Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Executive Summary 1
Chapter 1: Introduction 10
Chapter 5: Staffing 29
Appendix A: Documents 92
Appendix B: Interviews 93
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In October 2021, the St. Louis County Department of Justice Services selected CGL Companies
(CGL) to conduct a comprehensive review of the operations of the County’s Justice Center. This
facility provides secure detention for pretrial and sentenced inmates in the county justice
system. This project was initiated in the wake of years of executive leadership turnover and
several high-profile incidents at the facility. The primary objective of the project was to assess
the Justice Center’s current operations, and to provide recommendations to improve
performance, incorporating current best practices and professional standards.
The Justice Center faces a number of challenges which are described in this report. We have
provided 71 recommendations to provide a path to address these issues. Justice Center
management has been briefed on the report and has already begun implementation of many of
these recommendations. However, it is important to place these issues in context.
As the project team conducted the assessment, we heard repeated reports that the Justice
Center was a troubled facility. Media reports have reflected this, rightly focusing on the inmate
deaths that have occurred at the facility, the extensive turnover of leadership in the past six
years, and a historic pattern of high staff turnover and corresponding vacancies. This negative
perception in turn appears to have had a significant impact on recruitment and retention of
facility staff.
By contrast, our review, after extensive meetings with staff and observations of facility
operations on all shifts, generally found an orderly, clean facility staffed by employees who
executed their duties in a manner that created a secure environment. Many staff described the
Justice Center as a safe place to work and the project team felt safe when moving through the
facility.
It was clear that the constant turnover in executive leadership over the past years and the
staffing challenges resulting from the national labor shortage and the COVID-19 pandemic have
placed significant strains on staff, facility operations, and the ability to recruit and retain
employees. However, the perception of the Justice Center as a chaotic, unsafe facility with
severe operational issues is not consistent with the current reality we observed. Moreover,
certain functional units of the Justice Center, most notably Intake and Transportation, appear
to operate with a high level of professionalism and operational performance.
However, the Justice Center does have operational issues that must be addressed to meet the
needs of the St. Louis County justice system in an effective, efficient manner over the long-
term. This report describes these issues and recommendations. Highlights of our report follow.
Staffing: The most critical issue facing the Justice Center is assuring adequate correctional
officer staffing to support facility operations. Our review indicates the facility has far fewer staff
than required to operate in a manner consistent with professional standards. The current
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Justice Center post deployment requires 3 Full Time Equivalent (FTE) security staff to provide
coverage of all current, operational posts (this does not include staffing for the one floor of the
facility that is currently vacant for repairs). The Justice Center budget supports 266 security
FTEs. At the time of this analysis, the Justice Center employed 221 security staff. The facility has
managed the disparity between available and required staff by extensive reliance on overtime,
temporary closure of posts as needed, and contracting for temporary security staff.
The current roster does not provide sufficient relief staff. Actual staff leave data indicate the
shift relief factor needs to be increased from 1.63 to 1.88. This change alone increases officer
staffing requirements by 32 positions.
Following assaults on staff in late 2021, as a safety precaution, management changed the
deployment of housing unit staff to mandate a second officer in every housing unit at those
times when inmates are out of their cells during daytime activities. As partially implemented,
this practice adds 12 posts to the roster on the Morning and Afternoon shifts, which equates to
23 additional officers. However, this number of additional staff are not sufficient to fully
implement this policy throughout the facility. As a result, the facility must lock down half of the
housing units on each floor at any given time through the Morning and Afternoon shifts,
rotating available housing unit staff to allow inmates out of their cells for limited periods of
time. This practice severely impedes inmate access to out-of-cell time, recreation, and program
services and is not sustainable in the long-term.
The Justice Center is designed for direct supervision and has long followed National Institute of
Corrections (NIC) guidelines for inmate behavioral management in direct supervision facilities.
The basis of direct supervision inmate management is the establishment of one housing unit
officer as the single authority figure in inmate housing units. This creates consistency in
communicating with inmates and enforcing accountability. This supervision model is a
recognized best practice and is used in major jails throughout the United States.
Our recommendations to address facility staffing center on aligning staff requirements with
workload and implementing direct supervision in facility housing units:
• Staff the low and medium security general population housing units with one
officer per shift, consistent with National Institute of Corrections guidelines
and direct supervision principles. Housing unit officers will be supported by
additional floor rover posts, sergeants, and lieutenants stationed on every floor.
• Add ten officers to the Transportation Unit. This restores staffing to pre-COVID
levels and is consistent with the increasing workload.
• Update the relief factor to reflect actual staff availability and adjust rosters to
reflect accurate relief requirements.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
These recommendations result in a total security staff complement of 346 FTEs. This staffing
level will allow normal operation of current housing units. We project that staffing the facility at
this level will reduce annual overtime spending by $1.2 million.
Organization. The facility’s supervisory structure is top-heavy. The facility uses a unit
management system whereby the overall facility is separated into smaller units (floors)
managed by a team structure, led by majors. The Justice Center is somewhat unique in
designating majors to serve as unit managers. This practice removes the captain position from
floor supervisory decisions and creates disconnects in information sharing. Captains report to
the Security Superintendent but are also accountable to multiple majors depending upon the
floor, creating the potential for conflicting orders, and missed communication. The number of
unit managers is also excessive given the number of inmates housed on each floor.
The first-line supervisor position reports to the captains but is inadequately defined.
Historically, the facility has operated with the lieutenant as the first-line supervisor. In the last
few years however, the sergeant position was introduced as an additional supervisory level
between correctional officers and lieutenants. The current duties of sergeants and lieutenants
are indistinguishable. Clear delineation of each rank’s responsibilities will clarify the chain of
command and improve management oversight.
• Reduce the number of major posts from seven to three. Assign one major as
Facility Commander, one to oversee Intake and Transportation, and one to
manage the Integrity Unit.
• Reduce the number of unit managers from five to three and assign three new
captains to these positions. The qualifications for unit manager positions should
also be broadened to include case managers and other community corrections
staff.
• Redefine the role of the sergeant as a lead correctional officer responsible for
field training of new employees, mentoring existing staff, and providing relief
for correctional officers for breaks and other periods when the officer needs to
leave their post. In this capacity, sergeants will report to the lieutenants
responsible for first line-supervision in their assigned areas. The two corporals
should be reclassified as sergeants. In total this reduces the number of required
sergeants by 14 FTEs.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Modifying the supervisory structure for security to clarify responsibilities and reporting
relationships will produce better communications and improved management accountability.
The proposed organizational structure reduces the number of majors and sergeants while
increasing the number of captains and lieutenants. Total recommended command staffing is 6
FTEs lower than current command staffing requirements These recommendations result in the
following organizational structure:
Director
Major Integrity
Deputy Director
Unit
Security
Superintendent
Watch
Unit Managers Captain Lieutenant
Commanders
(Captains) Intake/Transp. Admin/Training
(Captains)
Lieutenant Sergeants
Lieutenants
Transp. Training/FTO
Lieutenant
Intake
Operations & Policy. Operating policies and procedures establish the rules by which the facility
operates and should provide a specific guide to staff in the conduct of their duties. The project
team reviewed a number of operational policies at the request of facility management to
determine consistency with contemporary professional standards. We found that although the
policies were comprehensive and covered most key areas of facility management and
operations, in several cases they require modification to establish greater accountability and
conform with contemporary standards. Our review produced recommendations for
modifications to policies in the following areas:
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• Roster Management
• Use of Force
• Segregation Placement
• Emergency Response
• Disciplinary Hearings
The project team also reviewed materials provided regarding the facility’s response to the
deaths of five inmates in 2019. The materials reviewed focused on the actions and
appropriateness of security personnel and did not address actions of the medical provider or
others involved. The departmental reports provided were short reports provided by security
staff involved in the incidents and are not the actual death investigations that were conducted
by law enforcement personnel. Each death was found to be a result of medical conditions.
Security personnel noted abnormalities with inmates’ health and attempted to direct them
towards healthcare. Two separate instances are noted of medical staff stating that inmates
were faking illness and they did not follow-up. In one case a healthcare manager stated during
an interview that inmates would not be seen by medical sick call solely based on the referral of
security personnel. This is contrary to standard practice in most jails, as security personnel
often have the most interaction with inmates and are likely be the best source of information
related to their condition.
Case records make no mention of security camera verification of appropriate security checks;
therefore, we assume that these systems were not installed and/or available to investigators.
Verifications were cited showing regular required security tours were conducted in the housing
units but not in medical areas. However, one case summary revealed potential issues in logging
system accuracy and/or verification of security tours. The officer in question was alleged to
have potentially falsified log entries but further investigation revealed he had a history of
documenting security tours hours after he performed them. This fact may be an indicator that
supervisory staff are not regularly checking entries throughout the shift to ensure accurate and
timely security tours. Recommendations based on this limited review include:
• Establish by policy that first-line supervisors review all duty post logbook entries once
per shift. This creates greater accountability of line-level staff properly documenting
security checks while also providing opportunity for supervisory interaction with staff on
a regular basis.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Organizational Culture. The project team conducted an extensive series of focus groups,
interviews, and facility tours to determine characteristics of organizational culture that could
affect facility operations. Our review found many staff troubled by negative public perceptions
of the Justice Center. The tenure of a former Justice Center Director was described as a time of
extreme stress resulting from an autocratic leadership approach with inconsistent and arbitrary
decision-making. Some staff reported to have been victimized by episodes of verbal abuse by
the former director. Staff that were employed during that period consistently described a
turbulent time which resulted in long-term damage to the facility’s work environment.
Staff also perceived issues with “favoritism” influencing the outcomes of promotions and
discipline, disregard for policy compliance (particularly in the area of staff discipline), and
inconsistency in communication through the chain of command. Particularly in areas of policy
and operational directives, current patterns of communication appear inconsistent and
fractured. Effective communication is a prerequisite for a positive organizational culture.
Building a more positive culture requires support from management. The Justice Center has
accomplishments and positive stories to tell that reflect well on staff and that will help build a
positive environment. During our review staff consistently identified the same preferred
culture; one that emphasizes teamwork, recognition, engagement, and empowerment. These
principles should be at the center of approaches to develop a positive staff culture.
Staff training is also a vital tool in promoting cultural change. Effective training improves work
skills, creates consistency in operational practices, and can provide a means to facilitate
communication. Staff consistently mentioned improved training as a key facility need.
• Assign a diverse team from all levels of the facility to recommend revision of
selected policies.
• Meet with a group of officers hired in the past 12 months to identify what
could be improved in new employee training to enhance their transition to the
jail.
Health Care. The St. Louis County Department of Public Health is responsible for management
of medical and behavioral health services at the Justice Center. Current policies and procedures
guiding care delivery are not sufficiently specific to correctional healthcare. National
Commission on Correctional Health Care (NCCHC) standards are the nationally recognized
baseline for correctional health care policies and procedures. Implementation of these
standards and subsequent accreditation by NCCHC should be a priority for the County.
The health care program also suffers from a high vacancy rate for budgeted staff positions. At
the time of this review, 30.4 percent of all clinical positions and 37.1 percent of nursing
positions were vacant. This problem is not unique to St. Louis County. In the aftermath of
COVID, correctional facilities nationally are facing crisis levels of clinical staffing shortfalls. The
default approach to addressing this problem for many jurisdictions has been extensive reliance
on temporary, contract, or registry nursing agencies to fill these vacancies. St. Louis County has
followed this approach as well.
However, this approach can create serious issues in service quality. The problem is
compounded by the fact that nurse managers work a significant amount of direct care “nursing
shifts” and do not have time to provide leadership, orientation, or supervision functions.
Nurses reported the managers work 60-80 hours a week.
To address this issue, the County has recently released a Request for Proposal (RFP) for a
contractor to provide a full-time roster of staff to work at the Justice Center. This is a unique
approach in that most jurisdictions that attempt to outsource staffing find it also necessary to
contract out system management. We understand that St. Louis County does not wish to
privatize the entire health care delivery system at the Justice Center. However, it is not clear
that the RFP as released will attract credible bidders that can effectively address the current
clinical staffing shortfalls.
We also found the existing sick call process to be flawed in that if less than 4 nurses are
available during medicine distribution, the nurses do not collect sick call requests and inmates
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
are directed to submit their sick call requests at the next opportunity. This can delay the
expeditious review and triage of sick call requests which is a foundation of effective
correctional health care.
The current psychiatrist providing service to the Justice Center lives in Arizona and is available
only through a telehealth video portal. While tele-psychiatry is a valuable adjunct clinical
service, it works best when the provider is also willing to come on site at periodic intervals to be
part of team meetings, meet with difficult to manage patients, and to be part of the larger
multidisciplinary meetings.
The Justice Center lacks an electronic tracking system to cross reference the number of
scheduled, pending, and completed encounters. Such encounters would include Clinical
Institute Withdrawal Assessments (CIWA), Clinical Opiate Withdrawal Assessments (COW), x-
rays, labs, chronic care visits, physical sick calls, nurse sick calls, and mental health visits. This is
basic management information needed to align staffing patterns with workload requirements.
• Adopt the 2018 NCCHC Standards of Care as basis for policy and procedure
development in support of pursuing accreditation by NCCHC. To support this initiative,
management should commence development of new policies and procedures in
accordance with each NCCHC standard and establish an orientation program and
implementation plan for achieving NCCHC accreditation.
• To retain staff and provide adequate supervision to temp nurses, the Nurse Managers
should reduce their time allocated to direct care “shift work” and instead prioritize
nursing leadership functions.
• Establish and enforce by policy that all sick call requests, without exception will
be collected 7 days per week inclusive of holidays and triaged within 24 hours,
regardless of available nurse staffing. This is consistent with NCCHC and
American Correctional Association (ACA) standards.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Justice Center management team has been proactive in responding to this report.
Over the course of our review, the project team provided regular updates on our
findings and recommendations to Director Scott Anders. In many cases, these updates
resulted in immediate action to either implement the proposed solution to an issue, or
plan for its implementation. As a result, the Justice Center has already begun action on
many issues documented in this report and is realizing the benefits of these actions.
Recommendations in the process of implementation include:
• Require first-line supervisors to review all duty post logbook entries once per shift.
• Implement an “Unauthorized Items” list to clarify items that may not be introduced into
the facility by staff or visitors.
• Replace strip searches of staff suspected of criminal behavior with referrals to law
enforcement agencies for investigation.
• Redefine the role of sergeants to be Field Training Instructors and Rovers in support of
housing unit security.
• Facilitate feedback from staff in their first year of employment on their work
experiences and factors that would improve retention.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
In October 2021, the St. Louis County Department of Justice Services selected CGL Companies
(CGL) to conduct a comprehensive review of the operations County’s Justice Center, which
provide secure detention for pretrial and sentence inmates in the County justice system. This
project was initiated in the wake of several years of executive leadership turnover and several
high-profile incidents at the facility.
The primary objective of the project was to study, review, and analyze the Justice Center’s
current operational practices and policies, and to provide recommendations that will improve
operational performance, incorporating current best practices and principles. Key specific areas
of review included facility staffing practices, security policies and procedures, management
systems, organizational culture, command structure, and health care service delivery
Methodology
In support of our analysis, we requested a large amount of data from the County. Much of the
request addressed basic descriptive information on program design, service delivery, and
facility conditions. We also requested detailed data on the offender population managed by the
County, both in jail and in the probation system. Finally, we also requested performance and
activity measure data, planning documents, management reports, and other documentation of
operations and programs.
Appendix A provides a summary list of the documents and data provided by the County in
support of this project.
We supplemented the written documentation and data provided by the County with
information gained from extensive interviews with key justice system stakeholders and
program administrators. These interviews centered on internal perspectives of the key issues
facing the County justice system, strengths of the current programs, and opportunities for
improved performance. Interview subjects provided invaluable insight into the unique
challenges facing the justice system in St. Louis County.
Appendix B lists the individuals interviewed over the course of the project.
Finally, the project team conducted thorough tours and assessments of the Justice Center.
These tours provided first-hand exposure to the conditions of these facility and the County’s
approach to operations and the delivery of program services. These on-site reviews included
meetings with facility administrators, detailed facility tours, and interviews with incarcerated
individuals, department heads, and line staff. As part of the study, focus groups were held with
front-line staff at every facility to develop further insight into the organizational culture, staff
perspectives, and work environment issues.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
During the review, CGL conducted regular briefings for the Justice Center Director to advise of
the project’s progress; discuss any impediments or problems encountered while completing the
performance review; obtain feedback and input on the direction and scope of the project; and
to summarize preliminary observations and findings.
