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Issue 3 The Official Newsletter of the Johnny Reb Gaming Society $5.00

John Bell Hood, CSA

“Hood at Atlanta” Scenario Series

Peachtree Creek / Wilson’s Creek Scenarios
Artillery in the Civil War - The Napoleon
Scratchbuilding Fences and Stone Walls
Modeling Creeks and Rivers
JR 101

Steven Hofner (Order #35311104)

 1

Welcome to ―CHARGE!‖ From the Editor’s Desk

This is the official newsletter of the Johnny Reb
Gaming Society. This international group is an
informal association of miniature wargamers who use
the Johnny Reb gaming rules developed by John Hill.
The society exists to actively promote the usage of all
three versions of these excellent rules, and to provide
sponsorship for JR games at wargaming conventions.
The newsletter will provide a quarterly forum for
exchanging information regarding the rules, original
wargaming scenarios written with JR in mind, and
historical articles of general interest to the Johnny
Reb gamer. In addition, from time to time, we will
feature contests and trivia with Civil War-related
prizes to the winners.
US membership in the society is $20 per year, which
will partially cover the cost of assembling, printing,
and mailing the newsletter. Dues are payable via
money order or personal check, which must be made
out to Deborah Mingus (society treasurer and
secretary). Our mailing address and e-mail address
are as follows:
I want to say thank you to all who have offered
encouragement, support, advice and friendship to
Debi and I as we developed the Johnny Reb Gaming
Society and this newsletter. We truly appreciate the
generosity of the Civil War gaming community! With
our kids gone from home off in college, this newsletter
has been a joint labor of love for Debi and I, and has
enabled us to have a project together.
Our goal is to bring you an ever-improving product,
chock-full of useful scenarios, articles, and
information. We encourage you to submit anything
that you feel would be of interest to the regimental-
level Civil War gamer or history buff.
In this issue, the JR Gaming Society is proud to
present the first installment in a multi-part series by
George Anderson recreating the battles for Atlanta.
The first scenario is Peachtree Creek.
Maintaining the creek theme, Scot Gore has
submitted a Wilson’s Creek game that is sure to be a
popular choice for conventions and gaming groups.

The Johnny Reb Gaming Society Doug Kline has provided another excellent terrain
1383 Sterling Drive article - this one naturally on modeling creeks and
York PA 17404 rivers on your gaming table.
jrgsnl@comcast.net
Daniel Erdman brings us tips on how to make
We welcome your submissions of articles, scenarios, fantastic scratch-built fences and stonewalls and
advertising, and related information, as well as letters Doug Rogers offers advice for the new Johnny Reb
to the editor. The copyrighted name Johnny Reb is gamer.
used by written permission of John Hill.
Trivia Answers – Issue #2
Table of Contents 1. Margaret Mitchell, author of “Gone With the
Wind.”
Welcome to Charge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2. Lewis Powell a.k.a. Lewis Paine, Co. I, 2 nd FL
From the Editor‘s Desk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3. False - this was later made up by Hill and Heth to
Trivia Answers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 justify their actions, but in fact was not the case.
Ask John Hill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Early had passed through town days before and
JRIII for Beginners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 had not found significant shoes.
Johnny Reb III Basing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. Roughly 50 minutes by most accounts, possibly
Wilson‘s Creek . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 less.
Order of Battle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5. Lincoln was 54 at the time
Map . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 6. John Reynolds, from Lancaster PA
Designing Your Own ACW Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 7. Whitworth
Scratch Building Fences & Stone Walls . . . . . . . . . . . .11 8. George Rose; it was part of the Rose Farm
9. 62
Hood at Atlanta (Background) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10. Lucy Long
Hood at Atlanta (Peachtree Creek) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
11. Robert Earl Lee
Peachtree Creek Map . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 12. Camp Colt, Dwight D. Eisenhower
The Napoleon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 13. Joe Hooker
Artillery Tables for JRIII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 14. Most sources suggest roughly 53,000 casualties;
Splashing to Glory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 some estimates are slightly higher.
15MM ACW Barn Patterns . . . . . . . .Back of Newsletter 15. Maj. Gen. John Gibbon

Steven Hofner (Order #35311104)

 2
Rick Harrison was the winner of Trivia #2

You’ve got questions? John Hill’s got answers!

Q – I play JR II. How do I convert my existing batteries and regiments to JR III?
A - For artillery, the JR II battery of 2 sections of Napoleons and one section of 10# Parrots would be converted to
one battery of three sections with mixed guns. The easiest way to convert regiments from JR II scenarios to JR III
scenarios is to simply remove one stand. Hence, a five-stand, 25-figure regiment will convert to a four-stand, 20-
figure regiment and a five-stand, 20-figure regiment will convert to a 16-figure, four-stand regiment.
Q – Do buildings block line of sight? Can a unit fire through them?
A - It is true that the buildings are out of scale and that their presence really represents a built-up farm area, but, it is
for that exact reason I have them blocking fire. They would represent a serious clutter factor - fences, gardens, small
trees, outbuildings, whatever that would prevent some parts of a formed firing line from seeing the target. Hence,
when engaging through or across a building and/or built up area, I usually adjudicate the "who" can fire on a stand-by-
stand basis - which captures the effect of some guys being blocked while others would not.
Q – Are there any modifiers for a unit on a hill for either fire combat or for defending the hill ag ainst a charge?
A - According to many military writers of the late 18th century, there was no firing advantage in a musketry duel of
being uphill. Musketry investigations by the British after the Napoleonic Wars and the US, to a lesser extent, prior to
the Civil War actually revealed that in a musketry exchange between equal units, the fellow at the bottom of the hill
almost always took less casualties. This was due to the well known, at the time, effect that soldiers with a height
advantage almost always shot too high. Shooting too high was probably the most common musketry mistake, which
being uphill only made worse.
Occasionally if the hill was steep enough, being uphill was a most serious artillery disadvantage. For example, at
Little Round Top, the Union artillery on the top of the hill could not fire directly at the advancing Rebs coming up
that rocky slope due to an inability to depress the tubes sufficiently. The Confederates had the same problem on
Missionary Ridge, and this effect contributed significantly to the Union taking the position.
However being up a hill did have some advantages. The most obvious one is that it may enable you to fire over other
friendly units. The other obvious advantage is that it improved the commander's visibility once the firing began. If the
hill was high enough, a commander could see above the musket smoke that often tended to lie relatively low to the
ground. It is my opinion that this potential visibility advantage negated, to some extent, the shooting-too-high
phenomenon discussed in the first paragraph.
The other historical advantage that is indirectly modeled in JR is in a charge. That advantage is that the slope could
slow the charge and cause it to go into disorder prior to contact with the defender. This effect is modeled by having an
upslope movement, depending on the steepness of the slope being defined as either broken or rough terrain. With less
movement and fewer dice to roll for breakthrough, the problem for the attacker is that the probability is much greater
that he will impact the defender in disorder - simulating the fatigue of climbing the hill - thereby, greatly increasing
the probability that he will be suffering the "+4, in disorder" penalty in the dice-down for impact. And that is serious
enough disadvantage that the attacker will probably lose the impact dice down.
Q - How does fire penetration work when a unit fires on a skirmish line?
A - If a unit is less than two inches behind a skirmish line, it suffers the same casualties as the skirmish line. However
beyond that two-inch distance, there is no fire penetration. A firing unit could fire over or through the skirmish line in
an attempt to hit the unit behind it as area fire (losing one die, page 7).
Q- Can a unit charge an enemy in its rear, even if it is not facing the object of the charge?
A - JRIII does not prohibit a unit from making a charge in any direction, provided it is in a straight line directly
against an enemy. So, yes, a unit could charge - in disorder - to its rear, if an enemy unit was there. My reading and
experience as a reenactor has led me to believe that a unit would do what it had to do, though it might be a little
messy.

Steven Hofner (Order #35311104)

 3

family room will tend to keep players longer than a

JRIII for Beginners
or “JR Newbie
Survival 101”
by Doug Rogers
What motivates people to become interested in
historical simulation or wargaming? Everyone has
different hot buttons and different temperaments,
so the triggers vary as well. It is important to
consider a new JRIII player's motivation if you want
to keep him or her interested. Imagination is the
key attribute that makes anyone want to play a
game. The person's imagination is often seeded by
an interesting teacher, reading a good book,
watching a movie, seeing a reenactment, or even
by playing a board game like BattleCry or making a
model.
Fun must be the prime focus when setting up what I
call a “Learning Game.” This type of game takes
the pressure to perform off the new player. The role
of other players, and even opponents, is to teach
the new person the game. Aspects that promote
fun are friendly, helpful people who mentor the
initiate. Food is also a good feature at such a
game. This environment frees the new player to
experience the creativity of setting strategy,
employing tactics and allows them to focus on the
intellectual challenge of learning the basic rules.
blighted storage unit in January. One club I visited
in Indiana had a nice public clubhouse setting with
storage, tables, refrigerator and the works, but I'm
sure that did not develop overnight.
If this approach is taken with new players, the new
players have fun, are intellectually challenged, have
made new friends, and are more likely to show up
to the second and third game where the more
advanced concepts of command control and
replacements, etc can be learned. They can come
to appreciate winning a good defense and
achieving multiple victory conditions. Who knows?
They might even become serious competition as
steel sharpens steel, or they may even run a
campaign some day… all under your guiding
tutelage!
Doug Rogers, North Coast Historical Wargamers,
Lake Co., OH _ www.geocities.com/nchws2003

Competition is a strong motivator, especially for

young players, so you want to set clear and simple
victory conditions for the first game(s) (i.e. Take
that hill, ....). Make sure the game is a small simple Doug Rogers‟ 15mm diorama showing Cadmus
action using basic rules only. It must be fast- Wilcox‟s Alabamans defending the Codori-
moving, and getting bogged down in rule lawyering Trostle Thicket at Gettysburg
is death to the newbie. A meeting engagement of
equal strengths and troop quality is best. If you can
pair the new player up with a more experienced
player on the same side to give advice, that is
NEW ANTIETAM
good. Visually attractive battlefields and troops SCENARIOS COMING!!!
enhance play. It's not impossible to learn with
cardboard markers and masking tape, but not too Watch for Scott Mingus and Ivor Janci’s new
fun. FULL-COLOR regimental scenario books (in
the spirit of the “Enduring Valor: Gettysburg in
Be sure to pick a convenient time to play for the Miniature” scenarios and the “Zouave”).
new player. Friday night for a High School senior, Contact Ivor at mjd_pub@comcast.net for
or Sunday morning for a middle-aged deacon may complete details!
not work too well. Comfortable, friendly
surroundings are also to be considered. A heated

Steven Hofner (Order #35311104)

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JOHNNY REB III Basing

These guidelines are from Gary Sapp and represent his personal views on basing figures for Johnny Reb gaming. The
rules author, John Hill, has commented that slight deviations in width and depth do not significantly impact the game.
The Johnny Reb Gaming Society provides Gary‘s chart as a useful reference tool for players just starting out in JR
gaming.
Basing Standards
Men-to-Figures Conversion Chart
(Command)
Men 1st Stand 2nd Stand 3rd Stand 4th Stand
100-130 1 1 1 1
131-160 1 2 1 1
161-190 1 2 2 1
191-220 1 2 2 2
221-250 2 2 2 2
251-280 2 3 2 2
281-310 2 3 3 2
311-340 2 3 3 3
341-370 3 3 3 3
371-400 3 4 3 3
401-430 3 4 4 3
431-460 3 4 4 4
461-490 4 4 4 4
491-520 4 5 4 4
521-550 4 5 5 4
551-580 4 5 5 5
581-610 5 5 5 5

Units larger than 610 infantry or 370 cavalry should be broken down into two battalions of equal
size.

