WORLD MARITIME AXIS

A ND S I L K R O A D
Repositioning of State Sovereignty in
Indonesia-China Bilateral Relations

HASAN MUSTAPA
FARUQ ANSORI  MELDA JUWITA

Center for Research and Publishing

Sunan Gunung Djati Islamic State University Bandung
WORLD MARITIME AXIS
AND SILK ROAD
Repositioning of State Sovereignty in
Indonesia-China Bilateral Relations

HASAN MUSTAPA
FARUQ ANSORI  MELDA JUWITA

Center for Research and Publishing

Sunan Gunung Djati Islamic State University Bandung
WORLD MARITIME AXIS AND SILK ROAD
Repositioning of State Sovereignty in Indonesia-China Bilateral
Relations

Authors:
Hasan Mustapa,
Faruq Ansori dan Melda Juwita
ISBN: 978 – 623 – 7633 – 43 – 3

Editor:
Riska Maelani
Design and Layout Cover:
MILE Institute Team
Figure: www.meed.com/21st-century-maritime-silk-road/ and
maritimenews.id/global-maritime-axis-a-curious-vision-part-1/

Published By:
Center for Research and Publishing SGD ISU Bandung
Jl. H.A. Nasution No. 105 Bandung
Tlp. (022) 7800525, Fax. (022) 7800525
http://lp2m.uinsgd.ac.id

67 pages; 14,8 x 21 cm.

First Printing, December 2019

All rights reserved

Reproduction of this paper in any form and by any means without the
written permission of the publisher shall be prohibited.
WORLD MARITIME AXIS
AND SILK ROAD
Repositioning of State Sovereignty in Indonesia-
China Bilateral Relations

The Jakarta-Bandung Fast Train Project, initiated by the government of

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and continued by Joko Widodo, is controversial.
Initially, the feasibility study of the project involved the Ministry of National
Development Planning Republic of Indonesia / National Development Planning
Agency (Bappenas), the Technology Assessment and Application Board (BPPT),
the Ministry of Transportation and the Japan International Corporation Agency
(JICA). When completed and auctioned, Japan is offering a project loan with a
40-year interest rate of only 0.1 per cent per year and a grace period of 10 years.
China offers its best proposal and provides an investment of US$ 5.5 billion over
a 50-year period and an interest rate of 2% per year. China has come out
victorious. The project was finally developed by PT Kereta Api Indonesia Cina
(KCIC), a consortium of Indonesian state-owned enterprises and the China
Railways Consortium with a business-to-business scheme.

Several issues arise, in particular as to whether the sovereignty of the

country is under threat? This book seeks to explore this issue from the point of
view of state law independence.

Center for Research and Publishing

Sunan Gunung Djati Islamic State University
Bandung
Jl. H.A. Nasution No. 105 Bandung
 (022) 7800525, Fax. (022) 7800525
http://lp2m.uinsgd.ac.id
 PREFACE

I received a call from Faruq Ansori, a long-

separated friend, in early 2019. We used to share a room
in the 2016-2017 period at the Nanshida Hotel, Nanjing,
in the program of Chinese Language and Culture. Sadly,
for health reasons, I was unable to finish the language
program at Nanjing Normal University to train for the
Ph.D. program. Yes, Allah's mercy is exceptional. I was
finally able to finish my studies in Indonesia.
The meeting at the Nanshida Hotel, which was
only about two weeks ago, was still attached to Faruq's
mind by inviting me to do joint research. I also said yes,
and after a few stages, this book was present as one of
the progress of the project that we worked on together.
Of course, my gratitude goes to several colleagues
who trusted me to participate in joint research. Among
them: Faruq Ansori and Melda Juwita. Hopefully, their
studies will finish soon, and let's rebuild this country
together, not with negating each other but try to
harmonize the world maritime axis and silkroad in
rhythm to make a brighter civilization.
December, 2019
Hasan Mustapa

i
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am very grateful for the willingness of my

friend Hasan Mustapa to participate in this project.
In many sections relating to comparative research,
he has contributed significantly to the completion
of the enhanced project in the form of this book.
Since I was in the Language class at Nanjing
Normal University, even though in a relatively
short time, I have confidence that for collaborative
projects like this, he is indeed the right person.
Hopefully, our collaboration will continue to
produce several other studies, especially related to
the theme of bilateral relations between Indonesia
and China.

December 2019
Faruq Ansori

ii
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface … i
Aknowledgements … ii
Table of Contents … iii
List of Figures & Tables … v
1. Synergy In Hegemony … 1
2. Politics of Hope in the Chinese Silk Road … 4
3. Diplomation of Indonesian Maritime … 7
3.1. Honeymoon of Indonesia-China Relations
In the First Era of the Jokowi Government
(2014-2019) … 8
3.2. Participation in the Belt Road Initiative
Project … 10
4. State Sovereignty at the Intersection … 12
4.1. Effect of Political Interests … 12
4.2. Toward The Rule of Law Sovereignty
(Environtmental Issues, Human Rights,
Economic Development, International
Concern) ... 13
5. Reflections Law Sovereignty … 15
5.1.Bilateralism … 15

iii
 5.2.Investment Agreement … 21
5.3.Public Political Relations … 22
5.4.State Sovereignty … 23
6. State Independence Reposition … 26
6.1. Indonesia and China Agreement … 27
6.2. Law Equality … 29
6.3. Avoiding Government Abuses … 32
6.4. Attention to the Environtment … 36
6.5. Human Rights Issues … 41
6.6. International Concern … 45
7. Legal Equality in Investment Cooperation, A
Conclusion … 49
7.1.Research Findings (Economic
Considerations, Labors Problem,
Environtmental Pollution, Ambiguous
Foreign Policy, Government Decisiveness
… 49
7.2.Conclusion … 53
References … 55
Index … 68
About The Authors … 71

iv
 LIST OF FIGURES

Table 3.1. Indonesia and China Comparison: 7

Population Total, Area …
Tabel 6.1. Foreign Workers Profiles … 33
Table 6.2. Foreign Workers Business Sector 2017- 34
2018 …
Table 6.3. Open Unemployment Based on Highest 35
Education 2017 – 2018 …

Table 6.4. Pertamina Pipe Explosion Cases by 39

KCIC

LIST OF TABLES

Figure 3.1. Realization of Investment Throughout 11

2018 …
Figure 6.1. Jakarta-Bandung Fast Train Plan Process 31
…
Figure 6.2. Foreign Workers 2017 … 33
Figure 6.3. Foreign Workers 2018 … 33
Figure 6.4. Foreign Workers Business Sector 2017 … 34
Figure 6.5. Foreign Workers Business Sector 2018 … 34
Figure 6.6. The Illegal Fishing Ship Drown (Oct 47
2014-August 2018) …

v
 1. SYNERGY IN HEGEMONY

Many claim that the policies of the Jokowi

administration, which strongly supported China,
seemed to open an old romance between the
Soekarno Old Order regime (1959-1965) and Beijing
(Peking). History records this intimate relationship
with the establishment of the Axis: Jakarta-Peking
and, of course, Moscow. It is undeniably true, and
this demonstrates that the Adigium of Open and
Effective Foreign Policy, repeated by the
government at that time, has become a paradox.

The convergence of the interests of China's

"Silk Road" and "Maritime Axis" political and
economic strategies will lead to bilateral
agreements between the two countries. As a
developing country needing foreign investment for
economic growth, investment controls have also
been put in place as a tool for attracting foreign
capital, often suggesting that the rule of law has
faded. Whereas, in fact, certain provisions and
bilateral agreements must be fair to the rule of law
in the interests of the welfare of the people.

This research addresses the main issues

relevant to the consequences of the rule of law in
bilateral agreements as a result of the convergence
of the economic interests of the Chinese "Silk Road"
and "World Maritime Axis." In addition, this
analysis will clarify other advanced problems in the
bilateral relations between Indonesia and China,
such as (a) How much effort is being made to
ensure legal equality? (b) To what degree are the
laws governing efforts to prevent abuse of power?
(c) How stringent are the rules on environmental
issues? (d) How are serious human rights
compliance concerns? (e) How sensitive are
international regulations?

The underlying assumption of this paper is

that the regulation of bilateral relations between
Indonesia and China is still not optimal to maintain
the rule of law, in particular the influence of
political interests in the bilateral relations between
Indonesia and China. This research is seen through

2
the approach to the rule of law of Hayek (2005: 57-
58) and Sornarajah (2010: 224-231) where the rule of
law includes aspects of (1) equality of law, (2) the
avoidance of abuse of power, (3) environmental
care, (4) human rights awareness and (5)
international concern.

This study refers to a number of conceptual

foundations, such as bilateral cooperation,
investment agreements, political and economic
relations, state sovereignty and legal sovereignty.



3
 2. POLITICS OF HOPE IN CHINESE
SILKROAD

The Silk Road is a network of ancient trade

routes as a center of cultural interaction on the
Asian continent, linking the West and East from
China to the Mediterranean Sea. Since the Han
dynasty, this silk trade route has been very
profitable for China. Today, China has encouraged
economic and geopolitical influence to be re-
established. One of them is the One Belt & One
Road International Project. Management of
international trade routes through the Silk Road
Maritime Corridor has political and economic
consequences. The involvement of the Chinese
army in the strategic waters of the Indian Ocean,
the Gulf of Aden and the Suez Canal is a
diplomatic indication of the intention to become a
major world power. While on the economic side,
China predicted that it would be the center of
international trade (Costantinos, 2016: 1; Ramadhan,
2018: 152).