These briefings helped to refine a list of core issues that the project team identified as being
most critical in terms of affecting the facility’s overall performance. As the review proceeded,
the following list of core issues emerged. These core issues became the primary focus of the
review and were used to frame the issues presented in this report.
CGL’s staffing assessment is based on the National Institute of Corrections (NIC) “Staffing
Analysis Workbook for Jails, Second Edition.” While this staffing process follows the NIC’s
standardized methodology, the unique factors of the St. Louis County Justice center must be
considered.
11
CHAPTER 2: FACILITY PROFILE
The Justice Center is a nine-story high-rise detention facility. The facility is part of the County’s
Justice Services Center which opened in 1998 and shares space with the Prosecutors’ office,
Public Defender’s office, County Police Fingerprint Unit, Fugitive section, Pre-trial and
Community Release, and some Public Works offices.
The facility has a modern design that allows for direct supervision, which centralizes inmate
services within the housing unit, where correctional officers are removed from a secure
enclosed room and placed in the open housing unit dayroom where they have immediate visual
observation and continual interaction with the population. Direct supervision is an industry best
practice and has been shown to improve facility safety and operations while reducing conflict
and unrest. The following table shows the current housing unit configuration and the
populations assigned to each unit.
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CHAPTER 2: FACILITY PROFILE
The first floor of the facility is dedicated to the intake and release processes for individuals
entering and exiting the facility. The admissions area is separated into a law enforcement lobby
and intake processing. The law enforcement lobby contains areas for law enforcement officers
to complete paperwork, medical staff to conduct initial intake screenings, and a property officer
to collect, inventory, and secure an individual’s personal belongings. Several temporary holding
cells are contained in this area for staging during the initial reception process. The Intake
processing area contains a several temporary multi-occupancy holding cells and open seating
for individuals to await further screening and identification processing.
The Transportation Unit utilizes the first floor holding cells to stage individuals needing escort
to court or secure transportation outside of the facility.
The third floor of the facility contains the facility’s master control center where all doors,
cameras and floor activities are monitored. Medical and mental health services are also located
on this floor and include a clinical services area, mental health services, infirmary housing, and
acute mental health housing. Clinic services are provided four days per week during which
inmates are bought down from housing unit floors to receive clinical services. One day per
week, clinic services conduct floor visits. The infirmary and mental health housing units contain
a total of 28 beds for both male and female inmates.
Floors four through seven are similar in design. Each floor contains four direct supervision
housing units (A, B, C, and D) each containing 48 cells with housing for 72 individuals. Each unit
contains an open dayroom for daily activities and a lower level and upper tier of cells
surrounding the dayroom. The lower level of cells is designed for double occupancy (2-beds)
and the upper tier cells are single occupancy. Each of these floors are used for housing
individuals in general population. Custody levels of individuals differ between floors with lower
custody housing on the lower floors and higher custody on the upper floors. Unit 4D is used for
housing of general population female inmates. For every two housing units on floors four
through eight, a shared recreation space is attached for indoor/outdoor recreation.
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CHAPTER 2: FACILITY PROFILE
At the time of the project team’s on-site evaluation, housing unit 4A was closed due to
plumbing problems causing water infiltration in some of the judiciary offices below.
Additionally, all the housing units on the fifth floor were unoccupied due to low population
levels and to make the most efficient use of available security staff. The facility staff reported
plans to relocate the fourth-floor population to the fifth floor to make use of the available
housing space across all four housing units on the fifth floor.
The eighth floor consists of four housing units (A, B, C, and D) dedicated to special management
populations. The A-Unit is similar to floors four through seven and is used for initial housing
once an individual leaves the intake processing center and awaits initial classification. This
housing unit is also diagnostic, holding individuals for a determined amount of time as a Covid-
19 prevention measure. Housing units B, C, and D each contain three secure sub-units (1, 2, and
3) and are used to separate populations into smaller groups. These three units house the
facility’s specialty populations, including segregation, protective custody, and administrative
segregation. The B unit houses female inmates within these categories as well as the female
diagnostic/initial housing.
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CHAPTER 3: MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
• Intake
• Fifth Floor
• Sixth Floor
• Seventh Floor
• Eighth Floor
• Internal Affairs
• Administration
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CHAPTER 2: FACILITY PROFILE
Director
Major
Deputy Director
Integrity Unit
Security Supt.
Watch
Intake/Transp.
Commanders 5th Floor Major 6th Floor Major 7th Floor Major 8th Floor Major Admin Major
Major
Captains
Admin/Training
Lieurtenants Transp. Captain Intake Captain
Captain
Training Transp.
Sergeants Intake Lieutenant
Corporals Lieutenant
Intake Sergeant
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CHAPTER 3: MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
The Justice Center is somewhat unique in assigning majors to serve as unit managers. Unit
management was originally designed to have a diverse leadership, with potential managers
coming from diverse backgrounds including security, case management, programs, and intake.
Systems and facilities that use unit management frequently staff these positions with civilians.
Unit managers are “mini wardens” accountable for their staff and those confined in the unit.
They are leaders and leadership characteristics are the most critical prerequisite for the
position.
No post order or governing policy was identified to describe the actual implementation of unit
management at the Justice Center. However, based upon interviews, the unit managers
assigned to floors hold the following responsibilities:
• creating security staff schedules (including the assignment of staff to and days off) per
floor
Certain unit manager positions have additional duties such as managing the inmate discipline
process, reviewing use of force incidents, and conducting internal investigations. Appendix C
provides a sample description of typical unit manager responsibilities that may serve as basis
for defining the use of unit management at the Justice Center.
Unit management is more regularly observed within a prison system setting, often in facilities
with separate housing compounds. However, it’s use in jails is not uncommon. Unit
management does require a more intensive level of supervisory staff than typical of most jails.
In addition to unit management, the Justice Center has a well-developed operational command
structure. Captains serve as watch commanders assigned to the entire building and specialty
areas (10 total) as follows:
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CHAPTER 3: MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
• 2 assigned per shift as Watch Commanders for the entire building (6 total)
• 1 assigned on the morning and afternoon shift in Intake (the night shift was assigned as
an acting major) (2 assigned)
• 1 assigned to Transportation
• 1 assigned to Administration/Training
The watch commander positions on each shift are responsible for completing daily schedules to
address sick calls, hospital details, and address other last minute scheduling needs. This position
is also responsible for managing the third-floor jail operations (master control, infirmary, and
mental health housing) and keeping an overall command presence for the facility. The captains
assigned to Intake, Transportation, and Administration/Training have management
responsibilities for those specialty divisions.
This command structure, with the major assigned to the floor as the unit manager,
removes the captain position from floor supervisory decisions. In interviews with staff at
both the captain and major level, there were obvious disconnects in information
sharing, which should not occur with a clear chain of command structure. The captains
(watch commanders) in this structure report to the Security Superintendent but are also
accountable to multiple majors depending upon the floor, creating the potential for
conflicting orders, and missed communication. The number of unit managers also
appears excessive given the number of inmates housed on each floor.
As a paramilitary organization that relies upon supervisors giving direction and staff following
orders, a clear chain of command needs to be defined and reinforced at all levels. Modifying
the supervisory structure for security to clarify responsibilities and reporting relationships will
produce better communications and improved management accountability. Establishment of a
Facility Commander position, staffed by a Major, will provide a senior manager with direct
authority over the watch commander captains and the unit manager captains.
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CHAPTER 3: MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
First-line supervisors report to the captains and are responsible for management of correctional
officer activities. The first-line supervisor position is inadequately defined. Historically, the
facility operated with the lieutenant as the first-line supervisor. During a previous director’s
tenure, the sergeant position was introduced as supervisory level between the correctional
officer and lieutenant. This is generally consistent with the typical staffing structure found in
jails, which utilize a sergeant position as a first line supervisor and a lieutenant as a mid-level
manager to oversee a shift’s activities and to manage sergeants. Currently, it is not clear
whether the sergeant or the lieutenant functions as the first-line supervisor.
The sergeant position is similarly poorly defined in its role and responsibility. A comparison of
the Lieutenant and Sergeant Post Orders (3/21 Revision date) indicates only minor differences
in responsibilities. Interviews with staff revealed little difference between the sergeant and
lieutenant work responsibilities. Based upon our staffing discussions with facility staff, the two
positions are used interchangeably to supervise officers and floor activities.
Observations support the lack of differentiation between these two positions. We found that
each floor requires two supervisors assigned on the Morning and Afternoon shifts. The two
supervisors could be two lieutenants, two sergeants, or a combination of 1 lieutenant and 1
sergeant. The Overnight shift requires 3 supervisors to manage floor operations in any
combination. Similarly, the Intake and Transportation units are assigned both sergeants and
lieutenants, but again were found to use these positions interchangeably.
Based upon our interviews, observations, and review of post orders, it appears that the
implementation of the sergeant level position was never fully accepted as a separate first-line
supervisory position between the lieutenant and correctional officer. Without distinction, this
creates disparity with each level performing the same responsibility but receiving different
levels of compensation. Further, it creates confusion among line staff in the chain of command
structure. Facility management has considered phasing out the sergeant level position and
returning to the lieutenant level as a first line supervisor position. We concur with this change.
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CHAPTER 3: MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
post on all three shifts for the Infirmary/Clinic, one lieutenant post on all three
shifts in Intake, and one lieutenant post on the administrative shift to provide
supervision of the Transportation Unit.
The Justice Center has implemented this recommendation and converted 8 vacant
Sergeants to Lieutenants to serve as first -line supervisors. The responsibilities of the
sergeant position may be redirected towards training and support. Many jail systems
have an established role for senior line staff to provide support and guidance for new
staff. Jurisdictions use titles for this function such as Field Training Officer (FTO), Field
Training Instructor (FTI), Senior Correctional Officer, or Corporal. The position provides
career advancement opportunities as a progression from officer to mentor to
supervisor. Oftentimes, this position receives a salary increase either as a percentage
increase to base salary or a stipend increase during times of training activity.
The Justice Center has implemented this recommendation, redefining the duties of sergeants to
be Field Training Officers and Rovers. The recommended command structure makes the
following changes to current post staffing requirements:
• Add one captain post to provide management coverage of the Overnight shift in
Intake/Transportation
• Redefine sergeants as Field Training Officers with three sergeants assigned to the
Morning shift on floors 5 through 7, three sergeants assigned to the Afternoon shift on
floors 5 through 7, and two sergeants assigned to the Overnight shift on floors 5 and 6.
• a total of eight posts to be deployed as needed across the housing unit floors across the
three shifts and promote the two training corporal posts to sergeant posts.
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CHAPTER 3: MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
Figure 3 shows the revised command structure that results from these recommendations.
Director
Major Integrity
Deputy Director
Unit
Security
Superintendent
Watch
Unit Managers Captain Lieutenant
Commanders
(Captains) Intake/Transp. Admin/Training
(Captains)
Lieutenant Sergeants
Lieutenants
Transp. Training/FTO
Lieutenant
Intake
This command structure requires 61 FTEs in total, as shown in Table X. The proposed
organizational structure reduces the number of majors and sergeants while increasing the
number of captains and lieutenants. Total recommended command staffing is 8 FTEs lower
than current command staffing requirements and 3 FTEs above funded staffing levels.
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CHAPTER 3: MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
22
CHAPTER 4: ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE
The project team conducted a cultural assessment of the Justice Center to gain a
comprehensive view of the facility’s organizational culture and operations based on its current
structure, functioning, and overall dynamics of the organization. The assessment examined
what staff think and feel about their work and the facility. The objective of the assessment was
to identify areas of concern and challenging aspects of the culture and make recommendations
that can help advance the mission of the Justice Center by providing additional support for
positive organizational and cultural enhancements.
Approach
The National Institute of Corrections [NIC] has developed a standardized process to assess the
staff culture of correctional facilities including jails and prisons. NIC determined, after years of
providing technical assistance to jurisdictions to address presenting issues without achieving
sustainable change, that when the facility culture is not healthy, positive and lasting operational
change is not likely to be realized. In response, NIC worked with Kim Cameron and Robert
Quinn of the University of Michigan, leading researchers in the fields of organization culture, to
adapt their organizational assessment model to correctional institutions. The resulting protocol,
the Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument [OCAI], measures how staff feel about
coming to work at the facility and how they would like to feel about coming to work.
The assessment was conducted over two full days and engaged approximately 145 jail staff
from all portions of the facility and throughout all levels of the workforce. Consistent with the
NIC protocol, the project team conduct targeted focus group sessions with randomly selected
staff representing Executive Staff, Command Staff, Middle Managers, First Shift Officers, and
Second Shift Officers were conducted. Each focus group lasted approximately one-and-a-half
hours.
Participant independently completed OCAI surveys and participated in robust discussions about
what staff liked most about the facility and what the staff would most like to see changed to
make this a better place to come to work. The project team also conducted a comprehensive
tour of the facility and interviewed staff on their perceptions of facility operations and
conditions. Staff were uniformly engaged and eager to participate in these discussions.
The following themes were consistently voiced by staff during all focus groups and from staff
interviewed throughout the facility.
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Perceptions of a Troubled Facility. As the project team prepared to conduct the assessment,
we continued to hear that the Justice Center was a troubled facility. This theme has been
perpetuated through media depictions of the facility that have focused on the inmate deaths
that have occurred at the facility, the extensive turnover of leadership in the past six years, and
a historic pattern of high staff turnover and corresponding vacancies. This negative perception
of a troubled facility is held by many in the community and heavily influences public perception
of the Justice Center. This in turn appears to have had a significant impact on recruitment and
retention of facility staff.
By contrast, the project team, after extensive meetings with staff and observations of facility
operations, generally found a clean, orderly facility where staff and residents felt safe. We
observed a clean facility throughout all the floors that were staffed by employees who executed
their duties in a manner that created an orderly environment. Moreover, despite the public
perception, staff generally described a safe place to come to work and the project team felt
safe when moving through the facility. The perception of the Justice Center as a chaotic, unsafe
facility with severe operational issues is not consistent with the reality we observed.
The Justice Center has accomplishments and positive stories to tell that reflect well on staff and
that will help build a positive environment. The Center needs to take the initiative to correct
misinformation and disseminate a more accurate representation of the facility.
In response to this recommendation, the Justice Center has developed a public affairs team,
which has completed a newsletter and is developing a podcast.
The Legacy of Banasco. The tenure of former Justice Center Director Raul Benasco was
characterized by staff as a time of extreme stress resulting from an autocratic leadership
approach with inconsistent and arbitrary decision-making. Some staff appeared to be victimized
by episodes of verbal abuse with this facility leader. Staff that were employed during that
period consistently described a turbulent time which resulted in long-term damage to the
facility’s work environment.
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CHAPTER 4: ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE
Favoritism. Staff at all levels of the organization voiced concern regarding favoritism influencing
the outcomes of promotions and discipline. Many examples described can be attributed to past
administrations. There also seemed to be a feeling from long-term employees that they were
not treated fairly, as new employees have received upgraded pay and benefits. More senior
staff feel they endured a long period of employment without pay increases without that time
being recognized compared to compensation levels received by newer staff. Senior staff also
felt in the past they had been held to a much higher level of compliance with policy that newer,
less senior staff.
The Justice Center has developed a committee to address this issue. The committee has
developed a plan that is being reviewed for implementation.
Consistent with this recommendation, Director Anders is now meeting with all
unsuccessful candidates for promotion.
Disregard for Policies. Policies that seemed to generate this theme centered around employee
discipline and dress code. It is anticipated that as vacancies increased due to recruitment and
retention challenges, supervisors may be adjusting enforcement of these policies to ensure
adequate levels of staff to fill posts.
Recommendation 11: Identify current policies and procedures that are not
regularly followed or are inconsistently applied and recommend specific
changes to policies to improve consistency. This can be initiated through
executive committee meetings with command staff.
Recommendation 12: Assign a diverse team from all levels of the facility to
recommend revision of selected policies. A specific example to start with may
include the Dress Code and Grooming Policy. Leadership always maintains
approval authority.
Chain of Command has Broken Links. Staff observed that facility leadership seems divided,
leading to splintered communications and diminished trust. This theme can be directly
attributed to the significant leadership turnover at the Director’s rank compared to a very
stable, tenured command staff. Current communication channels at the Justice Center need to
be improved to facilitate these changes. Particularly in areas of policy and operational
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CHAPTER 4: ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE
The Justice Center has implemented this recommendation. The first facility newsletter
was issued July 12, 2022.
COVID Changes Everything. COVID has had a substantial operational impact on jails throughout
this country, increasing staff stress and impairing consistent channels of communication from
leadership to line staff. In the case of the Justice Center, there is a significant number of newer
staff that have never experienced direct supervision of groups of residents in common areas.
