Corruption and Populism in Mexico: Is AMLO The Same Formula Against Corruption?

8.
Corruption and populism in Mexico:

is AMLO the same formula against
corruption?
Irma Méndez de Hoyos, Tomislav Lendo and
Ulises Flores Llanos
INTRODUCTION
On 1 December 2018, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO)1 took office

as President of Mexico. He won an unparalleled margin of victory of 30 per-
centage points over his closest competitor, and his party, Morena, achieved the
majority of the seats both in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. López
Obrador promised to change the Constitution and the political regime itself,
referring to his term as “Mexico’s fourth popular and social transformation”
(4T).2 That election was his third attempt to run for the presidency. He had
previously lost to the center-right PAN (Partido Acción Nacional) in 2006, and
to the PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) in 2012.
López Obrador began his political career as a member of the PRI (Institutional
Revolutionary Party) that ruled Mexico for most of the twentieth century. He
was considered to be a member of the interparty left-wing. Ever since, Obrador
has been characterized as a left-wing populist,3 mainly due to his rhetoric and
policy preferences. The core of his discourse still consists of critical views
of the deep inequalities that characterize Mexico’s socio-economic structure.
From the outset of his political career, he has denounced the alliance between
the political and economic elites, which he blames for perpetuating economic
inequalities. In policy terms, he advocates a change in income distribution in
order to increase the wellbeing of the have nots, the peasants, and the working
class. As a Textbook populist, he promised to serve and represent “the people”
with whom he has built an unprecedented link. There is little doubt that the
so-called end of corruption constitutes the most important self-defined task
of his administration and the core of his communication strategy. Featuring
prominently in his daily press conferences are his attacks against the “privi-
leged” – the middle class and, above all, the rich. The emphasis is on the need
190
Irma Méndez de Hoyos, Tomislav Lendo and Ulises Flores Llanos - 9781839109676
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 07/15/2021 10:20:58AM by emma.penton@e-elgar.co.uk
via AUTHOR COPY - NOT TO BE POSTED IN AN OPEN ONLINE REPOSITORY
Corruption and populism in Mexico 191
to eliminate corruption, starting with the (to employ the terms used in the
introduction to this volume) “opportunistic corruption” of individual power
mongers to the grand “group oriented corruption”, aimed at buttressing the
elites. “Corruption in Mexico has occurred from top to bottom, and this is how
we are going to sweep the government, like the stairs are swept, from top to
bottom” (López Obrador, 11 January 2019).4
The time of writing, some 18 months after his inauguration, seems sufficient
to investigate the extent to which this call against corruption is actually achiev-
ing real change, or whether it is an empty moral sermon against political and
economic elites (resembling, perhaps, Trump’s struggle against “the swamp”
elaborated in an earlier chapter). The importance of such a consideration
derives from the supposed contrast between “right-wing “ and “left-wing”
populism. As the introduction to this volume noted, one of the differences lies
in what is meant by “the people”. The former version of populism tends to be
exclusive, whereas the latter is inclusive. As against the populist parties and
regimes of Europe and the USA, what López Obrador represents is a form
of populism akin to Bolivia’s former president, Evo Morales, Venezuela’s
Nicolas Maduro, or Ecuador’s Lenín Boltaire Moreno Garcés. What we seek to
clarify, then, is whether there is a major difference between the various forms
of populism. Is the anti-corruption discourse restricted to the strategic level,
reflecting arguments made in different stages of socio-political development,
but with little bearing on the realities in which they were made? All populists
claim to combat corruption in the name of “the people”. Are we indeed looking
at a difference that makes a difference, or modes of communications aimed
to fit circumstances, but end up with few changes to the nexuses between
populism and corruption? In this context it is relevant to mention a variance
between López Obrador and other left-wing politicians and parties. Unlike
them, he does not view tax reform as the basis of the promised change. Rather,
the transformation of income distribution he promises will supposedly emerge
from the breakdown of the elites’ anti-people pact and the end of the corrup-
tion that stems from it. In all his presidential campaigns, he promised not to
increase taxes or add any new ones. In his view, tax increases affect the whole
of society and, despite the fact that Mexico is one of the countries with the
lowest level of tax revenue as a share of gross domestic product (GDP), he
believes that increasing taxes is not necessary. On the contrary, in his view,
ending corruption and reducing superfluous government expenses will suffice
to improve the wellbeing of Mexico’s 50 million poor inhabitants. The fact is
that populists do not take unpopular measures and there are few things more
unpopular than raising taxes.
The introduction to this volume also offered a range of corrupt behaviors
and the reactions of followers: from opportunistic corruption, to group ori-
ented corruption, compensatory corruption, defensive corruption, and legal
192 Populism and corruption
corruption. In our effort to clarify the question above, we also seek to establish
whether left-wing populism involves a shift in the mode of corruption justifi-
cation and, of even greater importance, of the widespread perception of such
shifts among followers. The link between populism and corruption reflects
both individual preferences and the institutional context where corruption
occurs (Flores, 2019: 70–71). If the context is characterized by inefficiency
and excessive bureaucracy, citizens might tend to engage in corrupt transac-
tions to satisfy their needs. This suggests the relevance of both the individual
and the institutional levels. At the individual level, the argument made in the
introduction and Chapter 2 of this volume is that populism weakens control
institutions. It thereby generates a context that is permissive to corruption.
At the individual level, it provides a direct link between the leaders and the
led. The former provide and distribute benefits to the latter. The resulting
clientelist relationship is financed by public resources that are used in a per-
sonalistic manner. This relationship brings about the centralization of power
while undermining democratic principles such as representation. In sum, our
question is to what extent did the discourse and reforms produced by López
Obrador and his government initiate a new and different form of regime.
We will argue that, in a context of a series of past strategies to combat
corruption, López Obrador emerged as a successful left-wing populist who
offered to clean the state apparatus and the government not through institu-
tional reforms, as previous politicians did, but by the moral principles that he
argues guide his life: honesty, hard work and a life far from privileges. The
legitimacy of his offer is based on personal attributes, rather than knowledge or
skills. By placing himself close to the poor people and far from luxury – a pow-
erful idea in a country where 42 percent of the population lives in poverty – he
has managed to penetrate deeply the political, cultural and social life of most
Mexicans.
We found that, in the context of systemic corruption which prevails in
Mexico, the President uses the negative perception of corruption among citi-
zens to strengthen his own personal power. He has done so by putting in place
at least three game plans: first, an intense political communication strategy
through which he creates a powerful narrative which reframes corruption as an
attribute of the institutions created in the neoliberal era, and also as an attribute
of his most conspicuous adversaries, but not his allies and friends. Second,
the transformation or deterioration of actual institutions that are perceived by
him and his administration as “neoliberal”, and therefore corrupt, incidentally
are mainly agencies whose role is to function as a counterbalance. Within this
strategy is the weakening of existing anti-corruption institutions, such as the
National Anti-corruption System (SNA, from its name in Spanish); the sys-
tematic attack against autonomous agencies, such as INAI (National Institute
for Access to Information), INE (National Electoral Institute), CRE (Energy
Regulation Commission), INEE (National Institute for the Evaluation of

