FUJIKI v.

 MARINAY
GR NO. 196049, June 26, 2013
FACTS:
Minoru Fujiki is a Japanese national who married Maria Paz Galela Marinay in the Philippines.
The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to
Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara. Without the first marriage being dissolved,
Marinay and Maekara got married in Quezon City. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan.
However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started
to contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to re-establish their relationship. Fujiki then
helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan declaring her marriage in
Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.
Later, back in the Philippines, Fujiki filed a petition for a Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Judgment before the RTC. However, the trial court dismissed the petition maintaining that Fujiki
lacks personality file the petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on
the ground of bigamy.

RULING:
Yes, a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be
made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
In this case, there is no doubt that the prior spouse, Fujiki, has a personal and material interest in
maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it.
Thus, he has the legal personality to file the petition. 
 CAMIGUIN v. KING
G.R. No. 213426. June 29, 2021

FACTS:
Petitioners filed twin petitions before the CA seeking the issuance of writs of kalikasan and
continuing mandamus against the establishment and/or construction of a diesel power plant by
King Energy Generation, Inc. (KEGI) in Sitio Maubog, Barangay Balbagon, Mambajao,
Camiguin. According to them, the construction of said power plant violates their constitutional
right to a balanced and healthful ecology and a slew of environmental laws.
Petitioners state that although Camiguin is an isolated island province far from the nearest cities
and provinces, it should not be denied of the benefits of a law created to champion the protection
and promotion of our natural resources. They allege that the power plant in issue is located only
in the municipality of Mambajao, thus it does not mean that the pollutants it will not contribute
to the threat that causes the recent natural calamities that took the lives of hundreds of inhabitants
in northern Mindanao. Petitioners claim that the precautionary principle creates a bias in favor of
the constitutional right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology.
The CA, in a Resolution dated 26 May 2014, dismissed the petitions outright. It found that the
petition for issuance of a writ of kalikasan failed to comply with Section 1, Rule 7 of the RPEC.
The CA also dismissed the petition for issuance of a writ of continuing mandamus for failing to
state any reason to justify the immediate filing before the CA instead of the Regional Trial Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petitions.

RULING:
No. Parties that seek the issuance of the writ of kalikasan, whether on their own or on others'
behalf, carry the burden of substantiating the writ's elements. Before they proceed with the case,
they must be ready with the evidence necessary for the determination of the writ's issuance.
Here, an examination of the petition filed before the CA readily shows that petitioners were
unable to meet the burden of proving their entitlement to the writ of kalikasan prayed for. Apart
from citing a purported Press Release issued by the International Agency for Research on Cancer
(IARC) on the association between cancer and diesel exposure, as well as a Wikipedia article on
the advantages and disadvantages of diesel engines vis-á-vis spark ignition engines, they offered
no other evidence to substantiate the alleged safety, health and environmental damage caused by
the construction of the diesel power plant to the residents of Camiguin.
 ONDE v. OFFICE OF THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRATION OF LAS PIÑAS CITY
G.R. No. 197174, September 10, 2014

FACTS:
Petitioner filed a petition for correction of entries in his certificate of live birth before the RTC
and named Office of the Local Civil Registrar. He prayed that the following entries on his birth
certificate be corrected as follows:

Entry From To

1) Date and place of marriage of his parents December 23, 1983 - Bicol Not Married

2) First name of his mother Tely Matilde

3) His first name Franc Ler Francler

RTC dismissed the petition. Hence, this present petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUES:
1. WON the correction on the first name of petitioner and his mother can be done by the city
civil registrar under R.A. No. 9048.
1. WON the correcting of entry on petitioner’s birth certificate that his parents were married to
"not married" is substantial in nature requiring adversarial proceedings.