This will dictate a need for a transitional approach to normalizing facility operations and
increased on-the-job training for line staff.
All categories of staff identified the same preferred culture; one that emphasizes teamwork,
recognition, engagement, and empowerment. These principles should be at the center of
approaches to allow positive staff culture to grow through the efforts and actions of the
workforce.
The Justice Center has units that exemplify this type of positive organizational culture. The first
floor which contains Intake and Discharge, as well as the Transportation Unit has an
exceptionally positive culture. Staff assigned to this floor were consistently assigned to this
location. Staff were cross-trained, felt confident filling in for others when necessary, and
displayed positive attitudes. Operational performance appeared to be very good. This is a great
example of a positive culture to examine and use as a model to replicate throughout the
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CHAPTER 4: ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE
facility. While it is recognized that this is not a residential floor and perhaps will always “feel”
different than floors housing residents, consistency of staff assignment and the focus on cross-
training seem to fuel this positive environment. This floor provides a model to build on as
cultural improvement is pursued.
The facility’s use of unit management is also consistent with building a positive, team-oriented
culture. Unit management is a long-standing facility operational approach that promotes the
type of teamwork and empowerment that staff at the Justice Center seek. The mission
statement of unit management is to; “Be responsive to the concerns of staff and needs of
residents”. The fact that there are unit managers responsible for each Justice Center floor’s
operation is a significant advantage. Enhanced training in unit management principles and
practices would allow further progress in building a positive organizational culture.
Staff training is a vital tool in promoting cultural change. Effective training improves
work skills, creates consistency in operational practices, and can provide a means to
facilitate communication. Staff consistently mentioned improved training as a key
facility need.
Recommendation 16: Meet with a group of officers hired in the past 12 months
to identify what could be improved in new employee training to improve their
transition to the jail.
In support of this recommendation, Director Anders is meeting with all staff with less
than one year experience to discuss their experiences and factors that will improve
retention.
The Justice Center has redefined the duties of posted sergeant vacancies to include Field
Training Instructor responsibilities.
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CHAPTER 5: STAFFING
Properly staffing a correctional facility involves more than multiplying the number of posts to
be covered by the number of shifts. An appropriate staffing level is determined by having the
correct number of staff, in the correct place, at the correct time, doing the right things. In
evaluating required staffing, a thorough analysis requires a detailed review of facility
characteristics, staffing and leave data, an on-site review of facility operations, development of
a facility housing profile, identification of minimum post coverage needs, and evaluation of
current staff deployment protocols. A major component of the analysis is the calculation of a
relief factor to ensure proper staff coverage of the required posts.
Approach
CGL’s staffing assessment is based on the National Institute of Corrections (NIC) “Staffing
Analysis Workbook for Jails, Second Edition.” Appendix D provides additional information on
the factors that go into correctional facility staffing assessment. In addition, our review of
facility staffing used the following criteria to assess post and staff deployment requirements:
The review also considers applicable regulatory standards that may govern jail operations.
Three sets of regulatory standards are relevant for the Justice Center. These include the
Missouri Core Jail Standards (MCJS) – (March 2019), the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003
(945 USC 15601), and American Correctional Association (ACA) accreditation standards.
Appendix E summarizes key elements of these regulatory standards.
Finally, to understand jail staffing, it is important to emphasize the difference between posts
and budgeted positions. A post within a jail is the duty location which needs to be staffed for a
specific number of hours and days per week. Most posts in a jail, such as housing unit officers,
must be filled 24-hours per day, 7-days per week. Budgeted positions, or full-time equivalent
positions (FTEs), are the number of employees allocated to a facility to fill these posts. For
example, an employee typically works a 5-day, 8-hour shift for a total of 40-hours per week, but
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many posts in a jail must be filled seven days per week, 24-hours per day. Given staff work
schedules, leave time, and other time away from post, at least 5 full-time budgeted positions
are typically required to fill a single 24-hour per day, seven days per week post.
The Fiscal Year 2022 budget supports 363 positions at the jail. Of these funded positions, 266
are security related FTEs ranging from corrections officers to the superintendent position. All
security positions identified provide services to the daily management and supervision of the
inmate population. As of June 2022, 45 of these security positions, or 17 percent of the total,
were vacant. Most of these vacancies were among corrections officers. The Center has made
significant progress in filling vacancies, reducing the number of security vacancies by over 60
percent since January 2022. Table 3 reflects the current breakdown of funded security
positions.
The project team documented current post assignments deployed within the Justice Center on
all four operating shifts, the Administration Shift (8:00 a.m. – 5:00 p.m.), the Morning Shift (6:00
a.m. – 2:30 p.m.), the Afternoon shift (2:00 p.m. – 10:30 p.m.), and the Overnight Shift (10:00
p.m. – 6:30 a.m.). We placed posts on those shifts into three categories: Administration, which
include training, support, and senior posts; Intake/Transportation, which includes intake,
release, and transportation; and Security Operations, which covers posts for all the facility
housing units. The review identified 202 posts in operation, of which 70 percent were allocated
to Security Operations. At the time of this review, five housing units (4A, 5A, 5B, 5C, and 5D)
were closed.
To determine the staffing required to operate these posts, we applied the facility’s current shift
relief factor (1.63) to the posts identified as in consistent use and operation at the time of our
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review. We include an evaluation of the relief factor, its impact on staffing requirements, and a
projection of staffing required for full operation of every housing unit later in this report.
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Current Justice Center post deployment requires 303 FTEs to provide coverage of all open
posts, using current facility relief assumptions. Recent operating policy changes are a major
factor driving current security staffing requirements. Following assaults on staff in late 2021, as
a safety precaution, management changed the deployment of housing unit staff to mandate a
second officer in every housing unit at those times when inmates are out of their cells during
daytime activities. Management created 12 additional housing unit posts on Floors 4, 6, and 7
to provide a second officer in half of the housing units on each floor. To assure the presence of
two officers on the housing unit when inmates are out of their cells, this level of staffing
requires alternating opening and locking down half of the housing units on each floor through
the Morning and Afternoon shifts.
The resulting requirement exceeds funded security positions by 37 FTEs, and existing staffing
levels by 81 FTEs. The facility manages the disparity between available and required staff by
intensive use of overtime and temporary closure of posts as needed.
Required
Posts Staffing
Superintendent (Security) 1 1
Corrections Security Major 7 7
Corrections Captain 10 10
Corrections Lieutenant 15 24
Corrections Sergeant 15 24
Corrections Corporals 2 2
Corrections Officers 152 234
Total 202 302
Management plans for full staffing of the current supervision model call for deploying two
corrections officers to staff all housing units during the Morning and Afternoon shifts and
adding rover posts to the Overnight shift. This will allow ending the intermittent lockdown of
housing units and enable normal facility operations, with all housing units open during normal
hours. Management also plans to increase staffing coverage in the infirmary by one post on
both the Morning and Afternoon shifts; and to add 10 correctional officer posts with a
supervisor to the Transportation Unit. Plans also reflect the closure of the 4th Floor housing
units and corresponding movement of inmates to the 5th Floor.
Table 6 identifies the impact of these planned changes on overall security staffing
requirements.
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CHAPTER 5: STAFFING
The planned post deployment adds 32 posts to current operations and requires 347 FTEs, based
on current facility relief assumptions. The post plan results in an increase of 45 FTEs over
current post plan staffing requirements, exceeds funded staffing levels by 81 FTEs, and
represents an increase of 126 FTEs over current staffing levels.
Required
Posts Staffing
Superintendent (Security) 1 1
Corrections Security Major 7 7
Corrections Captain 10 10
Corrections Lieutenant 15 24
Corrections Sergeant 16 26
Corrections Corporals 2 2
Corrections Officers 183 278
Total 234 347
The key additions that account for this increase in staffing requirements include:
• 1 supervisor (sergeant) post 5 days per week to the transportation unit (1 FTE)
• 10 transportation officer posts 5 days per week to the transportation unit to return to
normal (pre-Covid) staffing (10 FTEs)
• 2 officer posts 7 days per week to the medical unit (1 on Morning shift and 1 on
Afternoons) to fully staff as required for the medical and mental health population (3.76
FTEs)
• 12 officer posts 7 days per week to the floors to have 2 officer posts per housing unit on
Morning and Afternoon shifts (22.56 FTEs)
• 4 officer rover posts to the Overnight shift to cover each floor’s rover post for breaks
and relief (7.52 FTEs)
• 3 officer posts with the transfer of population from the 4th Floor to the 5th Floor (5.64
FTEs)
One of the essential elements required in determining correctional facility staffing is the
development and application of an accurate shift relief factor. A shift relief factor (relief factor)
identifies the total number of full-time equivalent positions (FTEs) it takes to fill a single post.
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An accurate shift relief factor is therefore an important metric for planning and budgeting
purposes. For example, if a facility adds a 2nd housing unit post that must be fill continuously
on a single shift, then the relief factor will clearly identify the number of FTEs needed on board
to fill that new post.
Most posts within a detention facility are “Relief Posts” while others are “non-Relief.”
• Relief Posts: Jails operate 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. Within the Justice Center
most correctional officer posts must be continuously filled by staff to ensure the security
and operations and can never be left vacant. Common examples of these types of posts
include housing unit posts that supervise in-custody individuals in the living unit and
intake posts that are responsible for receiving arrestees into the jail. Because these
posts cannot be left vacant, they are designated as “relief posts” or “relievable”.
• Non-Relief Posts: There are also some posts that can be left vacant when staff aren’t
available and do not need to be relieved. For example, several posts that have
administrative duties and don’t directly supervise the incarcerated population can be
closed when staff aren’t present.
In a staffing assessment, it is critical to not only calculate an accurate relief factor based on
internal data and practices, but to also identify what posts are required to be filled, whether
the posts are relief or non-relief posts, and the frequency in which the post is to be filled.
To further illustrate the usefulness of a relief factor, assume a relief factor of 1.75 for an 8-hour
post. It therefore takes 1.75 FTEs for every post requiring relief. If the day shift at a detention
center had 30 relief posts, the facility would need 52.5 staff (1.75 x 30) to fully staff those posts.
The project team approached this task by applying a generally accepted methodology used by
many justice system agencies throughout the United States. Detailed descriptions of the
methodology may be found in Staffing Analysis Workbook for Jails, 2nd edition published in
2003 by the National Institute of Corrections 1.
The shift relief factor is calculated by dividing the hours per year a post must be filled, by the
hours an average employee is available to fill a post (Net Annual Work Hours). The Net Annual
Work Hours is calculated by subtracting leave usage, training time away from post, and any
break time from the total hours the employee is assigned to work in a year.
1
Liebert, D. and Miller, R., Staffing Analysis Workbook for Jails, National Institute of Corrections, 2001.
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Two data elements must therefore be determined to arrive at an accurate relief factor:
• Total Hours Post Must Be Filled in a Year: The total hours a post must be filled is easily
calculated. An 8-hour shift must be filled 2,922 hours. This is calculated by multiplying
the number of days in a year (365.25 when leap year is considered) by the hours present
on post during a shift (8 hours).
• Total Hours Average Employee Can Fill a Post: Known as the Net Annual Work Hours
(NAWH) this element provides the hours per year an average employee is available to
fill a post. It considers the following:
o Hours assigned to fill a post. Employees working an 8-hour shift are assigned to
work approximately 2,087 hours per year. (40 hours per week multiplied by
52.18 weeks per year with leap year considered).
o Hours away from post coverage: Even though an employee may be assigned to
work 2,087 hours per year, they will not actually be able to fill a post to that
level. This is due to three factors: use of leave time, training time that takes them
away from post coverage, and break time during their shift.
Leave Usage. In support of the project team’s relief factor calculation, the Justice Center
provided three calendar years’ worth of leave data (2019, 2020, 2021) that identified the hours
of leave usage by employees for the following 20 detailed leave types.
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As noted in the Justice Center’s Policy 139, Time Off Policy, Paid Time Off (PTO) includes all
vacation and sick leave. CGL therefore grouped data from these 20 leave types into the
following major leave categories:
• Holiday
• PTO (Paid Time Off)
• FMLA
• Compensatory
• Other
Based on an analysis of these data files, Table 9 summarizes total leave usage by correctional
officers for each of these categories in 2019, 2020 and 2021. Aggregate leave usage has risen
each year, likely because of the COVID-19 pandemic.
The leave categories with the greatest increase over this 3-year period were non-paid leave,
reflecting that staff were increasingly using unpaid absences during the pandemic. Table 10
shows the detailed categories with the greatest numerical increase in leave usage from 2019 to
2021.
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For the relief factor calculation, the annual leave hours must be converted to average leave per
employee. Documentation was provided by the Justice Center that allowed CGL to develop the
average number of correctional officers on board for each year (169 in 2019, 174 in 2020, 142
in 2021). Using this data, we developed the average leave usage by major leave category as
shown in Table 11.
Note: In our interviews we were informed by management that staff were charged with leave
usage when they refused an overtime shift. Any leave usage accrued for this situation should
not be counted in a relief factor calculation. We therefore reduced overall leave usage per
employee by an estimated 16 hours to account for this overtime leave charges. This reduction
ha a minor impact on the overall relief factor.
Table 11: Justice Center Average Leave Usage per Correctional Officer
The data show that average correctional officer leave usage increased by 34.5 percent (113.73
hours) from 2019 to 2021, rising from 329.30 to 443.03 hours.
Training Time. Both new hire training and annual training take a correctional officer away from
post coverage. Therefore, each must be accounted for in the shift relief factor calculation.
• Annual Training: Per interviews with Justice Center administration and middle
managers, each correctional officer should participate in 40 hours per year of annual
training away from post.
• New Hire Training: Newly hired correctional officers must participate in 120 hours of
classroom instruction at the Justice Services Academy, at the conclusion of which they
must complete another 120 hours of on-the-job training (OJT) in which they cannot fill a
post on their own. To determine the hours an average employee is away from post for
new hire training (academy and OJT), the number of newly hired correctional officers
must be collected. The Justice Center provided this information and we estimated that
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75 percent completed the entire training (academy plus OJT) and 25 percent only
completed one-half of the entire training. The total hours associated in each year for
new hire training is then divided by the average number of correctional officers on
board during the year. The resulting calculated hours away from post coverage for
training is shown in Table 12.
The average amount of training time away from post increased by nearly 30 percent from 2019
to 2021, rising from 100.89 hours to 128.73 hours. This increase was entirely due to high
turnover rates with resulted in increased new hires required to go through initial training and
OJT.
Break Hours: Justice Services Policy 132, Staff Breaks/Meals, indicates that staff will receive a
30-minute meal period during their shift. The shift relief factor will therefore calculate an
additional 30 minutes away from post for every shift an officer works. We also note the policy
indicates staff “may” also receive “two (2), ten (10) minute personal breaks, one the first half of
the shift and one the second half.” These breaks are not required and were therefore not
considered in the shift relief factor calculation.
The data developed allows for calculation of an accurate relief factor as shown in Table 13.
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Shift Relief Factor: 8-hour, 7-day post with relief 1.88 1.91 2.06
Relief Factor: 24/7 5.64 5.74 6.17
Shift Relief Factor: 8-hour, 5-day post with relief 1.34 1.37 1.47
As noted earlier, the COVID-19 pandemic has skewed leave usage and turnover rates higher,
thereby artificially raising the shift relief factors for 2020 and 2021. We therefore will base our
staffing analysis on the more representative 2019 shift relief factor, 1.88 for an 8-hour shift,
with coverage required 7 days per week.
Recommendation 19: Establish the staff relief factor at 1.88 for correctional
officer posts that require relief. This means the facility needs 1.88 FTEs to fill a
single post that requires relief.
Data regarding supervisor leave and training was not provided by the Justice
Center. However, interviews and experience indicate that lieutenants use considerably
less leave time than most line staff. This is especially true in St. Louis County where
corrections officers use a substantial amount of FMLA leave, and other leave.
Additionally, the shift relief factor calculation for line staff includes time away from post
for new-hire academy and PTO training, which isn’t needed for lieutenant and sergeant
positions. Therefore, we developed a separate relief factor for lieutenants and
sergeants, according to the following assumptions:
• Used the 2019 relief factor calculation for corrections officers as the basis for our
calculation.
• Removed any training hours related to new hire academy/PTO participation for
both sergeants and lieutenants.
Given these assumptions the shift relief factor for lieutenant positions is 1.72 and
sergeants is 1.81.