Base Sizes Figs Width

Infantry 1 3/8"
Depth = 3/4" 2 5/8"
3 7/8"
4 1 1/8"
5 1 3/8"
Cavalry 1 ½"
Mounted Depth = 1 1/8" 2 3/4"
Dismounted Depth = 3/4" 3 1"

Dismounted units have 1 horse-holder stand - same figs as the command stand and sized the
same (this is used to indicate where the horses were left).

Officers Figs Size

Brigade Commander 1 1" x 1"
Division Commander 2 1¼” x 1¼”
Corps Commander 3 1½" x 1½"
Army Commander 4 2" x 2"

Division, Corps, and Army Commanders should have 1 flag bearer on the stand holding the
Division, Corps, or US Flags.

Field Pieces & Other Items

Guns 1" x 1 1/8" with a 1/4" square cutout on each of the rear corners.
Crew 1" x 3/4" with a 1/4" x ½" cutout in the center of the front edge.

Steven Hofner (Order #35311104)

 5
Wilson’s Creek
August 10, 1861
Missouri
Scenario by Scot Gore
BACKGROUND
The Battle of Wilson‘s Creek occurred August 10, 1861
along Wilson's Creek, about ten miles southwest of
Springfield MO. This six-hour battle is considered to be
the second major battle of the Civil War and the first
major battle west of the Mississippi River. Brigadier
General Nathaniel Lyon commanded the Union forces,
numbering about 5,400 men. They consisted of Missouri,
Kansas, Iowa and U.S. Regular soldiers. On the
Confederate side, there were about 10,000 men,
commanded by Brigadier General Ben McCulloch. They
consisted of men from Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana,
and Texas. The Missouri contingent was the Missouri
State Guard (MSG) under the command of Major
General Sterling Price. The battle was waged over who
would control the state of Missouri - the U. S.
government or the state of Missouri.
The Confederate forces, having amassed almost double
the effective force of the Union army in the region, were
moving north to attack Lyon‘s forces in Springfield.
General McCulloch‘s plan was to march north on August
10th and attack. A heavy rainfall on the 9th caused him
to reconsider the march. His forces were armed with poor
quality weapons and ammunition that were sensitive to
moisture. General McCulloch was concerned that much
of his force could become ineffective if forced to advance
in the rain. He called off the advance for the 10th and
ordered the troops to remain bivouacked along Wilson‘s
Creek. His inexperienced commanders failed to re-
deploy camp pickets after the march orders were
countermanded.
General Lyon, commanding the Union force, was aware
that the Confederates had likely assembled a superior
force to oppose him. Lyon decided to pursue a bold
strategy. Leaving a token force in Springfield, he
marched the majority of his soldiers to the south to pre-
emptively strike the unsuspecting Rebels. Advancing on
August 9th, he discovered the Confederates‘ location in
their camp along Wilson‘s Creek. In a further bold move,
Lyon split his force. A brigade under the command of
Col. Franz Sigel was sent east and south, around the
Rebel camp. The remaining force under Lyon‘s personal
command advanced due south. Both wings attacked
simultaneous ly at dawn against a completely surprised
Confederate force.
The battle lasted from dawn until noon with the
Confederates as the victors. It was at this battle that
Nathaniel Lyon, the first Union general to be killed in the
Civil War, met his death. The victory was not a decisive
Steven Hofner (Order #35311104)
one because the Confederate forces did not pursue the
retreating Union army, and thus the Yankees lived to
fight again seven months later in Arkansas at the Battle
of Pea Ridge, which would be a victory for the Federals .
Casualties for the Union were 258 killed, 873 wounded
and 186 missing for a total of 1,317 or 24.5%. The
Confederates reported 277 killed, and 945 wounded for a
total of 1,222 or 12%.
Source: Greene County Historical Society
THE WARGAME
The scenario deals with the Union attack on the Rebel
camps near Wilson‘s Creek. It begins at 5:00 AM and has
no set end point.
Table size is 5x10 feet for Johnny Reb III, 15mm scale.
Adjust as needed for other ground scales or rules sets.
Confederate Troop Activation
Confederate troops are in camp and unaware of the
imminent attack. There was great confusion in the early
moments of the battle as inexperienced Confederate
soldiers and commanders tried to recognize and react to
the unexpected Union assault. To simulate this effect,
Rebel regiments, batteries, and commanders may not
move or fire until they have been activated by there own
initiative or the imminent treat of death at the hands of
the enemy.
To activate, commanding players must roll higher than
the number listed on the below table. Once successful,
the unit may be marked, moved and fired as normal on
the next game turn.
Turn Green Militia Officers
1 8 9 3
2 7 8 3
3 6 7 3
4 5 6 3
5+ 4 5 3
An active officer attached to a unit can add his morale
rating to their activation die roll.
Units that take a casualty or are a target of a charge
(successful or unsuccessful) are automatically activated,
and may mark and move in the next turn. Non-active units
impacted in a charge will not form, will not fire a defensive
volley, their impact dice downs are unadjusted, and the unit
will melee as normal.
Sigel’s Brigade
Franz Sigel was under orders from General Lyon not to
fire on the Confederates until the main attack from north
began. The player commanding Sigel‘s force may obey
or disregard this order at his or her own discretion.
 6
Sterling Price
Sterling Pr ice was the commander of the Missouri State VICTORY CONDITIONS
Guard. At the outbreak of the war, many assumed that he
The area surrounding Wilson‘s Creek is not strategic to
would command the Confederate forces in the region. He
either side in the conflict. The battle developed at the site
is a recognized command and authority figure; therefore
he can command and offer assistance to any Rebel unit in as a matter of chance. Therefore, there are no victory
the battle. points for obtaining or holding areas of the battlefield.
Infantry with Shotguns The goal of both sides was to reduce the opposing force
Infantry armed with shotguns are not covered by the to a degree that effective control of the state of Missouri
Johnny Reb III rules. Shotgun ranges and modifiers are would be difficult to maintain with the manpower at
as follows. hand.
Basically, the side that inflicts the most casualties wins
Weapon Short Range Medium Long and the Rebs have a 20-man head start, in effect starting
Shotguns ½ inch 1 inch 2 inches with 20 bonus points.
(+1 DRM) Turn all stands eliminated over to the gamemaster /
judge. Half the figures of all stands that rout off a table
Visibility edge are considered eliminated. If a unit routs off a table
At the time of the battle, the Wilson‘s Creek region was
edge count up the remaining figures and treat half of
covered by scattered stands of scrub oak, tall grass, and
them as hits on the unit. This will likely eliminate at least
shrubs that varied in height from knee-high to well over a
one stand; turn those over to the judge just like a combat
man‘s head. Because of these conditions, visibility was casualty. Then remove any casualty markers from the
highly variable. To simulate this, the Johnny Reb III
remaining stands and ask the judge to drop them in the
visibility rules will be slightly modified for this scenario. victory condition tray, and give the other stands to the
judge and explain that these stands don‘t count for
1) Visibility will be determined for each unit separately. victory points. Each figure per stand will count as a
Therefore it will be possible for a unit to see an victory point for the game.
enemy unit, but the visibility back could be
obscured. The side with the most points WINS.
2) Visibility will be two dice six measured from the
middle of the s ighting unit to the closest point of the ®2004 Scot Gore. This miniature wargaming scenario may
target. not be photocopied or otherwise reproduced without written
3) Units attempting to spot a target at a lower elevation permission of the author and from the Johnny Reb Gaming
get an additional die 6 of visibility. Society. All rights reserved. Scenario questions may be
addressed to the author at sgore@minn.net
The distance across cleared fields will not count as part
of the total spotting distance.
DEPLOYMENT
Set up is as per the map. There are no reinforcements for Scenarios and Articles
either side.
Needed!
TERRAIN
Please feel free to send us your Johnny Reb
Most of the battlefield is Broken terrain. gaming scenarios (Civil War, American
The fields are Open and should be fenced. Revolution, or any other period that works
The area shown speckled on the map (south of with the JR rules system). Send all
Bloody Hill) is Rough terrain.
submissions to the Johnny Reb Gaming
All creeks are fordable. All water crossings are
Broken terrain. Society at jrgsnl@comcast.net. Articles will
Dashed lines represent hills. be used based upon space and availability
Black boxes are buildings per issue, and may be edited by the staff.
Brown lines are roads Keep ‗em coming, soldier!
Blue lines are creeks

Steven Hofner (Order #35311104)

 7

Wilson’s Creek - Order of Battle

Steven Hofner (Order #35311104)

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Steven Hofner (Order #35311104)

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Steven Hofner (Order #35311104)

 10

Designing Your Own ACW Scenarios

by Scott Mingus, Sr.