RULING:
1) YES. Section 1 of R.A. No. 9048 provides that clerical or typographical errors on entries in a
civil register can be corrected and changes of first name can be done by the concerned city civil
registrar without need of a judicial order. R.A. No. 9048 provides that jurisdiction over
applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with administrative officers.
Hence, the correction on the first name of petitioner and his mother can be done through
administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order.
2) YES. Corrections of entries in the civil register including those on citizenship, legitimacy of
paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, involve substantial alterations. These substantial
alterations can be corrected through appropriate adversary proceedings. Hence, correcting the
entry on petitioner’s birth certificate that his parents were married to "not married" is
a substantial correction requiring adversarial proceedings since it will affect his legitimacy. It
will convert him from a legitimate child to an illegitimate one.
 DR. RUBEN C. BARTOLOME v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 243288, 28 AUGUST 2019

FACTS:
Ruben C. Bartolome filed a petition to change his name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court
before the RTC of Parañaque City. The petitioner prays for the correction of his name from
“Feliciano Barthlome” as appearing in his birth certificate to the name that he allegedly use since
his childhood, “Ruben [Cruz] Bartolome”. After the posting and publication the petitioner
presented different proofs of his identity which all bears the name “Ruben C. Bartolome. The
RTC denied the petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, insufficiency of evidence,
and improper venue.It was held that the procedure sought for the change of the petitioner’s first
name is incorrect, and RA 9048 is the proper remedy. As regards with the prayer to correct the
last name it was denied for improper venue. It was further held that the RTC of Manila where the
civil registrar is located is the proper venue, pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. Lastly, the evidences presented was not sufficient to prove that he had been habitually
called “Ruben C. Bartolome” since childhood. The CA held that the petitioner should have filed
the correction in the entries of his birth certificate under RA 9048, instead of Rule 103. It was
likewise held that the petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that the surname of
his father and his siblings is spelled as “Bartolome”. The OSG argued that the CA correctly
denied the petition. A petition pursuant to RA 9048 before the civil registry should have been
filed first in order to change his first name and to correct the spelling of his surname.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the change/correction sought in the petitioner’s first name, middle name, and
surname, as appearing in his birth certificate, from Feliciano Bartolome to Ruben Cruz
Bartolome should be filed under RA 9048, Rule 103, or Rule 108.

RULING:
The changes sought by the petitioner are all covered by RA 9048. In connection to this, the
change sought in the petitioner’s first name from “Feliciano” to “Ruben” is covered by Section
4(2) of RA 9048, as amended, on the ground that he had habitually and continuously used
“Ruben”, and is publicly known by that first name. Further, the inclusion of the petitioner’s
middle name “Cruz”, and the correction of his last name from “Batholome” to “Bartolome”, a
mere clerical error, and is covered by Section 2 of the said law. The latter may be readily
corrected by merely referring to the existing records of the Civil Registrar such as the last name
of the petitioner’s parents and immediate family members. Therefore, the petition should have
been filed in the local civil registry of the city or municipality where the records sought to be
changed or corrected is being kept, pursuant to Section 3 of RA 9048, as amended. The
petitioner can only avail the appropriate judicial remedies when the changes/corrections sought
through the administration’s proceeding are denied. Hence, if the prayer to administratively
change the first name was denied, the same may be brought under Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court. And if the prayers to administratively correct the middle name and surname were denied,
the same may be brought under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
 OSORIO v. NAVERA
G.R. No. 223272, February 26, 2018
FACTS:
Together with his superior officer, SSgt. Osorio was charged in two (2) Informations
beforeBranch 14, Regional Trial Court, Malolos City for allegedly kidnapping University of theP
hilippines students Karen E. Empeño and Sherlyn T. Cadapan. Warrants of arrest were
issuedagainst SSgt. Osorio which caused the arrest of the latter by Colonel Yambing. SSgt.
Osorio wasturned over to the Criminal Investigation and Detection Unit Group in Camp Crame,
QuezonCity and was detained in Bulacan Provincial Jail. He was later transferred to
the Philippine ArmyCustodial Center in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City where he is currently
detained.Contending that he was being illegally deprived of his liberty, SSgt. Osorio filed
a Petition for Habeas Corpus before the Court of Appeals. He mainly argued that courts-martial,
not a civilcourt such as the Regional Trial Court, had jurisdiction to try the criminal case
considering thathe was a soldier on active duty and that the offense charged was allegedly
"service-connected."
In the alternative, he argued that the Ombudsman had jurisdiction to conduct preliminaryinvestig
ation and the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction to try the case because among his co-accused was
Major General Palparan, a public officer.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a writ of habeas corpus is SSgt. Osorio's proper remedy?

