birth to resource imbalance, crime

and instability. Radical and extremist elements find this opportunity to exploit governments‘

weakness and stage insurgency to seek control through political violence.

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During recent and current conflicts U.S. military forces have been involved in urban

operations as counter insurgents, peace-keepers and liberators at various trouble spots of the

world, and this involvement is likely to continue in future as well. Survivability, logistics,

slower pace of operation in urban areas encourages adversaries to use urban areas as their

power centers. Any conflict with such forces will inevitably pitch friendly forces into clash of

opposing wills and contesting battles in urban environment – the urban warfare. The insurgent

uses restricted urban spaces and presence of neutral civilians to shield against friendly forces‘

superior maneuver and firepower. Living between the population and using propaganda effect

affords great opportunity for insurgents to discredit the legitimacy of friendly forces‘

operations. Urban warfare thus promises political and technological incentives for U.S.

adversaries and therefore will continue to be practiced (Edwards, 2000, p.1).

Military operations in urban environment are difficult and dangerous. The difficulty

arises due to: huge number of noncombatants, vital government and civilian infrastructures,

and important sociopolitical institutions. The operations become dangerous due to cluttered

three-dimensional spaces posing logistical and navigational challenges (Gerwehr & Glenn,

2000, p.1). It is much likely that some states and non-state actors will counter US

technological superiority in open battle field through asymmetric capabilities in restricted

battle space. The complexity of urban areas is ideal to achieve balance of power like

operations against US forces in Mogadishu and Russian forces in Grozny (Forbes, 2015).

During the last fifty years, most of U.S. forces operations were carried out on foreign soil.

U.S. forces operated amid alien and unfriendly noncombatants in harsh conditions and

unfamiliar terrain. The overmatched adversary confronting U.S always uses asymmetric

thinking and seeks battle in urban environment. Placing a strong opponent in a hostile territory

blunts his information, surveillance, command and control capabilities by confronting him
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with unfriendly and uncooperative population (Gerwehr & Glenn, 2000, pp.1-2).

Urban warfare is prolonged and a real test of patience and sacrifice. U.S. has been

engaged in Afghanistan for over 17 years and is still fighting on. U.S forces are struggling to

strengthen Afghan National Army; however despite much investment and training their

efficacy against Taliban are not up to desired standards. U.S longest war continues and like all

prolonged wars this war is sapping America‘s resources whereas a clear end is not visible

(Fuchs, 2018). Besides, US influence in Middle East is also declining due to draining effect of

Iraq war on U.S. resources. While local states are also eying China and Russia due to

uncertainty about U.S. intentions and capabilities in the region (Wehrey et al, 2010).

American public has a general impression of being sensitive to causality and human

rights violation and the same is exploited by adversaries. Therefore, conventional powers face

a dilemma while operating in urban areas on how to fight a successful urban warfare while

keeping causalities below public tolerance threshold (Edwards, 2000, p.8). On one side

fighting in cities provide advantage to adversary to inflict more casualties. Whereas on the

other, U.S advantage of heavy weapons in ground and air is restricted due to strict rules of

engagement (ROE) and presence of non-combatants in urban areas (Edwards, 2000, p.2).

Social media, political pressure and changing standards of morality have exacerbated this

dilemma. Nowadays soft factors like media, collateral damage, ROE, psychological operations

(PSYOP), public affairs (PA), civil affairs (CA) and politico-military strategy are considered

more important than hard factors like airpower, technology, combined arms, and joint

operations (Edwards, 2000, p.8). Waxman elaborates that the law of armed conflict (LOAC)

imposes caution on warfighters to minimize risk of collateral damage and civilian injury. Such

legal constraints restrict freedom in aerial operations planning in the urban settings due to

collocation of military and civilian assets which are often difficult to distinguish (Waxman,
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2000, p.24).

It is important to understand why operations in urban areas are so necessary for U.S

forces in present and future operations despite its heavy cost and logistic constraints.

According to U.S Army Field Manual, following advantages justify operation is urban

environment (FM 3-06, 2006, p. 1-4):-

(1) To attack, isolate and destroy the enemy.

(2) Urban infrastructure, capabilities and resources have operational or strategic value.

(3) Symbolic importance of urban areas.

(4) Urban areas are nodal points and dominate a region or avenue of approach.

Carl von Clausewitz highlighted the importance of cities in his words: ―Public opinion

is won through great victories and the occupation of the enemy‘s capital.‖ In order to seize the

enemy‘s material forces we should direct our operations against the places where most of

these resources are concentrated: principal cities, storehouses, and large fortresses (Clausewitz

& Gatzke, 2003).

