ABOUT THE AUTHORS AND ILLUSTRATORS

MARK STILLE (Command er, United States Navy, retired) received his BAin history
fro m the University of Mary land and also holds an MA from the Naval War College.
He has worked in the int elligence community for 30 years , including tours on
the faculty of the Naval War College, on the Joint Staff and on US Navy ships.
He is currently a senior ana lyst working in the Washington DC area. He is the
RITISH DREADNOUGHT
author of numerous Osprey t itles, focusing on naval history in the Pacific, and
also of sever al wa rgames .

IAN PALMER is a high ly experienced digita l artist. A graduate in 3D des ign, he

GERMANDREADNOUGHT
cu rrentl y works as Art Direct or for a leading UK games developer. Besides his
art ist ic int erest s he is also a keen musicia n and moto rcyc list. He lives in Surre y
JUTLAND 1916
wit h his wife and daughte r, and two cats .

HOWARD GERRARD studied at t he Wallasey School of I

freelance des igner and illustrator for over 20 years. HI
of publishers and is an associate member of the Guild
won both the Society of British Aerospace Companies
Sword Trophy and has illustrated a number of books fe
and works in Kent.

MARK STILLE
l pub lished in C rear Britain in 20 10 by Os prey Publish ing,
lJand H ou se, Wesr Way, Bod ey, O xfo rd, 0X2 OPH , UK
02 23 rd 51, Suite 2 19, Lon g Island Ci ty, N Y 1110 1, USA
tail: info@osprcypublishing.com

:0 10 O sprey Publishi ng Ltd.

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:IP catalogue record fo r this book is available from the British Library.

'I ISBN: 9781 84908 167 2

F e-book ISBN: 9781 849 08 16 8 9

, layout by: Ken Vail G raph ic Design, Cam bridge, UK

:x by Sand ra Sho trcr
(set in fTC Co nduit and Ado be Garamo nd
CONTENTS
)5 by Boun fo rd.com
;i nat ed by PD Q Digital Med ia Solut ions
ted in C hina through Bookbui lders Introduction 4
II 12 13 14 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2

rey Publ ish ing is suppo rting the Woo d land Tru st, the UK's leadin g woo dland
Chro nology 8
.ervarion charity, by funding the dedicatio n o f trees.
Design and Development 10
no wl edg em ent s
author wou ld like thank th e sraff of the Naval H istory and Heritage
10

imand Photographi c Sect ion (forme rly the US Naval H istor ical Center) for
The Strategic Situation 28
. assistance in procuring the photographs used in this book. Special thanks go
(eirh Allen and friends who graciously reviewed the (ext and clarified many Technical Specifications 34
nical poi n ts fo r the autho r.

icat io n The Combatants 46

boo k is ded icated to Bill Karwacki
Combat S3
Statistics and Analysis 71
Aftermath 76
Further Reading 78
Index 80
 Conqueror was a powerf ul ship
with a balanced , impressive
appearance . Shown here
before the war, her foremast
was shortened and the
torpedo nets removed before
Jutl and. She served in the
Grand Fleet throughout the
war and was scrapped in 1923.

INTRODUCTION
Since 1805 , the Royal Navy had reigned supreme on the world's oceans. Though th is
supremacy was challenged at tim es, by the turn of the 20th century the Royal Navy
was f.1cing its most serious challenge in some 100 years. T his challenge came in th e
form of a united Germa ny and its growin g industrial strength. As the two most
powerful industrial powers in Euro pe, Germany and Britain were engaged in trade
com petition; by the turn of the century thi s com petition was beginning to take a
more alarmi ng turn in the form of a naval rivalry.
With its global empire and worldwide tradin g int erests, Britain needed a large navy
to maintain its position and power. What concerned the British was the developm ent
of a sizeable navy by a continental power with no naval tradition and, seemingly, no
need for such a force. T he reasons why Germany became a mar itime power remain
controversial even tod ay. Many in Germany felt that a great power, as German y was
becomi ng, had to possess a stro ng navy to bolster its statu s and to support and defend
its trading int erests. T here is also evidence that the drive for a powerful navy had its
root s in Ge rma n internal politics. When the Stat e Secretary of the Im perial Naval
Offic e, Admiral Alfred von Tirpirz, began to agitate for a large navy he found fertile
squad rons of eight ships each along with two fleet flagships and four reserve
battle ships. T his dram atic Ge rma n decision to challenge Britain's naval supremacy
not only put the Royal Navy on noti ce, but changed the direction of British foreign
policy. In order to maintain its com mandi ng naval position and contai n Germany, the
British abando ned th eir po licy of isolation. From 190 2 to 1907 , agreeme nts were
reached with Japan, France and Russia. T hus, when an event in Euro pe set off the
powder keg between the two opposing power blocks, the British were virtually ensured
of being dragged in against Ger ma ny.T his consequence was the tru e legacy of T irpirz's
desire to build a large fleer. As T irpirz's dr eam of a large Ger man Navy was gaining
favour in his homel and , the Royal Navy was undergoing a transform ation , led by the
cont roversial First Sea Lord , Admiral of th e Fleet Sir John Fisher. As the Royal Navy's
leader from 1904 to 1910 , Fisher oversaw its transfo rm at ion from the com placency
of the world's dominant peacetime navy, to a force ready to conduct mod ern war. He
dir ected that large numbers of obsolete warships be scrapped and that the fleet be
concentrated in home waters to oppose the growing German fleet. T he most dramatic
of Fisher's plans was the int roduction of a new type of warsh ip based on his conc epts
of an all-big-g un warship. T his ship, nam ed Dreadnought, was so revolut ion ary that
Bell erophon wa s a virt ual

ground and a large degree of support. repeat of Dreod nought.

Armour wa s act ually weaker,
In 1897, Tirpitz outlined a plan to increase the size of the German Navy to provide
but one impro vement was to
political and military leverage against Ge rmany's most dangerou s enem y, Britain. The move the for emast in front
goal for 1905 was to possess a fleet of 19 battleship s. T his force was the so-called 'risk of th e forw ard smokestack,
fleet' - a fleet powerful eno ugh to act as a deter rent against a Briti sh attack, by reducing smoke interference
in th e gunn ery control
threatening the Royal Navy with such severe losses that it wo uld lose its maritime
posit ion. She ser ved the
supremacy. If the British were allayed by Germa n promises that this fleet was purely
ent ire war ass igned to the
~l
defensive, there was no doubt about th e purpose of the Second Ger man Naval Law Grand Fleet and was sold for
of June 1900. T he law pro vid ed for a fleet of 38 battl eships, organized into four scrap in 1922 . 5
 Naval balanc e, August 1914
Dreadnoughts
In s ervice:
Under construction:
Battlecruisers
In ser vice:
Under constru ction:
Pre-dreadnoughts
Rheinl and ente red serv ice
in April 1910 and is pict ured
here soon afterwards.
At Jut land, she was hit by a
sing le secondary gun round
and repa ired in under two
weeks. She was later heavily
damaged afte r running
aground off the Finn ish coast
in April 1918. The vessel was
laid up as an accommodat ion
sh ip before being turn ed over
to th e Allies in 1920 and
6 scrapped in 1921.
it m ad e ever y o the r battl esh ip obsolete. II was also a
controversial mo ve in Britain, as it wip ed awa y the Royal
Britain Germany
Navy's existi n g adva ntage in battl eships and levelled th e
playing field , th us providing th e erma ns with a chance to
22 15 catch up . T he advent of Dreadnought was followed by Fisher's
13 5 pet project, the bartl ecru iser, whi ch co m b ine d th e hitt ing
power of a bat tleship and the spee d of a cru iser. T he cos t of
thi s com bination was a relative lack of armou red p rot ection ,
9 3
wh ich Fisher, in co rrectly, believed cou ld be com pensated for
1 3
with superior speed . T he result of Fisher's revolu tio n was that
40 22 th e stre ng th of any navy was now m easured in te rm s of the
number of dr eadnou gh ts it po ssessed . All battl eships des igned
befo re Dreadnought we re consid ered as 'pre- dread n ough ts' and we re no lon ger fit for
duties wi th th e m ain battle fleet.
Fishe r was willing to take th e risk of radi cally changing th e naval balance with the
introduction of Dreadnought because he calculated th at British sh ipyards could out-
build any rival. Fishe r was cor rect in thi s belief. By th e start of th e wa r in August 191 4 ,
th e Royal N avy had established a firm su per ior ity, as dem on strated by th e table above.
NAVAL STRATEGY IN 1914
For both Britain and Germa ny, co ntro l of the North Sea was vital. After all th e d rama
an d expense of th e great naval race between the two countries, the co mmanders of
both navies expec te d a t itan ic naval clash shortly afte r war was de clared. Yet the
strategies on bot h sides ensure d th at such a clash between dread nough ts would not
occ ur for two years, and th en by accide nt.
Traditionally, th e Royal N avy preferred to in st itute a close blocka de of its
o ppo ne nts to ensure that Brit ish sh ip ping was undisturbed , and to ma ximi ze the
cha nces th at an enemy would be b rou ght to battle. By th e 20 th century, however,
new naval technologies had m ad e a close blockad e too da ngerous. T he introduction
of m in es an d to rpedoes aboard submarines , to rpe do boats and destroyers m ade it too
dangero us to m aintain large units close to ene my nava l bases. Briefly, the Royal Navy
co nsidere d th e use of an 'observational blockade' centred on a point in th e No rt h Sea
halfway between Ge rmany and Britain , b ut even th is was d ismisse d as im practical.
W hen th e Brit ish d eclared war o n Germa ny in Aug ust 191 4, th ey put in p lace a
distant blockade w ith th e aim of co ntrolling th e exits from the North Sea. T he G rand
Fleet was cha rged to co nduct freq ue nt sweeps in to the No rt h Sea to keep the Germa n
fleet in port an d to assert co ntro l of th e wa te rs. T he C ha n nel Fleet , based aro und a
number of p re-dread nou ghts, bloc ked th e English C ha n ne l. C ru isers pat roll ed th e
area fro m th e She tlands to th e N o rwegian coas t.
T he G erm an s were co unting o n th e British to try to impose a close block ad e of th e
Heli goland Bight. T he intention was that if the Royal N avy app eared close to Ge rma n
bases, U-boats, torped o craft and extens ive m in e ba rra ges wou ld infli ct losses on th e
numerically superior Briti sh unti l the Germa n heavy uni ts co uld engage th e G rand
Fleet at equal streng th. Even if th e Royal N avy did not atte m p t a close blo ckad e, th e
Ge rmans bel ieved tha t th e British wo u ld still co m m it light forces to wa tch th e
Hel igoland Bight, and tha t th e Royal N avy wo uld be forced to sup po rt these forces.
T h is situation wo u ld still offer the Ge rma ns ample opport u nity to arrrite the Gra nd
Fleet unti l th e od ds had been evened . In the event th at th e battleshi ps of th e Gra nd
Fleet remai ned n ear Scapa Flow (their ma in naval base) on di sta nt blockad e, th e
Ge rmans felt th ey did no t have su fficient strength to attack them at that locatio n.
T h is outcome is actually what happen ed whe n wa r began - the Grand Fleet went to
its blockade sta tion at Scapa Flow and no ligh t un its were commi tted to watch the
Germa n bases o n th e Hel igoland Bight. T he German naval staff had no pla ns to deal
with thi s eventua lity.
T he co m ma nde r of th e G rand Fleet, Admi ral Sir John je llicoe, realized tha t he had
a signi ficant ad vantage in d read n ou ghts over th e Ge rmans, but was wo rrie d abo ut
wha t he perceived as a critical Ge rma n adva ntage in destroyers, as well as th e mine and
U-boat threat . T hese dan gers reinforced his determination not to take th e Grand Fleet
too close to Ge rm any's North Sea bases. T he com m ande r o f th e Ge rma n Hi gh Seas
Fleet was under orders from th e Kaiser not to risk th e fleet un less there was th e
likelihood of victo ry. Such an op po rt u n ity could on ly exist if the G rand Fleet had
already su ffered attrition o r if th e Ge rma ns found an o pportu n ity to en gage ju st a
portion of th e Briti sh warsh ips. W ith both sides relu ctant to co m mit thei r m ain fleets
in any th ing bu t favoura ble circu ms tances, and both sides unli kely to bel ieve th at a
given sit ua tion was favo urable anyway, a majo r clash between fleets was go ing to be a
m atter of accide nt, not design.
?
 DESIGN AND
DEVELOPMENT
ADVENT OF THE DREADNOUGHT
O n 2 October 190 5, a revolutionary new wars h ip was laid down in Po rts m outh,
England . T he ship was launched in an incre dible fo ur months an d was com pleted
and ready to com mence sea tr ials in an eq ually remarkable spa n of 365 days. T he
ship, name d H MS Dreadnought, was so advanced th at she immediately rendered every
\
o the r existing battl eship obso lete. W hat mad e th is shi p so rema rka ble? Most
significant, Dreadnoughtwas th e first 'all-big-gun' ship. Previou s battl eships carried an
array of weapons, usua lly a m ain battery of 12in guns supported by several ot her
batteries of lesser size. Because actio ns were conducte d at fairly short ran ges, th e
sma ller guns sup po rt ing th e slow- firing main guns were pe rfectly ade quate for
penetrati ng th e more lightl y armo ured areas of an enemy battleship. Yet as improved
fire-control proce dures pu shed engageme nt ranges out farther, th e effectiveness of the
sma ller guns began to di m in ish . Additiona lly, fire control was actua lly made more
difficult by the imp ossibility of distinguishing th e splashes of th e 12in gun s fro m any
of the ship's othe r guns.
T he mer its of th e all-big-gun ship were obvious not only to th e British. T he Italians
and th e Ame ricans were also exploring this concept, and th e US Navy had already
design ed and been autho rized two all-big-gun battleships earlier in 1905. However,
th e Royal Navy under the energetic an d far-sighted Fisher was the first to take action
with th e constructio n of Dreadnought. Fishe r orde red that the new stea m turbi ne
powerplant, still not per fected, was also placed on Dreadnought, giving her a speed of
10 2 1 knots an d making her the fastest battleship in th e wo rld at th e rime,
Accompanying th e advent of the Dreadnoughtwas the introduc tion of Fisher's pet The 13.5in guns aboard
project, th e battl eship- cru iser. These ship s, eventually know n as bartlecru isers, also Emperor of Indio, shown here.
were formidable weapons.
feat ure d an all-big-g un arm ament and the new steam turb ines. T he princi pal
At 20 degreeselevation. they
diffe rence between th em an d a drea dno ught was the provision of a lighter scale of could th row a 1,4001b shell
armour pro tection . This red uced weight burden , combined wi th the tur bi nes, gave a maximum of 23,800 yards.
t he new ba tt lecruisers a several kno t speed advantage ove r dre ad nought s and all Awell-trained gun crew could
fire almost two rounds per
armo ured cru isers of the day. The extra speed, Fisher believed , wo uld act as a measure
minute.
of prot ection . T he batrlecru isers possessed the pace and armament to hunt down
an d destroy the most powerful armo ured cru isers of th e period, whi le their speed
gave them the o ption of wit hdrawing from action against a d read nou gh t with
superior armame nt . This premise, however, was forgo tte n by bo th sides during the
war, when the bat tlecru iser was for ced to engage ship s eq uipped with heavy
armament. Give n th e bartlecruiser's inferio r pro tec tion , the results were predictable.
11
 The main st ay German
1 ,
DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS dreadnou ght weapon was the
12in gun mounted in double
turret s, as seen here on
Dreadnought designs are a fine balance between several competing factors. The Kaiser before t he out break of
foremo st of these are firepower, protection and propulsion . Each facto r carries with wa r. The max imum elevation

it weight and cost considerations. In general, British d readno ught designs tended to of the t urret was 13.5
degrees , whic h gave a
stress firepower. British bat tleships carried larger guns than their German counterparts,
maximum range of 21,0 00
giving th em grea ter firepower. Conversely, Ge rma n battl eship design ers tended to yards. Aft er Dogger Bank , th e
em phasize protection at th e expense of firepower. A major facto r in the competing Germans began a progr amm e

efforts to provide adequate protection was that after a certa in point in the dreadnought of inc reasin g the elevat ion of
the ir 12in t urrets to 16
race it was dictated to Royal Navy designers th at an inc rease in beam was not possible
degrees , which tr anslated to
due to the size of existing dry docks to accommod ate the ship s. The Germans had no a maximum range of 22,300
such restr ictions. T heir battl eship s possessed a greater beam th at in turn allowed for yards. By Jut land, however,
increased pro tect ive measures, which included greater subd ivision and the inclusion only Prinzregent Luitp old had
been so modifi ed. The hoists
of tor pedo bulkh eads.
in Germa n tu rret s were fast er
than th ose in Brit is h turr ets,
so th e rate of fire for German
FIREPOWER
turrets appro ached th ree

The mainstay British naval weapon at the start of the dreadno ught era was th e 12in rounds per m inute.

gun, dating back to 1893. In orde r to improve the mu zzle veloc ity, range and
penetration of th is weapon , its barrel length had been expanded from 35 calibre to 50 advoca ted tha t cap ital ships sho uld mou nt an all-big-gun arma ment. T he Iro n D uke
calibre. At longer ranges, however, it was found that the latest versions had accura cy class was th e first to use a Gin gun secon dary armament, and this weapo n becam e
problems. T he high mu zzle velocity also had the effect of increasing wear and tear on standard on all subsequent design s. The G erm an Navy adopted th e 5.9in gun as their
the barrel, thus reducing gun life. d read no ught secondary arm ament from the start.
To solve this problem, the Royal Navy went to the 13.5 in gun beginning with the
O rio n class of d readn ou ghts. Most imp ortantl y, this gun provided for a much larger
shell with imp roved penetration. The larger shell and increase in bore also permi tt ed
a lower m uzzle velocity, which made for much greater accuracy and less barrel wear.
T he fin al developm ent of Royal Na vy pre-w ar dreadnought arma ment was the
prod uction of a 15in gun. Its combination of reliability and accuracy made it on e of
th e best large guns ever developed by the Royal Navy. Because the m uzzle velocity
was compara tively low, the barrel life was also o utstanding. OSlfrie sl and in 1920 under

T he Ger ma n Navy's first d readn ou ghts used an 11in gun th at possessed a high American cont rol. This
overhead shot present s a fine
mu zzle velocity and thu s outstan ding range. It fired a relatively sma ll shell, however,
view of her main armam ent
which limited its pe netration. In their seco nd class of dreadno ughts, the Germans and part of her 5.9in
introd uced a slightly larger 12in gun. They clung to the 12in shell even as the British casemate-moun ted second ary
moved on to th e 13.5in and fina lly a 15in shell, preferring the greater rang e and armame nt . Ostjriesland was
perhaps th e most well-known
pen etr ation against the higher barrel wear and red uced accuracy.
German dreadnought because
Altho ugh Briti sh dr eadnou ghts carried a larger main gun th an th eir Ge rma n of th e series of test s she
oppo nents, this was not the case for the seconda ry armament. T he Royal Navy used endured in 1921. After being
4in guns from Dreadnought up through the King George V class. These were m uch hit by 80 bombs of var ious
sizes and 24 she lls, she was
criticized for being inadeq uate to dea l with th e growi ng size of torpedo boats and
finall y sunk by Colonel Billy
destroyers. T he Royal Navy was un able to get a larger seconda ry armament due to
Mitchell on 21 July 19 21 by

1-
14 the increased costs of mounting a Gin gun battery, and th e views of Fisher who had 15
six large bombs.