Education), and budget cuts that have reduced agencies to its bones. Third, he
has centralized the policy-making processes, as in the case of social programs,
which are now directly operated by the presidential office and through which
the President and his party are creating a social and political basis of support.
The chapter is divided into four sections. Following this introduction, we
will present a general glimpse into the problem of corruption in Mexico. The
intention is to show the empirical dimension of it based on both the public
perception of corruption and the grasp of the institutional capacity to erode
the exercise of public power for private gains. We will then analyze the use of
anti-corruption arguments as a political strategy, focusing on López Obrador’s
discourse and messages to explain his conception of corruption and the role
it plays in his narrative. We also provide evidence of the way in which the
government actually deals with corruption. The final section presents a general
balance of the partial results of Mexico’s Federal Government regarding cor-
ruption. We use the core evidence of the first sections to evaluate the extent
to which the López Obrador government’s narrative and actions represent an
effective way to combat the systemic corruption that prevails in the country.
CORRUPTION IN MEXICO
Some scholars have argued that corruption is not a characteristic of the

Mexican political system, but the system itself (Avilés, 2004, quoted in Morris,
2009). Up to 2000, the Mexican political system functioned on the basis of
a single party and a clientelist-type structure. For several decades, corruption
pervaded various levels of society, to the degree that a range of corrupt behav-
iors became part and parcel of the political and administrative system.
The diversity of corrupt behaviors under discussion makes efforts to define
or measure them difficult. The literature offers several forms of corruption that
fit the situation. These include grand corruption (more commonly understood
as political corruption) that occurs at the top levels of the political system, and
petty corruption, which occurs at the street level or administrative services,
especially when citizens seek access to goods and services. The behaviors
listed by analysts also include bribery, diversion of public funds, money laun-
dering, nepotism; financial fraud, influence peddling and extortion (Amundsen
et al., 2000; Jiang, 2017). Two graphs provide a glimpse of the systemic
character of what is involved: the first (Figure 8.1) provides a measurement of
the “control of corruption”, as defined by the World Bank, from 1996 to 2018;
the second (Figure 8.2) depicts the percentage of perceived corruption in the
Federal Government.
According to the World Bank, the indicator of control of corruption “cap-
tures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private
Source: World Bank Governance indicators data.
Figure 8.1 Control of corruption in Mexico, 1996–2018
gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’
of the state by elites and private interests”. “Control of corruption” is part of
the Worldwide Governance Indicators and, as such, it is turned into a positive
indicator by the World Bank. Thus, instead of naming it corruption – which
is what it actually measures – the World Bank reversed its measurement, so
the more negative punctuation indicates a worse perception of corruption and
therefore less control of it.
Figure 8.1 shows that, prior to 2000, the perception of the control of cor-
ruption was in an intermediate range. It improved between 2000 and 2009,
a period when alternation in power took place and the main opposition party
at that time, PAN (National Action Party), ruled the country. From 2010, the
perception of the control of corruption started to worsen until 2014. From
then on deterioration of the indicator grew steeper, reaching its worst point in
2017. It is this context of increasing perception of corruption that created the
opportunity for a challenger in the presidential race, López Obrador, to attack
his adversaries and the “corrupt elite” they represented.
As can be seen in Figure 8.2, perception of corruption in the Federal
Government worsened over President Peña-Nieto’s tenure (2012–2018).
Respondents were asked if corruption in the Federal Government was very
frequent, frequent, infrequent or not frequent. The graph in Figure 8.2 depicts
only the results for “very frequent”. Corruption perception increased rapidly
between 2011 and 2013 by almost ten percentage points, whereas between
2013 and 2015 it remained almost at the same level. In 2017, perceptions of
corruption in the Federal Government increased again. Notably, the last avail-
Source: National Survey of Quality and Government Impact, ENCIG Mexico.
Figure 8.2 Perception of corruption in the Federal Government
able figure shows that in 2019 the perception of corruption decreased during
López Obrador’s first year in office.
In Mexico, the most common form of corruption is the “opportunistic
corruption” at the street level that occurs when police officers are bribed.
According to the National Survey of Quality and Government Impact 2019
(ENCIG, from its name in Spanish), dealing with the police generates the
highest number of acts of corruption: around 60 percent of the times in which
citizens deal with police officers end up in corruption. With data from the
same survey, from the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI),
approximately 16 percent of those who required services or had contact with
a public official experienced some kind of corruption. What stands out from
these data is that, in the period corresponding to López Obrador’s presidency,
the perception of corruption has decreased (Figures 8.1 and 8.2), but the inci-
dence has increased (INEGI, 2020). This suggests that little has been achieved
in terms of corruption reduction, but the President’s communication strategy
has worked well.
Corruption has proven to be a complex and long-lasting problem in Mexican
politics. Governments have taken action to address it, but so far they have been
rather unsuccessful. That is why the recent creation of the SNA in 2016 seemed
promising. To understand the relevance of such a system it is worth looking at
the three reforms that preceded it. The first, focusing on the control of financial
resources was designed and approved in 1999, towards the end of President
Zedillo’s term. It created the Superior Audit of the Federation (ASF). This
agency resides in the lower chamber of Congress. It is charged with reviewing
the public account of the Federal Government and with technical and manage-
rial autonomy. The second reform, also involved changes to the Constitution.
The Federal Law for Access to Public Information (2002) led to the creation
of the Federal Institute for Access to Public Information (INAI). For the first
time, Mexico had regulations regarding access to government information;
responsibilities of public institutions were pointed to as safeguarding infor-
mation, as well as protecting the data of citizens. And the third development
resulted from Mexico’s adherence to the United Nations Convention in the
Fight against Corruption, held in Mérida, Mexico (2003). Mexico’s adherence
to the Convention and the fact that it took place in the country, underlines the
importance of the subject for the Fox administration (2000–2006).
More recently, in 2012, two important anti-corruption items were released.
Congress approved the Federal Anti-Corruption Law and the creation of the
National Prosecutor’s Office against Corruption (Bautista, 2017), a body with
technical and operational autonomy from the General Attorney’s Office, to
which it is attached. More recently, the SNA was created in July 2016, under
Peña-Nieto’s government. This is a mechanism that seeks to integrate “insti-
tutional efforts supported by transparency and accountability and strengthen
the confidence of citizens in institutions in a framework of promoting legality
and good practices” (SFP, 2016; Arellano, 2020). The SNA is the structure
of coordination between all government agencies in charge of the prevention,
detection and punishment of administrative responsibilities and acts of corrup-
tion, as well as the supervision and control of public resources.
The SNA operates under four fundamental axes: “the strengthening of the
ASF; the strengthening of the Ministry of the Public Function (SFP, from its
name in Spanish), through increased powers in the internal control bodies; the
creation of a prosecutor’s office specialized in fighting corruption, attached
to the Attorney General’s Office; and the granting to the Federal Court of
Administrative Justice (TFJA) of the power to sanction serious acts of cor-
ruption.” The four institutions are charged with establishing and coordinating
the imposition of administrative and criminal sanctions on public servants
(Nava, 2018). To achieve this, the SNA relies on a relatively complex design,
where various institutions involved in the issue of corruption, in addition to
a citizen council, define strategies. The executive members of the SNA are:
the president of the SNA Citizen Participation Committee, the head of the ASF
(legislative branch), the head of the Special Prosecutor’s Office for Combating
Corruption, the head of the SFP (executive branch), a representative from the
Council of the Judiciary (judiciary branch), the President of the INAI (autono-
mous body) and a magistrate from the TFJA (judiciary branch). The design of
the system highlights the participation of autonomous bodies, representatives
of the executive, judicial, and legislative branches, as well as citizens, with
a certain level of expertise, elected in a public call.
With the reform that established the SNA, the internal comptrollers of the
Federal Government agencies acquired the power to investigate administrative
faults, as the substantive authority (which directs and conducts the procedure
of administrative responsibilities) and as the resolving authority (which makes
decisions about non-serious administrative responsibilities). If the administra-
tive offense is serious, it is referred to the TFJA so that the procedure is fol-
lowed in accordance with the General Law of Administrative Responsibilities
(Nava, 2018).
With the anti-corruption reform, the ASF is expected to be empowered to
promote complaints before the administrative judiciary branch (TFJA) and
the Specialized Prosecutor’s Office. Thus it has acquired the ability to work
with the superior inspection entities of the states to substantiate and investigate
serious administrative offenses. In a recent analysis Myers and Rouzaud (2016)
contend that the general law of the SNA places greater emphasis on the control
of resources and on coordination and cooperation strategies between agencies
to deal with cases. As mentioned above, the system seeks to coordinate efforts
among agencies to make the identification of cases of corruption easier in
public administration institutions and in the follow-up of cases, incorporating
a greater spectrum of legal elements to define corruption crimes.
López Obrador’s vision regarding the fight against corruption seems to
be different from the SNA’s. While the SNA’s aspiration was to establish
inter-institutional cooperation and coordination, Obrador’s aim seems to be the
concentration of all decision-making in those organizations that he can control
– the SFP and the Financial Intelligence Unit (UIF, from its name in Spanish,
an agency that is part of the Ministry of Treasure).
In the present administration the anti-corruption strategy is focused on
supervising public officials’ activities where the Secretariat of Public Function
(a position appointed by the President which reports directly to him) has had
a more relevant role to play than the SNA in defining the anti-corruption strat-
egy. Eight actions have been mentioned as the core plan against corruption:
• asset and conflict of interest declarations;