This chapter analysis: urbanization, history of urban warfare, explanation of relevant

terms, asymmetric adversaries capabilities, U.S forces possibility of commitment in urban

warfare, strength and weakness of friendly forces, military and non-military characteristics of

urban areas, tangible and intangible factors effecting urban operations, failures and success of

recent engagements and evolving threats. To mitigate the future threat: need for correct

strategic appraisals, understanding nature of environment, correct framing of policy have been

emphasized. Intelligence analysis tools, civil affairs, PSYOPS and resilience are the core of

this chapter.

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Historical Context and Origins of the term

Fighting for cities and fighting in cities have been a common recurrence in the

recorded history. Rome has seen several battles, sieges and revolts. The first siege around 387

BC lasted six months and ended with much of Rome been burnt. Byzantine Army captured

Rome twice between 536 and 549. The city was stormed and captured by Holy Roman Empire

operating against the Pope in 1527 and was stormed again by French Army during Italian

Revolution in 1849 - in support of Pope. US Fifth Army captured Rome in 1944 from

retreating Germans. Wars fought in and for Rome for ethnic, religious, political and military

reasons highlight the significance of urban areas in warfare and the complexity of its

environment (FM 3-06, 2006, p. 1-4).

Fighting in Beirut, Grozny, Sarajevo, Sadr City, Fallujah, Damascus, Helmand, Kabul,

Mosul etc. are replete with examples of extensive involvement of modern forces in cities. A

successful major military operation without influencing its surrounding urban environments

may not be possible (FM 3-06, 2006, p. 1-4). In battle for Stalingrad Soviet forces effectively

contained superior German air and artillery by implementing an asymmetric approach in high-

intensity conflict, imposing a fight in urban terrain- well known to the Soviets (Gerwehr &

Glenn, 2000, p.3). On January 31, 1968, two North Vietnamese Army (NVA)/Vietcong (VC)

regiments and two sapper battalions attacked and seized part of Hue. Hue was the third largest

city in South Vietnam and a spiritual and cultural center. NVA/VC retained portions of the

city for three weeks against determined US attempts to retake it. Although the battle for Hue

was a tactical victory for the US, the North Vietnamese clearly achieved strategic success by

antagonizing the American consciousness with the high costs of urban warfare. (FM 3-06,

2006), p. 3-10).
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In 1994, Chechnya fell into a civil war between pro-independence and pro-Russians.

Chechens, armed with a huge number of antitank weapons gave heavy resistance to Russian

forces. It took Russians two months of brutal fighting, before they were able to capture Grozny

after a heavy toll (FM 3-06, 2006, p.11-1). One IDF brigade commander commented about

their complex engagement in Beirut (1982) and how difficult it was to fight in urban settings:

―Every room is a new battle. Once troops are inside a building, it is impossible for a

commander to understand what his troops are confronting, the battlefield is invisible‖ (FM 3-

06, 2006, p. H-7).

In 2003, the enemy confronted by U.S forces was an amalgam of Saddam regime

paramilitary fighters (the fedayeen) and remnants of the Iraqi Army. The fadayeen used

guerrilla tactics to confront Americans as they approached Baghdad along with some foreign

fighters who came to Iraq only to fight Americans (Gentile et al, 2017, p.41). The battle for

Sadr City (2008) was a kinetic operation for clearing out extremist elements from districts

surrounding Baghdad. Baghdad‘s small streets restricted movement of Stryker vehicles, U.S.

forces had to bring M1 Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley fighting vehicles to survive IED and

RPG attacks. U.S forces were also tasked to construct a 12-foot concrete barrier to deny

insurgent‘s access to the population and to provide a parameter of security against rockets.

(Gentile et al, 2017, p.48).

The above examples from history apprise about: the necessity and complexity of

fighting in cities, the type of combat pitched by adversaries and the requirement for

warfighters to be innovative and resilient. The asymmetric advantages urban warfare promises

the adversaries will inevitably pull U.S forces to somehow commit in them. UK MOD Joint

Doctrine Publication for Land Power rightly emphasized that fighting in urban environment is

more challenging for military forces and they have to be highly adaptable and resilient to
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operate successfully:

―the phenomenon of urbanization has created physically, culturally and

institutionally complex cities that are challenging for military forces operating

in them. Land forces have to be highly adaptable and resilient to operate

successfully in these different conditions‖.

(JDP -0-20, 2017 Jun)

To understand urban operations (UO) it is important to understand the characteristics

of urban areas. A useful working definition of urban area as drawn from Army FM 90-10-1 is:

―A concentration of structures, facilities, and people - that forms the economic

and cultural focus for the surrounding area. The four categories of built-up areas

are large cities, towns and small cities, villages, and strip areas‖.