FIRE CONTROL
The true measure of a battl eship's effectiveness is not the size and number of its gun s,
but its ability to hit its target. At short rang e, a shell follows a flat trajectory, wh ich
redu ces the fire-control problem of co mpe nsa ting for th e roll of th e ship while
po inting th e gun at th e ta rget. As th e ran ge of guns continued to increase, th e
importance of effective fire co nt rol over great er distan ces was magnified. At lon ger
ranges, the trajectory of the shell increases and a nu mber of factors affect the accuracy
of gunnery. By the outbreak of war, the Royal Navy had devised a very elaborate
system of fire co nt rol. The basis for long-rang e fire was th e use of a rangefinder to
measure th e d istanc e from a gun to its target. The sta ndard Briti sh battl eship
rangefinder was th e 9ft-l on g coinc ide nce rangefinder developed by Barr and Stro ud.
It was technicall y capable of providing ranges within 85 yards at 10,000 yards. As was
later evidenced at Jutland, however, the accuracy of the rangefinder was much reduced
in service due to light refraction and the heating of the rangefinder tube.
A rangefinder pro vided onl y th e tru e ran ge, howeve r, not the gun ran ge, which
need ed to include the distance s of target m ovement and ow n ship's mov em ent.
Factoring in all these variables provid ed what is known as the range rate. To do this, the
Royal Navy adopted an analogue computing device (known more commonly as the
Dumaresq, after its inventor) , which helped compute and check the range rate against
other data. The range rate information was tran smitted to guns electromechanically by
means of a Vickers receiver-transmitter, which eq uipped all ships after Dreadnought. In
1912, th e Admiralty adopted the Dreyer Table to pro vide a fairly com prehe nsive
approach to fire control, allowing operators to visually compare ranges reported by
rangefind ers to a continuously evolving estim ate of the range bein g sent to the gun s.
Unfortunately for the Royal Navy, the Dreyer Tab le was unable to contend with rapid
changes of range rates, and pre-war exercises had demonstrated that a skilled gunnery
Orion show ing her two
forward 13.Sin gun turrets.
Jus t aft of these is t he heavi ly
armoured conning tower fr om
whi ch the ship would fight
and navigate in batt le. The
foremast is pos iti oned aft
of the smokes tack, showing
t he obvi ous problems its
occupants wou ld enco unte r
fr om smo ke in many wind
16 condit ions.
officer provided better solutions. A much superior system, the Argo Clock, was available
before the war, but was rejected. Event ually, th e Argo system did find its way aboard a
few dreadnoughts, and at least four ships were fitted with it at Jutland .
T he Royal Navy used a system of centralized fire cont rol, whi ch relied on a cent ral
director, usually fitted in th e fo retop , that enabled all th e ship's guns to be trained, laid
and fired from a single position. T he training angle and elevation for th e guns were
tran smitted electronically from th e director to each of th e turrets, where th e desired
settings were laid automatically by th e control systems in th e turret.
The Germ an s did not develop such a so phisticated approach to fire control, a
situa tio n easily explained by the Ge rmans' int ention to fight at relatively sho rt ranges.
H owever, at Jutl and, the German fire control system proved at least as effective as th e
British system. T he Germa ns relied on 9ft lOin range finde rs, which like th ose of th e
British , were mounted on each turret and in th e bridgewo rk. In 190 8, th e Ge rma ns
ad opted a ste reoscopic ran gefinder and introduced a Dumaresq eq u ivalent that
provid ed target deflection. The Ge rma n fire control system was very dependent on
the skill of th e arti llery officer to estim ate range rate. O n Ge rman battl eship s, fire was
co ntrolled from the armo ured co nn ing towe r, where th e art illery office r took orde rs
from th e ship's commanding officer and spo tted th e fall of shot. T he director-po inte r
system in th e gunne ry co nt rol tower genera ted a training angle for th e turrets, but
each turret was laid and fired individually.
PR OTECTION
By 1905 , th e state-of-the-a rt battl eship armo ur was Krupp cemente d plate armo ur.
At this tim e, norm al battl e ranges were assessed to be at 6,000 yards, and lon g-ran ge
engagements maybe o ut to 10,000 yards. At both th ese ranges, th e shell of a high-
velocity gun would strike its target's sides. For this reason, a dreadn ou ght 's arm our was
con centrated on its main belt on th e hull. Weight pen alties made it imp ossible to
Collingwood under
const ruction befor e her launch
on November 1908. She was
part of the thi rd 8riti sh class
of dreadnoughts, but off ered
lit tl e impro vement over
Dreodnought. This view
shows her stern torpedo tub e.
Both th e Brit ish and Germans
thought th at batt leship -
launched torpedoes would
be pote nt weapons in a
dreadnought duel, and both
retained t hem throughout the
war. In practi ce, th ey proved
utterly ineffective. Also not e
th e recess in th e hull where th e
belt armour would be fitted . 17
 extend the main belt over the ship's entire length or up the entire heigh t of the hull,
so it was situa ted along the waterline to guard th e shi p's vital areas. In practice, thi s
di stribution meant that it exte nded from the forward-most turret to th e m ost aft
turret, providing protection for the magazine s and propulsion spaces. T he armo ur
above th e main belt was tapered and was prim arily int ended to prov ide protection
against high-exp losive shells - th e effect of these shells against unarmoured parts of the
ship was shown to be devastating in th e Russo-Japanese wa r of 190 4-05.
Both British and Ge rma n battl eship s were well protected from heavy shell imp acts
at what was con sidered normal battle ranges, but as a matter of course German main
belts were thicker tha n British one s. Since it was believed tha t heavy shells wou ld not
have th e trajectory to strike the ship's hori zontal areas, deck armour was comparatively
light, sufficient to pro vide prot ectio n against splinte r damage from shells bursting
above. Later, wh en better fire control allowed for great er engagement ranges (10,000
yards and beyond) , the trajectory of shells was steeper, wh ich meant that it was the
deck s of the ships being stru ck, not th e sides. Both British and Ge rm an ships lacked
adeq uate deck armo ur against heavy shells.
The adve nt of reliabl e tor pedoes and th e threat of m ine s dem anded th at early
dr eadnought design s provide ade q uate protection below the waterline . For th e tru e
vulnerability of early dread no ughts was not again st she llfire, but against underwater
dam age. T his was especially tru e with British dr eadnoughts, which lacked ad eq uate
protecti on from torpedoes, a fact th at helped shape British tacti cs at Jutl and .
D readnought was de signed with o n ly a thin pro tective screen covering her
magazines and shell rooms. The first Germ an dr eadnoughts, in contrast, were fitt ed
wit h a co ntin uo us 1.25in anti-torpedo bu lkhead that protected all her vita l below-
deck spaces. In th eir seco nd class of d readnought, th e British enhanced underwater
protection by extendi ng the screen over all vit al spaces in a com para ble manner to
the Germans. Yet from the Co lossus to Iron Duke classes, th e British reverted to
the use of screens covering on ly the magazine spaces. T he Queen Elizabeth and
Revenge classes we re fitted wit h anti-to rpe do bulges, which were design ed to
detonat e th e to rp ed o as far as possibl e from th e sh ip's internal bulkhead s wh ile
also pro viding protecti on from splinte r dam age. The provision of a bul ge, whe n
properly designed, provided a h igh level of protection again st the small torpedo
warheads of th e day, and was the equal of German underwater protection. Both the
Royal Na vy and the G erma n N avy also atte m p ted to provid e underwat er
prot ection with elaborat e subdivision sche mes . In th is area the Ge rma ns were more
successful, since their sh ips had wid er beam s and closer subd ivisio n requirem ents.
Even subdivision, however, had its limi ts, as the pum p ing and d rainage systems
that passed tho ugh bu lkh ead s still permitted the ent ry of floodwater when th ey
wer e broken.
PROPULSION
Prior to D readnought, th e ma in propulsion systems in battleships involved
18 recipro cating machinery. T he issue with reciproc ating machin ery was th at it tended
to overheat when run at high speeds over a sustained period, primarily because of
difficulties with effective lubricati on. Additionally, vibration at high speeds was a real
probl em. T he stea m turbine offered many pot enti al adva ntages (see below), but in
1905 it remain ed an unproven technology, o nly being first used o n a ship in 1897.
T he Royal Navy's decision to use turbi nes on D readnought was a bold on e.
T he introduction of turbines offered consid erab le weight advantages . For
example, o n Dreadnoughtthe weight savings amo unte d to some 1,000 ton s d irectl y
and indi rectly, we ight th at could be devoted to add it io nal arm ou r or guns. In
service, th e turbine proved more reliable th an reciprocating machinery and gave th e
ship the abi lity to stea m at higher speeds for lon ger distances. Yet early turbines had
problem s du e to th e different ro ta tiona l speed requirem ents of th e turbines and th e
prop ellers. Tur bines wo rk mo st efficiently at high er rot at ion al speeds co ntrasted to
prop eller s th at work better at lower rotati on al spee ds . When th e turb in es we re
attached to the propellers by direct drive, th is resu lted in lower top spe ed s and
in creased fuel consumption. The introd uction of gear ed turb in es solved th ese
problems, but th is solutio n was not used o n dr eadnou ghts until afte r t he wa r.
Ano ther problem was appare nt only after the sta rt of th e war, whe n d read no ugh ts
were more frequently run at high speeds. Such usage caused the brass seawa ter pip es
in the condenser to leak, th us allowing saltwate r int o the feed water. This effect was
kn own as 'im pingem ent' and remained a problem th rou gh out th e wa r - during th e
first part of th e wa r, d readn ou ghts of both sides were placed out of action by thi s
m ech ani cal failure. In co nt rast to Briti sh sh ips, Ge rma n ships used sma ll-t ube
boil ers and lighter materials. The extra space and weigh t savings cou ld be devot ed
to extra protection , but Briti sh tur bin es and large-tube boilers proved to be very
reliable in serv ice.
D ur ing th e war, th e design of later dr eadn ou ghts featured the use of oil fuel in
preference to coal. The advantages of oil were obvious. Wh en burned fully, oil provides When launched on 10
30 per cent more heat per pound tha n coal. Operat ion ally, the use of oil suspended Februar y 190 6, Dreodnoug ht
th e need to re-coal every few days, a messy pro cedure. Refuellin g with oil, by revoluti onized naval warfar e.
There were several
com parison, was mu ch faster and easier. Beginning with th e Queen Elizabeth class,
weakn esses to her design, but
all British dreadnou ghts were oil-fired . T he Ge rma ns d id not int rodu ce th eir first oil- her overall capabilities made
fired dreadn ought until th e Bayern class. previous batt leship s obsolete.
•
19
 Temeraire pict ured before
th e war. Built to a modif ied
r Following th e completion of D readnought in Octo ber 190 6, the ship ran trials for
ano ther six months. H er design, and her un proven steam turb ines, proved to be a

+
Dreadn ought design, she sti ll
comp lete success. Now th e Royal Navy q uickly had to build a lead in d read no ught
employ ed an awkward main
nu mbers. Fisher incl ude d plans for four sister ships for Dreadnought in the 1906
battery layout , using wing
turrets. Present at Jutl and, budget, but onl y three were approved . T hese shi ps, kno wn as th e Belleroph on class,
she played only a minor part. had less main belt armo ur th an Dreadnought, but had bett er subdivision. In addition,
She was later sent to Turkish th e more effective 4in gu n replaced the 3in gun as the ship s' secon dary battery. The
waters in 1918, before being
Admiralty again asked for four dreadnough ts in 1907 , but once more on ly three were
scrapped in 1922 after a brief
period as a cadet ship. approved . T hese becam e th e St Vincent class, but th ey were essent ially repeats of th e
D readnought design . The o nly significan t differen ce was th e provision of a new
develop ment of the 12in gun with bett er per forma nce .
The fourth ship req uested in 1907 was act ually postpon ed to 1908 and was
completed to a mo dified design . T his ship, N eptune, featured a new layout for its ten
12in guns, designed to imp rove the broadside firepower. Instead of the wing tur rets
on Dreadnought, Nep tune was fitte d with th e two m iddl e turrets in a stagge red
arrangement that permitted each to fire crossdeck in a broadsi de. Neptunealso featured
th e first use ofsuperfiring turrets. The two additiona l d read nou gh ts approved in 1909
were built to a simi lar desig n to N eptune an d featured the use of the staggered or
ROYAL NAVY DREADNOUGHT DESIGNS 'echelon' turret arra ngeme nt ami dshi ps. In service, however, thi s design was not
practical and was not repeated. T hese ships also carr ied a heavier main armour belt,
In gene ral, it is accurate to say th at the Royal Navy placed more im po rt ance on but underwater protection was infer ior beca use of the deletion of torpedo bu lkheads.
re-building a commandi ng nu merical lead over its nearest dr eadn ought competitor Also approved in 1909 was the first of the 'super- dreadnough ts', so called because of Thunderer was th e last ship
th an o n producin g ships of great qu alit y. W he n co m pa red with Germa n th e move up to a 13-5in gun. Orion was th e first ship to car ry the new weapo n. Also laid down of the Orion class of
super-dreadnoughts. Note
dr eadn ou ghts, British shi ps did not compa re well ind ividually, but any q ualitative for th e first tim e, all five main batt ery tur rets were mounted on the cent re line, thu s
th at all her 13.5in tur rets are
advantage the Germans may have possessed was overshadowed by the product ivity ensuring maxi m um broa dside firepower. located on t he centre line with
of British sh ipyards. In 1909, the naval race betwee n Brita in an d Germany was in full swing. After the clear arcs of fi re. At Jut land,
Brit ish govern me nt learned of th e provisio ns of th e Ger man Supplementary Nava l she fir ed only 37 main gun
round s. After t he war, she
Law of 1908 , the usual pace of th ree dreadn ou ghts per year was abando ned in favour
served as a cadet ship from
of six battl eships and four battlecrui sers. The ot her three bat tleships approved in 1909
1921 to 19 26, before being
were also built to the Orion design, and were laid down in 19 10. The next two classes, broken up.

Hercules pictured before t he

war. The booms locat ed along
th e hull are for torpedo nets,
but were removed in 1915 -
16. Hercules was the fir st
atte mpt to break away from
the basic Dreadnought desig n
by abandoning the use of
wing tu rrets in favour of an
arra ngement where all five
t urrets could fir e broadside.
This layout proved a failur e in
servi ce. Hercules survive d the
war to go int o reserve in 1919
20 and was scrapped in 192 2. 21
 l

__. .: _ ..::.::..•-:.=:-.-. J _ o_ _

totalling eight ships, were little mod ified from the design of Orion. Four ships of the Queen Elizabeth was
King George V class were approved in 1910 followed by four ships of the Iron Duke t he epitome of Brit ish
dreadnoug ht des ign during
class in 1911 . The Iron Dukes were fitted with th e larger 6in-gun seconda ry batt ery
the war. Of the five ship s in
made essentia l by the increasing size of torpedo boats and destroyers. the class, only Queen
T he next big step in Royal Navy dreadnought design was already in the works . Elizobeth mis sed Jutland.
Approval for the Q ueen Elizabeth class was given in 191 2, and by 1913 wo rk was All five were modernized to
serve in World War II.
begun on all five un its. All were commissioned after the sta rt of the war, yet all bu t
one were present at Jutl and. W hen launched the y were beyond qu estion the most
powerful ships in the world . T hey were the first British dreadn ought s to move to an
oil-fired propul sion system, and with th eir more powerful machin ery they were the
fastest battleship s of the day. Armour was also increased. Most impo rtan tly, the new
15in gun was fitted; because the weight of shell was so m uch greater than the 13.5in
gun, her designers were able to move to an eight-gun batt ery instead of the custo mary
ten guns.
The last class of British battl eship s completed during the war were the five units
of the Revenge class. T hese were plann ed to be heavily armed and armo ured 2 1-knot
ships suitable for work in the North Sea. As such, they were essentially a 15in gun
version of the Iron Duke class. T his intent, however, was thrown into confusion whe n
Fisher retu rned as First Sea Lord in October 1914. He sto pped the construct ion of the
class and decided to fit oil-fired boilers to all five ships for a maximum speed of 23
knots . T he ships were never able to achieve thi s speed , but essent ially becam e slower
versions of th e Queen Elizabeth class. Three of the five ships were fitted with ant i-
torpe do bulges and it was found that the provision of these 6ft bu lges redu ced top
speed by only less th an half a kno t.
Finally, in August 1914, four dreadn ou gh ts were under construct ion in British
yards for foreign navies. Two were earma rked for th e Turkish Navy and were already 23
 complete. T hese were quickl y imp ounded and renamed Erin and Agincourt in British
service. Chile had also ordered rwo ships and one was almos t com plete. As British
relation s with Ch ile were much better than with Turk ey, these rwo Chilean ships were
purchased in Septem ber 1914. T he lead ship ente red Royal Navy service in O ctob er
and was nam ed Canada. T he second was completed in 1918 as an aircraft carrier.