I start ed playing miniature wargames in the late 1970s back in my college undergrad days at Miami (OH) University,
beginning with playing in George Nafziger‟s classic 25mm Napoleonic games. Soon I bought my first 20mm Civil War
figures from K+L / Thomas. As my kids grew up, we often played wargames (by now, we had s witched t o 15mm and
JR). I began writing scenarios for my kids and their friends to play, concentrating on Gettysburg and Antiet am. My
notes and playtests grew more sophisticated, and event ually, I was encouraged to compile them in what later became
the Enduring Valor series. Through it all, I followed a relatively simple formula for designing these scenarios.
1. Select a battle or skirmish to model. The decision can be based upon personal interest, ancestors at that particular
battle (as in my case of Antietam and Gettysburg), geographic proximity, or gaming potential.
2. Research, research, research! Start with exploring t he context of the battle. What were t he aims of t he overall
campaign? What ot her battles preceded and succeeded the fight that you are researching? What were the political
and military consequences? What were the strategic objectives associated with t he battle? Campaign books ,
general texts, and the like are of value.
3. Perhaps the most important step is to next research the tactics of the fight. The Official Records are an excellent
starting place. Find a good set of maps for the battle in question (the OR Atlas is useful, as are the battlefield
historical associations, park rangers, local historical societies, and libraries). Many times, good resources are in the
mail aft er only one phone call. Read battle accounts in regiment al histories, dedicated books, officers‟ pers onal
biographies, local newspaper archives from historical societies, etc.
4. Research the OOB. Orders of battle can at times be tricky, but the OR is a good start, as are brigade and
regimental histories, books, and similar resources. For Antietam, I scanned over 100 documents and found several
previously unpublished (in wargaming scenarios ) details as to armament and number of effectives in the regiment ,
often contradicting popular opinion.
5. Now write the historical setting / background for the scenario. Then, determine victory objectives and conditions
based upon what you have found regarding the commanders‟ intentions for the fight.
6. Add in the time frame – when did the fight start, when did it end? What portion are you modeling? Had units been
previously engaged that day so that they were not fresh, or had s ustained casualties or ran low on ammunition?
Which units at the start of the scenario are entitled to an opening volley bonus? Whe n did reinforcements arrive? B y
what route did they enter the field? In what formation?
7. Study the maps and battle accounts (particularly the soldiers‟ accounts). Were the streams fordable? Did any terrain
feature stand out as an obstacle, cover, or objective? What was the weat her? How were the roads for movement ?
Are there accounts of fences or stonewalls that played any significance? Did the soldiers describe any particular
hindrances with the terrain (plowed fields, orchards, etc.)? Translate this information int o the scenario set-up details .
8. Draw your terrain map. Add troop placements, key terrain features, roads, a compass, and other pertinent details .
Pay particular attention to woods, hills, streams, and roads.
9. Finally, write out the OOB. Include as much as you can find on regiment al strengths and armament. In many cases ,
it is easier t o find brigade details, and simply allocate these men across the regiments in a suitable fas hion. Assign
officer ratings based upon historical performance and / or rank and influence.
10. Add any final details found in y our research, and begin playtesting. Rework the scenario based upon your initial
playtests and then play it again. Finally, re -read the most pertinent resources and books / accounts of the fight to
see if there are any hidden gems of information that would make the scenario even more accurate and interesting.
11. Some gamers will strive for balance, and alter historical settings, troops strengths, reinforcement schedules ,
objectives and the like to provide both sides with a reasonable chance at victory. Others will keep the historical
settings and conditions and try their luck at besting the actual outcome.
Remember that the ultimate objective is to provide a scenario that is fun and entertaining, a nd that creates an
atmosphere for fellowship among the players. Alter the scenario as y ou see fit to achieve those ends. Some
suggested on-line resources for the ACW scenario designer…
Official Records – www.ehistory.com/uscw/library/or/index.cfm
Some selected orders of battle - www.fortunecity.com/victorian/pottery/1080/a_battles.htm
Regimental index - www.civilwararchive.com/regim.htm
Confederate Veteran (useful eyewitness accounts of certain battles) – www.americancivilwar.50megs.com/CVM.html
Old Civil War battle and campaign maps – www.memory.loc.gov/ammem/gmdhtml/cwmhtml/cwmhome.html
Modern topographic maps of battlefields - www.topozone.com/default.asp
Battlefield panoramas (helpful for some battles in viewing the terrain) - www.civilwaralbum.com/panoramas.htm
Photos of leading generals - www.generalsandbrevets.com/default.htm

Steven Hofner (Order #35311104)