Urban areas are bitterly contested as they are the transportation, communication and

industrial hubs and hold social, financial, and political implications for any country. Michael

Baumann highlights the importance of urban areas as cited in (Gerwehr & Glenn, 2000, p.7):

―[W]hat‘s needed is a vanguard in the metropolis that declares its solidarity with

the liberation movements of the third world. Since it lives in the head of the

monster, it can do the greatest damage there‖.

(Baumann, 1975, p. 46, emphasis added.)

Population is the most important factor of urban environment and affects operations

within it. Vygotsky relates guerilla warfare to the target environment: If guerrilla derives

support from peasantry/farmers he will prefer rural guerrilla warfare however if the support is

from working-class, then urban guerrilla warfare is desired (Vygotsky,1896). The erstwhile

term Military Operations on Urban Terrain (MOUT) has been now replaced with UO (FM 3-

06, 2006, p.ix). According to FM 3-06.11, ―UO are operations planned and conducted in an
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area of operations (AO) that includes one or more urban areas‖. Dominant feature of an urban

area are man-made construction and high population (FM 3-06.11, 2002). The Field Manual

explains the basic necessity of UO with these points:-

(1) Assigned objective is within the urban area or an urban area is between two

natural obstacles in avenue of approach and cannot be bypassed.

(2) Clearance of urban area is decisive in shaping conditions for current or

projected operations.

(3) Political or humanitarian considerations demand control of an urban area or

necessitate operations within it.

(4) Urban areas promise a better overall defense

Contemporary Relevance of the Subject and References to Recent Incidents

Since Iraq invasion in 2003, U.S. Army has reassessed the importance of combat in

urban areas. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) centered on controlling Baghdad, the same was

evident in ―Thunder Run‖ in 2003 and the ―Surge‖ in 2007–2008 (Gentile et al, 2017, p.7).

U.S Army seems presently concerned about implications of operations in urban areas,

particularly megacities. In 2014, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in

its study highlighted that as cities grow due to urbanization, many governments fail to provide

adequate security, employment, infrastructure, and services which is then exploited by local

armed groups and thus urban areas become safe havens and support bases for terrorists,

insurgents, or criminal organizations (U. S. Army, 2014)

UO was labelled ―attritionist‖ by DOD due to difficulty in acquisition of intelligence.

Without correct intelligence friendly force commanders resort to traditional concepts like

static (siege), indiscriminate (rubble-ization) or trading causalities for information- by sending

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ground forces to establish close contact with enemy ( Forbes, 2015). Mansoor in his article:

―Why Can‘t America Win Its Wars?‖ appreciates American wars in Panama (1989) and Gulf

(1991). Both wars had better outcomes and precluded prolonged commitment of US forces

after the conflict; they were clearly articulated and had achievable end states. Kuwaitis and

Panamanians viewed coalition forces as liberators. After WWII, presence of US military

forces, economic aid, and commitment of American policymakers ensured Germany, Italy,

and Japan emerge as liberal democracies, committed to prosperity and human rights (Mansoor,

2016). However, Hall in a very recent article attributes failure of America in Iraq and

Afghanistan to: ―poor intelligence; an imbalance of ends, ways, and means; policy-strategy

mismatches; improper use of instruments of national power; deficient host-nation

commitment; and a lack of popular support‖. He also links failure to ―too-frequent

commitment of military forces without fully understanding the nature of the environment‖

(Hall, 2018).

Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations views OE as a ―composite of the conditions,

circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the

decisions of the commander.‖ Whereas Hall adds a new term, ―nature of the environment‖

(NOE) and refers to it as not only comprising of traditional OE but also intangibles like

political dynamics, competing agendas, and relationships among the people, military, and

government. According to Hall these entities are closely associated to Clausewitz trinity of

passion, chance, and reason. Population figures out as the most important factor shaping the

nature of environment. David Galula stressed upon the importance of winning people with an

analogy, ‗relationship of influenced depth with evolving generations of warfare‘. He described

that, if fourth generation warfare is a logical continuation of its previous forms of warfare; it

essentially goes deeper into enemy territory i.e to the hearts and minds of people (Galula,
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2006). Population and its brain thus becomes the battle space for U.S forces and its adversary

in urban warfare. UO will thus embark to alter the fabric of adversary society’s perceptions,

loyalties, beliefs and concepts. Such penetration is affected by means of random methods to

directly or indirectly influence perception makers like: intellectuals, columnists, political

leaders, celebrities, law enforcement agencies and media. It also aims at controlling social

behaviors and attitudes by exploiting social / ethnic / political fault lines through apt

manipulation of sources of instability (opposition, non-state, subs state) and sources of

stability (state institutions).