Recommendation 20: Establish the staff relief factor at 1.72 for lieutenant
posts that require relief and 1.81 for sergeant posts that require relief. This
means the facility needs 1.72 FTEs to fill a single lieutenant post that requires
relief and 1.81 FTEs to fill a sergeant post that requires relief.
Applying this relief factor to the post plans described earlier results in an increase of
approximately of 36 FTE’s required for the Current Operations post plan and 42 additional FTEs
for the Management Initiatives post plan.
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Table 14: Impact of Relief Factor Update - Current Operations Post Plan Staffing
Table 15: Impact of Relief Factor Update - Management Initiatives Post Plan Staffing
Management
Management
Initiatives
Initiatives Difference
Staffing with
Staffing
Updated SRF
Superintendent 1 1 0
Majors 7 7 0
Captains 10 10 0
Lieutenants 24 25 1
Sergeants 25 28 3
Corporals 2 2 0
Corrections Officers 278 316 38
Totals 347 389 42
As shown in Table 16, St. Louis County’s calculated relief factor is 10.6 percent higher than the
average of comparison counties (1.70).
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The driving factor behind the Justice Center’s high shift relief factor is the very high use of leave
time. As shown in the following table Justice Center leave usage and total time away from post
(which includes training time and break time) is extremely high.
St. Louis County’s total hours away from post (leave, training, and break hours) is more than 56
percent higher than that of the average of the comparison jurisdictions.
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Policy changes can affect the assumptions used to support these calculations. St. Louis County
is considering implementing a policy change that will only pay the overtime rate for any work
over 40 hours in a week. Currently staff can take leave time and work less than 40 of their
regular shift hours in a week and still be paid for assigned overtime. For example, under
existing practices, a correctional officer assigned to work 40 hours in a week can take 8 hours of
leave on Monday and be assigned 8 hours of overtime on Friday. That officer works a total of
40 hours that week and will be paid 8 hours of overtime for working a shift other than what
they are assigned. With the implementation of this policy change, the correctional officer
would receive no overtime rate pay because they had not worked more than 40 hours in that
week.
Historical leave data provided shows that hours related to unauthorized absences has increased
significantly since 2019.
Hours associated with unauthorized absences increased substantially between 2019 and 2021,
rising by 352 percent from 837 to 3,909 hours. Total leave hours also increased from over 58,000
hours in 2019 to nearly 66,000 hours in 2021. Leave usage per employee had a larger increase in
2021, rising by more than 110 hours for each employee.
The proposed overtime policy change could substantially reduce the use of unauthorized
absences and other leave usage because staff will now be required to meet that 40-hour work
threshold per week before earning the overtime rate for additional hours worked. Therefore, any
use of leave time would now have a detrimental financial impact on their ability to earn overtime
that week. But this assumes staff make attendance decisions based primarily on their financial
best interest. This is likely not necessarily the case when staff are subjected to excessive levels of
overtime, as has been the case recently at the Justice Center. Other factors such as work/life
balance and the simple need for a rest or break become more important than overtime pay.
It is likely that any financial benefits resulting from this policy change will occur in combination
with reductions in overtime and increases in staffing levels. It is not possible to disentangle the
impacts of this policy change from the impact of overall short staffing. As staffing levels improve,
leave usage per person should decrease, thereby impacting the shift relief factor and overall
staffing needs.
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Recommendation 21: The Justice Center should monitor leave usage and annually
update the shift relief factor based on actual data trends.
The County is also considering a policy to provide up to 480 hours of paid parental leave for male and
female staff. Projecting the impact of this policy requires making assumptions on the number of
correctional staff that may earn parental leave each year. Per the Brookings Institute, the average birth
rate in the United States in 2020 was 55.8 per 1,000. In other words, for every 1,000 women of
childbearing age (15 to 44) 55.8 gave birth in 2020. Because both parents would be subject to this new
policy the birth rate for the purposes of this analysis should be doubled, resulting in a rate of 111.6 out
of 1,000 or 11.2%.
Table 19 shows the average number of correctional officers in 2019 and the percent that we
estimate would be eligible for paid parental leave, using the birthrate assumptions described
above. This project that 19 staff could be eligible for this policy on an annual basis.
2019
Average Number of Correctional Officers 169
% COs Eligible for Paid Parental Leave (11.2%) 19
These 19 staff could take up to 9,120 hours of paid parental leave in a year (19 x 480 hours).
Dividing the 9,120 hours of leave usage by the net annual work hours for staff in our 2019 shift
relief factor calculate (1,553.31) results in a revised relief factor that requires an additional 5.9
FTEs.
Events over the past two years, nation-wide, have altered the operations of jails while
managing the impact of the pandemic. The Justice Center is no different and responded by
minimizing inmate contact with one another and enacting social distancing by limiting out of
cell time for every housing unit. As corrections practitioners learn more about how to keep
inmates safe while maximizing out of cell time, jails have begun to return to normal operations.
Staff new to corrections that were hired during the pandemic have not been exposed to a fully
operational direct supervision environment where most inmates are out of their cells in
common dayroom areas. As the facility returns to normal operations and permits more out of
cell time in large groups, newer staff may experience challenges in managing the population. In
addition, incidents over the past year resulted in significant changes in staff deployment,
requiring the addition of one officer (two total) in each housing unit while inmates are out of
their cells during daytime activities.
The Justice Center is designed for direct supervision and has followed National Institute of
Corrections (NIC) guidelines for inmate behavioral management in direct supervision facilities in
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the past. Direct supervision is a recognized “best practice” in jail administration and has been
successfully implemented in hundreds of jails throughout the United States.
The basis of direct supervision inmate management is the establishment of a housing unit
officer as the single authority figure in inmate housing units. The absence of this single
authority from regularly scheduled corrections staff creates inconsistency in establishing
expectations and holding inmates accountable. Often inmates utilize these inconsistencies as
justification for acting out or simply not abiding by rules and regulations.
The following description of direct supervision comes from the U.S. Department of Justice,
Direct Supervision Jails, The Role of the Administrator.
A critical precondition to assigning a single officer to manage a housing unit is that the
officers have sufficient authority commensurate with their responsibilities. Since officers
will exercise their authority through verbal commands rather than physical force, there
should be a mechanism to remove inmates who refuse to comply with officers’
directions.
One of the major sources of inmate violence is the struggle for leadership when a
leadership void exists. To prevent competition for leadership among inmates, the officer
must fill the void. There is room for only one leader on a housing unit and that leader
must always clearly be the officer. The officer must not share the leadership role with an
inmate by placing one inmate in a subordinate role to another.
The officers’ duties and the unit environment should be structured to support and
emphasize their role as undisputed leader of the unit. Any inmate who competes for the
leadership role must be dealt with effectively, even if that means removal from the
housing unit.2
Concerns have been raised by Justice Center staff regarding the impact of a return to direct
supervision upon the number of inmate assaults on staff. The facility provided the following
data on the number of annual assaults3 on staff:
• 2020 – 66
2
Bogard, D., Hutchison, V., Persons, V., Direct Supervision: The Role of the Administrator, Office of Justice
Programs, US Department of Justice, February 2010.
3
Staff assaults include non-physical attacks such as spitting.
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• 2021 – 52
The current policy of assigning two officers per housing unit was ordered on November 11,
2021. Prior to this change in management, approximately 45 assaults had already been
committed in 2021, leaving additional assaults committed through the end of the calendar year,
for a total of 52 for the year. The trend for 2022 annualizes to a projected total of 51 assaults,
or slightly below the total number of assaults for 2021. This is about 23 percent below the
number of assaults experienced in 2020. However, it is important to note that the number of
assaults in 2021 was already trending far below the 2020 experience even before the change in
staffing policy. Attributing all or even most of the decrease in 2021 assaults to just the change
in staffing policy is not supported by the data.
In addition to a lower base trendline of assaults in 2021, jail management implemented other
policies that could partially explain the reduction in assaults. On October 20, 2021, the jail
issued electronic tablets to facilitate inmate communication, entertainment, and programming
within their cells. The jail also implemented a lockdown of approximately half of the facility at
any given time due to the lack of staff available to implement the policy of two officers in every
housing unit. This resulted in inmates’ out-of-cell time being reduced by half.
Although it seems to be clear the number of inmate assaults on staff have decreased since
2020, it is not immediately clear what the cause is. Many factors come into play that could
have a significant impact on the decrease including the addition of staff in housing units, the
implementation of tablet technology, and the decrease in inmate out of cell time. It is not
possible to separate out the individual impact of these changes on the assault rate.
The decision to increase officer coverage in general population housing units after the assaults
was a reasonable temporary action, giving management an opportunity to determine the
underlying causes which led to the inmate assaults. However, this alternate staffing strategy is
inconsistent with the principles of direct supervision of general population housing units, which
call for one officer per unit, and has been used extensively to improve inmate management in
jails throughout the United States. It is important to return the facility to normal operations
with increasing out-of-cell time for general population inmates. The current staff deployment
pattern increases the amount of time inmates must spend locked up, which increases tension in
the population, degrades inmate mental health and reduces opportunities for rehabilitative
programming that improve inmate behavior.
Recommendation 22: Staff the general population housing with one officer per
unit per shift, supported by floor rover posts and lieutenants stationed on
every floor. CGL supports national best practices and the U.S. Department of
Justice’s National Institute of Correction’s recommendations for staffing general
population direct supervision housing units which call for one officer per unit.
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Higher custody housing units, such as the eighth floor require additional staffing for safety and
better inmate supervision. The predominant difference is the eighth floor does not function as
a direct supervision housing unit as it is designed for segregation and separation of a higher
custody populations. Units on the 8th Floor should retain their current staffing pattern.
An adequate number of rover posts is essential to allow flexible deployment of staff on an as-
needed basis. Increasing the number of rover posts will allow for more flexible security
coverage and support the transition back to direct supervision.
Recommendation 23: Assign two rover positions to each floor on the days and
afternoon shifts and one rover position to each floor on the night shift. These
positions should be seven-days per week.
The Transportation Unit is another area of need. The current schedule utilizes 15 officers
dedicated to transporting individuals to the courthouse and vehicle transports to off-site
locations. During optimum levels of staffing, the full complement of the transportation unit is
25 officers. Transportation unit officers are required to escort individuals to court in teams of
two, remain in the courtroom during each hearing and then return the individual to the jail. As
staffing levels decreased and as courts slowed during the pandemic, the reduction of officers in
this unit was manageable. As courts return to normal operations, this unit will need to return to
its original complement of 25 officers.
Finally, the infirmary/mental health housing area on the 3rd Floor requires additional staff to
provide adequate security coverage, given the large number of inmates entering and exiting the
area on an ongoing basis.
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Required
Posts Staffing
Superintendent (Security) 1 1
Corrections Security Major 3 3
Corrections Captain 13 13
Corrections Lieutenant 20 33
Corrections Sergeant 10 10
Corrections Officers 167 286
Total 214 346
The recommended post deployment plan requires a net total of 12 additional posts over
current operational staffing practices and 80 FTEs over current funded staffing levels. Most of
this increase in FTEs is associated with the update to the shift relief factor.
With the updated relief factor, each post plan (current, management initiatives, and
recommended) requires substantial increases over funded and filled staffing levels. Table 22
compares each of post plans assessed in the analysis with current funded and filled positions.
Current
Operations Management Recommended
Funded Filled Updated Initiatives Staffing
FTEs FTEs SRF Updated SRF Updated SRF
Superintendent (Security) 1 1 1 1 1
Corrections Security Major 5 4 7 7 3
Corrections Captain 11 11 10 10 13
Corrections Lieutenant 19 18 25 25 33
Corrections Sergeant 19 11 27 28 10
Corrections Corporals 2 2 2 2 -
Corrections Officers 209 175 266 316 286
Total FTEs 266 222 338 389 346
CGL’s recommended staffing plan with the updated shift relief factor requires an increase of 77
corrections officers over current funded levels (increase from 209 to 286). This also represents
an increase of 111 positions above the number of corrections officers on board at the time of
our study (175).
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Benchmarking
In order to provide context to this analysis of staffing, we compared budgeted custody staffing
levels for the Justice Center with other urban jurisdictions with similarly sized facilities. Given
differences in facility design, population level, and security supervision policies, meaningful
comparisons of staffing between jurisdictions can be difficult. However, in order to provide a
rough comparison of staffing levels, we collected data on the number of security staff and
inmate population levels from Jackson County (Kansas City), Jefferson County (Louisville), and
Milwaukee County. We calculated the inmate to staff ratio, or the number of inmates per
budgeted officer, for each jurisdiction. The data, as shown in Table 25, show that Justice Center
has 3.17 inmates per officer, which is higher than the inmate to staff ratio for the Louisville and
Kansas City jails, but lower than the number of inmates per officer in Milwaukee County.
However, given that the actual number of available security staff at the Justice Center is well
below the funded level, the real inmate to staff ratio is much higher than shown here.
Budgeted Inmate to
Security Staff Jail ADP Staff Ratio
St. Louis County 266 842 3.17
Jefferson County (Louisville) 431 1,250 2.90
Jackson County (Kansas City) 317 872 2.75
Milwaukee County 251 890 3.55
Average 316 964 3.09
Given the magnitude of this recommended increase in correctional officer positions, we have
developed a 5-year phase-in plan that moderates the annual fiscal impact of the
recommendation and eases hiring pressures. This plan increases correctional officer FTE’s by
between 15 and 16 positions each year:
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Given the current starting correctional officer salary of $37,752/year with benefits that are
estimated at a premium of 56.45%, we project the cumulative payroll cost of these 77
additional staff to be $4.6 million over the five-year phase-in, as shown in Table 25.
Recommended
Corrections Officer Projected Annual Cumulative Payroll
FTE Increase Payroll Increase Increase
Year 1 +16 $ 945,008 $ 945,008
Year 2 +15 $ 885,945 $ 1,830,953
Year 3 +16 $ 945,008 $ 2,775,961
Year 4 +15 $ 885,945 $ 3,661,906
Year 5 +16 $ 945,008 $ 4,606,914
A significant portion of this additional staff cost would offset existing overtime expenditures. In
fact, 64 percent (49 of the additional 77 recommended FTEs) would directly reduce overtime,
while the remaining 28 FTEs would be used to fill the 15 additional corrections officer posts in
the recommended plan. We estimate current correctional officer overtime at approximately
$1,528,034 by prorating FY 2021 total overtime ($2,378,352) by the percent of total overtime
hours worked by correctional officers (correctional officer overtime hours-45,876 hours/total
staff overtime hours-71,405) in FY 2021, or 64.2 percent.
We project that the phase-in of these additional officers will avert 80 percent, or $1.2 million,
of current correctional officer overtime expenditures (correctional officer overtime
expenditures-$1,528,034 x 0.80) over five years. This reduces the cumulative additional cost of
the recommended increase in correctional officers from $4.6 million to $3.4 million over the 5-
year phase-in period.
In order to identify any possible efficiencies, we also examined the impact of the use of
alternative shifts on staffing needs at the Justice Center. Jails employ a wide range of shift
schedules. Three, eight-hour shifts are the most common system in use, while 12-hour shifts,
10-hour shifts, and other hybrid shifts can also be found. There are a number of factors for
consideration when determining the relative efficiency of alternative shift schedule:
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• Efficiency/Complexity. Some shift structures are less efficient and can be more complex
to manage than others.
• Hours of Activities and Services. The duration of a shift (8-hour, 10-hour, 12-hour) may
be better aligned with the peak in workload activities throughout the day. If normal
activities in a day run from 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m., then a 8-hour shift may be more
effective, as the 1st and 2nd shifts would fully cover those 16-hours of activities.
• Recruitment and Retention. Some shift structures could be seen as more attractive to
recruiting and retaining staff.
10‐Hour Shift Schedules. Although preferred by many employees, ten-hour shifts are not often
used for detention agencies for the following reasons:
• More Facilities/Equipment. When the 10‐hour shifts overlap, you will have employees
from two shifts working at the same time. You will need twice as much space and
equipment to accommodate this.
• Built‐In Overtime. Many people hope that changing to 10‐hour shifts will eliminate the
need for built‐in overtime. Unfortunately, this rarely happens.
• Unusual Start Times. When you align the overlapping shifts with the peak workload
periods, this may result in some unusual shift start and end times, for example a day
shift that starts at 11:00 am. Organizations that set the shift start times to satisfy
employee preferences (rather than matching the workload) will end up with double
coverage during their slow periods and normal coverage during the busy periods. This
defeats the purpose for adopting 10‐hour shifts.
• More Supervisors. If the supervisors also want 10‐hour shifts, it will take at least 5
people with rotating shifts and 6 people with fixed shifts to have one supervisor
available at all times. If you need two supervisors to be available at all times, you will
need twice these amounts.