RULING:
No. The arrest warrants against SSgt. Osorio were issued by the court that has jurisdiction
over the offense charged. SSgt. Osorio's restraint has become legal; hence, the remedy of habeas
corpus is already moot and academic. SSgt. Osorio's proper remedy is to pursue the orderly
course of trial and exhaust the usual remedies, the first of which would be a motion to quash,
filed before arraignment, on the following grounds: the facts charged do not constitute an
offense; the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; and the
officer who filed the information had no authority to do so. Kidnapping should never be part of
the functions of a soldier. It cannot be done in a soldier's official capacity. If a soldier
nonetheless proceeds allegedly on the orders of a superior officer, the soldier shall be tried before
the civil courts. The remedy of habeas corpus, on the argument that only courts-martial have
jurisdiction over members of the Armed Forces, will not lie.
 OSMEÑA v. GARGANERA
G.R. No. 231164, March 20, 2018

FACTS:
Inawayan landfill served garbage disposal area of Cebu City as approved by DENR in 1993. In
2011, former Mayor Rama ordered the closure of the said landfill and subsequent SP resolutions
were approved for the closure and rehabilitation of the landfill. As a result, the Inayawan landfill
was partially closed and all wastes from Cebu City were disposed in a privately-operated landfill
in Consolacion and formally closed in 2015. In 2016, under the administration of Mayor
Osmeña, they sought with DENR regarding the temporary opening of the landfill, which the
DENR did not opposed. But, after the DOH inspection, it recommends the immediate closure of
the landfill due to the lack of sanitary requirements, environmental, health and community safety
issues.
Joel Capili Garganera for and on his behalf, and in representation of the People of the Cities of
Cebu and Talisay and the future generations, including the unborn (respondent) filed a petition
for writ of kalikasan with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Environmental Protection
Order (TEPO) before the CA. That Inayawan landfill causes serious environmental damage
which threatens and violates their right to a balanced and healthful ecology and has already
outgrown its usefulness and has become ill-suited for its purpose. Respondent further asserted
that its reopening and continued operation violates several environmental laws and government
regulations.
The CA, granted a writ of kalikasan, required petitioner to file a verified return and a summary
hearing was set for the application of TEPO. But Mayor Osmeña averred that respondent failed
to comply with the condition precedent which requires 30-day notice to the public officer
concerned prior to the filing of a citizens suit under R.A. 9003 and R.A. 8749. However, CA still
granted the privilege of the writ of kalikasan which ordered Mayor Osmeña and/or his
representatives to permanently cease and desist from dumping or disposing of garbage or solid
waste at the Inayawan landfill and to continue to rehabilitate the same.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, CA correctly ruled that the requirements for the grant of the privilege of the writ
of kalikasan were sufficiently established.

RULING:
Yes. Here, the present petition for writ of kalikasan under the RPEC is a separate and distinct
action from R.A. 9003 and R.A. 8749. A writ of kalikasan is an extraordinary remedy covering
environmental damage of such magnitude that will prejudice the life, health or property of
inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.31 It is designed for a narrow but special purpose:
to accord a stronger protection for environmental rights, aiming, among others, to provide a
speedy and effective resolution of a case involving the violation of one's constitutional right to a
healthful and balanced ecology that transcends political and territorial boundaries, and to address
the potentially exponential nature of large-scale ecological threats.
Given that the writ of kalikasan is an extraordinary remedy and the RPEC allows direct action to
this Court and the CA where it is dictated by public welfare, this Court is of the view that the
prior 30-day notice requirement for citizen suits under R.A. 9003 and R.A. 8749 is inapplicable.
It is ultimately within the Court's discretion whether or not to accept petitions brought directly
before it. Under Section 1 of Rule 7 of the RPEC, the following requisites must be present to
avail of this extraordinary remedy: (1) there is an actual or threatened violation of the
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology; (2) the actual or threatened violation
arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or
entity; and (3) the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental
damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or
more cities or provinces. Expectedly, the Rules do not define the exact nature or degree of
environmental damage but only that it must be sufficiently grave, in terms of the territorial scope
of such damage, so as to call for the grant of this extraordinary remedy. The gravity of
environmental damage sufficient to grant the writ is, thus, to be decided on a case-to-case basis.
The Court is convinced from the evidence on record that the respondent has sufficiently
established the aforementioned requirements for the grant of the privilege of the writ of
kalikasan. The record discloses that the City Government's resumption of the garbage dumping
operations at the Inayawan landfill has raised serious environmental concerns.
 REPUBLIC v. CAYANAN
GR No. 181796, November 7, 2017