Various incidences in recent past confirms that the achievement of Clausewitz

―political ends ‖ may become time taking and laborious using ―military means‖, rather the

same can be easily and rapidly achieved by altering ―will of people‖ through faster means

available. News media journalist, social media bloggers, political analyst and individual actors

can be influenced to derive social attitudes and behaviors to particular subjects and thereby

widening or narrowing fault lines to own advantage. Recent history is also testament that

much of terrorists incidences have occurred in cities and urban centers to achieve larger

coverage / audience and more psycho-social impact. Effectiveness of urban warfare depends

heavily on external and internal support and relationships. Support provided by local and

international media cells and freelancers through: social media instant messaging, images and

video uploads, and blogging have massive coverage and are all difficult to control.

Compliance is achieved not only through soft means but where required physical

means are also used. Non-compliance, loyalty and stubbornness of public and governments are

punished through coercion, sabotage and political violence. Surveillance and point targeting is

achieved through cheaper means like snipers / target killers / killer-drones and exploits the

vulnerability of urban population in markets and public places. A recent use of flying
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Improvised Explosive Device (IED) quad-copter by ISIS in Syria has added to this

predicament (Ball, 2017). ISIL fighters in Mosul (2017) used drones to drop 40mm grenades

and used advanced vehicle-borne IEDs to deter Iraqi forces (South, 2018). In these

circumstances a counter-insurgent will seek to identify threat and vulnerabilities in cities /

urban centers by focusing on population, to thwart giving any weakness to its covert adversary

to exploit.

Complexity of modern cities / metropolis has been identified as a major issue in most

recent engagements. Wolfel correctly identified the complexity of modern cities based on

three fundamental concepts. First, modern cities are multidimensional (subterranean, surface

and vertical). Second, cities are interconnected through globalization, social media and

modern methods of communication. Third, cities are uncontrollable due to inter connectivity,

rise of black market, informal economy and lack of government control over slums (Wolfel,

2016). There are thousands of buildings, vehicles, people, rooms, windows and streets. The

densities of both people and buildings in urban areas create operational difficulties. Structures

and public infrastructure inhibit maneuver and firepower, restricts field of fire and degrade

command and control (C2) capabilities. Urban residents create condition for restrictive ROE

which increase stress on soldiers and strain on logistics; amid terrorism and impromptu

violence (Medby & Glenn, 2002, p.25).

Assessing battle field environment of cities using traditional approaches of situational

awareness become insufficient due to: multidimensionality, interconnectivity and

uncontrollability of cities (Wolfel, 2016). The problem in the modern dense urban

environment is that the OE, including the AOO, often extends much further than in the past.

The impact of connections and linkages, facilitated by globalization, advancement in

communication technology, and media access challenge the traditional idea of a unique OE
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that can be isolated for analysis by an intelligence team (Kosal, 2018). Concept of Urban

Triad addresses this challenge. The triad includes: ―complex manmade terrain superimposed

on natural terrain, a large and densely distributed population, physical and service

infrastructures (Wielhouwer, 2005).

Joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) used by analyst

to define OE falls short in analyzing intangibles as conceptualized by doctrine. Strategic

analysts also use —political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure

(PMESII) framework to understand OE. However, even using both JIPOE and PMESII does

not address critical variables outside the doctrinally defined OE (Hall, 2018).

Contemporary Military intelligence (MI) Concepts like - areas, structures, capabilities,

organizations, people and events (ASCOPE) can be drawn in 3D for insurgent, counter-

insurgent and population in its three planes. The population plane is kept in the center as it‘s

the common operating ground for the other two. It helps counter-insurgent optimize its

resources by studying possibilities of different outcomes. Let‘s take an imaginary example of

say, ‗Celebrations of Ganesh Festival in Paris‘. The ASCOPE 3D model will be prepared for

Insurgent, Counter Insurgent and population. Each plane will be filled. Following e.g is for

population plane. Let‘s say in Paris (Area), Hindu Community (People) is planning a religious

ceremony (Event) at a Local Temple (Structure) from 4 p.m until 9 p.m (Capability), the event

is arranged by Ganesh Festival Planners (Organization). This scenario gives birth to a number

of possible opportunities (for insurgent), vulnerability (of population) and threat (to counter-

insurgent). By carefully mapping all such possible scenario in its AOO, urban security

planners can dispose there forces optimally.

Like ASCOPE 3D models like - Sewage, Water, Electricity, Academics, Trash,

Medical, Safety, and Other Considerations (SWEAT-MSO) also offer a solid approach to
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defining OE of Megacities /Dense Urban Areas. Strategic theorist Harry R. Yarger uses US

Army War College‘s VUCA model—volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous—to

highlight the challenging and complicated nature of the strategic environment. Mapping urban

areas on these contemporary models incorporating tangible and intangible variables will give

significant understanding of urban nature of environment and will facilitate planners to

conceive threats, prioritize them and utilize forces to thwart them (Hall, 2018).