4
 One Belt & One Road is a project launched by
President Xi Jinping in 2013. The term was split into
economic belts along the ancient Silk Road and the
21st Century Maritime Silk Road. In addition to
deepening China's reform, the plan also sought to
open up and promote its environmental diplomacy.
The opening of the new Chinese silk route is
expected to ensure the security of energy supplies
from the Middle East and access to the markets of
the countries of South East Asia. Therefore, it can at
least reduce the influence of the United States in
Asia (Campos, 2015: 20; Sevilla, 2017: 83).
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a large-
scale BRI initiative initiated by China under Xi
Jinping's presidency, covering 2/3 of the global
population and 3/4 of energy sources. Namely: (1)
China's interest in securing energy supply lines to
the Middle East and Central Asia through
collaboration with countries in South Asia; (2)
China's ambition to take over the leadership role in
the Asian region through the fight to fund Japan's
fast-training project; (3) China's ambition is to
challenge US supremacy in both security and
economic fields. Moreover, if BRI is realized, China
will not only benefit economically, but will be able
to change the geopolitical constellation of the world

5
(Anam dan Ristiyani, 2018: 217-236; Ramadhan,
2018: 139).
In 2015, China set up the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank (AIIB) to provide financial
support for the One Belt One Road (OBOR)
initiative. As a strategic and geo-economic idea,
One Belt One Road is an attempt to merge land and
sea routes, as well as an effort to connect China
with a combined 70-plus countries around the
world. From the mainland, the idea of' Belt' begins
the development of road infrastructure along the
Xi'an, Xinjiang, Central Asia, Moscow, Rotterdam
and Venice roads.
In the maritime sector, the' Bridge' concept
seeks to link ocean infrastructure across South East
Asia, South Asia, East Africa and the
Mediterranean. Contained in the definition of'
way.' Not to be ignored, in order to support the
funding elements of the' Belt' and' Bridge'
infrastructure projects, China also built-in 2015 (Hu,
2017: 108; Callahan, 2016: 236).



6
 3. DIPLOMATION OF INDONESIAN
MARITIME

In 2014, President Jokowi unveiled his

government's dream of the World Maritime Axis.
This maritime vision is part of five policy principles
consisting of maritime diplomacy to settle maritime
conflicts, safeguard maritime sovereignty and
stability, protect natural resources, improve defense
diplomacy and minimize maritime differences
between countries by resolving regional territorial
disputes (Wardani, 2018: 5; Ramadhani, 2015: 392).
Table 3.1. Indonesia and China Comparison:
Population Total, Area
Country Population (people) Area (km2) World Population
Total Ratio

China 1.379.302.771 9.596.961 18,6 %

Indonesia 260.580.739 1.904.569 3,5 %

Source: CIA World Factbook 2017

7
 From an economic and political point of view,
this dream is certainly very much in line with the
introduction of One Belt Road. Apart from being a
fellow Asian country, Indonesia also has the
opportunity to develop a wealth of human
resources, as shown in the above comparison.
3.1.Honeymoon of Indonesia-China Relations In
the First Era of the Jokowi Government (2014-
2019)
Indonesia has a water area that is larger than the
land area of 6,315,222 km2, the coastline of the island is
99,093 km, and the number of islands that have been
defined by the National Team for Earth Visualization is
13,466. The notion of the Global Maritime Axis
championed by Jokowi since 2014 has become the focus
of his government's policy, which has great ideals to
return Indonesia to its former glory as a seafarer nation
(Jalesveva Jayamahe). This strategy also underlines the
fact that Indonesia highlights the growth of the marine
sector in various aspects in the course of its
administration in 2015-2019 (Nainggolan 2015).

Many attempts have been made by the

President to recognize these values. These range
from the building of world-class sea tolls on the
main islands; there are at least 24 ports in Indonesia,

8
including Periuk, the provision of more fishing
vessels, the restructuring of the fish trade system,
the growth of human resources and a few other
issues. This effort shows the President's sincerity in
making Indonesia the world's maritime axis.
Indonesia's national interest in improving and
growing the economy through the world's naval
axle faces a number of internal management and
organizational challenges, as explained earlier.
Overlapping key roles and functions between
maritime management sectors, lack of coordination
between areas and growing sectoral egos are a
major managerial challenge.
While in the operational realm, the lack of
infrastructure to sustain maritime operations due to
lack of funds, rampant crimes in the marine sector
such as piracy, illegal fishing, breaches of national
borders and piracy pose significant challenges to
the realization of the global maritime axis.
In addition, each sector should support this
policy instead of becoming an obstacle to its
implementation. It recommended that horizontal
integrity between areas by integrated cooperation
should be a concern supported by infrastructure to
support the performance of each sector, particularly
in terms of security and marine patrols. This
consideration is nothing but the realization of

9
Indonesia as the world's maritime axis (Latifah dan
Larasati, 2017: 112-113).
Many countries are keen to accept plans for
maritime infrastructure projects that offer benefits
and can deliver tremendous benefits. It seems that
China has an attitude, even though it remains
cautious to carry out its obligations and support
later (Nainggolan, 2015: 167-190).
3.2.Participation in the Belt Road Initiative Project
Indonesia's participation in One Belt One Road
itself will become a blunder if it does not respond with
careful planning. China's maritime vision is a plan to
extend its reach, while Indonesia follows the path that
China has taken. If it is not supported by the power of a
strong naval infrastructure, it may be part of the
competition coordinated by the program. Ideally, the
convergence of the Chinese Maritime Silk Road has
important consequences for the Indonesian World
Maritime Axis. The inclination, however, indicates a
negative trend. The gains will be less than the losses.

This problem arises because Indonesia does

not yet have a systematic and synergistic geo-
strategy as a geo-economic framework as a basis for
the strategic structure of the Maritime Axis. Geo-
strategy is very strategic in presenting a macro,

10
micro and detailed description of the negative
impacts of the nexus between the Chinese Silk
Road and the Indonesian World Maritime Axis. In
addition, to monitor the negative impact of several
external maritime policy effects on security systems
in East and South East Asia (Majid; Fitriyanti, 2016:
355-374).

Singapore 9.2
Japan 4.9
China 2.4
Hong Kong 2
Malaysia 1.9
0 2 4 6 8 10

Amount (Million US $)

Figure 3.1. Realization of Investment Throughout 2018

(BKPM in Sukmana, 2019).

Whereas the Chinese investment in Indonesia

is still below Singapore and Japan, as shown in the
graph above.



11
 4. STATE SOVEREIGNTY IN
INTERSECTION

In addition to the positive response, this

intimate relationship between Indonesia and China
also feared a reduction in state sovereignty through
impartial policies. For example, the election of PT
China Indonesia Fast Train (Kereta Cepat Indonesia
Cina/ KCIC). It is a partnership of Indonesian state-
owned companies and the China Railways
Partnership to collaborate on the Jakarta-Bandung
Rapid Train Line. Whereas previously, the
government and the Japan International
Corporation Agency (JICA) carried out a feasibility
study of the fast-train project. According to the
government, the basis for choosing KCIC is purely
business (Sugianto, 2018).
4.1.Effect of Political Interests
This research is based on the basic idea that
the Law on Foreign Regulation is still not ideal for
the preservation of the rule of law, in particular the
effect of political interests in the bilateral relations
between Indonesia and China.

12
 One of the supporting elements of state
sovereignty is the rule of law. For democratic states,
the rule of law is seen as obedience to existing rules
which, of course, contradict arbitrary government
action. Therefore, the rule of law requires equality
in which there are no special legal rights for certain
individuals appointed by the authorities. This is an
attempt to maintain equality before the law, which
is the opposite of arbitrary government (Hayek,
1944:72; Hayek, 2005:57-58).
4.2.Towards the rule of law Sovereignty
As far as state sovereignty is concerned,
according to international law on foreign
investment, a number of things have become global
trends, such as environmental issues, human rights,
economic development and widespread
international attention.
a. Environmental issues
Many environmental activist groups find
multinational corporations to be responsible for
pollution caused mainly in developing countries
where environmental standards are low. As a result
of lax regulation, multinational companies see
developing countries as a haven where they can
make profits without having to bear the costs of

13
dealing with the stringent regulatory standards
they face in their home countries.
NGOs believe that investment agreements
prevent actions taken against polluters when the
agreement ensures that violations of existing
investor rights are considered expropriation under
the contract. Arguments have also made it possible
for investment agreements to secure highly
polluted industrial exports to developing countries.
For this category, investment agreements may
include exceptions to allow the host country to
protect the environment (Sornarajah, 2010: 224-231).
b. Human Rights
Human rights issues are rarely mentioned in
bilateral investment agreements. However,
violations related to the suppression of dissension
on specific projects initiated by multinational
companies have been revealed in recent years.
Recent domestic lawsuits against the parent
company of a multinational company have accused
agents of these multinational companies of human
rights violations of the political elite of developing
countries, illustrating the extent of the problem.
Investment agreements that prevent the State
from influencing the improvement of the human
rights situation that may occur. Nevertheless, the