For these reasons, a 10‐Hour shift schedule is not inefficient in addressing facility staffing needs
12‐Hour Shift Schedules. Twelve-hour shifts are often popular among the staff because they
compress the work week and provide more days‐off than 8-hour shifts. This can have the
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positive effect of improving staff morale and reducing absenteeism. The popularity of 12-hour
shifts is also believed to increase worker motivation and stimulate greater effort that would
counter any effects of increased fatigue on 12-hour schedules. Typically, the way an agency
implements a shift schedule (or a change in schedule) has a substantial impact on the
employees’ acceptance of it.
Many agencies work staggered schedules where staff are scheduled to work no more than a
few days consecutively (i.e., a “2‐3‐2” shift pattern). But for agencies where staff work seven
consecutive days before getting a day off, fatigue may become more of a factor. Soliciting
employees’ input and involvement in this decision is crucial to their satisfaction and support of
a particular schedule.
Another advantage of the 12-hour shift when appropriately staffed is the ability to rotate days
off from week to week ensuring that all employees have opportunity for preferred days off. In
the more traditional 5-2 work week with assigned RDO’s, typically junior staff lack opportunity
for preferred days off sometimes resulting in retention issues. Conversely, utilizing rotating
days off can be less favorable to senior staff who have earned their way into preferred days off
with seniority.
However, in our experience, the benefits to staff morale derived from use of 12-hour shifts,
quickly disappear if the facility remains unable to fully staff its authorized staffing complement.
In these circumstances, management must often mandate overtime, requiring staff to work
additional shifts during the pay period. These additional shifts, on top of regularly scheduled 12-
hour workdays, rapidly erodes staff morale, leading to increased staff separations. This in turns
fuels a cycle of ever-greater reliance on mandated overtime, further increasing staff turnover.
Unless a jail is near its full authorized staffing level, 12-hour shifts may exacerbate staff
retention and overtime issues.
To assess the impact of changing to a 12-hour shift system, we adjusted the recommended
roster to convert housing unit officers and floor supervisors to a 12-hour shift system, with a
corresponding shift relief factor. The analysis indicates that such a system would require 354
security FTEs, approximately 9 FTEs over the recommended staff level with 8-hour shifts. The
reason for this is the rover position on each floor. Our recommendations for eight-hour shifts
assigned two rovers to each floor on the morning and afternoon shifts but only one on the
overnight shift. The 12-hour shift option with relief does not allow for reduced coverage of
these posts in the evening after lockdown. Assuming a 6:00 a.m. - -6:00 p.m. first shift and a
6:00 p.m. – 6:00 a.m. second shift, the 12-hour shift schedule does not easily accommodate
reduced staff coverage for a period of less than 12 hours. As such, in this scenario, the 12-hour
shift is less flexible and creates inefficiencies mot present in the 8-hour shift schedule.
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The staffing plans described in this report reflect current inmate population levels, which allow
for the closure of all housing units on one floor of the Justice Center. Should the county inmate
population increase significantly, or if a decision is made to expand contract housing for federal
detainees or inmates from other jurisdictions, it may be necessary to operate the facility with
all housing units open. We project this will result in 20 additional posts to be staffed on the
reopened floor. With relief, this will require a total of 383 custody staff, an increase of 37
officers above the recommended staffing plan. Table 26 shows the recommended post plan for
full operation of all floors.
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This post plan, with full operation of all floors, requires a total of 234 posts, assuming the
recommended housing unit staffing deployment of one officer assigned to each housing unit,
with two rover posts on the morning and afternoon shifts. This results in a total staffing
requirement of 383 FTEs, as summarized in Table 27.
Table 27: Justice Center Staffing Requirements: Recommended Staffing – Full Operations
Required
Posts Staffing
Superintendent (Security) 1 1
Corrections Security Major 3 3
Corrections Captain 13 13
Corrections Lieutenant 20 33
Corrections Sergeant 11 10
Corrections Officers 186 323
Total 234 383
Roster Management
The Justice Center determines its ongoing staffing needs and deployment of positions uniquely
on a floor-by-floor basis rather than applying a unified system to assigning staff to the whole
facility. While not an improper practice, this practice loses some of the benefit of relief
positions and partial positions. For example, the unit managers meet on a weekly basis to
determine staffing for the following week. We learned that each unit manager determines the
number of posts necessary to manage the floor, applied a shift relief factor to the number of
posts, and identified the total number of positions required for staffing. The current staffing
pattern for the 6th Floor identified 6 posts that need to be covered and the needed staff 24
hours per day:
The total number of staff, once applying the updated shift relief factor is 39.48 FTEs. The
fractional portion of this calculation gets lost when applying this staffing philosophy individually
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by unit rather than looking at the facility as a whole. When adding the 7th Floor numbers to this
calculation, the same number of FTEs are required and the fractional position, combined with
the 6th Floor number then becomes one full FTE. The current staffing practice loses the benefit
of the full FTE.
In addition, the scheduling exercise demonstrated is time consuming and not methodical. Unit
managers spent an inordinate amount of time subjectively determining staff to be sent to other
floors and areas to work. This creates the propensity of inconsistencies in staff working the
same area, eliminating the potential for line staff to develop leadership and control through
regular assignment to a specific housing unit.
The time spent by unit managers putting together schedules could better be managed through
staffing software designed for detention facilities. This would eliminate the need for unit
managers to be involved, allowing them to focus more on floor responsibilities and program
development.
In the absence of a software scheduling program, the project team has developed a complete
master schedule of all facility security positions, included in Appendix F. The master schedule
provides coverage for staffing needs for each shift, divided into three sections:
• Administration
• Facility Floors
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Roster Management
The project team observed weekly roster management meeting among the unit managers. This
meeting is held on a weekly basis to ensure sufficient roster coverage of each floor of the
facility in the upcoming week. Although the meeting provides a unique opportunity for unit
managers to collaborate, it is a very manual approach that requires an extraordinary amount of
time kin managing a simple process that could be centralized and be facilitated with the use of
technology.
The current practice of individual management of staff by floor assignment may unnecessarily
compartmentalize the facility, requiring much more command staff time to manage days off,
vacation time, training, etc. One unit manager noted the fact that only certain officers were
authorized to work his assigned floor because of the complexity of the inmates on his level and
the experience required.
Most command staff agreed that the weekly meeting to determine rosters was not the best use
of their time and were open for suggestions and recommendations to streamline the process.
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Use of Force
The project team reviewed the use of force policy in addition to one example of the use of force
review process. The following factors were taken into consideration in the team’s review of the
policy:
Does the policy provide clear guidance and direction for staff to follow? The current policy
provides very concise and clear guidance on appropriate use of force. However, the policy itself
seems to be buried in a sea of many other policies and does not stand out in any way as a
critical piece of information. The use of force in any correctional or law enforcement setting is
typically one of, if not the most scrutinized actions of a public safety employee that could result
in negative outcomes, including injury or death and major discipline of an employee. This
policy requires the appropriate level of importance and should be designated as a critical policy
that is easily located and referenced.
Is the policy current and reviewed on a defined basis? The use of force policy was revised in
2019, but it is unclear as to how often it is reviewed for appropriateness.
Recommendation 27: Establish specific dates and timelines for review and
revision of critical policies, including Use of Force. It is common for use of force
policies to be reviewed on an annual basis to ensure consistency with current
case law and best practices.
Does the use of force policy differentiate between planned uses of force and force that is used as
the result of immediate action or self-defense? The use of force policy appears to initially focus
on when it is appropriate for a supervisor to authorize force indicating planned uses of force.
Later in the policy, several other instances where force is appropriate are also mentioned
indicating force that is not planned.
Does the policy reflect national standards and best practices? The use of force policy dictates
throughout that every reasonable action be taken to reduce or eliminate uses of force, which is
consistent with best practices. However, such policies and procedures should also consider
mental health considerations on planned uses of force. In situations that do not present an
imminent threat to staff or other inmates, mental health staff should be incorporated into the
decision to use force if possible. When practical, medical staff should be in close proximity
when a planned use of force is executed. At a minimum, authorization be sought for planned
uses of force by an authority figure not directly involved in the current situation.
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It should be noted that some situations can quickly evolve into a situation where imminent
harm presents itself which should change this requirement. Additionally, the use of force
continuum seems to indicate appropriate levels of force for very specific situations. Most
facilities generalize this language to not limit staff’s ability to protect themselves and others
from harm.
Recommendation 30: Clarify in policy that not all options identified on the
continuum of use of force measures are required in the order listed in policy if
the situation in question dictates a higher level of response and is rapidly
evolving.
Is there a process in place for external review (other than staff present or involved in the
reported incident) of the appropriateness of the use of force? The current policy and process
requires review and reporting by the Unit Manager. This practice ensures accountability by all
staff to appropriately report and document all use of force incidents. The requirement of
review by a Unit Manager brings attention on the use of force to an appropriate level of
management.
Have staff been sufficiently trained in the decision to use force and use of force procedures? It
appears that Justice Center staff receive sufficient use of force training in their initial academy.
However, staff should be required to review use of force policy on an annual basis in addition to
a short probing quiz to validate their review of policy and understand its contents and are
aware of any changes.
Recommendation 32: Mandate annual staff review and training on use of force
policies.
In response to this recommendation, use of force training was completed for all
supervisors.
Segregation Placement
Segregation housing at the Justice Center is utilized for the following reasons:
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Intake/Orientation/COVID Protocol. All inmates booked into the facility undergo an initial
segregation period on level four (females) or level eight (males) and undergo a 7-10 day COVID
protocol. Inmates are assessed for further appropriateness of classification during this time
and receive an orientation on expectations while at the facility. This placement/designation is
consistent with best practices related to direct supervision and strategic inmate management.
An effective orientation process also relieves anxiety commonly associated with entering a
correctional facility that may lead to self-harm, violence, or irrational behavior.
Protective Custody. Inmates may request to be placed in protective custody housing or may be
assigned involuntarily because of their current charges. These inmates are always transported
and housed alone. Inmates placed in protective custody are typically assigned this designation
by their own request unless charges dictate. The facility should make every attempt to ensure
that inmates requesting protective custody are warranted in their concerns. The overuse of
this type housing is a signal that general population housing is not safe.
Administrative Segregation. Inmates in this setting may have exposure to other similarly
classified inmates and are typically placed in these units because they do not function well in
general population. This is non-disciplinary housing, so inmates are afforded visitation, tablet
access, and commissary privileges. These inmates are allowed to be housed, transported, and
may spend time out of their cells with other similar inmates. This designation is less restrictive
than protective custody. Again, there appears to be no formalized process for admission into
this type of housing.
Lockdown. Inmates are placed in lockdown for disciplinary sanctions as the result of rule
violations. Inmates in this status do not receive social visits, tablet access, and are limited to
one phone call per week. There is not currently a maximum timeframe associated with
disciplinary housing and no required break in between sanction periods. Inmates can remain in
lockdown housing indefinitely as they continue to violate rules.
The facility utilizes a plea-bargaining system for inmates undergoing the disciplinary process
which may result in sanctions ranging from not guilty to 30 days of full restrictions. Inmates are
afforded the opportunity to participate in a formal hearing that occurs within three business
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days by an external staff member if they do not wish to accept a plea offer. This process allows
access to due process for inmates and streamlines administrative requirements for staff.
Concerns noted with disciplinary housing are the lack of the limitations in continuous sanctions,
the removal of pro-social activities such as visitation and phone calls, and the potential for
indefinite periods of sanction housing. These factors present the potential for an inmate to
decompensate in their mental health as they lose hope of ever working their way out of
disciplinary housing.
Super Maximum Security. This use of restrictive housing is reserved for inmates that have
demonstrated institutional behavior that is not appropriate for placement into general
population housing. This designation is more of a classification and does not relate directly to
disciplinary housing. For that reason, super max inmates are afforded regular visitation and
commissary privileges. These inmates are typically housed alone in single cells throughout
various areas of the jail and are typically allowed out of their cells for only limited periods when
other inmates in the unit are locked down.
The Justice Center has implemented a non-formalized stepdown process aimed at providing
inmates the opportunity to work their way back to general population housing. All inmates in
restrictive housing are assessed every 30 days to ensure that they are appropriately placed and
if there exists potential for stepdown into less restrictive housing.
Inmates placed in restrictive housing have previously received weekly visits for medical and
mental health professionals, but this process has been discontinued as staffing conditions in
these areas have degraded.
Emergency Response
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The project team reviewed emergency response procedures currently in use by security staff
and found that most potential emergencies that may occur within the facility are outlined in
policy detailing actions to be taken. However, the policy fails to designate who should report to
emergencies. Current operations dictate that all available staff respond to emergency
situations which can lend to chaotically over-staffed responses and may also result in
unnecessary lockdowns for non-affected areas of the facility.
Example: A radio call for staff response is generated on the 4th floor. This
situation should mobilize a pre-designated response plan requiring all Level 4
and 5 rovers (four assigned) and Sergeants (two assigned) to respond. If the
situation dictates additional response that cannot be handled by six additional
staff, a secondary call may mobilize all rovers and sergeants from the other
floors of the facility.
As noted previously, the Justice Center has implemented a formal process of disciplinary
hearings. This process consists of a plea-bargaining agreement to expedite processing of
sanctions which appears to be utilized quite often. Additionally, inmates are provided the
opportunity of a formal hearing with unit managers from other levels than where they reside.
This process is consistent with best practices and provides due process for inmates. The
utilization of the plea-bargaining process also provides a pathway for streamlining sanctions so
that the system is not backlogged and overburdened with cases that do not require higher
levels of review.
Appeals of disciplinary sanctions are very infrequent. Inmates have 3 days to appeal their
disciplinary hearing following the receipt of their sanction. The policy states the appeal can go
to the director or designee to assign for review. Most appeals are done by staff at the Unit
Manager level. The appeal is to be answered within 5 working days.
Unit Managers often have a connection with most all incidents taking place on the unit. A more
impartial process cleaner to have would establish a consistent designee handling appeals and
not the unit manager.
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The project team reviewed current policy outlining personal grooming standards. The policy
very clearly outlines expectations and requirements of all uniformed and non-uniformed
employees as it relates to hairstyles, facial hair, and clothing articles. It also provides specific
guidelines for uniform requirements and appropriate attire for the business and training
environments. Although this policy seems lengthy and extremely detailed, it is important to
provide clear guidance and expectations to staff. This is also an area where employees may
differ in judgement or agreement given their personal values, age, or experience.
Other than the North Escape Breathing Apparatus which requires the ability to don a plastic
cover over the head, there is not currently in use any safety equipment dictating specific
restrictions on hair style, or facial hair except for the ability to pull the mask over the head.
Given this fact, the degree of specificity and detailed requirements in grooming standards need
to be reconciled with contemporary community standards, consistent with reasonable safety
and security principles. Grooming standards should not be excessively strict to the point of
impairing staff recruitment and retention and avoid any demonstration of discrimination
against any group of people.
2. All uniformed personnel must maintain hair and facial hair that supports proper
fitting of authorized self-contained breathing apparatus, gas masks and riot
helmets. A reasonable length of hair that complies with a professional standard
for our facility.
3. Hair styles that are offensive to any group of people shall not be authorized
4. Hair styles that extend beyond the bottom of the collar and could be used by
those confined to jeopardize the safety of staff shall not be authorized
5. Hair colors for both men and women often reflect the individual personality of
the staff member. While we respect the individual’s ability of self-expression, but
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8. Wearing the uniform during off hours and at times outside coming to and going
to work should be restricted in policy to avoid the public viewing staff in less
than a professional situation.
The project team reviewed all materials provided regarding the death of five inmates in 2019,
including incident and investigation reports. Reports provided were heavily redacted making
analysis difficult to determine what actions were taken by specific staff members. The most
descriptive information provided was detailed in the Internal Affairs summary reports to the
Director. It should be noted that the Internal Affairs reports focus on the actions and
appropriateness of detention security personnel and did not get into the actions of the medical
provider or others involved. The departmental incident reports provided are short reports
provided by security staff involved in the incidents and are not actual death investigations by
law enforcement personnel. Each death was found to be a result of medical conditions.
Communication between security and medical staff appeared to be an issue in these cases.
Security personnel noted several abnormalities with inmates’ health and attempted to direct
them towards healthcare. Two separate instances are noted of medical staff stating that
inmates were faking illness and those particular members of the medical staff neglected to
follow-up as required. In one case a healthcare manager stated during an interview that
inmates would not be seen by medical sick call solely based on the referral of security
personnel. This is contrary to standard practice in most jails, as security personnel often have
the most interaction with inmates and are likely be the best source of information related to
their condition.