GERMAN DREADNOUGHT DESIGN

From the very start, th e Ge rma ns employed different dreadnought design prin ciples
from the British. G erma n naval designers conside red th at protection was most
imp ortant and th e main German naval archi tect placed em phasis on an exte nsive
system of underwater protection by dividing the ship's hull into a large number of
narrow, watertight compartment s. T his co nfigura tion was made possible by a large
beam, which also provided a very stable gun platfo rm . T he Ge rma ns usually devoted
a larger proporti on of a ship's displacement to armo ur, allowing for thicker main belts
and for more of th e ship to be given some degree of prot ection .
Conversely, German ships were usually less well armed than their British counterparts,
partly due to weight considerations, which precluded the selection of large main guns on T he Ger mans were also slow to ado pt the steam tur bine. Because of manu factu ring Nassau was t he first German
a design already devoting considerable weight to armour prot ection. Another reason was difficulties and th eir un fam iliarity with the steam tu rbine, th e first rwo classes of dreadnou ght to ente r service ,
the German assessment that since the main battle area for their dreadn oughts was the Ger ma n dreadn ough ts retained reciprocat ing machinery. No t until 1909 were new in October 1909 . This
North Sea, where poor visibility was the norm, guns larger than 12in were unn ecessary. German dreadn oughts fitted with turbines, but once in service such ships were easily starboard view shows the

T hus, after the first class of dreadn ought was fitted with 11in guns, the Ger mans settled ship's basic layout . Designed
able to meet their design speeds. Before the war, the Germans explored the possibility hurr iedly as a counter to
on the 12in gun for all remaining classes, until finally adapting the 15in gun for their last of fitting a 2-str oke 12,000hp di esel eng ine to d rive the cent ral shaft and thereby Dreadnoug ht, she mounted
class built during the war.T he German 12in gun was clearly the equal to the early British increase cru ising rang e, but afte r bein g tested on a single dr eadn ou gh t thi s two more main gun s and was
12in guns, but the Germans failed to respond in a timely mann er as the British opened develop ment was not pursued furt her. In general, since Ge rma n battleships were slight ly bett er prot ected.

the firepower gap by adopting the 13.5in and finally the 15in guns. expected to operate onl y in the North Sea, endura nce was not a design emphasis.
H abitabili ty was also no t em phasized, since ships wo uld not be deployed for lon g
periods and crews lived in barracks ashore wh en the ship was in port.
The first Germa n dreadn oughts were the four ships of the Nassau class, which were
designed in 190 6 by imp roving the last of the pre-dreadn ought designs. Because of
Deutsch land was the lead probl ems with lengthenin g shipyard slipways to build the larger ships, construction
ship in th e fin al class of did not begin until 1907. Co mpared with Dreadnought, the first Ger man dreadn ought s
German pre-dreadnoughts . possessed greater protection, but were armed with smaller guns (11in compared with
Though the ir top speed was
l Zin) and were slower.
only 18 knot s, Scheer decided
to inclu de the entire class The next four ships were author ized in the 1908-09 bud get, and were all laid down
wit h the High Seas Fleet in in 1908. T he four ships of the Helgoland class were slightly improved versions of the
th e Jutl and operation. Nassau with armo ur protection being increased and a larger 12in gun fitted. However,
The weak underwa ter
the main batt ery layout still employed the use ofwing tur rets arranged in a mann er that
protect ion of the class was
amply demonstr ated when
only eight of the 12 guns could be brought to bear broadside. T his class also retained
Pommern was blown up by reciprocatin g steam engines, meanin g that it was still slower than British dreadn oughts.
? sing le torpedo hit, wit h Kaiser, th e lead ship of the next class, was laid down in 1909 with the remaining

1-
24 th e loss of her ent ire crew.
four ships of the class laid down in 1910 . T hese were the first Germa n dreadn oughts 2S

ABOVE
The four uni ts of t he Helgoland
class continued the German
emphas is on protec tion over
fi repower, thou gh t his class
did int roduce the 12i n gun,
wh ich was superior to its
Brit ish counter part.
BELOW
A Konig class unit in the perio d
before Jutland. This class was
the first German dreadnought
to place all main batt ery
turrets on t he cent re line.
26
,: /ir. ~
to use stea m turbines, and all five ships of th e class, including o ne fitt ed with an
experime nta l d iesel engine o n o ne shaft, exceeded th eir design speed of 2 1 knot s.
Arm our protection was again improved until total armour reached 40 per cenr of th e
ship's normal dis placeme nt. T he main battery was red uced to ten 12in guns in five
turrets, but th e two middle turrets were arranged in echelo n to allow them to fire
bro adside in eith er di rection. This layout, theoretically, increased the broadside to ten
gun s, bur in pr actice it was no t a success and it was not used again.
T he last dread nou ght s laid down before th e war were th e four ships of th e Konig
class. T he first three sh ips were autho rized as parr of th e 1911 -1 2 budget, and the last
ship in the 191 2-1 3 budget. All were completed in 19 14 and all saw actio n at Jutland .
T hey possessed th e same superio r level of pro tection found on th e Kaiser class.
T he main differen ce was th e placem ent of all five turrets on th e ship's centre line.
 THE STRATEGIC
SITUATION
Wi th both fleets determin ed to accept action on ly und er £wourab le circumstances, the
openi ng of the war did not bri ng th e major fleet engagement expected by many on
both sides. T he Gra nd Fleet conducted regular sweeps into the North Sea, but in the
absence of oppos itio n from th e High Seas Fleet, th e main enemies of British
dreadn oughts becam e min es and submarines instead of Ge rma n dreadnought s.
T he first action between British and Ge rma n naval forces did not occur until 28
August, when th e Royal Navy made plans to attack the Ge rma n pat rollers off
H eligoland. In an actio n con ducte d in fog and haze, the Ge rmans were ini tially
surprised. The commander of the Gra nd Fleet's Battle C ruiser Force, Vice-Adm iral Sir
David Beatty bravely rushed in to the fight in the face of a mine and to rpedo thre at
in bad weather. T he final result was the first British naval victory of the war, with
three Ger ma n light cruisers sunk. The larger effect was to make th e Germans even
more cautio us, and the Kaiser went as far as order ing that the commander of the Hi gh
Seas Fleet gain his person al approval before committing to an ope ration that might
result in a fleet engagement.
Despite the Germans' reluctance to comm it the Hi gh Seas Fleet to action , they
in creased submarine and minelaying operations. These paid divid ends wh en on
5 Septem ber a U-boat sank a Briti sh sco ut cru iser, and on 22 Septem ber th e old
subma rine U-9 sank three armo ured cruisers in succession off the Dutch coast, with
a roral loss of more th an 1,40 0 men . The power of th e subma rine was now fully
evident to the Royal Navy. Furthermore, on 27 October the dread nought Audacious,
out on firing practice, hit a mine off the coast of northern Ireland . T he ship sank ,
28 more du e to poor dam age control than any design flaw.
T he inactivity of the Hi gh Seas Fleet did not sit well with many, amo ngst them Audacious shown sinking
T irpitz. H e pressed for offensive operations. T ho ugh the comma nder of the High Seas on 27 October 1914, t he first
Fleet, Admiral Fried rich von Ingenohl , declined to comm it his ships to combat, for British dreadnought loss
of the war. The loss of th is
reasons of mora le, some offensive action was desired. According ly, the H igh Seas Fleet's
vess el to a small min e was
Scouting Force of bartlecruisers and light cru isers un der Rear Admiral Franz Hipper very unsett lin g to th e Royal
conducted a bomb ardm ent ofYarmouth on the east coast of England on 3 November. Navy . Her sinki ng was due
T hro ugho ut the early part of the naval war in the North Sea, the British had the more to t he immat ure state
of damage contr ol in th e
benefit of a high level of insight int o Germa n naval opera tions. T he int elligence was
Royal Navy at th e tim e, rath er
provided by Room 40, the Royal Navy's code-breaki ng organization, named after its
than any design weakness .
residence on the first floor of the old Admira lty Buildi ng. After an uncertai n start, but
bolstered by int elligence windfalls (including obtaini ng the current signal book from
a German ligh t cruiser that ran agro und in the Baltic), Room 40 was invariab ly able
to provide the Admiralty with advance warn ing of all pending major Ger ma n naval
operations. Room 40 did not always know the object of a Ge rman naval sort ie, but
it d id develop reliable means to predict when the H igh Seas Fleet was at sea, often
allowing the Gra nd Fleet to leave port before a German opera tion had even begun.
T he Germans planned another bombardment raid on the English coast, th is time
against Scarboro ugh and H artl epool. On this occasio n, Hi pper's bartlecruisers were
suppo rted by the Hi gh Seas Fleet itself, which came out as far as the Dogger Bank,
abo ut halfway across the North Sea. Room 40 was able to p rovide warn ing th at
ano ther raid was imminent . In respo nse, the Ad mira lty ordered Beatty's bartlecruisers
to a point where they could intercep t the Ger man s on their way home. ]ellicoe wanted
to support the ope rat ion with the enti re Grand Fleet, bu t was refused by the
Adm iralty, who tho ught that th e 2nd Battle Squadro n wit h six dreadno ughts was
sufficient. T he decision was a recipe for pot enti al disaster, as Room 40 had not been 29

Elements of the 4th Battle
Squadron in a line-abreast
form ation in t he North Sea
in 1915. The nearest ship is
an Iron Duke class ship , the
second ship is Agincourt
and the third is a ship of
the Bellerophon class .
30
able to discern that the ent ire Hi gh Seas Fleet was also at sea and that they would be
operati ng close by the six British dreadn ou ght s. It loo ked as if the Ge rmans would get
to engage a portion of the Grand Fleet with overwhelming force.
T he events of the Ger ma n raid on 16 December ended up being indecisive du e to
poor weath er and comm and probl ems. The Germa n warshi ps co nducted th eir
bo mbardment and successfully avoided int ercept ion by Beatty's battl ecruisers desp ite
being spotted by Beatty's light cruiser scouts and later by elements of the 2nd Battl e
Squad ron. Before th e escape of the Ger man bartlecruiscrs, the Hi gh Seas Fleet had
com e into contact with the destroyer screen of the 2nd Battl e Squad ron. Instead of
pressing the attac k with his 14 dreadn oughts and eight pre-dreadnought s, Ingenohl
turned away when only 10 miles from th e British force, fearful tha t he had co me
across the ent ire G rand Fleet and knowi ng he did not have the Kaiser's permission to
engage in such a battl e.
In Janu ary 1915 , the Germans plan ned anot her raid into the Dogge r Bank area to
clear out fishing trawlers suspected of acting as British surveillance unit s, and to engage
British light forces th ought to be in the area. Hipper wanted suppo rt from the Hi gh
Seas Fleet, bu t Ingenohl could not gain the Kaiser's permission to sail the fleet that far
into the North Sea. Unfortunately for the Ge rma ns, Room 40 had deciphered orders
for the operatio n and the British had prepared an amb ush. O n 24 Jan uary 191 5, the
thr ee battl ecru isers and one armo ured cruiser under H ipp er were spo tted and were
soon being pursued by Beatt y's five battl ecrui sers. In a confused action marked by
British signalling probl ems, th e five British batt lecruisers were able to sink onl y the
armo ured cruiser Blucher, while allowing th e th ree barrlecruisers to escape.
T he battl e of Dogger Ban k had severe repercussion s for the Ge rma ns. Ingenohl
was replaced by Admiral Hugo von Poh l and the Kaiser inst ruc ted von Pohl th at
he could not seek battl e beyon d the m inefields of the Heli goland Bight. Most
imp ortantl y, it was ob vious that the Ge rma n strategy of attri tion in the No rth Sea
was not wo rking. In order to hurt the British, another method had to be found. T he
only alterna tive was to utilize submarines. O n 4 Februa ry 19 15, the Germans declared
th e waters around Britain and Ireland a military zone in which merchant ships were
liable for destru ction .
T he first unrestricted submarine cam paign ran from February to October 19 15.
T he Ge rma ns lacked sufficient sub ma rines to make a blockade effective, but early
results were enco uraging and British ant i-subma rine efforts were inade quate. T he real
prob lem for the Germans was dealing with the diplom atic fallout of attacking neutral
shipping, particularly th at of the United Sta tes. In thi s environme n t, an in cident
involving Amer ican ships or American casualties was inevitable, and it came on 7 May
191 5, whe n a Ge rma n subma rine sank the C unard liner Lusitania with the loss of
1,201 lives, 128 of them American. T he Ger mans avoided an American ent ry into the
war with some concessions to their submar ine blockade, but by Septe m ber sub marine
att acks had reverte d to the restricti ve prize ru les. The first unrestr icted submar ine
cam paign had failed, but the potent ial of the subma rine had been fully dem on strated
while the Hi gh Seas Fleet sat idly in port.
Following the failure of the unr estricted submarine campaign, events moved in a
In one of th e most iconic
direc tion tha t wo uld finally result in a clash at sea between the great dreadn ou ght maritim e photo s of all tim e,
fleets. The first of these was the death of Pohl in February 1916 from cance r. Hi s German armoured cruis er
rep laceme nt was Vice Admiral Reinh ard Schee r, who was mu ch more offensively BlOcher is shown capsizing
on 24 January 1915, duri ng
minded . He was also an advoc ate of a renewed subma rine campaign. T he Kaiser,
the batt le of Dogger Bank.
however, could not brin g himself to approve ano ther rou nd of unrestricted submari ne
This battle marked the end of
warfare until some type of understand ing had been reached with the Ame ricans. What a series of German raids on
resulted was a restricted U-boa t offensive that qu ickly ran into diplomat ic troubles. the English coast during th e
Co mplementi ng the U-boat campaign was a nu mber ofother measures intended to early part of th e war. It was
not until Jut land that the
put constant pressure on the British and force them to take actions that might bring
opposing batt lecr uiser
the Germans the oppo rtunity of an engagement on f.'lvo urable terms. Amongst these forces wou ld meet again.
31
 measures were intensified sweeps by the High Seas Fleet, including the ren ewed
bom bard ment of Brit ish coastal towns. The first of Scheer's fleet movements occurred
on 5-6 M arch 1916, when he sortied to a point sout h of Dogge r Bank to int ercept
British light units on patrol. Thou gh th e Gra nd Fleet tried to interce pt, th ere was no
action. On 25 March, the British mo unted an opera tion to launch an aircraft raid from
a seaplane carrier against German Zeppelin statio ns on the Schleswig coast. T he five
aircraft th at were launched inflicted no damage, but did prompt th e Hi gh Seas Fleet
to put to sea. The seaplane carrier was being covered by Beatty's Battle Cruiser Force,
bu t was ordered to withdraw when the German sortie was discovered. The Gra nd Fleet
was ordered to a position off the Scott ish coast, but bad weather prevented the Ge rmans
from advancin g farther int o th e No rth Sea and both sides retu rned to base.
Jellicoe resisted mo unting pressure from the Admi ralty to be mo re aggressive. The
Admiralty supported the notion that furt her air raids wo uld force the Ge rmans out to
figh t. Jellicoe did not th ink this o utcome was as likely, and worried th at even if the
Germans did emerge it would be late in the day before they wo uld be in a position clear
of the rninefields, leaving insufficient time for the Grand Fleet to engage them decisively.
Jellicoe also worried abo ut the fuel consu mption of his destroyers and ligh t cruisers,
submarines and a mi nelayer to attack the H igh Seas Fleet if it emerge d. Concurrently,
Scheer was making plans for a bombardment of Sunde rlan d by his battlecr uisers, to
again atte mpt to dr aw out a portion of the Gra nd Fleet. T he bombardment wo uld be
suppo rted by th e H igh Seas Fleet position ed sout h of the Dogger Ban k. A force of 18
U-boats was stationed off British naval bases to attack British capital ships. German
Navy Ze ppelins wo uld overwarch the entire operation to prov ide scouting reports
and make sure th e Gra nd Fleet was not intervening. Hipper wo uld dr aw any
inte rcepting Brit ish force onto the Hig h Seas Fleet fo r it to deliver a crushi ng blow.
Yet because of maint enance issues with key units, Scheer had to push the planned
opera tion back to th e end of May. Poor weather prevented ade q ua te Zeppelin
coverage, and th e end urance of th e U- boa ts already stationed off British naval bases
was reaching its lim its. Schee r therefore decided to abandon the planned
bo mbardment in favour of an operation targeted against British light un its and
Benbow , an Iron Duke class
shipping in the Skaggerak . T he Ge rma n battl ecrui ser force was o rdere d to show itself
super-dreadnought, leading
off th e No rwegian coast to dr aw th e Brit ish out. other ships of the 4th Batt le
At 0 1OOhrs on 3 1 May 1916, the Ge rman barrlecruisers left port, followed by the Squadron in 1915. The
mai n body of th e H igh Seas Fleet. As usual, Roo m 40 informed Jellicoe that potent ial for th e smoke

whi ch would prevent him from lingerin g lon g off th e Ge rma n coast waiting for the produ ced by a group of
some thi ng was up, and th e Gra nd Fleet was already at sea whe n th e Ge rma ns
dreadnought s to affect
High Seas Fleet to emerge. In jellicoe's mi nd, he was unable to force the Germans out, departed. T he great clash was finally at hand . visibility is readily apparent.
so any engagement wou ld result from a German attempt to seize the initiative.
O n 20 April, the British mo unted an o peratio n into the Kattega t to attack German
shipping. In respo nse to int elligen ce th at th e H igh Seas Fleet was at sea, the Grand
Fleet rushed to intercept, bu t were frustrated by heavy fog. Scheer took the initiative
on 24 Apr il, when he sortied his ba rtlecruisers, supported by th e High Seas Fleet, to
cond uct a bombard ment of Lowestofr. T he British, again advised by Room 40 th at
an operation was under way, sort ied th e Grand Fleet an d th e Battle C ruiser Fleet. T he
Germans bartlecruisers encountered British light forces and then pressed on to shell
Lowesroft, followed by Yarmouth. Declining an op portunity to press an attack on th e
British naval units, th e battl ecrui sers, accom pa nied by th e Hi gh Seas Fleet, headed
west to their bases. The Grand Fleet, impe ded by heavy seas, was not able to intercept.
In the series of raids and counter-raids, the next move was the Royal Navy's. On 4
May, two British seap lane carriers moved into pos it ion off th e Schleswig coas t to
mo unt ano the r attack on Ze ppelin sheds. O nly one of the 11 aircraft intend ed to take
part in the raid actua lly bombed its target, but the sheds were not the real ta rget.
Je llicoe ho ped that th is action wo uld entice the High Seas Fleet to sortie; in
preparation th e British had mi ned th e Ge rman chan nels and moved submarines int o
the area . After lin gerin g wi th the Grand Fleet, Jellicoe de parted. By the time the
Germans did come out later in the day, the British were gone.
G iven the heighte ned activity by the German and British navies, it was becoming
more likely th at a clash between fleets wo uld occ ur. But as both sides still sought to
engage on favourab le terms, any such clash wou ld still be the result of accident . Jellicoe
decided to keep the pressure up with a planned ope ration into the Karregar wit h light
fo rces on 2 June, suppo rted by a battl e sq uadro n position ed in the Skaggerak an d the
32 enti re G ran d Fleet fart her to th e north-west. T his o pe ration was supported by
33
 Bellerophon class
Ships in class Bellerophon,Superb, Temeroire
Displacement (normal) 18,596 tons
Dimensions lengt h 526 ft; beam 82ft 6in; draught 31ft
Armament 10 x 12in/45ca l guns; 16 x 4in guns; 3 x 18in torpedo tub es

Protection main belt 1O-5in; deck 3-1.5in; tu rr ets 12in; connin g tow er llin; barbett es lD -5in; torp edo
bulkh ead 3- l in; weight of armour 5,430 tons (2 8.7 per cent of normal displacement)
Machinery 4-shaft Parsons tu rbines and 18 boilers creati ng 23,000hp; top speed 20.75 knots
Range 5,720 nautic al miles [nrn] at 10 knots
Crew 840 (1914)

TECHNICAL Neptune class, ther e were significant modifi cations between the first ship of the class

SPECIFICATIONS
and the other two. Overall, th e design proved un satisfactory and was not repeated.
While several navies, prin cipally th e US Navy, had already moved to placin g all Superb pictur ed before th e
main gun turrets o n th e centre line, th e Royal Navy was reluctant to do so because of war. Before th e sta rt of the
the design of its turrets. T he probl em was th at the sigh ting hoo ds at th e front of th e war, the height of her top mas ts
was reduced and the 4 in guns
turrets mad e th e occ upants inside susceptible to being conc ussed if a superim posed
remove d from the top of the
turret fired over th em . Royal Navy design ers sti ll co nside red it essential th at its
12in main batt ery . Superb was
battl eships carry ten main guns and it was intended to ena ble all of th ese to fire present at Jut land, but played
BRITISH BATTL ESHIPS broadside. Neptune introduced echeloned gun s arnidship, which in theor y en abled all a minor role. In 1918, she was

ten gun s to be brought to bear broadside. This was th e same layo ut explored on the sent to Turkish waters as th e

