LEGAL

ETHICS
J. Leonen Case Digests

UST FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW

 LEGAL ETHICS
(J. Leonen Case Digests November 2012 – December 2019)

Prepared by:
2020 UST GOLDEN NOTES
DEAN’S CIRCLE 2020
UST LAW REVIEW VOL. 65

ATTY. LEAN JEFF M. MAGSOMBOL

Adviser

ATTY. NILO T. DIVINA

Dean, UST Faculty of Civil Law
 SYLLABUS FOR THE
2020 BAR EXAMINATIONS

LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS

& PRACTICAL EXERCISES

I. LEGAL ETHICS

A. PRACTICE OF LAW
1. Concept
a. Privilege
b. Profession, not business
2. Qualifications
3. Continuing requirements for membership in the bar
a. Good moral character

ELADIO D. PERFECTO v. JUDGE ALMA CONSUELO D. ESIDERA

A.M No. RTJ-15-241, July 22, 2015, Second Division (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Lawyers are not and should not be expected to be saints. What they do as citizens of their faiths
are beyond this court’s power to judge. Lawyers, however, are officers of court. They are expected to
care about and sustain the law. This court’s jurisdiction over their actions is limited to their acts that
may affect public confidence in the Rule of Law.

FACTS

On July 15, 2010, petitioner Perfecto filed an administrative complaint against respondent
Judge Esidera for falsification of public document and dishonesty. Perfecto alleged that Judge Esidera
was first married to Richard Tepace on May 7, 1987 at the MeTC of Manila.

Based on her certification of marriage records, Judge Esidera married Renato Esidera on June
3, 1992. On October 3, 1990, Judge Esidera gave birth to a daughter with Renato Esidera. Her
marriage to Richard Tepace was later declared void on January 27, 1992.

Perfecto further alleged that Judge Esidera falsified her daughter’s birth certificate to make it
appear that she and Renato Esidera were married on March 18, 1990 and that their daughter was a
legitimate child. Perfecto prays for judge Esidera’s dismissal from office for her alleged dishonesty.

On the question of integrity, honesty and morality, Judge Esidera argued that everything she
did was legal and in accordance with her religious beliefs. She was, indeed, married to her second
husband on March 18, 1990, but only under recognized Catholic rites. The priest who officiated their
marriage had no authority to solemnized marriages under the civil law. She said that couples who
are civilly married are considered living in the state of sin and may be ex-communicated. They cannot
receive the sacraments. Thus, her marriage to Richard was not recognized by the catholic church.
 On September 29, 2014, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended that Judge
Esidera be found guilty of disgraceful, immoral, or dishonest conduct and that she be suspended from
judicial service for 15 days with the warning that a repetition of s similar offense would be dealt with
more severely.

The Office of the Court Administrator found that Judge Esidera condoned the
misrepresentation onher child’s birth certificate. It also found that Judge Esidera engaged in an “illicit
affair” and contracted a second marriage while another marriage subsisted. She contracted the
second marriage knowing that there were legal impediments to tat marriage. Judge Esidera “did not
comport herself according to her Roman Catholic faith.”

ISSUE

Is respondent judge guilty of immoral conduct based on, among others, her alleged affair and
her failure to comport herself according to the Roman Catholic faith.

RULING

This court may not sit as judge of what is moral according to a particular religion. We do not
have jurisdiction over and is not the proper authority to determine which conduct contradicts
religious doctrine. We have jurisdiction over matters of morality only insofar as it involves conduct
that affects the public or its interest.

Thus, for purposes of determining administrative liability of lawyers and judges, “immoral
conduct” should relate to their conduct as officers of the court. To be guilty of “immorality” under the
Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer’s conduct must be so depraved as to reduce the public’s
confidence in the Rule of Law. Religious morality is not binding whenever this court decides the
administrative liability of lawyers and persons under this court’s supervision. At best, religious
morality weighs only persuasively on us.

Therefore, we cannot properly conclude that respondent judge’s acts of contracting a second
marriage during the subsistence of her alleged first marriage and having an alleged “illicit” affair are
“immoral” based on her Catholic faith. This court is not a judge of religious morality.

While we do not find respondent judge administratively liable for immorality, we can
determine if she is administratively liable for possible misconduct. The Code of Professional
Responsibility directs lawyers to obey the laws and promote respect for the law.

We cannot conclude that, for purposes of determining administrative liability, respondent

judge disobeyed the law against bigamy when she and her second husband conducted a marriage
ceremony on March 18, 1990.

Respondent judge claimed that this marriage was merely a sacramental marriage entered
into only to comply with the requirements of their religious beliefs. It was valid only under the Roman
Catholic Church but has no legal effect.

Respondent judge’s act of participating in the marriage ceremony as governed only by the
rules of her religion is not inconsistent with our law against bigamy. What the law prohibits is not
second marriage during a subsisting marriage per se. What the law prohibits is a second marriage
that would have been valid had it not been for the subsisting marriage. Under our law, respondent
judge’s marriage in 1990 was invalid because of the solemnizing officer’s lack of authority.
 The lack of authority of the officer that solemnized respondent judge’s marriage in 1990
renders such marriage invalid. It is not recognized in our law. Hence, no second marriage can be
imputed against respondent judge while her first marriage subsisted.

However, respondent judge may have disobeyed the law, particularly Article 350 of the
Revised Penal Code, which prohibits knowingly contracting marriages against the provisions of laws.

We find that there is no compelling state interest that may limit respondent judge’s right to
participate in religious and merely ceremonial acts that are non-violative of other people’s rights and
with no legally binding effect. The institution of marriage is not threatened when we accommodate
respondent judge’s freedom to participate in such ceremonies even if they have secular counterparts
under our laws.

However, benevolent neutrality and claims of religious freedom cannot shield respondent
judge from liability for misconduct under our laws. Respondent judge knowingly entered into a civil
marriage with her first husband. She knew its effects under our laws. She had sexual relations with
her second husband while her first marriage was subsisting.

Respondent judge cannot claim that engaging in sexual relations with another person during
the subsistence of a marriage is an exercise of her religious expression. Legal implications and
obligations attach to any person who chooses to enter civil marriages. This is regardless of how civil
marriages are treated in that person’s religion.

Moreover, respondent judge, as a lawyer and even more so as a judge, is expected to abide by
the law. Her conduct affects the credibility of the courts in dispensing justice. Thus, in finding
respondent judge administratively liable for a violation of her marriage obligations under our laws,
this court protects the credibility of the judiciary in administering justice.

Lawyers are not and should not be expected to be saints. What they do as citizens of their faiths are
beyond this court’s power to judge. Lawyers, however, are officers of court. They are expected to
care about and sustain the law. This court’s jurisdiction over their actions is limited to their acts
that may affect public confidence in the Rule of Law. Our state has secular interests to protect. This
court cannot be expected to condone misconduct done knowingly on account of religious freedom
or expression.

b.Citizenship; reacquisition of the privilege to practice law in the

Philippines
4. Appearance of non-lawyers
a. Law student practice
b. Non-lawyers in courts
c. Non-lawyers in administrative tribunals and labor tribunals
d. Proceedings where lawyers are prohibited from appearing
5. Sanctions for practice or appearance without authority
a. Lawyers without authority
b. Persons not lawyers
6. Public officials and practice of law

AMADEL C. ABOS v. SALVADOR A. BORROMEO IV

 A.M. No. P-15-3347, July 29, 2015, Second Division (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

As a Clerk III, and thus being a public servant, he is bound by the Constitution and Republic Act
No. 6713 to exhibit the highest degree of professionalism not only in his official duties but also in his
personal endeavors. As a court employee, he is expected to uphold the image of the judiciary not only
within the confines of the Hall of Justice but also in his personal dealings with the public.

FACTS

Amadel C. Abos filed a Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Pagdedemanda before the Office of the Court
Administrator alleging that Abos was the daughter of Letecia Cadut Abos, the shared tenant of an
eight-hectare agricultural land in Barangay Rumbang, Rizal, Occidental Mindoro. The property was
previously owned by Rafael Mondofiedo and was allegedly entrusted to Abos' grandfather, Vicente
Cadut, Sr., and was under the tenancy of her mother, Letecia Cadut Abos, and sister, Jocelyn.

When the ownership of the property was transferred to Rafael Mondofiedo's stepdaughter,
Elsa Aguirre, she allegedly refused to recognize Abos or the members of her family as tenants of the
land.

Abos alleged that Salvador A. Borromeo IV, Clerk III, Branch 45, Regional Trial Court of San
Jose, Occidental Mindoro, together with a member of the Philippine Army known only as "July," and
one Elvie Magbanua, arrived in the property and uprooted 150 coconut seedlings. She also alleged
that July threatened to kill her and her family if they did not leave the property.

ISSUE

Should Borromeo be disciplined.

RULING

YES. "Public service is a public trust.” In line with the constitutional mandate for
accountability in public servants, Republic Act No. 6713, or the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees, was enacted "to promote a high standard of ethics in
public service." Section 4(A) of the law outlines the norm of conduct expected of public officials and
employees, namely, commitment to public interest, professionalism, justness and sincerity, political
neutrality, responsiveness to the public, nationalism and patriotism, commitment to democracy, and
simple living. Any violation of these norms of conduct holds the offender liable for conduct
unbecoming a public officer and is punishable by the penalties provided for under Section 11 (a) of
the law.

Here, Borromeo admitted to uprooting Abos' coconut seedlings. He argues that even
assuming that he did utter threats to Abos, he only did so in order to assert his family's rights over
the disputed property. Borromeo as Clerk III of Branch 45, Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro violated this public stewardship. He violated the public's trust.

While Borromeo's acts are not connected to his official functions as a Clerk III of the Regional
Trial Court of San Jose, he is, first and foremost, a public servant. As a public servant, he is bound by
the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6713 to exhibit the highest degree of professionalism not only
in his official duties but also in his personal endeavors. As a court employee, he is expected to uphold
the image of the judiciary not only within the confines of the Hall of Justice but also in his personal
dealings with the public.

a. Prohibition or disqualification of former government attorneys

7. Lawyers authorized to represent the government
8. Lawyer's oath

B. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER

1. Society
a. Respect for law and legal processes

TERESITA B. ENRIQUEZ v. ATTY. TRINA DE VERA

A.C. No. 8330, March 16, 2015, Second Division (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Membership in the bar requires a high degree of fidelity to the laws whether in a private or
professional capacity. Any transgression of this duty on his part would not only diminish his reputation
as a lawyer but would also erode the public’s faith in the Legal Profession as a whole. A lawyer may be
removed or otherwise disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for
gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, which showed him to be unfit for the office
and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer to him.

FACTS

Petitioner Enriquez filed a disbarment or suspension complaint against respondent Atty. De

Vera for the issuance of worthless checks and non-payment of a loan.

Sometime in April 2006, Atty. De Vera borrowed P500,000.00 from Teresita with interest of
P20,000.00 per month until fully paid. However, Teresita did not have the full amount. Atty. De Vera
persuaded her to borrow the amount from a common friend, MaryJane D. Luzon (Mary Jane), by
mortgaging her property located in Lucena City. Atty. De Vera issued Check No. 310571 post-dated
July 31, 2006 for P500,000.00. Atty. De Vera also issued at least two more checks to cover the interest
agreed upon.

Teresita alleges that in June 2006, Atty. De Vera obtained another loan from Teresita’s sister
in the amount of P100,000.00. Teresita guaranteed the loan. Atty.De Vera issued Bank Check No.
317689 post-dated July 14, 2006 for P100,000.00 to Teresita. Teresita claimed that she paid her
sister the amount borrowed by Atty. De Vera.

Upon maturity of the checks, Teresita presented the checks for payment. However, the checks
bounced for being drawn against insufficient funds. Teresita attempted to encash the checks for a
second time. However, the checks were dishonored because the account was closed.

Teresita demanded payment from Atty. De Vera. However, she failed to settle her obligations,
prompting Teresita to file complaints against Atty. De Vera for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
and estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code
 In her administrative complaint, Teresita prays that Atty. De Vera be disbarred or suspended
for violation of her oath under Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE

Did Atty. De Vera committed serious misconduct and should be held administratively liable
for the issuance and dishonor of worthless checks in violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

RULING

YES. This court has ruled that the lawyer's act of issuing worthless checks, punishable under
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, constitutes serious misconduct.

We recently reiterated the purpose and nature of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in relation to an
administrative case against a member of the bar:

Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 has been enacted in order to safeguard the interest of the banking
system and the legitimate public checking account users. The gravamen of the offense defined and
punished by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check, or any check
that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment and putting it in circulation; the law is designed
to prohibit and altogether eliminate the deleterious and pernicious practice of issuing checks with
insufficient funds, or with no credit, because the practice is deemed a public nuisance, a crime against
public order to be abated.

Being a lawyer, was well aware of the objectives and coverage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. If
he did not, he was nonetheless presumed to know them, for the law was penal in character and
application. His issuance of the unfunded check involved herein knowingly violated Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22, and exhibited his indifference towards the pernicious effect of his illegal act to public interest
and public order. He thereby swept aside his Lawyer’s Oath that enjoined him to support the
Constitution and obey the laws.

A lawyer is required to observe the law and be mindful of his or her actions whether acting in
a public or private capacity. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON 1 -

A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 -

A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 -

A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY- AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

Rule 7.03 -
A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.

ALFRED LEHNERT v. ATTY. DENNIS L. DIÑO

A.C. No. 12174, August 28, 2018, En Banc (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct and violates Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which mandates all members of the bar "to obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law."

FACTS

Complainant filed an administrative complaint against the respondent and prayed that the
respondent be permanently disbarred for violating the lawyer's oath, as well as the Code of
Professional Responsibility, when he committed two (2) violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.

In his Complaint, Complainant claimed that a Warrant of Arrest was issued for the
respondent’s arrest. Members of the Philippine National Police and National Bureau of Investigation
attempted to serve the warrant. However, despite their exhaustive efforts, they were unable to locate
him at his residential addresses, or even at his office address. Thus, considering that respondent was
hiding to evade arrest, Complainant prayed for his immediate disbarment.

ISSUE

Is the respondent guilty of violating the lawyer’s oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he issued post-dated checks, which were subsequently dishonored?

RULING

YES. A lawyer's payment of financial obligations is part of his duties.

Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the
courts and to their clients. As part of those duties, they must promptly pay their financial obligations.
Their conduct must always reflect the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility. On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend
lawyers for any professional or private misconduct showing them to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity and good demeanor — or to be unworthy to continue as officers of the Court.

The Court continues to state that the issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross
misconduct and violates Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates all
members of the bar "to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law." Issuance of worthless
checks also violates Rule 1.01 of the Code, which mandates that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."

Thus, the Court has imposed the penalty of one (1)-year suspension from the practice of law
for a cavalier attitude toward incurring debts. The Court has imposed a higher penalty of two (2)-
year suspension on a lawyer who issued worthless checks and also disregarded the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines' orders in administrative proceedings.

b. Efficient and convenient legal services

c. True, honest, fair, dignified, and objective information on legal
services

DAVID YU KIMTENG v. ATTY. WALTER YOUNG

G.R. No. 210554, August 5, 2015, Second Division (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

A disbarred lawyer's name cannot be part of a firm's name. A lawyer who appears under a firm
name that contains a disbarred lawyer's name commits indirect contempt of court. From the time
respondent Revilla was disbarred in 2009, it appears that no efforts were exerted to remove his name
from the firm name. Thus, respondents Atty. Young and Atty. Magat are held liable for contempt of court.

FACTS

The petitioners are the majority stockholders of Ruby Industrial Corporation. In Majority
Stockholders of Ruby Industrial Corporation v. Lim, the court ordered the liquidation of the said
Corporation. Private respondents Walter T. Young, Jovito Gambol, and Dan Reynald Magat are
lawyers practicing under the firm, Young Revilla Gambol & Magat. They appear as counsels for the
liquidator.

An Opposition was filed against the appearance of Young Revilla Gambol & Magat on the
ground that Revilla was already disbarred in 2009. The firm filed a Reply to the Opposition stating
that the firm opted to retain Revilla’s name in the firm name even after he had been disbarred, with
the retention serving as an act of charity.

Judge Calo overruled the opposition and stated that Atty. Young could still appear for the
liquidator as long as his appearance was under the Young Law Firm and not under Young Revilla
Gambol & Magat. Thus, petitioners filed this Petition under Rule 71 to cite respondents Atty. Walter
T. Young, Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr., Atty. Jovito Gambol, Atty. Dan Reynald R. Magat, and Judge Ofelia L.
Calo in contempt.

ISSUE

Is the continued use of respondent Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr.’s name in their firm name even
after his disbarment constitute contempt of court?

RULING

YES. Maintaining a disbarred lawyer’s name in the firm name is different from using a
deceased partner’s name in the firm name. Canon 3, Rule 3.02 allows the use of a deceased partner’s
name as long as there is an indication that the partner is deceased. This ensures that the public is not
misled. On the other hand, the retention of a disbarred lawyer’s name in the firm name may mislead
the public into believing that the lawyer is still authorized to practice law.
 The use of a deceased partner’s name in a law firm’s name was allowed upon the effectivity
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, with the requirement that “the firm indicates in all its
communications that said partner is deceased.” On the other hand, this court has ruled that the use
of the name of a person who is not authorized to practice law constitutes contempt of court. From
the time respondent Revilla was disbarred in 2009, it appears that no efforts were exerted to remove
his name from the firm name. Thus, respondents Atty. Young and Atty. Magat are held liable for
contempt of court.

d.Participation in the improvements and reforms in the legal

system
e. Participation in legal education program
f. Lawyers in government service discharging their tasks
2. The legal profession
a. Integrated Bar of the Philippines
b. Membership and dues
c. Upholding the dignity and integrity of the profession
d. Courtesy, fairness, and candor towards professional colleagues
e. No assistance in unauthorized practice of law
3. The courts
a. Candor, fairness, and good faith towards the courts
b. Respect for courts and judicial officers
c. Assistance in the speedy and efficient administration of justice
d. Reliance on merits of case, not on impropriety tending to
influence the courts
4. The clients
a. Availability of service without discrimination
i. Services regardless of person's status
ii. Services as counsel de oficio
iii. Valid grounds for refusal
b. Candor, fairness, and loyalty to clients
i. Confidentiality rule
ii. Privileged communication
iii. Conflict of interest

ROBERTO BERNARDINO v. ATTY. VICTOR REY SANTOS

ATTY. JOSE MANGASER CARINGAL v. ATTY. VICTOR REY SANTOS

A.C. NO. 10583 & A.C. NO. 10584, February 18, 2015, Second Division (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The rule on conflict of interest is based on the fiduciary obligation in a lawyer-client relationship.
Lawyers must treat all information received from their clients with utmost confidentiality in order to
encourage clients to fully inform their counsels of the facts of their case

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is “whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an
issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this
argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client.” This rule covers not only cases
in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has
been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer
will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in
which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his
first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of
interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of
his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double
dealing in the performance thereof.

FACTS

These cases involve administrative Complaints against Atty. Victor Rey Santos for violation of
Canon 10, Rule 10.01 and Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In A.C. No. 10583, complainant Roberto C. Bernardino (Bernardino) filed a Letter-Complaint

against Atty. Victor Rey Santos (Atty. Santos) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, praying
that Atty. Santos be investigated and subjected to disciplinary action. Bernardino alleged that the
death certificate of his aunt, Rufina de Castro Turla, was falsified by Atty. Santos. Atty. Santos made
it appear that Rufina Turla died in 1992, when in fact, she died in 1990. Atty. Santos used the falsified
death certificate to support the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Mariano Turla, husband of
Rufina Turla. Paragraph 6 of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication prepared by Atty. Santos states:

Being her surviving spouse, I am the sole legal heir entitled to succeed to and inherit the estate
of said deceased who did not leave any descendant or any other heir entitled to her estate.

Years later, Atty. Santos, on behalf of Marilu Turla, daughter of Rufina and Mariano Turla, filed a
Complaint for sum of money with prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and temporary
restraining order against Bernardino alleging that Marilu Turla is an heir of Mariano Turla, which
allegedly contradicts the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication that Atty. Santos drafted. Hence, Atty. Santos
represented clients with conflicting interests.