It was unclear during review of these incidents what tools investigators have available to verify
whether appropriate security tours are conducted at specified intervals. In some cases, pipe
tour system verifications were cited for housing units but not in medical areas. There is no
mention of security camera verification of appropriate security checks, therefore it is assumed
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that these systems are not installed and/or available to investigators. We do note that camera
systems currently in place at the Justice Center provide visual observation of key operational
areas and are actively monitored by staff.
One case summary revealed potential issues in logging system accuracy and/or verification of
security tours. The officer in question is alleged to have potentially falsified log entries but
further investigation revealed he had a history of documenting security tours hours after he
performed them. This fact may be an indicator that supervisory staff are not regularly checking
entries throughout the shift to ensure accurate and timely security tours.
Procedure on the administration of random staff searches outlined in this policy seem
consistent with practices at other secure correctional facilities and are reasonable considering
the nature of the work functions being performed by staff. Although random employee
searches may not be ideal for staff morale, most employees in this profession are well aware of
cases and examples of criminal investigations and findings of employees who have successfully
introduced criminal contraband into secured facilities.
The lack of specificity of authorized items in this policy provides an opportunity for discretion
by command staff to allow staff to use judgement on what and what not to bring into the
facility. This promotes an atmosphere that employees are generally trusted professionals and
not overly micromanaged or under constant surveillance by supervisors.
However, the lack of clearly defined items that are unauthorized may lead to the perception of
gray areas and questions as to who can bring in what.
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Strip Searches. Policy 120 also outlines requirements for the authorization of staff to be strip
searched if reasonable grounds exist that an employee may be smuggling contraband into the
secure perimeter of the correctional facility. This section of the policy seems inconsistent with
observed practices at other similar institutions and is cause for concern by project consultants.
It is unimaginable that there would ever be an appropriate situation for command staff to order
a strip search of one of its own employees without the initiation of a criminal investigation by a
qualified law enforcement agency or unless the employee was physically in custody and an
inmate of the facility.
This section of policy seems to open the door for unfair treatment and/or targeting of certain
staff without the removal of bias by an outside law enforcement organization trained in the
implementation of criminal investigation tactics and procedures.
Recommendation 44: Remove Section C, “Strip Searches” from Policy 120 and replace
with language establishing that any credible or reasonable information received by
the management indicating situations where staff may be suspected of engaging in
criminal activity will be referred to the appropriate law enforcement agency for
investigation and/or enforcement action.
This policy change was implemented July 12, 2022.
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This organizational model, in which the local public health agency is tasked with health care
service delivery within the county jail, is common in the United States. In such arrangements, it
is important that the two agencies (the public health agency and the jail) work together and
have a common understanding of responsibilities in support of their respective missions. To
that end, most jurisdictions employing this type of organizational model establish a
memorandum of understanding (MOU) or agreement that clarifies the specific services to be
provided, respective responsibilities in delivering services, and communication protocols. Such
an agreement should also outline methods for coordination of performance monitoring and
problem resolution. No such agreement or understanding exists between DPH and the Justice
Center.
Recommendation 45: The Department of Public Health and the Justice Center
should develop an agreement that clarifies their respective roles and
responsibilities in the delivery of health care at the Justice Center. The
agreement should establish processes and activities to assure effective
communication and coordination of activities.
Technology
Since the fall of 2021, the Justice Center has provided all inmates with tablet devices with
limited wi-fi capability. Inmates utilize the tablet to request medical appointments and if
purchased, they are allowed to take it home with them when they are discharged. The tablets
are used for regular checkups and as backup for tele-psychiatry services when the facility’s
videoconferencing system is down, mental health will use it for screening appointments. CMD
loads information on the tablets covering mental health, sleep hygiene, substance-abuse, and
other health-related educational materials.
Policies
Although CMD is making progress in the development of site-specific policy and procedures for
the for the Justice Center, current overall policies and procedures are not sufficiently specific to
correctional healthcare. Policies and procedures should be site and department specific,
covering every aspect of health care within the facility tom address medical, dental, and
behavioral health needs in the inmate population.
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National Commission on Correctional Health Care (NCCHC) standards are the nationally
recognized baseline for correctional health care policies and procedures.
Recommendation 46: Adopt the 2018 NCCHC Standards of Care as basis for
policy and procedure development in support of pursuing accreditation by
NCCHC. A first step in this process would entail purchase of copies of the 2018
NCCHC Standards for Jails for distribution to site leadership and medical
department heads to begin the work towards achieving NCCHC accreditation.
CMD has contacted NCCHC regarding the accreditation process. To support this initiative,
management should commence development of new policies and procedures in accordance
with each NCCHC standard. To facilitate this process, multidisciplinary meetings should be
coordinated between CMD and Justice Center management to review the standards and
determine not only policy and procedures, but practice guidelines, as to determine where
action plans will need to be instituted to achieve compliance.
NCCHC prefers a year of documentation utilizing current NCCHC Standards prior to a site
undergoing its Initial accreditation review. Mock Audits would be helpful at 6 and 9 months
prior to the initial on-site accreditation review.
Services
The CMD Medical Director is Board Certified in Family Medicine and has a master’s degree in
Public Health. The variety and scale of on-site clinical procedures managed by the Medical
Director is impressive, including:
• chronic care
• preventative care
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• management of HIV
• polysubstance withdrawal
• co-management of psychiatry
• wound care
• infirmary care
• pic lines, central line, ports, G tube, trach care, J tube management, and IV management
The Medical Director provides clinical oversite to 5.0 FTE midlevel providers. These providers
manage chronic clinic, provider sick call, H&P’s at intake post “2”, and provide mental health
assessments as well as other duties as required. The Mental Health Director provides oversight
for the mental health staff which consists of 1.0 FTE Licensed Social Worker, 1.6 LCSW’s, 1.0 FTE
Psychiatric Nurse Practitioner, and 0.85 FTE Psychiatrist (services provided through tele-
psychiatry.
In 2021, the facility experienced an average of 6.25 emergency room events per month. This
represents a low level of emergency room utilization for a facility of this size and likely
correlates to the additional 24 hour/7 days per week nurse practitioner coverage that has been
implemented at the facility.
Staffing
The health care program suffers from a high vacancy rate for budgeted staff positions. The
following table shows that 30.4 percent of all clinical positions and 37.1 percent of nursing
positions were vacant at the time of this review.
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FTE %
Position Required Vacant Vacant
EMT /EMTP 12.6 0 0.0%
Nurses (LPN included) 28.3 10.5 37.1%
Clinical Leadership 4 2 50.0%
Medical Assistants 6.6 3 45.5%
Providers 6 2 33.3%
Total Clinical 57.5 17.5 30.4%
This problem is not unique to St. Louis County. In the aftermath of COVID, correctional facilities
nationally are facing crisis levels of clinical staffing shortfalls. The highly competitive market for
nurse staffing has resulted in substantial increases in compensation for nurses throughout the
health care industry to recruit and retain staff. Jails and prisons, which often have lower
compensation levels and less efficient hiring systems, have extreme difficulty in attracting
clinical staff in this environment The default approach to addressing this problem for many
jurisdictions has been extensive reliance on temporary, contract or registry nursing agencies to
fill these vacancies. St. Louis County has followed this approach as well, relying upon AccuCare,
Favorite Staffing, and other agencies to provide temporary nurses.
However, this approach can create serious issues in service quality in that temporary nursing
staff are not necessarily trained or familiar with the unique requirements of correctional health
care delivery. Lack of continuity in staffing is also a problem in maintaining consistent work
processes and acceptable quality of care. Extended use of temporary nurses also has a negative
impact on the morale of full-time staff at the facility. Temporary nurses require extensive
guidance and supervision during their shifts from county nurses who in many cases are
receiving lower salaries than the temporary nurses. This problem is compounded by the fact
that nurse managers work a significant amount of direct care “nursing shifts” and do not have
time to provide leadership, orientation, or supervision functions. Nurses reported the
managers work 60-80 hours a week.
To address this issue, the County has recently released a Request for Proposal (RFP) for a
contractor to provide a full-time roster of staff to provide services at the Justice Center. This is a
unique approach in that most jurisdictions that attempt to outsource staffing find it also
necessary to contract out management of the staff to attract bidders other than the temporary
registry staffing agencies. By not including policy development and management systems, the
RFP increases liability for companies who are committing their full-time staff to provide medical
care under management and policies which they do not control. We understand that St. Louis
County does not wish to privatize the entire health care delivery system at the Justice Center. It
is not clear that the RFP as released will attract credible bidders that can effectively address the
current clinical staffing shortfalls.
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The only other readily available alternative to address the staffing shortfall currently is to
redouble recruitment efforts, including establishing relationships with area nursing schools
currently to provide internship opportunities and outreach.
Staff retention is a significant need as well. Exit interviews would be relevant to determine the
etiology of the high number of staff separations.
Recommendation 48: To retain staff, the Nurse Managers should reduce their
time allocated to direct care “shift work” and instead provide the nursing
leadership functions necessary to keep staff onboard. Many staff hired over
the last few months quickly resigned saying the program is unorganized, with no
orientation, and that staff felt thrown in too quickly.
Service Delivery
Intake and History and Physical. Intake side “1” is staffed with 2 FTE 24/7 staff, either nurses
and/or medics. The health screening performed at intake includes administering a
questionnaire on current health conditions, checking vital signs, and if consent is given,
performing a drug and pregnancy tests. Staff also perform a “fit for confinement” assessment
at intake and if the detainee is unconscious, semiconscious, bleeding, mentally unstable,
severely intoxicated, or showing signs of withdrawal, they are sent to the hospital, usually
accompanied the arresting officer, to be returned to the Justice Center when the hospital
medically clears the individual. Consistent with “best practices,” staff also conduct the Clinical
Institute Withdrawal Assessment Alcohol (CIWA) screening instrument and the Clinical Opiate
Withdrawal Symptoms (COWS) scale, administering an initial dose of Ativan, if clinically
indicated. If a detainee is on medication, the staff completes an Release of Information request,
which is sent to the pharmacy for medication verification.
If determined by intake side “1” they are fit for confinement the inmate then goes to side “2”
staffed with one RN FTE 24/7, and one Nurse Practitioner FTE 24/7, where a more detailed
assessment is performed. If significant medical issues are present the inmate is seen by the
chronic care provider, and a medical history and physical exam are conducted.
There appear to be several opportunities to achieve greater efficiency in the intake process.
The level of nurse staffing at intake is high relative to contemporary staffing practices for jails of
this size. In accordance with jail market practice, this is considered a lot of staff for this sized
facility, with an average daily population approximately 900. Some efficiencies could be
achieved by consolidating Side “1” and Side “2” functions. At the time of this review (late
afternoon) the nurse on side “2” had only seen nine (9) detainees for the day. Staff indicated
that the normal volume of intakes is about 40 inmates per day. This is quite low to support
three full-time nursing staff being stationed in intake 24/7.
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The intake assessment electronic form is very repetitive and could be revised or condensed to
save staff time and achieve efficiencies. Similarly, the Justice Center’s inmate data system does
not feed the DPH Electronic Health Record (EHR). This means that the medical staff needs to
reenter all the inmate demographic information, which has already been collected in the
booking process, which is time consuming and unnecessary. An interface should be set up
between the two systems to sharing of inmate demographic information. CMD also needs to
add a section on its intake form for Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) related clearance
questions, as this is a federal requirement for all jails.
CMD should consider utilizing Cerner for medication verification. This is a web-based
medication verification system that intake staff can access upon booking. If an inmate is on
medication, Cerner will auto-populate the medication demographics. All nationwide
pharmacies are linked into this web-based system.
Special Diets. CMD has a process to order special medical diets and identify inmates that
require a special diet each month; however, the report does not provide cumulative data to
track the number of special diets ordered at the facility.
CIWA and COWS Detox Protocols. CMD has a process to identify and place inmates on CIWA
and COWS detox protocols. Inmates are added to the Medication Administration Record (MAR),
assigned to a medication nurse for assessment (two times a day at morning, and evening
medication pass). There is no fluid replenishment provided. These protocols should be
completed three times a day with fluid replenishment for electrolyte stabilization provided.
Most jails have implemented processes to have the protocol assessments completed at a
separate time from the medication pass, to devote complete attention and focus on the visual
assessment(s) and to be able to provide electrolyte replenishment, comfort meds, and
medication for CIWA as clinically appropriate. The current system also fails to track how many
inmates are on protocols in the facility at any given time. This could potentially lead to clinical
protocols being missed as it is only documented on the inmate’s paper MAR located in the
pharmacy.
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Recommendation 51: Revise the CIWA and COWS detox protocols to include
increased frequency of assessment, provision of fluid replenishment, and
improved tracking of inmates on assessment protocols. The assessments
should also be completed separate and apart from scheduled medication passes,
consistent with “best practices.”
Nurse Sick Call. Housing unit officers distribute blank sick call slips, and, in the morning, nurses
pick them up during the medication pass. However, they only pick them up if there are 4
nurses working the medication pass. According to staff, if less than 4 nurses are available, the
nurses do not pick sick call requests and inmates are directed to submit their sick call requests
at the next opportunity. This is a significant issue that requires immediate resolution. The sick
call process also does not generate data on the length of time required for appointments or
compliance with scheduled appointments. The project team was not provided access to
medical records to assess the quality of the clinical encounters or the timeliness of the nurse
sick call process more definitively.
Recommendation 52: Establish and enforce by policy that all sick call requests,
without exception will be collected 7 days per week inclusive of holidays and
triaged within 24 hours, regardless of available nurse staffing. This is consistent
with NCCHC and American Correctional Association (ACA) standards.
Infirmary. There are 33 total cells in the infirmary, including 11 medical, 17 mental health, 4
negative pressure rooms, and 1 safety room for inmates at risk of self-harm. There were 14
patients in the infirmary at the time of our review, of which seven patients had mental health
diagnoses.
CMD lacks critical information on infirmary utilization. According to staff, the only data tracked
is the number of unique visits to the infirmary (2,007 medical visits and 1,329 mental health
visits for 2021 and 2022 to date. The is no data available on the average number of patients
housed in the infirmary. Without the length of stay for each visit it is also impossible to
determine the workload or level of productivity of staff in the unit.
Nurses appear to need training on infirmary documentation, as patients require nurse charting
on each patient each shift, rather than 1 note, with 1 set of vitals that begins in the morning, as
is the current practice.
The infirmary is currently staffed with 2 EMT/EMT-P FTEs 24/7 and 1 RN FTE 24 /7. This is
appropriate for a 33-bed infirmary that is utilized at near capacity, but there is no data available
to support this level of utilization and associated staffing requirements. Without this data, there
is no means to determine the alignment of current staffing with actual infirmary workloads. The
project team was not provided access to medical records and son could make no assessment of
staff work activities or clinical care.
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DPH has taken a very restrictive approach on the amount of clinical information they provide to
outside assessors and corrections staff, including the Justice Center management leadership,
citing the patient privacy requirements of the Heath Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA). In most correctional systems, custody staff and jail managers are routinely
provided basic medical data on inmate patients, provided they have taken and passed courses
on patient confidentiality. This can be critical in that officers with basic knowledge of inmate
health care issues can be alerted to changes in their condition that may warrant medical
attention.
NCCHC addresses this issue in Standard J-A-07 Privacy of Care: “There must be a balance
between extent of need for privacy based on health needs, timely access, the facilities plant
design, and custody concerns. All custody officers trained (See C04) in confidentially matters
should be considered part of the health care team and thus may present as needed during
clinical encounters.” This similarly applies to jail leadership, where care custody and control are
involved and that require a more flexible approach to HIPAA enforcement.
This process requires DPH leadership to rethink their position where it comes to jail healthcare
communication.
Patient Advocate Position. The Justice Center has a community liaison phone line that allows
anyone from the community to call in and leave a voice mail. Patient Advocate returns these
calls relating to an inmate’s medical condition, which may, dependent on the issue, involve the
COO or Medical Director. This is an outstanding program and consistent with “best practices.”
The Patient Advocate investigates patient grievances, schedules off-site appointments with
community providers, and coordinates transportation. This position however does not have the
clinical background required to investigate medical grievances. Grievances that pertain to key
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health care functions should be tracked through the CQI program and reviewed to identify any
recurrent issues and implementation of corrective action plans if indicated.
Daily Huddles occur each morning at 8:45am where upper management and anyone available
can review operational issues, announcements, skills checks, supplies, equipment, or staffing
needs. This is very good practice.
This group is an outstanding resource to involve in the transition to NCCHC policies and
processes.