Following th e successful tria ls of Dreadnought, the British moved quickly to bu ild a flagsh ip of Brit ish naval forces.
first bat tlecrui ser design , and as on Invincible it was found to be im practical in service
After being used as a target
numerical dr eadnought superiority over any potential rival. T he lead ship of the du e to the blast effect and strain on the hull when th e guns were fired crossdec k. O n ship in 192 2, she was broken
Bellerophon class was laid down in Decemb er 1906 and all three un its were completed top of this, th e Number 4 turret was supe rimposed over the Number 5 tur ret, which up in 1923.
by M ay 190 9. T he Belleroph on vessels were a virtual repeat of Dreadnought. The main
battery of ten 12in gun s was mounted in five tur rets, three placed o n th e centreline.
T he other two turrets were wing turrets, so th at an eight-gun bro adside was possible.
T he secondary armament was deficient, with onl y 16 4in gun s, which were inad equ ate
to sto p a destro yer attack. In addition , th e guns were badl y placed , with eight being
located on th e top of the main turrets . By 191 6, all 4 in guns were moved to more
workable positions in the superstru cture.
On the heels of th e Bellerophon class, the first ship of the St Vincent class was laid
down in Febru ary 1907. The three ships of thi s class were essentiall y a repeat of the
previou s design, but did inco rpo rate slight improvem ents. T he layout of the main
batt ery remain ed th e same, but th e main weapo n was a more powerful version of the
12in gun . The 4i n gun was retained as th e seconda ry arma ment. Arm our prote ction
was largely th e sam e as in th e prec eding class. The power of the machinery was
incre ased to compensate for a slightly larger displacement. Combined with a more
efficient longer hu ll, th e class easily reached its design speed of 21 knots.
Not unti l the programme of 1909 did th e Royal Navy attempt to depart from the
basic design of Dreadnought. T he three ships of the Neptune class attempted to add ress
34 the prin cipal flaw in th e layout of th e main battery of Dreadnought. Within the 3S
 Collingwood retained t he
ineff icient wing -tu rret
arra ngements of early Brit ish
dreadnough ts . Present at
Jut land, she was undamaged,
but barely missed being
torpedoed. She went into
reserve in 1919 and was
scrapped in 19 23.
Ships in class
Displacement (normal]
Dimensions
Armament
Protection
Machinery
Range
Crew
36
Colossus pictu red befor e th e
wa r. Her design was deficient
in terms of tu rret and
smokes tack placement ,
-.1 and her protec t ion showed
no improvement over
Dreodnought launched
four years earl ier. Colossus
survived th e war and serve d
in var ious training capaciti es
before being broken up in
19 28.
meant that the Number 4 could not be fired astern. To clear the decks for crossdeck
firing , the ship's boats were placed on a flying bridge between the smokestacks. This
awkward arrangement was an obvious so urce of trouble in battl e if dama ged , so it
was removed just after th e outbreak of war. T he same 12in/50 gun was used as on the
St Vincent class, and armo ur protection was on a sim ilar scale. was now dropped to save weight. At the same time, th ou gh , the forwar d smo kestack
T he later two ships of th e class, Colossus and Hercules, were not laid down until July was placed in front of the forward mast, introducing th e same problems with smoke
190 9 and we re able to incorporate several m odifications. T he prin cipal differen ce and making th e ship's only rema ining fire-co ntrol station virt ually unusable.
was in armo ur prot ecti on. As a weight-saving measur e, th e scale of protect ion on In late 190 9, th e first ship of th e four-sh ip O rion class was laid down . All four had
Dreadnought had been red uced on subseq uent classes. Prot ecti on on Colossus and ente red service by 19 12. T hese ships displayed the best Brit ish battleship design to
Hercules was im proved to 11in on th e main belt and th e barb et res, returning date, and represente d a significant increase in capabilities over previou s designs. T he
protection to that of Dreadnought. T he Royal Navy still believed th at torpedoes were pr incipal differenc e was th e decision to move to a 13.5in gun . T he main batt ery was
imp ortant weapons in a battl eship duel , and now the longer-ran ged 21 in torpedo was still ten gun s, but for th e first tim e all five tu rrets were mounted on the centre line,
int rod uced on battleship s. T he appearance of the later two ships was also altered . On allowing for a ten-gun bro adside. T he decision to place superfiring turrets fore and aft
previou s British drea dnought designs, the placement of th e smokestacks mad e the aft
cont rol position on the rear mast practically unusable due to smoke. The after mast Neptune class
Ships in class Neptun e, Colossus, Hercules
St Vincent class
Displacement [ norma l] 19,680 tons [Colossus and Hercules 20,03 0 tons]
Collingwood, St Vincent, Vanguard
Dimensions lengt h 546ft; beam 85f t; draught 28ft 6in [Co lossus and Hercules 29ft Sin]
19,700 tons
Armament 10 x 12in/50cal guns; 16 x 4in guns; 3 x 21in torp edo tub es
length 536 ft ; beam 84ft; draught 27-31ft
main belt 1O-2. 5in (Colossus and Hercules 11-7in]; deck 3- 1.5in (Colossus and Hercules
10 x 12in/5 0cal gun; 18 x 4in guns; 3 x 18in torpedo tubes 4-1.5in]; t urrets llin; conning tower llin; barbett es 1O- 5in [Colossus and Hercules
Protection
main belt 1O- 8in ; deck 3- 1.5in; tu rrets l l in; conning tower llin; barbett es 9-5 in; torpedo 11-4in ]; weight of armour [Colossus and Hercules] 5,562 tons ( 27.3 per cent of normal
displacement]
bulkhead 3-1.5in; weight of armour 5,590 tons (28 per cent of normal displacement]
4 -shaft Parsons turbines and 18 boilers creating 24,5oohp; top speed 21 knots Machinery 4-shaft Parsons tu rbines and 18 boilers creati ng 25,000h p; top speed 21 knots
6,9oonm at 10 knots Range 6,62onm at 10 knots (Colossus and Hercules 6,68 onm]
823 (1915] Crew 813 [Colossus and Hercules 791 in 1916]
37

Ships in class
Displacement [normal]
Dimensions
Arm ament
Protection
Machinery
Range
Crew
Dreadnou ght began th e wa r
as flags hip of th e 4t h Batt le
Squadron, but in May 1916
she was tempora rily
transferred to the 3rd Batt le
Squadron when it was
transferred from the Grand
Fleet to Sheerness to boost
defences against further
German raids. As a result,
38 Dreadnough t missed Jut land.
Orion class King Geo rge V class
Conqueror, Monarch, Orion, Thunderer Ships in class Ajax, Audacious, Centurion, King George V
22,200 tons Displacement [normal) 25,420 tons
length 581ft; beam 88ft 6in; draught 31ft 3in Dimensions length 597ft 6in; beam 89ft; draught 28ft 8in
10 x 13.5in/45cal guns ; 16 x 4in guns; 3 x 18in torpedo tubes Armament 10 x 13.5in /45cal guns ; 16 x 4i n guns ; 3 x 21in torpedo tu bes
main belt 12-8in; deck 4 -1in; turrets 11in; conning tower 11in; barbettes 1O-3in; weight of main belt 12-8in; deck 4-1 in; t urrets 11in; conn ing tower 11in; barbettes 1O-3 in; weight of
Protection
armour 6,560 tons [29 per cent of normal displacement) armour 7,080 tons [30.2 per cent of normal displacement )
4-shaft Parsons turbines and 18 boilers creating 27,OOOhp; top speed 21 knots Machinery 4-shaft Parsons turb ines and 18 boilers creating 27,000hp ; top speed 21 knots
6,730nm at 10 knots Range 6,31Onm at 10 knots
754 (1914) Crew 1,114 (1916)
included the restriction not to fire directly fore and aft, because of the concussion include the fitting of four guns forward below the ma in deck level. It proved
problem to personnel in the lower turret. Yet this arrangement was thought to be im possible to use these guns in any kind of sea, and all were remo ved during the war.
tactically insignific ant com pared with the advant age of being able to fire a full ten-gun At the start of the Great War, two of the four ship s of the Iron D uke class were
broadside. In addition to the inc rease in firepower, protection was also increased on already in service, with the other two due to co mm ission before the end of th e year.
the main belt and the turret barb ertes, giving the class a fine balan ce of offensive and Thus, at the start of the war these were the most powerful battle ship s in the Royal
defen sive qu alities. A continu ing design flaw was th e placem ent of th e for ward Navy.The principal difference between these ships and those of the very sim ilar Ori on
sm okestack in front of th e mainmast, which created problems with smo ke in th e fire- and King George V classes was th e overdu e provision of a secondary battery of Gi n
dir ection cent re. guns. Ten of th e 12 gun s, however, were placed in single casema tes for ward and close
The four ships of th e King Geo rge V class were all laid down in 1911 and had all to the waterline, mak ing them subject to interference from heavy seas and spray. T he
ent ered service by 1913. T hese were essent ially repeats of th e Orion s. T he layout of last two guns were mounted even lower in th e area of th e Number 5 turret. T his
th e main battery was retained, but an improved model of th e 13.5in gun was fitted , placement proved so troublesome that the gun s were removed and mounted in th e
whi ch fired a heavier shell. T he seco nda ry arm ament was still inadequate to deal with forward supe rstruc tu re before th e battl e of Jutl and . T hese ships were th e first Royal
to rpedo boats and destroyers, and the layout of the IG 4 in gun s was modified to Navy battleship s to mount anti-aircraft guns.
The five ships of th e Queen Elizabeth class were the most successful of any British
battleship design of World War 1. Laid down in 191 2-1 3, non e were available by th e
start of the war, but all had been completed and were in service for th e battl e of
Jutland. The lead ship of th e class was in refit during Jutl and , but the remaining four
ships all saw act ion against the High Seas Fleet.
Iron Ouke class
Ships in class Benbow, Emperorof India, Iron Duke, Marlborough
Displacement [normal) 26,100 tons
Dimensions length 623ft; beam 90ft; draught 32ft 9in
Armament 10 x 13.5in /45cal guns; 12 x 6in guns ; 3 x 3in ant i-aircraft guns; 4 x 21in torp edo tubes
main belt 12-8in ; deck 2.5-lin; turrets 11in; conning tower 11in; barbettes 11in; weight of
Protection
armour 7,925 tons [ 31.2 per cent of normal displacement)
Machinery 4-shaft Parsons turbines and 18 boilers creating 29,000hp ; top speed 21 knots
Range 8,100nm at 12 knots
Crew 1,102 (1914)
39
 T he design incorp orated several significant improvements. T he most impo rta nt of
Royal Sove reign class
these was the decision to abando n the mixed coal and oil fuel system on previous British
dr eadn ou ghts in favou r of an all-oil fuel sysrem. This move was dr iven by the Ships in class

req uireme nt to create a mu ch higher output to meet th e design speed of25 kno ts with
no extra weight in mac hinery. T he decision to go to oil also saved eno ugh weight that
the scale of armo ur protection could actually be increased in some key areas. T he result
was a squadron offast battl eships with excellent protection . T he Admi ralty envisioned
tha t the 'Fast Squadron' wo uld be used to bring a reluctant enemy force to battl e, and Prot ect ion

it possessed th e speed to operate with the G rand Fleet's battl ecrui ser squadro n.
T he other majo r im provem ent on th e Q ueen Elizabeth class was the decisio n to Machinery

move up to a 15in gun. T he larger gun was imp ortant for a number of reason s. T he
requi rem ent to fit additional boilers to meet th e 25-knot speed requ irement meant
th at a tur ret amidships could not be fitt ed, but th e British were reluctant to abandon
the hitting power presen ted by a ten-gun battl eship . If a 15in gun was fitted, how ever,
the to tal broadside weight of an eight-gun 15in broadside wo uld actu ally be greater
than ten I3.5in guns .
A follow-up to th e Queen Elizabet h class was the eigh t planned ships of th e
Revenge class. O f th ese, only five were com pleted, and of th ose o nly two (Revenge
and Royal Oak) participated in Jutl and . T he Revenge class maintained the same scale
of protection and th e same 15in-gun main battery, but were no t design ed to have the
same high speed.
Addi tionally, the re were several battl eshi ps intend ed for foreign governments th at
the Royal Navy expropriated at the start of th e war. All of th ese participated in the
clash at Jutland . Erin was laid down in 19 11 for Turkey, but was take n into British
service in 19 14 . She gave the Royal Navy a un it possessing the same capabi lities as an
Iron D uke-class ship, with the same main and secondary arma ment and a simi lar scale
of pro tection. Agincourt was or igina lly or dere d by Brazil, but was sold in Jan uary
1914 , un compl eted , to Turkey. Along with Erin, she was destin ed never to fly th e
Turkish flag, being confiscated by th e Royal N avy in 1914. Agincourt was not a well-
balan ced design . She did not possess the level of armour protection of other Brit ish
Oueen Elizabeth class
Ships in class Barham, Malaya, Queen Elizabeth, Valiant, Warspite
----------------{
Displacem ent (normal) 32, 590 to ns
Dimensions lengt h 639ft 9in (Barham and Warspite 643 ft 9in]; beam 90ft r in; draught 33ft
Range
Crew 909 (1916
--------------------_-1
battles hip s, but compensated for th is with enormo us firepower. Her main battery was
14 14in guns (largest of any World War I dr eadn ou ght) mo unte d in seven cent re lin e
turrets, perm itting all 14 guns to fire broadside. Canada was laid down in 1911 for
Chile, and completed in late 191 5. T he Royal Navy pur chased the ship and she proved
to be a welcome additio n to the G rand Fleet. T he design was based on Iron Duke, but
since th e sh ip was lon ger and mou nt ed mo re powerfu l mach inery, her top speed
was almost 23 kno ts. Armament was an im pressive ten 14in guns (all centre line) and
18 6in gu ns. Her level of protection was not equa l to the Iron Duke's, but was sim ilar
to earlier British dreadn ou ght s. In service, she was co nsidered one of the Grand Fleet's
best ships.
GERMAN BATTLESHIPS
T he Ge rman Navy was never able to maint ain the Royal Navy's pace of dreadn ought
construction. There were fewer yards in Germany capable of building large ships. T hose
that could do so were mu ch less efficient than their British counterparts, which could
complete a dreadn ou ght in a year. In cont rast, Ger man yards took typically from two to
three years. By the opening of the war, and up unti l the time of Jutland , the Ge rman
Navy was able to complete four classes of d readn ou ghts for a tota l of 17 units. To
compensate, the Ge rmans augmented the Hi gh Seas Fleet with the most modern of their

Armament 8 x 15in/4 2cal guns; 14 x 6in guns; 4 x 21in torpedo tube s

pre-drea d noughts. In additio n to the 17 dreadn ou ghts comp leted before Ju tland, six
----------------{ batrlecruisers were also in service. O ne of these, however, was caught in the Mediterranean
main belt 13-8 in; deck 3-1 in; t urr ets 13in; conning tower 11in; barbettes 1O - 4i n; weight of
Prot ecti on at the war's begin ning and by 1916 was nom inally part of the Turkish Navy.
armour 8,900 to ns ( 30 per cent of normal displacement ]
----------------{ T he Nassau class was the Ge rman Navy's respo nse to Dreadnought. Caught
4-shaft Parsons tu rbines (Brown-Curtis in Barham and Valiant ] ; 24 boilers creat ing
Machine ry un prepared, German naval designers took six months after the comp letion of
r5 ,000hp ; to p speed 24 knots
Dreadnought to set tle on the design, and th e first ship of the class was not laid down
Range 5,000nm at 12 knots
unt il Ju ne 1907 . The four ships of the class were comp leted betwee n October 1909
Crew 1,016 (1916)
40 and May 191 0, each having take n between two and thr ee years to com plete. 41
-~.---
 Posen entered service in May
1910 and was photogr aphed t
here short ly thereafter.
The arrangement of her main
armament is evident. The ship
st ressed protect ion over
firepower and her eight
llin-gun broadsid e delivered
a weight of only 6,OBOlb - far
less th an her Briti sh rivals.

T he design of thi s first German d readnought set th e pattern for future

co nstruc tio n. Yet the Ge rma ns were forced to use th e triple-expansion mach inery
from their pre-dreadnought designs, as there was no tim e to develop turbines without Because of th e req uireme nt to begin construction as soon as possibl e, th e Posen shown after t he sta rt

suffering an even greater delay. With improved horsepower from earlier designs, the
sh ips could just make 20 kn ots. In 1915 , all four ships in th e class were modified to
burn fuel oil whi ch was sprayed on th e coal.
T he strength of the class was its protection, particularly below the waterline. The
main batt ery was mounted in six tur rets, each with two 11in guns. T he layout of th ese
turrets allowed for only two on th e centre lin e, with th e other four placed two on
each side of th e ship, making th e broadside onl y eight guns firing a compa ratively
light shell weight of 6,080Ib. The seco ndary battery comprised 12 5.9in guns,
arranged in single casemates six per side.
W ith the naval race with the Royal Navy heat ing up , th e Ge rma ns laid down four
ships of th e Hel goland class in 1908. Because speed was of th e essence, thi s class was
based on the Nassau class with onl y minor improvements. The biggest chan ge was th e
shift to a 12in gun in an attempt to match th e Royal Navy's adva ntage in bro adside
shell weight. T he layout of th e main batt ery was a repeat of th e Nassau class, so that
onl y eight guns cou ld be brought to bear broadside. The secondary battery comprised
14 single 5.9in guns mounted in casemates.
autho rities again decided not to wait for turbines. Speed was increased increm entally of th e war, essent ially
uncha nged apart from
by the provision of greater power and a lon ger hull. A wider beam was provided , and
t he removal of some of
this was used to provide a better intern al arrangement . T he magazines for th e win g her prom inent radio gaffs .
12in turrets were provided with improved underwat er protection and were less 5he fir ed 53 l l in rounds at
crowded . All of the bo ilers were also gro uped together, which allowed the ship's th ree Jutlan d and was undamaged.
After the war, she was handed
smokestacks to be placed together am idship s.
over to Great Britain and
T he next class of dr eadn ou ghts was laid down in 1910. This class, named for th e scrapped in 19 21.
Kaiser, included several im po rta nt developments. T he Ge rma ns had successfully
incorporated turb ines int o th eir ba ttlecru isers, and now they were fitted o n a class of
d read no ughts. T he 12in gun was retained , but th e layout of the mai n battery was
revised . T hree of the five turrets were fitted on the cent re line (one fo rward and two
aft), and th e rem ain ing two were fitt ed am idships in a staggered arrangement th at
th eo retically allowed both tur rets to fire broadside. In reality, this arrangeme nt proved
impractical. T he am idships turrets were too close to th e fore and aft superstructures
to permit them to fire fore and aft with out creating blast damage. C rossdeck fire o n
the broadside was also difficul t, as it placed great stresses on th e hull.