Relevance to US Homeland Security and Foreign Policy

U.S. forces will continue to encounter a complex urban environment in its perceived

future operations. The Army‘s future enemies will certainly use urban areas as a base for their

own operations (Gentile et al, 2017, p.5). Techniques of operating in urban areas will vary

depending on local history, cultures of local populace, economic development, local climate,

available building materials, and many other factors. Human dimension and its effects on

operations are much more difficult to assess and understand than the dimensions of terrain.

Success will be guaranteed on the side that will better understand and exploit the effects of

population in urban environment (FM 3-06, 2006, p. 2-2). U.S. Joint Publication 3-06 ‗Joint

Urban Operations‘ elaborates the fundamentals of UO that: ―the entire urban environment

must be addressed simultaneously and systematically. Power should be applied in a way to

disable hostile elements while enabling elements that are essential to the city‘s functioning by

a combination of comprehensive and systematic approach that has isolating, protecting,

improving, sustaining, persuasive, destructive, and disruptive actions or capabilities‖ (JP,

2013).

Like urban areas urban warfare is also complex and challenging. It is challenging due

to poor communications, difficult command and control, difficult target acquisition, short
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ranges, limited fire support and long dependent supply lines. It is complex due to presence of

tall buildings, sewers, subways, tunnels, cisterns, and basements e giving layered dimensions

to battlefield with mobility, concealment, cover, and storage sites for insurgents and terrorists

(FM 3-06.11, 2002, p.2-33).

Insurgents will pose asymmetrical threat in urban warfare- a threat that uses dissimilar

weapons or force (e.g. sniper attacks, IEDs, ambush, insider attack, drone attack, suicide

bomber, hostage situation etc.) to offset U.S. superior military force and technological

advantage (FM 100-6, 1996). Insurgents rely more on haphazard attacks that result more on

circumstance rather than by a well-designed operation. Insurgents do not require orchestration

of timing or simultaneous use of its capabilities to achieve a desired effect (Asynchronous

Threat).

U.S Army Field Manual 100-6 correctly identifies that threat to U.S Forces will

emanate from a range of individual sources (non-state actors, sub state actors, non-government

organizations) to complex national organizations (foreign intelligence services and adversary

military). Boundaries between these sources are indistinct, difficult to discern and sometimes

intermingled. Tracing the origins of a particular incident may sometimes become cumbersome.

For e.g. actions that appear to be the work of hackers may actually be the work of a foreign

intelligence service / cyber-attack team. Sources include unauthorized users, insiders,

terrorists, sleeper cells, drug lords and urban gangs (FM 100-6, 1996, p-1-6). This poses an

increased demand for intelligence integration and analysis from a number of sources including

human intelligence (HUMINT) and signal intelligence (SIGINT).

Urban warfare is intelligence and surveillance intensive. Thorough knowledge of

buildings, alleyways, tunnels and rooftops may have to be acquired through Intelligence,

Surveillance and Recognizance (ISR) sources to operate in complex environment of cities.

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During Operation Urgent Fury, lack of official maps of Grenada compelled troops to rely on

tourist maps. Although latest satellite based imagery address this issue yet many attributes

need to be added to operate successfully in urban terrain (FM 3-06.11, 2002, p. H-13). As

Gentile points out that recent trends of smart cities offer new opportunities for intelligence

collection and dissemination. Smart cities are not just a Western phenomenon. By 2030, Asia,

Africa, and Latin America are expected to make reasonable progress in this field. Quite

probably U.S Army may find itself conducting operations within such a smart city (Gentile,

2017, p.130). In this backdrop data collected by surveillance cameras, navigational

applications, utility services data, business data, IMEI, MAC addresses and national biometric

databases can come handy and be manipulated in favor of own forces.

Threat forces will try to win the information war to create strategic effects, so their

campaigns need not be treated as mere tactical military successes. They will embark to weaken

legitimacy of U.S. Forces and make their campaign appear indigestible to domestic and world

audience (FM 3-06, 2003, p. 3-9). Larger connectivity, smart phones, 4G / LTE and broadband

services have increased the coverage of events and has provided outreach to everyone. Internet

access provides the means to easily disseminate threat propaganda, misinformation, and

disinformation through web sites and electronic mail. Mobile cameras, available and easily

concealable, will be as important tool to threat actors as weapons and ammunition. According

to U.S Field Manual for combined arms operation in urban terrain, ―American ―atrocities‖

may be staged and broadcasted. Electronic mail may be transmitted to sympathetic groups to

help undermine resolve. Internet web sites provide easy worldwide dissemination of threat

propaganda and misinformation. Hackers may gain access to US sites to manipulate

information to the threat‘s advantage‖ (FM 3-06.11, 2002, p-2-37). In Mogadishu (1993)

during the 17 June attack, about sixty Somali noncombatants were killed as helicopter
16
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gunships pounded an Aideed stronghold with tube launched optically linked wire guided