 11
SCRATCHBUILDING FENCES
AND
STONE WALLS
by Daniel Erdman
There are a number of companies that make excellent
fences. However, if you are interested in scratch-
building your own from relatively inexpensive
materials, read on. Some people advocate buying a
box of wooden matches and splitting them with a
sharp blade to make fence rails. Other people will buy
tapered toothpicks as building material.
Both of these materials should be painted a gray-
brown to look like weathered wood. Either type can be
used to build the fences described below. However, as
someone who likes to spend my money on figures and
paint, I go for even less expensive materials. Many
fine fences are literally growing a few feet from your
home.
Look for a large weed or small tree that has compound
leaves (stinkweed or tree of heaven are some
examples). These have lots of small branches with
twigs that in the winter are bare and devoid of sap
(assuming you live in North America). Cut down the
weed/tree (in most cases you'll be doing people and
nature a favor -- the one I took was trying to
undermine my neighbor's garage!) and drag it home in
pieces.
Steven Hofner (Order #35311104)
Cutting the right-sized twigs for fence pieces will take
no longer than decapitating matches, and you don't
have to paint them. They're already the gray-brown
color of weathered fence rails. Also, they will vary
slightly in thickness and number of leaf nodes, giving
a variety and interest to your fences. Use them for
worm fences and post and rail.
Use the larger twigs either by splitting them into two
or four pieces lengthwise (authentic split-rail fences)
or by incorporating them into breastworks, bridge
railings, hasty works, etc. Build fences in lengths
varying from three to twelve inches. These seem to
cover the needs of most scenarios.
Worm Fences
Start with a piece of medium cardboard the length of
the fence section you want to build and about 1 ½‖
wide. Paint the cardboard a terrain color and flock it as
you wish (you may also do this as the last step). Lay
out lengths of rail on the cardboard in a ―zig‖ pattern: /
/ / / / /. Fasten them down with white glue. It‘s a good
idea to place a ―zig‖ at each end of the section, with
the tip of the end rails touching the very edge of the
cardboard where it will connect with the next section.
Then glue the ―zag‖ rails on top of them, with a little
overhang. Keep adding rails in alternating zig-zags
until your model fence is four or five rails high.
The end of the worm fence section presents a
difficulty. Glue an upright ―post‖ made of a slightly
thicker twig. As the end rails are added, glue them to
the post. The end is shorter than the rest of the fence
but not too bad. If this bothers you, insert a small piece
of twig between each rail and glue in place. When in a
rush I have even left off the post and just glued the
rails in a stack, but they look as though they are
precariously balanced there.
Once the fences are the height you want, glue some
leaning poles in place at each crisscross. As an option,
lay a last rail on top of the crisscross poles. If you want
more robust fences that resist rough handling, leave off
the poles and the top rails.
You can place completed sections end to end on the
wargame table, and if you have kept your zigs and
zags straight, they will look like one continuous fence.
Make some sections with the zigs and zags in the
opposite direction, that is, laying your first set of rails \
\ \ \ \ \. This will give you more flexibility in setting up
your fenced areas, especially corners. Model sections
of varying lengths for odd-shaped or smaller fields.
 12
Post and Rail Fences
There are two kinds of post and rail fences. The easier
ones to build with twigs are the kind that have two
posts side by side with just enough space to lay
he ends of rails between them. The photo on the back
of the Johnny Reb II rules box shows an example of
the two-post fence.
On a piece of cardboard ½‖ wide and as long as you
want your fence section to be, set up pairs of posts at
intervals equal to the length of the fence rails. Lay the
first row of rails in every other gap between the posts.
Add a second row of rails in the alternate gaps, with
each end resting on the end of a rail in the first row.
Continue until your fence is the desired height.
If the posts pull apart, wait awhile for the glue to dry
before laying the rails. Or, bind them together with a
very thin wire that in scale will look like baling wire.
You can still see some real fences today where the two
posts are held together by this method.
The ends of the fences again present a problem. Add a
very short piece of twig between the rails at the ends
of the section to keep them even.
I have yet to find a good way of using twigs to build
the other kind of post and rail fence, in which there are
(usually) four holes bored through the post, with the
rails tapered on the ends and laid into the holes.
Around Gettysburg there are thousands of these
fences. I have simulated this kind of fence by whittling
the posts flat on both sides, then gluing the flattened
ends of the rails directly to the posts. However, this
method is time-consuming and does not look
convincing to me.
Steven Hofner (Order #35311104)
As a final touch, make some demolished fences of the
same type as your whole ones. Insert these in places
where a column has stormed through. They are much
more aesthetically pleasing than cardboard markers
indicating ―gap in fence‖.
Stone Walls
Material for stone walls comes from sifting rocky dirt
through a couple of sizes of screen to get big and small
rocks. Of course, I live in New Mexico, where dirt is
easy to find; it's not all covered over with vegetation
the way it is in other parts of the country. The "big"
stones are nearly the size of my figures' torsos; the
small ones are the size of their heads. I build the walls
with white glue to hold the stones together. As with
the fences, I fasten them on cardboard bases with
white glue. Again, there is no need to paint.
I can understand buying stone walls rather than
making them since (a) there are fewer of them than
there are fences in most scenarios (b) making them the
way I do is time-consuming, almost an art and (c) we
do need to keep hobby suppliers in business.
However, I still recommend gathering stones to build
low walls that have a wooden rail on the top to raise
the height. These are in evidence, for example, on
Seminary Ridge at Gettysburg and in the area over
which Pickett charged. There is an engraving on page
181 of Albert A. Nofi's The Gettysburg Campaign (3rd
edition) showing a wall-fence.
To make such an obstacle, lay a rail along a low wall
of stones, almost a long pile of rubble, really. Then
cross two short poles over the top of the rail, and lay
another rail on them. Glue the rails in place. That will
slow down an enemy artillery battery for at least one
turn!
 13
Hood at Atlanta:
Background
by George Anderson
On May 7, 1864 three Union armies began
an advance that would take them into the heart of
the Confederacy. Once there, they planned to silence
its heartbeat, and then deliver a deathblow. Maj.
Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman led these armies.
Many historians claim Sherman invented modern
war through his beliefs that an enemy‘s civilian
population and infrastructure, as much as his armies,
were legitimate targets of war. Sherman was not a
great success as a tactical general, and he had a
string of dubious actions to his account for, but he
had overcome his problems and early reputation to
gain the friendship and unshakeable confidence of
the Federal commander in chie f, Ulysses S. Grant.
Grant could count on Sherman to see the ‗big
picture,‘ and to carry out his part in the destruction
of the Rebellion. In 1864, Sherman‘s mission was to
advance and put pressure on the Confederacy‘s
second army, the Army of Tennessee. He was ―to
break it up, and to get into the interior….‖ In order
to do this, he chose as his objective the city of
Atlanta.
In 1864, Atlanta had a population of 8,000
(to put this into perspective the city would be the
size of modern Totnes, or Wick), but because of the
war, this had swollen to around 20,000 by the
beginning of Sherman‘s campaign. Four of the
Confederacy‘s limited railway systems met at
Atlanta or nearby, arteries that helped feed Lee‘s
army in Virginia. As the war progressed, Atlanta
became a center of military manufacturing;
cartridges, shells, primers, cannon, rifles, armour
plate, and the minutia of war including leatherwork
and belt buckles. Two foundries, a rolling mill, a
pistol factory, and half a dozen military hospitals
were within the city precincts. It was also an
administration hub for the Confederate government,
containing every department needed to run a large
military machine. The loss of such an important
Southern city would be both a military disaster and
a morale catastrophe to Confederate hopes of
eventually winning the war. Atlanta‘s loss would be
the beginning of the end.
To bring about the fall of Atlanta and the
demise of the Army of Tennessee, Sherman‘s vast
‗army group‘ contained many components, the
Steven Hofner (Order #35311104)
main being Ma j. Gen. George H. ―Pap‖ Thomas‘
Army of the Cumberland. Consisting of three corps
(Fourth, Fourteenth and Twentieth) numbering
73,000 men and 130 guns, this army alone
outnumbered the Confederates. Thomas was a
friend of Sherman‘s, but no friend of Grant‘s. He
was a Virginian fighting for the Union, although his
family did not respect his views, and Thomas was
seen in a very bad light in the South. To some, he
was a slow mover, but in reality, Thomas was
methodical and precise. At Stone‘s River, he had
helped turn certain defeat into victory when he
uttered, ―This army can‘t retreat.‖ Saving
Rosecrans‘ defeat at Chickamauga from becoming a
worse disaster with his stand on Horseshoe Ridge,
this action earned him the sobriquet ―Rock of