14
country or the forces who govern it are often also
involved in human rights violations with
multinational companies. Nonetheless, a successful
government will improve the situation and
discourage it from doing so by treating such
intervention as a violation of investor rights under
the agreement.
This issue is addressed by several agreements.
Safety, morality and public welfare benefits, the
principles used in international trade law, have
become part of several investment agreements.
Nevertheless, the extent of the use of phrases in the
investment agreement has not been determined. In
international trade, the court has not granted the
term reach that allows the interests included in the
formula to negate the benefits of free trade. There is
little reason to believe that the case will be different
when the term is called an investment agreement.
c. Economic Development
The premise underlying the investment
agreement is that foreign investment leads to
economic development and that foreign investment
agreements lead to a higher flow of foreign
investment. Both of these hypotheses have been
discussed. There is no evidence to suggest that
investment deals have led to higher levels of

15
foreign investment in the countries that have made
them. Several countries, especially the least
developed countries, have liberalized their foreign
investment laws and have signed a large number of
investment agreements without witnessing the
anticipated flow of foreign investment.
Institutions that previously supported this
agreement now have research that shows that there
is no evidence that it leads to a positive flow of
foreign investment and that it is conjecture. Since
the presumption underpinning this agreement is
that the flow of foreign investment leads to
economic development, there is no reference to
economic growth in the contract, nor does it
include important provisions for the promotion of
economic development. The role of the capital-
exporting partner in facilitating the flow of foreign
investment is not specified as an obligation in the
agreement, but rather as a permissive language.
The trend towards the incorporation of
development clauses in investment agreements will,
however, increase in momentum. The Doha
Declaration of the WTO Ministerial Meeting, which
mandates the study of investment as a possible
discipline within the framework of the WTO, calls
for the issue to be studied in the context of
development. These compromises would highlight

16
the need to ensure that investment agreements
include clauses addressing issues of economic
development and moving from investment security
models to economic liberalism to models that seek
to eliminate the harmful effects of foreign
investment while preserving profitable investment.
d. International concerns
Apart from the interests of the host country,
foreign investment in the country also raises
international concerns. International law has
moved to recognize that issues included in the
country's residential care can involve global values
and that, in this situation, the international
community has the right to ensure that changes
take place in the domestic case. The new classic
example is a revolution that has taken place in the
field of human rights. The State can no longer claim
that there have been serious violations of human
rights in its territory; it is only a domestic matter
and not a matter for the attention of other
international communities.
International law on foreign investment is
also moving in the same direction by embracing
principles drawn from the relevant fields of
international law. Although foreign investment is a
process that takes place entirely within the territory

17
of the host country, the host country can’t avoid
scrutiny by the international community. Such an
effort can’t prevent the main force of international
rules on domestic law which justifies such action.
In one instance, government interference in a
foreign investment contract occurred because a
sand mining project involving potential damage to
an environment listed in the World Heritage
Convention was found to be justified by a domestic
court. Something like this can’t, of course, be left
alone as a local problem. The definition of
sovereignty as an absolute term must be
reconsidered today. The inability of the ethnic
majority to control political dynamics and to
protect its citizens in different regions of the world
is evidence that the state can’t close itself to
international assistance under the pretext or in the
name of sovereignty. State sovereignty can’t be
used as a shield by national authorities to prevent
foreign aid to civilians in countries needing
international assistance and protection (Riyanto,
2012: 12).



18
 5. REFLECTION LAW
SOVEREIGNTY

Dominant relations in two countries, or more

often than not, refer to political, economic, cultural and
historical ties. Strong bilateral relations are
characterized by cooperation between institutions and
people at administrative and political level, as well as in
the private sector, academia and civil society. Certain
aspects of bilateral relations include trade and
investment, cultural exchange as well as general
knowledge, public understanding and recognition of
and ties between countries. In the meantime, the
strengthening of bilateral cooperation includes:
cooperation, shared outcomes, and enhanced mutual
knowledge and understanding between donor countries
and recipients as a result of bilateral cooperation
(Committee, 2016: 5).

5.1.Bilateralism
Bilateralism plays a vital role in the pursuit of
liberalization. Bilateralism makes liberal trade politically
feasible at home, because it enables political actors to

19
manage the costs and benefits of local politics resulting
from losing and winning economic actors through
commercial collaboration. Bilateralism, however, is not
without issues. Concerns over domestic sales create
problems with law enforcement, which can contribute to
the termination or even reversal of liberalization.
Multilateral cooperation should address this problem of
compliance (Rohlfining, 2007: 254-255).

Bilateral cooperation is a result of multilateral

dependence. According to many different measures,
interdependence is on the rise in almost every part of
the world. International political economists are talking
about global infinity, from prosperity to emissions. The
most important international problems-including
pollution, electricity, air traffic control and the
enforcement of trade and investment rules-intrinsically
concern several countries at the same time. What is
causing global problems is that they can’t often be dealt
with adequately in the national arena. Costs and
benefits flow into the external field. Such external
consequences are often so severe that domestic targets
can’t be accomplished without concerted multilateral
intervention (Caporaso, 1992: 599).

20
5.2.Investment Agreement
Investment plays a key role in a nation economic
development. Investment agreements capable of being
included in a number of contract goods and
arrangements, one of which is the ASEAN-China Free
Trade Agreement, which governs international trade
and investment ties between ASEAN member countries
and China. When carrying out this arrangement, of
course, there is also a need to enforce the concept of
reciprocity, where both countries must seek to provide
the same treatment so that both can benefit from the
investment they have made. One of the minimum
standards for the provision of care accepted by the
various investment agreements and the ACFTA is the
concept of fair and equitable treatment. This theory
addresses why, and how necessary, the host country
should give its investors fair care. This theory is also one
of the reasons why investors would feel attracted to
invest their money in a country in order to increase
investment flows.

Compared to Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and

even Vietnam, Indonesia's rating continues to fall, as the
four countries are increasingly pragmatic in offering fair
and balanced security and care to investors. The
implementation of the concept of fair and equitable

21
treatment between Indonesia and China has not been
fully implemented. Indonesia still faces a number of
challenges in terms of providing legal certainty and ease
of bureaucracy and administration to Chinese investors
who invest their money in Indonesia. This is
demonstrated by the many overlapping central and
regional rules, the complex bureaucratic process, and so
on (Putri, et al., 2018: 295).

5.3. Public Political Relations

The term "political economy" dates back to the
18th century, when public transactions became
increasingly political and subject to government control
(Caporaso & Levine, 1992). The householder, once the
sole supplier of his wishes for fulfillment, began to rely
on the head of state to provide the institutions and the
legal rules required to achieve his own livelihood. The
fundamental change in what constitutes "economy"
perception, sparking a heated debate on the degree to
which the government must be active in the economic
life of its people.

NGOs and civil society actors are currently

engaged in this ongoing debate in the midst of evolving
democratic contexts around the world. The overall
concept that unites the definition of the political
economy is the complex and inevitable social interaction,

22
the economic and political power of the market, and the
need to examine each of these elements in order to
understand the orderly economy.

Sociology, political science and economics are

fields of their own. Political economy viewpoints use
their respective insights to understand economics as
part of a wider social system and to research it in the
same way that public relations expertise draws from
many scientific disciplines. Caporaso and Levine (1992)
identified economics as having "its own social objectives
which could not be reduced to those we associate with
politics and family life" (p. 29). Political economics,
distinct from pure economics in "political economy in
varying degrees, recognizes the influence of political
economic growth and (more or less) ideological, cultural
and other social factors and makes them part of their
study" (Kollontai, 2002: 218; Sriramesha, et al., 2009: 369).

5.4. State Sovereignty

In the sense of relations between nations,
sovereignty often applies to the notion of freedom and
vice versa. An independent country is a sovereign state.
A sovereign state is an independent state and not under
the jurisdiction of another government (Jens Bartelson,
2006: 463). International law has historically accepted
that the state as an independent and sovereign body

23
ensures that the country is not subject to additional
authority (Miguel Gonzalez Marcos, 2003: 1; Martin
Dixon & Robert Mc. Corquodale, 2000: 248). National
sovereignty and equality are qualities intrinsic to an
independent state as a matter of international law.
Recognition of state sovereignty and harmony between
countries is also the basis for state workers in the global
legal system (Ian Brownlie, 1990: 287).

Sovereignty is regulated by a range of rights

recognised by international law, such as the right to
equality, territorial jurisdiction, the right to determine
nationality for the citizens of its territory, the right to
authorize and reject or prevent people from entering
and leaving their territory, the right to nationalize (RC
Hingorani, 1982: 117-118).

Sovereignty is a fundamental concept in the

field of domestic and international law and a point
of contact between the two systems of law and
order. State sovereignty is one of the fundamental
norms of the global legal network. Consequently,
the definition of a sovereign state as a unitary
authority which is not subject to any party is a
buffer of the international legal system which
upholds the principle of non-intervention and state
consent. Nevertheless, the idea of state sovereignty

24
has evolved in the most recent debate and practice,
so that state sovereignty can no longer be preserved
in an absolute sense (Michael J Struett, 2005: 70-180；
Riyanto, 2012： 5-14).