Off-Site Care. During 2021 there were 75 hospital runs, for an average of 6 patients a month.
This an exceptionally small number for a facility of this size and may be a positive result from
having providers on site 24/7 with a large infirmary. Lack of data metrics makes it difficult to
make any more detailed assessments of patterns in off-site care. There is no data on the
number of patients sent to the emergency room that were subsequently admitted to the
hospital, the number of days they stayed, or which provider was responsible for the order. The
number of patients sent to hospitals from the intake process due to their condition at booking,
versus hospital admissions for conditions that developed after the intake process is also
unclear. The lack of data makes meaningful utilization management difficult.
Behavioral Health. The current psychiatrist providing service to the Justice Center lives in
Arizona and only available through a telehealth video portal. This system has experienced many
technical issues that have disrupted service delivery. While tele-psychiatry is a valuable adjunct
clinical service, it impairs the ability of providers to work as a team. Tele-psychiatry works best
when the provider is also willing to come on site at periodic intervals to be part of team
meetings, meet with difficult to manage patients, and to be part of the larger multidisciplinary
meetings with the mental health team, COO, Nurse Managers, Medical Director, and facility
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leadership. It appears that there is approximately 14% of the ADP that is on the psychiatric
caseload. This is well below the national average which now stands at approximately 20 - 25%.
The Medically Assisted Treatment Program (MAT) is a grant funded program through the
Missouri Department of Mental Health. The program allows for those inmates that enter the
Justice Center from an active and verified program to be enrolled in the MAT program. There
are currently five inmates in the MAT program and 1 full time person oversees this program
and provides discharge planning needs.
Dental. The clinic space has a dental operatory, staffed by DPH dentists scheduled to provide 20
hours of service per week. In the first two months of 2022 the dentist saw 48 patients over the
course of 160 hours of service provided the dentist saw 48 patients. This translates to an
average of 3.3 hours of dentist time per patient. The more common standard in jails is for a
dentist to see 2-3 patients per hour. Staff indicated the dentist is usually on site for 10 hours
per week, and often cancels clinic at the last minute. Staff indicated that the current wait time
for an inmate to see the dentist is 4-5 months. There appears to be a massive disconnect
between scheduled dental hours, actual dental hours provided, and inmate population dental
service needs.
Recommendation 58: Align the number of dental hours provided with current
workload demands for service. Determine the number of inmates on the dental
list and how far back in time the dental sick call requests go. Industry standards
call for jail inmates to be seen within 30 days of their request for dental service,
given their typically short lengths of stay in jail. Identify the number of dental
hours required to reduce the wait time for dental care to 30 days or less from
the time of the service request.
Chronic Care. CMD does not have a comprehensive Chronic Care Clinic Program. The nurse
conducting the health care screening at intake identifies inmates with chronic care conditions
and refers the inmate for treatment and medication as indicated. If conditions are missed at
intake, the inmate may not be placed on the chronic care list for the duration of their stay at
the Justice Center. NCCHC requires an initial chronic care clinic be within 30 days of initial
evaluation to establish a clinical baseline, inclusive of diagnostics and laboratory. An alternative
is to perform a “full population assessment”. This option requires 100% screening of new
inmates within 14 days of booking, or “individual assessment when clinically needed”
assessments on those determined to be at high risk for significant health problems to be
completed within 48 hours of admission. Follow-up intervals can be varied based on inmate’s
disease control.
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Clinical Encounters. CMD lacks an electronic tracking system to cross reference the number of
encounters (e.g., CIWA, COWs assessments, x-rays, labs, chronic care visits, MD sick calls, nurse
sick calls, MH visits) scheduled, pending, and completed. This is basic management information
needed to align staffing patterns with workload requirements.
Infectious Disease. By all indications, CMD did an excellent job in managing COVID response at
the Justice Center. All care was provided per CDC guidelines and more testing was done at this
site than the project team has seen in any similar sized facility. CMD administered 18,864
COVID tests from April 2020 through March 7, 2022. Of those 18,864 tests only 473 were
positive, with no cases requiring hospitalization. However, CMD does not have comparable data
on testing and incidence rates for other infectious diseases for inmates at the Justice Center.
CMD should follow the excellent approach to data collection established with COVID and apply
this model to data collection for other infectious diseases,
Pharmacy Services. DPH has contracted with Diamond Pharmacy Services for their
pharmaceutical needs since 2006. Diamond pricing represents a 22 percent discount from
Average Wholesale Price (AWP) or Usual & Customary charges for brand-name medications,
and a 94 percent discount on generic drug AWP.
Diamond will not allow an interface with Allscripts, the provider for DPH’s current Electronic
Health Record (EHR). There is no electronic communication between Allscripts and Diamond at
all. Without electronic communication, the Medication Administration Record (MAR) is not part
of the electronic medical record until scanned in much later. Aa a result, providers do not have
any information on whether the patient is taking prescribed medications or whether other
providers have the patient on medication. Policy requires that paper MARs are handwritten
every thirty days to keep up to date with every order for every patient by all the providers. As a
result, nurses spend copious hours handwriting the MARS for a large part of the jail population.
There is an inherent risk of medication errors with manual copying of so many MARS. As a
work-around, the provider enters the medication order in Allscripts, Allscripts directs that to an
electronic mailbox at the clinic, and a clinic nurse transcribes that order onto the MAR,
transcribes it again for Diamond, and then electronically faxes the order to Diamond on an
Allscripts electronic fax.
If the system was interfaced when the provider entered the order, the order could be filled
without any additional nursing time required. The current practice is to collect the MARs at the
end of the month which are sent to DPH, where they are eventually scanned into the EHR. At
the time of the project team’s site visit on March 10th, DPH had just packaged the February
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MARs for scanning. As a result, for the day period following the end of February, providers did
not have current knowledge on current medication use by their patients their patients, as the
MAR was not included with the medical record.
Diamond’s contract, Section A 2. Scope of Service p.9 Informational Technology, states that
“contractor shall work with the County’s and other third-party vendors to meet current
specifications and requirements in order to assure an accurate and timely bidirectional flow of
patient eligibility, prescription, and other necessary information to provide medication benefits
to county patients.” It is unclear why DPH has not strongly suggested that Diamond provide the
interface. The contract also indicates Diamond will work with the DPH to secure340b pricing for
HIV medications. It does not appear that is happening. Given that HIV medications represent
55% of pharmaceutical expenses this should be a priority for DPH.
The project team’s inspection of the facility’s medication room identified numerous issues. The
refrigerator had no consistent temperature checks done and had an abundance of vials of
medications all unopened - a massive number of refrigerated medications for ADP of 900.
Medication carts all had approximately 10 to 20 cups per cart that were filled with unlabeled
over-the-counter medications. The staff indicated “this is the way it’s always been.” The
narcotic count book currently utilized is not sufficient to assure the narcotics are being utilized
by the patients and not taken by others. The count book consists of a loose-leaf binder where
the tabs can open, allowing pages pulled. Entire boxes, or cards could be taken unnoticed.
Nurses are dispensing medication by placing the inmate’s medication into small envelopes and
writing the information on the envelopes. This practice is against pharmacy law and is out of
the scope of nursing practice.
A review of inspection reports by DPH’s pharmacy consultant, while lacking adequate detail
describing noted issues, shows repeated findings of “no accountability for sharps or narcotics,”
but no indication of corrective action plans to address these deficiencies.
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sharps from bulk stock to working stock are deducted from the bulk stock count
and added to the working stock counts.
The project team’s review noted large piles of inmate medications from home, placed on top of
containers on the floor, with no accountability or documentation.
CMD currently has four medication carts for distribution four times per day, with about 120
inmates receiving medication per cart. Almost every inmate is on several different PRN
medications such as Tylenol or Advil, often ordered simultaneously. There is no protocol to
enroll inmates into a chronic care clinic with evidence of excessive reorders of OTC medication.
With 24/7 provider coverage, inmates who continually ask for renewals for OTC medication
should be enrolled in a chronic care clinic and seen by the nurse practitioners regularly for such
complaints.
During med passes the project team noted that when an inmate refuses the over-the-counter
medication, the nurse leaves it in a paper envelope “in case, he wants it another day”.
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CMD treats inhalers, eyedrops, creams, and a small amount of nitro as Keep On Person (KOP)
medications; however, there is no monitoring system in place for compliance. CMD is
considering expanding the KOP program to include some OTC medication. Expansion of the
program in this manner, a should include a plan for inmate noncompliance.
Clinic. The Justice Services Clinic is a large room filled with medical supplies - there are no PAR
levels and expensive supplies are everywhere, with no counts. This room can be accessed by
many staff members leading to cost containment and supply management issues. Every triage
room in the clinic had large numbers of sharps of all different types and sizes with no counts or
documentation. accountability for any of these sharps. There was no delineation of “bulk” or
“working” stock sharps. It appears there have been no formal sharps counts in the facility, or
procedures to manage biohazard containers that contain sharps.
Electronic Health Record. Because the Jail Management System (JMS) system does not populate
into the EHR (Allscripts), the EHR does not discharge inmates when they are released from the
facility. As noted earlier, Diamond Pharmacy and Mobile RX for x rays are not interfaced with
Allscripts. This is unusual and creates unnecessary scanning and delay with the entering of data
into the medical record in real time. The medication administration records (MARS) are still
paper and need to be copied and transcribed at the end of each month. Requiring all clinical
data to be entered into the EHR allows for development of data metrics for management
review.
Allscripts does not have reporting capacity or dashboards which severely limits the CMD
leadership team’s ability to query and manage the clinical data metrics and to provide any
analysis or data analytics on request. There are no dashboards for staffing or clinical encounter
metrics.
DPH does have clinical processes/EHR fillable forms in place to deliver healthcare and document
such care. DPH will need to match these fillable forms up against the compliance standards for
NCCHC to ensure they meet the expectations and indicators for each of the essential standards.
While the current forms are lengthy and include a lot of detail, they fall short of the NCCHC
compliance standards.
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APPENDIX A: DOCUMENTS & REPORTS
6E1_PSA_Risk_Factors
6E2_PSA_Points_and_Scales
St. Louis University, An Evaluation of the 20th Year of Choices, a Substance Abuse Recovery
Program Operated by the St. Louis County Department of Justice Services, December 16, 2018
Vera Causa Group, St. Louis County Department of Justice Services Personnel Investigation
Report, January 22,2021
Pew Charitable Trust, Understanding Trends in Jail Population in St. Louis County, Missouri:
2010 – 2019
KPMG, St. Louis County, Department of Justice Services, Improving the County’s Understanding
and Recovery of Costs Related to Delivering Correctional Services, October 15, 2021
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APPENDIX B: INTERVIEWS
APPENDIX B: INTERVIEWS
Elizabeth Allen, Corrections Medicine COO
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APPENDIX B: INTERVIEWS
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APPENDIX C: UNIT MANAGER DUTIES
• Meet weekly
• Involve all unit managers (select 1 lead), mental health staff, medical staff, classification,
security Lieutenant assigned to the 3rd or 8th Floor
• Review length of housing assignment
• establish behavioral plans for mental health population
• establish behavior plans for segregation inmates to work their way out of segregation
• Review compliance with behavioral plans, medication treatment, and staff cooperation
• Make determinations for future housing and how to move inmates back to general
population
Grievance and ADA Coordinator
• One Unit Manager should be assigned as the grievance and ADA coordinator
• This individual should receive all formal grievances to review, track, and route to the
appropriate party.
• Responsible for ensuring timely answers from responding parties
• Routing responses back to the inmate
• Managing appeals for all grievance received
• Developing a statistical analysis of grievances over time to identify areas for
improvement.
• Track and respond to all ADA requests
• Ensure agency compliance with accessibility concerns/requests
Use of Force Review Committee
• Establish a review committee led by one Unit Manager to receive, track, and review all
use of force incidents.
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APPENDIX C: UNIT MANAGER DUTIES
• All Unit Managers should participate in the review committee, along with use of force
trainers, the Intake captain, and the facility commander.
• Review all use of force incidents to identify evaluate appropriate force situation,
evaluate appropriate for applied, training needs, and make referrals for further
investigation.
• Track all force incidents to determine areas of concern. Track by:
o Day of week
o Shift
o Time of day
o Participants (staff)
o Participants (inmates)
o Type of force utilized
• Make recommendations for training needs and policy revision as determined by
reviews.
Assign one Unit Manager to be responsible for support services:
95
APPENDIX D: STAFFING FACTORS
As a result, no fixed ratio of staff to inmates exists to guide the number of staff needed in a jail.
The number of staff needed must therefore be evaluated on a facility-by-facility basis. A
substantial number of factors impact jail staffing needs including:
• Facility Mission: The overall mission of the detention facility plays a significant role in
determining the number of staff needed. At the local level some jails only house pretrial
offenders, while others house both pre-trial and sentenced inmates. Additionally, some
may offer more intensive inmate programs or off-grounds work crews and work release
programs that increase the staffing needs of the facility. The Justice Center has a
mixture of all these requiring different staffing patterns based upon programs, higher
custody housing areas, mental health, and high-risk medical housing.
• Facility Layout. The physical design/layout of a facility will greatly impact the minimum
number of posts required to provide adequate supervision of the population. Those
facilities that are efficiently designed and that provide clear lines of sight and reduce
need for inmate movement can significantly reduce staffing needs. For example, the
Justice Center is a direct supervision facility, which incorporates many inmate services
into the housing unit, requiring less inmate movement and escort. However, direct
supervision facilities tend to have a higher demand for staffing, requiring a staff
presence in each housing unit.
• Offender Classification. The type of inmates housed and assigned to an area will have a
large impact on the need for supervision and the potential risk level present. The
standard classification system (maximum, medium, and minimum security) has a direct
relationship to the staffing required. Inmates who display the potential for aggressive
behavior and have greater needs (mental health, protective custody, etc.) require more
staff than lower custody inmates.
• State Standards. Under Missouri Statute 221 “Jails and Jailers”, the Missouri Sheriffs’
Association established a manual of core jail standards as a guide in providing safe and
secure facilities. The core standards for the operation of jails impact the workload of
staff in the facility. Of specific note are standards governing facility staffing: MCJS 2.1.2
Employee Posts, MCJS 2.1.5 Male and Female Staffing, and MCJS 2.1.9 Staffing.
96
APPENDIX D: STAFFING FACTORS
• Inmate Movement Practices. The degree of inmate movement and the nature of that
movement (escorted or unescorted) relate directly to the degree of control exercised
over inmate behavior and the staffing required to enforce the desired level of control.
Many modern correctional facilities provide access to recreation and programming
activities near the housing units that reduce inmate movement.
• Court Orders/Consent Decree. In many cases, the facility history can include some past
court orders, consent decrees or agreements that have an impact on staffing needs. The
facility’s desire to maintain compliance with these past agreements can influence the
number of staff needed.
• Collective Bargaining Unit Agreements. Collective bargaining unit agreements can play a
major role in the staff needed to manage a detention facility. Agreed upon shift
schedules, post assignments and other factors may influence the number of staff
needed.
• Intensity and Access to Programs. The intensity of programming in local jails has
increased in the past decade due to the research that supports the benefits of in-
custody programming in reducing offender recidivism and improving their success upon
release. But this additional programming has costs, both in the professional staff needed
to administer the programs and security staff required to escort and supervise areas
where programming occurs.
• National Mandates. Mandates such as the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the
Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) have increased staff workloads and altered security,
housing, and program practices within correctional facilities.
• Litigation. In the past decade, litigation outcomes against state and local correctional
systems have resulted in significant changes in the operational practices. These
outcomes have resulted in enhanced treatment for those with mental illness, increased
out-of-cell time for those in segregation status, and expanded standards of care for
those with medical needs.
• Past History of Incidents: After serious incidents, detention facilities regularly conduct
after-incident reviews and make changes to policies or practices. These changes often
97
APPENDIX D: STAFFING FACTORS
impact staff workloads in an effort to reduce the likelihood of future incidents. The
Justice Center recently revised its staffing practices to reflect the need for 2 officers in
each housing unit before the inmates housed there are provided out-of-cell time.
Jails across the United States are currently housing large numbers of special needs inmates and
the Justice Center is not exempt from this trend. Many detention facilities have become the
largest mental health providers in the county, region, or state. Some jails have as many as 40%
of their overall population diagnosed with some form of mental illness. Additionally, the opioid
epidemic has placed a strain on jails due to the physical state that these inmates exhibit upon
arrival at the facility. Along with the obvious detoxification issues that arise, many of these
defendants have underlying chronic medical conditions that are only realized or displayed once
the person has been “clean” from their addiction for a number of days. Managing individuals
with various chronic illness (asthma, hypertension, heart disease, diabetes and certain cancers)
is exacerbated by a steady increase of both elderly offenders (graying of America) and the
challenging needs of youthful offenders.