Chickamauga.‖
Sherman‘s second force was the Army of
the Tennessee, commanded by 35-year-old Maj.
Gen. James Birdseye (pronounced birdzee)
McPherson. This command also had three corps
(Fifteenth, Sixteenth and Seventeenth), but some of
the divisions were absent on security duties during
the campaign. Nonetheless, it still numbered 24,500
men and 96 cannon. McPherson was in the same
class at West Point as John Bell Hood, where
McPherson finished first and Hood was a few
demerits short of being thrown out. General Grant
was instrumental in his rise to high command, and
McPherson quickly rose from colonel of engineers
to command of an army. Sherman shared Grant‘s
high opinion of McPherson.
Last was the Army of the Ohio, a grandiose
name for what amounted to just over one corps
(Twenty-third), 13,559 men, 28 guns, commanded
by Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield. He was a political
general, and at 32, was small and ugly. While he
lacked actual combat experience, he was, however,
ambitious and calculating, and desperate to please
his superiors. Schofield had friends in high places,
and he had directed the Department of the Missouri
for a time, helping Grant out with troops at
Vicksburg. All this had paved his way, despite his
lack of experience, to command of the Army of the
Ohio. Apart from Sc hofield‘s men, the Union troops
were, in general, veterans of many campaigns, well
equipped and managed. In their ranks, the new
repeating rifles were beginning to make an
appearance in large numbers, despite the doubts of
senior officers. The only weak link in Sherman‘s
chain was his cavalry, as this was not a unified
command and was led by dubious commanders. The
horsemen were at Sherman‘s beck and call, not that
 14
of their nominal commander, George Thomas. All
in all, it would be difficult for the Confederates to
halt such an imposing force.
To oppose the Yankee onslaught, the
Confederacy fielded the Army of Tennessee, the
poor relation of Lee‘s Army of Northern Virginia.
Its two corps (Hood‘s and Hardee‘s) were soon
joined by Leonidas Polk with his Army of
Mississippi, which became in effect another corps
(Polk‘s). With a total of ten infantry divisions and
two cavalry corps, the army now had an overall
effective strength of 53,000 men. The Rebel cavalry
looked formidable on paper, but in fact only 2,400
men could be counted on for fieldwork.
In command was General Joseph E.
Johnston, who along with Beauregard, was the
victor of First Manassas. He saw himself as the
Confederacy‘s senior general, Jefferson Davis didn‘t
see it that way and ranked him fourth. This dispute
was to blight their relationship for the rest of the
war. Hood was only given the command because no
one else was available. Johnston was ―small,
soldierly and graying, with a certain gamecock
jauntiness.‖ He was also described as ―… A diffic ult
and touchy subordinate…a military contradiction.‖
Loved by his men, Hood was hated by Davis. In
some government circles, Johnston was blamed for
losing the fortress of Vicksburg. His conduct during
the coming campaign would not change Davis‘
opinion. He has in no doubt that he had to stop
Sherman, come what may. Johnston‘s corps
commanders were Lt. Gen. William J. Hardee and
John B. Hood. Hardee was famous for compiling a
tactical manual used by the U.S. army. However, he
was also described as a trouble maker, and as a
general who shirked his responsibilities. Despite
this, he had gained a reputation as one of the
South‘s finest corps commanders. He plotted against
Bragg, but was a friend of Joe Johnston. John Bell
Hood by 1864 had become one of the Confe deracy‘s
top generals, a celebrity, a six-foot blonde giant of a
man. In early photographs, he looks every bit the
Viking Warrior, albeit a dour one. Feted wherever
he went, ―the Gallant Hood‖ was associated with the
famed ―Texas Brigade,‖ which he had led to glory,
although he himself was from Kentucky. ―Hood‘s
Division‖ of the Army of Northern Virginia was
arguably the best fighting force in an army full of
excellent combat units. John B. Hood was an
aggressive warrior and he had suffered for this trait
with two wounds, leaving him with a shattered arm
and the loss of his right leg. He arrived in the
Western Theatre with James Longstreet just before
Steven Hofner (Order #35311104)
the battle of Chickamauga, in which the divisions
from the East helped inflict a hefty defeat on the
Army of the Cumberland. All this cost Hood dearly.
The hero of Gaines Mill, Second Manassas,
Gettysburg, and Chickamauga, although still only
thirty-two, could not walk without crutches, despite
having a cork leg from Europe. Hood couldn‘t dress
himself, requiring a personal servant to tend to his
most intimate needs. Despite all this, Hood
continued to serve the Confederacy. He was
rewarded with a promotion to lieutenant general,
and given command of a corps in the Army of
Tennessee on March 2, 1864.
The first actions of the campaign
foreshadowed the typical pattern of Sherman‘s
advance – 1) the Confederates would hold an
excellent defensive position that would be costly (or
downright foolish) to attack. 2) The Yankees would
then move to the right or left or both, and find a way
to outflank the offending position. 3) Johnston, upon
learning of the new threat, would simply withdraw.
This happened in front of Dalton at Rocky Face
Ridge on May 5-9, Johnston fell back to Resaca, a
series of actions here during May 13-16 ended with
Johnston just managing to extricate his army and
retreating twenty-five miles to Cassville. Here he
attempted a counterstroke while Sherman‘s armies
advanced on a broad front, it came to naught and he
was persuaded by Hood and Leonidas Polk that their
position was untenable, so once again the Army of
Tennessee fell back, this time to Allatoona Pass.
Sherman saw the Pass as too strong to attack,
therefore he once again pinned the Confederates in
place and used superior numbers to move by the
flank, this resulted in the fighting at New Hope
Church (Dallas) on May 25-27. Johnston fell back
again, to a formidable position on Kennesaw
Mountain, he was now only twenty miles or so from
Atlanta, and it was now almost the end of June.
Perhaps by now Sherman was fed up of playing cat
and mouse or maybe he didn‘t want to waste any
more time, for whatever reason he abandoned his
tactic of out maneuvering the Confederates and
frontally assaulted Johnston‘s position, the result, on
June 27 was a bloody debac le. Nonetheless, once
bitten Sherman went back to his old ways and
within a week Johnston‘s army was entrenched
behind prepared fortifications on the Chattahoochee
River, a mere seven miles from the center of
Atlanta. This barrier was once again turned and the
Army of Tennessee had to abandon its carefully
selected killing ground, Johnston‘s army was now
south of Peachtree Creek, almost inside the city‘s
 15
defenses. On the evening of July 17, Joseph E. Cheatham was ―surprised,‖ and Patrick Cleburne
Johnston was relieved of command, Jefferson Davis, expressed doubts about Hood‘s leadership ability.
his advisors and the Confederate people had had Further down the chain, it would seem just as bad.
enough, they simply wanted Atlanta saved, What little fighting Johnston did do in his long
politically the North must be denied a victory before retreat was actually done by Hood‘s division, and
their upcoming elections, the peace party had to the rank and file perceived all his efforts as nothing
win, Johnston‘s replacement was the dour John Bell more than bloody repulses. Many soldiers, however,
Hood. were also sick of retreating, and knew that
Johnston‘s replacement by Hood came as no something had to be done to reverse their fortunes.
surprise to many and certainly not to Hood himself, With the aggressive Hood now in command, that
as early as March 7, Hood was writing to the something could only mean a pitched fight.
Confederate President undermining Johnston and
agreeing with Davis‘ own strategies ―…will give us
an army of 60,000 or 70,000 men, which I think,
should be sufficient to defeat and destroy all the
Federals on this side of the Ohio river.‖ First Hood
and then Polk began to constantly carp to Davis
about Johnston‘s operations and both bewailed
missed opportunities and the constant withdrawals
without a fight. By the end of May Hood was
building up a power base in the Army of Tennessee,
as he already had the ears of Jefferson Davis and his
military advisor Braxton Bragg, things did not look
good for Joe Johnston, either Johnston would have
to reverse his cautious retreat with spectacular
results or his days were numbered. As the situation
worsened Bragg was sent to Atlanta, arriving July
13, with a view to ―ascertaining the position of his
(Johnston‘s) army, its condition and strength..‖
Hood took the opportunity to further project his own
views and on July 15 in a memorandum to Bragg
stated ―attack him (Sherman), even if we should
have to recross the river to do so,‖ and finally the
damning ―I regard it as a great misfortune to our
country that we failed to give battle to the enemy
many miles north of our present position.‖ Bragg
concluded his observations with ―If any change is
made, Lieutenant-General Hood would give
unlimited satisfaction, and my estimate of him
already high, has been raised by this campaign. Do
not understand me as proposing him as a man of
genius, or a great general, but as far better in the
present emergency than any one we have available.‖
Two days later Hood was given command of the
Army of Tennessee.
Hood may have been sure of both his
destiny and his ability to halt Sherman, but, as usual,
the senior generals of the Army of Tennessee were
at odds with their leader. Hardee was angry at being
bypassed for a junior, even though he had shown
great reluctance to command the army himself once
before. Generals Stewart, French, and Stevens were
―sorry‖ that Johnston had been replaced. Benjamin