(TOW) missiles. The lavish use of firepower during UNOSOM II alienated the civilian

population. Thus implying that, the firepower which had demolished the Iraqi Republican

Guards was ill-suited to the streets of Mogadishu (FM 3-06, 2006, p. H-7). Similarly, media

coverage of urban battle for Hue affected the will of both the American people and their

political leadership. Had US leaders made information warfare an integral part of Hue

campaign, by exposing NVA‘s brutality against civilians, the outcome of the war would be

different (FM 3-06, 2006, p. 3-10).

The urban environment is ideal for carrying out effective sniping operations by the

adversaries to demoralize own forces. Sniping achieves headshots, creates panic in troops,

erodes confidence of officers and gives headaches to commanders. The invisible sniper is hard

to locate and the post trauma fighting patrols usually fail to achieve a quid pro quo. This has

rendered huge permanent deployment with an adversary equipped with such weaponry as

futile and costly on troops. In 2018, Times of Israel reported that an IDF soldier, Sgt Aviv

Levi, was killed by Palestinian sniper fire along the Gaza border (TOI, 2018).

On the other side, units suffering casualties from urban sniper fire get frustrated by

their inability to strike back and violate the laws of land warfare concerning treatment of

captured snipers. U.S Army Field Manual 3-06 upholds it vital for commanders and leaders at

all levels to understand the law of land warfare and also understand the psychological

pressures of urban warfare. The manual further dilates upon that in some stability and support

situations, the ROE and the mandate under which the US forces will operate may severely

restrict how much lethal counterforce can be used against snipers (FM 3-06, 2006, p. 6-8).

New technologies also hold immense promise for friendly forces. The growing capability of

drones, aerostats and satellites if effectively incorporated by own forces, in future, will make
17
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insurgent‘s survivability tougher in urban areas. Use of snipers by friendly forces in urban

areas will be comparatively more legitimate, as it causes less collateral damage than arty and

air bombing.

U.S Forces and commanders operating in urban environment need to be creative and

adaptive. Friendly forces have proved their ability in this regard in several cases. In Fallujah,

evacuation of noncombatants reduced the problem of identifying enemy and also reduced

civilian causalities; which otherwise would have alienating world opinion (Gentile et al, 2017,

p.xii). In Sadr City 2008, constructing a 12-foot concrete barrier enabled local population feel

confident of U.S. and Iraqi soldiers and shifted momentum of stability and support operations

in favor (Gentile et al, 2017, p.50). In urban warfare, creativity is also demanded in cultural,

religious and language orientation of forces. Formal and informal norms of population must be

respected in a manner as to win their support for friendly forces. Any mistake could lead to

population supporting threat forces or joining their network. Russians admit that during their

fight in Chechnya, they failed to assess the effects of religion in conflict (Gentile et al, 2017,

p.30). Recently in 2018, a US soldier was killed and another wounded in an insider attack

when an Afghan commando opened fire on them in Kabul due to feelings of mistrust and

radicalization. In 2012, 61 coalition soldiers were also killed in such kind of attacks (Binding,

2018).

Recent urban conflicts also bring home a point that the policy ultimately shapes

military operations. Current Russian operations in Ukraine suggest that U.S Forces may not

only engage in urban warfare with irregular forces in future but also some regular and very

organized forces. NATO allies envisage a scenario that Russian forces could invade Poland,

Romania, and the Baltics, reaching cities such as Riga, Latvia, in mere two days. In such a

case, U.S. and NATO forces might have to engage in urban warfare against Russians to
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preclude a fait accompli and a cost effective success (Gentile et al, 2017, p-60). This growing

threat is and admixture of conventional and sub conventional war fighting. While a modern

adversary will be sabotaging national will on one end by using non-state and sub-state actors it

will also be opening a conventional front as a side dish. A modern adversary will be using

artificial intelligence (AI), unmanned aerial platforms, swarm drones, cyber and robotic

warfare and may supply them to home insurgents or use these capabilities in support role.

These capabilities in urban areas will be employed easily from ventilation windows, tunnels,

slums rooftops and underground terrorist dugouts. These technologies will be targeting

civilians to make them wary of friendly forces beside point targeting U.S and friendly

deployments. The enemy will be planning all this behind a curtain and our forces will be

unable to pin war crimes on an unbranded bot, swarm or an AI system.