FACTS:
Regina filed a petition for habeas corpus in the RTC alleging that Pablo, her husband, was being
illegally detained by the Director/Head of the CIDG. She contended that a group of armed men
identifying themselves as operatives of the CIDG, led by Pascua, had forcibly arrested Pablo
without any warrant of arrest, and had then detained him at the office of the CIDG in Camp
Crame; and that despite repeated demands, the CIDG operatives had not produced the body of
Pablo.
The CIDG received the petition for habeas corpus brought in behalf of Pablo. The CIDG filed its
return on the writ wherein it denied having the custody of Pablo or having detained him. It
prayed for the dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus.
Regina, albeit reiterating the allegations of the petition for habeas corpus, amended her petition
to now seek instead the issuance of a writ of amparo. The RTC issued the writ of amparo. Regina
moved ex parte for the issuance of a temporary protection order and witness protection order,
and it was granted. Pascua did not appear in the proceedings in the RTC. He tendered
explanations for his non-appearance.
The RTC issued an order maintaining the writ of amparo; ordering the CIDG to continue its
investigation into the disappearance of Pablo; directing respondent SPO1 Pascua to appear
before the proper forum; making the temporary protection order permanent; and upholding the
enrollment of Regina in the Witness Protection Program of the Department of Justice. The CIDG
filed an MR, but it was denied.
Hence, the CIDG filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the SC. It contended that there
was no sufficient evidence to support the writ of amparo; and that a mere accusation
accompanied by inherently hearsay evidence is not sufficient ground for the court to issue a writ
of amparo or allow its continued effectivity.
Pascua contended that Regina failed to establish by the required burden of proof that he caused
the “forced disappearance” of Pablo Cayanan within the ambit protected by the rule on the writ
of ampar; that following Mexico’s Amparo, it is an essential requirement for the supposed victim
to establish where he is being held; that Philippine rule on amparo specifically covers “public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity,” which evidently precludes a
government institution/instrumentality, such as CIDG-PNP; and that enforced or forced
disappearance means that it must be established that agents of the state perpetrated its
commission.

ISSUES:
1.       Whether or not sufficient evidence supported the grant of the writ of amparo by the RTC
2.       Whether or not the CIDG already discharged its duty as required by the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo
3.       Whether or not the issuance of the writ of amparo by the RTC impaired Pascua’s right to
the presumption of his innocence.