Helgoland class
Nassau class
Ships in class Ostfriesland , Thuringen , Helgola nd , Oldenburg
Ships in class Rheinland , Posen , Nassau , Westfalen
Displacement [no rmal) 22 ,800 tons
Displacement [no rm al) 18,900 ton s
Dimensions lengt h 546ft; beam 93ft 6in; draught 27ft 6in
Dimensions length 478ft; beam 89ft; draught 27ft 6in
12 x 12in/50 cal guns; 14 x 5.9in/ 45 cal guns; 14 [red uced to 12 in 1913) x 3.4in guns ;
12 x l1in/45cal guns; 12 x 5.9in /45ca l guns; 16 x 3.4in guns; 6 x 17.7into rpedo tu bes Arm ament
Armament 6 x 19.7in torpedo tubes
main belt 11.5-4in; deck 4in; turrets l l in: conning tower 12in; weight of armou r 6,640 tons main belt 11.75-4in; deck 3in; turrets l l in: conning tower 12in; weight of armour 8,350 ton s
Protection Protection
[35 .2 per cent of normal disp lacement] [36 .6 per cent of norma l displacement]

3-shaft verti cal tr iple-expansion and 12 boilers creating 22 ,000h p; top speed 19.5 knot s Machin ery 3-shaft vert ical tripl e-expansion and 15 boilers creatin g 28,0 00hp ; top speed 20 knots
Machinery
9,400nm at 10 knots Range 9,400nm at 10 knot s
Range
1,130 [wartime) Crew 1,300 [w artime] 43
Crew
42

Ostfries/and shawn in 19 20
after being handed aver to
th e US Navy . As a member of
th e second class of German
dreadnoughts, she retained
t he awkward wi ng·t urre t
config uratio n, but feat ured
an improved interior
arra ngement th at allowed
all th e boilers to be grouped
together. This layout resu lted
in a t hr ee-smokestac k
arrangement , unique for
a German dreadnought .
Ships in class
Displac ement [norm al)
Dimensions
Armament
Prot ect ion
Machinery
Range
Crew
44
Konig class
Ships in class Konig , Grosser KurfOrst , Markgraf and Kronprinz
Displacement [norm al) 25,800 ton s
Dimensions lengt h 580ft; beam 97ft ; draught 28ft 6in
10 x 12in/50ca l gun s; 14 x 5.9i n/45 cal guns; 6 x 3Ain guns ; 2 x 3A in anti -aircraft guns ;
Armament
5 x 19.7in torpedo tubes
mai n belt 14-lOin; deck 4.5in; turrets 14in; connin g tower 14in; weight of arm our 10,440
Protection
tons [40 A per cent of norm al displacement )
Machinery 3-shaft Parsons tu rbin es and 12 boilers creati ng 31,OOOhp; t op speed 21 knots
Range lO,OOOn m at 10 kn ots
Crew 1,300 [wartime]
Prot ection was incr eased over previous dr eadnought classes, and was superior to
comparable British classes. The shi ps developed more th an th eir designed pow er, in
th e case of Kaiser up to 55 ,OOOhp, so were able to make up to 23.4 knots. Friedrich
der Grosse was selected in 1914 to be refitted as th e fleet flagship and was fitt ed with
a heavy foremast which gave her a different app earan ce from her sister ships.
T he four ships of the Kon ig class were laid down in 1911 and at th e tim e of Jutl and
were th e most mod ern dreadnoughts in the Hi gh Seas Fleet. T he class retained ten 12in
gun s as its main armament , which were mounted in five turrets. Howeve r, the awkward
arrangement of th e two amidships turrets from the Kaiser class was altered in favour of
all turrets being fitted on the cent re line. The centre line turret between th e stacks gave
these ships a ten-gun broadside, the first ever for a Germ an dreadnought. The secondary
armament remained at 14 5.9in guns, each mounted singly in casemates. Prinzregen r Lui tpold
Wi th an increased beam , a high level of subdivision was again in evidence. As in photographed immed iatel y
th e Kaiser class, the boiler roo ms and machinery were gro uped fore and aft of the before the outb reak of war. As
a membe r of th e Kaiser class,
amidships turret , wh ich created th e wid ely spaced smokestacks. Unlike previou s
she cont inued the t rend of
classes, a heavy tubular foremast was fitt ed with a contro l to p. emphasizi ng protec tion over
fi repower, but was a more
effec t ive fighting un it than
Kaiser class her Britis h contemporaries.
Undamaged at Jut land, she
Friedr ich der Grosse, Kaiserin, Konig Albert , Prinz regent Luitpold , Kaiser was scutt led at Scapa Flow
in June 1919.
24,720 tons
lengt h 564ft; beam 95ft 3in; draught 27ft 3in
10 x 12in/50cal guns; 14 x 5.9in /45cal guns ; 12 [re duced to 10 by 1915J x 3Ai n guns;
5 x 19.?i n torpedo t ubes
mai n belt 13.75-7.75in ; deck 3in; tu rrets 11.75in; conning tower 13.?5in ; weight of armour
10,100 tons [ 40 .1 per cent of norm al dis placement)
3·shaft Parsons tu rbines and 16 boilers creatin g 31,OOOhp; to p speed 21 knot s. Prinzregent The Konig class comprised
t he elite V Divi sion of III
Luitpold equipped with 2-shaft Parson s tu rbines and 14 boilers creating 26,OOOhp; top speed
Squadron. All fought at
20 knots .
Jutl and and after the war
9,50 0nm at 10 knots all were surrendered in
1,250 [wartime) November 191B, and
scu tt led in Jun e 1919. 45
 compa red favoura bly wi th his ot her career
opt ions. Before the o utbreak of the wa r, th e
Royal Navy was able to take its pick of
available applicants . T hose th at were accepted
could join as early as 15 o r 16 years old, and
co m mi tte d th em selves to a 12-year hitch.
Tra ining began wit h a six-week stint of
seama nship and basic schooli ng, followed by
spec ialized tra ini ng .
Life aboard a capital ship was crowded, given
the large size of a d readn ough t crew. T he lower
deck was divided into a separate mess for each

THE COMBATANTS division or specialization. W hen not on watch

or perform ing their specific tasks, ratings had to
eat, sleep and spend off-duty tim e in the same
crowded space. Meals were collected from the
galley and bro ught to th e messing area. Food
was plent iful but generally unimaginative, since
refrigerated storage was not available. Once the
ROYAL NAVY DREADNOUGHT CREWS meal was finished , th e same area was used
for sleeping, with ratings accom modated in
The Royal Navy went to war with a foundati on of highly trained and motivated crews hammocks. O ne of the traditi on al benefits was
for its dr eadnoughts. All personnel were volun teers, and , in add ition to being a daily rum ration , usually served at lunch .
committed to long service careers, th e same personnel were assigned to a single ship Life on a Briti sh dr eadnou ght was mo re
for extended period s, makin g for cohesive crews. abo ut monoton y th an anything else. Becau se
For generatio ns, entry int o the Royal Navy as an officer was based far more on th e base at Scapa Flow was not develop ed at
class status an d the abi lity of the app licant 's pare nts to support the prospective officer, the sta rt of th e war, and was not judged to be safe from U- boat attack, th e Grand Admir al Sir David Beatty
rather than raw talent. In 19 16, almost all of a British d read nou ght 's officers wou ld Fleet spent the first few mo nt hs of the war contin ually at sea. W hen not at sea, the shown in 19 1B wit h King
have come through th e Brita nnia Royal Naval Co llege. An app licant typically joi ned crew was coaling or replenishi ng stores . Even when Scapa Flow was finished in 191 5, George V afte r Beatty
assum ed comma nd of the
at 13 an d was sent to college fo r four years, followed by six months on a train ing it offered a cold and dreary alternative to life at sea, with very lim ited distractio ns
Grand Fleet . His perf orm ance
cru iser. At th at point, th e asp irant jo ined th e fleet as a midshipman. W he n ashore. M ost men remained on the ship, spend ing th e tim e engaged in spo rts, movies at Jut land was marked by
commission ed , almos t all new officers selected navigation and gunnery career path s; or ed ucation. Jellicoe designed an extensive programme of fleet exercises to counte ract over-aggr essiveness and
engineering was not viewed as a suitable career for a gentleman. th e bo redom . T he G rand Fleet went to sea often for train ing. While insid e Scapa a series of com ma nd and

Prom ot ion from the lower deck was very rare and a point of conte ntio n until 191 2,
when First Lord of the Ad miralty W inston Ch urchill devised the Mate Scheme, whereby
petty officers and above could atta in commissioned sta tus with the rank of mate
(equivalent to lieutenant). The option was later extended to engineers in 19 14. In 19 13,
Churchill introduced a special entry scheme whereby cadets from publi c schoo ls could
join the Royal Navy at 18, take two cruises, and then be sent to the fleet as midshipmen.
T his measure did mu ch to provide the Royal Navy with most of its engineers.
There was strict segregation between th e upper deck (officers) and th e lower deck
(ratings). T he bulk of a d read no ugh t's crew was com posed of enlisted personnel.
Young wo rking-class men were d rawn to th e Royal Navy fo r security and adve nt ure.
46 D espite th e lo ng hours and severe d iscip lin e, wo rk ing co nditions in th e Navy
contro l difficult ies. His Battl e
Flow, th ere was adeq uate space for daily (except Sunday) gun nery and torp edo d rills.
Cruiser Fleet came off second
G unnery exercises were conducted at regular int ervals to th e west of Pentla nd Firth, best to Hipper's
and involved a squadron of d read no ugh ts engaging towed targets. Even in the bays of battl ecruisers.
Scapa Flow, sh ips wou ld shoot at ta rgets towed by picket boats . Shi ps wo uld also
engage in gu nnery p ractice at nigh t, with searchlights providing illumi natio n .
W ha t is hard to q uantify is the Royal Navy's psycho logical edge created by th e
Royal Navy 's tradition of victo ry and dom in an ce. T he up start Ge rma n Navy went
into the battl e with an inferiority complex. In th e wo rds of Scheer h imself: 'T he
English Fleet has th e advantage of loo king back on a hundred years of proud
tradition which m ust have given every man a sense of superiority based o n the grea t
deeds of th e past. ' 47
 German offi cers and men

GERMAN BATTLESHIP CREWS were as well tra ined as t heir

Royal Navy counte rparts , but
operated under a series of
In 1897, th e entire Ge rma n N avy had o nly 1,000 officers and a to tal personnel
rest rict ive orders from the
streng th of abo ut 26 ,000. By 1914, personnel str ength had swollen to 80,000, Kaiser thro ughout the war.
including 3,6 12 officers. In ord er to suppo rt th e inc reasing complexity of the Kaiser's In th e end, th e Kaiser's prized
navy, many technical skills were required, hen ce there were several branches of th e surface fle et disintegrated
into chaos and mut iny.
officer corps - marine infantry, engineer, torpedo engineer, ordnance , ordnanc e
artificer, torpedo and medical. T he premier bran ch , however, was the execut ive
bran ch , as o nly its personnel were enti tled to co mma nd a ship.
T he German Navy's officers were d rawn to naval service for a nu mb er of reason s,
including a sense of adve nt ure, desire for travel and not least th e desire for soc ial
prestige and qui ck prom otion (at least co mpa red with th e army). Each year, about
200 candidates were accepted as officers, a fraction of tho se who applied. The cost of
training put a career as a naval officer out of reach of the lower strata of society. C riteria
for selection was at th e discretion of th e Ed uca tio n D epartment, and thi s can be
described only as arbitrary. T he basic require me nts were parental support for th e cost
of trainin g and mainten an ce upon com m issioning , good social standing, th e ability
to pass an ent rance exam and high- school atte nda nce (although a high-scho ol
cert ificate wasn't required) . A cons ervative upbringing in a middle- or upper-class
home was preferred over a form al ed ucation. The result was a largely homogeneous
officer corp s. M ost were from northern Germ any and , not un surp risingly, most were
from coastal areas. Only some 10- 15 per cent were from th e nobili ty, and on ly 14 per
cent were Ca tho lic. Jews were th e rare exceptio n, and the sons of social dem ocrats
and trade uni onists fam ilies were excluded .
Upon selection, th e candidate was sent to th e Navy School for 12 months, followed
by exams for executive officer. Next, the candida te undertook anothe r six weeks of
specialized training. N ow he went to sea for 12 months. If successful, he was
com m issioned as an ensign. In th e final step, the candida te had to be elected to th e
officer corps by secret ballot by the memb ers of his ward room . T his proce ss offered a
last cha nce to weed out any undesirables. The system was remarkably successful in
keeping the officer corp s homogen eous. Even under th e strains of war, not a single the most talented seame n. Another di fference from th e Royal Navy was th e creatio n
non-commissioned officer was promoted to officer. of a class of ratin g kn own as a deck officer. T his had no equivalent in the Royal Navy
In the years before th e G reat War, and co nt inui ng in to th e war, Ge rma n naval and was required in th e Ge rman Navy because of the lack of conti nuity in a conscript
leadership was never able to solve th e grow ing friction between engineer officers and force. Despite the title, deck officers were conside red rat ings, not officers, but to add
execut ive officers. Eng ineer officers, despite th eir obvious and growi ng imp ortance in mo re co nfusion th ey were more like execu tive officers th an senior petty officers in
a mod ern navy, were treated as second-class citizens, bein g forced to wear different their responsibilities and d ress. Adva nceme nt to deck officer from petty officer was
uniforms and even m aintain separa te messing from execut ive officers. By 1917-1 8, dependent o n technical skill; advance me nt to co m m issioned sta tus was ext remely
the situation had disintegrated int o passive resistance by th e engineers. remote, and was ano ther source of friction in th e personnel rank s. In 1914, th ere were
While th e com positio n of the Royal Na vy and German Navy's officer corp s was 2,977 deck officers.
broadly sim ilar, th e make-up of th e enlisted ranks was vastly different. The Royal T he crew of a Ge rman wa rtime dr eadn ou ght was large; fo r exam ple the crew
Navy relied on voluntee rs, but th e Ge rma n Navy depended on conscripts to fill th e of Prinzregent Luitpold includ ed 22 execut ive officers, six engineers, two paymasters,
majorit y of its enlisted ranks. A con script was o bligated for th ree years' service, 27 deck officers and 1,020 petty officers and ratings. A dreadn ou ght was comma nded
48 followed by another four years in the active reserves. Petty officers were recru ited from by an officer of captain rank. T he actual running of the ship was perform ed by the first 49
 officer, who was responsibl e for all disciplin e, maintenan ce and train ing. T hird in
com ma nd was th e navigation officer. Ano ther key figur e was the art illery officer, who
was responsible for trainin g all gun crews, maintainin g all guns and directing the ship's
fire in action.
By the time of]utland, it can be said that massive boredom had begun to affect the
High Seas Fleet, but that none of the disciplinary problems which were later to cripple
the fleet were yet evident. D uring the tenure of Admiral von Pohl, wh ich included
almost all of 191 5, the fleet had gone to sea only five times, and never more th an 120
miles from hom e base. Ma ny of the mo re adven turesome and am bitious sailors and
officers had applied for transfers to th e U-boa t bra nch, th e air branch or even th e
army, where they were assured of action. Nevertheless, by all accounts overall morale
at Jutl and was still high. After Jutl and , this would cha nge drast ically. By 1917, morale
was deplorable; in 191 8, the crews of the dread nought s went int o open m ut iny.
Before the war, Ger man dreadn ought crews were extrem ely well drilled and trained,
but this fine edge had been tem pered by th e 22 mo nt hs leadi ng up to Jutland .
COMBAT
T hro ugho ut 191 5, th e Ger man dreadn ou ght s ma inta ined a du lling schedule: a week
on patro l behind th e defensive min efield s of th e Heligoland Bight; ano ther week
anchore d in th e Schilling Roads near W ilhelmshaven , on alert to respon d to a British
incursion; then a period of gunnery dr ills in the Kiel Bay, followed by a period of at
least two weeks pierside at W ilhelmshaven , where the crews lived ashore . Yet despite
the fact that the crews spent less time at sea than British dreadn ought crews, in May
BRITISH AND GERMAN TACTICS
1916 the gunnery skills of the Germans remain ed high, with gun crews able to get the It is im po rta nt to review the genera l tactics of each side before beginning an account
range quickly and ma intai n a high rate of fire. of the battle itself. T he tactics of the Grand Fleet were developed entirely by Jellicoe
and were bu ilt on th ree p recep ts. T he first, and mos t important, was a defe nsive
emphasis. Jellicoe was determ ined not to risk his dreadn oughts to und erwater threats.
He was convinced that the Ger ma ns would operate their submarines in conj unction
with th eir battl e fleet and th at a German tactic wo uld be to lay mines and then
attem pt to dr aw the British across them. Jellicoe also gave the Ger mans credit for a
formidable destroyer force equippe d wit h supe rior torpedoes. T hus, he intended to
engage th e Germans with gunfi re at long ranges, beyond the effective range
of to rpedoes.
To keep his fleet together and to bring the greatest number of heavy guns to bear
on the enemy, Jellicoe was also determ ined to fight in a line-ahead formation on a

A G·3?·c1ass German
destroyer cutt ing th rough
a line of High Seas Fleet
dreadnoughts. The Briti sh
overestimated th e t orpedo
thr eat posed by Germ an light
units dur ing t he war and th is
perception affect ed the ir
tactic s at Jut land. During the

1-
52 battl e, Germ an torpedo boats
played only a mino r role. 53
 para llel course to the enemy. H e rejected mo re flexible tactics du e to his concern that
a squad ron of the Grand Fleet might be isolated and dest royed, and his doubt th at
'divided' tactics could be em ployed successfully. Because th e threat of torpedoes made
it too dangero us to stea m in a line ahead during the approach ph ase, Jellicoe ordered
th at th e Grand Fleet approac h th e enemy in columns. He wo uld order the fleet to
de ploy into a lin e ahead ju st before th e battl e was join ed . H e desired th at the
engage ment begin at long range (I8,000 yards) and th at in the early stages he wo uld
not close insid e 14 ,000 yards . Once th e weigh t of gunfire had red uced Ge rman
streng th, he wo uld close to 10,000 yards to finish th e enemy. British destroyers were
to be emp loyed in an entirely defensive role. j ellicoe's third precept was sim ple - the
Gran d Fleet wo uld rely on centralized control: him.
Despite jellicoe's concerns, Ge rma n tactics were also dedicated to a decisive
gun nery engage me nt . Yet Scheer, being a to rpedo expert , did see a role for a massed
destroyer attack under some circ um sta nces. Scheer planned to isolate an d destroy a
small portion of th e Gr and Fleet; under no circumstances did he want to be dr awn
int o a decisive engagement with th e main body of the enemy fleet. Sho uld this appear
to be happen ing, Scheer planned to resort to an evasive turn away covered by smoke
an d a torpedo attack.
Scheer's tactics in the battl e itse lf were dri ven by the fact th at he was heavily
o utn um bere d; in d readn ou gh ts th e edge was 28 to 16 an d 9 to 5 in battlecr uise rs,
Opening mov ement s of the
favo uring the Brit ish . This translat ed into a sign ificant Britis h adv antage in battle of Jut land , 31 May 1916

," ~;f
o 40 mites

~ I
0300 hrs
o 4Qkm
Pent land
Firth
NORWAY

MorayFirth The Naze

1430hrs

•
OOOOhrs

· Cromarty
Grand Fleet
Rendezvous HighSeas Fleet

•
Rendezvous

1430hr s
JutlandBank
1200 hrs

JUTLAND
1430hr s
\

Horns Reef

Dogger Bank

-----u-s2z---1
\ J
----------- 1 r------~~;- -----r

.
UB21
J
I I
: 1
I
1 )0
~. R. [lb.
L_ l l- - ~-l
Humber
I_I I U46 I
Wilhelmshaven• .
-- "t==__ J