• a specialized unit on ethics and prevention of conflict of interest;
• an ethics code and integrity rules;
• a protocol for public officials when dealing with public contracts;
• a registry of public servants involved in public contracts;
• a national single window for delivering governmental information;
• a list of sanctioned suppliers and their causes; and
• mechanisms of collaboration with the private sector.
Up to the time of writing, the law regulating the SNA has not been modified
and the organization has hardly played any relevant role. Many of the current
actions represent a kind of continuity of what was already being done in the
fight against corruption but now centralized. One of the most relevant meas-
ures that demonstrates Obrador’s governing style is to publish the list of sanc-
tioned suppliers and the causes of the sanction. The President has a fancy for
revealing and confronting those who do not agree with his projects and ideas,
or those who he considers to be immoral or to affect the public good.
In this administration, the anti-corruption actions that have greater impact in
the media are those carried out by the UIF. Under Obrador’s populist style of
governing, it stands out that notorious cases of corruption have been given far
greater importance than the SNA, whose position has been weakened, allow-
ing it to play just a minor role. Decision-making has been centralized at the
SFP and the UIF, both part of the Executive Branch, and consequently within
the PRESIDENT’s hierarchy.
CORRUPTION IN THE PRESIDENT’S DISCOURSE AND

ACTIONS
López Obrador has used corruption and its negative perceptions to gain power
and to consolidate his political and popular leadership. He has done so in
several ways such as: dividing society between the good people and the corrupt
elite, or those who support the “transformation of Mexico” and those who
want to “return to the corrupt system of the past”; reframing the concept of
corruption to suit his narrative; attacking, blaming, and criminalizing his polit-
ical adversaries, thereby weakening opposition; undermining or disappearing
institutions, particularly those that have a checks and balances function; and
using public resources to broaden his social and political base, through social
programs. This section addresses the use of corruption as a political tool both
in his narrative and as part of his government decision-making process. The
evidence provided comes both from his public addresses and the actual deci-
sions that have been made by his government during his first year and a half
in office.
As mentioned earlier, a great deal of López Obrador’s governing style and
political strategy rests on his political communication strategy. As a Mayor
of Mexico City and as an opposition leader, he built a strong reputation as an
effective communicator – a politician that speaks the people’s language. This
feature is rather characteristic of populist leaders, who use language as a means
to distance themselves from other politicians and the elite, and to get closer
to the common people, the way they speak, and their concerns. In the case of
Obrador it is not only the language but the intensity with which he addresses
the people. From his first day in office, he has scheduled a press conference
every morning on weekdays and he also addresses his followers in rallies
taking place all over the country, mainly at weekends.
López Obrador uses these public interventions as a means to control the

agenda. He makes policy announcements, spins the news and throws smoke-
screens every morning in order to lead the conversation. As Federico Estevez,
a professor at ITAM (Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México), declared
to David Agren from The Guardian, referring to López Obrador’s press
conferences, “It doesn’t matter what the quality of the communication is, it
dominates the [news] cycle. That’s all it’s about. That’s all it’s supposed to be
about” (Agren, 2020). In these press conferences as well as in his speeches,
corruption is the most recurrent topic. Between 1 December 2018 and 30 April
2020, López Obrador conducted a total of 347 press conferences and gave 156
speeches for a total of 503 public addresses.
Like other populist leaders, López Obrador seeks to have a direct and
permanent contact with his audience (Urbinati, 2019: 16). Both the press
conferences and the weekend rallies allow him to develop a narrative in which
corruption plays a central role. He has turned corruption into the enemy to
defeat, and his favorite topic in his public addresses. In fact, one of his main
campaign promises was precisely to put an end to corruption which – from his
point of view – had prevented Mexico from becoming a more developed and
prosperous society, as well as a safer one. Now, as President, López Obrador
has taken every opportunity to highlight his crusade against corruption, using
the issue both to place himself in a moral high ground and to admonish his
adversaries.
Table 8.1 shows the most frequently used words in the President’s public
interventions. As can be seen, apart from terms such as government, México,
or us, the most frequently used is corruption. The word was used 3,524 times
between 1 December 2018 and 30 April 2020. That is seven times on average
in every public intervention. Another two features become obvious by revisit-
ing Table 8.1: (a) his populist character revealed in the intense use of the words
the people as opposed to citizens or society and the word us, highlighting the
difference with them (the elite, the neoliberals); and (b) his statist ideology
revealed in the intense use of words like government, president, national and
budget.
The basic argument advanced by the President is that the neoliberal system
which preceded him was structurally corrupt, as its main goal was to benefit an
economic and political elite that ran the country at the expense of the people.
In López Obrador’s words:
the neoliberal regime imposed for the last 36 years was characterized mainly by
corruption. There were 36 years of looting, abuse, waste, using the budget for the
benefit of minorities and leaving the people in distress. This is what we are chang-
ing, this will never happen again. (López Obrador, 6 September 2019)
Table 8.1 Most frequently used words (December 2018–April 2020)
Term Count Times per speech (average) Waged percentage*