Another Complaint was filed against Atty. Santos by Atty. Jose Mangaser Caringal (Atty.
Caringal). This was docketed as A.C. No. 10584. Similar to Bernardino’s Complaint, Atty. Caringal
alleged that Atty. Santos represented clients with conflicting interests. He also alleged that in
representing Marilu Turla, Atty. Santos would necessarily go against the claims of Mariano Turla.
Also, in representing Marilu Turla, Atty. Santos was allegedly violating the so-called “Dead Man’s
Statute” because “he would be utilizing information or matters of fact occurring before the death of
his deceased client. Similarly, he would be unscrupulously utilizing information acquired during his
professional relation with his said client that would constitute a breach of trust or of privileged
communication.”

Atty. Caringal further alleged that Atty. Santos violated Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he filed several cases against the other claimants of Mariano Turla’s estate. In
other words, he engaged in forum shopping. In addition, Atty. Santos allegedly violated Canon 10,
Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he drafted Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of
Self-Adjudication. The Affidavit states that Mariano Turla is the sole heir of Rufina Turla, but Atty.
Santos knew this to be false. Atty. Santos’ wife, Lynn Batac, is Mariano Turla’s niece. As part of the
family, Atty. Santos knew that Rufina Turla had other heirs.
 Atty. Caringal argued that Atty. Santos was bound by the statement in Mariano Turla’s
affidavit that Rufina Turla had no other heir. Moreover, Atty. Santos allegedly converted funds
belonging to the heirs of Mariano Turla for his own benefit. The funds involved were rental income
from Mariano Turla’s properties that were supposed to be distributed to the heirs. Instead, Atty.
Santos received the rental income. Lastly, Atty. Caringal alleged that Atty. Santos cited the repealed
Article 262 of the Civil Code in his arguments.

In his Answer, Atty. Santos denied having falsified the death certificate. He explained that the
death certificate and the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication were given to him by Mariano Turla and that
he was not aware that there was a falsified entry in the death certificate. As regards the issue on
conflict of interest, Atty. Santos argued that he did not represent and was not representing conflicting
interests since Mariano Turla was already dead. Further, “he was representing Marilu Turla against
those who had an interest in her father’s estate.” Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Self-Adjudication never
stated that there was no other legal heir but only “that Mariano Turla was the sole heir of Rufina
Turla.”

Regarding the allegations of Atty. Caringal, Atty. Santos insisted that he did not commit forum
shopping because the various cases filed had different issues. As to the conversion of funds, Atty.
Santos explained that the funds used were being held by his client as the special administratrix of the
estate of Mariano Turla. According to Atty. Santos, payment of attorney’s fees out of the estate’s funds
could be considered as “expenses of administration.” Also, payment of Atty. Santos’ legal services was
a matter which Atty. Caringal had no standing to question. On the allegation that Atty. Santos cited a
repealed provision of law, he discussed that Article 262 of the Civil Code is applicable because it was
in force when Marilu Turla’s birth certificate was registered.

The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines recommended that
Atty. Santos be suspended for three (3) months. It found that Bernardino failed to prove his allegation
that Atty. Santos knew that the death certificate was falsified and used it to support Mariano Turla’s
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. Likewise, Atty. Caringal failed to prove that Atty. Santos converted
funds from Mariano Turla’s estate. With regard to the citation of a repealed provision, the
Commission on Bar Discipline stated that the evidence presented did not prove that Atty. Santos
“knowingly cited a repealed law.” Further, Atty. Santos did not engage in forum shopping. The
various cases filed involved different parties and prayed for different reliefs. However, the
Commission on Bar Discipline agreed with Bernardino and Atty. Caringal that Atty. Santos
represented clients with conflicting interests.

In the Resolution dated May 10, 2013, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines adopted and approved the findings and recommendations of the Commission on Bar
Discipline. Atty. Santos filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, which was denied by the IBP Board
of Governors in the Resolution dated March 22, 2014.

ISSUES:

1. Did Atty. Santos violated the Code of Professional Responsibility

2. Does the Integrated Bar of the Philippines have the authority to impose sanctions on lawyers

RULING
1. YES. Atty. Victor Rey Santos is liable for violation of Canon 10, Rule 10.01 and Canon 15, Rule 15.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

CANON 15 — A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his client.

Rule 15.03 — A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

The rule on conflict of interest is based on the fiduciary obligation in a lawyer-client

relationship. Lawyers must treat all information received from their clients with utmost
confidentiality in order to encourage clients to fully inform their counsels of the facts of their case.

In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat, this court explained what conflict of interest means:

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or

more opposing parties. The test is “whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s
duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In
brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for
the other client.” This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications
have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will
be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will
require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any
matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new
relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection.
Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new
relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity
and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the
performance thereof.

Applying the test to determine whether conflict of interest exists, respondent would
necessarily refute Mariano Turla’s claim that he is Rufina Turla’s sole heir when he agreed to
represent Marilu Turla. Worse, he knew that Mariano Turla was not the only heir.

However, Rule 15.03 provides for an exception, specifically, “by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.” Respondent had the duty to inform Mariano Turla
and Marilu Turla that there is a conflict of interest and to obtain their written consent. Mariano Turla
died on February 5, 2009, while respondent represented Marilu Turla in March 2009. It is
understandable why respondent was unable to obtain Mariano Turla’s consent. Still, respondent did
not present evidence showing that he disclosed to Marilu Turla that he previously represented
Mariano Turla and assisted him in executing the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. Thus, the allegation
of conflict of interest against respondent was sufficiently proven.

Likewise, we accept and adopt the IBP Board of Governors’ finding that respondent
violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states:
 CANON 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be mislead by any artifice.

In the Report, the Commission on Bar Discipline explained:

Corollary to the foregoing, the Commission by virtue of the doctrine res ipsa loquitor
finds that the respondent’s act of failing to thwart his client Mariano Turla from filing
the Affidavit of Adjudication despite . . . his knowledge of the existence of Marilu Turla
as a possible heir to the estate of Rufina Turla, the respondent failed to uphold his
obligation as a member of the bar to be the stewards of justice and protectors of what
is just, legal and proper. Thus in failing to do his duty and acting dishonestly[,] not
only was he in contravention of the Lawyer’s Oath but was also in violation of Canon
10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

As officers of the court, lawyers have the duty to uphold the rule of law. In doing so,
lawyers are expected to be honest in all their dealings. Unfortunately, respondent was far from being
honest. With full knowledge that Rufina Turla had another heir, he acceded to Mariano Turla’s
request to prepare the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication.

2. NO. This court notes that the wording of the IBP Board of Governors’ Resolutions dated May 10,
2013 and March 22, 2014 seems to imply that it is the Integrated Bar of the Philippines that has the
authority to impose sanctions on lawyers. This is wrong.

The authority to discipline members of the Bar is vested in this Court, and not the IBP, under the
1987 Constitution: ARTICLE VIII. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional

rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of
law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.

Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan elucidated on this court’s “plenary disciplinary authority over

attorneys” and discussed referring to the authority of the Supreme Court to discipline officers of the
court and members of the court and members of the Bar. The Supreme Court, as regular and guardian
of the legal profession, has plenary disciplinary authority over attorneys. The authority to discipline
lawyers stems from the Court’s constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the practice of law,
which includes as well authority to regulate the practice itself of law. Quite apart from this
constitutional mandate, the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court over members of the Bar is
an inherent power incidental to the proper administration of justice and essential to an orderly
discharge of judicial functions. The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is but
corollary to the Court’s exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A lawyer is not merely a professional
but also an officer of the court and as such, he is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of
dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society.

This court’s authority is restated under Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, specifically:

RULE 138. Attorneys and Admission to Bar

 SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds
therefor.—A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct
in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney for
a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.

In Ramirez v. Buhayang-Margallo, this court emphasized the authority of this court to

impose disciplinary action on those admitted to the practice of law. Parenthetically, it is this court
that has the constitutionally mandated duty to discipline lawyers. Under the current rules, the duty
to assist fact finding can be delegated to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The findings of the
Integrated Bar, however, can only be recommendatory, consistent with the constitutional powers of
this court. Its recommended penalties are also, by its nature, recommendatory.

The authority given to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is based on Rule 139-B,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which provides that “proceedings for the disbarment, suspension or
discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines . . . upon the verified complaint of any person.” However, this authority is only to
assist this court with the investigation of the case, to determine factual findings, and to recommend,
at best, the penalty that may be imposed on the erring lawyer. We reiterate the discussion in Tenoso
v. Atty. Echanez:

Time and again, this Court emphasizes that the practice of law is imbued with public
interest and that “a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his
brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the
most important functions of the State—the administration of justice—as an officer of
the court.” Accordingly, “ lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of
legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing.”

Only this court can impose sanctions on members of the Bar. This disciplinary authority
is granted by the Constitution and cannot be relinquished by this court. The Resolutions of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines are, at best, recommendatory, and its findings and
recommendations should not be equated with Decisions and Resolutions rendered by this court.

TERESITA P. FAJARDO v. ATTY. NICANOR C. ALVAREZ

A.C. No. 9018, April 20, 2016, Second Division (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Government officials or employees are prohibited from engaging in private practice of their
profession unless authorized by their department heads. More importantly, if authorized, the practice
of profession must not conflict nor tend to conflict with the official functions of the government official
or employee.
 In this case, respondent was given written permission by the Head of the National Center for
Mental Health. However, by assisting and representing complainant in a suit against the Ombudsman
and against government in general, respondent put himself in a situation of conflict of interest.
Respondent's practice of profession was expressly and impliedly conditioned on the requirement that
his practice will not be "in conflict with the interest of the Center and the Philippine government as a
whole.”

FACTS

Complainant Teresita P. Fajardo was the Municipal Treasurer of San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija.
She hired respondent Atty. Nicanor C. Alvarez to defend her in criminal and administrative cases
before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Alvarez was then working in the Legal Section of the
National Center for Mental Health. He asked for P1,400,000.00 as acceptance fee. However, Atty.
Alvarez did not enter his appearance before the Office of the Ombudsman nor sign any pleadings.

Atty. Alvarez assured Teresita that he had friends connected with the Office of the
Ombudsman. He said that he needed to pay the amount of P500,000.00 to his friends and
acquaintances working at the Office of the Ombudsman to have the cases against Teresita dismissed.
However, just two weeks after Teresita and Atty. Alvarez talked, the Office of the Ombudsman issued
a resolution and decision recommending the filing of a criminal complaint against Teresita, and her
dismissal from service, respectively.

Teresita then demanded that Atty. Alvarez return at least a portion of the amount she gave.
Atty. Alvarez promised to return the amount to Teresita however, he failed to fulfill this promise.
Teresita sent a demand letter to Atty. Alvarez, which he failed to heed. As a result, Teresita filed before
the Office of the Bar Confidant a Verified Complaint praying for the disbarment of Atty. Alvarez.

The Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Alvarez guilty of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility and recommended Atty. Alvarez's suspension from practice of law for
one year. He was also ordered to return the amount of P700,000.00 to Teresita with legal interest
from the time of demand until its full payment.

These findings and recommendations were adopted by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Board of Governors. Atty. Alvarez moved for reconsideration of the Resolution, but the Motion was
denied by the Board of Governors. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUES

(1) Is Atty. Alvarez authorized to engage in the private practice of law?

(2) Is the amount charged by respondent for attorney's fees reasonable under the
principle of quantum meruit?

RULING

(1) NO. Under Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees, and Memorandum Circular No. 17, government
officials or employees are prohibited from engaging in private practice of their profession unless
authorized by their department heads. More importantly, if authorized, the practice of profession
must not conflict nor tend to conflict with the official functions of the government official or
employee.
 In this case, respondent was given written permission by the Head of the National Center for
Mental Health. However, by assisting and representing complainant in a suit against the Ombudsman
and against government in general, respondent put himself in a situation of conflict of interest.
Respondent's practice of profession was expressly and impliedly conditioned on the requirement
that his practice will not be "in conflict with the interest of the Center and the Philippine government
as a whole.”

(2) NO. The court did not broaden their ruling on the issue on attorney’s fees in relation to
quantum meruit. It only stated that the Supreme Court is not a collection agency for faltering
debtors and ordered restitution of amounts to complainants due to the erroneous actions of
lawyers. Respondent is, therefore, required to return to complainant the amount of
P500,000.00—the amount that respondent allegedly gave his friends connected with the Office
of the Ombudsman.”

iv. Candid and honest advice to clients

v. Compliance with laws
vi. Concurrent practice with another profession
c. Client's money and properties
i. Fiduciary relationship
ii. Co-mingling of funds
iii. Delivery of funds

JUN B. LUNA v. ATTY. DWIGHT M. GALARRITA

A.C. NO. 10662, July 07, 2015, En Banc (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Those in the legal profession must always conduct themselves with honesty and integrity in all
their dealings. Lawyers should maintain, at all times, "a high standard of legal proficiency, morality,
honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession,
the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility."

Members of the bar took their oath to conduct themselves "according to the best of their
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to their clients," and to "delay no
man for money or malice." These mandates apply especially to dealings of lawyers with their clients
considering the highly fiduciary nature of their relationship. Clients entrust their causes—life, liberty,
and property—to their lawyers, certain that this confidence would not be abused.

FACTS

Jun B. Luna (Luna) filed a disbarment against his lawyer, Atty. Dwight M. Galarrita (Atty.
Galarrita), before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, for his failure to deliver to his client,
complainant Luna, the P100,000.00 settlement proceeds he received after entering into a
Compromise Agreement in the foreclosure case without his client's consent.

Luna alleged that he retained Atty. Galarrita's legal services in filing a foreclosure Complaint
on October 14, 2002 before the RTC of Gumaca, Quezon. The Complaint against one Jose Calvario
(Calvario) alleged that Calvario borrowed P100,000.00 from Luna. This loan was secured by a Deed
of Real Estate Mortgage over a parcel of land in Quezon Province. Due to non-payment of the loan,
Luna filed the Complaint praying for payment of the obligation with interest, and issuance of a
foreclosure decree upon Calvario's failure to fully pay within the period.

The parties tried to amicably settle the case during pre-trial, followed by Luna's presentation
and offer of evidence. Atty. Galarrita opted to enter into a settlement with the other party after his
formal offer of evidence. They submitted the Compromise Agreement before the trial court on
February 14, 2006. It provided that Calvario would pay Luna P105,000.00 as payment for his
mortgaged land and, in turn, Luna would cause the removal of the encumbrance annotation on the
land title. The trial court approved the Compromise Agreement.

Luna alleged that Atty. Galarrita never informed him of this Compromise Agreement, and
did not deliver to him the P100,000.00 settlement proceeds Atty. Galarrita had received. Luna's
Complaint attached a copy of the Counsel's Report dated August 12, 2003 where Atty. Galarrita
proposed and provided justifications for settlement, and waived any compensation for his services
in the case.

In his Verified Answer, Atty. Galarrita prays for the dismissal of the disbarment Complaint. He
argues that he entered the Compromise Agreement by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney that
includes this purpose. He regularly submitted reports to Luna on developments and possible
settlement before he entered the Compromise Agreement. He submits that Luna "'slept' on his
rights."

Atty. Galarrita adds that under their General Retainership Agreement, Luna shall pay him
P4,000.00 monthly. Luna should have paid P48,000.00 as of November 17, 2006, and after four years
with no revocation, termination, or nullification, Luna's unpaid obligation amounted to P208,000.00.
He listed other unpaid amounts for his legal services. Atty. Galarrita, thus, argues for an application
of the rule on retaining lien. Atty. Galarrita also raises the two-year prescription under Rule VIII,
Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar
Discipline. More than four years elapsed since their last communication in 2006 when the
Compromise Agreement became final.

In his December 4, 2010 Report and Recommendation, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. Galarrita violated Rule 16.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and recommended "his suspension from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year."

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors, in its April 15, 2013 Resolution No.
XX-2013-441, adopted and approved with modification the Investigating Commissioner's Report and
Recommendation in that Atty. Galarrita is recommended to be "suspended from the practice of law
for six (6) months and ordered to return the amount of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos
to complainant without prejudice to the filing of a collection case for retainer's fee against
complainant." The Board of Governors denied its reconsideration. The Office of the Bar Confidant
reported that "no motion for reconsideration or petition for review was filed as of November 17,
2014." In any case, it is this court that has the authority to discipline members of the bar.

ISSUE

Is Atty. Galarrita administratively liable for entering into a Compromise Agreement

without his client complainant Luna's consent, then refusing to turn over the settlement proceeds
received.

RULING

YES, Atty. Galarrita is administratively liable. Complainant Luna entrusted respondent Atty.
Galarrita with handling the civil case involving a mortgaged land in Quezon Province. However,
without complainant Luna's consent, respondent Atty. Galarrita settled this case with the other party.

Article 1878 of the Civil Code provides that "special powers of attorney are necessary in
the following cases: . . . (3) To compromise, to submit questions to arbitration, to renounce the right
to appeal from a judgment, to waive objections to the venue of an action or to abandon a prescription
already acquired."

The Rules of Court thus requires lawyers to secure special authority from their clients when
entering into a compromise agreement that dispenses with litigation.

SEC. 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. - Attorneys have authority to bind their
clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing and in taking appeals,
and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without special authority,
compromise their client's litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a client's claim but
the full amount in cash.

Atty. Galarrita contends that he holds a Special Power of Attorney to enter into compromise
agreements, but as found by the Investigating Commissioner, there seems to be a compelling reason
to believe that Complainant had not given any authority for the Complainant to enter into
Compromise Agreement at that precise stage of the trial. Firstly, the Complainant was not made a
party to the Compromise Agreement despite the fact that he was not abroad when the agreement
was executed. Secondly, there was no indication that he had agreed to the amount of P100,000.00 in
exchange for his withdrawal of the complaint. Thirdly, he was not seasonably informed of the
execution of the Compromise Agreement/payment of the P100,000.00 and came to know of the same
only much later.

It would seem, however, that despite the authority given to Respondent, the same SPA cannot
justify Respondent's representation in the Compromise Agreement on February 14, 2006. To dissect,
the SPA was executed on September 16, 2002 or a month before the filing of the Complaint for
Foreclosure of Mortgage. Thus, the conclusion seems to be that the authority given therein to
Respondent to enter into a possible settlement referred only to a possible settlement that could
be secured or firmed up during the preliminary conference or pre-trial of the case. In fact, the
tenor of the SPA indicates that the SPA was precisely executed in order to constitute Respondent as
Complainant's representative during the preliminary conference or pre-trial.

Assuming it can be inferred that the SPA and the authority given to Respondent can be
liberally interpreted and allowed to extend up to the time the Compromise had been executed, still
the Respondent may not have faithfully performed his sworn duty to his client. During the mandatory
conference, it was established that at the time the compromise was executed the Complainant was
not abroad and, therefore, given the current information technology it would have been easy or
convenient for Respondent to have informed his client about it. Admittedly, his failure in this regard
had only given Complainant the reason to cast doubt on his real intention in agreeing to the
compromise agreement for and in his behalf.

It would seem, however, that by Complainant's act of demanding the amount from
Respondent, the former may have already ignored the issue on the lack of authority on his part thus
curing the defect on the latter's authority to enter into the same. Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct." Members of the bar must always conduct themselves in a way that promotes "public
confidence in the integrity of the legal profession."

Worse, respondent Atty. Galarrita not only failed to promptly inform complainant Luna of the
former's receipt of the P100,000.00 settlement proceeds but also refused to turn over the amount to
complainant Luna. This court has held that "any money collected for the client or other trust property
coming into the lawyer's possession should promptly be reported by him or her." (Rule 16.03 under
Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that:

CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come
into his possession.

Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or
upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much
thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice
promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all
judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of
Court.

In several cases, we have disciplined lawyers who failed or refused to remit amounts received
for and on behalf of their clients. "The penalty for violation of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility usually ranges from suspension for six months, to suspension for one year, or two
years, and even disbarment " depending on the circumstances of each case. In this case, respondent
Atty. Galarrita entered into the Compromise Agreement involving complainant Luna's property
without informing him. Even though complainant Luna forewent the lack of authority issue,
respondent Atty. Galarrita still continued to act in bad faith by refusing to turn over the P100,000.00
settlement amount received. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Investigating Commissioner found
that:

On another point, there seems no cogent proof, too, that Respondent had been advised of
Complainant's supposed agreement to Mr. Calvario's payment of P100,000.00. Despite
Respondent's allegations that he had informed Complainant about his so-called counsel's
report, it remains undisputed that the Complainant did not give him any express approval of
the same.