RULING:
1 Yes, the SC held that Substantial evidence is sufficient in proceedings involving petitions
for the writ of amparo. The respondent must show in the return on the writ of amparothe
observance of extraordinary diligence. Once an enforced disappearance is established by
substantial evidence, the relevant State agencies should be tasked to assiduously investigate and
determine the disappearance, and, if warranted, to bring to the bar of justice whoever may be
responsible for the disappearance.
Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.  Here, Regina fully discharged her duty to present substantial evidence in
support of her petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo.
2.        No, the SC held that the CIDG did not observe the required extraordinary diligence. The
allegation that the CIDG had continuously searched for Pablo among its various operating
divisions similarly constituted a general denial because the CIDG did not thereby indicate who
had conducted the search, and how thoroughly the allegedly continuous searches had been
conducted.
Under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the return should spell out the details of the
investigations conducted by the CIDG and the NBI in a manner that would enable the RTC to
judiciously determine whether or not the efforts to ascertain Pablo’s whereabouts had been
sincere and adequate. The return by the CIDG was non-compliant in that regard. 
3.        No, the SC held that the issuance of the writ of amparo did not impair Pascua’s right to
the presumption of innocence. The proceedings taken under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo are
not akin or similar to those in criminal prosecutions. In the former, the guilt or innocence of the
respondents is not determined, and no penal sanctions are meted. The proceedings only endeavor
to give the aggrieved parties immediate remedies against imminent or actual threats to life,
liberty or security. The presumption of innocence is never an issue. In the latter, the prosecution
of the accused with due process of law is the object of the proceedings. The presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused is always the starting point. Hence, the need for the State to
adduce proof beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.
 REYES v. ELQUIERO
G.R. No. 210487 September 2, 2020

FACTS:
Salome petitioned the CA for a writ of habeas corpus. Salome essentially alleged that:
Melysinda, Rex, and Irish lived together in San Pedro, Laguna, until Rex left for the United
States, where he died in February 2009; thereafter, Irish has remained in the custody of
Melysinda; Salome last heard from Irish when the former's daughter, Daisy E. Benavidez, visited
the child in San Pablo City. Since then, Melysinda prevented Salome and her daughters Daisy
and Gilda E. Kelley from having any contact or communication with Irish. Salome thus prayed
for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to compel Melysinda and any person acting on her
behalf to produce the body of Irish before the Court. The CA granted the petition. It directed the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus returnable to the RTC of San Pablo City, Laguna.
Melysinda then filed an Opposition to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, where she argued that:
Salome had no personality to question Irish's custody; the petition was baseless as Irish was not
being deprived of liberty or otherwise restrained, but instead is in the rightful care and custody of
her biological aunt, whom she purportedly recognizes "as her very own mother"; Salome was
guilty of forum shopping: and Salome was not genuinely interested in the child's welfare, but
merely hoped to benefit materially from Rex's estate.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Habeas Corpus should be treated as a regular habeas corpus petition governed
primarily by Rule 102 or as a special habeas corpus petition which is an ancillary remedy
governed by the special rules on custody.

RULING:
Habeas Corpus Case was filed by Salome with a view of obtaining custody of Irish. To further
regulate the availment of habeas corpus writs as a means of recovering custody, the Supreme
Court promulgated the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to
Custody of Minors.
The provision reiterates the ruling in Sombong that a habeas corpus proceeding essentially
functions as a custody proceeding in its own right. For this reason the last paragraph specifically
provides that in habeas corpus custody proceedings initiated before the CA, the return may be
made "to a Family Court or to any regular court within the region where the petitioner resides or
where the minor may be found for hearing and decision on the merits"; and that "[u]pon return of
the writ, the court shall decide the issue on custody of minors. The appellate court, or the
member thereof, issuing the writ shall be furnished a copy of the decision." Crucially, as the
petition is being filed under the Rule on Custody of Minors as a special form of habeas corpus,
the other provisions of that rule are applicable to the proceeding.
 SALAS v. BUNYI-MEDINA
G.R. No. 251693. September 28, 2020
FACTS:
The accused in their capacities as leaders of the organizations, in conspiracy with, and in support
of the cause of, the organizations aforementioned, engaged themselves in war against the forces
of the government, destroying property or committing serious violence, and other acts in pursuit
of their unlawful purpose.
That despite the advent of a new regime occasioned by the February 1986 revolution, the
organizations, through the leadership of the accused who, in open contempt of the new
government's policy of reconciliation and, in a determined effort to overthrow the government
and to install a new social and political order in our society, persisted and continued in their
depredations against the forces of the government and innocent civilians causing death and
destruction.
In the course of the trial, Rodolfo — who was already in detention at the time of the filing of the
Information and did not obtain provisional liberty through bail — entered into a plea bargaining
agreement with the prosecution. Rodolfo pleaded guilty to rebellion under Executive Order No.
187, which repealed P.D. No. 1834. Thus, the RTC rendered a judgment against Rodolfo.
Rodolfo was arrested by law enforcement authorities at his residence in Angeles City,
Pampanga. Hence, the present recourse which petitioner filed on behalf of Rodolfo. The Court
rendered a Resolution ordering that the writ of habeas corpus be issued in favor of Rodolfo.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the instant petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus lies as the proper
remedy for Rodolfo.