25
 6. STATE INDEPENDENCE
REPOSITION

Based on the above, this analysis seeks to

expose the ramifications of the legal supremacy of
bilateral agreements as a result of the convergence
of the Chinese "Silk Road" with the economic
interests of the Indonesian "Pacific Maritime Axis."
In addition, other problems clarified in the bilateral
relations between Indonesia and China, such as (a)
To what degree do investment regulations impose
legal equality? (b) Is there a genuine effort to
prevent abuse of power in the provision of
investment? (c) How concerned is the regulation of
foreign investment on environmental issues, (d)
How profound is the sensitivity of human rights
shown by foreign investment regulations, (e) How
far is the regulation? Containing a foreign concern?
In addition, the international humanitarian
movement requires human needs to be addressed
equally, equitably and without prejudice. In the
sense of the world, any government in the country
is expected to be able to respond to all the

26
community's demands, both in terms of social
services, social security, meeting basic needs, and
so on. Contemporary developments in policy
direction should always focus attention on the
needs of fellow human beings in the form of civil
society (Mustapa, 2019:29). Likewise, bilateral
cooperation should be able to safeguard a variety of
things that could challenge the economic
independence and sovereignty of a nation.
6.1. Indonesia and China Agreements
In 2015, Indonesia and China agreed to work
together in eight fields to conclude a Memorandum
of Understanding signed at the Great Hall of the
People by officials witnessed by President Joko
Widodo and President Xi Jinping (AntaraNews,
2015). The eight MOUs have been signed, namely:
a. Memorandum of Understanding on Economic
Cooperation between the Ministry of Economic
Affairs of Indonesia and the Commission for
National Reform and Development of the PRC.
b. Agreement on the Jakarta-Bandung High-
Speed Railway Development Project between
the Ministry of State-owned Enterprises of
Indonesia and the National Reform and
Development Commission of the PRC.

27
c. Maritime and Search and Rescue Agreement
between the Indonesian National Search and
Rescue Agency and the Ministry of Transport
of the Republic of China. This MoU,
accompanied by the Remote Sensing
Agreement, was also signed earlier on 13
October 2014 The China National Space
Administration (CNSA) and the Indonesian
Maritime Security Coordinating Board signed
an agreement supporting the new efforts to
improve maritime safety.
d. The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)-
signed on October6-contains the transmission
of remote sensing data by CNSA to Bakorkamla
Earth Stations covering the vast Indonesian
archipelago. These data were intended to
improve the early warning capability of the
Indonesian Maritime Security Coordinating
Board and to support maritime law
enforcement and disaster response. The MoU
follows the signing in 2012 of the Maritime
Cooperation Agreement between China and
Indonesia and the establishment of a bilateral
naval cooperation committee.
e. Preventing the Double Taxation Agreement
between the PRC and Indonesia between the
two countries.

28
f. The Framework for Space Cooperation (2015-
2020) between the Indonesian National
Institute of Aviation and Space (LAPAN) and
the PRC Space Agency. This MoU followed the
signing of the 2015-2019 Aeronautics and Space
Collaboration between LAPAN-CNSA in
Beijing, China 2015-03-27.
g. The Cooperation Agreement on Mutual Aid
between the Ministry of State-owned
Enterprises of Indonesia and the Development
Bank of China.
h. Agreement on Industrial and Construction
Cooperation between the Ministry of State-
owned Enterprises of Indonesia and the
National Reform and Development
Commission of the PRC (Jakarta Greater 2015;
Unspider 2014; Panda 2014).
6.2. Law Equality
The viewpoint of the State Legal Sovereignty
in the implementation of the Bilateral Policy in the
Maritime Silk-Shaft Route can be explained as
follows.
In Chapter III of the Basic Investment Policy,
Article 4(2) of the Law of the Republic of Indonesia,
Number 25, 2007 on investment, it is mentioned
that, in setting the required policies, the

29
government gives equal treatment to domestic
investors and foreign investors, while taking into
account national interests.
According to the government, the dispute
over the creation of a Chinese consortium company
overthrew Japanese companies in the Jakarta-
Bandung Rapid Train Infrastructure Project purely
on the basis of commercial considerations. In
comparison to Japanese companies that do not
respond to business-to-business schemes, Chinese
companies are willing to submit business-to-
business plans in the course of a fast-track project.
Where the financing of this project, without the use
of the state budget, reduces the risk of State losses.
Likewise, this proposal is not in breach of the
rules because the government has just carried out a
feasibility study with the Japan International
Corporation Agency (JICA) through the National
Development Planning Agency (Bappenas), the
Ministry of Transportation (Kemenhub) and the
Technology Assessment and Implementation
Agency (BPPT). Meanwhile, the strict selection of
project winners is based on the auction as shown in
the figure below:

30
 Preliminary Consolidation Finalization
The funds for the construction
of the Jakarta-Surabaya Semi-
the government conducts a
Fast Train along the 748 km of
feasibility study with the Japan The government opens an open
5.5 hours by the speed of an
International Cooperation auction. Enter China after Japan
average of 160 kilometers are
Agency (JICA)
estimated to reach Rp 100
trillion

The government decided to The second revised Japanese

The study fund is bailed out by proposal was brought to
build the Jakarta-Bandung
JICA. The feasibility study Jakarta on August 26, 2015.
route in advance along the 150
process began in early 2014 China submitted its proposal on
km worth Rp 67 trillion
August 11, 2015

Figure 6.1. The Jakarta-Bandung Fast Train

Plan Process (Sugianto, 2018)

Thus, the implementation of the Indonesia-

China cooperation project is still guided by legal
equality in which it does not grant specific rights to
a particular person or company. The selection of
China as the winner of the tender is more
reasonable, according to the government, because
of technology and financial capability that does not
require government guarantees through the state
budget so that collaboration can be done on a B-to-
B basis (business to business). In addition to hoping
to win the confidence of a number of other foreign
investors in China's "guarantee," the government
also wants China's investment opportunity to build

31
infrastructure in Indonesia to last a long time
(Yamin dan Windymadaksa, 2017: 217).
6.3.Avoiding Government Abuses
The issue of the 10 million foreign workers
invasion from China to Indonesia has spread.
While it has not been empirically proved that there
are discrepancies in the number of foreign
employees between the Ministry of Labor
(approximately 21 thousand) and the Ministry of
Justice and Human Rights (approximately 31
thousand people), it certainly needs serious
attention. The use of foreign workers is one thing
that can not be prevented, particularly when
foreign investment enters a country. Immigration
violations are among the problems faced by foreign
workers entering Indonesia.
Although the monitoring of foreigners is
regulated in Article 68(1) of the Immigration Act,
there is still a rise in violations of international
immigration. This was due to the weak cooperation
of the external control team and the lack of optimal
enforcement of the regulations relating to
foreigners and their activities in the territory of
Indonesia (Jazuli, 2018: 89).
Not surprisingly, on the basis of data from the
Ministry of Labor and Transmigration, foreign

32
workers, in particular from China, experienced a
significant increase, as shown in the following table:
Table 6.1. Foreign Workers Profile
No. Foreign 2017 2018 Increment
Workers (people) (people) (people)

1. China 24.804 32.209 Up 7.405

2. Other Countries 61.170 63.126 Up 1.956

Total . 85.974 95.335 Up 9.361

j. Singapore Picture 6.2. Foreign Workers 2017

2%
i. England k. Others
2% 18%
h. USA
a. Cina
3%
29%
g. Australia
3% b. Japan
f. Philipines 16%
4%
e. Malaysia
5% d. India c. South
7% Korea
11%

Picture 6.3. Foreign Workers 2018

17%
a. Cina
2% 2% b. Japan
34%
3% 3%
c. South Korea
3%
7% d. India
5% 10% 14%

33
 Table 6.2. Foreign Workers Business Sector 2017 and 2018
No. Sector 2017 (people) 2018 (people)

1. Services 52.633 59.013

2. Industry 30.625 33.589

3. Agriculture and maritime 2.716 2.733

Total 85.974 95.335

Picture 6.4. Foreign Workers Business Sectors 2017

(People)
7 komisaris
6 supervisor
2%
3%
5 teknisi 1 profesional
11% 28%

4 direksi
18%

3 konsultan 2 manajer
15% 23%

Picture 6.5. Foreign Workers Business Sector 2018

(people)
7 komisaris
6 supervisor
5 teknisi 2% 2%
9% 1 profesional
4 direksi 32%
16%

3 konsultan
2 manajer
17%
22%

Source: Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration

(Hamdani, 2019)

34
 In Chapter VIII, Article 42(4) of the Law of the
Republic of Indonesia, No 13 of 2003 on jobs, it
specified that foreign workers were only able to
work in Indonesia for employment purposes.
Whereas Article 45 contains the obligations of
foreign workers to appoint Indonesian nationals as
accompanying foreign workers employed by them.
For example, the transfer of technology, the transfer
of expertise to foreign workers and the training and
training of Indonesian workers by the qualifications
of positions held by foreign workers do not apply
to foreign workers occupying the positions of
directors and commissioners. The increase in the
number of foreign workers contrasts sharply with
the increase in unemployment of the working era
as shown in the table below:
Table 6.3.

Open Unemployment Based on Highest Education 2017 – 2018

2017 2018
Highest Education
August August
Public/ Senior High School 1,910,829 1,930,320

Vocational High School 1,621,402 1,731,743

Academy/Diploma 242,937 220,932

University 618,758 729,601
Total 7,005,262 7,000,691

Source: National Labor Force Survey (2019)

35
 The table above shows an increase in
unemployment in high school, technical and
university students in 2017 and 2018. There has
therefore been an increase in unemployment in the
productive age since 2017. A total of 4,150,989 to
4,391,664 in 2018 or as many as 240,675 people. Not
yet seen, the transition of technology from foreign
workers to local workers, as required by the
Manpower Act, presents challenges to the
government. There are certainly a number of
concerns raised by a comparison of the rise in
foreign workers with rising unemployment
between 2017 and 2018. The government can be
said to be unreasonable if this process continues
and no real action responds to it.
6.4.Attention to the Environment
In Indonesia alone, about 1,000 Chinese
companies are engaged in activities in which 50 per
cent of them invest in Java, with information of
around 17 per cent of companies involved in
construction, 15 per cent in mining and 13 per cent
in electricity. Their presence is expected to help
increase local labor force, move technology and
skills, and enhance cultural exchanges between the
two countries (Saputri, 2018).