There is enough indicia to conclude that Respondent had committed bad faith in entering into
the Compromise Agreement. From February 2006 to November 2010, or a period of four (4)
years, Respondent failed to turn-over the P100,000.00 he had collected from Mr. Calvario to
Complainant. Worse, he failed to seasonably inform Complainant about the same. He kept the
 money and claimed he had the right to retain the same invoking the counsel's right to a
retaining line sic. He pointed out that Complainant had incurred accrued attorney's fees
which he is bound to pay under the general retainer agreement. Thus, it is not amiss to state
that he entered into the said agreement with the odious motivation to hold on to it and pave
the way for the payment of his attorney's fees. In so doing, he violated the trust reposed in
him by his client and violated Rule 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

As to Respondent's invocation of the lawyer's retaining lien and his retention of the money,
the Court deems the same unlawful. True, the Code of Professional Responsibility allows the lawyer
to apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving
notice promptly thereafter to his client. But this provision assumes that the client agrees with the
lawyer as to the amount of attorney's fees and as to the application of the client's fund to pay his
lawful fees and disbursements, in which case he may deduct what is due him and remit the balance
to his client, with full disclosure on every detail. Without the client's consent, the lawyer has no
authority to apply the client's money for his fees, but he should instead return the money to his
client, without prejudice to his filing a case to recover his unsatisfied fees.

On Respondent's argument that prescription has already set in against Complainant, suffice
it to state that the rules have already been supplanted by a new set of rules which do not anymore
carry the same. Administrative proceedings require only substantial evidence. This court accepts and
adopts the findings of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors, but with modification
increasing the period of suspension from the practice of law to two (2) years considering that
respondent Atty. Galarrita not only compromised litigation without complainant Luna's consent, but
also refused to turn over the settlement proceeds to date.

This court also sustains the order for respondent Atty. Galarrita to return the amount of
P100,000.00 to complainant Luna. In Ronquillo v. Atty. Cezar, the parties entered a Deed of
Assignment after which respondent received P937,500.00 from complainant as partial payment for
the townhouse and lot. However, respondent did not turn over this amount to developer Crown Asia,
and no copy of the Contract to Sell was given to complainant. This court suspended Atty. Cezar from
the practice of law for three (3) years, but did not grant complainant's prayer for the return of the
P937,500.00.

Ronquillo held that "disciplinary proceedings against lawyers do not involve a trial of an
action, but rather investigations by the court into the conduct of one of its officers." Thus, disciplinary
proceedings are limited to a determination of "whether or not the attorney is still fit to be allowed to
continue as a member of the Bar."

Later jurisprudence clarified that this rule excluding civil liability determination from
disciplinary proceedings "remains applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely civil in
nature — for instance, when the claim involves moneys received by the lawyer from his client in a
transaction separate and distinct from and not intrinsically linked to his professional engagement."
This court has thus ordered in administrative proceedings the return of amounts representing legal
fees.

This court has also ordered restitution as concomitant relief in administrative proceedings
when respondent's civil liability was already established. Although the Court renders this decision in
an administrative proceeding primarily to exact the ethical responsibility on a member of the
Philippine Bar, the Court's silence about the respondent lawyer's legal obligation to restitute the
complainant will be both unfair and inequitable. No victim of gross ethical misconduct concerning
the client's funds or property should be required to still litigate in another proceeding what the
administrative proceeding has already established as the respondent's liability. That has been
the reason why the Court has required restitution of the amount involved as a concomitant relief in
the cited cases of Mortem v. Pagatpatan, supra, Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit, supra, Small v. Banares, supra.

Respondent Atty. Galarrita does not deny his receipt of the P100,000.00 but justifies his
refusal to turn over the amount by invoking jurisprudence on retaining lien. The Rules of Court
provides for attorney's retaining lien as follows:

SEC. 37. Attorney's liens. - An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds, documents and
papers of his client which have lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same
until his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the
satisfaction thereof. He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the
payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has
secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have caused a
statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such
judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof to be
delivered to his client and to the adverse party; and he shall have the same right and power
over such judgments and executions as his client would have enforce his lien and secure the
payment of his just fees and disbursements.

First, "lawyers are not entitled to unilaterally appropriate their clients' money for
[themselves] by the mere fact that the clients owe them attorney's fees." They must give prompt
notice to their clients of any receipt of funds for or on behalf of their clients. Rule 16.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility provides for a lawyer's duty to "account for all money or property
collected or received for or from the client." Respondent Atty. Galarrita refused to comply with these
duties, warranting his suspension from the practice of law. Second, the elements required for full
recognition of attorney's lien are: "(1) lawyer-client relationship; (2) lawful possession of the client's
funds, documents and papers; and (3) unsatisfied claim for attorney's fees." Respondent Atty.
Galarrita must prove the existence of all these elements. However, this is not the main issue in this
disbarment case against him, and the validity of his retaining lien defense was not established.
Counter evidence even exists such as respondent Atty. Galarrita's Letter dated August 12, 2003
waiving any compensation for his services in the foreclosure case. Complainant Luna also raises
respondent Atty. Galarrita's negligence in handling the case, and lack of supporting receipts for the
incurred expenses respondent Atty. Galarrita seeks to reimburse.

Nevertheless, we maintain that the disposition of this case is without prejudice to the filing of
a collection case for retainer's fee against complainant Luna.

SPOUSES NICASIO DONELITA SAN PEDRO v. ATTY. ISAGANI A. MENDOZA

A.C. No. 5440, December 10, 2014, Second Division (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

It has been said that “[t]he practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet the high
standards of legal proficiency and morality. Any conduct that shows a violation of the norms and values
of the legal profession exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.”
 When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular purpose (such as for
filing fees, registration fees, transportation and office expenses), he should promptly account to the
client how the money was spent. If he does not use the money for its intended purpose, he must
immediately return it to the client. His failure either to render an accounting or to return the money (if
the intended purpose of the money does not materialize) constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule 16.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

The rule is that when there is a disagreement, or when the client disputes the amount claimed
by the lawyer . . . the lawyer should not arbitrarily apply the funds in his possession to the payment of
his fees.

FACTS

On or about November 21, 1996, complainants engaged the services of respondent to

facilitate the transfer of title to property, in the name of Isabel Azcarraga Marcaida, to complainants.
Complainants then gave respondent a check for P68,250.00 for the payment of transfer taxes. They
also gave respondent a check for P13,800.00 for respondent’s professional fee.

Respondent failed to produce the title despite complainants’ repeated follow-ups. Several
letters were sent by respondent explaining the delay in the transfer of title. However, respondent still
failed to produce the title.

Complainants subsequently referred the case to the barangay. Respondent refused to return
the amount complainants gave for the transfer taxes. Complainants were then issued a certificate to
file action. Complainants were then forced to obtain a loan from Philippine American Life and General
Insurance Company to secure the transfer of the title to the property in their names

Respondent contested the allegations of complainants. According to him, it was complainants

who caused the three-year delay in the transfer of title to complainants’ names. Complainants were
not able to furnish respondent several important documents: (a) original copy of the deed of
extrajudicial petition; (b) affidavit of publication with the clippings of the published item in a
newspaper of general circulation; and (c) a barangay certificate from the barangay where the
property is located as required by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.

In addition, respondent argued that complainants paid him the measly sum of P13,800.00
despite all the work he did for them, including facilitating the sale of the property. Respondent also
claimed that retention of the money is justified owing to his receivables from complainants for the
services he rendered in various cases.

The present administrative case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation. On July 8, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner, Atty.
Salvador B. Hababag, submitted his findings and recommendation. The Investigating Commissioner
found that respondent violated Canon 16, Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

The Investigating Commissioner found that both checks issued to respondent were encashed
despite respondent’s failure to facilitate the release of the title in the name of complainants.
Complainants had to obtain a loan to facilitate the transfer of title in their names. Moreover,
respondent admitted his liability in his letters to complainants. Respondent requested for a formal
hearing, reasoning that he “wants to exercise his right to confront his accusers [to] cross[-]examine
them and that of their witness.” The manifestation and motion was denied by this court in the
resolution dated September 22, 2014.

ISSUE

Is respondent guilty of violating Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for failing
to hold in trust the money of his clients.

RULING

YES. It has been said that “[t]he practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet
the high standards of legal proficiency and morality. Any conduct that shows a violation of the norms
and values of the legal profession exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.”

An examination of the records reveals that respondent violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Similarly, Rule 138, Section 25 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 25. Unlawful retention of client’s funds; contempt.—When an attorney unjustly

retains in his hands money of his client after it has been demanded, he may be punished for contempt as
an officer of the Court who has misbehaved in his official transactions; but proceedings under this
section shall not be a bar to a criminal prosecution.

A lawyer’s duty under Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is clear:

The fiduciary nature of the relationship between counsel and client imposes on a lawyer the duty
to account for the money or property collected or received for or from the client[,] [thus] . . . [w]hen a
lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular purpose (such as for filing fees,
registration fees, transportation and office expenses), he should promptly account to the client how the
money was spent. If he does not use the money for its intended purpose, he must immediately return it
to the client. His failure either to render an accounting or to return the money (if the intended purpose
of the money does not materialize) constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

[The lawyer’s] failure to return the client’s money upon demand gives rise to the presumption
that he has mishap propriated it for his own use to the prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed
in him by the client. (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent admitted that there were delays in the transfer of title of property to complainants’
name. He continuously assured complainants that he would still fulfill his duty. However, after three
(3) years and several demands from complainants, respondent failed to accomplish the task given to
him and even refused to return the money. Complainants’ alleged failure to provide the necessary
documents to effect the transfer does not justify his violation of his duty under the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Respondent’s assertion of a valid lawyer’s lien is also untenable. Respondent did not satisfy all the
elements of a valid retaining lien. He did not present evidence as to an unsatisfied claim for attorney’s
fees. The enumeration of cases he worked on for complainants remains unsubstantiated. When there
is no unsatisfied claim for attorney’s fees, lawyers cannot validly retain their client’s funds or
properties. Furthermore, assuming that respondent had proven all the requisites for a valid retaining
lien, he cannot appropriate for himself his client’s funds without the proper accounting and notice to
the client. The rule is that when there is “a disagreement, or when the client disputes the amount
claimed by the lawyer . . . the lawyer should not arbitrarily apply the funds in his possession to the
payment of his fees . . . .”

iv. Borrowing or lending

d. Fidelity to client's cause
i. Use of fair and honest means
ii. Client's fraud
iii. Procedure in handling cases

ANITA SANTOS MURRAY v. ATTY. FELICITO J. CERVANTES

A.C. No. 5408, February 7, 2017, En Banc (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

As respondent acknowledged his duty to compensate complainant for the amount of ₱80,000.00
and made his own commitment to make this compensation, he may not have been bound by a juridical
instruction, but he was certainly bound by his own honor. That he has failed to adhere to his own freely
executed commitment after more than a decade speaks volumes of how he has miserably failed to live
up to the "high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing" that is apropos to members of
the legal profession.

FACTS

Complainant filed a Complaint charging respondent of violating Canon 18 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility. Complainant alleged that sometime in June 2000, she sought the services
of a lawyer to assist in the naturalization of her son, Peter Murray, a British national. She and
respondent agreed on the latter's services, with complainant handing respondent the sum of
₱80,000.00 as acceptance fee.

About three (3) months passed without respondent doing "anything substantial." Thus,
complainant wrote respondent to inform him that she was terminating his services. As respondent
failed to return the ₱80,000.00 acceptance fee, complainant instituted the Complaint in this case. She
also instituted criminal proceedings against respondent for violation of Article 315(1)(b) of the
Revised Penal Code. This case was subsequently referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
its investigation, report, and recommendation.

After the proceedings before the IBP, Investigating Commissioner Raval furnished a Report
recommending that respondent be reprimanded and required to return the sum of ₱80,000.00 to
complainant. The IBP Board of Governors adopted Commissioner Raval's recommendations. Acting
on the pending incidents of the case, Investigating Commissioner Funa furnished a Report
recommending that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year, with an
additional three (3)-month suspension for every month (or fraction) that respondent fails to deliver
to complainant the sum of ₱80,000.00. Commissioner Funa justified the penalty of suspension by
emphasizing that, in a hearing conducted by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, respondent was
"orally directed" to return the ₱80,000.00 not later than the end of August 2004. Respondent acceded
to this; however, he failed to return the ₱80,000.00.
ISSUE

(1) Is respondent Atty. Cervantes guilty of violating Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility?

(2) Is the oral instruction given to respondent in the hearing attained such a degree of
finality as would immutably require him to comply, such that failure to comply
justifies additional or increased penalties?

RULING

(1) YES. It is evident from the records that respondent failed to deliver on the services
that he committed to complainant despite receiving the amount of ₱80,000.00 as
acceptance fee. Although respondent asserted that he did not actively solicit this
amount from complainant, it remains, as Commissioner Funa underscored, that
respondent accepted this amount as consideration for his services. Moreover,
following complainant's engagement of his services, respondent failed to
communicate with complainant or update her on the progress of the services that he
was supposed to render. Not only did he fail in taking his own initiative to
communicate; he also failed to respond to complainant's queries and requests for
updates. Respondent's failure to timely and diligently deliver on his professional
undertaking justifies the Integrated Bar of the Philippines' conclusion that he must
restitute complainant the amount of ₱80,000.00.

Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that “a lawyer shall not neglect
a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.”
Also, Rule 18.04 states that “a lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.”

(2) NO. Rule 139-B merely delegates investigatory functions to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. With the exercise of its delegated investigatory power, the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines refers proposed actions to this Court. Recognizing the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines' limited competence in disciplinary cases impels a concomitant
recognition that, pending favorable action by this Court on its recommendations, its
determinations and conclusions are only provisional. Therefore, rulings on
disciplinary cases attain finality and are enforceable only upon this Court's own
determination that they must be imposed.

The oral instruction given to respondent in the hearing has, thus, not attained such a degree
of finality as would immutably require him to comply, such that failure to comply justifies additional
or increased penalties. Penalizing him for non-compliance is premature. Nevertheless, respondent
acknowledged his duty to compensate complainant for the amount of ₱80,000.00 and made his own
commitment to make this compensation. He may not have been bound by a juridical instruction, but
he was certainly bound by his own honor. That he has failed to adhere to his own freely executed
commitment after more than a decade speaks volumes of how he has miserably failed to live up to
the "high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing" that is apropos to members of the
legal profession.

e. Competence and diligence

i. Adequate protection
 ii. Negligence
iii. Collaborating counsel
iv. Duty to apprise client
f. Representation with zeal within legal bounds
g. Attorney's fees
i. Acceptance fees
ii. Contingency fee arrangements
iii. Champertous contracts

ATTY. ROMEO G. ROXAS v. REPUBLIC REAL ESTATE CORPORATION

G.R. No. 208205, June 01, 2016, Second Division(Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

It has been held that a client is free to change his counsel in a pending case and thereafter retain
another lawyer to represent him. That manner of changing a lawyer does not need the consent of the
lawyer to be dismissed. Nor does it require approval of the court. An experienced lawyer such as Atty.
Roxas is expected know that a counsel’s services can be withdrawn at any time. There is no such thing
as an irrevocable attorney-client relationship.

FACTS

Republic Real Estate Corporation (RREC) entered into an agreement with Pasay City for the
reclamation of the foreshore lands along Manila Bay. Subsequently, the Republic of the Philippines
sued for recovery of possession and damages with writ of preliminary injunction. The said case
reached the Supreme Court which ruled that both the agreement and Ordinance No. 121, as amended,
were declared null and void for being ultra vires and contrary to Republic Act No. 1899.

After the said decision, several motions and petitions were filed by RREC and Pasay City. One
of which is the motion for writ of execution filed by the RREC which the RTC granted. As a result,
Sheriff IV Reyner S. De Jesus issued a Notice of Execution and Notice to Pay against the Republic for
P49,173,064,201.17 instead of the P10.9 million ordered by this Court, to be divided between RREC
and Pasay City. On appeal, the CA granted the petition for certiorari filed by the Republic.

Atty. Romeo G. Roxas of RGR & Associates, counsel for RREC filed before the SC a complaint
against the three CA Justices who nullified the Writ of Execution and Sheriff De Jesus' Notice alleging
misconduct and violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 in relation to Article 204 of the
RPC, and it prayed for their disbarment. Atty. Roxas also filed a Motion for Inhibition against the three
Justices. Both the Complaint and the Motion for Inhibition were filed without RREC's authority.
Consequently, RREC terminated the services of RGR & Associates, Atty. Roxas' law firm, due to loss
of confidence and breach of trust and the former engaged another law firm.

Atty Roxas filed a Petition for Review Pro Hac Vice. He signed the Verification and Certificate
Against Non-Forum Shopping in his own name. Although he admits that he filed his Pro Hac Vice
Petition in his personal capacity and without RREC's authority, Atty. Roxas asserts that RGR &
Associates is RREC's rightful counsel. And that the termination of RGR & Associates' legal services
was made in bad faith. RREC's engagement with his firm was made allegedly on a contingent or a 'no
cure, no pay' basis. Thus, Atty. Roxas alleges that RGR & Associates' engagement with RREC, being
one coupled with interest, was irrevocable. He prays for attorney's fees beyond quantum meruit.
Specifically, he asks for the full amount upon the terms and conditions of his contingency contract
with RREC. He allege that in a letter-agreement between RREC and RGR & Associates, a decision in
RREC's favor would entitle Atty. Roxas' firm to at least 3.5 hectares of land or a minimum of P175
million from the judgment award, depending on the land or amount to be awarded by this Court.
However, the letter-agreement is silent on reimbursement of RGR & Associates' advanced payment.

ISSUES

(1) Does Atty. Roxas have the right to reimbursement?

(2) Is RGR & Associates’ discharge properly made?

RULING

(1) NO. Even assuming Atty. Roxas pursued RREC’s case at his firm’s expense and on a contingent
basis, the court cannot allow such an agreement. An agreement of this nature is champertous and
void for being against public policy. In Nocom v. Camerino, A champertous contract is defined as
a contract between a stranger and a party to a lawsuit, whereby the stranger pursues the party’s
claim in consideration of receiving part or any of the proceeds recovered under the judgment; a
bargain by a stranger with a party to a suit, by which such third person undertakes to carry on
the litigation at his own cost and risk, in consideration of receiving, if successful, a part of the
proceeds or subject sought to be recovered. An Agreement whereby the attorney agrees to pay
expenses of proceedings to enforce the client’s rights is champertous. Such agreements are
against public policy especially whereas in this case, the attorney has agreed to carry on the
action at its own expense in consideration of some bargain to have part of the thing in dispute.
The execution of these contracts violates the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and his
client, for which the former must incur administrative sanction.

As officers of the court, lawyers should not exploit nor take advantage of their client’s
weaknesses. Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a lawyer from lending
money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he or she has to advance necessary expenses
in a legal matter he or she is handling for the client. The case of Bautista v. Gonzales has settled that
although a lawyer may, in good faith, advance the expenses of litigation, the same should be subject
to reimbursement. Thus, absent a reimbursement agreement, the champertous contract is void.
Lawyers who obtain an interest in the subject matter of litigation create a conflict-of-interest
situation with their clients and thereby directly violate the fiduciary duties they owe their clients.

(2) YES. The termination of RGR & Associates’ services is not subject to the Court’s review. A
lawyer may be dismissed at any time, with or without cause. In Lim, Jr. v. Villarosa, the court ruled
that: A client may discharge his attorney at any time with or without cause and thereafter employ
another lawyer who may then enter his appearance. Thus, it has been held that a client is free to
change his counsel in a pending case and thereafter retain another lawyer to represent him. That
manner of changing a lawyer does not need the consent of the lawyer to be dismissed. Nor does
it require approval of the court.

An experienced lawyer such as Atty. Roxas is expected know that a counsel’s services can be
withdrawn at any time. There is no such thing as an irrevocable attorney-client relationship. As stated
in Busiños v. Ricafort, “the relation between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in its nature
and of a very delicate, exacting and confidential character, requiring high degree of fidelity and good
faith.” Thus, when the client itself no longer wants its attorney’s services, the counsel cannot continue
to desperately cling on to it.

iv. Attorney's liens

JUN B. LUNA v. ATTY. DWIGHT M. GALARRITA

A.C. NO. 10662, July 07, 2015, En Banc (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Those in the legal profession must always conduct themselves with honesty and integrity in all
their dealings. Lawyers should maintain, at all times, "a high standard of legal proficiency, morality,
honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession,
the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility."