RULING:
The writ of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to obtain the release of persons detained by
virtue of a judicial process.
Habeas corpus plays a vital role in protecting constitutional rights. It is a proceeding against
some person who has the immediate custody of the party detained, with the power to produce the
body of such party before the court or judge, that he may be liberated if no sufficient reason is
shown to the contrary. Habeas corpus does not compensate for past wrongful incarceration, nor
does it punish the State for imposing it. Instead, it is a challenge to unlawful custody, and when
the writ issues it prevents further illegal custody.
In the present case, it was clearly averred by petitioner that an Information for filing of criminal
charges which were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 08-262163 (formerly H-1581) and 14-
306533 to 14-306546 before Branch 32 of the RTC of Manila. Thereafter, Judge Bunyi-Medina
issued a Warrant of Arrest by virtue of which Rodolfo was arrested at his home in Angeles City,
Pampanga. Likewise, a Commitment Order was issued by the RTC directing Rodolfo's detention
at the Manila City Jail. These issuances are hallmarks of judicial process. The restraint on
Rodolfo's liberty was lawful from the very beginning. It cannot be inquired into through habeas
corpus.
It bears repetition to state at this juncture that habeas corpus does not lie where the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a
court which had jurisdiction to issue the same. Rodolfo is, therefore, not entitled to the writ of
habeas corpus.
 SANCHEZ v. DARROCA
GR NO. 242257, October 15, 2019

FACTS:
Vivian Sanchez learned that her estranged husband, Eldie Labinghisa was among the seven
alleged members of the New People’s Army who were gunned downed by PNP. Upon
discovering, Sanchez went to St. Peter’s Funeral Home to verify her husband’s death. However,
three police officers stationed took photos of her without her permission. Fearing what the
officers had done, she left without identifying her husband’s body. Her friend, PO2 Nerissa Dela
Cruz, informed her that her photos is being circulated at the police station and argued her to tell
the investigating officers her husband’s name, otherwise, they would go after her.
The following day, Sanchez went back to the funeral home but confronted by three police
officers who threatened to apprehend and charge her with obstruction of justice if she refused to
answer their questions. Again, fearing for her safety, she hurried home without confirming the
identity of her husband’s body.
Later that day, two police officers went to Sanchez house and showed her a photo of cadaver,
which she identified as her husband.
In the following days, Sanchez noticed the frequent drive-bys of a police a police car in front of
her house and a vehicle that tailed her and her family when they went to Iloilo, She also noticed
someone shadowing her when she was outside her house, causing her to fear for her and her
children’s safety.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the police officer can compel Sanchez to give testimonies against Eldie
Labinghisa.

RULING:
No. In recognition of the significance of marriage to Philippine society, testimonial privilege and
communication privilege have been granted to spouses. This is to preserve harmonious
relationship and to prevent any party, including a spouse, to take advantage of the free
communication between the spouse or of information learned within the union.
In the present case, Sanchez admits to being separated in fact from Eldie for more than a decade
yet this does not suffice as an exception, as separation is not tantamount to strained marital
relations. Further, neither spouse committed an offense that impaired their conjugal union.
 VIVARES v. ST. THERESA’S COLLEGE
G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014