Government 4888 9.7 0.61
Mexico 4849 9.6 0.61
People 3966 7.9 0.50
Us 3732 7.4 0.47
Corruption 3524 7.0 0.44
Folks 3469 6.9 0.44
Country 3400 6.8 0.43
President 3344 6.6 0.42
Time 2524 5.0 0.32
Information 2000 4,0 0.25
Youth 1909 3.9 0.24
National 1903 3.8 0.24
Health 1860 3.7 0.23
Budget 1849 3.7 0.23
Note: * Waged percentage: the percentage represented by that word among all the words in the
texts analyzed (that is all the speeches and press conferences during the period), excluding words
shorter than three letters, prepositions, articles and pronouns.
Source: Official stenographic versions published by Mexico’s Presidencia de la República.
The President argues that, during those years, fortunes were amassed under an
opaque alliance between business captains and the political elite. This, in turn,
was the source of economic stagnation, social and economic inequality, and
public insecurity, among many other ills. The President’s mission is therefore
to put an end to such a regime in order to protect the interests and will of the
“the good people”. Both corruption and the privileges of the bureaucratic elite
are the most pernicious problems affecting peoples’ welfare. Consequently, his
main task is to put an end to both. From the outset, he has made a deliberate
effort to show that he is prepared to cut out the presidential privileges. He
declined to live in the presidential mansion. He refused to fly in the presiden-
tial airplane and has been unsuccessfully trying to sell it. He refuses to be seen
as protected by bodyguards and claims to have renounced to a body of 8,000
officers. And, above all, he claims that these savings together with the money
saved by “ending corruption” are going directly to the benefit of the neediest.
In a way, we could say that he reframes the concept of corruption from
a notion of “abuse of public office for private gain” or “abuse of entrusted
power for private gains” (Transparency International, 2020), both notions that
allow for a personal identification and prosecution of corruption, to a wider
notion of corruption that defines an entire system. The underlying concept of
corruption in López Obrador’s view is the blurring of the lines between politi-
cal power and economic power. In López Obrador’s words:
there was this association between the private sector and the public sector, and
there were no borders, it was the same; they ruled, influentialism prevailed. (López
Obrador, 11 February 2019)
The only businesses that should be of interest to public servants are public busi-
nesses, not private ones. It must be understood, this is the separation of economic
power from political power. (López Obrador, 10 April 2019)
Furthermore, he uses corruption as a shortcut. Corruption allows him to have

a very simple story about the public problems and their solutions. Corruption
is regarded as the origin of all problems. By eliminating it, he is solving all
the teething troubles at the same time. When asked what the plan is to solve
the country’s ills his answer is simple: eliminating corruption, that is the plan
(López Obrador, 3 February 2019).
Mexico’s main problem is corruption. Other problems arise from there: poverty,
insecurity, and violence, but what has damaged Mexico the most is political cor-
ruption. That is the main cause of economic inequality, social inequality, insecurity,
violence, all the ills that afflict us. (López Obrador, 21 April 2019)
Corruption enables López Obrador to mark the difference between us, “the
people” and them “the elite”. In the manner of all populist leaders, he places
himself on the side of the “good people”, the “right people” and portrays the
privileged elite as the enemies of the common people. He does not want inter-
mediaries, so the beneficiaries can identify him as the source of the benefits.
The delivery of social benefits has been modified on the grounds that when this
was run by institutions, it was prone to corruption. That is why these benefits
must go now directly from the President to the beneficiary. Urbinati argues
that “populist democracy” is a new form of representative government, based
on a direct relation between the leader and those he/she defines as the “right”
or “good” people and on the sovereignty of the audience. Its immediate targets
are the “‘obstacles’ to the development of those phenomena” (Urbinati, 2019:
4). In López Obrador’s terms:
The people themselves tell me. Mister, don’t send us the support, the money, through
the government, because they are pinching it. And the same with organizations. That
will no longer be the case. The money will go directly from the Federal Treasury to
the beneficiary with a card […] The same thing about the childcare program, it is
not canceled, only now the support will be delivered directly to mothers, they will
receive their support. Why is that? Because what happened? The childcare centers
charged for 300,000 children, a little more, but a tally was made. Do you know how
many children really did exist? Two hundred thousand. There were 100 thousand
ghost children, that’s why they jumped. (6 April 2019)
This has led to fundamental changes in social policy delivery. An important

shift in such direction was the creation of a new area within the presiden-
tial office: the General Coordinator of Development Programs, under the
direct authority of the President. According to the Law of the Federal Public
Administration, this new agency is responsible for the supervision of special
social programs that involve direct benefits for the population, in coordination
with the Ministry of Welfare. To carry out this duty, the presidential office
appointed one delegate in each state, who is responsible for managing special
social programs at a local level.
One of the first actions of the new General Coordinator of Development
Programs was to conduct a new tally of beneficiaries entitled “Welfare
Census”. Carrying out this tally were a group of young people wearing
a uniform with the President’s name on it. This triggered a judicial complaint
by opposition parties who argued that the new social programs became a tool
of personal propaganda, in contravention of the electoral law. The response
was that the decision to directly operate the special social programs was
based on evidence of corruption in the way in which benefits were distributed.
Irrespective of the fact that no evidence was presented to prove corruption,
since December 2018 special social programs dispense benefits directly to
more than 14 million people.
An illustration of the changes in the way the new programs are managed is
one concerning the elderly. According to the new rules of operation officially
published in March 2019, the implementation of the program is carried out by
the General Coordinator of Development Programs, part of the presidential
office and the Ministry of Welfare. In the past, it was this last office alone that
was in charge. The potential relevant effects of this crucial change in social
policy delivery are: (a) the distribution of social benefits directly under his
name allows the President to consolidate a strong base of political support
and legitimize the direct link with the people, his moral superiority, and his
crusade against the elite; (b) whereas the President and his party have created
publicly funded clientelist relationships, opposition parties have struggled to
survive; (c) this type of social policy strengthens López Obrador’s reframing
of corruption: it does not exist if he and his government are involved in the
distribution of benefits, because “we are not the same” he argues. So, contrary
to best practices, the social programs activated by the presidency have rules
that are not transparent and legitimize the President’s direct intervention. So,
despite the fact that the argument to change the policy was to end corruption,
what we have today creates a context for even greater corruption.
López Obrador contends that the money saved by curbing corruption

and reducing government spending allows the financing of social programs
without burdening the taxpayer, “increasing fuel prices or public borrowing.
The funds destined to finance social programs come from what is saved by
fighting corruption and by eliminating luxury and superfluous expenses in
government” (López Obrador, 1 December 2019). Thus, character and polit-
ical will are more important than institutions to ending corruption. Multiple
examples illustrate the President’s promotion of his will as the substitute for
institutional action:
I had a meeting with the entire cabinet and I reminded them: beware, zero corrup-
tion, beware of subordinates, there must be no impunity, no matter who they are,
even family members, because there is moral authority, there is political authority.
(López Obrador, 3 December 2019)
If the government gives a good example of rectitude, honesty, not lying, not steal-
ing, not betraying citizens, this example I’m sure will be followed by all Mexicans.
Tax evaders will be ashamed with their families, with their children. So, we are
going to apply these new legal measures, but I think it will not be necessary, because
we are all going to act lawfully and we are going to behave well, so that in this
way we all help to get our beloved Mexico out of its problems. (López Obrador, 4
January 2019)
Not only the National Institute of Transparency but many other autonomous
bodies – characterized by their professionalism and technical experience
– have been under the attack of the President and his party’s majority in
Congress. In the first months of his administration Congress passed a new edu-
cation law, abolishing the National Institute for the Evaluation of Education.
Later that same year a minister of the Supreme Court resigned allegedly due to
pressures stemming from the presidency. Various members of the governing
board of the Energy Regulation Commission, including its president resigned
due to pressures from the Executive Branch; they were replaced by persons
who lack technical capacity or merits for the job, but are loyal to the President.
The President of The National Commission for Human Rights was replaced by
a person who did not fulfill the requirements, but is a political activist loyal to
López Obrador and his party, Morena; another who did not fill the requirements
replaced the national ombudsman. Mexico’s President continually criticizes
the National Electoral Institute, the Federal Institute of Telecommunications,
and the National Commission of Economic Competition, on the grounds that
they are too costly and useless for the purpose they were created. They are
a product of the corrupt practices of the neoliberal past.
there was a lot of pretense, various supposedly autonomous, independent agencies

were created, a whole constellation of independent, autonomous agencies, another
government to operate the looting, to facilitate theft, to deliver contracts, permits