Members of the bar took their oath to conduct themselves "according to the best of their
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to their clients," and to "delay no
man for money or malice." These mandates apply especially to dealings of lawyers with their clients
considering the highly fiduciary nature of their relationship. Clients entrust their causes—life, liberty,
and property—to their lawyers, certain that this confidence would not be abused.

FACTS

Jun B. Luna (Luna) filed a disbarment against his lawyer, Atty. Dwight M. Galarrita (Atty.
Galarrita), before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, for his failure to deliver to his client,
complainant Luna, the P100,000.00 settlement proceeds he received after entering into a
Compromise Agreement in the foreclosure case without his client's consent.

Luna alleged that he retained Atty. Galarrita's legal services in filing a foreclosure Complaint
on October 14, 2002 before the RTC of Gumaca, Quezon. The Complaint against one Jose Calvario
(Calvario) alleged that Calvario borrowed P100,000.00 from Luna. This loan was secured by a Deed
of Real Estate Mortgage over a parcel of land in Quezon Province. Due to non-payment of the loan,
Luna filed the Complaint praying for payment of the obligation with interest, and issuance of a
foreclosure decree upon Calvario's failure to fully pay within the period.

The parties tried to amicably settle the case during pre-trial, followed by Luna's presentation
and offer of evidence. Atty. Galarrita opted to enter into a settlement with the other party after his
formal offer of evidence. They submitted the Compromise Agreement before the trial court on
February 14, 2006. It provided that Calvario would pay Luna P105,000.00 as payment for his
mortgaged land and, in turn, Luna would cause the removal of the encumbrance annotation on the
land title. The trial court approved the Compromise Agreement.

Luna alleged that Atty. Galarrita never informed him of this Compromise Agreement, and
did not deliver to him the P100,000.00 settlement proceeds Atty. Galarrita had received. Luna's
Complaint attached a copy of the Counsel's Report dated August 12, 2003 where Atty. Galarrita
proposed and provided justifications for settlement, and waived any compensation for his services
in the case.

In his Verified Answer, Atty. Galarrita prays for the dismissal of the disbarment Complaint. He
argues that he entered the Compromise Agreement by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney that
includes this purpose. He regularly submitted reports to Luna on developments and possible
settlement before he entered the Compromise Agreement. He submits that Luna "'slept' on his
rights."

Atty. Galarrita adds that under their General Retainership Agreement, Luna shall pay him
P4,000.00 monthly. Luna should have paid P48,000.00 as of November 17, 2006, and after four years
with no revocation, termination, or nullification, Luna's unpaid obligation amounted to P208,000.00.
He listed other unpaid amounts for his legal services. Atty. Galarrita, thus, argues for an application
of the rule on retaining lien. Atty. Galarrita also raises the two-year prescription under Rule VIII,
Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar
Discipline. More than four years elapsed since their last communication in 2006 when the
Compromise Agreement became final.

In his December 4, 2010 Report and Recommendation, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. Galarrita violated Rule 16.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and recommended "his suspension from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year."

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors, in its April 15, 2013 Resolution No.
XX-2013-441, adopted and approved with modification the Investigating Commissioner's Report and
Recommendation in that Atty. Galarrita is recommended to be "suspended from the practice of law
for six (6) months and ordered to return the amount of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos
to complainant without prejudice to the filing of a collection case for retainer's fee against
complainant." The Board of Governors denied its reconsideration. The Office of the Bar Confidant
reported that "no motion for reconsideration or petition for review was filed as of November 17,
2014." In any case, it is this court that has the authority to discipline members of the bar.

ISSUE

Is Atty. Galarrita administratively liable for entering into a Compromise Agreement

without his client complainant Luna's consent, then refusing to turn over the settlement proceeds
received.

RULING

YES, Atty. Galarrita is administratively liable. Complainant Luna entrusted respondent Atty.
Galarrita with handling the civil case involving a mortgaged land in Quezon Province. However,
without complainant Luna's consent, respondent Atty. Galarrita settled this case with the other party.

Article 1878 of the Civil Code provides that "special powers of attorney are necessary in
the following cases: . . . (3) To compromise, to submit questions to arbitration, to renounce the right
to appeal from a judgment, to waive objections to the venue of an action or to abandon a prescription
already acquired."
 The Rules of Court thus requires lawyers to secure special authority from their clients when
entering into a compromise agreement that dispenses with litigation.

SEC. 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. - Attorneys have authority to bind their
clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing and in taking appeals,
and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without special authority,
compromise their client's litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a client's claim but
the full amount in cash.

Atty. Galarrita contends that he holds a Special Power of Attorney to enter into compromise
agreements, but as found by the Investigating Commissioner, there seems to be a compelling reason
to believe that Complainant had not given any authority for the Complainant to enter into
Compromise Agreement at that precise stage of the trial. Firstly, the Complainant was not made a
party to the Compromise Agreement despite the fact that he was not abroad when the agreement
was executed. Secondly, there was no indication that he had agreed to the amount of P100,000.00 in
exchange for his withdrawal of the complaint. Thirdly, he was not seasonably informed of the
execution of the Compromise Agreement/payment of the P100,000.00 and came to know of the same
only much later.

It would seem, however, that despite the authority given to Respondent, the same SPA cannot
justify Respondent's representation in the Compromise Agreement on February 14, 2006. To dissect,
the SPA was executed on September 16, 2002 or a month before the filing of the Complaint for
Foreclosure of Mortgage. Thus, the conclusion seems to be that the authority given therein to
Respondent to enter into a possible settlement referred only to a possible settlement that could
be secured or firmed up during the preliminary conference or pre-trial of the case. In fact, the
tenor of the SPA indicates that the SPA was precisely executed in order to constitute Respondent as
Complainant's representative during the preliminary conference or pre-trial.

Assuming it can be inferred that the SPA and the authority given to Respondent can be
liberally interpreted and allowed to extend up to the time the Compromise had been executed, still
the Respondent may not have faithfully performed his sworn duty to his client. During the mandatory
conference, it was established that at the time the compromise was executed the Complainant was
not abroad and, therefore, given the current information technology it would have been easy or
convenient for Respondent to have informed his client about it. Admittedly, his failure in this regard
had only given Complainant the reason to cast doubt on his real intention in agreeing to the
compromise agreement for and in his behalf.

It would seem, however, that by Complainant's act of demanding the amount from
Respondent, the former may have already ignored the issue on the lack of authority on his part thus
curing the defect on the latter's authority to enter into the same. Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct." Members of the bar must always conduct themselves in a way that promotes "public
confidence in the integrity of the legal profession."

Worse, respondent Atty. Galarrita not only failed to promptly inform complainant Luna of the
former's receipt of the P100,000.00 settlement proceeds but also refused to turn over the amount to
complainant Luna. This court has held that "any money collected for the client or other trust property
coming into the lawyer's possession should promptly be reported by him or her." (Rule 16.03 under
Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that:
 CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come
into his possession.

Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or
upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much
thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice
promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all
judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of
Court.

In several cases, we have disciplined lawyers who failed or refused to remit amounts received
for and on behalf of their clients. "The penalty for violation of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility usually ranges from suspension for six months, to suspension for one year, or two
years, and even disbarment " depending on the circumstances of each case. In this case, respondent
Atty. Galarrita entered into the Compromise Agreement involving complainant Luna's property
without informing him. Even though complainant Luna forewent the lack of authority issue,
respondent Atty. Galarrita still continued to act in bad faith by refusing to turn over the P100,000.00
settlement amount received. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Investigating Commissioner found
that:

On another point, there seems no cogent proof, too, that Respondent had been advised of
Complainant's supposed agreement to Mr. Calvario's payment of P100,000.00. Despite
Respondent's allegations that he had informed Complainant about his so-called counsel's
report, it remains undisputed that the Complainant did not give him any express approval of
the same.

There is enough indicia to conclude that Respondent had committed bad faith in entering into
the Compromise Agreement. From February 2006 to November 2010, or a period of four (4)
years, Respondent failed to turn-over the P100,000.00 he had collected from Mr. Calvario to
Complainant. Worse, he failed to seasonably inform Complainant about the same. He kept the
money and claimed he had the right to retain the same invoking the counsel's right to a
retaining line sic. He pointed out that Complainant had incurred accrued attorney's fees
which he is bound to pay under the general retainer agreement. Thus, it is not amiss to state
that he entered into the said agreement with the odious motivation to hold on to it and pave
the way for the payment of his attorney's fees. In so doing, he violated the trust reposed in
him by his client and violated Rule 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

As to Respondent's invocation of the lawyer's retaining lien and his retention of the money,
the Court deems the same unlawful. True, the Code of Professional Responsibility allows the lawyer
to apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving
notice promptly thereafter to his client. But this provision assumes that the client agrees with the
lawyer as to the amount of attorney's fees and as to the application of the client's fund to pay his
lawful fees and disbursements, in which case he may deduct what is due him and remit the balance
to his client, with full disclosure on every detail. Without the client's consent, the lawyer has no
authority to apply the client's money for his fees, but he should instead return the money to his
client, without prejudice to his filing a case to recover his unsatisfied fees.

On Respondent's argument that prescription has already set in against Complainant, suffice
it to state that the rules have already been supplanted by a new set of rules which do not anymore
carry the same. Administrative proceedings require only substantial evidence. This court accepts and
adopts the findings of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors, but with modification
increasing the period of suspension from the practice of law to two (2) years considering that
respondent Atty. Galarrita not only compromised litigation without complainant Luna's consent, but
also refused to turn over the settlement proceeds to date.

This court also sustains the order for respondent Atty. Galarrita to return the amount of
P100,000.00 to complainant Luna. In Ronquillo v. Atty. Cezar, the parties entered a Deed of
Assignment after which respondent received P937,500.00 from complainant as partial payment for
the townhouse and lot. However, respondent did not turn over this amount to developer Crown Asia,
and no copy of the Contract to Sell was given to complainant. This court suspended Atty. Cezar from
the practice of law for three (3) years, but did not grant complainant's prayer for the return of the
P937,500.00.

Ronquillo held that "disciplinary proceedings against lawyers do not involve a trial of an
action, but rather investigations by the court into the conduct of one of its officers." Thus, disciplinary
proceedings are limited to a determination of "whether or not the attorney is still fit to be allowed to
continue as a member of the Bar."

Later jurisprudence clarified that this rule excluding civil liability determination from
disciplinary proceedings "remains applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely civil in
nature — for instance, when the claim involves moneys received by the lawyer from his client in a
transaction separate and distinct from and not intrinsically linked to his professional engagement."
This court has thus ordered in administrative proceedings the return of amounts representing legal
fees.

This court has also ordered restitution as concomitant relief in administrative proceedings
when respondent's civil liability was already established. Although the Court renders this decision in
an administrative proceeding primarily to exact the ethical responsibility on a member of the
Philippine Bar, the Court's silence about the respondent lawyer's legal obligation to restitute the
complainant will be both unfair and inequitable. No victim of gross ethical misconduct concerning
the client's funds or property should be required to still litigate in another proceeding what the
administrative proceeding has already established as the respondent's liability. That has been
the reason why the Court has required restitution of the amount involved as a concomitant relief in
the cited cases of Mortem v. Pagatpatan, supra, Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit, supra, Small v. Banares, supra.

Respondent Atty. Galarrita does not deny his receipt of the P100,000.00 but justifies his
refusal to turn over the amount by invoking jurisprudence on retaining lien. The Rules of Court
provides for attorney's retaining lien as follows:

SEC. 37. Attorney's liens. - An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds, documents and
papers of his client which have lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same
until his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the
satisfaction thereof. He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the
payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has
secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have caused a
statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such
judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof to be
delivered to his client and to the adverse party; and he shall have the same right and power
over such judgments and executions as his client would have enforce his lien and secure the
payment of his just fees and disbursements.
 First, "lawyers are not entitled to unilaterally appropriate their clients' money for
[themselves] by the mere fact that the clients owe them attorney's fees." They must give prompt
notice to their clients of any receipt of funds for or on behalf of their clients. Rule 16.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility provides for a lawyer's duty to "account for all money or property
collected or received for or from the client." Respondent Atty. Galarrita refused to comply with these
duties, warranting his suspension from the practice of law. Second, the elements required for full
recognition of attorney's lien are: "(1) lawyer-client relationship; (2) lawful possession of the client's
funds, documents and papers; and (3) unsatisfied claim for attorney's fees." Respondent Atty.
Galarrita must prove the existence of all these elements. However, this is not the main issue in this
disbarment case against him, and the validity of his retaining lien defense was not established.
Counter evidence even exists such as respondent Atty. Galarrita's Letter dated August 12, 2003
waiving any compensation for his services in the foreclosure case. Complainant Luna also raises
respondent Atty. Galarrita's negligence in handling the case, and lack of supporting receipts for the
incurred expenses respondent Atty. Galarrita seeks to reimburse.

Nevertheless, we maintain that the disposition of this case is without prejudice to the filing of
a collection case for retainer's fee against complainant Luna.

v. Fees and controversies with clients

vi. Concepts of attorney's fees

LUI ENTERPRISES, INC. v. ZUELLIG PHARMA CORPORATION and the PHILIPPINE BANK OF
COMMUNICATIONS

G.R. No. 193494, March 12, 2014, Third Division (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

In its ordinary sense, attorney’s fees "represent the reasonable compensation a client pays his or
her lawyer for legal service rendered." In its extraordinary sense, attorney’s fees "are awarded as
indemnity for damages the losing party pays the prevailing party." The award of attorney’s fees is the
exception rather than the rule. It is not awarded to the prevailing party "as a matter of course.

FACTS

Lui Enterprises, Inc. and Zuellig Pharma Corporation entered into a 10-year contract of lease
over a parcel of land located in Barrio Tigatto, Buhangin, Davao City. The parcel of land was covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-166476 and was registered under Eli L. Lui. Zuellig Pharma
received a letter from the Philippine Bank of Communications. Claiming to be the new owner of the
leased property, the bank asked Zuellig Pharma to pay rent directly to it. Attached to the letter was a
copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 336962 under the name of the Philippine Bank of
Communications. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 336962 was derived from Transfer Certificate of
Title No.T-166476. Zuellig Pharma promptly informed Lui Enterprises of the Philippine Bank of
Communications’ claim. Lui Enterprises wrote to Zuellig Pharma and insisted on its right to collect
the leased property’s rent. Due to the conflicting claims of Lui Enterprises and the Philippine Bank of
Communications over the rental payments, Zuellig Pharma filed a complaint for interpleader with
RTC. In its complaint, Zuellig Pharma alleged that it already consigned in court P604,024.35 as rental
payments. Zuellig Pharma prayed that it be allowed to consign in court its succeeding monthly rental
payments and that Lui Enterprises and the Philippine Bank of Communications be ordered to litigate
their conflicting claims.

Regional Trial Court of Makati ruled that Lui Enterprises "was barred from any claim in
respect of the rental payments since it was declared in default. Thus, according to the trial court,
there was no issue as to which corporation had the better right over the rental payments. The trial
court awarded the total consigned amount of P6,681,327.30 to the Philippine Bank of
Communications and ordered Lui Enterprises to pay Zuellig Pharma P50,000.00 in attorney’s fees.

The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court. The Court of Appeals found that Lui Enterprises
filed its motion to dismiss four days late. With respect to Lui Enterprises’ motion to set aside order
of default, the Court of Appeals found that Lui Enterprises failed to show the excusable negligence
that prevented it from filing its motion to dismiss on time. On its allegedly meritorious defense, the
Court of Appeals ruled that the nullification of deed of dation in payment case did not bar the filing
of the interpleader case, with Zuellig Pharma not being a party to the nullification case. On the award
of attorney’s fees, the Court of Appeals sustained the trial court since Zuellig Pharma was constrained
to file the action for interpleader with consignation in order to protect its interests.

ISSUE

Is Zuellig Pharma entitled to attorney’s fees.

RULING

NO. The Court of Appeals erred in awarding attorney’s fees. In its ordinary sense, attorney’s
fees "represent the reasonable compensation a client pays his or her lawyer for legal service
rendered." In its extraordinary sense, attorney’s fees "are awarded as indemnity for damages the
losing party pays the prevailing party." The award of attorney’s fees is the exception rather than the
rule. It is not awarded to the prevailing party "as a matter of course."

Under Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorney’s fees cannot be recovered in the absence of
stipulation, except under specific circumstances:

(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;

(2) When the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third
persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;

(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;

(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;

(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the
plaintiff’s plainly valid, just and demandable claim;

(6) In actions for legal support;

(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;

(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen’s compensation and employer’s liability laws;
 (9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising froma crime;

(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded; and

(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation should be recovered.

Even if a party is "compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his
or her rights," attorney's fees will not be awarded if no bad faith "could be reflected in a party's
persistence in a case." To award attorney's fees, the court must have "factual, legal, and equitable
justification." The court must state the award's basis in its decision. These rules are based on the
policy that "no premium should be placed on the right to litigate."

In this case, the Court of Appeals awarded attorney's fees as "Zuellig Pharma was compelled
to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect its interests." This is not a compelling
reason to award attorney's fees. That Zuellig Pharma had to file an interpleader case to consign its
rental payments did not mean that Lui Enterprises was in bad faith in insisting that rental payments
be paid to it. Thus, the Court of Appeals erred in awarding attorney's fees to Zuellig Pharma. All told,
the Court of Appeals' award of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees must be deleted.

h. Preservation of client's confidences

i. Prohibited disclosures and use
ii. Disclosures, when allowed
1. Withdrawal of services
j. Duties of lawyers in case of death of parties represented

C. SUSPENSION, DISBARMENT, AND DISCIPLINE OF LAWYERS

1. Nature and characteristics of disciplinary actions against lawyers
a. Sui generis
b. Prescription of actions
2. Grounds

IN RE: RESOLUTION DATED AUGUST 14, 2013 OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-G.R. CV No.
94656, v. ATTY. GIDEON D.V. MORTEL

A.C. No. 10117, July 25, 2016, Second Division (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Gross misconduct is defined as an "inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct" in

administering justice, which prejudices the parties’ rights or forecloses a just determination of the case.
As officers of the court, lawyers themselves should be at the forefront in obeying court orders and
processes. Atty. Mortel utterly disrespected the lawful orders of the court by ignoring 12 Court of Appeals
Resolutions.

FACTS
 Atty. Gideon D.V. Mortel handles the case of Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Angelita De Jesus,
through her Attorney-in-Fact Jim Dulay for his client, Angelita De Jesus. Having recently moved out of
his office, he requested to use the address of his friend’s law firm, MFV Jose Law Office, as his address
on record for Bank of the Philippine Islands. All communication, court orders, resolutions, notices, or
other court processes addressed to the law firm were received by the firm and Atty. Mortel will then
be informed whenever there was a resolution or order pertinent to the Bank of Philippine Islands.

In relation to the aforementioned case, the Court of Appeals issued a Notice for Atty. Mortel
to file an appellant’s brief however, instead of heeding to this, Atty. Mortel moved to withdraw
Angelita De Jesus’ appeal in light of an amicable settlement. After the Motion to Withdraw Appeal was
filed, he stopped communicating with MFV Jose Law Office.

In numerous resolutions, the Court of Appeals directed Atty. Mortel to secure and submit his
client's written conformity to the Motion to Withdraw Appeal and to furnish his client's present and
complete address but he failed to comply in all of them. The Court of Appeals found that his non-
compliance without valid reason constitutes disobedience or defiance of the lawful orders,
amounting to gross misconduct and insubordination or disrespect and in result, he was suspended
from legal practice for six (6) months and was given a stern warning against repeating his actions.
This then resulted to an administrative case against him.

Four years passed since the Court of Appeals sent its first Resolution but only then did Atty.
Marcelino Ferdinand V. Jose, Managing Partner of MFV Jose Law Office, question why the Resolutions
were not forwarded to Atty. Mortel. He learned that Atty. Mortel could not be reached but through a
mutual friend, he was finally able to reach and inform Atty. Mortel of the development.

Atty. Mortel filed before the Court of Appeals an Omnibus Motion and Manifestation with
Profuse Apologies, arguing that he honestly believed that the case was already closed and terminated
in light of his Motion to Withdraw Appeal and that the Resolutions never reached him.

ISSUE

Is respondent Atty. Gideon D.V. Mortel guilty of disobedience or defiance of lawful court
orders, amounting to gross misconduct and insubordination or disrespect?