There has been a massive influx of refugees in Europe in last decade from conflict

areas in Asia and Africa. Urban areas provide ideal breeding ground for these immigrants with

plenty of job opportunities and mixed communities (BAK, 2016). In the guise of immigrants,

terrorist organization members also infiltrate neutral countries to re-organize, prepare and

conduct terrorist attacks. For e.g. the attacks in Paris (13th November 2015) and Brussels

(22nd March 2016) were conducted in response to air raids on ISIS positions in Syria and Iraq

(BAK, 2016). A BBC report ―Germany: Migrants' may have fuelled violent crime rise'‖

mentions that more than one million refugees have entered Germany since 2015 due to

Germany‘s open-door policy. These migrants have fled war and abuses in Afghanistan, Iraq

and Syria and are contributing to increase in violent crimes in Germany. Sex attacks on New

Year‘s Eve 2015 in cities like Cologne by immigrants from Middle East and Africa is one

such case (BBC, Jan 2018). Criminal gangs, drug networks, weapon mafia and radical

communities can be exploited, by modern and able adversaries, to be used as proxies in

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European cities and utilize its massive infrastructure as ideal urban battlegrounds.

Underground trench networks dug between houses and covert headquarters, normally out of

surveillance, can be used effectively to organize and train radical beliefs and plan violence.

Although, the immigrants settling in Europe may not contribute to a threat likely to be

confronted by US or its allies presently, yet its possibility cannot be ruled out in future.

Mental health and resilience of soldiers engaged in urban warfare is extremely

mandatory. The Russian units while fighting in Grozny began to decline almost immediately

upon initiation of high intensity combat. Mental resolve will be a battle winning factor for U.S

forces in any future urban conflict. On the contrary: lack of conviction, mental sickness and

psychological issues of warfighters will place a heavy bar on success of any such operation.

General Peter Chiarelli, declared suicide a top issue when he was Army vice Chief of Staff, he

said: ―Suicide, not combat, is the leading cause of death of soldiers deployed in Middle East to

fight ISIS. This really is an illness. Since the campaign began in December, 2014, 31 troops

have died, 11 did suicide and only 8 were combat deaths‖ (Daily Mail, 2016).

Urban warfare is a nerve racking experience as sifting hostile elements from civilian

population is cumbersome. U.S. forces may be motivated, trained and well equipped to take on

new challenges but the urban warfare is complicated. Here the adversary is covert, determined

and takes his time to observe friendly force‘s weakness. Therefore a robust civil affair (CA) /

PSYOPS capability will be necessary during future urban conflicts. U.S Forces may be

required to conduct emergency law enforcement operations (like in battle of Panama),

firefighting (like in battle of Manila), medical evacuation and treatment, conduct of elections,

running schools, institutions and sometimes complete government (FM 3-06, 2003, p. 4-3).

Inevitably, U.S forces have to allocate appropriate resources for performing these multifaceted

tasks.
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Occupation forces are treated as aliens in host countries. Forces claiming to defend

their motherland from foreign invasion enjoy popular sympathy; the same was evident from

Stalingrad, Mogadishu, and Grozny. Defending forces use local population as source of ration,

munitions, shelter, and information. Therefore urban warfare is inherently difficult for

attacking forces and comes up with a high rate of causality and sustenance issues. Only those

forces survive who keep determined and resilient despite causalities and high maintenance

cost. In future urban operations, attackers with effective PSYOPS strategy will prevail. In

Beirut, IDF experienced that the attacker must win the international propaganda battle before

overwhelming an opposition (FM 3-06, 2006, p. H-13).

Mercy Corps research in Afghanistan and Colombia concluded that unemployment and

poverty were the deciding factor whether or not a young people will engage in conflict. The

extremist organizations drive recruitment by exploiting government failures, popular

grievances and feelings of injustice. Youth is encouraged to join insurgent camps by

infuriating frustrations due to injustice, discrimination, corruption and abuse. Just like in

Nigeria, Boko Haram was able to recruit young men by widening grievances due to

government failings (Keny-Guyer, 2018, para. 5).

U.S Forces in future urban operations need to focus on governments to be more

proactive regarding youth affairs, as they are custodians of country‘s future politics and

economics. In Somalia, access to education and civic engagement reduced youth participation

in violence. U.S forces in all future urban operations need a robust mechanism to ensure

inherent economic growth; as all other sectors like health, education and social welfare are

sustainable if it is backed by a sound economy. Stable economic environment help people

return to normality and recover more quickly after a conflict. In this backdrop, private sector

can play a massive role in building lasting peace, by creating entrepreneurial and employment
21
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opportunities for youth (Keny-Guyer, 2018, para. 7-10). Putting to foot war torn economies

will be the most effective way to engage the populace and bring home a message that the sole

purpose of war is a more lasting peace. In a recent article, Spencer while describing urban

warfare in Mosul, highlights that it took about nine months for more than 100,000 friendly

forces‘ contingent to liberate Mosul from IS fighters. During Mosul operation (2016 to 2017),

about 826,000 Iraqis were displaced. When they returned, over 40,000 homes were completely

destroyed. Spencer refers to an estimate that over $88.2 billion will be required only to rebuild

the destroyed cities in Iraq (Spencer, 2018).