to private companies. And in all these organizations, most of the counselors
represented the vested interest groups. And they sold us the idea that this was inde-
pendence, autonomy, the so-called civil society […] Then the problem was solved
by creating these autonomous organisms […]. The salaries of the directors of the
autonomous organizations through the roof. (López Obrador, 12 February 2019)
In both rallies and press conferences, the President underlines his govern-
ment’s program and depicts and condemns his adversaries, always assuming
a position of guardian of the people and their interests. Following the populist
script, he takes issue with the elite, what he calls the “rapacious minority”,
which includes the richest businessmen and women as well as former members
of the bureaucratic elite. In the President’s narrative, they represent an oppro-
brious past marked by the extreme suffering of the many and the unlimited
privileges of the few.
While attacking the economic elite in his discourse and even with specific
policies that affect certain industries, López Obrador does not do away with
them or substitute them with a new elite. He meets with them, makes policy
announcements with them, and is accompanied by them in international visits.
It seems like what he is trying to do is make it clear that he is in charge and will
not be subordinated to private interests, but on the contrary private interests
must be subordinated to the state. The underlying message seems to be that
there is room for everybody, independent of their past, as long as they are
willing to bend the knee. If so, all “sins” can be “cleansed”.
The fight against corruption has also been used selectively to deal with
political adversaries. The UIF has filed lawsuits against key members of the
past administration, such as Rosario Robles, former head of the Ministry of
Agrarian, Territorial and Urban Development, for a case known as Estafa
Maestra (the Master Scam); and Emilio Lozoya, former director of Mexico’s
state-owned oil monopoly (PEMEX), for offenses linked to money laundering
and illicit enrichment, in connection to the Brazilian corporation Odebrecht.
This has raised questions about the use of corruption for political revenge;
especially since Robles was a close ally of López Obrador until another cor-
ruption scandal broke in 2004, linking Obrador’s close assistants with illegal
financing of political campaigns.
It is worth noticing that, although the UIF’s main functions are focused on
the prosecution of financial crimes, particularly money laundering, this agency
has powers to prosecute some crimes related to corruption. It receives and ana-
lyzes reports of financial operations and then disseminates intelligence reports
and other useful documents to detect illicit operations. When appropriate the
UIF presents lawsuits to the corresponding authority.
Note: 2020 data correspond to the months of January to April.

Source: Authors’ own graph using UIF data.
Figure 8.3 Number of complaints filed by UIF
Between 2018 to 2019, the UIF signed 36 agreements with different author-
ities from local governments and public service ministers, to autonomous
agencies, such as electoral subnational organizations. Figure 8.3 shows the
number of lawsuits developed by the UIF. Lawsuits reflex the potential cases
of corruption, thus AMLO’s priority cases. It is clear that in the first year of
López Obrador’s administration, the number of lawsuits increased considera-
bly (up to 164), in contrast with the number of complaints in 2012 (35) or even
in 2016, with less than 120.
This evidence shows the actual proactive role of the UIF in one of the
most important topics of López Obrador’s campaign: corruption. In 2019, 27
percent of the lawsuits were related to corruption offenses (45), whereas in
2020, that increased to 37 percent. Although its efficacy is open to question
even by members of the government, there is little doubt about the contribution
the UIF is making to López Obrador’s narrative regarding corruption.
Another important criticism is about the impartiality of the UIF’s investiga-
tion processes. So far, López Obrador has failed to acknowledge any accusa-
tion of corruption against members of his government, making great efforts to
reframe this when illicit acts were denounced by the press or any other actor.
This is the case, for instance, of his electricity captain, Manuel Bartlet, accused
of providing false statements about the nature and size of his assets in order to
cover the great fortune amassed during his time as a public servant. When con-
fronted with this case the President defended Bartlet, arguing that he should
be allowed time to defend himself because he was being subject to calumnies.
Later on, Bartlet’s son was accused of getting direct contracts from the Federal
Government to sell overpriced items during the sanitary crisis. The operation
was canceled but Bartlet’s offspring have not been touched. More recently,
there was a claim that those who benefited from selling facemasks considera-
bly overpriced were relatives of a senator from Morena (the President’s party).
There is little doubt that investigating and enforcing the law against
corrupt actors – either public or private – is an important part of any good
anti-corruption public policy. However, the rule of law presupposes that norms
are applied in an impartial manner. The fact that most of the actors under
investigation or currently in jail are López Obrador’s adversaries generates
concern in the way in which public institutions are being used.
In sum, while the President sounds determined in his efforts to curb cor-
ruption, his actions do not follow. Very little has been seen in terms of laws
and institutions, the National Anti-corruption System has been restricted and
unfunded since López Obrador took office.
López Obrador’s narrative also recommends a solution: in order to get rid
of corruption, institutions enforcing the law are not required; what is needed
is the will of those in power. And the only ones who have that will are López
Obrador and the members of his government, the so-called 4T. So, the story
is simple: to solve all of Mexico’s problems for the benefit of the people, by
eliminating corruption, the 4T must remain in power.
A DIFFICULT BALANCE: BETWEEN MORAL

DISCOURSE AND ACTUAL PERFORMANCE AGAINST
CORRUPTION
In this chapter we seek to answer the question of whether Mexico’s President’s

call against corruption has brought about change, or is primarily a political
strategy. We contend that, on the positive side, López Obrador is right in
pointing out that corruption is one of the most serious problems in the country.
Systemic corruption has undoubtedly caused serious social, political and eco-
nomic damage. By putting it at the center of the public agenda, López Obrador
has made the issue of corruption not only more visible, but also central to the
success of his government. Achieving the expected results would then seem
crucial for the future of the first populist president of the Mexican democratic
transition. Another positive aspect of his strategy is pointing out the collusion
between economic and political power as one of the most pernicious forms of
corruption in Mexico. Secondary, but also relevant, are the investigations that
have led to the imprisonment of politicians accused of corruption, especially in
a country where impunity has been a trademark.
However, just because corruption is on the agenda does not mean it is
effectively dealt with. The anti-corruption discourse does not seem to have
been reflected in effective measures to reduce it, at least not in terms of abuse
of power and public functions for private purposes, collusion, and lack of
transparency (World Bank, 2020b). López Obrador goes from assuring that
corruption is over to admitting it is still a pending issue.
I come to tell you that the transformation of Mexico has already begun. It is no longer
as it used to be, that a new government came in and things remained the same, the
same corruption continued. Corruption is over. (López Obrador, 2 February 2019)
It bothers me a lot to find out about cases of corruption. After 19 months I am still
finding corruption. (López Obrador, 3 July 2020)
Our analysis suggests that the implementation of the three axes of his strategy
to combat corruption has strengthened López Obrador’s popular support, but
has shown limited results in terms of reducing corruption, and is eroding the
pillars of democracy in Mexico.
Following the populist script, the anti-corruption narrative (first axis)
divides society between the “pure people” and the “corrupt elite”. From the
analysis of his discourse, we found that López Obrador reframes corruption,
associating it with the neoliberal past, the economic elite and his political
adversaries, whom he refers to as the conservatives. Corruption thereby
becomes a property of specific people rather than a specific set of behaviors.
The same behavior is defined as corrupt if enacted by predecessors and not
corrupt if enacted by members of the current government. The same is true at
the institutional level. Corruption became the core characteristic of institutions
created in the neoliberal period. Thus, from López Obrador’s perspective,
corruption is not a complex public problem demanding institutional change,
but rather a personal attribute. On this basis, putting an end to bureaucratic cor-
ruption only requires appointing allies, or “honest” people as public servants,
and punishing unfriendly members of the elite or their supposed cronies who,
by definition, are involved in corruption.
The consequences of this strategy are numerous. The President’s discourse
delegitimizes the institutional effort made in the last two decades, during
which progress was made in the construction of institutions that, although
limited, sought to control the abuse of power and professionalize the public
function through a career system for civil servants based on merit and com-
petition. At the same time, it legitimizes personalized appointments of friends
and loyal people. His discourse becomes a powerful political weapon that sets
the daily agenda, disqualifies the media, intimidates public opinion, and limits
the opposition parties and political actors who disagree with his government’s
policies.
The second axis of this strategy, centralizing decisions that used to be part
of the complex public administrative structure, produces the opposite effect
to avert red tape and bureaucratic corruption. Centralizing decision-making
makes it more difficult to fight corruption, as this requires, among other