RULING

YES. Atty. Mortel utterly disrespected the lawful orders of the court by ignoring 12 Court of
Appeals Resolutions. He failed to justify the long delay in complying with the Resolutions requiring
his client’s written conformity to the Motion and information on his client’s current address. He also
failed to justify his failure on complying with the other Resolutions (a) requiring him to show cause
why he should not be cited in contempt, and to comply with the Court of Appeals’ earlier Resolutions;
(b) citing him in indirect contempt and ordering him to pay a fine of ₱10,00000; (c) reiterating the
Resolutions that directed him to pay the fine and inform the Court of Appeals of his client’s address,
and warning him of a more severe sanction should he fail to do so; (d) requiring him to show cause
why he should not be suspended from the practice of law for his refusal to pay the fine; and (e)
ordering him to again to comply with the Resolution that directed him to pay the fine.

His actions actions shatter the dignity of his profession. He exhibited disdain for court orders
and processes, as well as a lack of fidelity to the court. The Court agrees that his acts constitute gross
misconduct and insubordination or disrespect of court. For his gross misconduct, insubordination,
and disrespect of the Court of Appeals directives, and for his negligence of his client’s case,
respondent must be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year, with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

3. How instituted

ROBERTO BERNARDINO v. ATTY. VICTOR REY SANTOS

ATTY. JOSE MANGASER CARINGAL v. ATTY. VICTOR REY SANTOS

A.C. NO. 10583 & A.C. NO. 10584, February 18, 2015, Second Division (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The rule on conflict of interest is based on the fiduciary obligation in a lawyer-client relationship.
Lawyers must treat all information received from their clients with utmost confidentiality in order to
encourage clients to fully inform their counsels of the facts of their case

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is “whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an
issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this
argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client.” This rule covers not only cases
in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has
been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer
will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in
which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his
first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of
interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of
his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double
dealing in the performance thereof.

FACTS

These cases involve administrative Complaints against Atty. Victor Rey Santos for violation of
Canon 10, Rule 10.01 and Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In A.C. No. 10583, complainant Roberto C. Bernardino (Bernardino) filed a Letter-Complaint

against Atty. Victor Rey Santos (Atty. Santos) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, praying
that Atty. Santos be investigated and subjected to disciplinary action. Bernardino alleged that the
death certificate of his aunt, Rufina de Castro Turla, was falsified by Atty. Santos. Atty. Santos made
it appear that Rufina Turla died in 1992, when in fact, she died in 1990. Atty. Santos used the falsified
death certificate to support the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Mariano Turla, husband of
Rufina Turla. Paragraph 6 of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication prepared by Atty. Santos states:

Being her surviving spouse, I am the sole legal heir entitled to succeed to and inherit the estate
of said deceased who did not leave any descendant or any other heir entitled to her estate.
 Years later, Atty. Santos, on behalf of Marilu Turla, daughter of Rufina and Mariano Turla, filed a
Complaint for sum of money with prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and temporary
restraining order against Bernardino alleging that Marilu Turla is an heir of Mariano Turla, which
allegedly contradicts the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication that Atty. Santos drafted. Hence, Atty. Santos
represented clients with conflicting interests.

Another Complaint was filed against Atty. Santos by Atty. Jose Mangaser Caringal (Atty.
Caringal). This was docketed as A.C. No. 10584. Similar to Bernardino’s Complaint, Atty. Caringal
alleged that Atty. Santos represented clients with conflicting interests. He also alleged that in
representing Marilu Turla, Atty. Santos would necessarily go against the claims of Mariano Turla.
Also, in representing Marilu Turla, Atty. Santos was allegedly violating the so-called “Dead Man’s
Statute” because “he would be utilizing information or matters of fact occurring before the death of
his deceased client. Similarly, he would be unscrupulously utilizing information acquired during his
professional relation with his said client that would constitute a breach of trust or of privileged
communication.”

Atty. Caringal further alleged that Atty. Santos violated Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he filed several cases against the other claimants of Mariano Turla’s estate. In
other words, he engaged in forum shopping. In addition, Atty. Santos allegedly violated Canon 10,
Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he drafted Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of
Self-Adjudication. The Affidavit states that Mariano Turla is the sole heir of Rufina Turla, but Atty.
Santos knew this to be false. Atty. Santos’ wife, Lynn Batac, is Mariano Turla’s niece. As part of the
family, Atty. Santos knew that Rufina Turla had other heirs.

Atty. Caringal argued that Atty. Santos was bound by the statement in Mariano Turla’s
affidavit that Rufina Turla had no other heir. Moreover, Atty. Santos allegedly converted funds
belonging to the heirs of Mariano Turla for his own benefit. The funds involved were rental income
from Mariano Turla’s properties that were supposed to be distributed to the heirs. Instead, Atty.
Santos received the rental income. Lastly, Atty. Caringal alleged that Atty. Santos cited the repealed
Article 262 of the Civil Code in his arguments.

In his Answer, Atty. Santos denied having falsified the death certificate. He explained that the
death certificate and the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication were given to him by Mariano Turla and that
he was not aware that there was a falsified entry in the death certificate. As regards the issue on
conflict of interest, Atty. Santos argued that he did not represent and was not representing conflicting
interests since Mariano Turla was already dead. Further, “he was representing Marilu Turla against
those who had an interest in her father’s estate.” Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Self-Adjudication never
stated that there was no other legal heir but only “that Mariano Turla was the sole heir of Rufina
Turla.”

Regarding the allegations of Atty. Caringal, Atty. Santos insisted that he did not commit forum
shopping because the various cases filed had different issues. As to the conversion of funds, Atty.
Santos explained that the funds used were being held by his client as the special administratrix of the
estate of Mariano Turla. According to Atty. Santos, payment of attorney’s fees out of the estate’s funds
could be considered as “expenses of administration.” Also, payment of Atty. Santos’ legal services was
a matter which Atty. Caringal had no standing to question. On the allegation that Atty. Santos cited a
repealed provision of law, he discussed that Article 262 of the Civil Code is applicable because it was
in force when Marilu Turla’s birth certificate was registered.
 The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines recommended that
Atty. Santos be suspended for three (3) months. It found that Bernardino failed to prove his allegation
that Atty. Santos knew that the death certificate was falsified and used it to support Mariano Turla’s
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. Likewise, Atty. Caringal failed to prove that Atty. Santos converted
funds from Mariano Turla’s estate. With regard to the citation of a repealed provision, the
Commission on Bar Discipline stated that the evidence presented did not prove that Atty. Santos
“knowingly cited a repealed law.” Further, Atty. Santos did not engage in forum shopping. The
various cases filed involved different parties and prayed for different reliefs. However, the
Commission on Bar Discipline agreed with Bernardino and Atty. Caringal that Atty. Santos
represented clients with conflicting interests.

In the Resolution dated May 10, 2013, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines adopted and approved the findings and recommendations of the Commission on Bar
Discipline. Atty. Santos filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, which was denied by the IBP Board
of Governors in the Resolution dated March 22, 2014.

ISSUES:

1. Did Atty. Santos violated the Code of Professional Responsibility

2. Does the Integrated Bar of the Philippines have the authority to impose sanctions on lawyers

RULING

1. YES. Atty. Victor Rey Santos is liable for violation of Canon 10, Rule 10.01 and Canon 15, Rule 15.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

CANON 15 — A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his client.

Rule 15.03 — A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

The rule on conflict of interest is based on the fiduciary obligation in a lawyer-client

relationship. Lawyers must treat all information received from their clients with utmost
confidentiality in order to encourage clients to fully inform their counsels of the facts of their case.

In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat, this court explained what conflict of interest means:

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or

more opposing parties. The test is “whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s
duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In
brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for
the other client.” This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications
have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will
be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will
require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any
matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new
 relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection.
Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new
relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity
and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the
performance thereof.

Applying the test to determine whether conflict of interest exists, respondent would
necessarily refute Mariano Turla’s claim that he is Rufina Turla’s sole heir when he agreed to
represent Marilu Turla. Worse, he knew that Mariano Turla was not the only heir.

However, Rule 15.03 provides for an exception, specifically, “by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.” Respondent had the duty to inform Mariano Turla
and Marilu Turla that there is a conflict of interest and to obtain their written consent. Mariano Turla
died on February 5, 2009, while respondent represented Marilu Turla in March 2009. It is
understandable why respondent was unable to obtain Mariano Turla’s consent. Still, respondent did
not present evidence showing that he disclosed to Marilu Turla that he previously represented
Mariano Turla and assisted him in executing the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. Thus, the allegation
of conflict of interest against respondent was sufficiently proven.

Likewise, we accept and adopt the IBP Board of Governors’ finding that respondent
violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states:

CANON 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be mislead by any artifice.

In the Report, the Commission on Bar Discipline explained:

Corollary to the foregoing, the Commission by virtue of the doctrine res ipsa loquitor
finds that the respondent’s act of failing to thwart his client Mariano Turla from filing
the Affidavit of Adjudication despite . . . his knowledge of the existence of Marilu Turla
as a possible heir to the estate of Rufina Turla, the respondent failed to uphold his
obligation as a member of the bar to be the stewards of justice and protectors of what
is just, legal and proper. Thus in failing to do his duty and acting dishonestly[,] not
only was he in contravention of the Lawyer’s Oath but was also in violation of Canon
10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

As officers of the court, lawyers have the duty to uphold the rule of law. In doing so,
lawyers are expected to be honest in all their dealings. Unfortunately, respondent was far from being
honest. With full knowledge that Rufina Turla had another heir, he acceded to Mariano Turla’s
request to prepare the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication.

2. NO. This court notes that the wording of the IBP Board of Governors’ Resolutions dated May 10,
2013 and March 22, 2014 seems to imply that it is the Integrated Bar of the Philippines that has the
authority to impose sanctions on lawyers. This is wrong.

The authority to discipline members of the Bar is vested in this Court, and not the IBP, under the
1987 Constitution: ARTICLE VIII. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

 (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of
law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.

Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan elucidated on this court’s “plenary disciplinary authority over

attorneys” and discussed referring to the authority of the Supreme Court to discipline officers of the
court and members of the court and members of the Bar. The Supreme Court, as regular and guardian
of the legal profession, has plenary disciplinary authority over attorneys. The authority to discipline
lawyers stems from the Court’s constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the practice of law,
which includes as well authority to regulate the practice itself of law. Quite apart from this
constitutional mandate, the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court over members of the Bar is
an inherent power incidental to the proper administration of justice and essential to an orderly
discharge of judicial functions. The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is but
corollary to the Court’s exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A lawyer is not merely a professional
but also an officer of the court and as such, he is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of
dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society.

This court’s authority is restated under Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, specifically:

RULE 138. Attorneys and Admission to Bar

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds

therefor.—A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct
in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney for
a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.

In Ramirez v. Buhayang-Margallo, this court emphasized the authority of this court to

impose disciplinary action on those admitted to the practice of law. Parenthetically, it is this court
that has the constitutionally mandated duty to discipline lawyers. Under the current rules, the duty
to assist fact finding can be delegated to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The findings of the
Integrated Bar, however, can only be recommendatory, consistent with the constitutional powers of
this court. Its recommended penalties are also, by its nature, recommendatory.

The authority given to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is based on Rule 139-B,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which provides that “proceedings for the disbarment, suspension or
discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines . . . upon the verified complaint of any person.” However, this authority is only to
assist this court with the investigation of the case, to determine factual findings, and to recommend,
at best, the penalty that may be imposed on the erring lawyer. We reiterate the discussion in Tenoso
v. Atty. Echanez:

Time and again, this Court emphasizes that the practice of law is imbued with public
interest and that “a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his
brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the
most important functions of the State—the administration of justice—as an officer of
 the court.” Accordingly, “ lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of
legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing.”

Only this court can impose sanctions on members of the Bar. This disciplinary authority
is granted by the Constitution and cannot be relinquished by this court. The Resolutions of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines are, at best, recommendatory, and its findings and
recommendations should not be equated with Decisions and Resolutions rendered by this court.

4. Proceedings

CELIANA B. BUNTAG, et.al v. ATTY. WILFREDO S. TOLEDO

A.C. No. 12125, February 11, 2019, Third Division(Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Court will not penalize lawyers unless it is unmistakably shown that they are unfit to continue
being a member of the Bar. As a basic rule in evidence, the burden of proof lies on the party who makes
the allegations. In the case at bar, complainant miserably failed to comply with the burden of proof
required of her. A mere charge or allegation of wrongdoing does not suffice. Accusation is not
synonymous with guilt.

FACTS

Complainants filed a Disbarment Complaint against respondent, their former counsel in

several criminal and civil cases. Complainants claimed that despite knowing that they were
indigents, respondent demanded money from them several times. They asserted that respondent
forced them to lie during their hearings and cross-examinations, and to sign documents without
understanding their contents. They further alleged that respondent did not take any action against
the judge assigned on their cases, even if the judge was clearly biased against them. He also failed to
update them on the status of their cases. They added that respondent handled a civil case despite a
conflict of interest. Complainants claimed that respondent became indifferent when he noticed that
they could no longer afford to pay him, so they asked him to withdraw as their counsel.

Respondent requested Complainants to "enumerate the specific material facts and dates
when he allegedly borrowed money from them and brought people to their houses to eat as
'dignitaries.' He also asked them to provide the specific incidents that involved his "alleged lying,
conflict of interest, and mishandling.

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline recommended dismissing
the Administrative Complaint. It found out that Buntag, et al. failed to substantiate their claims
against the lawyer. In an Extended Resolution, the Director of Commission on Bar Discipline
recommended that the Complaint against Atty. Toledo be dismissed for lack of evidence.

ISSUE

Does the complainant overcome the burden of proof required for disbarment cases?

RULING
 NO. It is well-established that the allegations in a disbarment complaint must be proven with
substantial evidence. Here, complainants failed to present any evidence to adequately support their
allegations against respondent. They failed to state how much he supposedly demanded from them.
They also did not attach receipts of the payment to support their claim of unreasonable demand of
money. Complainants alleged that they were forced to sign documents without understanding their
contents. These documents should have been annexed to their Complaint to show this Court what
these were.

Court will not penalize lawyers unless it is unmistakably shown that they are unfit to continue
being a member of the Bar. As a basic rule in evidence, the burden of proof lies on the party who
makes the allegations. In the case at bar, complainant miserably failed to comply with the burden of
proof required of her. A mere charge or allegation of wrongdoing does not suffice. Accusation is not
synonymous with guilt.

The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the

preservative and not on the vindictive principle, with great caution and only for the most weighty
reasons and only on clear cases of misconduct which seriously affect the standing and character of
the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the Bar. Only those acts, which cause loss of moral
character, should merit disbarment or suspension, while those acts, which neither affect nor erode
the moral character of the lawyer should only justify a lesser sanction unless they are of such nature
and to such extent as to clearly show the lawyer's unfitness to continue in the practice of law. The
dubious character of the act charged as well as the motivation, which induced the lawyer to commit
it, must be clearly demonstrated before suspension or disbarment is meted out. The mitigating or
aggravating circumstances that attended the commission of the offense should also be considered.
5. Discipline of Filipino lawyers who practice in foreign jurisdictions
6. Sanctions

VICTOR C. LINGAN v. ATTYS. ROMEO CALUBAQUIB and JIMMY P. BALIGA

A.C. No. 5377, June 30, 2014, Third Division (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The Supreme Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. When the
Supreme Court orders a lawyer suspended from the practice of law, the lawyer must desist from
performing all functions requiring the application of legal knowledge within the period of suspension.
This includes desisting from holding a position in government requiring the authority to practice law.

FACTS

In the resolution, the Court found Attys. Romeo I. Calubaquib and Jimmy P. Baliga guilty of
violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and of the Lawyer's Oath.
Respondents allowed their secretaries to notarize documents in their stead, in violation of Sections
2455 and 2466 of the Notarial Law. Respondents were suspended from the practice of law for one
year, revoked their notarial commissions, and disqualified them from reappointment as notaries
public for two years. Complainant Victor C. Lingan filed his motion for reconsideration, praying that
respondents be disbarred, not merely suspended from the practice of law. In the resolution, the Court
denied complainant Lingan's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. After this court had
suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law, the Commission on Human Rights En Banc issued
the resolution, suspending him from his position as Director/Attorney VI of the Commission on
Human Rights Regional Office for Region II. According to the Commission on Human Rights En Banc,
Atty. Baliga's suspension from the practice of law "prevented him from assuming his post as Regional
Director for want of eligibility in the meantime that his authority to practice law is suspended." Atty.
Baliga argued that he cannot be suspended for acts not connected with his functions as Commission
on Human Rights Regional Director. According to Atty. Baliga, his suspension from the practice of law
did not include his suspension from public office. He prayed for clarification of this court's resolution
"to prevent further injury and prejudice to his rights.” The Court noted without action Atty. Baliga's
ex parte clarificatory pleading as this court does not render advisory opinions.

The Court received a letter from complainant Lingan. In his letter, Lingan alleged that Atty.
Baliga continued practicing law and discharging his functions as Commission on Human Rights
Regional Director, in violation of this court's order of suspension. Complainant Lingan allegedly
received a copy of the Commission on Human Rights En Banc's resolution suspending Atty. Baliga as
Regional Director. Atty. Baliga's motion, the Commission reconsidered Atty. Baliga's suspension and
instead admonished him for "violating the conditions of his commission as a notary public."
According to complainant Lingan, he was not served a copy of Atty. Baliga's motion for
reconsideration. Complainant Lingan claimed that the discharge of the functions of a Commission on
Human Rights Regional Director necessarily required the practice of law. A Commission on Human
Rights Regional Director must be a member of the bar and is designated as Attorney VI. Since this
court suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law, Atty. Baliga was in effect "a non-lawyer and
was disqualified to hold the position of Regional Director during the effectivity of the order of
suspension." The Commission on Human Rights, according to complainant Lingan, should have
ordered Atty. Baliga to desist from performing his functions as Regional Director. Complainant
Lingan prayed that this court give "favorable attention and action on the matter."

In its report and recommendation, the Office of the Bar Confidant found that the period of
suspension of Attys. Calubaquib and Baliga had already lapsed. It recommended that respondents be
required to file their respective motions to lift order of suspension with certifications from the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Executive Judge of the court where they might appear as
counsel and state that they desisted from practicing law during the period of suspension. On the claim
that the Commission on Human Rights allowed Atty. Baliga to perform his functions as Regional
Director during the period of suspension, the Office of the Bar Confidant said that the Commission
"deliberately disregarded" this court's order of suspension. According to the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Commission on Human Rights had no power to "alter, modify, or set aside any of this
court's resolutions which have become final and executory."

In compliance with this court's order, Attys. Calubaquib and Baliga filed their respective
motions to lift order of suspension. Atty. Baliga also filed his comment on complainant Lingan's
allegation that he continued performing his functions as Regional Director during his suspension
from the practice of law. In its report and recommendation, the Office of the Bar Confidant stated that
Atty. Baliga "should not have been allowed to perform his functions, duties, and responsibilities as
Regional Director which required acts constituting practice of law." Considering that Atty. Baliga
claimed that he did not perform his functions as Regional Director which required the practice of law,
the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the Commission on Human Rights be required to
comment on this claim. The Office of the Bar Confidant also recommended holding in abeyance the
resolution of Atty. Baliga's motion to lift suspension "pending the Commission on Human Right's
filing of comment.” In the resolution, the Court held in abeyance the resolution of Atty. Baliga's
motion to lift one-year suspension. The Commission on Human Rights was ordered to comment on
Atty. Baliga's claim that he did not practice law while he held his position as Regional Director. In its
comment, the Commission on Human Rights reiterated that the penalty imposed on Atty. Baliga as a
member of the bar is separate from the penalty that might be imposed on him as Regional Director.
The Commission added that it is "of honest belief that the position of Regional Director is managerial
and does not require the practice of law." It again manifested that it will "abide by whatever ruling
or decision this court arrives on the matter."

ISSUE

Should Atty. Baliga's motion to lift order of suspension should be granted.

RULING

NO. The Court held that Atty. Baliga violated the order of suspension. The Court suspends him
further from the practice of law for six months. Practice of law is "any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience." It
includes "performing acts which are characteristics of the legal profession" or "rendering any kind of
service which requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." Work in government that
requires the use of legal knowledge is considered practice of law.