36
 One of the issues that often emerges from
rising factories is the environmental contamination
of industrial waste. S. PT. For example, Kahatex is a
textile company founded in 1979 by Liang Hua
Song. Based on the inspection of the Citarum
Harum Survey Team-a collaboration of cross-
regional government agencies in West Java-at the
beginning of January 2018, along with a number of
other companies suggested that they would dump
waste into the river. Also, in May 2017, the
Coalition Against Waste, a coalition of West Java
Walhi, Bandung Legal Aid, the Society of
Environmental Concerns, and Greenpeace
Indonesia, won a lawsuit before the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court annulled the Liquid Waste
Disposal Permit (IPLC) issued by the Regent of
Sumedang Regent to Kahatex Group, PT Five Star
Textile Indonesia and PT Insan Sandang Internusa.
Through disposing of its liquid waste in the
Cikijing River, a tributary of the Citarum River
(Sari, 2015; Perkasa, 2018).
Both Indonesia and China are involved in
environmental issues. In relations between
Indonesia and China, this problem is quite a
dilemma, particularly with regard to the maritime
question. The Chinese side, through an official of
the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, said

37
that the Chinese government should impose a "zero
tolerance" penalty on domestic vessels that have
been found to breach high-sea fishing laws and
regulations. Liu Xinzhong, Deputy Director of the
Marine Fisheries Administration, also confirmed
that China is very concerned about the safety and
preservation of marine resources. In Indonesian
waters, from 2014 to 2018, only one ship from
China was sunk in the same timeframe as Vietnam,
which reached 276 (Katadata, 2019).
In 2016, however, an Indonesian patrol boat
intercepted a 300-ton Chinese fishing vessel, Kway
Fey 10078, which was fishing near the Natuna
Islands, where the "nine broken lines" marking
China's claim to the South China Sea overlapped
with Indonesian waters. According to the
Indonesian Minister of Fisheries, Pudjiastuti,
hunters are now switching tactics using new and
comprehensive technology. With a length of 150
km and a full 100 km of container, working from
the high seas and reaching the exclusive economic
zones of all countries outside national jurisdiction
(Rose, 2018).
In Part Two, Article 76(1) and (2) of the Law
of the Republic of Indonesia, Number 32 Year 2009
on Environmental Protection and Management,
provides that: (1) the Minister, the Governor or the

38
Regent / Mayor shall apply administrative penalties
to the person in charge of the company or operation
if a violation of the environmental permit has been
found under supervision. (2) Administrative
sanctions shall consist of: (a) written warning; (b)
government coercion; (c) the freezing of
environmental licences; or (d) the revocation of
environmental permits.
In addition to the waste problem in Citarum,
which includes not only Chinese companies but
also local businessmen and illegal fishing, the PT
explosion of the Pertamina pipe. KCIC (Indonesian
Chinese Fast Train) needs attention as well. This
problem is shown in the table below.
Table 6.4. Pertamina Pipe Explosion Cases by KCIC.
Time/Location Case Reason Follow Up
Time:  Pertamina pipeline  Not due to PT KCIC
Tuesday, explosion at the lack of apologizes to PT
October, 22 Jakarta-Bandung preliminary Pertamina and
2019 Fast Train project project the public for the
site. studies. incident.
Location:
 A Jakarta-Bandung  Language
Cipularang
fast train project barriers make
Toll Road,
worker, Li project
Cimahi area,
Xuanfeng, was workers
West Java
killed. misunderstan
d the stages of
work.
 Drilling at that
point should
not be done
because there
will be a

39
 pipeline
diversion.
Source: (Anwar, 2019)
Malaysia and Indonesia are the main
suppliers of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to China,
which together supply about 80 per cent. Although
Russia supplied 1.2 per cent of all LNG imports to
China in 2015, the rise was 25 per cent from 2014.
The cycle of foreign investment would certainly
have an impact on the financial and economic
sectors. Sadly, unlike modern ecological
modernisation, China still lacks transparency in the
handling and monitoring of environmental data,
which is very limited by civil society. Furthermore,
the modernization of China's domestic ecology has
been disconnected from China's regional and global
"go-out" policy, including the Silk Road Economic
Belt, by overlooking important elements of this
phase.
Nevertheless, China's green shift can be
accomplished in part by exports of polluting
industries and the destruction of natural resources
in countries that are in a lower position and
therefore more vulnerable than the global
production chain. Therefore, environmental
damage and emissions can only be exported rather
than seriously reduced-criticism that can

40
theoretically be extended to any "climate change"
region.
Among the other risks posed by the Silk Road
Economic Pathway, there is a lack of meaningful
social protection to protect the local population
from the adverse effects of the major projects
proposed;' Racing to the bottom' in terms of local
and national environmental standards (under the
banner of eliminating needless' bureaucracy' or
creating an' attractive investment climate'); poor
communication between integration policy
planners and various stakeholders of members of
the Silk Path Economic Line; and the general lack of
public consultation for large investment projects
(Tracy, E., et al., 2017: 80).
6.5.Human Rights Issues
One of China's international human rights
issues was the persecution of Muslim minorities in
East Turkestan (officially referred to by the Chinese
government as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region), an ethnic minority region in northwest
China. Indonesian Vice President Jusuf Kalla said
that Indonesia did not agree to the violation of
human rights. Nevertheless, in his opinion, the
question of the persecution of Uighur Muslims is
China's internal problem, so that Indonesia does

41
not want to intervene in the domestic affairs of a
nation.
The reaction of Indonesia and several Muslim
countries such as Malaysia, Pakistan and Saudi
Arabia, which were "cold" towards the Uyghur
community, contrasted with their frontal approach
to the humanitarian disaster in Palestine and
Rohingya, Myanmar. Of course, economic and
political considerations in their relations with
China are one cause for caution (ABC Australia,
2018; Walden, 2019).
Since 2014, the Chinese government has
initiated an "Eradication of the Ideological Virus"
program by setting up camps for political
indoctrination, collective punishment, and
stringent and systematic limits on religious
movements and contact to 13 million Turkish
Muslims in Xinjiang. Since the end of 2016,
repression has increased dramatically. The UN
urges the Beijing Government to put an immediate
end to the detention and to provide information on
the number of prisoners and the reasons for their
arrest. Interestingly, this happened when the
Chinese government actively adopted a governance
and trade model through the Global Belt and Road
Initiative (Human Rights Watch, 2018: 118;
Florentin, 2018).

42
 In denying the allegations, the Chinese side
sent a delegation of 66 people to the UN Human
Rights Council. Others argue that the establishment
of a' education and training center' in Xinjiang is a'
preventive measure to combat terrorism.' Many
scholars, such as Gao (2018), suggest that the
redefinition of' detention' to' training and
education' is nothing but a replication of the
Chinese language Zhi Lu Wei ma of the Qin
Dynasty (221–206 BC) in the millennial period. This
terminology defines someone who deliberately
misinterprets the truth and distorts the evidence for
an ulterior motive. The Chinese media support the
government's stance and label international
criticism a "American" attack that is false. In order
to strengthen the help of some non-Western
countries, the Chinese party conducted its first
official visit in December 2018 to examine the
conditions in Xinjiang, Russian ambassadors, 11
Asian countries and a Muslim majority (GCRP,
2019: 4).
After 1 January 2019, Indonesia's position as a
non-permanent member of the UN Security
Council can be more crucial. Sadly, Indonesia's
position–based on ANP-INSIGHT data–at the level
of diplomacy from a global perspective with a
political vitality of 0.33 is very inferior as an

43
internal player compared to China, with China's
vitality policy hitting 0.89 and holding the position
of a global player. However, Indonesia's economic
reliance on China in many of China's infrastructure
development projects is an obstacle to direct
cooperation with China on the Uighur dispute.
Bilateral barriers have been resolved by a
multilateral approach where Indonesia is inspired
by the UN, ASEAN and OIC forums on the Uyghur
Muslim minority problem. This move forward can
at least make China's human rights diplomacy
policy adaptable to international norms (Gozali,
2019; Zhu, 2011: 217).
Law No. 37, 1999 governs foreign relations
and policy in Indonesia. It is claimed that: (a)
foreign policy adheres to the free and active
concept of national interest; and (b) foreign policy
applied by diplomacy that is innovative,
constructive and anticipatory, not just routine and
reactive, strong in values and convictions, but also
reasonable and versatile in approach. The
Indonesian attitude, which treats the Uyghur
question as a Chinese domestic problem and is
careful not to be deeply involved, is a reflection of
an "unreactive" and "fair and versatile approach."
As regards human rights issues at home, it was
governed in Law No 26 of the Year 2000 on Human

44
Rights Courts and Law No 39 of 1999 on Human
Rights.
6.6.International Concerns
There is a non-linear relationship between
economic interests and state sovereignty in
relations between Indonesia and China. The
increase of Chinese investment in Indonesia in a
variety of infrastructure financing activities does
not impact Indonesia's resolve to retain Natuna
Island, which is the border of Indonesia in the
waters of the South China Sea. In the area of
sovereignty, relations between the two countries
are based on the principle of strategic importance.
Economic cooperation between the two countries is
based on the principle of constructive cooperation
in efforts to improve trade and investment ties.
Several ASEAN countries varied in their view of
the South China Sea dispute with China. The
Philippines and Vietnam continue to claim the
territories in dispute. Malaysia and Brunei did not
act and their disputed territories did not conflict
with China. Laos and Myanmar are supporting
China. Singapore and Thailand continue to increase
their profits and losses (Andika, M.T. and Aisyah,
A.N., 2017: 161; Hartati, A. Y., 2016: 19).