things, establishing multiple controls. This can even provoke the multiplica-
tion of acts of corruption. The centralization of power also makes possible
the use of public resources for political–electoral purposes, as in the case of
social programs, and alterations in law enforcement or even the violation of
due process of law. Additionally, there is the erosion of one of the pillars of
democratic systems: the balance of powers. Weakening the institutions moves
the country backwards on the democratic path. At the time this chapter was
written an illustrating case was taking place in Mexico. The former director of
PEMEX (the state oil monopoly), Emilio Lozoya, was extradited from Spain to
Mexico on charges of corruption. However, he has not set foot in prison on the
grounds that he will be a “collaborative witness”, as argued by the President.
This illustrates how the law seems to be selectively enforced in Mexico, and
also exemplifies how the supposed independence of the prosecutor’s office is
not as such.
The third axis of López Obrador’s strategy has an institutional dimension.
He has weakened certain institutions, particularly those supposed to serve
as a counterweight. This is the case of the SNA, whose design required the
consensus of federal and local governments, public servants, political parties,
experts and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), among others. By ignor-
ing the institutional scaffolding created to fight corruption, the agreements of
several years are thrown overboard, and a policy that approaches international
best practices is not sustainable.
The President’s strategy of limiting the scope of action of the SNA implies
that the core purpose under which it was created, the operation of a system
that integrates three levels and three branches of government as well as auton-
omous actors, is broken. Critical appointments as well as assigning it a budget
that allows it to operate are still pending.
In short, the fight against corruption led by López Obrador and his govern-
ment, despite their appearances and intentions, has fostered: (1) new contexts
of corruption; (2) institutional weakening, less professionalization and impu-
nity; and (3) a waste of resources.
All of this contravenes the international recommendations and best practices
against systemic corruption and represents an important piece of evidence
that López Obrador’s approach to fighting corruption is no more than a moral
discourse and a political strategy. Table 8.2 compares the core elements of sys-
temic corruption, the best practices to combat it, according to the mainstream
literature and international agencies, and the Mexican government’s actions
against corruption. There is a sharp contrast between key international recom-
mendations and López Obrador’s policies against corruption.
As can be seen in Table 8.2, Obrador’s government is addressing the abuse
of public power – the first element of systemic corruption – by investigating
Table 8.2 Theoretical characteristics, anti-corruption best practices

and Mexico’s actions
Systemic corruption Mexico’s actions against

Best practices against corruption
characteristics corruption
Abuse of public power Accountability systems Halting the National
Anti-corruption System
Investigating elite members
(politicians and businessmen)
accused of corruption
(“Sweeping the stairs from top to
bottom”)
Abuse of public function Civil service systems Appointing “loyal” and “honest”
people in key positions
Elite Connections between Open elections/audit and control of Promising/discourse about the
private groups and public public treasury separation between political and
power economic power
Promising that his government is
not corrupt
Favoring direct purchase (without
a public bidding process)
Centralizing distribution of public
funds
Obtaining political capital Audit and control of the public Centralizing management of social
with public fund promotion treasury/transparent operation rules programs with direct distribution
of social programs of benefits
Publicizing the President’s name
when enrolling people in social
programs
A way of doing business Public tenders Favoring direct purchase (without
secretly and behind closed public bidding process)
doors/favoring friends
Source: Authors’ own table with theoretical elements of Amundsen et al., 2000; Johnston, 2005;
Jiang, 2017.
and prosecuting members of the political and economic elite, instead of putting
in place an accountability system, following recommendations of international
agencies. Regarding the abuse of public office, while the literature and inter-
national agencies advise establishing a civil service system to regulate and
professionalize the entry into the public administration structure, the President
finds it more reliable to appoint “honest” and “loyal” friends in key positions.
This was the case of the Director General of PEMEX, where López Obrador
appointed an agrarian engineer with no experience of the energy sector, but
a good friend of his.
In the case of elite connections between private groups and public power,
López Obrador has relied on his promise that his government is not corrupt.
However, he favors at the same time direct government purchases, avoiding
public bidding.
Finally, a key characteristic of systemic corruption is the use of public funds
to gain political capital and personal promotion. In this case, Mexico’s govern-
ment ignores the best international practice of guaranteeing transparent rules
of social programs and auditing the public treasury. On the contrary, it favors
centralizing the management process of key social programs so as to directly
distribute social benefits and publicize the President’s name while enrolling
people in the list of beneficiaries.
In sum, Table 8.2 suggests López Obrador’s actions and discourse diverge
from the best international practices to solve systemic corruption. His gov-
ernment resembles what Urbinati refers to as a “new form of representative
government” but a “disfigured one”, which is identified as populist democracy
(Urbinati, 2019: 3). Populism may not be the cause of corruption (Cubillos,
2013: 13) but, by weakening the institutions of vertical and horizontal account-
ability (Del Tronco, 2013), it seems to foster its continuity and prevent its
dismantling (Cubillos, 2013: 16). The President has strengthened a political
context favorable to him and his party, using corruption as the best and ulti-
mate popular cause to remain in power. Rather than a real attempt to change
institutions, López Obrador’s fight against corruption seems to be nothing
more than a strategy to advance his political project.
NOTES
1. AMLO is an acronym for Andrés Manuel López Obrador. In the press, he is com-
monly referred to as AMLO.
2. The idea of a fourth transformation seeks to put López Obrador’s administration
on the same level as previous major revolutions in Mexico’s history, namely: The
Independence (from Spain), the Reform (separation of Church and State), and the
Mexican Revolution.
3. “Left-wing populism in Mexico is inseparable from the person of Andrés Manuel
López Obrador [AMLO]. Unlike other populists in Latin America, AMLO is far
from being an outsider. […] he began his political career in the early 1970s in
the PRI. Later he was part of the Democratic Current founded by Cuauhtémoc
Cárdenas and Porfirio Muñoz Ledo, which split from the PRI in 1988.” Own
translation from Monsivais-Carrillo, 2018: 14.
4. López Obrador’s quotations in this chapter come from the stenographic versions
of his press conferences and speeches, which are published in his blog. Translation
from Spanish to English is the responsibility of the authors.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aboy, G. (2005), ‘Populismo y democracia en la Argentina contemporánea. Entre el
hegemonismo y la refundación’, Estudios sociales, 28 (1), 125–149.
Agren, David (2020), ‘Mexico’s López Obrador holds daily briefings rivalling
Trump’s: “A spectacle without any value”’, The Guardian, accessed 4 May
2020 at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/04/mexico-president-amlo
-coronavirus-briefings-like-trump.
Amundsen, I., Andvig, J., Fjeldstad, O., Sissener, T. K., and Søreide, T. (2000,
December), ‘Research on corruption, a policy oriented survey, Norwegian Agency
for Development Cooperation’, final report commissioned by the Norwegian
Agency for Development Co-operation.
Arellano, D. (2020), Corruption in Latin America, New York: Routledge.
Barros, S. (2006), ‘Espectralidad e inestabilidad institucional. Acerca de la ruptura
populista’, Estudios Sociales, 30 (1), 145–162.
Bautista, Ó. D. (2017), Reflexiones en torno a la creación del sistema nacional anticor-
rupción (SNA) de México y su desvinculación de la ética pública como mecanismo
de prevención de la corrupción, Colección de cuadernos para prevenir y controlar
la corrupción Cuaderno 3, Contraloría del Poder Legislativo del Estado de México,
Toluca, Estado de México, México: Impresos Tegar.
Caiden, G. E. (1988), ‘Toward a general theory of official corruption’, Asian Journal of
Public Administration, 10 (1), 3–26.
Cerutti, H. (1978), ‘Posibilidades y límites de una filosofía latinoamericana “después”
de la filosofía de la liberación’, paper presented at the IX Inter-American Congress
of Philosophy, Caracas.
Cubillos, J. M. (2013), ‘Vínculos entre Corrupción y Populismo en América Latina
(2000–2010)’, doctoral dissertation, Universidad Externado de Colombia.
De Cleen, B. (2017), ‘Populism and nationalism’, in C. Rovira, P. Taggart, P. Ochoa
and P. Ostiguy (eds), Handbook of populism, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press,
pp. 342–362.
Del Tronco, J. (2013), ‘Desconfianza y “accountability” ¿Las causas del populismo en
América Latina?’, Latin American Research Review, 48 (2), 55–78.
Fallers, L.A. (1964), ‘Populism and Nationalism: a Comment on DA Low’s “The
Advent of Populism in Buganda”’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 6
(4), 445–448.
Flores, U. (2019), Por qué persiste la corrupción en México? Gobiernos ineficientes o
ciudadanos corruptos, D.F., México: Instituto Nacional de Administración Pública,
A.C.
Flores, U. and Hernández, R. (2020), ‘Que roben pero que salpiquen: aproximaciones
a la cultura de la corrupción a través de la tolerancia a ésta en México’, Journal of
Public Administration of Latin American Group of Public Administration, 4 (6),
9–24.
Freidenberg, F. (ed.) (2007), La tentación populista: una vía al poder en América
Latina, Madrid, Spain: Editorial Síntesis S.A.
Germani, G., Di Tella, T. and Ianni, O. (1977), Populismo y Contradicciones de clase
en Latinoamérica, Evanston, IL: Era.
Hermet, G. (2003), ‘El Populismo como concepto’, Revista de Ciencia Política, XXIII
(1), 5–18.
INEGI (2020), Encuesta Nacional de Calidad e Impacto Gubernamental, accessed 1