The Commission on Human Rights is an independent office created under the Constitution
with power to investigate "all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights.” It
is divided into regional offices with each office having primary responsibility to investigate human
rights violations in its territorial jurisdiction. Each regional office is headed by the Regional Director
who is given the position of Attorney VI. The powers and functions of a Regional Director are
characteristics of the legal profession. Oaths and affirmations are usually performed by members of
the judiciary and notaries public - officers who are necessarily members of the bar. Investigating
human rights complaints are performed primarily by the Commission's legal officer. Discussing
immediate courses of action and protection remedies and reviewing and approving draft resolutions
of human rights cases prepared by the legal officer require the use of extensive legal knowledge. The
exercise of the powers and functions of a Commission on Human Rights Regional Director constitutes
practice of law. Thus, the Regional Director must be an attorney - a member of the bar in good
standing and authorized to practice law. When the Regional Director loses this authority, such as
when he or she is disbarred or suspended from the practice of law, the Regional Director loses a
necessary qualification to the position he or she is holding. The disbarred or suspended lawyer must
desist from holding the position of Regional Director.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any lawful order of
a superior court is a ground for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law. It provides that
“a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct,
or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.”

D. READMISSION TO THE BAR

1. Lawyers who have been suspended
 2. Lawyers who have been disbarred
3. Lawyers who have been repatriated

E. MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION

1. Purpose
2. Requirements
3. Compliance
4. Exemptions
5. Sanctions

F. NOTARIAL PRACTICE
1. Qualifications of notary public

EFIGENIA M. TENOSO v. ATTY. ANSELMO S. ECHANEZ

A.C. No. 8384, April 11, 2013, En Banc (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The duties of notaries public are dictated by public policy and impressed with
public interest. "Notarization is not a routinary, meaningless act, for notarization converts a private
document to a public instrument, making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary
proof of its authenticity and due execution." In misrepresenting himself as a notary public, respondent
exposed party-litigants, courts, other lawyers and the general public to the perils of ordinary documents
posing as public instruments.

FACTS

Etigenia M. Tenoso filed a complaint against Atty. Anselmo S. Echanez alleging that
respondent was engaged in practice as a notary public in Cordon, lsabela, without having been
properly commissioned by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City, Isabela. The complainant
presented evidence supporting her allegation that respondent had notarized various documents in
Cordon, Isabela from 2006 to 2008 and that respondent's name does not appear on the list of notaries
public commissioned by the RTC of Santiago City, Isabela for the years 2006 to 2007 and 2007 to
2008. According to her, this alleged act violates Rule III of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice (A.M.
No. 02-8-13-SC).

In his Answer, respondent dismissed such allegations as being "preposterous, full of lies,
politically motivated and meant to harass or intimidate him". Also, he surmised that the documents
annexed to the Affidavit-Complaint were "tampered and adulterated," or that "somebody might have
forged his signature."

The Investigating Commissioner Atty. Salvador B. Hababag recommended that respondent be

suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months and disqualified from being commissioned as
a notary public for two (2) years for violating Rules 1.01 and 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The IBP Board of Governors affirmed the findings of the Investigating Commissioner
but increased the penalty of suspension from six (6) months to one (1) year. On August 12, 2009, the
IBP Board of Governors transmitted its Resolution to the Supreme Court for its action following Rule
139-B of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE

Is Atty. Echanez guilty of engaging in notarial practice without a notarial commission, and
accordingly, should be suspended from the practice of law.

RULING

YES. Respondent failed to present evidence to rebut complainant's allegations. Per Section 1,
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the burden of proof is vested upon the party who alleges the truth of
his claim or defense or any fact in issue. Thus, in Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services, Office
of the Court Administrator v. Gutierrez, where a party resorts to bare denials and allegations and fails
to submit evidence in support of his defense, the determination that he committed the violation is
sustained.

The duties of notaries public are dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest.
"Notarization is not a routinary, meaningless act, for notarization converts a private document to a
public instrument, making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of its
authenticity and due execution."

In misrepresenting himself as a notary public, respondent exposed party-litigants, courts,

other lawyers and the general public to the perils of ordinary documents posing as public
instruments. As noted by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent committed acts of deceit and
falsehood in open violation of the explicit pronouncements of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Evidently, respondent's conduct falls miserably short of the high standards of morality, honesty,
integrity and fair dealing required from lawyers. It is proper that he be sanctioned.

REX M. TUPAL v. JUDGE REMEGIO V. ROJO

A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842, February 24, 2014, Third Division (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court judges may act as notaries public.
However, they may do so only in their ex officio capacities. They may notarize documents, contracts, and
other conveyances only in the exercise of their official functions and duties. The 1989 Code of Judicial
Conduct not only enjoins judges to regulate their extra-judicial activities in order to minimize the risk
of conflict with their judicial duties, but also prohibits them from engaging in the private practice of
law.

FACTS

Rex M. Tupal filed with the Office of the Court Administrator a complaint against Judge
Remegio V. Rojo for violating the Code of Judicial Conduct and for gross ignorance of the law. Judge
Rojo allegedly solemnized marriages without the required marriage license. He instead notarized
affidavits of cohabitation and issued them to the contracting parties. He notarized these affidavits on
the day of the parties’ marriage. These "package marriages" are allegedly common in Bacolod City.
For notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage he solemnized, Judge Rojo
allegedly violated Circular No. 1-90 dated February 26, 1990. Circular No. 1-90 allows municipal trial
court judges to act as notaries public ex officio and notarize documents only if connected with their
official functions and duties. Rex argues that affidavits of cohabitation are not connected with a
judge’s official functions and duties as solemnizing officer. Thus, Judge Rojo cannot notarize ex officio
affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage he solemnized. Also, according to Rex, Judge Rojo
allegedly violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation
without affixing his judicial seal on the affidavits. He also did not require the parties to present their
competent pieces of evidence of identity as required by law.

Judge Rojo did not deny notarizing the affidavits of cohabitation. He argued that notarizing
affidavits of cohabitation was connected with his official functions and duties as a judge. The
Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary does not prohibit judges
from notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage they will solemnize. Thus, Judge
Rojo did not violate Circular No. 1-90. Judge Rojo also argued that he did not violate the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice. He is a judge, not a notary public. Thus, he was not required to affix a notarial
seal on the affidavits he notarized. Also, Judge Rojo argued that he need not notarize the affidavits
with the parties presenting their competent pieces of evidence of identity. Since he interviewed the
parties as to the contents of their affidavits, he personally knew them to be the same persons who
executed the affidavit. The parties’ identities are "unquestionable." Judge Rojo alleged that other
judges in Bacolod City and Talisay City also notarized affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose
marriage they solemnized.

In its report dated July 30, 2013, the Office of the Court Administrator found that Judge Rojo
violated Circular No. 1-90. The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that Judge Rojo be
fined ₱9,000.00 and sternly warned that repeating the same offense will be dealt with more severely.
The Office of the Court Administrator ruled that affidavits of cohabitation are documents not
connected with municipal trial court judges’ official functions and duties. Under the Guidelines on the
Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary, a judge’s duty is to personally examine
the allegations in the affidavit of cohabitation before performing the marriage ceremony. Nothing in
the Guidelines authorizes judges to notarize affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage they
will solemnize. Since Judge Rojo notarized without authority nine affidavits of cohabitation, the Office
of the Court Administrator recommended a fine of ₱1,000.00 per affidavit of cohabitation notarized.

ISSUE

Is Judge Rojo guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and of gross ignorance of
the law.

RULING

YES. This court finds Judge Rojo guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and of
gross ignorance of the law. Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90 and the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice. Municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court judges may act as notaries public.
However, they may do so only in their ex officio capacities. They may notarize documents, contracts,
and other conveyances only in the exercise of their official functions and duties. The 1989 Code of
Judicial Conduct not only enjoins judges to regulate their extra-judicial activities in order to minimize
the risk of conflict with their judicial duties, but also prohibits them from engaging in the private
practice of law (Canon 5 and Rule 5.07). They may also act as notaries public ex officio only if lawyers
or notaries public are lacking in their courts’ territorial jurisdiction. They must certify as to the lack
of lawyers or notaries public when notarizing documents ex officio. Judge Rojo notarized affidavits
of cohabitation, which were documents not connected with the exercise of his official functions and
duties as solemnizing officer. He also notarized affidavits of cohabitation without certifying that
lawyers or notaries public were lacking in his court’s territorial jurisdiction. Thus, Judge Rojo violated
Circular No. 1-90. Before performing the marriage ceremony, the judge must personally interview
the contracting parties and examine the requirements they submitted. The parties must have
complied with all the essential and formal requisites of marriage. Among these formal requisites is a
marriage license. A marriage license is issued by the local civil registrar to parties who have all the
qualifications and none of the legal disqualifications to contract marriage. Before performing the
marriage ceremony, the judge must personally examine the marriage license presented. If the
contracting parties have cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years and have no legal
impediment to marry, they are exempt from the marriage license requirement. Instead, the parties
must present an affidavit of cohabitation sworn to before any person authorized by law to administer
oaths. The judge, as solemnizing officer, must personally examine the affidavit of cohabitation as to
the parties having lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and the absence of any
legal impediment to marry each other. The judge must also execute a sworn statement that he
personally ascertained the parties’ qualifications to marry and found no legal impediment to the
marriage.

Based on law and the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the
Judiciary, the person who notarizes the contracting parties’ affidavit of cohabitation cannot be the
judge who will solemnize the parties’ marriage. As a solemnizing officer, the judge’s only duty
involving the affidavit of cohabitation is to examine whether the parties have indeed lived together
for at least five years without legal impediment to marry. The Guidelines does not state that the judge
can notarize the parties’ affidavit of cohabitation. Thus, affidavits of cohabitation are documents not
connected with the judge’s official function and duty to solemnize marriages. Notarizing affidavits of
cohabitation is inconsistent with the duty to examine the parties’ requirements for marriage. If the
solemnizing officer notarized the affidavit of cohabitation, he cannot objectively examine and review
the affidavit’s statements before performing the marriage ceremony. Should there be any irregularity
or false statements in the affidavit of cohabitation he notarized, he cannot be expected to admit that
he solemnized the marriage despite the irregularity or false allegation. Thus, judges cannot notarize
the affidavits of cohabitation of the parties whose marriage they will solemnize. Affidavits of
cohabitation are documents not connected with their official function and duty to solemnize
marriages.

Judge Rojo also violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Rule IV, Section 2, paragraph (b)
of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice prohibits a notary public from notarizing documents if the
signatory is not personally known to him. Otherwise, the notary public must require the signatory to
present a competent evidence of identity. A competent evidence of identity guarantees that the
person appearing before the notary public is the signatory to the instrument or document to be
notarized. If the notary public does not personally know the signatory, he must require the signatory
to present a competent evidence of identity. In all the nine affidavits of cohabitation Judge Rojo
notarized, he only stated that the parties subscribed and swore to their affidavits before him. Judge
Rojo did not state that the parties were personally known to him or that the parties presented their
competent pieces of evidence of identity. Thus, Judge Rojo violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice. For violating Circular No. 1-90 and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice nine times, Judge
Rojo is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.

2. Term of office of notary public

3. Powers and limitations
 CRESCENCIANO M. PITOGO v. ATTY. JOSELITO TROY SUELLO

A.C. No. 10695, March 18, 2015, Second Division (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The notarial commission is a license held personally by the notary public. It cannot be further
delegated. It is the notary public alone who is personally responsible for the correctness of the entries
in his or her notarial register.

FACTS

Crescenciano M. Pitogo purchased a motorcycle from Emcor, Inc. However, Emcor, Inc.
allegedly failed to cause the registration of the motorcycle under his name. Pitogo, thus, filed a Civil
Complaint before the Regional Trial Court against EMCOR, Inc. The motorcycle was eventually
registered in Pitogo's name based on three documents notarized by respondent Atty. Joselito Troy
Suello.

Pitogo obtained a copy of the three documents from the Land Transportation Office. He went
to Suello's office to have them certified. Pitogo claims that when he called Suello the next day to tell
him about the importance of these documents to his civil case, Suello "disowned the documents."
Suello instead ordered his secretary to give Pitogo a copy of his notarial register.

Pitogo requested Suello to certify the authenticity and veracity of the three documents he
obtained from the Land Transportation Office. He wanted to determine if the documents were duly
notarized by Suello or were merely fabricated. Pitogo did not receive a reply from Suello.

Pitogo then filed his Affidavit-Complaint against Suello before the Cebu Chapter of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Pitogo alleges that there were discrepancies between the three
documents notarized by Suello and Suello's entries in his notarial register.

ISSUE

Did Suello properly recorded the entries in the notarial register.

RULING

NO. Notarial acts give private documents a badge of authenticity that the public relies on
when they encounter written documents and engage in written transactions. Hence, all notaries
public are duty-bound to protect the integrity of notarial acts by ensuring that they perform their
duties with utmost care.

Hence, when respondent negligently failed to enter the details of the three documents on his
notarial register, he cast doubt on the authenticity of complainant's documents. He also cast doubt
on the credibility of the notarial register and the notarial process. He violated not only the Notarial
Rules but also the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers to promote respect
for law and legal processes.
 Respondent also appears to have committed a falsehood in the pleadings he submitted. In his
Answer to complainant's Affidavit-Complaint, respondent claimed that he certified complainant's
documents as true copies. Later, in his Position Paper, he passed the blame to his secretary. This
violates the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits lawyers from engaging in dishonest
and unlawful conduct.

Respondent's secretary cannot be blamed for the erroneous entries in the notarial register.
The notarial commission is a license held personally by the notary public. It cannot be further
delegated. It is the notary public alone who is personally responsible for the correctness of the
entries in his or her notarial register.

JIMMY ANUDON v. ATTY. ARTURO B. CEFRA

A.C. No. 5482, February 10, 2015, En Banc (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Whoever acts as Notary Public must ensure that the parties executing the document be present.
Otherwise, their participation with respect to the document cannot be acknowledged. Notarization of a
document in the absence of the parties is a breach of duty.

FACTS

Complainants and Jimmy’s brothers and sister co-own a 4,446-square-meter parcel of land
located in Sison, Pangasinan covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 69244. Respondent
Atty. Arturo B. Cefra (Atty. Cefra) is a distant relative of Jimmy and Juanita. Jimmy and Juanita claimed
that the Deed of Absolute Sale was falsified. On August 12, 1998, Atty. Cefra notarized a Deed of
Absolute Sale over a land covered by TCT No. 69244. The names of Johnny Anudon (Johnny), Alfonso
Anudon (Alfonso), Benita Anudon-Esguerra (Benita), and complainants Jimmy and Juanita appeared
as vendors, while the name of Celino Paran, Jr. (Paran) appeared as the vendee. They alleged that
they did not sign the Deed of Absolute Sale. Moreover, they did not sign it before Atty. Cefra. The
National Bureau of Investigation’s Questioned Documents Division certified that Jimmy and Juanita’s
signatures were forged. This is contrary to Atty. Cefra’s acknowledgment over the document.

In addition to the forgery of their signatures, Jimmy and Juanita stated that it was physically
impossible for their brothers and sister, Johnny, Alfonso, and Benita, to sign the Deed of Absolute
Sale. Johnny and Benita were in the United States on the day the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed,
while Alfonso was in Cavite.

Jimmy and Juanita also initiated a disciplinary action by filing a Complaint with this court on
August 6, 2001 questioning the propriety of Atty. Cefra’s conduct as lawyer and notary public. In the
Resolution dated September 19, 2001, the SC required Atty. Cefra to comment on the administrative
complaint. Atty. Cefra filed multiple Motions for Extension of Time, which this court granted. Despite
the allowance for extension of time, Atty. Cefra did not comply with this court’s order to file a
Comment. This court fined Atty. Cefra in the Resolutions dated March 12, 2003 and November 17,
2003. In both Resolutions, this court directed Atty. Cefra to file his Comment.

Atty. Cefra’s continued refusal to file his Comment caused this court to order his arrest and
commitment.18 Thus, the National Bureau of Investigation’s agents arrested Atty. Cefra at his
residence on January 14, 2007. Atty. Cefra finally submitted his Comment on January 15, 2008.
ISSUE

Is Atty. Cefra administratively liable?

HELD:

YES. Atty. Cefra violated his duty as a notary public. Notarization is the act that ensures the
public that the provisions in the document express the true agreement between the parties.
Transgressing the rules on notarial practice sacrifices the integrity of notarized documents. It is the
notary public who assures that the parties appearing in the document are the same parties who
executed it. This cannot be achieved if the parties are not physically present before the notary public
acknowledging the document.

Atty. Cefra claims that Jimmy and Juanita wanted to sell their land. Even if this is true, Jimmy
and Juanita, as vendors, were not able to review the document given for notarization. The Deed of
Absolute Sale was brought to Atty. Cefra by Paran’s representatives, who merely informed Atty. Cefra
that the vendors signed the document. Atty. Cefra should have exercised vigilance and not just relied
on the representations of the vendee.

It is possible that the terms and conditions favorable to the vendors might not be in the
document submitted by the vendee for notarization. In addition, the possibility of forgery became
real.

Aside from Atty. Cefra’s violation of his duty as a notary public, Atty. Cefra is also guilty of
violating Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. This canon requires "a lawyer to uphold
the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes." He
contumaciously delayed compliance with this court’s order to file a Comment.

As early as September 19, 2001, this court already required Atty. Cefra to comment on the
Complaint lodged against him. Atty. Cefra did not comply with this order until he was arrested by the
National Bureau of Investigation. Atty. Cefra only filed his Comment on January 15, 2008, more than
seven years after this court’s order. Atty. Cefra’s actions show utter disrespect for legal processes.

The act of disobeying a court order constitutes violation of Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which requires a lawyer to "observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts." Under Rule 138, Section 27, paragraph 159 of the Rules of Court, "wilful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court" constitutes a ground for disbarment or suspension from the practice
of law. Atty. Cefra’s disobedience to this court’s directive issued in 2001 was not explained even as
he eventually filed his Comment in 2008. Clearly, his disobedience was willful and inexcusable. Atty.
Cefra should be penalized for this infraction.

TEODORO TORTONA v. JULIAN GREGORIO

G.R. No. 202612, January 17, 2018, Third Division(Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Through notarization, the public and the courts may rely on the face of the instrument, without
need of further examining its authenticity and due execution. It is an act that is imbued with public
interest. Notarized documents enjoy the presumption of regularity. They are accorded evidentiary
weight as regards their due execution. However, any such presumption is disputable. It can be refuted
by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Petitioners successfully discharged this burden with
the aid of an expert witness.

FACTS

This case is an offshoot of a Deed of Absolute Sale allegedly entered into by sisters Rufina, the
purported seller, and Rafaela, the purported buyer. Petitioners are the heirs of Rufina, while
respondents are the heirs of Rafaela. Rufina and Rafaela co-owned with their other siblings two (2)
parcels of land located in Longos and Talaba, Bacoor, Cavite. When Rufina was still alive, she regularly
collected her respective 1/10 and 1/5 shares in the income. After her death, petitioners continued to
collect and receive their mother’s share.

Sometime in 1997, petitioners filed a complaint for recovery of real property with damages.
They alleged that their cousin Emilio offered them a balato of P50,000.00 for the sale of the first
parcel to the Department of Public Works and Highways. They asked why they were not instead given
their 1/10 share in the proceeds of the sale. To this, Emilio allegedly replied that according to
respondents, the two (2) properties had already been sold by Rufina to Rafaela during their lifetime.
Petitioners proceeded to the Office of the Registry of Deeds to verify the supposed sale. It appeared
that Rufina sold her shares to both lands. It also became apparent that sometime after the sales of the
two (2) parcels, respondents executed a Declaration of Heirship and Extrajudicial Partition.

Petitioners underscored that their mother was illiterate, not even knowing how to write her
own name. They alleged that she only affixed her thumbmark on documents, and whenever she did
so, she was always assisted by at least one (1) of her children. Petitioners likewise presented as
witness National Bureau of Investigation fingerprint examiner Eriberto B. Gomez, Jr., who conducted
an examination to determine the genuineness of the questioned thumbmarks in the Deed of Absolute
Sale. Gomez noted that “the purported thumbmarks of Rufina Casimiro in the alleged Deed of
Absolute Sale were not identical with her standard thumbmarks in the standard documents.”

The Regional Trial Court concluded that the Deed of Absolute Sale was a forgery and ruled in
favor of the petitioners. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the ruling of the Regional Trial
Court. It found that the Deed of Absolute Sale was a notarized document and had in its favor the
presumption of regularity. The Heirs of Rufina then filed the present Petition.