Steven Hofner (Order #35311104)

 16
Hood at Atlanta:
Peachtree Creek
by George Anderson
Gen. William T. Sherman had split his armies
into three groups, intending to come at Atlanta
from the North and Northeast. Hood‟s army was
just south of Peachtree Creek, along the
approach route of “Pap” Thomas and his Army of
the Cumberland. Peachtree Creek was the last
natural barrier before Atlanta‟s defenses. It was
not a wide barrier, but its banks, covered in heavy
undergrowth, were steep and difficult to traverse.
On July 19, Hood learned that Thomas was
crossing Peachtree Creek, while the other parts
of Sherman‟s army were not yet at Decatur, six
miles away to the east. Having cut his military
teeth taking part or in the vicinity of Lee and
Jackson‟s great flanking attacks, Hood saw this
as an ideal opportunity to destroy Sherman
piecemeal. Two corps, under Hardee and
Steven Hofner (Order #35311104)
Stewart, would catch Thomas off guard before he
had a chance to dig in, and drive him back along
the creek, where, with his retreat blocked, he
would be forced to either surrender or be
destroyed. Cheatham‟s Corps would cover the
right, in position to eventually join the
Confederate cavalry in blocking McPherson and
Schofield at Decatur. Once Thomas was
defeated, Hood would march the rest of his army
to join Cheatham, bringing about the destruction
of the rest of the Federals. Atlanta would be
saved and Hood vindicated.
Meanwhile, Sherman learned of the Rebel
change of command by reading a captured
newspaper. He immediately realized that the
Rebels intended to fight him for Atlanta, but he
thought that it was more likely that the weaker
wing of his army, Schofield and McPherson,
would be attacked, rather than the stronger,
Thomas. Sherman, as he had done before and as
he would do again, had become complacent.
Now, he wanted the gap between his forces
closed.
 17
At midnight on July 19, Hood explained
his plan of attack for the next day to his generals,
hoping to leave no room for mistakes. He
constantly went over every detail, reiterating time
and time again that their men must charge home
at the “point of the bayonet.”
On July 20, as the heat of the day built up,
Yankees continued to cross the creek, knowing
there were Rebels in their front, but are not really
expecting a full-scale assault. Nevertheless,
Newton‟s advanced force stopped and dug in
astride the Peachtree Road leading to Atlanta.
Ward‟s division halted just behind and to the right
of Newton. Thomas now had three corps in line:
the Fourth on the left, the Twentieth in the center,
and the Fourteenth on the right. While the
veterans of the Fourteenth had dug in, as had
Newton‟s men, the rest of the army remained
unprotected by works.
Unfortunately, Hood‟s plan began to
unravel. About 10 a.m., he learned that the
Yankees had finally passed Decatur, and were
advancing toward Atlanta. With only 2,500 Rebel
cavalry to stop the Federals, Hood had no choice
but to immediately send Cheatham to the east.
The attack had to be delayed while the Army of
Tennessee realigned itself. Cheatham,
commanding a corps for the first time, moved too
far. Hardee, ordered to keep in contact, also
advanced too far, while Stewart stayed where he
was. Informed of what was happening, Hood
refused to intercede, and trusted Hardee‟s
experience. Meanwhile, Thomas‟s Yankees
tentatively moved forward.
Three hours late, at 4 p.m., Hardee
eventually stopped moving to the right, and finally
moved to attack. His rightward shift, although it
has taken considerable time, had fortuitously put
the Confederates in a better position to assault
the Yankee line. This was not the case for Bates‟
division, which could not find the Federal line due
to the close terrain, and subsequently, took
almost no part in the battle. Walker‟s division
surprised Newton‟s troops, and a bitter struggle
ensued in which the Yankee‟s fought tooth and
nail to halt the Rebel advance. Federal infantry
reserves and artillery, one battery being led by
General Thomas himself, managed to secure the
Union left, preventing Walker from rolling up the
Federal flank.
It was now Maney‟s (Cheatham‟s) division
turn to go forward. However, they did so only
after carefully adjusting their battleline. To their
left, Loring‟s division mistakenly took this
adjustment as their cue to go forward. At first,
Steven Hofner (Order #35311104)
they did well, exploiting the terrain and routing
two Union brigades of Geary‟s division. However,
Maney‟s slow advance allowed the Federals to
recover, and they eventually forced Loring back.
Walthall was the next Rebel unit to go in, and
although the Federals were now expecting him,
he achieved success. Soon Walthall attacked
both flanks of William‟s blue division, managing to
also hit the left flank of the supine Fourteenth
Corps.
As so often before, just as success
seemed within their grasp, the Rebels were
halted by concentrated Union artillery fire.
Walthall was forced to withdraw. Despite the
setbacks, Loring was willing to attack again if
properly supported by Hardee. Eventually,
Hardee ordered the best division in the
Confederate army, Cleburne‟s, to attack.
However, before the Irishman could advance,
orders arrived from Hood that reinforcements
were needed to the east as Yankee General
McPherson was only two and a half miles from
the center of Atlanta. Night fell, and the battle
petered out. Hood‟s first gambit had failed.
Union losses at Peachtree Creek were
concentrated almost entirely in Twentieth Corps,
which lost around 1,700 men. The overall total of
Federals killed, wounded, or missing came to
approximately 1,900. Confederate returns do not
give a complete picture as they only exist for
Stewart‟s Corps, but informed sources put the
number at 2,500.
THE WARGAME
The scenario concentrates on the battle
for the Union left, commencing at 3 PM and
continuing until the onset of darkness at 7:15 PM.
The Federal skirmish line (marked 79/102 on the
map, in front of Harrison‟s brigade) is a combined
detachment from both those regiments. It is
considered a separate entity for all gaming
purposes.
Kimball and Blake‟s brigades are behind
hasty works, and these do not extend to the
skirmishing units on the Union left. Some Federal
units came under Confederate artillery fire, but I
cannot find any information that identifies these
batteries. Therefore, I have chosen to include a
few at random. Due to the small size of many
regiments, I recommend merging units with 200
men or under.
Regimental strengths are always a
problem when dealing with the Civil War. The
Confederates usually bear the brunt of the blame,
as their returns are infamously short of the kind of
 18
information that the wargamer feeds on.
However, for the Atlanta campaign, the Union
returns are almost as bad. They include plenty of
information on casualties, but not on regimental
or brigade strengths. Looking through these
reports on the three days of fighting depicted in
these scenarios, it becomes clear that many
regiments and brigades on both sides were
commanded by lower echelon commanders, i.e.
colonels, majors, or even captains.
Thus, I can only suppose that these men
were either too busy living up to their new
positions, or did not have enough experience, to
formulate „proper‟ reports or returns, hence, the
differing quality from the norm. It is also apparent
that, although the Union forces outnumbered the
Rebels by a considerable amount, overall they
still maintained the large organization (three
armies) with which they had begun the campaign.
This meant that the number of units stayed the
same, while their actual complements diminished.
The Confederates in the West frequently
amalgamated their regiments fairly early in the
conflict. Although as a rule the Federals did not
do so, in the West, at least they often joined
depleted regiments to form „battalions‟ within a
brigade organization.
Many Union regiments were partially
equipped with repeating rifles during this
campaign. However, to find a whole regiment
thus armed was not the norm. These weapons
were usually in short supply, and they were
generally used by companies accustomed to
skirmishing duties. I find that most rules systems
tend to overcompensate for these weapons, and
turn them into early versions of machine guns (to
the detriment of the game). Therefore, any unit
marked RR(p), (Colt rifles), or RR should not be
able to fire twice if using JR2 rules, but instead,
they only receive an up 1 column shift on the fire
table. If not using JR, or if you disagree, then I will
leave this to your discretion.
DEPLOYMENT
All major forces, except Bates‟
Confederate division, are already on the field.
From the start of the game, check on each turn to
see if any units from this force will arrive on the
battlefield. Check each brigade individually, and
allow them to arrive on a die roll of five or six.
Only one brigade is allowed to arrive each turn. If
a unit successfully arrives, determine by die roll
whether the unit enters at point „A‟ or „B‟.
Steven Hofner (Order #35311104)
Bates will enter along with the second
brigade to arrive. Cheatham‟s Tennessee division
cannot move until turn two, as Walker historically
attacked first. Union commander George Thomas
starts the game deployed with the First Michigan
battery. This unit, along with Thomas, cannot
arrive until the turn after a unit of Bates‟ division
opens fire or comes under fire. They must enter
on Peachtree Road.
TERRAIN
Woods are mainly light, with heavy
clumps within them, especially on the
Confederate right. The open ground is covered
with a thin growth of young pines, which do not
hamper movement, hinder visibility or give cover.
There are several cornfields, but these do not
hamper visibility, and they are treated as open.
All slopes are considered as broken terrain. All of
Newton‟s regiments may have hasty works to
their front, except for the 100th Illinois and the
57th Indiana out on the left flank.
VICTORY CONDITIONS
Hood hoped to sweep the Yankees back
across Peachtree Creek. Therefore, the
Confederates must force the Federals from the
heights. If the Confederates can clear and hold
the Collier Road ridge, they can claim a minor
victory. If they also overrun the ridge behind it,
then they have won a major victory. To hold the
high ground, the Union player must have at least
two non-routed brigades on the heights at the end
of the game. To qualify, these brigades must still
have half their strength left in non-routed
regiments.
ORDER OF BATTLE
UNION
Army of the Cumberland
Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas, superior, +2
Fourth Army Corps
Second Division
Brig. Gen. John Newton, average, +2
First Brigade
Brig. Gen. Nathan Kimball, average, +1
36th Ill. 200 men, RM, average
 19
44th Ill. 200 men, RR(p), average
73rd Ill. 200 men, RR(p), average
74th Ill. 320 men, RR(p), average
88th Ill 220 men, RR, average
15th Mo. 200 men, RR(p), average
24th Wis. 300 men, RM, average
Second Brigade
Col. John W. Blake, average, +1
100th Ill. 300 men, RM, average
40th Ind. 300 men, RR, average
57th Ind. 300 men, RM, average
28th Ky. 300 men, RM, average
26th Oh. 300 men, RR(p), average
97th Oh. 300 men, RM, average
Third Brigade
Brig. Gen. Luther P. Bradley, average, +1
27th Ill. 200 men, RR(p), average
42nd Ill. 200 men, RR(p), average
51st Ill. 200 men, RM, average
79th Ill. 200 men, RM, average
3 Ky. 200 men, RM, average
64th Oh. 300 men, RM, average
65th Oh. 200 men, RM, average
125th Oh. 440 men, RM, average
Artillery
Bty. A, 1st Oh. 6x12lb N, average
Bty. M, 1st Ill. 4x3” R, average
Twentieth Army Corps
Third Division
Brig. Gen. William T. Ward, average, +2
First Brigade
Col. Benjamin Harrison, average, +1
102nd Ill. 200 men, RM(p), average
105th Ill. 200 men, RM, average
129th Ill. 300 men, RM, average
70th Ind. 300 men, RM, average
79th Oh. 200 men, RM, average
Det. 79/102 100 men, RR, average
Second Brigade
Col. John Coburn, average, +1
33rd Ind. 380 men, RM, average
85th Ind. 280 men, RM, average
19th Mich. 300 men, RM(p), average
22nd Wis. 340 men, RM(p), average
Third Brigade
Col. James Wood, Jr., average, +1
Steven Hofner (Order #35311104)
20th Conn. 300 men, RM, average
136th N.Y. 200 men, RM, average
55th Oh. 200 men, RM, average
73rd Oh. 300 men, RM, average
26th Wis. 400 men, RM, average
Artillery
Bty. I, 1st Mich. 6x3” R, average
CONFEDERATE
Army of Tennessee
Hardee’s Corps
Lt. Gen. William J. Hardee, average, +2
Cheatham’s Division
Brig. Gen. George Maney, average, +2
Maney’s Brigade
Col. F.M. Walker, average, +1
1st and 27th Tenn. 200 men, RM, average
4th Tenn. (CSA) 100 men, RM, average
6th and 9th Tenn. 200 men, RM, average
19th Tenn. 100 men, RM, average
50th Tenn. 100 men, RM, average
Strahl’s Brigade
Brig. Gen. Otho F. Strahl, average, +1
4th and 5th Tenn. 200 men, RM, average
24th Tenn. 100 men, RM, average
31st Tenn. 100 men, RM, average
33rd Tenn. 200 men, RM, average
41st Tenn. 200 men, SB, average
Vaughan’s Brigade
Col. Michael Magevney, Jr., average, +1
11th Tenn. 100 men, RM, average
12th and 47th Tenn. 200 men, RM, average
13th and 154th (Senior) Tenn. 200 men, RM,
average
29th Tenn. 100 men, SB, average
Wright’s Brigade
Col. John C. Carter, average, +1
8th Tenn. 100 men, RM, average
16th Tenn. 100 men, RM, average
28th Tenn. 200 men, RM, average
38th Tenn. 200 men, RM, average
51st and 52nd Tenn. 200 men, RM, average
Walker’s Division
Maj. Gen. William H.T. Walker, average, +2
Gist’s Brigade
 20
Brig. Gen. States Rights Gist, average, +1
8th Ga. Btn. 200 men, RM, average
46th Ga. 200 men, RM, average
65th Ga. 260 men, RM, average
5th Miss. 200 men, RM, average
8th Miss 240 men, RM, average
16th S.C. 220 men, RM, average
24th S.C. 240 men, RM, average
2nd Ga. Btn. Sharpshooters, 200 men, RM,
average
Mercer’s Brigade
Brig. Gen. Hugh W. Mercer, average, +1
1st Ga. (Vols.) 300 men, RM, green
54th Ga. 200 men, RM, average
57th Ga. 260 men, RM, average
63rd Ga. 220 men, RM, green
Stevens’ Brigade
Brig. Gen. Clement H. Stevens, average, +1
1st Ga. (CSA) 240 men, RM, average
25th Ga. 200 men, RM, average
29th Ga. 200 men, RM, average
30th Ga, 300 men, RM, average
66th Ga. 260men, RM, average
1st Ga. Btn. Sharpshooters, 200 men, RM,
average
Bate’s Division
Maj. Gen. William B. Bate, average, +2
Tyler’s Brigade
Brig. Gen. Thomas B. Smith, average, +1
37th Ga. 100 men, RM, average
15th and 37th Tenn. 140 men, RM, average
20th Tenn. 200 men, RM, average
30th Tenn. 160 men, RM, average
4th Ga. Btn. Sharpshooters, 100 men, RM,
average
Steven Hofner (Order #35311104)
Lewis’ (Orphan) Brigade
Brig. Gen. Joseph H. Lewis, average, +1
2nd Ky. 100 men, SB, elite
4th Ky. 200 men, RM, elite
5th 100 men, RM, elite
6th 100 men, RM, elite
9th 200 men, RM, elite
Finley’s Brigade
Brig. Gen. Jesse J. Finley, average, +1
1st and 3rd Fla. 100 men, RM, average, +1
1st Fla. Cav. (dismounted) and 4th Fla. 200 men,
RM, average
6th Fla. 140 men, RM, average
7th Fla. 140 men, RM, average
Artillery
Phelan‟s Ala. Bty. 4x12lb N, average
Marion Fla. Arty. 4x12lb H, average
Turner‟s Miss. Bty. 4x12lb N, average
Army of Mississippi
Stewart’s Corps
Loring’s Division
Featherston’s Brigade
Brig. Gen. Winfield S. Featherston, average, +1
3rd Miss. 240 men, RM, average
22nd Miss. 200 men, RM, average
31st Miss. 300 men, RM, average
33rd Miss. 200 men, RM, average
40th Miss. 300 men, RM, average
1st Miss. Btn. Sharpshooters 240 men, RM,
average
 21