August 2020 at: https://www.inegi.org.mx/programas/encig/2019/.
Jiang, G. (2017), Corruption control in Post Reform China: A social censure perspec-
tive, Singapore: Springer Nature Publishing.
Johnston, M. (2005), ‘Es posible medir la corrupción, pero es posible medir la
reforma?’, Revista Mexicana de Sociología, (2), 357–377.
Klitgaard, R. (1994), Controlando la Corrupción. Una indagación práctica para el gran
problema social de fin de siglo, Buenos Aires, Argentina: Editorial Sudamericana.
Laclau, E. (ed.) (1978), Política e ideología en la teoría marxista. Capitalismo, fas-
cismo, populismo, Spain: XXI century of Spain Editors.
Laclau, E. (1987), ‘Populismo y transformación del imaginario político en América
Latina’, Boletín de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe, (42), 25–38.
Laclau, E. (2005), ‘La razón populista’, México, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 29, 33.
Monsivais-Carrillo, A. (2018), ‘La izquierda populista en México: ¿Amenaza o
correctivo para la democracia?”’ Working Paper, Research Gate, accessed 3
March 2021 at: https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/57056854/IzqPopMx
_AM2018.pdf?1532375289=&response-content-disposition=inline%3B+filename
%3DLa_izquierda_populista_en_Mexico_amenaza.pdf&Expires=1614807905&
Signature=K4WpOEiSwD8XTsfLbdRufterhxHokvHD-r86TGUcLWOQsfWCkXN
RBcdHLwzUAL5pPsd18pZfVUk03QvEd3qJbR5leu4tdvqMBsfV0C0ZgANXcyI
2LXAhok1vU-O5N1hf~lOrnTJgY3lDeXAOpnrvbhffQY7Jtx9Tvnuae
C2NtiSEUOWe5KCQNLjGnz0ysG73fDGXGVy750JFwlxvTEGUg5b~
j6N49ryjPlmsYOYlKAIyNAcnfIiXBNTcjPDmxITYgVvMu2AlYhLf4HUhMIbp
TyPvz1BYHCdaRl5RivugzXL3SZoZBhq4kshRetui33aj5bYmp4-YnqcycW
~GD9u9tA__&Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA.
Morris, S.D. (2003), ‘Corruption and Mexican political culture’, Journal of the
Southwest, 45 (4), 671–708.
Morris, S.D. (2009), Political corruption in Mexico: The impact of democratization,
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Mudde, C. and Kaltwasser, C.R. (2013), ‘Exclusionary vs. inclusionary pop-
ulism: Comparing contemporary Europe and Latin America’, Government and
Opposition, 48 (2), 147–174.
Myers, A. and Rouzaud, D. (2016), ‘El sistema Nacional Anticorrupción’, Estudios,
XIV (119), 135–159.
Nava, Ó. (2018), ‘El Sistema Nacional Anticorrupción en México y las nuevas atribu-
ciones del órgano de control externo’, Revista Española de Control Externo, XX
(58), 155–184.
Nye, J. (1989), ‘Corruption and political developement: A cost benefit analysis’, in A.
Heindenheimer, M. Johnston and V. Le Vine (eds), Political corruption: A hand-
book, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, pp. 963–983.
Paramio, L. (2006), ‘Giro a la izquierda y regreso del populismo’, Revista Nueva
Sociedad, 205, 62–74.
Retamozo, M. (2017), ‘La teoría política del populismo: usos y controversias en
América Latina en la perspectiva posfundacional. Latinoamérica’, Revista de estu-
dios Latinoamericanos, (64), 125–151.
Shills, E. (1956), The torment of secrecy: The background and consequences of
American security, Chicago, IL: Ivan R. Dee.
United Nations (2004), United Nations Convention Against Corruption Final Report,
Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, accessed 1 August 2020 at:
https://www.unodc.org/documents/brussels/UN_Convention_Against_Corruption
.pdf.
Urbinati, Nadia (2019), Me the people: How populism transforms democracy,
Cambridge, MA, London, UK: Harvard University Press.
Wills, E. (1997), ‘Autonomía local, descentralización y corrupción en Colombia. La
corrupción en Colombia’, paper presented at the Corruption and Decentralization
Seminar.
WEB REFERENCES
Web Pages Without a Named Author
Alto Nivel. (2019), Así justifica AMLO la desaparición del Instituto de Evaluación
Educativa, accessed 18 May 2020 at https:// www .altonivel.com.mx/actualidad/
mexico/asi-justifica-amlo-la-desaparicion-del-instituto-de-evaluacion-educativa/.
Aristegui Noticias. (2019), Es más lo que ha ocultado que lo que ha hecho la CNDH
para defender los derechos humanos: AMLO, accessed 16 May 2020 at https://
aristeguinoticias.com/0511/mexico/es-mas-lo-que-ha-ocultado-que-lo-que-ha
-hecho-la-cndh-para-defender-los-derechos-humanos-amlo/.
CONEVAL. (2020), Medición de la pobreza, accessed 4 May 2020 at https://www
.coneval.org.mx/Medicion/PublishingImages/Pobreza_2018/Serie_2008-2018.jpg.
El Universal. (2018), AMLO ordena cancelar reforma educativa de EPN, accessed
18 May 2020 at https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/amlo-entierra-la-reforma
-educativa-y-elimina-al-inee.
El Universal. (2019), AMLO envía los mismos perfiles para la CRE, accessed 17 May
2020 at https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/politica/amlo-envia-los-mismos
-perfiles-para-la-cre.
El Universal. (2019), Prefiero que una víctima encabece la CNDH: AMLO, accessed
16 May 2020 at https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/prefiero-que-una-victima
-encabece-la-cndh-amlo.
El Universal. (2020), AMLO da la bienvenida a México Libre; no cuestionará registro
de INE, accessed 18 May 2020 at https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/politica/
amlo-da-la-bienvenida-mexico-libre-no-cuestionara-registro-de-ine.
El Universal. (2020), Bartlett: primero 23 casas, ahora 12 empresas, accessed 6
May 2020 at https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/opinion/carlos-loret-de-mola/bartlett
-primero-23-casas-ahora-12-empresas.
El Universal. (2020), Investigan a empresa de hijo de Bartlett, accessed 6 May 2020
at https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/politica/investigan-hijo-de-bartlett-por
-ventiladores.
La Razón. (2019), Investigación íntegra de la SFP sobre bienes de Manuel Bartlett,
accessed 6 May 2020 at https://www.razon.com.mx/mexico/investigacion-completa
-sfp-bartlett/.
MVS Noticias. (2019), AMLO califica al INE de ‘florero’, accessed 18 May 2020
at https://mvsnoticias.com/noticias/nacionales/amlo-recuerda-a-servidores-de-la
-nacion-que-no-deben-hacer-proselitismo/.
Noticieros Televisa. (2019), AMLO nombra a comisionados de la Comisión Reguladora
de Energía, accessed 17 May 2020 at https:// noticieros .televisa
.com/ultimas
-noticias/amlo-nombra-comisionados-comision-reguladora-energia-cre/.
SFP (Secretaría de la Función Pública). (2016), Sistema Nacional Anticorrupción,