ISSUE

Is the Deed of Absolute Sale allegedly executed by Rufina Casimiro, as seller, and Rafaela
Casimiro, as buyer, void?

RULING

YES. Petitioners successfully discharged the burden of proving that thumbmarks affixed on
the contentious Deed of Absolute Sale is false and simulated.

The contentious Deed of Absolute Sale in this case is a notarized document. Thus, it benefits
from the presumption of regularity. The burden of proving that thumbmarks affixed on it by an
ostensible party is false and simulated lies on the party assailing its execution. It is then incumbent
upon petitioners to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the seller’s thumbmarks, as
appearing on the Deed of Absolute Sale, are forged and are not their mother’s. Notarization enables
a notary public to ascertain the voluntariness of the party’s act and to verify the genuineness of his
or her signature. Through notarization, the public and the courts may rely on the face of the
instrument, without need of further examining its authenticity and due execution. It is an act that is
imbued with public interest. Notarized documents enjoy the presumption of regularity. They are
accorded evidentiary weight as regards their due execution. However, any such presumption is
disputable. It can be refuted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.

Petitioners successfully discharged this burden with the aid of an expert witness. They
contrasted Rufina’s apparent thumbmarks on the Deed of Absolute Sale with specimen thumbmarks
on authentic documents. They demonstrated disparities that lead to no other conclusion than that
the thumbmarks on the contentious Deed of Absolute Sale are forged. Rule 130, Section 49 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence specifies that courts may admit the testimonies of expert witnesses or of
individuals possessing “special knowledge, skill, experience or training.” Testimonies of expert
witnesses are not absolutely binding on courts. However, courts exercise a wide latitude of discretion
in giving weight to expert testimonies, taking into consideration the factual circumstances of the case.

4. Notarial register
5. Jurisdiction of notary public and place of notarization
6. Revocation of commission
7. Competent evidence of identity

ALFONSO SINGSON CORTAL, et.al v. INAKI A. LARRAZABAL ENTERPRISES

G.R. No. 199107, August 30, 2017, Third Division (Leonen, J)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Rule IV, Section 2(b)(2) of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that the need for a
competent evidence of identity is not an absolute requirement. It is imperative only when the signatory
is not personally known to the notary. When the signatory is personally known to the notary, the
presentation of competent evidence of identity is a superfluity. The Court of Appeals failed to absolutely
discount the possibility that petitioners may have been personally known to the notary public, especially
considering that, by that advanced stage in litigating their claims, they must have already verified
several pleadings, likely before the same notary public.

FACTS

Private respondent Inaki A. Larrazabal Enterprises owned 3 parcels of land in Sitio Coob,
Barangay Libertad, Ormoc City. In 1988, these 3 parcels were placed under the Compulsory
Acquisition Scheme of Presidential Decree No. 27, as amended by Executive Order No. 228. Pursuant
to the Scheme, Emancipation Patents and new transfer certificates of title were issued to farmer-
beneficiaries, petitioners included.

In 1999, Larrazabal Enterprises filed its Action for Recovery of these parcels against the
Department of Agrarian Reform and the petitioners before the Office of the Regional Adjudicator,
DARAB. It alleged that no price had been fixed, much less paid, for the expropriation of its properties,
in violation of the just compensation requirement under Presidential Decree No. 27, as amended.
Thus, it prayed for the recovery of these lots and the cancellation of petitioners' transfer certificates
of title.
 In their Answer, petitioners denied non-payment of just compensation. They presented
certifications issued by the Land Bank of the Philippines that the amounts of P80,359.37 and
P95,691.49 had been deposited as payments in the name of Larrazabal Enterprises.

The Regional Adjudicator Felixberto M. Diloy ruled in favor of Larrazabal Enterprises and
ordered that it be restored to ownership of the lots. The DARAB reversed the Decision of Regional
Adjudicator Diloy and ruled that Larrazabal Enterprises' action, which was filed in 1999, was already
barred by prescription and laches. Larrazabal Enterprises filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The
DARAB reversed its own decision and granted Larrazabal Enterprises' Motion for Reconsideration.
It justified its ruling by saying that Larrazabal Enterprises had been denied due process when the
parcels were taken from it without having been given just compensation. Petitioners then filed a
Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed their Petition. Thus,
this Petition was filed.

ISSUE

Is the dismissal of petitioners' appeal justified by the failure of the Verification and
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping to show any competent evidence of identity of the petitioners,
in violation of Sec. 2.(2) Rule IV of the Rules of Notarial Practice?

RULING

NO. Rule IV, Section 2(b)(2) of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that the need for
a competent evidence of identity is not an absolute requirement. It is imperative only when the
signatory is not personally known to the notary. When the signatory is personally known to the
notary, the presentation of competent evidence of identity is a superfluity.

In this case, the Court of Appeals' bare reference to petitioners' inadequate proof of identity
does not justify the outright denial of their appeal. The Court of Appeals failed to absolutely discount
the possibility that petitioners may have been personally known to the notary public, especially
considering that, by that advanced stage in litigating their claims, they must have already verified
several pleadings, likely before the same notary public.

Ultimately, a defective verification is merely a formal and not a fatal, jurisdictional defect,
which could have very easily been ordered corrected. As to the defective certification of non-forum
shopping, the greater cause of justice should have impelled the Court of Appeals, as this Court
implored in Altres v. Empleo, to have at least enabled petitioners to rectify their lapse, rather than
completely deny them a chance at exhaustive litigation by a mere stroke of its pen.

PRISCILLA ZAFRA ORBE v. FILINVEST LAND, INC.,

G.R. No. 208185, September 06, 2017, Third Division Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Notarization under the Maceda Law extends beyond converting private documents into public
ones. Under Section 3 and 4, notarization enables the exercise of the statutory right of unilateral
cancellation by the seller of a perfected contract. If acknowledgement is in the customary rendition of
public documents, with greater reason should an acknowledgement be imperative in notices of
cancellation or demands for rescission made under Section 3 and 4 of the Maceda Law.
FACTS

Sometime in June 2001, Orbe purchased a lot with respondent Filinvest over a 385 sqm lot
with a total contract price of P2,566,795.00 payable on installment basis. From June 17,2001 to July
14, 2004, Orbe paid a total of P608,648.20. However, Orbe was unable to make further payments
allegedly on account of financial difficulties. As a result, Filinvest sent a notice of cancellation
rescinding the contract which was received by Obre on October 18, 2004. And on the said notice, it
was accompanied by a jurat, wherein the proof of identity used by the signatory of the respondent’s
notice of cancellation was a community tax certificate.

Orbe then filed a complaint for refund with damages before the HLURB wherein Arbiter
Soriano of HLURB ruled in her favor. He held that since Orbe made payments from June 17, 2001 to
July 14, 2004, or a period of more than two years, all of which should be credited to the principal,
she was entitled to a refund of the cash surrender value equivalent to 50% of eh total payments she
made, pursuant to Section 3 of RA No. 6552.

Filinvest appealed to the HLURB Board of Commissioners and affirmed Arbiter Soriano
Decision. Filinvest then appealed to the Office of the President (OP). The OP sustained the conclusion
that Orbe was entitled to a 50% refund and agreed how Orbe had made installment payments for
more than two (2) years.

Filivest made another appeal to the CA arguing that what RA No. 6552 requires for refund of
the cash surrender value is not the length of time at least two years from the first payment to the last
payment, but the number of installments paid, that is, at least two years of installment or 24 monthly
installment paid. Thus, Section 3 will only apply when the buyer has made at least 24 installment
payments.

The CA reversed the prior rulings of the OP, the HLURB Board of Commissioners, and of
Arbiter Soriano and dismissed Orbe’s complaint. The CA reasoned that the phrase “two years of
installments under Section 3 means that the total payments made should at least be equivalent to
two years’ worth of installments.

Considering that Orbe's total payment of P608,648.20 was short of the required two (2) years'
worth of installments, she could not avail of the benefits of Section 3. What applied instead was
Section 4, enabling a grace period of 60 days from the day the installment became due and further
enabling the seller to cancel or rescind the contract through a notarial act, should the buyer still fail
to pay within the grace period. It found Filinvest to have sent Orbe a valid, notarized notice of
cancellation thereby precluding any further relief.

ISSUE

Is the jurat made by the respondent a valid notarial act as contemplated under the Maceda
Law?

RULING

NO. For cancellations under Section 4 to be valid, three (3) requisites must concur, First, the
buyer must have been given a 60-day grace period but failed to utilize it. Second, the seller must have
sent a notice of cancellation or demand for rescission by notarial act And third, the cancellation shall
take effect only after 30 days of the buyer's receipt of the notice of cancellation.
 Respondent’s notice indicates that petitioner failed to utilize the 60-day grace period. The
notice of cancellation was also accompanied by a jurat; thereby making it appear to have been a valid
notarial act. This is not, however, the valid notarial act contemplated by the Maceda Law.

In ordinary circumstances, notarization of a private document converts the document into a

public one making it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. To enable this
conversion, Rule 132, Section 19 of the Revised Rules of Evidence specifically requires that a
document be “acknowledged before a notary public”.

Notarization under the Maceda Law extends beyond converting private documents into
public ones. Under Section 3 and 4, notarization enables the exercise of the statutory right of
unilateral cancellation by the seller of a perfected contract. If acknowledgement is in the customary
rendition of public documents, with greater reason should an acknowledgement be imperative in
notices of cancellation or demands for rescission made under Section 3 and 4 of the Maceda Law.

Through an acknowledgement, individuals acting as representatives declare that they are

authorized to act as such representatives. This is particularly crucial with respect to signatories to
notices of cancellation or demands for rescission under Sections 3 and 4 of the Maceda Law.

Respondent’s notice of cancellation here was executed by an individual identified only as

belonging to respondent’s Collection Department. It was also accompanied not by an
acknowledgement, but by a jurat. A jurat is a distinct notarial act, which makes no averment
concerning the authority of a representative. Even if respondent's notarization by jurat and not by
acknowledgement were to be condoned, respondent's jurat was not even a valid jurat executed
according to the requirements of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.

8. Sanctions

G. DUTIES OF LAWYERS UNDER SPECIFIC PROVISIONS IN THE RULES OF COURT

1. Judgments, final orders, and entry of judgments
2. Contempt

ATTY. HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., v. ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP) CHIEF
OF STAFF, GEN. GREGORIO PIO CATAPANG, BRIG GEN. ARTHUR ANG, CAMP AGUINALDO
CAMP COMMANDER, and LT. COL. HAROLD CABUNOC, AFP PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE CHIEF

G.R. No. 214986, February 15, 2017, Second Division(Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Where there are yet no proceedings against a lawyer, there is nothing to keep private and
confidential. Respondents' threats were made before November 4, 2014, and there was no proceeding
to keep private.

FACTS

Atty. Herminio Harry L. Roque, Jr., was the counsel of the family of the slain Jeffrey "Jennifer"
Laude, 26-year old Filipino, who was allegedly killed at a motel in Olongapo City by 19-year old US
Marine Private Joseph Scott Pemberton. Respondents state that petitioner, with his clients, forced
their way inside the premises of the Mutual Defense Board-Security Engagement Board and gained
entry despite having been instructed by Military Police personnel not to enter the compound.

In response to this, the respondents filed a disbarment complaint against petitioner, before
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the same was publicly announced through a conference.

Petitioner filed a Petition to Cite for Indirect Contempt against the respondents, alleging that
the press statement of the respondents was reported on, and generously quoted from, by media. He
asserts that respondents' acts are contumacious violations of Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court, to which the respondents responded that the filing of the disbarment case was not meant to
malign petitioner as a lawyer but rather was a response to the events that transpired at Camp
Aguinaldo.

ISSUES

Is respondents’ public pronouncements violative of Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court?

RULING

NO. Where there are yet no proceedings against a lawyer, there is nothing to keep private and
confidential. Respondents' threats were made before November 4, 2014, and there was no
proceeding to keep private.

An examination on the Press Statement made on November 4, 2014 also reveals that it does
not divulge anything that merits punishment for contempt nor does it divulge any acts or character
traits on the part of petitioner that would damage his personal and professional reputation. Its
coverage of the disbarment complaint was a brief, unembellished report that a complaint had been
filed. Such an announcement does not, in and of itself, violate the confidentiality rule, particularly
considering that it did not discuss the disbarment complaint itself.

POLO PLANTATION AGRARIAN REFORM MULTIPURPOSE COOPERATIVE (POPARMUCO), v.

RODOLFO T. INSON, CESO III, AS REGIONAL DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM, REGION VII

G.R. No. 189162, January 30, 2019, Third Division (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

What is crucial in contempt proceedings is the intent of the alleged contemnor to disobey or defy
the court. To constitute contempt, the act must be done willfully and for an illegitimate or improper
purpose. Respondent’s erroneous cognizance of the Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion can only be deemed
as grave abuse of discretion, which is more properly the subject of a petition for certiorari, not a petition
for contempt.

FACTS

A portion of the landholding owned by Polo Coconut Plantation, Inc. (Polo Coconut) was
placed under the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Polo Coconut's title was
canceled in favor of the Republic of the Philippines and a collective Certificate of Land Ownership
Award (CLOA) was issued and registered in favor of the POLO PLANTATION AGRARIAN REFORM
MULTIPURPOSE COOPERATIVE (POPARMUCO) members whom the Department of Agrarian Reform
identified as agrarian reform beneficiaries.

Polo Coconut moved for the suspension of the survey, but Regional Adjudicator denied the
Motion for lack of jurisdiction. Polo Coconut filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for
Certiorari, which the CA ruled in favor of Polo Coconut. In its September 3, 2008 Decision, the
Supreme Court reversed the CA decision. It confirmed the acts of the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR), through the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer, and declared the issuance of TCT and CLOA
as valid. Furthermore, the Court ruled that DAR had the property authority to identify and select
agrarian reform beneficiaries.

Subsequently, 164 alleged regular farmworkers of Polo Coconut filed a Petition for Inclusion
as qualified beneficiaries in TCT /CLOA and Exclusion of those named as beneficiaries therein. They
also filed a Petition for Immediate Issuance of a Cease and Desist Order and/or Injunction. Acting on
the Petition the respondent, Regional Director Inson issued a Cease and Desist Order.

POPARMUCO members filed a Motion to Quash the said order with Motion for
Reconsideration. They alleged that they were not given prior notice of the filing of the Petition for
Inclusion/Exclusion, and that the Cease and Desist Order defied this Court's September 3, 2008
Decision. POPARMUCO filed before the Supreme Court a Petition for Contempt against respondent.

Respondent asserts that the September 3, 2008 Decision is no legal impediment to his taking
cognizance of the Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion and issuance of a Cease and Desist Order. Court
had recognized the Department Secretary's exclusive jurisdiction over the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, including the identification and selection of its
beneficiaries. Further, his issuance of the Cease and Desist Order is authorized under Section 22,
which vests in the Department of Agrarian Reform the power to reassess the qualification of
identified beneficiaries, and even strip them of their rights if found to have violated agrarian laws.

During the pendency of this Petition, respondent dismissed in a September 29, 2009 Order
the Motion to Quash and upheld the validity of his Cease and Desist Order. Respondent further
directed the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer "to facilitate the inclusion of the . . . qualified agrarian
reform beneficiaries in CLOA No. 00114438 under TCT No. T-802 by filing a petition before the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Oriental Negros for the amendment/correction of the
subject CLOA.

ISSUE

Is the act of the respondent in taking cognizance of the Petition for Inclusion/ Exclusion
constituted defiance of the September 3, 2008 Decision of the Supreme Court?

RULING

NO. Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its
authority, justice, and dignity, and signifies not only a willful disregard of the court's order, hut such
conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or,
in some manner, to impede the due administration of justice. To be considered contemptuous, an act
must be clearly contrary to or prohibited by the order of the court. The court's contempt power
should be exercised with restraint and for a preservative, and not vindictive, purpose. "Only in cases
of clear and contumacious refusal to obey should the power be exercised."

Here, respondent justified his cognizance of the Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion based on the
Department's exclusive prerogative in the identification, selection, and subsequent re-evaluation of
agrarian reform beneficiaries

However, as earlier stated, the issue on the qualification of the existing Certificate of Land
Ownership Award holders had long been laid to rest in this Court's final and executory September 3,
2008 Decision. Some of the petitioners in the inclusion/exclusion proceedings were even
respondents in that case. Still, respondent's erroneous cognizance of the Petition for
Inclusion/Exclusion can only be deemed as grave abuse of discretion, which is more properly the
subject of a petition for certiorari, not a petition for contempt.

At any rate, whether respondent's actions were improper is not an issue here. What is crucial
in contempt proceedings is the intent of the alleged contemnor to disobey or defy the court. In
contempt, the intent goes to the gravamen of the offense. Thus, the good faith or lack of it, of the
alleged contemnor is considered. To constitute contempt, the act must be done willfully and for an
illegitimate or improper purpose.

3. Arraignment and plea

4. Attorney-client privilege
5. Powers and duties of court and judicial officers

ATTY. JOSELITA C. MALIBAGO-SANTO v. JUANITO B. FRANCISCO, JR.,

A.M. No. P-16-3459, June 21, 2016, En Banc (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The Court has repeatedly emphasized that sheriffs are not authorized to receive any voluntary
payments from parties in the course of the performance of their duties regardless of the fact that both
respondent and Planters bank allege that no solicitation took place and that Planters bank insisted on
giving respondent the amount as a token of appreciation and gratitude.

FACTS

Atty. Joselita Malibago- Santos received a letter of Intent to Redeem Subject Property from
Overlook Resort Inc. and its President, Raymond C. Ricardo, in relation to its extrajudicial foreclosure
case.

In an auction held earlier, Planters Development Bank was adjudged highest bidder. Thus,
Atty. Santos wrote the bank's Senior Vice President to inform her of the mortgagors' intent to redeem
the foreclosed property. Subsequently, Atty. Santos received a letter from Atty. Alexander L. Paulino,
legal counsel for Planters bank, stating that the redemption price of P5,053,706.89 for the foreclosed
property. Attached to the letter were statements of accounts and receipts in support of this amount,
including a receipt for P8,000.00 signed by Sheriff Juanito B. Francisco, Jr., who was then Sheriff-in-
Charge.
 In a memorandum, Atty. Santos required Sheriff Francisco to explain why he did not submit
an estimate of expenses and liquidation in relation to the P8,000.00 he received. In his explanation,
he stated that he received the check when the auction had already been concluded, as a token of
appreciation.

The Office of the Court Administrator received a Confidential Memorandum from Presiding
Judge Ma. Consejo Gengos-Ignalaga. It detailed her findings and recommendations after conducting
a formal investigation on the letter-complaint of Atty. Santos against Sheriff Francisco. She
recommended that Sheriff Francisco be found guilty of simple misconduct and reprimanded as
penalty.

In its Memorandum, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended that the instant
complaint against Sheriff Francisco be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter and that
Francisco be found GUILTY of gross misconduct and be SUSPENDED for three (3) months without
pay with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same offense shall be dealt with more severely.

ISSUE

Is Sheriff Francisco guilty of gross misconduct when he accepted the P8,000.00 check from
Planters Bank?

RULING

YES. Sheriffs play a crucial role in our justice system as our front-line representatives tasked
with executing final judgments by the courts. Codes of ethics for public employees such as sheriffs
prohibit them from accepting any form of remuneration in relation to the performance of their official
duties.

In Astorga v. Villanueva, the Court states that the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel requires
that court personnel avoid conflicts of interest in performing official duties. It mandates that court
personnel should not receive tips or other remunerations for assisting or attending to parties
engaged in transactions or involved in actions or proceedings with the judiciary. The Court has
always stressed that all members of the judiciary should be free from any whiff of impropriety, not
only with respect to their duties in the judicial branch but also to their behavior outside the court as
private individuals, in order that the integrity and good name of the courts of justice shall be
preserved. Court personnel cannot take advantage of the vulnerability of party-litigants.

Both respondent and Planters bank allege that no solicitation took place and that Planters
bank insisted on giving respondent the amount as a token of appreciation and gratitude. Still, Courts
has repeatedly emphasized that "sheriffs are not authorized to receive any voluntary payments from
parties in the course of the performance of their duties." This opens doubt on monetary
considerations being made for wrongful and unethical purposes, creates cracks in our justice system,
and proves "inimical to the best interests of the service."