Recently, Afghan Taliban carried out a series of terrorist attacks in Kabul killing more

than 115 people, the attack was carried out possibly due to air strikes against opium labs which

would disrupt Taliban finances (CFR, 2018 Jan). With all these examples shouting load, U.S

cannot ignore importance of rehabilitation, reconstruction and economic revival in its operated

areas. Urban warfare has to be followed with urban reforms and development, or else the

population loose hope and join alternate sides. Resurgence of the Taliban insurgency and there

territorial gains can only be stopped by feeding hope to Afghan nation, through visible signs of

prosperity (Global Conflict Tracker, 2018).

It is important for U.S that in any future conflict, strategic appraisal should be

conducted prior to committing forces. This will help senior policy and decision makers to

better articulate strategic objectives. Often the cost of operations is not worth achieving the

political objective. Sacrifice of national treasure, equipment, alliances, lives and time must be

weighed against the end objectives and its useful timeframe. A prolonged war even if won at

such a high cost, makes the success irrelevant due to change in political environment and

emergence of new threats (Hall, 2018).

The strategy employed to defeat Al Qaeda, Taliban, Iraqi forces and now ISIS has
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consisted largely of a direct approach. The U.S forces in their pursuit have been subjected to

lies, deceit, subversion and betrayals. Thousands of troops were committed in unfriendly

terrain, among hostile population to fight a climactic and bloody battle.. As Hall quotes

Yarger: ―the strategist must understand the nature of the environment in order to exert

influence within it‖ (Hall, 2018). Sun Tzu legendary words: ―the victorious warrior wins

before committing forces, while the defeated warrior commits forces and then seeks victory‖

(Tzu, 1994). This notion alone sums up the premise of the need to understand the nature of the

environment (Hall, 2018). U.S foreign policy may explore indirect approach of Liddell Hart

when it‘s stuck in the directness of Clausewitz (Meilinger, 2017). Economic, financial and

political domains afford innumerable avenues for affecting a strategy of paralysis and come

out with clean hands. Hoarding enough energy to counter new threats and deterring emerging

regional powers. In its realization a perfect urban war is one, which is won bloodlessly.

Conclusion

The growing trend of urbanization, population growth and migration are increasing

values of cities as hub of economy, knowledge, propaganda and power. These cities afford

great advantages for adversaries employing asymmetric capabilities to counter U.S Forces.

U.S forces in conflict will find itself fighting in urban areas to evade or neutralize its

adversaries of their power centers. Urban warfare is inherently prolonged, resource intensive

and heavy on men and material. Fighting urban warfare needs political resolve, strategic

clarity and well define end, ways and means. Population figures out as the most decisive

factor in winning the urban warfare. Winning this support is not easy. The adversary is hiding

within the population and discriminating the adversary from population needs extensive

intelligence analysis. History is replete with good and bad examples of conducting this war.
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The worst of these examples used little CA and PSYOPS and were high in collateral damage.

Understanding the dynamics of urban areas and its varying factions is a new art of war

that considers both tangible and intangible factors of urban areas. It engages individuals,

intellectuals, institutions and leaders of the country and wins their support for the operations.

Understanding the strategic nature of environment and its analysis is vital to articulate the

strategic objective. All this has to be foreseen prior to committing your forces. U.S Forces in

future urban operations need to focus on good local governance, uplifting of youth and

economy to win local support and thus win wars.

The changing nature of threat calls for understanding urban warfare even better.

Modern adversary will stage urban warfare in alliance with enemies within to discredit our role

in international politics. They will use their in-house networks to subvert and sabotage friendly

forces‘ peacekeeping efforts. Keeping both conventional and sub-conventional capabilities on

the leading edge is not the only requirement but the just, proportionate and ethical use of force

is also being evaluated in newsrooms.

Political objectives must be unambiguously selected, international environment shaped

and national opinion built before stepping into war. A wrong war, at wrong place with wrong

enemy may never be fought. These wars dispense a localized threat to distributed regions.

Radical beliefs and violent tendencies travel our homeland and that of our natural partners in

the form of displaced people- adding on to the threat matrix. Once the right conflict is

selected, it must be rigorously perused with utmost resilience. The value of objective and

political ends must justify the sacrifice of lives, money, resources and time spent.

―For the most decisive victory is of no value if a nation is bled white in gaining it‖

Sir Basil Liddell Hart

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