Steven Hofner (Order #35311104)

 22
The Napoleon
by Phili p M. Cole
Since 1857, the basic smoothbore cannon used
by the U.S. Army was the Napoleon. Named after
Napoleon III of France, it was sometimes referred
to as the ―gun-howitzer,‖ or the ―light 12-
pounder.‖ This artillery piece was the greatest gun
in its category, and had the distinction of being
one of the top three cannons used during the Civil
War. General Lee considered the 12-pound
Napoleon, the 10-pound Parrott and the 3- inch
rifle to be the best guns available for improving
the field artillery.
With regards to wargaming, it would be useful
to compare the relative value of the Napoleon
with its other two counterparts, and to consider
this gun‘s contribution in battle. Barrel weight,
ease of operating, effective range, and killing
power were all parameters used to gauged the
importance of this weapon.
Compare barrel weights, for example. The
barrel of the Napoleon weighed in the
neighborhood of 1,210 pounds. The 10-pound
Parrott weighed about 900 pounds and the 3- inch
rifle about 815 pounds. With the Napoleon being
33% heavier than the Parrott and almost 50%
greater than the 3- incher, it caused greater wear
on horse teams, decreased maneuverability over
uneven terrain, and required more energy and
muscle-power for handling during operations.
There were even more features distinguishing
the Napoleon from the other two leading gun
types. Napoleons were smoothbores, while the
Parrott and 3- inch gun were rifled. Smoothbores
were typically safer and easier to operate. The
sponging step was quicker, since it was easier and
more effective to sponge the smooth surface of
the barrel than the troublesome, spark-hiding,
spiral lands and grooves of rifled guns.
In addition, Napoleon rounds were all
prepackaged - the cartridge bag was directly
attached to the projectile. This made them easier
to handle, and they needed less loading time. This
package required only one ramming stroke. In
contrast, rifled gun cartridges were separate from
the projectile, requiring two ramming strokes.
The Napoleon possessed an even greater
advantage due to the simplicity of its ammunition.
Steven Hofner (Order #35311104)
With the exception of canister, Napoleons fired
round projectiles. There were only four kinds to
choose from – shot, case, shell, and canister. With
few choices, finding the right wagon with the
right ammunition made replenishing easier.
In contrast, rifled ammunition was complex.
The system diversity in the design was extensive.
It included nine different categories of methods
used to impart a spin on the projectile. Each
category had a multiple of projectile selections.
Some systems‘ ammunition could not be used
interchangeably between different models of
guns, even those with the same caliber.
Maintaining a broad inventory was unwieldy;
restocking correct ammunition was even more
difficult. Some guns were put out of action from
using incorrect ammunition, caused by the
confusion in the variety of projectiles.
The Napoleon‘s spherical ammunition produced
another advantage. The blunt round shape of its
ammunition caused increased air resistance and
slowed down the projectile. The striking velocity
of a Napoleon projectile was only about one-third
of its muzzle velocity. Decreased velocity
allowed gunners to visually track the trajectory
and make necessary corrections on the next shot.
In contrast, the bullet-shaped high- velocity rifled
projectiles were not normally visible in flight.
The average velocity of a rifled projectile was
more than double that of a Napoleon‘s.
On the downside, Napoleons had a large bore of
4.62 inches. Because of using larger ammunition,
batteries made up of Napoleons carried fewer
projectiles in their limbers and caissons. A
Napoleon ammunition chest carried 32 rounds or
a total of 128 on hand for immediate use. The 3-
inch and 10-pound Parrott ammunition chest
carried 50 rounds, or a total of 200 on hand for
immediate use. Faster load times consumed more
ammunition, and with less ammunition on hand,
Napoleons had less staying power on the field
than rifled guns.
In addition, smoothbores were comparatively
inefficient in delivering projectiles to their targets.
For ease of loading, the round projectiles were
about 1/10 inch smaller in diameter than the bore
of the barrel. The difference, called windage, was
needed to overcome the thick film buildup from
firing, and it allowed continued operations.
Windage, however, leaked a considerable amount
 23
of propellant gas. Napoleons used 2 ½ times more
gunpowder than 3- inchers and ten-pound Parrotts.
Burning more powder meant generating more
smoke. In turn, more smoke meant increased
concealment of targets.
As a consequence of propellant leakage and
spherical projectiles, Napoleons had a shorter
range than the rifled guns. The published ranges
of the three most popular guns, measured at 5
degrees elevation, were as follows:
12-pound Napoleon 1,619 yards
3-inch Ordnance rifle 1,830 ―
10-pound Parrott 1,850 ―
Readers should be aware, however, that these
published ranges merely provide a point-of-
reference comparison for different artillery pieces
at a given elevation. They do not reflect their
effective ranges or maximum elevations of use.
The Table of Fire for a Napoleon gun, for
example, instructed artillerymen to fire at targets
up to 2,000 yards. John Gibbon‘s Artillerist
Manual lists the range of a 3-inch rifle, firing case
shot, as being 4,180 yards at 16 degrees elevation.
At the first battle of Manassas, the targets of
Cushing‘s Federal battery were beyond the
maximum range of his guns. Cushing calmly
ordered his men to dig holes under the gun trails
deep enough to allow firing at angles upwards of
forty degrees.
Maximum range, however, was not the same as
effective range. As the distance increased, so did
the lateral deviation, or drift, of the round. In turn,
the chances of hitting the target decreased. For
example, a 12-pound Napoleon, firing a solid shot
at only 600 yards, would have a horizontal
deviation of about 3 feet. At 1,200 yards, the
deviation increased to about 12 feet. The other
projectiles fired by the 12-pounder produced an
even greater deviation.
Napoleons could increase their range by
ricochet firing. Best accomplished over level, hard
ground, ricochet firing was intended to ―bounce‖
the projectile over terrain and gain altitude in
order to increase its range. Although difficult to
achieve, the effects of ricochet firing were often
better than direct fire. As the projectile skipped
across the terrain the ball‘s velocity decreased. A
ball with low velocity fractured, split, and
splintered objects, and more widely scattered
Steven Hofner (Order #35311104)
dangerous fragments than one with high velocity.
Visually, ricochet firing kicked up dust clouds on
its deadly path, and, as a consequence, it affected
morale to a greater extent than a ball passing
through the air.
With the Napoleon‘s shorter range, this gun was
more limited in its participation in one of the most
effective artillery practices – cross-firing or
oblique firing. Cross- firing caused significantly
greater damage to targets with shallow depth.
Greater angles of fire increased the range required
to hit targets, and, in turn, diminished the
opportunity for the Napoleon‘s participation.
Although the effective range of Napoleons was
not as great as rifles, uneven and wooded terrain,
where most battles were fought, often neutralized
the long-range advantage of rifled guns.
Therefore, when battles were fought within the
operating distance of Napoleons, the positive
factor of range for rifled guns over Napoleons
diminished in importance while the positive value
of the Napoleons‘ killing power increased.
Killing power was where the Napoleon
displayed its eminence in battle. Despite
shortcomings in weight, range, and accuracy, the
cross-sectional bore size of a Napoleon was more
than double that of the 3-inch or 10-pound Parrott.
The additional two pounds of weight in Napoleon
ammunition helped increase its killing power.
This was especially evident with canister. When
fired from the smoothbore Napoleon, canister
balls exited the barrel in an evenly distributed
conical pattern that damaged targets in a
predictable manner.
By contrast, the grooves of rifled guns interfered
with exiting canister balls, causing a jagged
pattern and producing uneven damage. In
addition, the centrifugal force of a rifled barrel
caused a canister round to produce a dispersed
pattern sooner than that of a smoothbore. As a
result, the smaller-bore rifled guns had only half
the effective canister range than the Napoleons‘
outer distance of four hundred yards. In the words
of Brig. Gen. John Corse, U.S.A., ―No column
can stand a concentrated fire of six Napoleons by
volley or battery, double shotted with canister.‖
The effective range of a Napoleon was about
one mile, and the rifled guns about two miles.
Rifled guns were masters of the field when
operating beyond the effective range of
 24
Napoleons, which, in this case, were powerless Philip M. Cole was born in Gettysburg. He received
except for use as smoke generators. But the range his B. S. in Accounting at Penn State, and served as a
value for rifled guns was not static. It only applied Russian linguist in U.S. Navy during the Vietnam era].
when enemy targets were visible. Besides terrain Phil’s ancestors fought with 76th Pennsylvania
Volunteers {the “Keystone Zouaves”). He is a
interference, the great range equalizer for Licensed Battlefield Guide at Gettysburg National
Napoleons was the absence of smokeless Military Park. Phil authored the excellent book, Civil
gunpowder during the Civil War. As battles grew War Artillery at Gettysburg, which is available at
hotter and smoke from blazing muskets and Gettysburg bookstores or online at
artillery fire covered the field, visibility often www.militaryhistoryonline.com/Forum.aspx and at
dropped to well within the range of Napoleons. At www.windsofvalor.com
this point, the additional killing power of the
Napoleon more than offset any drawbacks they Artillery questions may be addressed to Phil at
had versus rifled guns. Phdicole@aol.com.
Most certainly, possessing longer-range rifled
artillery was important, but often it was not that
critical. In battles waged where the range was
within the realm of the Napoleons‘ operation, an
army with a disproportionately high number of
rifled guns gained the advantage of projecting its
firepower at longer distances, but it diminished its
capacity to kill at close-range. Decisive battles are
never won by long-range combat.
When rifled guns replaced Napoleons on the
battle line, an army sacrificed the qualities it
needed most—the killing power of canister fired
at short range from a large-diameter smoothbore.
It was the Napoleon that was needed to kill,
maim, or stop a massed assault. This is where the
battle‘s success or failure was almost always
decided.
The heavy use of the Napoleon continued
throughout the Civil War. At Gettysburg, for
example, Napoleons constituted over forty percent
of the Army of the Potomac‘s guns, and Army of
Northern Virginia totaled an almost an identical
percentage. Although smoothbores were slowly
becoming obsolete, at the end of the war, about
half the field guns in the Army of the Potomac
were twelve-pound Napoleons. From the war‘s
beginning through the end of 1863, the U.S.
government had ordered an impressive total of
1,113 of these deadly weapons. The last one
would be applied for in 1864. Throughout the
war, the Napoleon was the favorite piece for many
artillerymen. It was the last bronze gun produced
for an American army.

Steven Hofner (Order #35311104)

 25
Artillery Tables for JR3
ARTILLERY DRM CNSTR NORMAL LONG
Smoothbores
12# Napoleon 3 12 30
6# Gun -1 1 10 28
12# Gun, Model 1841 3 12 30
24# Gun
12# Howitzer +1 1 10 20
24# Howitzer +1 3 10 24
32# Howitzer +1 3 10 28
8” Howitzer
12# Mountain Howitzer +1 1 10 20
Rifled guns
3” Armstrong 2 16 36
3” Ordnance Rifle 2 16 36
4.5” Ordnance Rifle +1
10# Parrott Rifle 2 16 36
20# Parrott Rifle +1 2 18 40
30# Parrott Rifle
12# James +1 2 16 36
24# James
6# Wiard 2 16 36
10# Wiard 2 16 36
10# Blakely 2 16 36
6# Whitworth NA 24 62
12# Whitworth +1 NA 24 62
Miscellaneous
Gatling Guns
Mixed Guns 2 14 33

Ask John Hill some artillery questions…

Q- I need to use a 24# field howitzer in my OOB, but it’s not listed in the official JRIII charts. What should I
do, call it a heavy gun?
A - Since the 24# howitzer tube is slightly less than a hundred pounds heavier then the Napoleon, I would
not rate the 12# field howitzer as a heavy gun. As a comparison, the 32# field howitzer has a 1,920-pound
tube. So, for movement, it would be the same as a Napoleon. Now using the 12# Napoleon as the standard,
and rating the 24# field howitzer in relation to it, we get a 15mm range table as above.

Q- Does artillery get a +2 opening volley modifier?

A - This is not an "official" ruling, but consider the option of allowing the "+2 DRM" for opening volley for
artillery provided the guns are not firing the same turn they unlimber. Hence, a battery rushed to front and
going into action as soon as it unlimbers would not get this benefit. I generally favor the concept of artillery
having an opening volley benefit, if prior to that firing it had spent one complete tur n not moving or was in a
fixed position.

Q- The question of counter-battery fire came up in a JRIII game. Is it totally eliminated or did I just miss
it somewhere?
A – Counter-battery fire is smoothly integrated into the game. Note that an unlimbered battery has a target
modifier of "-3" DRM -- shoot at it like any other target; except that if you get a hit, you must roll to
determine if the hit knocked out a horse or a gun section.

Steven Hofner (Order #35311104)

 26
Q - Does the “hit by artillery” morale check affect artillery crews too?
A - It most certainly does.

Q - Why where 12-pounder howitzers omitted in JRIII?

A - The 12# howitzers were omitted because they almost never appeared as a battery of all 12# howitzers.
Almost always, they were deployed as a section within a mixed battery. In the west a 4-gun battery of one
section of 10#
Parrots and a section of 12# howitzers was not rare. But, I am sure on some occasion a full battery of four
12# howitzers was deployed. They can be approximated by using the 6# GUN range table with a (+1
DRM).