6. Disqualification of judicial officers/inhibition

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. IMELDA R. MARCOS

G.R. No. 185484, June 27, 2018, Third Division (Leonen, J.)
DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Whether or not to voluntarily inhibit from hearing a case is a matter within the judge's
discretion. Absent clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will
dispense justice in accordance with law and evidence, the Court will not interfere. No concrete proof of
Judge Pampilo's personal interest in the case was presented. There was no showing that his bias stems
from an extrajudicial source. Not only that, but none of his acts, as shown on the record, was
characterized by any error.

FACTS

This case involves 33 consolidated criminal cases, filed against Imelda R. Marcos, among
others, for violations of Section 4 of Central Bank Circular No. 960, in relation to Section 34 of
Republic Act No. 265, or the Central Bank Act.

Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals should have appreciated Judge Pampilo's
demeanor and over-eagerness to decide the case as evidence of grave abuse of discretion. He
characterized Judge Pampilo's scheduling of the prosecution's witness as a "noose-tightening tactic."
He claimed that due to the unreasonableness of the schedule for his testimonies, it was inevitable
that the prosecution would have to request for adjustments, and thereafter accept any resetting with
the warning that its presentation of evidence would be deemed terminated. Judge Pampilo made it
impossible for petitioner or for Department of Justice State Prosecutor Yarte to appear at the hearing
dates set by the court. By orally denying the Motion to Inhibit on April 24, 2007, Judge Pampilo
essentially forced the prosecution to present its evidence on the very same day, or end its
presentation of evidence. Petitioner also claims that Judge Pampilo, Atty. Galit, and Atty. Robert Sison
(Atty. Sison) all acted with a common objective of railroading the cases. He insists that this common
objective is evident from what transpired on April 24, 2007. In particular, petitioner points out the
fact that Judge Pampilo interpreted the Department of Justice Memorandum dated April 17, 2007 as
designating Atty. Galit as the lead prosecutor and refused to allow Prosecutor Yarte to argue as the
lead prosecutor. This is despite the fact that the Department of Justice Memorandum did not
designate Atty. Galit as the lead prosecutor or exclude Prosecutor Yarte from arguing before the
court.

Petitioner also assails the circumstances surrounding the promulgation of Judge Pampilo's
decision. He suggests that there must have been a direct liaison between Judge Pampilo and Atty.
Sison, because without one, under the circumstances, respondent Imelda would not have been able
to file an Urgent Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order Ad Cautelam in time for the original
scheduled promulgation to proceed. Further, he alleges that Judge Pampilo told reporters that
promulgation would proceed on May 23, 2007 despite the issuance of the Temporary Restraining
Order because respondent Imelda was working on having the Temporary Restraining Order lifted.

Petitioner further argues that Judge Pampilo acted with grave abuse of discretion for
promulgating his decision in violation of a subsisting injunction, and for abruptly terminating
petitioner's testimony. He insists that his testimony would have been sufficient to render admissible
the documents which Judge Pampilo found inadmissible as evidence.

ISSUE

Should Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. inhibit from hearing the case?
RULING

NO. The Court will not require a judge to inhibit himself in the absence of clear and convincing
evidence to overcome the presumption that he will dispense justice in accordance with law and
evidence. The Court will also not allow itself to become an instrument to paper over fatal errors done
by the petitioner and the prosecution in the lower court.

Whether or not to voluntarily inhibit from hearing a case is a matter within the judge's
discretion. Absent clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will
dispense justice in accordance with law and evidence, the Court will not interfere.

The Court has periodically repeated that it shall always presume that a judge will decide on
the merits of the case without bias. Allowing a judge to inhibit without concrete proof of personal
interest or any showing that his bias stems from an extrajudicial source will open the floodgates to
abuse. No concrete proof of Judge Pampilo's personal interest in the case was presented. There was
no showing that his bias stems from an extrajudicial source. Not only that, but none of his acts, as
shown on the record, was characterized by any error.Petitioner finds fault in the scheduling of his
testimony but fails to show how it was irregular. He characterizes the scheduling as "noose--
tightening," for being scheduled on "unreasonably proximate" dates. Far from the scheduling being
evidence of partiality, it was aligned with this Court's rules on expeditious disposition of cases and
the mandatory continuous trial system.

7. Withdrawal from case

8. Standing in court of persons authorized to appear for the government
9. Government lawyers and private practice
10. Amicus curiae

II. JUDICIAL ETHICS

A. SOURCES
1. New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
2. Code of Judicial Conduct

ARNEL MENDOZA v. HON. MARCOS C. DIASEN, JR.,

A.M. No. MTJ-17-1900, August 09, 2017, Second Division (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

A judge shall refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to reflect adversely on the
court's impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of judicial activities or increase involvement
with lawyers or persons likely to come before the court. A judge should so manage investments and other
financial interests as to minimize the number of cases giving grounds for disqualification. Judge Diasen's
act of attempting to sell rice to his employees and to employees of other branches was highly improper.
As a judge, he exercised moral ascendancy and supervision over these employees. If the sale had pushed
through, he would have profited from his position.
FACTS

Arnel G. Mendoza was a driver of a public utility vehicle. Mendoza alleged that on November
5, 2012, Judge Diasen called and asked him to assist Flores in looking for a rice retailer where he
could purchase 50 sacks of rice. He accompanied Flores and introduced her to the owner of Carolina
Marketing. Thereafter, they proceeded to Makati City Hall to see Judge Diasen, who gave them a check
for P70,000.00 to pay for the 50 sacks of rice. He also asked to increase his order to 70 sacks, replacing
his first check with a post-dated check for P112,000.00 dated November 16, 2012. However, when
the check was presented for payment to Carolina Marketing, it was dishonored due to insufficiency
of funds. Carolina Marketing then sought payment for the sacks of rice from Mendoza. Mendoza tried
to inform Flores and Judge Diasen about the matter but Judge Diasen was never in his office and
Flores was never at her residence. Thus, he was constrained to file this Complaint.

The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that Judge Diasen be found guilty of
conduct unbecoming a judge. The Office of the Court Administrator found that despite the
unsubstantiated allegation that Judge Diasen issued a bouncing check, Judge Diasen had admitted
that he would have profited from the sales of rice had it been delivered. The Office of the Court
Administrator found that Judge Diasen's actions "disclose a deficiency in prudence and discretion
that a member of the Judiciary must exercise in the performance of his official functions and of his
activities as a private individual." Thus, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended that
Respondent Judge Diasen be reprimanded to refrain from further acts of impropriety.

ISSUE

Is Judge Diasen guilty of conduct unbecoming a judge?

RULING

YES. The Code of Judicial Conduct instructs that judges "should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities." Judges must at all times conduct themselves in a manner
beyond reproach to ensure the public's continued confidence in the judiciary. Moreover, Canon 5,
Rule 5.02 provides that, “A judge shall refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to reflect
adversely on the court's impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of judicial activities or
increase involvement with lawyers or persons likely to come before the court. A judge should so
manage investments and other financial interests as to minimize the number of cases giving grounds
for disqualification.”

Judge Diasen's act of attempting to sell rice to his employees and to employees of other
branches was highly improper. As a judge, he exercised moral ascendancy and supervision over these
employees. If the sale had pushed through, he would have profited from his position. Judge Diasen
cannot also deny that his position did not influence the "would-be buyers" to actually partake in the
sale of rice. If employees of the other court branches and offices of the Makati City Hall could be
persuaded to buy the subject rice because a judge asked them to, what more with the employees of
his own branch. For his improper acts, Judge Diasen is found guilty of conduct unbecoming a judge.

B. QUALITIES
1. Independence
2. Integrity
 3. Impartiality

DOMINADOR BIADO, MAMERTO BIADO, CARLITO DELA CRUZ, NORMA DELA CRUZ, DANILO
DELA CRUZ, ROMULO MARANO SR., FRANCISCO PADILLA, LOLITA ABLIR AND SONNY
TONGCALO, v. HON. MARIETTA S. BRAWNER-CUALING, PRESIDING JUDGE, MCTC, TUBA-
SABLAN, BENGUET

A.M. No. MTJ-17-1891, February 15, 2017, Second Division (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

To be liable for gross ignorance of the law, the assailed orders of a judge, who acts in his official
capacity, should not only be erroneous; it must be established that his actuation was attended by "bad
faith, dishonesty, hatred" or other similar motive. However, petitioners failed to establish that
respondent judge's actuation was attended by these.

FACTS

Judge Marietta S. Brawner-Cualing is the presiding judge on the civil case, Heirs of Cariño Sioco
v. Dominador Biado et. al., filed before the 5th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tuba-Sablan, Benguet
where the petitioners herein are defendants.

The respondent judge issued a Decision on the aforementioned case, in favor of the Heirs of
Cariño Sioco, directing the petitioners to vacate the disputed lot and to "turn over the possession to
the plaintiffs," and such decision became final and executory. However, petitioners opposed the
assailed decision and claimed that respondent judge had no jurisdiction over the case. They averred
that she should have at least inquired by herself on the exact location of the disputed property to
determine if she had jurisdiction over the case. In their view, she showed gross ignorance of the law
and manifest partiality for her failure to know the exact location of the disputed property. For this
reason, they were prompted to file an administrative case against her.

ISSUE

Is Judge Marietta S. Brawner-Cualing guilty of gross ignorance of the law and manifest
partiality relative to the civil case she decided herein?

RULING

NO. To be liable for gross ignorance of the law, the assailed orders of a judge, who acts in his
official capacity, must be established to be attended by "bad faith, dishonesty, hatred" or other similar
motive. However, petitioners failed to establish that respondent judge's actuation was attended by
these. The burden to prove otherwise lies with the petitioners. Hence, the allegations in their
complaints should be proven by substantial evidence.

Moreover, a mere imputation of bias and partiality against a judge is insufficient because "bias
and partiality can never be presumed." It is incumbent upon the complainants to prove that
respondent judge was manifestly partial against them.

4. Propriety
5. Equality
 6. Competence and diligence

CHUA KENG SIN v. JUDGE JOB M. MANGENTE

A.M. No. MTJ-15-1851, February 11, 2015, Second Division (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Judges are to be reminded that it is the height of incompetence to dispense cases callously and
in utter disregard of procedural rules. Whether the resort to shortcuts is borne out of ignorance or
convenience is immaterial. Judges took an oath to dispense their duties with competence and integrity;
to fall short would be a disservice not only to the entire judicial system, but more importantly, to the
public.

FACTS

Complainant alleged that he and his brother, Victorio Chua (Victorio), separately filed their
complaints for slight physical injuries against each other before the Lupon of Barangay Bangkulasi,
Navotas City. Complainant filed his Complaint earlier than Victorio. When Victorio learned that his
Complaint would be considered as a counterclaim, he decided not to attend the scheduled hearings
set by the Lupon. Instead, Victorio filed a complaint for attempted murder against complainant
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Navotas City.

Due to Victorio’s failure to appear, the Lupon issued (1) a Certification to File Action dated
March 3, 2009 in favor of complainant allowing him to file his Complaint for slight physical injuries
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Navotas City; and (2) a Certification to Bar
Action/Counterclaim against Victorio due to his failure or refusal to appear in the hearing.

The respective Complaints for slight physical injuries and attempted murder were jointly
heard by Navotas Assistant City Prosecutor Lemuel R. Nobleza. It was recommended that both
brothers be charged with slight physical injuries. Informations for the Complaints were filed and
docketed as Criminal Case No. 10-13569 (People v. Victorio Chua) and Criminal Case No. 10-13570
(People v. Chua Keng Sin).

Criminal Case No. 10-13570 was raffled to Branch 54 of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Navotas
City presided by respondent. Complainant filed a Motion to Dismiss Case No. 10-13570 on the ground
that Victorio’s Complaint was filed in court without the required certification to file action.
Furthermore, the Lupon had issued a certification to bar action/counterclaim against Victorio.
Respondent denied complainant’s Motion to Dismiss in the Order dated September 15, 2010on the
ground that it was a prohibited pleading under the Rule on Summary Procedure.

Complainant sought the reconsideration of the Order. After almost two (2) years, respondent
denied the Motion for Reconsideration in the Order dated October 16, 2012 on the ground that the
Lupon had issued a certificate to file action. During the intervening period, complainant filed a Motion
for determination of probable cause assailing the Resolution of the reviewing prosecutor, upgrading
the offense of slight physical injuries complainant was charged with to attempted homicide.
 On November 3, 2010, the Motion for determination of probable cause was heard, giving
Victorio fifteen (15) days to file his comment/opposition to the Motion, while complainant was given
ten (10) days from receipt of the Comment to file his Reply. Victorio’s Comment was filed on
November 17, 2010. Respondent declared complainant’s Motion for determination submitted for
resolution on 22 November 2010, without waiting for the expiration of complainant’s period to file
Reply.

On November 23, 2010, respondent denied complainant’s Motion for determination of

probable cause for lack of merit.

ISSUE

Is Judge Mangente administratively liable?

HELD:

YES. Judge Mangente is guilty of gross ignorance of the law. Respondent was careless in
disposing the Motions filed by complainant, in a criminal case no less. The Office of the Court
Administrator correctly underscores that his experience as a public attorney and prosecutor should
have ingrained in him well-settled doctrines and basic tenets of law. He cannot be relieved from the
consequences of his actions simply because he was newly appointed and his case load was heavy.
These circumstances are not unique to him. His careless disposition of the motions is a reflection of
his competency as a judge in discharging his official duties.

Judges are to be reminded that it is the height of incompetence to dispense cases callously
and in utter disregard of procedural rules. Whether the resort to shortcuts is borne out of ignorance
or convenience is immaterial. Judges took an oath to dispense their duties with competence and
integrity; to fall short would be a disservice not only to the entire judicial system, but more
importantly, to the public. Respondent’s failure must not be brushed aside. The Court found that the
imposition of suspension for six (6) months to be justified.

C. ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION OVER JUDGES AND JUSTICES

D. DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDICIAL OFFICERS

1. Compulsory
2. Voluntary

E. DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY

1. Members of the Supreme Court
2. Lower court judges and justices
3. Grounds

ROGER RAPSING v. JUDGE CARIDAD M. WALSE-LUTERO AND CELESTINA D. ROTA

A.M. No. MTJ-17-1894, April 04, 2017, En Banc (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

 Judges and branch clerks of court should conduct personally a physical inventory of the pending
cases in their courts and examine personally the records of each case not only at the time of their
assumption to office, but every semester thereafter on 30 June and 31 December. The regular and
continuing physical inventory of cases enables the judge to keep abreast of the status of the pending
cases and to be informed that everything in the court is in proper order. Had respondent Judge Walse-
Lutero physically inventoried her cases on a semestral basis as prescribed, she could have discovered the
unresolved pending incidents earlier, instead of two (2) years later.

FACTS

Roger Rapsing accused Presiding Judge Caridad M. Walse-Lutero of Branch 34, Metropolitan
Trial Court, Quezon City of undue delay in resolving two motions filed by his counsel in Civil Case No.
06-35758, for Ejectment.

Judge Walse-Lutero denied delaying the resolution of the motions. She explained that the
Branch Clerk of Court failed to return the record of the case to her for the resolution of the motions.
She averred that she discovered the unresolved motions only in March 2011, when her staff, upon
coming from the Supreme Court, informed her of the present administrative complaint. Judge Walse-
Lutero further affirmed that "upon receipt of the record, she discovered that it was badly damaged
by rain water that leaked through the court's ceiling." Nonetheless, Judge Walse-Lutero alleged that
after the record was reconstituted, she promptly resolved all pending incidents and rendered her
decision in the subject case.

Rota attributed her "neglect/omission/lapse" to the high caseload of the court, particularly in
criminal cases. She added that the number of court personnel in her branch was not proportionate
to the court's caseload. This problem was allegedly aggravated by leaves of absence by court
personnel. Rota also explained that the case record got wet during the Typhoon Ondoy through a
leak in the roof. She allegedly apologized for it, and rectified the damage by working on Saturdays.

The Office of the Court Administrator recommended the dismissal of the case against Judge
Walse-Lutero, with a reminder for her "to be more meticulous and zealous in organizing and
supervising the work of her subordinates." Regarding Rota, the Office of the Court Administrator
recommended that Rapsing's complaint be docketed as a separate administrative matter against her
for gross neglect of duty.

ISSUES

(1) Is Judge Walse-Lutero liable for neglecting her duty to resolve motions expeditiously?

(2) Is Rota guilty of gross neglect of duty?

RULING

(1) YES, Judge Walse-Lutero is liable for neglecting her duty to resolve motions expeditiously.

While the Branch Clerk of Court was remiss in not calling respondent's attention to the
pending incident in Civil Case No. 06-35758, this does not completely exculpate respondent from
liability. As the presiding judge, it was respondent's responsibility to know which cases or motions
were submitted for decision or resolution. Judges are expected to closely follow the development of
cases and in this respect, "to keep their own record of cases so that they may act on them promptly."

In RE: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted at the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 55,
Malabon City, this Court held that "judges and branch clerks of court should conduct personally a
physical inventory of the pending cases in their courts and examine personally the records of each
case not only at the time of their assumption to office, but every semester thereafter on 30 June and
31 December." "The regular and continuing physical inventory of cases enables the judge to keep
abreast of the status of the pending cases and to be informed that everything in the court is in proper
order." Responsibility rests primarily on the judge and he or she "cannot take refuge behind the
inefficiency or mismanagement of his personnel."

Had respondent Judge Walse-Lutero physically inventoried her cases on a semestral basis as
prescribed, she could have discovered the unresolved pending incidents earlier, instead of two (2)
years later. In this case, the motions were submitted for resolution on September 12, 2008. On March
17, 2010, Rapsing even filed a Manifestation and Motion informing the court about the two (2)
pending motions, and praying for their resolution. The resolution of two (2) fairly simple motions
dragged on for more than two (2) years – thereby prolonging the resolution of the ejectment case –
because of respondent's lapse.Had Judge Walse-Lutero been more circumspect in discharging her
judicial duties, she would have discovered the pending incidents in the ejectment case. Instead, she
found out about the unresolved motions only in March 2011 when she was apprised by the Office of
the Court Administrator of the present administrative complaint.

While respondent's domestic concerns deserve some consideration from this Court, such
circumstances could only mitigate her liability. Judges have the duty to administer justice without
delay. Judge Walse-Lutero should bear in mind that those charged with the task of dispensing justice
carry a heavy burden of responsibility.

Here, considering the reasons for the delay in the resolution of the motions, the absence of bad
faith or malice on the part of respondent, and lack of any record of previous administrative sanctions
against her, this Court considers it proper to admonish respondent Judge Walse-Lutero for her failure
to act promptly on the complainant's motions.

(2) YES. By Rota's own admission, she failed to refer the case to Judge Walse-Lutero for
resolution of the pending incidents "even with the intermittent follow-ups of the . . . parties." She
likewise failed to report to Judge Walse-Lutero the damage in the records, thus, preventing the
reconstitution of the records at the earliest time possible. As the administrative assistant of the
presiding judge, it was Rota's duty to diligently supervise and manage court dockets and records,
and to ensure that the records were complete and intact. She played a key role in the complement
of the court and could not be permitted to slacken in her job.

Branch clerks of court must realize that their administrative functions are vital to the prompt
and proper administration of justice. They are charged with the efficient recording. filing and
management of court records, besides having administrative supervision over court personnel. They
play a key role in the complement of the court and cannot be permitted to slacken on their jobs under
one pretext or another. They must be assiduous in performing their official duties and in supervising
and managing court dockets and records. On their shoulders, as much as those of judges, rest the
responsibility of closely following development of cases, such that delay in the disposition of cases is
kept to a minimum.
 Rota's neglect in this case is gross, bordering on utter carelessness or indifference, to the
prejudice of the public she was duty-bound to serve. Her inattentiveness and lack of any effort to
even look for the case records, despite several follow-ups from the complainant, caused unnecessary
and undue delay in the progress of the ejectment case. Gross neglect of duty is such neglect which,
"from the gravity of the case or the frequency of instances, becomes so serious in its character as to
endanger or threaten the public welfare."

4. Impeachment
5. Sanctions imposed by the Supreme Court on erring members of the
judiciary

III. PRACTICAL EXERCISES

A. Demand and authorization letters

B. Contract of sale
C. Contract of lease
D. Special power of attorney
E. Verification and certificate of non-forum shopping
F. Notice of hearing and explanation in motions
G. Judicial affidavit
H. Notarial certificates: jurat and acknowledgement
I. Motions for extension of time, to dismiss, and to declare in default
J. Quitclaims in labor cases
K. Promissory note
L. Information in criminal cases
M. Retainer agreement