45
 The Government of Indonesia is committed to
maintaining the integrity of its maritime territories.
Within four years (2014-2018), Indonesia prohibited
10,000 foreign vessels from mainland China,
Taiwan, Thailand and the Philippines from
catching fish in its waters, half of which captured
more than 500 gross tons (GT) of fish. Thousands of
ships have been captured, sunk and, in some cases,
blown up. The Indonesian side believes that fishing
activities in Indonesian territorial waters, in
particular China, are illegal and include organized
transnational crime. The Chinese side has denied
the charge. However, in fact, based on an analysis
by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations (FAO), there has been a dramatic
reduction in fish stocks in their waters, which has
driven fishing in waters far beyond its exclusive
economic zone. The decline in fish stocks is due to
the increasing demand for high-quality fresh
seafood from middle-class consumers (Rosi, d.G.,
2018).

46
 488
Vietnam 276
90
Thailand 50
41
Indonesia 26
2
China 1
1
Tanpa negara 1
0 100 200 300 400 500 600

Ship

Figure 6.6. The Illegal Fishing Ship Drown (Oct 2014-

August 2018)

Indonesia’s decisive move against foreign

vessels passing through Indonesian waters,
referred to in paragraph (2) of Chapter IX of the
Indonesian Defense, Defence, Compliance and Sea
Safety Act, Law No 32, 2014 on Maritime Affairs.
This claimed that: authority to protect the
sovereignty and law of foreign vessels crossing
territorial seas and the waters of the Indonesian
archipelago is regulated by constitutional
provisions and international law. For this reason,
the Indonesian Government believes that solutions
to the issue of bilateral conflict can only be sought
by international cooperation (Rosi, D. G. 2018).
Within the context of the global Maritime Axis
strategy, the future of the Indonesian maritime
sector has been realized through synergy between

47
economic aspects and security aspects. In terms of
security, the battle against theft of fish is a
component of defense policy, as well as efforts to
safeguard Indonesia's territorial sovereignty. Many
Jokowi governments are concentrating on economic
development, including the concept of a' sea
highway' that seeks to connect goods and services
across Indonesia. Nevertheless, the great dream of
becoming the world's maritime axis has been met
with challenges. These include inadequate national
marine management due to a number of internal
barriers that need to be tackled, such as: 1)
conflicting roles of marine resource management
agencies; and 2) lack of operational support
facilities and various criminal activities in the
marine area (Syahrin, M.N.A., 2018: 1; Latifah dan
Larasati, D., 2017: 99).



48
 7. LEGAL EQUALITY IN INVESTMENT
COOPERATION, A CONCLUSION

Based on the above, the author follows the

findings of the research and the conclusions of this
report.

7.1.Research Findings
The findings of the review of the advance study
found that there were several conditions in the
bilateral relations between Indonesia and China:
a. Economic Considerations More Influential
Than Political Orientations
The selection of Chinese companies in the
Jakarta-Bandung Fast Train Project Purely
Economic considerations. Despite evidence of
political pressure, legal equality remains within the
boundaries of justice in the bilateral relations
between Indonesia and China. While policy
implementation is focused more on realistic
economic interests and policy strategies. The

49
selection of Chinese companies in the Jakarta-
Bandung rail project bidding process was purely
business considerations. Nevertheless, the
government and all elements of society still need to
be careful with rational estimates related to several
synergistic infrastructure projects that are secure
for the supremacy of state law.
b. Government Still Ignores Labor Problems
The government appears to be passive in
responding to the increase in the number of foreign
workers, especially China, which is not followed by
the absorption of local workers. The growth in
foreign workers is very large from year to year.
This is contrasted with the amount of active
unemployment, which is also rising every year. If a
balanced policy does not respond, it fears that this
exclusion is seen as an arbitrary power that is less
pro-justice andless pro-Prosperity. This reality can
cause a social conflict, particularly against the
Chinese ethnic group in Indonesia. Mandate Labor
law on the transfer of technology from foreign
workers to local workers has not yet been enforced.
c. Environmental Pollution Still Suggested
Many ethnic Chinese businesses have still
indicated that they would pollute the environment.
Some companies established by the Chinese in

50
Indonesia have shown that they have committed
environmental violations, in particular the
discharge of waste into rivers. Unfortunately, local
government bureaucracies are still weak so that
they can issue permits for the establishment of
foreign companies that have not yet completed
their environmental impact assessment. The
contamination of the Citarum River is one of the
situations in which similar problems tend to occur.
Sustainable synergy of all elements is required to
achieve environmental sustainability as mandated
by environmental law.
Strangely, when people were surprised how
"could have occurred" a pipe explosion near the
Cimahi toll road in the Indonesia-China Rapid
Train class project. The project leader "just"
responded with an apology to Pertamina and the
community for this incident and clarified that it
was not linked to an inexperienced feasibility study.
d. Ambiguous Policy in Responding to
Foreign Country Human Rights Cases
The Government is still cautious to deal with
human rights issues in Uyghur. Indonesia should
take a firm stance on the Palestinian issue or on the
humanitarian crisis in Rohingya, Myanmar. But not
during the mass arrests of Muslim minorities in

51
Uyghur. While reports of empirical evidence from
international institutions continue to surface, the
initiative stated to be "re-education" and vocational
training by the Chinese government as an effort to
eradicate extremism that threatens national stability
has not been able to touch the attention of the
Indonesian government. With political and
economic considerations, Indonesia is still cautious
and continues to remain silent on the grounds that
it considers the issue to be solely Chinese domestic.
This versatile approach is definitely not at odds
with the breath of the Law on Foreign Relations
and Foreign Policy and the Law on Human Rights
in Indonesia.
e. Government Decisiveness in Violation of
the State Territory
Under the leadership of the Indonesian
Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (2014-
2019), Susi Pudjiastuti, the government has taken a
strong stance against illegal fishing abuses by
international vessels and has been neutral in the
South China Sea conflict. While Indonesia urgently
needs Chinese investment in infrastructure growth,
this does not reduce Indonesia's efforts to preserve
its sovereignty. Through means of the Fisheries and
Maritime Law, the Indonesian Government is
distancing itself from the conflict over Natuna

52
Island in the South China Sea and threatening to
sink foreign ships that entered Indonesian waters
even though they were ships from China.

7.2.Conclusion
Finally, a number of things can be concluded
by means of some qualitative analysis that we have
done. Between them,
a. Economic and political considerations
frequently take precedence over the application
of the rule of law.
b. The lack of a rational strategy between national
and global interests can be an indicator of
arbitrary power.
c. Regulation of environmental pollution has not
yet been fully complied with by foreign
companies in Indonesia.
d. The issue of human rights is still seen as a
domestic issue.
e. The firmness and independence of the
perpetrators of illegal fishing in the South
China Sea dispute has not been optimal in
maintaining the country's rule of law.

53
 Some of the points mentioned above indicate
that the optimization of the sovereignty of state law
in the bilateral relations between Indonesia and
China through a shared vision of the World
Maritime Axis and the Silk Road is still weak. Of
course, according to the authors, the Indonesian
government needs to improve its role by enhancing
a number of aspects, such as: (a) strengthening
aspects of community prosperity and social justice
that outweigh economic and political
considerations; (b) balancing the national-global
policy pendulum; (c) improving legal compliance
through assertiveness of regulation.