Q - A regiment that was supporting a single gun battery routed, and when the battery did a morale check
for seeing this, the rules seem to say that a battery has its normal morale unless involved in a charge.
Does an unsupported battery really have its normal morale on anything but a charge?
A - Your interpretation is correct on artillery morale. A battery only suffers the unsupported morale penalty
if it is charged. All the battery memoirs I have read suggest that this was the only time a lone battery really
got worried. The rest of the time it was stoic defiance -- we can hit them harder than they can hit us. While
that often proved to be a misplaced optimism, is was very common among the gunner.

Photo courtesy of Cory Ring.

A classic JR Scenario – Chickamauga 1863 (Brecki nridge) Turn 1

The terrain is a cloth mat, painted & flocked.
Any other JR gamers in the Nashville area?

Steven Hofner (Order #35311104)

 27
Splashing to Glory
Streams and Rivers, and
Their Effect on Civil War Battles
By: Doug Kline
It is hard to find an American battlefield that was
not crisscrossed with some form of streams,
creeks, runs, or rivers. Many battlefields were
scenes of contested stream/river crossings; but,
at a minimum, water barriers affected the
generals‟ choice of tactics and strategies. Battles
that quickly come to mind included Gettysburg,
Manassas, Wilson‟s Creek, Saylers Creek,
Sharpsburg, Raymond, and many others. While
not all battles had fights directly around water
barriers, these terrain features often dictated the
flow of the battle. Defenders often chose land so
their lines were often anchored on rivers or
creeks. The flow of reinforcements to a chosen
field could greatly be impacted by watercourses,
as could the avenues of retreat. Watercourses
could also funnel an attack due to their impact on
movement and maneuver. In some cases, troops
were positioned directly behind a stream to take
advantage of its impediment to movement and its
effects on troop formation.
Larger rivers were usually impassible without
bridging, fording, or ferrying of troops. Smaller
rivers, while not always deep, greatly affected the
passage of heavy artillery and wagons, thus
sturdy bridges and good fords were important.
For infantry, factors such as the steepness of the
banks, condition of the bottom, water depth,
current, and whether the men were under fire all
affected the rate of crossing.
Soldiers throughout history have never liked
getting their feet/shoes wet. This can be
confirmed through many years of reenacting. Few
things are more miserable than to march for a
distance in wet shoes. Whenever possible,
soldiers removed their shoes and socks to keep
them dry. Soldiers had to keep their powder dry
and above water, so a depth over 3‟, or a
misplaced step, could cause soldiers to wet their
powder and the contents of their haversacks
(rations, etc.). Attempting to cross a stream or
small river under fire was even more difficult.
Often in 21st Century hindsight, we do not clearly
understand the barrier to Civil War troops posed
by a waterway. Many historians and students of
Steven Hofner (Order #35311104)
history have wondered why Antietam creek was
so difficult for the Union 9th Corps to cross.
However, individual soldiers rarely recorded or
referenced water depth, currents, or bank
conditions.
Smaller streams and rivers also posed challenges
to the movement of formed infantry units. These
waterways often affected unit alignment and
cohesion when under fire. It was not, and is still
not uncommon to find heavy underbrush, briars,
brambles, and other impediments along the
banks of smaller waterways. During the 1st day at
Gettysburg, the 26th NC was advancing on
McPherson‟s Woods, and while crossing
Willoughby Run, “the men faced a swath of creek
side underbrush that included dense brambles
with quarter-inch thorns. The obstacles would
slow the advance, causing the men to cluster
together and making the regiment an easier
target for an enemy on the opposite slope. There
was no choice, however, and nothing to do but
press on, push through the brambles, wade the
stream and reform on the other side”1
The depth and bank heights of many small
waterways also greatly impacted attacks,
providing ready-made defensive positions. At the
1863 battle of Raymond, MS, the 23rd Indiana
infantry approached Fourteen Mile Creek where
“they found the banks at this point 10 to 15 feet
high and nearly vertical, and densely overgrown
with a wild tangle of brush and vines. After much
difficulty and a great deal of swearing, the
Hoosiers got across and formed a battleline.” 2
Throughout similar first person accounts of the
war, other examples exist regarding the
abundance of brush, steep banks, deep water,
slippery banks, or creek bottoms
 28
Their effect on combat included the disruption of
unit alignment, disorganization, and hindrance to
the speed of movement. A combination of these
factors could doom any attack to failure.
During 1864, troops commonly began fortifying
positions behind creeks, creating a natural barrier
or abatis for their enemy to cross. In fact, small
sections of streams were dammed to create an
even greater barrier. Most of the time, troops
assaulting across creeks did not know anything
about the conditions they would encounter until
they reached the obstacle.
Treatment of Water Barriers in Johnny Reb
Rivers, streams and runs can be handled a
number of ways in Johnny Reb wargames.
Obviously, most rivers are impassible except at
fords and bridges, with some exceptions. Smaller
rivers can be treated as though they are larger
streams. On the other end of the spectrum, small
rivulets and runs pose only a minimal disruption
to movement, and can be classified as broken
terrain. This forces me to ask the question,
should small inconsequential streams be
modeled, or treated as anything but a patch of
broken terrain? The impact on a battle will be
limited.
Streams, creeks, and small rivers can be treated
in a number of ways. This can vary from broken
to rough terrain (remember, artillery and wagons
will be unable to cross if rough). Designating the
effects of a stream before starting the game will
help eliminate any problems. If a stream is
considered impassible for artillery, you will need
to make sure you have several crossing points
such as bridges or fords. Even though a stream
model may be an inch (or more) wide on your
gaming surface, few real streams were 50 yards
in width, so most of this width is purely gaming
esthetics. The space occupied by model streams
includes the flood plain, low areas, brush, and
Steven Hofner (Order #35311104)
other impediments. When a stream is wooded on
both sides, I like to call the whole space wooded.
Since many commanders and units were
surprised by stream banks or the conditions
encountered while crossing, I like to treat
streams/creeks as follows: Whenever a unit
attempts to cross a stream/creek, their movement
is reduced by 1d6 (we treat the movement rate as
broken in most cases). Most units will
automatically get across the stream even if they
roll higher than their allowed movement rate. We
require all units to roll when crossing, due to
factors such as whether a unit will plunge into the
water or balk at the bank, requiring efforts from
their officers to lead them across the water. As a
general, you will not know how your units will
react, making it more challenging. Consider the
1d6 loss as the cost to cross and reform for each
unit.
In addition to the die lost from movement rolls, I
require units to disorder when they charge across
a stream/river/creek, since the unit is not taking
as much time to cover the same distance.
Therefore, a great tactical benefit goes to the
defender who positions a body of water to their
front. By the way, I borrowed and modified this
idea from special rules practiced by John Hill in
convention games.
I use all of the above optional rules in my games,
even adding some special circumstances to
crossings that may be appropriate for a particular
game/battle. The number of first-person accounts
from the war gives quite an impression of how
waterways created havoc to an advance. My own
experiences at Saylers Creek reenactments
confirm the challenges of crossing a small 15‟
wide creek. The edges in most areas were
covered in thick briars and brambles, with steep
banks of 3-4 feet. If you were unfortunate to cross
during high water, the experience will remain with
you forever. Combine all of this with Yankees
charging on your rear, and it is an experience to
remember.
Modeling Streams and Rivers
Streams and rivers can be modeled a number of
ways, some of which I will discuss here. The best
way of modeling a river or stream is directly on a
terrain board where the water way can be
depressed
 29
into the terrain, creating a lifelike appearance.
Unfortunately, this is the least flexible method,
and will not benefit you for games done without
the sculpted terrain.
The simplest and least expensive method of
modeling steams is by using colored fabric, which
can be cut into various lengths and shapes. This
is a cheap source of reusable streams, and can
be a good starting point. In past years, I placed
blue fabric under my Geo-Hex to create the
desired effect. Other options include using
finished streams and rivers, which can be painted
onto cut polystyrene or onto the underside of a
clear plastic material. This method is relatively
quick and cheap, but it can take some trial and
error to develop a technique that you like. I
experimented with painted streams on
polystyrene years ago, but was not satisfied with
the effect and kept searching for other options.
Some gamers over the years have used various
types of Cellophane or Acetate type materials for
streams. Cutting sheets of semi-clear or opaque
materials into streams can create a convincing
effect. Once again, the effect you create depends
on your tastes and, in many cases, available
hobby finances.
There are quite a number of commercial stream
products available for your gaming usage. Some
of these include flexible painted latex streams
(Miniature World Maker) and other painted
products based on hardboard or polystyrene.
Many of these are fairly nice, and will give you
years of gaming enjoyment. Unfortunately, my
desire for lifelike terrain would not allow me to
stay with painted “blue” water for very long.
Hence, I created a method of producing
streams/rivers that appears right to my eye, using
a material called Lexel to give a good water
effect. Unfortunately, this process is
very involved, requiring 10 steps and several
weeks to finish. It is also messy and potentially
Steven Hofner (Order #35311104)
dangerous due to the Toluene and other
chemicals in the Lexel. I will not go into the
details on its use here, because my trial and error
process cost 3-4 times more than most
commercially products, and it has a steep
learning curve. However, these streams and
rivers are available from Battlefield Terrain
Concepts.
Other commercial products that can help you
create lifelike water include a couple of products
from Woodland Scenics, as well as artist‟s gel
mediums, and Mod Podge. Woodland Scenics
has a great product available which allows you to
pour it directly onto the streambed. This product,
Realistic Water, remains relatively flexible, and it
looks good when finished. The only drawbacks
are a slow dry time (it can get and remain cloudy
for a while) and it can trap bubbles. If using this
product, add thin layers and dry in between.
Artist‟s products such as gel mediums can
provide a neat effect. Renaissance Ink has a very
fine flocking gel, which creates believable water.
You can also try an older method of painting on
Mod Podge, which will dry clear and give a good
effect. I have found that the Mod Podge can
shrink a little, so beware.
No matter how you choose to model the creeks
and rivers on your battlefields, no tabletop is
complete without some type of waterway (with
few exceptions). The tactical effect of a waterway
can be significant and should not be overlooked.
Try some of these optional rules and see what
you think.
1
Gragg, Rod. 2000 HarperCollins, “Covered
With Glory – The 26th North Carolina Infantry at
the Battle of Gettysburg” pg. 117.
2
Bearss, Edwin Cole, 1986 Morningside, “The
Vicksburg Campaign – Grant Strikes a Fatal
Blow”, pg. 493.
www:battlefieldterrain
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Steven Hofner (Order #35311104)