ENGLAND ,
i
HOLLAND )
i
i
!
r- ......J
I
N
\'-
-\
---- German submarine areas
/i
j
A
54 ,.'
\, 55
 firepower as well. T he Briti sh dre adnoughts carri ed a total of 272 heavy guns, while
th e Ge rma n dr eadnoughts bro ught 200 he avy guns to th e fight. Battlecrui ser
firepower was also stacke d in favo ur of th e British, with 7 2 heavy gu ns against
44 for th e Ge rma ns . To top off Schee r's ch alle nge , th e British had a gene ra l
speed ad van ta ge. Becau se Sche er had relented and decid ed to brin g th e pr e-
d readnoughts of II Battle Squadron with th e Hi gh Seas Fleet, he was restricted to
a maximum speed of 18 kn ots, whi ch was 2-3 knots slowe r th an the Grand Fleet .
Lik ewise, the newest of Beatty's battlecruisers po ssessed a 3-knot adva ntage over
Hipper's form ation .
FIRST CONTACT
By 28 May 1916, Room 40 had provided ample evidence th at so meth ing unusual
was stirring in th e N orth Sea. On 30 M ay, it appeared th at a major operation by the
Hi gh Seas Fleet was imminent. In reaction, the Admiralty brought the G rand Fleet
to readiness th at afternoon . That evening, ] ellicoe led th e bulk of the G rand Fleet
(16 dr eadnoughts and three battlecrui sers) out fro m Scapa Flow, soon to be join ed
by ano th er eight dr eadnoughts from C ro ma rty. Beatty's Battle C ru iser Fleet
departed the Firth of Forth with six battlecruisers and th e four fast dreadnou ghts of
th e 5th Battle Squadron.
Since th e H igh Seas Fleet did not leave until early on th e morning of 31 M ay, the
British had beaten th e Germa ns to sea, but th eir departure was far from incident free.
As th e G rand Fleet steam ed at an econo mical 15 knots, zigzagging due to the threat
of su bmarines, ]e llicoe received a signal from the Admiralty at 1248hrs incorrectly
informing him th at th e Germans were not at sea. This gross error was the result of
poor judgem ent from th e Director of th e Operations D ivision at the Admiralty. It
was also a cru cial error; had ] ellicoe been informed th at th e Ge rma ns were at sea, he
could have increased his speed to enga ge th e Ge rmans earlier in the day. Perhap s more
importantly, when ]ellico e received subseq uent information from th e Admi ralty on the
Germans' locatio n, he tended to ignore it.
The greatest clash of dre adnoughts in history began inn ocentl y enough . T he light
cruiser Galatea on Beatty's port wing spo tted a plume of smoke 8 mi les away - thi s
was a Danish freighter blowing off steam . Upon investigating the contact, Galatea
reported two Germ an warships, wh ich were also investigating the smoke, and sen t a
report to Beatty at 1420hrs. Beatty reacted quickly and ord ered his fleet to go to battle
stations, increase speed to 22 kn ots and head to th e sout h-east to cur the Germa ns off
from their bases. A communications Iailurc, however, separated th e four d readnoughts
of the 5th Battle Squadron from Beatty's battlecrui sers.
As the respectiv e battl ecruise r fleets joined for battle, the opposing dre adnought
forces were hours away. ]ellicoe was some 65 mi les to the north, at least three hours'
stea m ing tim e. In respon se to Galatea's messages that th e Germa n forc e included
56
battlecruisers, he increased speed to 19 kn ots. Scheer was some 50 mi les to the sout h .
THE BATTLECRUISER PHASE
Hipper spotted the British battlecruisers first. He reversed his course to th e so uth to
draw the un wary British upon Scheer's dreadnought s. Beatty was mo re th an willing to
give chase. By his observations, his force faced onl y five Ge rman battlecrui sers, With
a 10-5 advantage in capital ships and superior speed, he was sure that a decisive victory
was at hand. For th e next hour, from 1545 until 1640hrs, th e battle crui sers would slug
it out suppo rted by th e four super-d read no ughts of the 5th Battl e Squadron.
When th e rang e reached 16,500 yards, Beatty swung his six battlecru isers into line
to engage th e Ge rma ns. The 5th Battl e Squadron was now some 7 miles behind.
Hipper's battlecruisers were on a parallel course to th e sout h-east, and they op ened fire
at about the sam e time . From the start, Ge rma n gunnery was excellent. T he first salvo
was 200 yards sho rt , but the next st raddled its tar gets , gain ing early hits. Within
minutes, three of th e Brit ish battlecruis ers had been hit multiple times. The British ,
facin g un favourable light co nd itio ns, and handicapped by smoke, overshot
consistently. By 1555hrs, the ran ge was down to 13,000 yards.
T he excellent Ge rma n shoo ting was soo n rewarded. At 1603h rs, after bein g str uck
by two salvoes from the bartlecrui ser Von der limn, Indefiztigable blew up, killing 1,0 17
of her crew. Beatty's flagship Lion was hit multiple times and avo ided the fat e of
Indefiuigable by flooding th e m agazine of her am idships 13.5in turret. T he accur ate
G erman fire forced Beat ty to op en th e rang e to 18,000 yards.
M akin g 24 .5 knots, th e four ships of th e 5th Battl e Squ adron strugg led to get into
range. Finally, at 1610hrs, they brought th eir 15in guns to bear and gained qui ck hits
on two G erman battlecrui sers. Yet thi s fire d id not stop barrlecrui sers Derfflinger and
Seydlitz from concent rating a bombardment on th e bart lecrui ser Queen Mary. Hit in
her amidships ma gazine , she blew up at 1626hrs with th e loss of all but eight of her
crew of 1,274 . Her destruction was witn essed by th e navigat ing offic er o n th e
battlecrui ser New Zealand:
Seyd li tz was t ypi cal of
the German approac h to
battl ecrui ser design, wit h
an emphasis on prot ecti on.
Her l l in main belt armour
made her as well protec ted
as most Brit ish battl eship s.
Accordi ngly, th e Germans
never felt t he need to design
a squadron of fast battl eship s
like th e Roya l Navy 's Queen
Elizabe th class. 57
 Malaya was assigned to t he
5t h Batt le Squadron and was • Germanship • British ship N
in t he th ick of the fig hting at ID German flagship ID British flagship
Jutl and. She fired 215 rounds A
at the Germans, wit h good
resu lts. In ret urn, she
received eight hits by heavy
GRAND FLEET
she lls, but suffe red no major
damage. However, 63 of her
crew were ki lled and another 1st Battle Squad ron

68 wou nded. 1st Light Morlborough

Cruiser ,

""
Squadron ,,"
" / '
"
,,*", Colossus
. . -.. 4th Battle
2nd Battle Squadron
/ ~, ',.,.sqU. dron
.. .. ./ , Barham '.. Iron Duke
.... , ' 2nd Light , ' 1D• • • • • • • ~lng George v
.... Cruiser ' .~ 5th Battle Squadron

................... SqU.•. ::.~.: ·

.....
1st 8: 2nd Battle
Cruiser
.~ Lion
.......•.•.•..

InVinc;~':'
~- \
. . . sudden ly I saw a salvo hit Queen Maryo n her porr side. A sma ll cloud of what looked Squadron " Inflexible
[sunk) 3rd Battle Cruis er Squadron
like coal-d ust came our from where she was hit, bur nothing more unt il several moments

t TorpedoBoat

.:..
later, when a terrific yellow flam e with a heavy and very dense mass of black smoke ..A. Flotilla ........................... . 3rdllght
Worsplre Defence
showed ahead, and the Queen Mary herself was no lo nger visible. . .. Cruiser Squadron
........

OPPOS ITE: Fleet Action
1830 -1835h rs
In an effort to bring relief to his heavy shi ps, Beatty ordered 12 destroyers to deliver
tor pedo attacks on the German battlecr uisers. T hese attacks were co untered by
.:..•.
H ipper, who ordered a light cruiser and 15 destroyers to attack the British heavy ships.
IIISquadron
........:._•..::.;_....~ ...•~...}
. ..,.:<..:.:. ::;::.:... ~olser Konig -,

ISquadron

. .~.:« . .~ ,
....,-:::.
.•..:::~...::_........ ttJ Friedrich der Grosse
' asrJrlestond
~), \, ~" l Sccutlng

\'"
•

/ ....,
./:•...•, Posen

TorpedoBoat : j f
• •
1 w rzow
.•/ .... , West/olen
Flotillas Ji~:":/
'Ji
.../ :.!aeursChlond / , / ) ......." .J II Scouting Group
, [Light Cruisers]
TorpedoBoat ....
II Squadron / ; : ....
Flotilla

:
./~;t.,
Hannover
Torpedo Boat
Flotilla HIGH SEAS FLEET
.....

.,./,,::~"I V
.....
Scou ting Group
[light Cruisers]
2m iles

58 ~~==JI
I 2km
59
 Barham shown in Scapa Flow.
She was heavi ly engaged at
Jut land and fired the most
heavy shells of any Brit ish
dreadnought ( 337], and also
cont ribu ted to t he damage
in flicted on several German
batt lecrui sers. She was st ruck
by six Germa n heavy shells ,
but none of th ese affected her
combat capabilit ies. They did,
however, kill 26 of her crew
and wound ed 46 .
In th e ensuing melee, two destroyers on each side were sun k and one Brit ish tor pedo
found its m ark on Seydlitz, but her effective anti-to rpedo defe nces allowed her to
maintain speed and stay in line.
As bad as Beatty's pro blems appeared to be, th ey got worse at I 638hrs when he
received a signal from one of his light cru iser squadrons tha t it had sighte d th e Hi gh
Seas Fleet. Now Beatty faced th e stre ngt h of bo th H ipp er and Scheer, and j ellicoe's
battl eships were still 50 m iles away. He cha nged course to the north at 1640hrs to
draw th e Germans into th e Gra n d Fleet . At thi s poin t, more signalling pro blems
bed evilled the British . T he 5th Battle Squadron m issed th e or igina l order to turn
north , and it was not repea ted and acknow ledged for another 14 m inutes. All this
tim e, th e 5th Battle Squa dron contin ued towards th e 16 d readn ou ghts of th e H igh
Seas Fleet. A turret officer on board Malaya recalled the spectacle:
Iron Duke was acti ve at
Jutla nd, engaging two
German Konig-class
dreadnoughts and a
batt lecru iser wit h 90 rounds
of 13.5in shells. She was
undama ged.
his apparent victory, he ordered 'Give C hase' at 1720hrs. T his purs uit had th e effect
of stri nging out the High Seas Fleet. T he 'Run to th e North' ended at 174 5h rs, when
Beatty spo tted the advance unit s of the Grand Fleer. Beatty now changed course to
the east to disguise the arrival of ]ellicoe's force for as long as possible. At 1755h rs,
however, a Ger ma n light cruiser reported British battleships to the east. Mi n utes later,
the leading Ger ma n dread nou gh ts sighted 24 British dreadnou ghts spread o ut across
the no rthern horizon. Scheer's worst nightmare had been realized - the ent ire streng th
of the Gra nd Fleet was on ly 16,000 yards away an d closing.

I saw, just distinguishable in the mist, a warship of sorts coming from the S.E... We
werenot long kept in suspense as to what this newship was, for veryshortlyafter sighting
her, I saw following her a long line of others, which we soon recognized as German
Dreadnought Battleships of the Konig and Kaiser classes.
When th e turn was made in full view of th e German batt leline, both Barham and
Warspite were hit. Beatty's battl ecrui sers were severely battered , but none had any
dam age to their engineer ing plants so were able to use th eir super ior speed to pull
away. Left behind, the four ships of th e 5th Battle Squadro n faced the conce ntrated
fire of Hi pper's five batt lecrui sers and th e lead ships of th e Hi gh Seas Fleet, th e four
Konig class drea dno ughts. Both Malaya and Barham were hit ano ther five tim es. T his
THE BATTLELINES ENGAGE
After ]ellicoe dispa tched Rear Admira l Sir Horace H ood 's 3rd Battle Cruise r Squadron
to support Beatty at I605 hrs, he went int o an infor mation void. He knew tha t Beatty
was engaging the H igh Seas Fleet and that the actio n was moving north to his position,
but Beatty had utterly failed to keep him informed of the de tails of the bat tlecrui ser
action and did not inform ]ellicoe of the location an d movement of the German fleer. OVERLEAF
From 1645h rs until ju st after 180 0h rs, Beatty sent ] ellicoe no comm un ications. By l B30hr s, th e main fleet
] ellicoe was forced to rely on what littl e he could see from his flagship Iron Duke. An act ion was und er way.
intermitte nt h aze persisted thro ugho ut the day, wh ich created variable visibility The 6th Division of th e

was the tim e of maxim um peril for the finest of th e Royal Navy's d readn ough ts, as this 1st Batt le Squadron was
sometimes up to 16,000 yards, other times down to a mere 2,000 yards.
heavi ly engaged. Shown
account from Warspites executive officer affirms: By 1800 hrs , ]ellicoe could fin ally see Beatty's flagship, bu t it was obvious th at the here are t he four ships of
pursuing Germans were closer tha n he anticipate d. Now he had a difficult decision t he division with th eir guns
Very soon after the ru m I suddenly sawon the starboard quarter the whole of the High to make on how to deploy his force . T he G ran d Fleet was steam ing sout h in six tr ained to sta rboard. The
Seas Fleet; at least I saw masts, funnels, and an endless ripple of orange flashes all down colum ns, each with four dr eadn ou gh ts. ] ellicoe needed to direct his fleet into a line-
leadin g ship is Marlb arough
[ Iron Duke class with 13.5in
the line, how many I didn't try to count, as we weregetting well strafed at this time, bur ahead formation to bring his big guns to bear on the Ger mans. Deployment int o a line gun s) followed by Revenge
I remembercounting up to eight. The noise of their shells over and short was deafening... ahead wo uld take 20 min utes, and once begun it could not be stopped. If ]ellicoe [with 15in guns ), then
deployed his ships to starboard (to the west), he wo uld place his dread no ughts closer Hercules (12in gun s] and
Schee r still had no idea tha t th e G rand Fleet was at sea an d was just over th e to where he thought th e Ger mans were, thus allowing him to open fire sooner. O n the finally Agin caurt (th e only
60 horizon . In response to what appeared to be a British flight and eager to con solid ate Brit ish dreadnought with
other hand, such a deployment also ran the risk of bri nging his fleet immediately into 14in guns ) . 61
 This dramat ic photog raph
shows the explosion aboard
Invincible follow ing a German
shell hitting her amidships
['0 ') turret. The explosion
resu lted in flames reaching
400ft high , and when the
smoke cleared some 20
minutes later, only her bow
Ge rman torpedo ran ge. If Jellicoe deployed to po rt (to th e east), he wo uld en d up
and stern sectio ns remained.
some 4, 000 yards fart her away from th e Germans. T h is m an oeuvre wo u ld also have
th e effect of crossing Schee r's 'T', an d place the Briti sh in a favo ura ble light situa tio n
whe re th ey wo uld be hidden in th e m ists to th e east an d the Germa ns silho ue tte d
aga ins t th e sunse t in th e wes t. Hi sto rian s have deb at ed thi s cho ice ever sin ce, but
Jellicoe had o nly m inutes to decid e. H e chose to go to port.
While j ellicoe's 24 dreadnoughts began to deploy into th eir fighting form ation,
Beatty's for ce steamed acros s j elli coe's to take up its position at th e front o f th e
form ati on. The co m ma nde r of th e 5th Battle Sq uad ro n decid ed to move his sh ips to
th e rear of th e Brit ish line. During this man oeuvre, Warspite suffered a jammed rudder
th at fo rced her to m ak e two co mp lete circl es with in 8 ,0 00 yards o f th e Ge rma n
d read nough ts. The Ge rma ns conce ntrated a fur iou s fire on th e British ship; du e to her
heavy armo ur, however, an d good fort u ne, n on e of th e 13 h its in flicte d serious
dam age. Una ble to m an oeuvre, Warspitewas Ollt of th e fight and was ordere d to return
to Rosyrh .
In th e van of th e Grand Fleet's fo rmation were two squadro ns of armoured cru isers.
Now, half of the l st Bat tle C ru iser Squadro n fou nd itself within 8,000 yards of th e
Ge rman dread no ug hts. T he Germans m ad e qu ick wo rk of the ar mo ured cruiser
Defence, wh ich blew up an d sank ar I 820h rs together with her crew of 900; a seco nd
armo red cruiser, Warrior, was also taken unde r fire and m ortally dam aged . She sank
th e followin g m orning. An observer aboard Colossus described the demi se of Defence:
At about 6.15p.m. we witnessed the action of the l st Cruiser Squadron and the blowing
up of Defence. We thought she had gone about a minut e before she finally blew up, as
she completely disappeared in a mass of spray, smoke, and flame. But she came through
it apparently still intact, only to disappear later in a tremendous belch of vivid flame and
dense black smoke, from which some dark object, possibly a boat or a funnel, was hurled
through space, twirling like a gigantic Catherine-wheel.
As th e Germa n battleships were pum me lling the armo ure d cru isers, the 3 rd Battle
One of the most remarkable
Cruiser Squadro n jo ine d th e fray. T he th ree battlecru isers were on a parallel co urse
sights of t he battle was
the upright bow and stern
sections of batt lecruiser
Invincible vis ible well after
she exploded at 1831hrs. The
two sections remained afloat
during the battle , and fina lly
64 sank during the night.
Oldenburg pictured during
the batt le of Jutland firing
her main armament . She fired
only 53 main battery rounds
durin g th e battle and was hit
by a single secondary round,
wh ich killed eight and
wounded 14.
with Hipper's batrl ecrui sers at abo ut 9 ,000 yards. H avin g ju st returned from gu nne ry
p racti ce at Sca pa Flow, th e British batrlecru isers o pe ne d an impressive fire o n the
leadin g two German bartlecruisers. After sco ring heavily against Lutz oio. Invincible
was engage d by Derfflinger. On th e thi rd salvo, th e British bartlecrui ser was struck
ami ds h ips and for a thi rd time the horribl e scene of a British bartlecruiser blow ing up
was rep eated . T he 12in Germa n she ll ignited the powd er in the ho ist, which travelled
down th e tru nk to the magazines. Invincible exploded; on ly six men were rescued of
a crew of 1,032.
Screened by the 3 rd Battle C ru iser Sq uadron, the G rand Fleet was deploying into
its lin e-ah ead formatio n, crossi ng the 'T' of the German dread no ug hts. This
positio ni ng wo uld allow the Brit ish dread noughts to use the ir entire broadside , whi le
allowi ng the Ge rma ns to em ploy only th ose heavy guns that co uld be brou gh t to bear
forwards. H ere was the mo me nt the Royal Navy had been plan ni ng for since the wa r
began. Yet it did not tu rn o ut to be th e crush ing blow for which th e British had hoped.
Com ing into the lin e ahea d, no organ ized fire d istr ibution was possibl e. T he first
dr eadnou gh t, Marlborough, ope ne d fire at 181 7hrs, but most sh ips did not even ope n
fire until 1830hrs. Even th en , onl y ten , ma ybe 12 , of th e 24 dr eadnoughts fired on
th e Ge rma ns. Visibi lity was poor and correcti on of fire d ifficult. T he target for thi s
onslaugh t was H ipp er's bartlecruis ers and th e dreadn ou ghts of III Squad ron. Konigwas
espec ially hard h it by eight heavy she lls.
As the volume of British fire inc reased, th e Germans were un able to find targets in
th e poor light to hit back effectively. Schee r was now in a critical situa tio n. Jellicoe had
crosse d his 'T' and th e British dread nough ts we re deliveri ng a withering fire. H e was
150 mil es from h ome with the British fleet between hi m and safety, and his fleet was
inferior in speed to the British. To stay and slug it out with the Grand Fleet would only
invite disaster. The captain of barrlecru iser SeydLitz described the situation:
Visibility had graduallybecome very unfavourable.T herewasa dense mist, so that as a rule
only the flashes of the enemy's guns, bur not the ships themselves, could be seen. From 65
 north west to northeast we had before us a hostile line firing its guns, though in the mist
we could only glimpse the flashes from tim e to time. It was a m ighty and terrible spectacle. N

A
At I 833hrs, Scheer ordered a mano euvre practised for just such an occasion . Called I ! // 2nd li ght
InvlnClbl.
!/! Cndse rS quadron
the 'battle about-tu rn', it required each ship to make a sim ultaneous I 80-degree turn .
!! / , \ 5th Batt l1l5quadron

, Barham
On th is occasion , the High Seas Fleet executed th e manoeuvre sma rtly; all 22
dre adno ughts and pre-d readnoughts turned away from the Gra nd Fleet and •,,, GRAND FLEET

disapp eared, aided by a smokescreen laid by Germa n destroyers and favourable wind s. Uorlborough /
Scheer's turn had been executed even before the Grand Fleet could deploy all its hI BatUe Squadr on •,
,
\ ,
, ~ ~
;i
r/.:;,~. ;\ ,/
dreadnought s into a line ahead. Thus, the long-awaited main action had lasted onl y Torpedo Boat Colossus '
Benbow' , ; Squl dron\ \ llt ll ght ,/
, \ \,
Flotilla . , \ , Cruiu r5 quadton ; 2nd
some 20 minutes from 1815 until 1835hrs. ]ellicoe decided not to follow the Germans 4tllBatt le Squadron ,
l,on Duk.. ~
~ Cruin r
, j " \ Squadron
into th e mist , and by 1855hrs was still un sure what had happ ened. At 1857hrs a : ,_:I!!lnyftr f::': ~

,
•i
III Squadron •• Orlan '

torpedo struck Marlborough, an incident th at probably served to reinfor ce ]ellico e's

Frledrlchd ffGro sslI
.......:: ::~: i.D
/....... ..
~onlg
I Scout lnSGroup \:\
.., ' King Georg, V
,;' I
reluctance to chase the Germans. He maintained cour se to the south-east and then to sq"~:,~: : .';",;:::'';;''iio 4th L1ahl •

th e south to keep the Grand Fleet between th e Germa ns and their bases. Eventually, ..•.::::.
I

..
,...,::::
Wesrjo !en
crulaerSo,Uld ron/ 1118: 2nd

,
eanleC rulur , ....
Squadron ' , .
,

....'
,/

IISqul dron
th e Germans would have to com e to him. ...·'~'on
Torpedo BODt
TorpedoBoat ~ ,
Flotil las
Flot illa

" Jrd Llght

Torpedo Bo,' " Cruiser Squadron
Flotilla

.... /
Lu tz ow , ..•..