54
 REFERENCES

ABC Australia. (2018). “Mengapa Pemerintah

Negara Muslim, Termasuk Indonesia Diam
Soal Uyghur?” [Why do Muslim countries,
including Indonesia keep quiet about the
Uyghur?]
https://www.tempo.co/abc/3377/mengapa-
pemerintah-negara-muslim-termasuk-indonesia-
diam-soal-uyghur (Senin, 24 Desember) 07:56
WIB. Accessed 05 Mei 2019.
Anam, S. dan Ristiyani. (2018). “Kebijakan Belt and
Road Initiative (BRI) Tiongkok pada Masa
Pemerintahan Xi Jinping” [China Belt and
Road Initiative (BRI) Policy during Xi
Jinping's Reign]. Jurnal Ilmiah Hubungan
Internasional. Vol 14. No 2: 217-236.
Andika, M. T, dan Aisyah, A. N. (2017). “Analisis
Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia-China di Era
Presiden Joko Widodo: Benturan Kepentingan
Ekonomi dan Kedaulatan?”[Indonesia-China
Foreign Policy Analysis in President Joko
Widodo's Era: Conflict of Economic Interest

55
 and Sovereignty?]. Indonesian Perspective. Vol.
2. No. 2 (Juli-Desember): 161-179.
Antara News. (2015). “Indonesia-Tiongkok
Sepakati Kerja Sama Delapan Bidang
[Indonesia-China Agree on Eight Field
Cooperation]”.
https://www.antaranews.com/berita/487606/indon
esia-tiongkok-sepakati-kerja-sama-delapan-bidang
(Kamis, 26 Maret 2015) 22:15 WIB. Accessed
20 April 2019.
Anwar, M. Choirul. (2019). “Terungkap! Pemicu
Ledakan Pipa di Kereta Cepat Gegara Bahasa”
(29 November).
https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/2019112918
3650-4-119191/terungkap-pemicu-ledakan-pipa-
di-kereta-cepat-gegara-bahasa. Diakses Dec, 01
2019.
Callahan, W. A. (2016). “China’s ‘Asian Dream’:
The Belt and Road Initiatives and the New
Regional Order”. Asian Journal of
Comparative Politics. Vol. 1. No. 3: 236.
Campos, I. D. (2015). “One Belt & One Road:
Between Cooperation and Geopolitics in the
Silk Road”. Contacto Global.Vol. 6 (Dec): 18-25.
Caporaso, J. A. (1992). “International Relations
Theory And Multilateralism: The Search For
56
 Foundations”. International Organization. Vol.
46. No. 3 (Summer): 599-632.
Costantinos, B. “China’s ‘Silk Road’: A drive for
Global Integration or Simply a Metaphor for
Hegemonic Quest Public Lecture”. Respublica
Literaria. Vol. IX No. XXXVI, CXXI, MMXVI, 1.
Elena F. Tracy, Evgeny Shvarts, Eugene Simonov &
Mikhail Babenko (2017). “China’s new
Eurasian Ambitions: the Environmental Risks
of the Silk Road Economic Belt.” Eurasian
Geography and Economics, 58:1, 56-88, DOI:
10.1080/15387216.2017.1295876.
Financial Mechanism Committee Guideline for
Strengthened Bilateral Relations. (2016). EEA
and Norway Grants 2009 – 2014 29.03.2012,
amended on (28 January): 5.
Fitriyanti, Rahmi. (2016). “Implikasi Jalur Sutra
Maritim Cina Terhadap Pembangunan
Geoekonomi Maritim Indonesia [Chinese
Maritime Silk Road Implications on
Indonesia's Maritime Geoeconomic
Development]”. Prosiding Konvensi Nasional
Asosiasi Ilmu Hubungan Internasional, ―Benua
Maritim Indonesia Dalam Perspektif Ilmu
Hubungan Internasional. Universitas

57
 Hasanuddin. Makassar. Volume 7 (23-24
November): 355-374.
Florentin, Vindry. (2018). “Sikap Indonesia pada
Penindasan Muslim Uighur, Begini Kata JK
[Indonesia's attitude towards Uighur Muslims
Oppression, JK says].”
https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1156245/sikap-
indonesia-pada-penindasan-muslim-uighur-
begini-kata-jk. (17 Desember). 19.35 WIB.
Accessed 05 Mei 2019.
Gao, Charlotte. (2018). “Bantahan Represi Muslim
Uighur: Apakah China ‘Menyebut Rusa
Sebagai Kuda’ [Muslim Uighur Repression
Rebuttal: Does China ‘Call the Deer as a
Horse’]?” www.thediplomat.com (November 9).
Accessed 05 Mei 2019.
Global Centre for The Responsibility to Protect
(GCRP). (2019). The Persecution of the Uighurs
and Potential Crimes Against Humanity in China
(April): 4.
Gozali, Pizaro. (2019) “Uighur dan Komitmen
Indonesia Menyelamatkan Umat Islam
[Uighurs and Indonesian Commitments to
Save Muslims]”.
https://www.republika.co.id/berita/kolom/wa
cana/19/02/16/pn00y7282-uighur-dan-

58
 komitmen-indonesia-menyelamatkan-umat-
islam. (Sabtu 16 Feb) 10:13 WIB. Accessed 04
Mei 2019.
Hamdani, Trio. (2019). “Fakta di Balik Data Tenaga
Kerja China di Indonesia [The Facts Behind
Chinese Labor Data in Indonesia]”.
https://finance.detik.com/berita-ekonomi-
bisnis/d-4447281/fakta-di-balik-data-tenaga-
kerja-china-di-indonesia/3 (Kamis, 28 Feb)
07:54 WIB. Accessed 21 April 2019.
Hartati, A.Y., (2016). “Kebijakan Luar Negeri
Republik Indonesia Dalam Sengketa Laut
Tiongkok Selatan (Era Presiden Soeharto
Sampai Presiden Jokowi) [Republic of
Indonesia Foreign Policy in the South China
Sea Dispute (Era of President Soeharto to
President Jokowi)].” Sosio Dialektika. Vol 1. No.
2 : 1-23, 19.
Hayek, F. A. (2005). The Road to Serfdom with The
Intellectuals and Socialism. Combine edition.
London:The Institute of Economic Affairs. 2
Lord North Street Westminster. SW1P 3LB in
association with Profi le Books Ltd.
Hayek, F. A.(1944). The Road to Serfdom. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.

59
Hu, R. W. (2017). “China’s One Belt One Road
Strategy: Opportunity or Challenge to India?”.
China Report. Vol. 53. No. 2: 108.
Human Rights Watch. (2018). Eradicating Ideological
Viruses” China’s Campaign of Repression Against
Xinjiang’s Muslims. (September): 118.
Jakarta Greater. (2015). “Kerjasama antara
Pemerintah RI dengan RRT [Cooperation
between the Government of the Republic of
Indonesia and China]”.
https://jakartagreater.com/mou-kerjasama-antara-
pemerintah-republik-indonesia-ri-dengan-republik-
rakyat-tiongkok-rrt/ (30 Maret). Accessed 20
April 2019.
Jazuli, Ahmad. (2018). “Eksistensi Tenaga Kerja
Asing Di Indonesia Dalam Perspektif Hukum
Keimigrasian (The Existence of Foreign Workers
in Indonesia From The Immigration Law
Perspective)”. JIKH. Vol. 12 No.1 (Maret): 89 –
105.
Katadata. (2019). “Cek Data: Benarkah 488 Kapal
Illegal Fishing Sudah Ditenggelamkan? [Data
Check: Is It Really 488 Illegal Fishing Vessels
Drowned?]”
https://databoks.katadata.co.id/datapublish/2019/0

60
 2/18/cek-data-488-kapal-ilegal-sudah-
ditenggelamkan. Accessed 09 Mei 2019.
Latifah & Larasati, D. (2017). Tantangan Internal
dalam Mewujudkan Indonesia Sebagai Poros
Maritim Dunia [Internal Challenges in
Realizing Indonesia as the World Maritime
Axis]. Jurnal Hubungan Internasional. Tahun X.
No.2 (Juli – Desember): 99-116 ; 112-113.
Majiid, F. A. (2019). “Poros Maritim dan Jalur Sutra
Maritim: Bergandengan Tangan atau
Bertepuk Sebelah Tangan? [Maritime Axis
and Maritime Silk Road: Hand in Hand or
Clap One Hand?]”
https://www.academia.edu/35567198/Poros_Marit
im_dan_Jalur_Sutra_Maritim_Bergandengan_Ta
ngan_atau_Bertepuk_Sebelah_Tangan. Pdf files.
Accessed 14 April 2019.
Masyithoh, dan Ramadhani, A. (2015). “An
Indonesian Perspective Toward Maritime
Vision: Is Pursuing National Interest While
Maintaining Neutrality in the South China Sea
Possible?”. European Scientific Journal
(November): 392.
Mustapa, Hasan. (2019). “Political Regional
Tourism In Civil Society Perspective (Profile
of Development Strategy of Situ Bagendit

61
 Tourism Object, Banyuresmi District, Garut
Regency, West Java Province)”. Politicon. Vol.
1 No.1 (Juli): 24-50.
Nainggolan, P. P. (2015). “Kebijakan Poros Maritim
Dunia Joko Widodo Dan Implikasi
Internasionalnya”[Joko Widodo's World
Maritime Axis Policy and Its International
Implications]. Politica. Vol. 6 No. 2 (Agustus):
167-190.
Panda, Ankit. (2014). “Indonesian Maritime
Security Board to Access Chinese Satellite
Data”
https://thediplomat.com/2014/10/indonesian-
maritime-security-board-to-access-chinese-
satellite-data/#!#disqus_thread (October 17).
Accessed 20 April 2019.
Perkasa, Anugerah. (2018). “Kegeraman Jokowi,
Kahatex dan British Virgin Islands” [The
Harshness of Jokowi, Kahatex and the British
Virgin Islands].
https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/2018
0326195722-20-286073/kegeraman-jokowi-
kahatex-dan-british-virgin-islands. (Kamis, 05
April) 11:01 WIB.. Accessed 28 April 2019.
Putri, R. R., Chandrawulan, A., Amalia, P. (2018).
“Peringkat Arus Investasi Indonesia Dalam

