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Terrorist Attacks, Mumbai, India
Terrorist Attacks, Mumbai, India
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Date:
November 26, 2008 - November
29, 2008
Location:
Mumbai •
India
Participants:
Lashkar-e-Taiba
Key People:
Yousaf Raza Gilani •
Pranab Mukherjee
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By the time the standoff ended at the Nariman House on the evening of November 28,
six hostages as well as two gunmen had been killed. At the two hotels, dozens of guests
and staff were either trapped by gunfire or held hostage. Indian security forces ended
the siege at the Oberoi Trident around midday on November 28 and at the Taj Mahal
Palace on the morning of the following day. In all, at least 174 people, including 20
security force personnel and 26 foreign nationals, were killed. More than 300 people
were injured. Nine of the 10 terrorists were killed, and one was arrested.
The attackers
Amid speculation regarding the identity of the terrorists, an unknown group calling
itself Mujahideen Hyderabad Deccan claimed responsibility for the attacks in an e-
mail; however, the e-mail was later traced to a computer in Pakistan, and it became
obvious that no such group existed. The way the terrorists had reportedly singled out
Western foreigners at both of the luxury hotels and at the Nariman House led some to
believe that the Islamic militant group al-Qaeda was possibly involved, but this
appeared not to be the case after the lone arrested terrorist, Ajmal Amir Kasab,
provided substantial information regarding the planning and execution of the attacks.
Kasab, a native of Pakistan’s Punjab province, told investigators that the 10 terrorists
underwent prolonged guerrilla-warfare training in the camps of Lashkar-e-Taiba. He
further revealed that the team of terrorists had spent time at the headquarters of a
second and related organization, Jamaat-ud-Dawa, in the city of Muridke before
traveling from Punjab to the port city of Karachi and setting out for Mumbai by sea.
After first traveling aboard a Pakistani-flagged cargo ship, the gunmen hijacked an
Indian fishing boat and killed its crew; then, once they were near the Mumbai coast,
they used inflatable dinghies to reach Badhwar Park and the Sassoon Docks, near the
city’s Gateway of India monument. At that point the terrorists split into small teams
and set out for their respective targets. Kasab—who was charged with various crimes,
including murder and waging war—later retracted his confession. In April 2009 his
trial began, but it experienced several delays, including a stoppage as officials verified
that Kasab was older than age 18 and thus could not be tried in a juvenile court.
Although he pled guilty in July, the trial continued, and in December he recanted,
proclaiming his innocence. In May 2010 Kasab was found guilty and sentenced to
death; he was executed two years later. In June 2012 Delhi police arrested Sayed
Zabiuddin Ansari (or Syed Zabiuddin), who was suspected of being one of those who
trained the terrorists and guided them during the attacks. In addition, David C.
Headley, a Pakistani American, pleaded guilty in 2011 to helping the terrorists plan the
attacks, and in January 2013 he was sentenced in a U.S. federal court to 35 years in
prison.
Connections to Pakistan
With evidence pointing to the attacks’ having originated within Pakistan’s territory,
India on November 28, 2008, requested the presence of Lieut. Gen. Ahmed Shuja
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Pasha, director general of Pakistan’s intelligence agency, as its investigation process got
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Pakistan at first agreed to this request but subsequently backpedaled,
account.
offering to send to India a representative for the director general instead of Pasha
hi lf Th i di t i t f th tt k f lt th i
himself. The immediate impact of the attacks was felt on the ongoing peace process
between the two countries. Alleging inaction by Pakistani authorities on terrorist
elements, Pranab Mukherjee, India’s external affairs minister, stated, “If they don’t act,
then it will not be business as usual.” India later canceled its cricket team’s tour of
Pakistan that had been scheduled for January–February 2009.
India’s attempt at pressuring Pakistan to crack down on terrorists within its borders
was strongly supported by the international community. U.S. Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice and British Prime Minister Gordon Brown toured both India and
Pakistan following the attacks in Mumbai. In a flurry of diplomatic activity that was
essentially viewed as an exercise in “conflict prevention,” U.S. officials and others urged
Pakistan’s civilian government to take action against those suspected of involvement in
the attacks. There were concerns that tensions might escalate between the two nuclear-
armed neighbours. India, however, refrained from amassing troops at the Pakistan
border as it had following the December 13, 2001, attack on India’s parliament, which
had also been carried out by Pakistan-based militants. Instead, India focused on
building international public support through various diplomatic channels and through
the media. India made a plea to the UN Security Council for sanctions against Jamaat-
ud-Dawa, contending that the group was a front organization for Lashkar-e-Taiba,
which had been banned by Pakistan in 2002. Acceding to India’s request, the Security
Council imposed sanctions on Jamaat-ud-Dawa on December 11, 2008, and formally
declared the group a terrorist organization.
Reaction in India
The terrorist attacks in Mumbai exposed loopholes in the security system that India
had in place to deal with this “new brand” of terrorism—urban warfare characterized by
symbolic attacks, multiple targets, and high casualties. Subsequent reports indicated
that several intelligence warnings by Indian as well as U.S. sources had preceded the
attacks but that authorities, citing the lack of “actionable intelligence,” had ignored
them. Moreover, there was an inordinate delay in the deployment of India’s elite
National Security Guards, whose commandos reached the besieged hotels some 10
hours after the first shootings took place on November 26. The lack of coordination
between authorities in the Indian capital of New Delhi and officials in Maharashtra
state also weakened the immediate crisis response. India’s interior minister, Shivraj
close Patil,
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public widely criticized in the aftermath of the attacks, tendered his resignation
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on November 30, 2008, declaring that he took “moral responsibility” for the assault.
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The November attacks prompted the Indian government to introduce important new
institutions as well as legal mechanisms to fight terrorism. On December 17, 2008, the
Indian parliament consented to the creation of the National Investigation Agency, a
federal counterterrorism group whose functions would be similar to many of those of
the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Parliament also approved amendments to the
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act that incorporated stringent mechanisms to
contain and investigate terrorism. Although myriad comparisons were made between
the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States and those that occurred in
Mumbai, the latter outbreak of terrorism was of a much more-limited scale, in terms of
both casualties and financial implications. The Mumbai attacks did, however, evoke a
similarly strong national and international outcry against such violence and renewed
calls to increase efforts to deal with the menace of terrorism.