THE SECOND ENGAGEMENT

.. .. .:
HIGH SEAS FLEET
~ .
IIScouling Group
At 1855hrs Sch eer inexplicably ord ered a second battl e about-turn at 1855hrs. (li ght CrUiser s)

T hough he had broken contact with the British, he ordered the H igh Seas Fleet right • German ship • Brit ish ship

hz;::q
lmiles

back into th e massed fire of the Grand Fleet. T he reason s for this orde r have never <I::> German flag ship IE> Briti sh flag ship I
o l km
been adequately explained, even by Scheer himself. Perhaps he hoped to surprise the

British or break through to the east and head for home. None of this happ ened . When Fleet Action 191D-191Shrs
the Germa n fleet reappe ared out of the mist, the British quickl y responded.
By 19 15hrs, the enti re Grand Fleet was pouring fire on the H igh Seas Fleet from
a range of betwe en 11,000 an d 14,000 yard s. Again the van of Schee r's fleet was
hammered and was un able to respond effectively. T he onl y damage suffered by the
British was two hits on the battleship Colossus that caused minor damage and wounded
five men. Of note, these were th e only gunfire casualties suffered by any Gra nd Fleet
dreadnought during th e ent ire battle . In cont rast, during this phase in the clash the
British hit the Ge rma ns with 37 large-calibre shells.
For a second tim e, Scheer was faced with an im mediate decision to save his fleet.
He ord ered the fleet to prepa re to execute another battl e about-turn . T his was to be
covered by an advance by Hipper's battlecruisers to cover the withdrawal and by a
massed destro yer attac k. At 1913hrs, Hipper's battered battlecruisers began th eir
charge against the Grand Fleet. Though it lasted for only four minutes, this 'death ride'
constituted on e of the most dramatic and controversial mom ent s of the battle. The
death ride was followed by an att ack by 14 destro yers, aimed at th e G rand Fleet's
dreadnoughts. T he destroyers came to with in 8,000 yards of the British battleline
66
before launching 3 1 torp edoes. An observer abo ard Conquerordescribed the action: 6i
 At 7. 14 observed enemydestroyers attacking, and fired on them for eight minutes.T hey
weremaking a veryheavysmokescreen, and were never on the samecoursefor more than
a minute at a time, turning, twisting, wriggling, and disappearing into their own smoke,
only to reappear again almost immediately at a different place.
Now Jellicoe was forced to ma ke an instant decision that wo uld have great im pact
on th e course of the battl e. In orde r to present a m uc h sma ller target to th e
approac hing tor pedoes , he could either tu rn his dreadn ou gh ts into th em or turn away
fro m th em. If he turned into th em , th e speed of th e advancing to rpedoes combined
with th e speed of his own ships wo uld leave litt le m argin for erro r in executi ng evasive
ma noe uvres . It wo uld, however, place him in an excellent position to resum e the
pursuit of th e now disorgan ized Ger man fleet. If he turned away, th e closing speed of
th e to rpedoes would be m uch reduced and ma ny wo uld pro bably run ou t of fuel
before reachi ng their intended targets. While preservi ng th e G rand Fleet's
d readno ugh ts fro m und erwater damage, th e eventuality most feared by Jellicoe, it
wo uld allow th e Ger ma n fleet to get away.
In the most single controversial decision of th e battle, Jellicoe chose to turn away
fro m th e Ge rmans. T he ma noe uvre was successful in defea ting the Ge rman to rpedo
attac k - only 2 1 torpedoes reached the British dread no ughts, and, despite several close
calls, non e hi t the ir target. T he tactical cost, however, was high; Scheer's desperat e
cou nterattacks allowed him to disengage just as it appeared th at the H igh Seas Fleet
was abo ut to be smas hed by the G rand Fleet's overwhelming gun powe r. Again,
followi ng th is turn away, Jellicoe did not know where Scheer was. In fact, he had
broken contact and was 15 m iles away. Yet as night fell, the British were still between
the H igh Seas Fleet and hom e. Jellicoe had every expecta tion th at th e next morning
wo uld see the destru ction of the German fleet.
THE HIGH SEAS FLEET BREAKS THROUGH
Given what he perceived as Ger man advantages in both train ing an d equipment for
night com bat, Jellicoe had no desire to seek an engagement with th e Ger ma ns unt il
dayligh t. Afte r 2 1OOhrs, he returne d th e Gra nd Fleet to cru ising form ation . Since he
still believed th e German fleet to be located to his no rth-wes t, Jellicoe deployed all of
his destroyers behind his dread no ugh ts to deal with any German night to rpedo attac k
against his vulnera ble heavy ships.
Jellicoe had reason to be conce rned about a night actio n. In addition to the German
superiority in to rpedoes, th e Ge rmans had trained heavily for n igh t engage me nts.
T hey possessed larger and better searchlights and had incorporated th em into th eir
nigh t gun nery techniques. T ho ugh confident of th e night-figh ting capabilities of his
ships, howev er, Scheer had only one th ou gh t in m ind - escape. H e wo uld have to act
quickly, as dawn wou ld break at 0200 hrs and full dayligh t wo uld be reach ed an hour
68 later.
T here were several potenti al rou tes for Schee r to take thro ugh th e Ge rma n and
British min efields to get home. O ne was the long route aro und Den mark to the Baltic.
T his option was im med iately dismi ssed as too long, especia lly given th at ma ny
Ge rman ships were dam aged. T he closest route to the curre nt location of the German
fleet was south-east to th e H orn s Reeflights hip an d then south behin d the minefields
of the Am rum Bank. T his was th e ro ure Schee r had taken en route to battl e on
3 1 May. T he other possibilities called for the Ger mans to steer sout h-west towa rds th e
Ems River and then head east to Wi lhelms haven, or to steer sout h towards Hel igoland
and the n hom e. For his parr, Jellicoe doub ted th at th e Ge rma ns wo uld attemp t to
break th rou gh the British fleet again to reach Horns Reef, so he decided to head sout h.
Scheer knew that the Gra nd Fleet was located to his south-east, so an escape to the
sout h seemed out of the qu estion. H e decided to take the sho rtest way hom e via H orns
Reef, now only 85 m iles away, by passing astern of the Gra nd Fleet. At 2 110hrs he
gave orders to steer to the south-east at 16 kno ts, stop ping at nothin g until H o rns Reef
was reached. He asked for airship reconnaissa nce of the H orns Reef area at daybreak.
T he un dam aged dread nou gh ts Westfizlen, Nassau, Rheinland and Posen moved into
the van to lead the breakth rou gh.
W hat transpired on the night on 3 1 May to 1 June was a series of confusing an d
savage clashes between the British destroyer flotillas and the heavy units of the Hig h
Seas Fleet. T he Ge rma n destroyers, feared by Jellicoe, played no role in the com bat.
T he mos t rem arkable aspect of the night battl e was the un iversal lack of initiative
show n by the dr ead nou ghts of the Grand Fleet and the critical lack of profession alism
exhibited by th e Admiralty in passing inte lligence to Jellicoe, inte lligence tha t could
have cha nged th e battl e.
As the two fleets converged, with the Grand Fleet heading sout h at 17 knots and the
High Seas Fleet heading south-east at 16 knots, the first elements to make contact were
the fleet's respective scouting forces oflight cruisers. In a clash at less than 1,000 yards,
an old German light cruiser was sunk and a British light cruiser was heavily damaged.
Jellicoe still had no reason to believe th at th e Ger mans were no t headi ng south. He
int erpreted th e sound of com bat to his rear as the expected clash between destroyers.
Even at 2241 hrs, a message from the Admira lty that contai ned the contents of Scheer's
2 110hrs orde rs failed to change his plans. By this time, after a series of m isleading or
simply incor rect reports, j ellicoe's confidence in intelligence provided by the Admira lty
had reached its nadir. Inexplicably, the Adm iralty failed to forward to Jellicoe Scheer's
request for airship reconnaissance of Horns Reef. Ha d this been don e, Jellicoe wo uld
have been in no doubt about the Germans' inten ded escape route. Even more inexcusable
was the fact that th e airship message was on ly one of seven messages int ercepted and
deciphered by Room 40 which gave the Hi gh Seas Fleet's course or positio n between
1043 and 01 OOhrs. No ne of these were passed by th e Admi ralty to Jellicoe.
By 223 0hrs, Scheer's dreadnoughts began encountering the British destroyers in the
rear of th e Gra nd Fleet's formation . In a series of close-range clashes, the 4th Destroyer
Flotilla was batt ered by th e leadi ng Ger man battl eship s. Four British destroyers were
sunk o r left sinking, and ano the r th ree were heavily dam aged. One of th ese was
rammed by th e dr ead nou ght Nassau, but was able to retu rn home desp ite losing 60ft
/
 of plat ing from th e side of her hull. In return, th e Briti sh destroyers to rpedoed a
Germa n light crui ser, whic h was later abando ned . Ano the r German light cru iser
collided with th e dreadnought Posen and was later abandoned . T he sacrifice of the
destroyers was in vain ; non e mad e a contac t report to Jellicoe. More inexplicable was
th e fact that th e several British dreadn ough ts that identi fied the Ge rman battl eship s
moving east neither engaged them nor made a contact report.
Later, the armoured cru iser Black Prince came across thr ee dreadn ought s of Scheer's
I Squadron, including his flagship Friedrich der Grosse. T he dreadnought s engaged
the poorly armoured cruiser at po int-blank range. Black Prince blew up with the loss
of her enti re crew of 900 . At about 0 145hrs, th e G ermans encountered another group
of British destroyers from the 12th Flotilla. T hese were able to fire 17 torp edoes at the
Germa n heavy ships at a range of only 2,000-3,000 yards. Non e of the dreadn oughts
were hi t, but pre-dreadnought Pommern was struck by a single to rpedo, causing a
catastrophic explo sion th at destro yed th e ship and killed all 844 aboard. T his is how
the actio n looked from on e of the British destroyers:
STATISTICS AND
At 2 minures past 2 the Faulknor fired her first torp edo, which probably passed ahead of
ANALYSIS
the second enemy ship.. . About two minu tes later the secon d torped o was fired, bu t almost
simultaneo usly with this the Ger mans sighted our flotilla, and all their battleships opened
fire, together with the light cru isers astern of their line who po ured a partic ularly heavy fire
on us. T he sea seemed to be alive with bursting shells and the air with the whistle of passing
projectiles. T he range was if anything und er 1,500 yards, and 'overs' mu ch predominated. Most analysis of the battle of Jutl and starts with the numbers of ships and men lost by
Sud denly a hu ge explosion too k place on the third Ger ma n ship, and with a deafenin g each side. Yetstrategically, this misses the point . T he battle changed nothing with regards
noise and shock she seemed first of all to open our, then to close together, then to go. to the overall situation at sea. Wh atever tactical success the Ger mans could claim , the
blockade of Germany remained intact. T he most succinct comm ent ary about the battle
With th is final action, Scheer had broken through the Gra nd Fleet. At no tim e was attr ibuted to a journalist who offered, 'The German fleet had assaulted its jailer and
did Jellicoe receive a report of Ge rman dreadn oughts being engaged. All present on
Dirf~ iiiein gt~mtT (.1;rgmftanb
Iron Duke's bridge conti nued to believe th at the sounds of com bat and period ic flash im S innt N~ § ( :'tts <1WftJjfS
4t9m ~ Dural ml1ifdrifd]trCSt.
of searchlights to the north was nothing more than a series of destroyer actions. Finally ~imn ifft ccm .) ~ JURi I(jU,
m. D. 81. 19H, Stil t 2<m.
at 0230hrs, Jellicoe moved his fleet toward s Horn s Reef, but it was too late to catch
th e G ermans outside of thei r protective minefields.
By 1300hrs on 1 June, leading element s of the Hi gh Seas Fleet reached the mouth
of th e Jad e and Elbe. T he dreadnought Ostfriesland str uck a mine at 05 20hrs, but
continued south and reached home. Even four of Hipper's battl ecru isers were able to
penetrate the British form ation and reach safety.T he exception was Lutzow, which was
finally abando ned and scut tled. Seydlitz was spotted and ident ified by no less than
four British dreadnoughts, but non e engaged the helpless battl ecruiser, which had to
be eventually towed stern- first int o harbour with thou sands of ton s of water aboard .
Konig was t he most
At abo ut 0400hrs, Jellicoe received a message from the Admiralty th at conta ined
heavily damaged German
Scheer's 0230hrs position only 16 miles from Horns Reef light ship . T his message dreadnought dur ing th e
confirmed what Jellicoe already suspected - he had lost his oppo rtunity to finish off batt le. This view shows

the Germans. All th at was left was to sweep north looking for stragglers (none was damage from a Britis h heavy
shell, which has penet rated
found) and th en head back to Scapa Flow where the G rand Fleet arrived at noon on
the deck armo ur in th e area
70 2 June. of t he forwar d tu rret.
 Losses at Jutland was back in jail.' T his strategic result was not lost on Scheer, the to tal accuracy was a bit better at 3.39 per cent (122
Hits on battleships and battlecruisers
who delivered a repo rt to the Kaiser on 4 July 1916. W hile hits out of3, 597 fired). If the 12 hits on the armo ured
British German Battleships
laudatory on the achievements of the H igh Seas Fleet, the report cru iser Black Prince are discount ed (these were scored Total hits by heavy shells
Queen Mary made the cent ral assertion that victo ry was not possible at sea at point-bl ank range), the overall accuracy drops to 3.08 8riti sh Barham 6
Batt lecr uise rs Invincibl e Lutzow
against the Grand Fleet. In his view, given the numerical per cent . For th e Hi gh Seas Fleet, the most accurate Warspite 15
Indef atigable
dreadnought superiority of the British and Ger many's ships were the well-drilled bartlecruisers, with an overall
Pre-dreadnought Pommern Malaya 7
unfavourable geographic position, resump tion of the U- boat accuracy of 3 .89 per cent (65 out of 1,670 ). The
Defence Colossus 2
cam paign against British shipp ing was the only way to victory. German dreadn oughts scored a less impressive 2.96 per
Armou red cruisers Warrior Nevertheless, on a tactical level, the outco me of the battl e German Konig 10
cent (57 of 1,927), even with the estimate d 12 hi ts on
Back Prince
was m uch different . T he Ge rma ns had mo re than held their Black Prince included. T his d isparity was du e in large Grosser KurfOrst 8
Wiesbaden own, and a sim ple tally of losses suggested that they co uld measure to the fact that the batt lecruisers were heavily Markgraf 5
Frauenlob
Light cruisers claim victory. engaged earlier in th e battl e when light cond itio ns
Elbing Kaiser 2
Simply tallying up losses also misses the point. T he High Seas favour ed the Germans and overall visibility was better.
Rostock Helgoland 1
Fleet did not gain a victory as mu ch as it had avoided For the British, the battl ecrui sers of the 1st and 2nd
Destroy ers 8 5 Battlecruisers
annihilation. Wh ile the Gra nd Fleet reported itself ready for sea Battle Squadro ns exhibited an overall dismal accuracy
Kill ed 6,094 2,55 1 British Lion 13
on the evening of 2 Jun e with 22 of its 24 dreadn oughts, the rate of 1.43 per cen t of the 1,469 heavy ro unds fired.
Woun ded 674 507 High Seas Fleet limp ed back to W ilhelmshaven. Of the 16 T he 3r d Battl e C ru iser Squadro n, th e beneficiary of Princess Royal 9
Prisoner 177 0 dreadnoughts that participated, only eight were fit for action after gun nery practice imm ediately before the battl e, scored Queen Mary 7
Total casualties 6,945 3,058
the battle. Of the five battlecruisers, on ly two remained ready for a more im pressive 4.29 per cent . British battl eship
Tiger 15
operations some two months later. T he vast majority of the gunnery was also mediocre. T he heavily engaged 5t h
New Zealand 1
damage to the Grand Fleet was suffered by the battlecruiser force Battl e Squa dro n scored an overall accuracy of2 .64 per
and its attached 5th Battle Squadron . Moreover, any losses that the Grand Fleet suffered cent (29 out of 1,099) while th e dreadno ughts of the Indefatig able 5
were made up by the retu rn of the dreadnoughts Queen ELizabeth and Emperor ofIndia Grand Fleet com bined for a 3.7 0 per cent accuracy rate Invincible 5
from refit, and the addition of the three last un its of the Revenge class. (57 of 1,593). O f no te, several divisions of Germ an Lutzow 24
T he extent of dam age suffered by the principal units of both sides, damage th at d readn ou ghts were hardly able to engage at all. T he Derfflinger 21
required dry-d ockin g to be repaired, can be gauged by the table below. division , com posed of King George V, Ajax, Centurion
Seydlitz 22
In addition, several ot her Ge rman dreadn ought s were damaged but did not require and Erin, fired a to tal of on ly 34 rounds in the entire
dry -docking. T hese included Rheinland (damage completed by 10 June), Westfizlen Moltk e 5
battl e, with Erin firing non e. Ano ther division of four
(com pleted 17 June ) and Nassau (com pleted 10 July). O rion-c lass units fired just less than 200 rounds. Von der Tann 4
T he edge in gun nery accuracy, T he British system of cent ral direction proved its
Battleship and battlecruisers damaged, with repair statistica lly, goes to th e Ge rma ns. A wort h, but the standard 9ft rangefinder was generally inadequate and the rapid changes
completion dates tot al of abo ut 85 heavy shells fired by in range, combined with poor visibility, were too much for the Dreyer Table plottin g
German Completiondate British Completiondate Ger man battl eships and battl ecruisers system. T he relatively prim itive Ger ma n fire-control system worked well und er the
str uck th eir British oppon ents. In cond itions , and the Ger man stereoscopic rangefind er proved better than the British
Helgoland 16 June Tiger 1 July
co nt rast, 102 heavy British shells coincidence instruments.
Grosser KurfOrst 16 July Barham 4July
struck Ge rma n dreadn ou ghts or T he real lesson of the battl e was the fact that it was extremely difficul t to sink a
Markgraf 20 Ju ly Malaya 10 July battl ecruisers. dreadn ou ght by gun fire. Even th e less-arm oured battl ecruisers were heavily resistant
Konig 21 Ju ly Wa rspit e 20 Ju ly T he most thoro ugh analysis of the to gunfire. T he ability of the German battlecruisers to receive damage was outstan ding,
Dstfriesland 26 Ju ly Princess Royal 21 Ju ly battl e indicates th at gun nery on for they were armo ured about as well as some British dreadn ought s. It was no t their
neither side was outstanding. After hits poor armo ur that doom ed the th ree British bartlecruisers lost at Jutl and , but rath er the
Moltke 39 Ju ly Marlborough 2 August
to smaller ships are facto red in, the cha racter of British ammu nition powd er. Unlike Germa n powd er, when Briti sh
Von der Tann 2 August Lion 13 Septe mber
tot al accuracy for th e British heavy powd er was ignited it burn ed quickly and created int ense over-pressures. To complete
Seydlitz 16 Septe mber
guns was 2.75 per cent (123 hits out of the potential for d isaster, British flash doors fitted to protect powder in th e magazine
72 Derfflin ger 15 Octo ber 4,48 0 rounds fired). For the Ger ma ns, and in the hoist to the turret were not adequately tested before the war, and proved
 Seydlitz was hit by an
amaz ing t otal of 21 heavy
shells and one to rpedo dur ing
th e battl e of Jut land, but
su rv ived to return home,
although as shown here
she was barely afloat.
She survived th e war only
to be scutt led in June 1919.
74
tI/'-,1, ~eiM 'alle .i. ': - /f/If. .
~ elun iWf.k,,!&+<. I'. ,ft,,- ,.'fa,_,,,,,,,4'aa,,,,,··
.b J!1. t.i,Ia/"d'~
, was never in any danger of
ii
un able to withstand the violent reaction of the powder when ignited. When th e flash
of ignited powd er reached th e shi p's magazine, it produ ced complete destruction.
All th ree battlecru isers, as well as the rwo armo ured cruisers th at blew up , were lost
in th e same way. It is true th at British gun nery pract ices at Jutland kept a greater
number of powder charges out of the magazine at any given time to increase th e rate
of fire, bu t thi s was only a cont ributing facto r.
In 1914, the Germa ns generally took less care than th e British with precau tions for
flash protection . Such was shown during th e battl e of D ogger Bank, when a 13. 5in
shell hit and penetrated the aft turr et barbette of Seydlitz. A total of 62 charges totalling
more th an six ton s of powd er ignited and burned, but d id no t explode like British
powder wou ld have. The Ger mans did not introduce flash precauti on s because of this
Despit e t he ten hit s fr om
Brit ish heavy shells, Konig
sink ing. Repairs took unt il
21 July 1916 to complete.
Some of t he int ernal damage
is shown here, but casualt ies
were relati vely light at 4S
dead and 27 wou nded.
incident before Jutl and . They did limit the nu mb er of charges out of the magazine at
anyone time, but overall their magazines were not flash tight. T he saving grace for th e
Germans was that their powder charges bu rned relatively slowly when ignited, and did
not cause the dangero us pressure rise created by British powder.
Another facto r redu cing the effectiveness of British gunnery was the performance
of its shells. British shells tend ed to break up when striking heavy armo ur at an oblique
angle, and detonated before penetrati ng deep int o th e plate. T he defects of British
armo ur-piercing shells ranged from th e use of Iyddire as a bursting agen t to shells
being too brittl e and fuses that had no delay. Of the 13 heavy shells that hit German
armo ur 10in thi ck or more, only six were effective. British shells also performed poorly
against armo ur of only 6-9in.
 Fleet put to sea to int ercept. T he actua l event was anti- climactic. T he dreadn ou ght
Westftlen was tor pedoe d by a British sub marine on 19 Aug ust and a variety of repo ns
fro m submarines and Ze ppeli ns, co m bined with radi o intelligenc e, co nfirmed to
Scheer that the Grand Fleet was at sea. A sim ilar op eration planned for Septem ber was
cancelled du e to poor weath er.
In Octo ber, the U-boats were pu lled away to participate in the latest round of on -
again, off-again com merce raiding. T heir absence mad e Scheer even more caut ious by
limiting ope rations to th e cent ral and eastern pans of th e No rth Sea. W he n th e Hi gh
The Bayern class was a larger
Seas Fleet sortied on 10 and 19 October, these opera tio ns did not even draw a reactio n versi on of th e Konig class ,
from the British. and was armed with 15in
Ironically, the greatest success of th e Hi gh Seas Fleet afte r Jutl and wo uld be in th e guns. A lack of speed made her