accessed 31 July 2020 at: https://www.gob.mx/sfp/acciones-y-programas/sistema
-nacional-anticorrupcion-64289.
The Washington Post. (2020), Hijo de Bartlett recibe contratos por 162 millones del
gobierno de AMLO, accessed 6 May 2020 at https://www.washingtonpost.com/
es/post-opinion/2020/05/03/hijo-de-bartlett-recibe-contratos-por-162-millones-del
-gobierno-de-amlo/.
The World Bank. (2020a), Control of corruption, accessed 15 April 2020 at https://info
.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/cc.pdf.
The World Bank. (2020b), Corruption and economic development, accessed 17 April
2020 at http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/cor02.htm
#define.
Transparency International. (2020), What is corruption?, accessed 26 March 2020 at
https://www.transparency.org/en/what-is-corruption#.
United Nations. (2004), United Nations Convention Against Corruption, accessed
31 March 2020 at https://www.unodc.org/documents/brussels/UN_Convention
_Against_Corruption.pdf.
Weblogs (Blogs)
AMLO – Sitio Oficial de Andrés Manuel López Obrador, Presidente de México. (2019),
‘Versión estenográfica de la conferencia de prensa matutina del presidente Andrés
López Obrador’, 4 January, accessed 14 September 2020 at https://lopezobrador
.org.mx/2019/01/04/version-estenografica-del-inicio-del-programa-zona-libre-de-la
-frontera-norte/.
López Obrador’, 11 January, accessed 14 September 2020 at https://lopezobrador
.org.mx/2019/01/11/version-estenografica-de-la-conferencia-de-prensa-matutina
-del-presidente-andres-manuel-lopez-obrador-21/.
AMLO – Sitio Oficial de Andrés Manuel López Obrador, Presidente de México.
(2019), ‘Versión estenográfica de la conferencia de prensa matutina del presidente
Andrés López Obrador’, 2 February, accessed 16 September 2020 at https://
lopezobrador.org.mx/2019/02/02/version-estenografica-presentacion-del-programa
-sembrando-vida-en-acayucan-veracruz/.
Andrés López Obrador’, 3 February, accessed 17 September 2020 at https://
lopezobrador.org.mx/2019/02/03/version-estenografica-programa-sembrando-vida
-en-cordoba-veracruz/.
López Obrador’, 11 February, accessed 16 September 2020 at https://lopezobrador
López Obrador’, 12 February, accessed 16 September 2020 at https://lopezobrador
(2019), ‘Versión estenográfica de la conferencia de prensa matutina del presi-
dente Andrés López Obrador’, 6 April, accessed 17 September 2020 at https://
lopezobrador.org.mx/2019/04/06/version-estenografica-programa-de-mejoramiento
-urbano-en-morelia-michoacan/.
López Obrador’, 10 April, accessed 15 September 2020 at https://lopezobrador.org
.mx/2019/04/10/version-estenografica-de-la-conferencia-de-prensa-matutina-del
-presidente-andres-manuel-lopez-obrador-62/.
López Obrador’, 21 April, accessed 18 September 2020 at https://lopezobrador.org
.mx/2019/04/21/version-estenografica-105-aniversario-de-la-defensa-patriotica-del
-puerto-de-veracruz-en-alvarado-veracruz/.
Andrés López Obrador’, 3 July, accessed 18 September 2020 at https://lopezobrador
López Obrador’, 6 September, accessed 15 September 2020 at https://lopezobrador
López Obrador’, 1 December, accessed 18 September 2020 at https://lopezobrador
.org.mx/2019/12/01/discurso-informe-primer-ano-de-gobierno/.
López Obrador’, 3 December, accessed 17 September 2020 at https://lopezobrador

Corruption and Populism in Mexico: Is AMLO The Same Formula Against Corruption?

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Corruption and Populism in Mexico: Is AMLO The Same Formula Against Corruption?

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

8.

Corruption and populism in Mexico:

On 1 December 2018, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO)1 took office

Regulation Commission), INEE (National Institute for the Evaluation of

Some scholars have argued that corruption is not a characteristic of the

Source: World Bank Governance indicators data.

Figure 8.1 Control of corruption in Mexico, 1996–2018

Source: National Survey of Quality and Government Impact, ENCIG Mexico.

Figure 8.2 Perception of corruption in the Federal Government

• asset and conflict of interest declarations;

CORRUPTION IN THE PRESIDENT’S DISCOURSE AND

López Obrador uses these public interventions as a means to control the

Table 8.1 Most frequently used words (December 2018–April 2020)

Term Count Times per speech (average) Waged percentage*

Furthermore, he uses corruption as a shortcut. Corruption allows him to have

This has led to fundamental changes in social policy delivery. An important

López Obrador contends that the money saved by curbing corruption

there was a lot of pretense, various supposedly autonomous, independent agencies

government to operate the looting, to facilitate theft, to deliver contracts, permits

Note: 2020 data correspond to the months of January to April.

Figure 8.3 Number of complaints filed by UIF

A DIFFICULT BALANCE: BETWEEN MORAL

In this chapter we seek to answer the question of whether Mexico’s President’s

makes it more difficult to fight corruption, as this requires, among other

Table 8.2 Theoretical characteristics, anti-corruption best practices

Systemic corruption Mexico’s actions against

INEGI (2020), Encuesta Nacional de Calidad e Impacto Gubernamental, accessed 1

Web Pages Without a Named Author

SFP (Secretaría de la Función Pública). (2016), Sistema Nacional Anticorrupción,

You might also like