62
 Kerangka Asean-China Free Trade Agreement
(Perbandingan Dengan Singapura, Malaysia,
Thailand, Dan Vietnam) Ditinjau Dari Prinsip
Fair And Equitable Treatment“ [Ranking of
Indonesian Investment Flows in the Asean-
China Free Trade Agreement Framework
(Comparison with Singapore, Malaysia,
Thailand, and Vietnam) Judging from the Fair
and Equitable Treatment Principles]. Jurnal
Hukum & Pembangunan. 48 No. 2. 275-298.
Ramadhan Iqbal. (2018). “China’s Belt Road
Initiative: Dalam Pandangan Teori Geopolitik
Klasik”[China’s Belt Road Initiative: In View
of Classical Geopolitical Theory]. Intermestic:
Journal of International Studies. Volume 2. No. 2.
(Mei): 139-155.
Riyanto, Sigit. (2012). “Kedaulatan Negara Dalam
Kerangka Hukum Internasional
Kontemporer”[State Sovereignty in a
Contemporary International Legal
Framework]. Yustisia. Edisi 84 (September-
Desember): 5-14.
Rohlfing, Ingo. (2007). “Bilateral and Multilateral
Cooperation in International Trade A
Political-Economy Perspective”. Ph.D Thesis.
School of Humanities and Social Sciences Date

63
 of Defense: July 11, 2007. International
University Bremen.
Rose, D. G. (2018). “Menteri Susi Targetkan China:
Itu Bukan Menangkap Ikan, Tapi
Kejahatan”[Minister Susi Targets China: It's
Not Catching Fish, It's Crime]. www.scmp.com.
(October 19). Accessed 04 Mei 2019.
Saputri, Maya. (2018). “Sekitar 1.000 Perusahaan
Cina Beroperasi di Indonesia”[Around 1,000
Chinese companies operate in Indonesia]. -
https://tirto.id/sekitar-1000-perusahaan-cina-
beroperasi-di-indonesia-dau727 (November).
Accessed 28 April 2019.
Sari, E. W. (2015). “Pusat Industri di Kab.
Sumedang”[Industrial Center in the Regency.
Sumedang].
http://erlindasoledad.blogspot.com (Februari).
Accessed 28 April 2019.
Sevilla Jr, H. A. (2017). “China’s New Silk Route
Initiative: Political and Economic Implications
for the Middle East and Southeast Asia”.
Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic
Studies. Vol. 11, No. 1: 83-106.
Sornarajah, M. (2010).The International Law on
Foreign Investment. Third Edition. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
64
Sriramesha, K., Duhéb, Sandra C. (2009).
“Extending Cultural Horizons: Political
Economy and Public Relations”. Public
Relations Review. 35. 368–375: 369.
Sugianto, Danang. (2018). “Sejarah Kereta Cepat
JKT-BDG: Digagas Jepang, Digarap
China”[JKT-BDG Fast Train History: Initiated
by Japan, Worked on by China].
https://finance.detik.com/infrastruktur/d-
3886103/sejarah-kereta-cepat-jkt-bdg-digagas-
jepang-digarap-china. (Senin, 26 Feb) 12:20 WIB.
Accessed 21 April 2019.
Sukmana, Yoga. (2019). “Ini 5 Negara dengan
Investasi Terbesar di Indonesia Tahun
2018”[These are 5 countries with the biggest
investment in Indonesia in 2018].
https://ekonomi.kompas.com/read/2019/01/30/
141000926/ini-5-negara-dengan-investasi-
terbesar-di-indonesia-tahun-2018. Accessed 07
Mei 2019.
Syahrin, M. N. A.. (2018). “Kebijakan Poros
Maritim Jokowi dan Sinergitas Strategi
Ekonomi dan Keamanan Laut
Indonesia”[Jokowi's Maritime Axis Policy and
the Synergy of Indonesia's Ocean Economic

65
 and Security Strategy]. Indonesian Perspective.
Vol. 3. No. 1 (Januari-Juni): 1-17.
Un.spider. (2014). “China and Indonesia Sign
Remote-Sensing Agreement”. http://www.un-
spider.org/news-and-events/news/china-and-
indonesia-sign-remote-sensing-agreement China
and Indonesia sign remote-sensing agreement (20
Oktober). Accessed 20 April 2019.
Walden, Max. (2019). Di Balik Keengganan dan
Dilema Indonesia Sehubungan HAM, Uighur,
dan China”[Behind Indonesia's Reluctance
and Dilemma Regarding Human Rights,
Uighurs and China]. https://foreignpolicy.com
Posted on February 6, 2019. Dalam
https://www.matamatapolitik.com/analisis-di-
balik-keengganan-dan-dilema-indonesia-
sehubungan-ham-uighur-dan-china/. Accessed 04
Mei 2019.
Wardani, F. A. (2018). “Faktor Dukungan Tiongkok
Terhadap Inisiasi Kebijakan Poros Maritim
Dunia Republik Indonesia Periode 2014-
2017”[Chinese Support Factors for the
Republic of Indonesia's World Maritime
Policy Period 2014-2017 Initiation]. Skripsi.
Program Studi Hubungan Internasional
Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik

66
 Universitas Islam Negeri Syarif Hidayatullah
Jakarta 1439 h/2018.
Yamin, M dan Windymadaksa, S. (2017).
“Pembangunan Kereta Cepat Jakarta-
Bandung Sebagai Mercusuar Hubungan
Indonesia-Tiongkok”[Jakarta-Bandung Fast
Train Development as a Lighthouse of
Indonesia-China Relations]. Jurnal Politik
Profetik. Volume 5, No. 2: 217.
Zhu, Yuchao. (2011). “China and International
‘Human Rights Diplomacy.” China: an
International Journal. 9. 2 (Sept): 217 – 245.

67
 INDEX

56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 64,

A 65, 66, 67, 71
China National Space
abuse of power, 2, 3, 26 Administration, 28
ACFTA, 21 civil society, 19, 22, 27, 40
arbitrary government, 13
ASEAN, 21, 44, 45 D
ASEAN-China Free Trade
Agreement, 21 democratic, 13, 22
Asia, 5, 6, 64 developing country, 1

B E
Belt and Road Initiative, 5, 42, economic development, 13, 15,
55 16, 17, 48
bilateral agreements, 1, 2, 26 economic liberalism, 17
bilateral relations, 2, 12, 19, 26, environmental issues, 2, 13,
49, 54 26, 37
Eradication of the Ideological
C Virus, 42

China, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12, F

21, 22, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32,
33, 37, 38, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, fishing vessels, 9
46, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, Foreign Policy, 1, 52, 55, 59
Foreign Workers, 33, 34, 60

68
 G Jokowi, 1, 7, 8, 48, 59, 62, 65
Jusuf Kalla, 41
green shift, 40

K
H
KCIC, 12, 39
Han dynasty, 4 Kereta Cepat Indonesia Cina,
human rights, 2, 3, 13, 14, 17, 12
26, 41, 44, 51, 53

I
imports, 40
INDEPENDENCE, 26
Indonesia, 2, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 21,
26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 35, 36,
37, 38, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45,
46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53,
54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61,
62, 64, 65, 66, 67
Indonesian National Search
and Rescue Agency, 28
investment, 1, 3, 11, 13, 14, 15,
16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 26, 29,
31, 32, 40, 41, 45, 52, 65
L
Labor, 32, 35, 50, 59
legal equality, 2, 26, 31, 49
M
Malaysia, 21, 40, 42, 45, 63
Maritime, 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 26,
28, 29, 47, 52, 54, 57, 61, 62,
65, 66
Maritime Axis, 1, 2, 7, 8, 10, 26,
47, 54, 61, 62, 65
Middle East, 5, 64
Multilateral cooperation, 20
Muslims, 41, 42, 58, 60

J N
Jalesveva Jayamahe, 8 Natuna, 38, 45, 52
Japan, 5, 11, 12, 30, 65 NGOs, 14, 22
Japan International
Corporation Agency, 12, 30 O
JICA, 12, 30
Joko Widodo, 27, 55, 62 Old Order, 1

69
One Belt & One Road, 4, 5, 56 Sovereignty, 13, 23, 24, 29, 56,
63
P state sovereignty, 3, 12, 13, 24,
45
Pakistan, 42
Palestine, 42 T
Political economy, 23
political science, 23 territorial, 7, 24, 46, 47, 48
pollution, 13, 20, 50, 53 Thailand, 21, 45, 46, 63
The Doha Declaration, 16
R
U
religious movements, 42
Remote Sensing Agreement, unemployment, 35, 36, 50
28 Uyghur, 41, 42, 44, 51, 55
Rohingya, 42, 51
rule of law, 1, 2, 12, 13, 53 V
Russia, 40
vessels, 38, 46, 47, 52
Vietnam, 21, 38, 45, 63
S
Saudi Arabia, 42 W
Silk Road, 1, 2, 4, 5, 10, 11, 26,
WTO, 16
40, 41, 54, 56, 57, 61
Singapore, 11, 21, 45, 63
Soekarno, 1
X
South China Sea, 38, 45, 52, 53, Xi Jinping, 5, 27, 55
59, 61 Xinjiang, 6, 41, 42, 43, 60
South East Asia, 5, 6, 11

70
 ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Hasan Mustapa
Participants in the Chinese Cultural and Language
program at Nanjing Normal University, China
(2016-2017). Worked at the Regional Secretariat of
the Garut Regency Government (2005-2019).
Starting in September, he became a lecturer at the
Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Sunan
Gunung Djati State Islamic University, Bandung.
The author can be contacted via e-mail via:
hmustafa396@gmail.com or kangmoez@uinsgd.ac.id

Faruq Ansori
Nanjing Normal University School of Law
International Law PhD Program student.

Melda Juwita
Ph.D. Program in Geography Economics
Department, Human Geography Department at
Nanjing Normal University School of Geography.

71