Baltic Sea, lon g a naval backwate r. By late 191 7, th e Russian Army was cracki ng apa rt the equiva lent of t he Brit ish

AFTERMATH and th e Ge rma ns advanc ing up th e Baltic coast. To use th e port of Riga as a supply
base, th e Germans had to take th e Russian-held islands in th e G ulf of Riga. In ord er
to accomplish th is objective, one battl ecrui ser and ten dreadn ou ghts of th e Hi gh Seas
Revenge class. Bayern was
operat ional at th e ti me of
Jutl and. but was left behin d
because her crew was not

Fleet were com mi tted to suppo rt the operation. From 12 to 20 October, th e Ge rma ns considered fu lly t rained . Here
she is shown sink ing by the
cleared th e Russian s fro m th e Gulf of Riga and esta blished Ge rma n maritime
stern on 21 Jun e 1919. when
dominance in th e Baltic. th e Germans scutt led the un its
T he last majo r Ger ma n surface ope ration of the war was cond ucted in Apri l 19 18, surre ndered at Scapa Flow.
In th e afterma th of th e great battl e, the German propagan da machin e went into high when H ipp er led his bartlecrui sers, suppo rted
gear to paint th e engagement as a Ge rma n victo ry. On 5 June, only fo ur days after th e by the dr eadn ou ghts, on a raid against one of
return of the High Seas Fleet to Wi lhelm shaven, the Kaiser made an appearance at th e the No rway-to-B ritain convoys. T he operatio n
naval base to award decorati on s and to promot e Scheer to fleet ad miral. Given th e ended in a fiasco wh en a Briti sh submarine
high expectations created by the High Seas Fleet's performance, the Ge rma ns cou ld torpedoed a battl ecrui ser already crippled by
not give up on future operations in the No rth Sea. D espit e popular belief, th e High engineering probl ems. In the last weeks of th e
Seas Fleet cont inued to challenge th e Royal Navy in th e N ort h Sea after Jutl and. war, Hipper, now commande r of the H igh Seas
As soon as th e fleet was ready for action, Scheer planned ano ther bombardment of Fleet, was prep ar ing a major fleet sor tie int o
the English coast. Learn ing from th e lesso ns of Jutland, Schee r paid particular the North Sea th at had all the earmarks of a
atte nt ion to the co-ordina tion of his Ze ppelin and U-boa t arms to avoid bein g death ride. O n 27 October, units of the H igh
sur prised again . The slow pre-dreadnou ghts were left behind and Hip per's Seas Fleet, lon g suffering fro m bad mo rale
battl ecrui sers were aug men ted by th ree dreadn ou ghts. brought on primarily by inactivity, refused to
The H igh Seas Fleet so rtied on the night of 18 Augu st. Just as in th e hours before accept o rde rs. Within days, th e mutiny had
Jutland, British inte lligence had alert ed Jellicoe to the Ge rman sort ie and the Grand spread throughout the fleet.
Acco rd ing to the term s of th e Armis tice
effective o n 11 Nove m ber 191 8, th e cream of
th e Hi gh Seas Fleet was to be intern ed at Scapa
Flow. Accor di ngly, on 2 1 November, nine of
th e most mod ern Ge rman dr eadn ou ghts, five
battlecruisers, seven ligh t cru isers and 49
Flagship of the Grand Fleet dest royers were esco rted by th e Grand Fleet
Oueen Elizabeth picture d on into custo dy. In M ay 191 9, th e once-pro ud
21 Novemb er 1918, stea ming
German dreadn ou ghts and the rest of th e fleet
off Scapa Flow as th e High
Seas Fleet is about to be scuttled th emselves in Scapa Flow, marking th e
76 interned. end of th e Hi gh Seas Fleet.
 H erwig, Holger H ., 'Luxury Fleet; The Ashfield Press, London (1991)
Hodges, Peter, The Big Gun, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD (198 1)
Ireland , Bernard, j ane's Battleships ofthe 20th Century, H arperCollin s, NY (1996)
London, Charles, jutland 1916, Osprey Publishing, Oxford (2000)
Marder, Arthur, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Vol. III, j utland and After,
Oxford University Press, London (1966)
Massie, Robert, Castles ofSteel Random House, NY (2003)
McCallum, lain, 'T he Riddle of the Shells, 1914-1 8: Disappointment in the North
Sea' in Warship 2005, Co nway Maritime Press, London (2005)
Philbin, Tobias III, SMS Konig (Warship Profile 37), Profile Publications Limited,
Windsor (1973)
Preston , Antony, BattleshipsofWorld WarJ, Stackpole Books, Harrisburg, PA (1972)

FURTHER READING Scheer, Reinhard, Germany's High Seas Fleet in the World War, The Battery Press,
Nashville, TN (2002)
Tarrant, V E., jutland: The German Perspective, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis,
MD (1995 )
Wingate, John , 'H MS Dreadnought' in Warships in Profile, Vol. 1, Profile
Publication s Limited, Windsor (1971)
Wragg, David, Royal Navy Handbook 1914-1918, Sutton Publishin g, Phoenix
Bonney, George, The Battle ofjutland 1916, Sutton Publishing, Phoenix Mill (2002) Mill (2006)
Breyer, Siegfried, Battleships and Battlecruisers 1905-1970, Doubleday and Yates, Keith, Flawed Victory, Naval Institu te Press, Annapolis, MD (2000)
Company, Garden City, NY (1973)
Brooks, John, 'T he Mast and Funnel Question: Fire-control Positions in British
Dreadnoughts 1905-1915 ' in Warship 1995, Conway Maritim e Press,
London (1995)
Burt, R. A., British Battleships ofWorld War One, Naval Institute Press, Ann apolis,
MD (1986)
Campbell, John, jutland:An Analysis ofthe Fighting, Lyons Press, NY (1998)
Campbell, John , 'German Dread noughts and their Protection' in Warship, Vol. I,
Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD (1977)
Corbett, Julian S., Naval Operations, Vol. III, The Naval and Milit ary Press,
Uckfield, nd
Fawcett, H.W and G.W W Hooper, The Fighting at jutland, Naval Institute Press,
Annapolis, MD (2001)
Friedman, Norman, Naval Firepower, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD (2008)
Friedman , Norman, Battleship: Design and Development 1905-1 945, Mayflower
Books, NY (1978)
Gardiner, Robert (ed.), The Eclipse ofthe Big Gun, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis,
MD (1992 )
Gordon, Andrew, The Rules ofthe Game, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD (2000)
Gregor, Rene, Battleships ofthe World, Naval Institute Press, Ann apolis, MD (1997)
Halp ern, Paul G ., A Naval History ofWorld War J, Naval Institute Press, Ann apolis,
MD (1994)
78 Hart, Nigel and Peter, jutland 1916, Cassell, London (2003)

INDEX
Figures in bold refer to illustrations Mate Scheme 46
Mitchell, Colonel Billy 15
aircraft, British 32
Argo Clock 17 Nassau, SMS 8, 24, 25, 41-42,69, 72
armour 11, 17, 17-1 8, 2 1, 26
oil, as fuel 19
Beatty, Vice-Admiral Sir David 28,30, 47, Ord er of Battle 54
50,57,58, 60-6 1
blockades 7, 3 I Pohl, Admiral Hugo von 30, 3 1
propu lsion 10-1 1, 18-19
chronology 8- 9 protection seear mo ur
Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty
Winston 46, 50 rangefinders 16, 17
crews Room 40 (British intelligence) 29-3 0, 32
British 46-47 Royal Navy (RN) 5-6 seealsoships, British
German 48-4 9, 52 after the battle 76-78
Battle of Jutland (1916) 56-70
design and development chronology 8- 9
British 10-1 1,1 3,14-19, 20- 24 design and development 10- 11, 13,
German 12,1 4- 19,24-27 14-1 9, 20- 24
Dogger Bank, Battle of(l91 5) 30, 3 1 dreadnought crews 46-47
Dreyer Table 16, 73 O rder of Battle 54
Dum aresq 16, 17 statistics and analysis 7 1-75
strategic situation 28-33
engines 10-1 1, 19, 25, 26 tactics 53-56
technical specifications 34-4 1
Fisher, Admiral Sir John 5, 6, 10-1 1,
14-15, 21,23, 50 Scheer, Vice Admiral Reinhard 24, 3 1, 32,
33, 51, 5 1, 55-56, 60-6 1, 66-67, 69,
German Navy 4-5 seeafro ships, German 70, 76, 77
after the battle 76-78 ships, British
Battle of Jutland (1916) 56- 70 Agincourt, H MS 30,6 1
chronology 8-9 Ajax, HMS 38-39,73
crews 48-49, 52 Audacious, HM S 28, 29, 38-39
design and development 12,1 4-19, Barham, HM S 39-40, 60, 60 , 72, 73
24-27 Bellerophon, HM S 5,8, 13, 34, 35
Ord er of Battle 54 Benbow, HM S 33, 39
statistics and analysis 7 1- 75 Black Prince, HMS 9, 70, 72, 73
strategic situatio n 28-33 Centu rion, HMS 38-39, 73
racti cs 53-56 Collingwood, HMS 17, 34, 36,36
technical specifications 4 1-45 Colossus, HM S 18, 36- 37,37,67, 73
guns Conqueror, HMS 5, 37- 38
British 10, 11,1 3, 14-1 7, 16,21 ,23 Dejmce, HM S 9, 64, 72
German 12, 14-1 7,15, 24, 26 Dreadnought, HMS 5- 6,8, 10- 11, 13,
14,1 8-1 9,19, 2 1, 38
Heligoland Bight 7, 28, 30 Emperor ofIndia, HM S 11, 39, 72
Hipp er, Vice Adiniral Franz 29, 30,5 1, 57, Hercules, HM S 20, 36- 37, 61
58, 77 Indefiltigable, HM S 9,57,72,73
Hood , Rear Admiral Sir Horace 61 Invincible, HMS 8, 9,64, 65, 72, 73
Iron Duke, HM S 8, 15, 18, 22, 23, 39,
Ingenohl, Admiral Friedrich von 29,30 6 1, 6 1
intelligence, British 29-30, 32 King George V, HMS 8, 14, 23, 38- 39 ,
73
Jellicoe, Admiral Sir John 7,32,33, Malaya, HM S 39-40, 58, 60 , 72, 73
50,53- 55,56, 6 1, 64, 65, 66, 68- 69, Marlborough, HM S 39, 6 1, 65, 66,72
70, 76 Monarch, HM S 37-38
Jutland, Barrlc of (I 9 16) 9,56-70 Neptune, HMS 8, 2 1, 34-36, 37
statistics and analysis 7 1- 75 Orion, HM S 8,1 4, 16, 21, 37- 38
Queen Elizabeth, HM S 8, 13, 18, 19,
line-ahead formations 53- 54 23, 23,39-40,72, 76
7E 80 Lusitanin, RMS 3 1 Queen M ary, HM S 9,57-58,72, 73
RELATED TITLES
Jutland 19 16
Ramillie s, HMS 41
Resolution, HMS 4 1
Revenge, HM S 13,1 8, 23, 41, 61
Royal Oak, HMS 9, 4 1
Royal Sovereign, HM S 4 1
St Vincent, HM S 8, 2 1, 34, 36
Superb, HMS 35, 35
Temeraire, HMS 20, 35
Thunderer, HM S 2 1, 37- 38
Valiant, HMS 39-40
Vanguard, HM S 34, 36
DUE 003 • 978 184603 133 5 DUE 015 • 978 1846033 308 CAM 072 • 978 1 85532 992 8
Warspite, HMS 39-4 0, 60, 64, 72,
73
ships, German
Bayern, SMS 9, 19,77 U-boa ts of th e Bri t ish Batt lc cru isers
Blucher, SMS 3 1 Kai se r's Navy 191 4 -1 8
DerfJli nger, SMS 65, 72 , 73
Deutschland, SMS 24
Friedrichdel' Grosse, SMS 43-44, 70
Grosser Kurfiirst, SMS 45,72, 73
Helgoland, SMS 8, 25, 26, 42-43,
72, 73
Kaiser, SMS 8, 15, 25- 26, 43-44,
73
Kaiserin, SMS 43-44
Konig, SMS 8, 26,26, 27, 45,65,
7 1, 72, 73, 75
Konig Albert, SMS 43-44
Kronprinz; SMS 45
Lutzoto, SMS 9,70,72,73 NVG 050 • 978 1 84176 362 0 NVG 124 • 978 1 84603 009 3 NVG 126 • 978 1 84603 008 6
Markgraf SMS 45,72, 73
Nassau, SMS 8, 24, 25, 4 1-42, 69,72
,
... ;
Oldenburg, SMS 42-43, 65 If
BRITI SH BATTL ESHIPS BRITISH BATTL ESHIPS
Ostfriesland, SMS 9, 15, 42- 43, 44, BRITI SH DESTRO YERS
19 39-45 (1) 193 9-45 (2)
70, 72 Nt'l s(m and I\j " g G.."rg<' V Cl.\~,<,s 1892- 1918
Pomm ern, SMS 9, 24, 70, 72
Posen, SMS 4 1-4 2, 42, 43,70
l'rinz regent Luitpold. SMS 15, 43-44,
45,49
Rheinland, SMS 6, 4 1-4 2, 72
Seydlitz, SMS 57, 60, 65- 66, 70, 72,
73, 74, 74
Tb uringen, SMS 42-43
U7esqak n, SM S 9, 4 1-42, 72, 77
statistics and analysis 7 1-7 5
srearn rurbine engines 10-11 , 19, 25, 26
strategic situation 28-33
/
submarines 28, 3 1, 77 NVG 154 • 978 1 84603 3889 NVG 160 • 978 1 84603 389 6 NVG 163 • 978 1 84603 514 2
tactics 53-5 6
technical specifications VISIT THE OSPREY WEBSITE
British 34-4 1
German 41-4 5 Informat ion about forth comin g books » Autho r informat ion · Read extracts and see
T irpirz, Admiral Alfred von 4, 5,29
torpedoes 17,1 8,53 sam ple pages · Sign up for our fr ee newsletters · Competitio ns and prizes · Osprey blog
weapons www.ospreypublishing.com
British 10, 11,1 3, 14-1 7, 16,2 1, 23
German 12, 14-1 7, 15, 24, 26
Zeppelins 32, 33, 77 To order any of the se title s, or for more info rmation on O sp rey Publishin g, contact:
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This is the account of machines of war pitted against each ot her
and the combatants who operated them . St ep ont o the batt lefield
and immerse yourself in the experience of real historic combat .

BRITISH DREADNOUGHT
vs GERMAN
DREADNOUGHT
Jutland 1916

In 1916, in th e seas near Jutland, two fleets of armoured d readnought s

met in op en battle. This book tells th e story of th e Briti sh and Ge rma n
battl eship s of th ese two great fleets - from their development as th e first
generation of fully-armoured warships to their combat experiences.
T he differing weapon systems and crew training of the British and
Ge rma n fleets are examined in detail, as is the titanic str uggle of Jutland
itself, through an hour-b y-hour, shot-by-shot recon struction. Finally, it
ana lyzes the outcome of th e strugg le, explaining th e successes and failures
of these great battleship s.

Colour art work - Photographs - Unriv alled detail - Cutaw ay art work

UK £ 12.99 / US $1 7.95 / ,CAN $19.95

IS BN 978- 1-84908-167- 2
OSPREY 5 1 795
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