FACTS:
Julia and Julienne , both minors, were, during the period material, graduating high school
students at STC. While changing into their swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend,
Julia and Julienne, along with several others, took digital pictures of themselves clad only in
their undergarments. These pictures were then uploaded by Angela on her Facebook profile.
Escudero, a computer teacher at STC’s high school department, learned from her students that
some seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting themselves from the waist up, dressed only
in brassieres. Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter and, through one of her student’s
Facebook page, showed the photos to Kristine Rose Tigol, STC’s Discipline-in-Charge, for
appropriate action. Thereafter, following an investigation, STC found the identified students to
have deported themselves in a manner proscribed by the school’s Student Handbook. Julia,
Julienne, Angela, and the other students in the pictures in question, reported, as required, to the
office Sr. Purisima, STC’s high school principal and. They claimed that during the meeting, they
were castigated and informed their parents the following day that, as part of their penalty, they
are barred from joining the commencement exercises scheduled on March 30, 2012.
A week before graduation, Angela’s mother, Dr. Armenia M. Tan, filed a Petition for Injunction
and Damages before the RTC and command the respondent not to implement the said sanction
which the RTC issued a temporary restraining order allowing the students to attend the
graduation ceremony, to which STC filed a motion for reconsideration. Despite the issuance of
the TRO, STC, nevertheless, barred the sanctioned students from participating in the graduation
rites, arguing that, on the date of the commencement exercises, its adverted motion for
reconsideration on the issuance of the TRO remained unresolved.
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data,
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC  issued the writ of habeas data.

ISSUES:
Whether or not a writ of habeas data should be issued given the factual milieu.

RULING:
No,  The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life,
liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of
data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved
party. The provision, when taken in its proper context, as a whole, irresistibly conveys the idea
that habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of
private individuals or entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the
aggrieved party and his or her correspondences, or about his or her family. Such individual or
entity need not be in the business of collecting or storing data. What matters is that the person or
entity must be gathering, collecting or storing said data or information about the aggrieved party
or his or her family. Whether such undertaking carries the element of regularity, as when one
pursues a business, and is in the nature of a personal Endeavour, for any other reason or even for
no reason at all, is immaterial and such will not prevent the writ from getting to said person or
entity.
 TAN v. OFFICE OF THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF THE CITY OF MANILA
G.R. No. 211435 April 10, 2019

FACTS:
Petitioner filed a Petition for Correction of Entry before the RTC. Petitioner alleged that he was
born on November 13, 1965 at St. Paul Hospital in the City of Manila; that his birth was duly
registered in the civil registry of Manila; that he had been using his real name “Ramon Corpuz
Tan” during his lifetime; that when he later secured a copy of his Certificate of Live Birth, he
discovered that his name was entered as “Ramon Corpus Tan Ko” instead of his true and correct
name which is “Ramon Corpuz Tan”; that the aforesaid material errors and mistakes in the
entries of his Certificate of Live Birth were due to inadvertence and error of the hospital
personnel who prepared the subject certificate; that “Ko,” which was the first name of his father,
was inadvertently included in his last name; and that the mistake was not immediately rectified
because he only discovered the same, after having his own children.
The RTC dismissed the petition for correction of entry. The RTC ratiocinated that the petitioner
failed to comply with the requirements of an adversarial proceeding noting that the correction
sought for, is a substantial correction and is governed by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, which
is not summary, but an adversarial proceeding. The appellate court concurred with the trial court
that the error sought to be corrected is a substantial one which requires an adversarial
proceeding.

ISSUE:
Whether the trial and appellate courts erred when they ruled that the petitioner failed to observe
the requirements of an adversarial proceeding in this case.

RULING:
Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court governs the proceeding for the cancellation or correction
of any entry concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register.
The difference lies only on the procedure which would govern the correction sought. “If the
correction is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the
civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be
adopted is adversary.” Corrections in the name, whether of the owner of the Certificate of Live
Birth or any of the parents indicated therein, may also involve substantial and controversial
matters which would require an adversarial proceeding.
In this case, the alleged error could not be considered a clerical error or a readily apparent
mistake. Contrary to petitioner’s claim, the correction sought would definitely have an effect on
his filiation with the persons named in his Certificate of Live Birth.
Verily, the “correction” of petitioner’s name from “Ramon Corpus Tan Ko” to “Ramon Corpuz
Tan” would necessarily affect not only his name, but also the names of his parents as entered in
his Certificate of Live Birth.
Petitioner failed to comply with the procedural requirements of an adversarial proceeding under
Rule 108.