The daily arrival of special-needs inmates to jails across the United States, as well as the critical
importance of having correctional officers who are predisposed and properly supervised to
work with those inmates, will continue into the foreseeable future. The best method of
ensuring the proper care of special population prisoners is to employ, develop, and retain a
corps of competent and highly motivated correctional staff.
98
APPENDIX E: RECULATORY STANDARDS – CORRECTIONAL FACILITY STAFFING
Employee posts should be located in, or in close proximity to, the detainee living areas to assist
employees in seeing and/or hearing, to facilitate reporting and responding promptly to
incidents and emergency situations. Video/audio surveillance may be utilized in order to assist
staff in keeping a secure and safe facility, if available. Post Orders shall be accessible to
employees.
Interaction between staff and detainees is required. The shift supervisor or designee shall visit
the living and activity areas of detainees once or more during the shift. Staff shall communicate
any health, safety, or security concerns to an immediate supervisor.
When male and female detainees are housed in the facility, at least one male staff member and
one female staff are on duty on each shift, when possible.
Staff are present at all times to perform following functions: ensure staff safety; maintain
custody and supervision of detainees; and, ensure the safe and secure operation of the facility.
The level of staff shall be based on the physical plant design, the level of security, total detainee
population, and other safety factors for the facility.
Physical facility design facilitates continuous interaction between staff and detainees in housing
units, medical holding cells, segregation cells, and booking holding cells, if available.
PREA Standards
The Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 (945 USC 15601), also known as PREA, establishes
standards to detect, prevent, and respond to sexual assaults that take place in prisons and
other detention facilities. Standard § 115.13 of this act addresses staffing and sets forth the
following provisions:
99
APPENDIX E: RECULATORY STANDARDS – CORRECTIONAL FACILITY STAFFING
(a) The agency shall ensure that each facility it operates shall develop, document, and
make its best efforts to comply on a regular basis with a staffing plan that provides for
adequate levels of staffing, and, where applicable, video monitoring, to protect inmates
against sexual abuse. In calculating adequate staffing levels and determining the need
for video monitoring, facilities shall take into consideration:
(5) All components of the facility's physical plant (including "blind-spots" or areas
where staff or inmates may be isolated);
(b) In circumstances where the staffing plan is not complied with, the facility shall
document and justify all deviations from the plan.
(c) Whenever necessary, but no less frequently than once each year, for each facility the
agency operates, in consultation with the PREA coordinator required by §115.11, the
agency shall assess, determine, and document whether adjustments are needed to:
(1) The staffing plan established pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section;
(2) The facility's deployment of video monitoring systems and other monitoring
technologies; and
(3) The resources the facility has available to commit to ensure adherence to the
staffing plan.
(d) Each agency operating a facility shall implement a policy and practice of having
intermediate-level or higher-level supervisors conduct and document unannounced
100
APPENDIX E: RECULATORY STANDARDS – CORRECTIONAL FACILITY STAFFING
rounds to identify and deter staff sexual abuse and sexual harassment. Such policy and
practice shall be implemented for night shifts as well as day shifts. Each agency shall
have a policy to prohibit staff from alerting other staff members that these supervisory
rounds are occurring, unless such announcement is related to the legitimate operational
functions of the facility.
This standard also requires "adequate" staffing along with supervision of staff to ensure
compliance. The main focus of this standard is to provide enough security to prevent sexual
assaults and to ensure that inappropriate relationships do not develop between staff and
inmates.
ACA Standards
Sufficient staff, including a designated supervisor, are provided at all times to perform
functions relating to staff safety and the security, custody, and supervision of inmates as
needed to operate the facility in conformance with the standards.
This standard requires a designated supervisor "at all times" along with a sufficient number of
correctional staff. Industry standard provides for 3 levels of supervision: line level staff,
supervisory staff, and command staff. The number of staff that is deemed “sufficient" can be
determined based on several factors, including the philosophy of operation and the programs
provided. Other determining factors are the design of the facility’s components, the types and
frequency of internal inmate movement, and the various risks and needs of the inmate
population.
The ACA standard 3-ALDF-1C-03 provides some guidance in determining this number by stating
the following:
Staffing requirements for all categories of personnel are determined on an ongoing basis to
ensure that inmates have access to staff, programs, and services. Staffing requirements should
be determined on more than inmate population figures and should include review of staffing
needs for health care, academic, vocational, recreation, library, and religious programs and
services. Workload ratios reflect such factors as goals, legal requirements, character, and needs
101
APPENDIX E: RECULATORY STANDARDS – CORRECTIONAL FACILITY STAFFING
of the inmates supervised, and other duties required of staff. Workloads should be sufficiently
low to provide access to staff and effective services.
A staffing plan for the correctional system should consider all these factors and provide staffing
and supervision at a sufficient level to meet security and program objectives.
Case Law
A number of cases in the federal courts have addressed the issue of staffing in jail systems. The
holdings of these key court decisions have had a material impact on correctional facility staffing
practices. These cases generally hold that sufficient staffing must be provided in correctional
facilities to accomplish the following objectives/functions:
• maintain security,
• ensure that all required inmate activities, services, and programs are delivered (medical,
exercise, visits, etc.).
Courts have frequently found jail administrators and elected officials liable for incidents that
have resulted from inadequate staffing. Costly damage awards have often been levied when
staff and officials are found negligent in selecting, retaining, assigning, and supervising staff.
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APPENDIX F: SAMPLE POST ROSTER
Floors
Position Admin Shift Shift 1 Shift 2 Shift 3 Totals
Major 1 0 0 0 1
Captain 3 2 2 2 9
Lieutenants 0 9.05 9.05 9.05 27.15
Sergeants 0 3 3 2 8
Officers 0 72.78 72.78 60.16 205.72
Totals 4 86.83 86.83 73.21 250.87
Intake/Transportation
Position Admin Shift Shift 1 Shift 2 Shift 3 Totals
Major 1 0 0 0 1
Captain 0 1 1 1 3
Lieutenant 1 1.81 1.81 1.81 6.43
Officers 25 15.04 15.04 15.04 70.12
Total FTEs 27 17.85 17.85 17.85 80.55
Admin
Shift 1 Shift 2 Shift 3 Totals
Position Shift
Superintendent 1 0 0 0 1
Major 3 0 0 0 3
Captain 4 3 3 3 13
Lieutenant 2 10.32 10.32 10.32 32.96
Sergeant 2 3 3 2 10
Officer 31 89.7 89.7 75.2 285.6
103
APPENDIX F: SAMPLE POST ROSTER
98
APPENDIX F: SAMPLE POST ROSTER
Staff Name Post Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday
Major Facility Commander OFF OFF
Captain 1 Shift Commander OFF OFF
Captain 2 Shift Commander OFF OFF
Captain 3 Unit Manager FL 3-5 OFF OFF
Captain 4 Unit Manager FL 6-7 OFF OFF
Captain 5 Unit Manager FL 8 OFF OFF
Lieutenant 1 3 Floor Lieutenant LT 6 LT 6
Lieutenant 2 5th Floor Lieutenant LT 6 LT 6
Lieutenant 3 6th Floor Lieutenant LT 6 LT 7
Lieutenant 4 7th Floor Lieutenant LT 7 LT 7
Lieutenant 5 8th Floor Lieutenant LT 7 LT 7
Sergeant 1 5th Floor Sergeant OFF OFF
Sergeant 2 6th Floor Sergeant OFF OFF
Sergeant 3 7th Floor Sergeant OFF OFF
Officer Officer
3 Master Control #1
Officer 1 40 40
Officer
3 Master Control #2 Officer 40
Officer 2 40
Officer
3 Infirmary #1 Officer 40
Officer 3 41
99
APPENDIX F: SAMPLE POST ROSTER
Staff Name Post Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday
Officer
3 Infirmary #2 Officer 41
Officer 4 41
Officer Officer
3 Infirmary #3
Officer 5 41 41
Officer 6 3 Clinic Officer 42 Officer 42
Officer
3 Rover (MC) #1 Officer 42
Officer 7 42
Officer Officer
3 Rover (MC) #2
Officer 8 42 43
Officer
Officer 43
Officer 9 5 Unit Control 43
Officer
Officer 43
Officer 10 5 Alpha 43
Officer
Officer 44
Officer 11 5 Bravo 44
Officer Officer
Officer 12 5 Charlie 44 44
Officer 13 5 Delta Officer 44 Officer 45
Officer
Officer 45
Officer 14 5 Rover #1 45
Officer Officer
Officer 15 5 Rover #2 45 45
Officer
Officer 46
Officer 16 6 Unit Control 46
Officer
Officer 46
Officer 17 6 Alpha 46
Officer
Officer 46
Officer 18 6 Bravo 47
Officer Officer
Officer 19 6 Charlie 47 47
Officer 20 6 Delta Officer 47 Officer 47
100
APPENDIX F: SAMPLE POST ROSTER
Staff Name Post Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday
Officer
Officer 48
Officer 21 6 Rover #1 48
Officer Officer
Officer 22 6 Rover #2 48 48
Officer
Officer 49
Officer 23 7 Unit Control 48
Officer
Officer 49
Officer 24 7 Alpha 49
Officer
Officer 49
Officer 25 7 Bravo 49
Officer Officer
Officer 26 7 Charlie 50 50
Officer 27 7 Delta Officer 50 Officer 50
Officer
Officer 51
Officer 28 7 Rover #1 50
Officer Officer
Officer 29 7 Rover #2 51 51
Officer
Officer 51
Officer 30 8 Unit Control 51
Officer
Officer 52
Officer 31 8 Alpha 52
8 Bravo Upper Officer
Officer 52
Officer 32 Control 52
Officer Officer
Officer 33 8 Bravo 52 53
8 Charlie Upper
Officer 53 Officer 53
Officer 34 Control
Officer
Officer 53
Officer 35 8 Charlie 53
8 Delta Upper Officer Officer
Officer 36 Control 54 54
101
APPENDIX F: SAMPLE POST ROSTER
Staff Name Post Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday
Officer
Officer 54
Officer 37 8 Delta 54
Officer
Officer 54
Officer 38 8 Rover 1 55
Officer
Officer 55
Officer 39 8 Rover 2 55
LT 4th
LT 4th FL LT 5th FL LT 5th FL LT 6th FL OFF OFF
Lieutenant 6 RDO LT 1017 FL
LT 7thh LT 6th
LT 8th FL LT 8th FL OFF OFF LT 7th FL
Lieutenant 7 RDO LT 1018 FL FL
Lieutenant 8 RFM Lieutenant OFF OFF
Lieutenanat
OFF OFF
9 RFM Lieutenant
Officer 40 RDO 1001 MC#1 MC#1 MC#2 MC#2 Infirm 1 OFF OFF
Infirm
Infirm 2 Infirm 3 Infirm 3 OFF OFF Infirm 2
Officer 41 RDO 1002 1
MC Rvr MC Rvr
OFF OFF Clinic Clinic MC Rvr 1
Officer 42 RDO 1003 2 1
5 Unit
OFF MC Rvr 2 5 Unit Ctrl 5 Alpha 5 Alpha OFF
Officer 43 RDO 1004 Ctrl
Officer 44 RDO 1005 5 Bravo 5 Charlie 5 Charlie 5 Delta OFF OFF 5 Bravo
Officer 45 RDO 1006 5 Rvr 2 5 Rvr 2 OFF OFF 5 Delta 5 Rvr 1 5 Rvr 1
6 Unit
OFF OFF 6 Unit Ctrl 6 Alpha 6 Alpha 6 Bravo
Officer 46 RDO 1007 Ctrl
Officer 47 RDO 1008 6 Bravo 6 Charlie 6 Charlie 6 Delta 6 Delta OFF OFF
7 Unit
6 Rvr 2 6 Rvr 2 OFF OFF 6 Rvr 1 r Rvr 1
Officer 49 RDO 1009 Ctrl
Officer 49 RDO 1010 7 Bravo OFF OFF 7 Unit Ctrl 7 Alpha 7 Alpha 7 Bravo
Officer 50 RDO 1011 OFF 7 Charlie 7 Charlie 7 Delta 7 Delta 7 Rvr 1 OFF
8 Unit
7 Rvr 2 7 Rvr 2 8 Unit Ctrl OFF OFF 7 Rvr 1
Officer 51 RDO 1012 Ctrl
102
APPENDIX F: SAMPLE POST ROSTER
Staff Name Post Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday
8B
8 Bravo OFF OFF 8 Alpha 8 Alpha 8 B upper
Officer 52 RDO 1013 Upper
8
OFF OFF 8 Bravo 8C Upper 8C Upper 8 Charlie
Officer 53 RDO 1014 Charlie
8D 8D
8 Delta 8 Delta 8 Rover OFF OFF
Officer 54 RDO 1015 Upper Upper
8 Rover 8 Rover
RFM RFM OFF OFF 8 Rover 2
Officer 55 RDO 1016/RFM 2 1
Officer 56 RFM OFF OFF
Officer 57 RFM OFF OFF
Officer 58 RFM OFF OFF
Officer 59 RFM OFF OFF
Officer 60 RFM OFF OFF
Officer 61 RFM OFF OFF
Officer 62 RFM OFF OFF
Officer 63 RFM OFF OFF
Officer 64 RFM OFF OFF
Officer 65 RFM OFF OFF
Officer 66 RFM OFF OFF
Officer 67 RFM OFF OFF
Officer 68 RFM OFF OFF
Officer 69 RFM OFF OFF
Officer 70 RFM OFF OFF
Officer 71 RFM OFF OFF
Officer 72 RFM OFF OFF
103
APPENDIX F: SAMPLE POST ROSTER
Staff Name Post Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday
Lieutenant
3 Floor Lieutenant LT 6 LT 6
1
Lieutenant
5th Floor Lieutenant LT 6 LT 6
2
Lieutenant
6th Floor Lieutenant LT 6 LT 7
3
Lieutenant
7th Floor Lieutenant LT 7 LT 7
4
Lieutenant
8th Floor Lieutenant LT 7 LT 7
5
Sergeant 1 5th Floor Sergeant OFF OFF
Sergeant 2 6th Floor Sergeant OFF OFF
Sergeant 3 7th Floor Sergeant OFF OFF
Officer Officer
3 Master Control #1
Officer 1 40 40
Officer Officer
3 Master Control #2
Officer 2 40 40
Officer Officer
3 Infirmary #1
Officer 3 40 41
Officer
3 Infirmary #2 Officer 41
Officer 4 41
104
APPENDIX F: SAMPLE POST ROSTER
Staff Name Post Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday
Officer Officer
3 Infirmary #3
Officer 5 41 41
Officer Officer
3 Clinic
Officer 6 42 42
Officer
3 Rover (MC) #1 Officer 42
Officer 7 42
Officer Officer
3 Rover (MC) #2
Officer 8 42 43
Officer Officer
Officer 9 5 Unit Control 43 43
Officer Officer
Officer 10 5 Alpha 43 43
Officer
Officer 44
Officer 11 5 Bravo 44
Officer Officer
Officer 12 5 Charlie 44 44
Officer Officer
Officer 13 5 Delta 44 45
Officer
Officer 45
Officer 14 5 Rover #1 45
Officer Officer
Officer 15 5 Rover #2 45 45
Officer Officer
Officer 16 6 Unit Control 46 46
Officer Officer
Officer 17 6 Alpha 46 46
Officer
Officer 46
Officer 18 6 Bravo 47
Officer Officer
Officer 19 6 Charlie 47 47
Officer Officer
Officer 20 6 Delta 47 47
105
APPENDIX F: SAMPLE POST ROSTER
Staff Name Post Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday
Officer
Officer 48
Officer 21 6 Rover #1 48
Officer Officer
Officer 22 6 Rover #2 48 48
Officer Officer
Officer 23 7 Unit Control 48 49
Officer Officer
Officer 24 7 Alpha 49 49
Officer
Officer 49
Officer 25 7 Bravo 49
Officer Officer
Officer 26 7 Charlie 50 50
Officer Officer
Officer 27 7 Delta 50 50
Officer
Officer 51
Officer 28 7 Rover #1 50
Officer Officer
Officer 29 7 Rover #2 51 51
Officer Officer
Officer 30 8 Unit Control 51 51
Officer Officer
Officer 31 8 Alpha 52 52
8 Bravo Upper Officer
Officer 52
Officer 32 Control 52
Officer Officer
Officer 33 8 Bravo 52 53
8 Charlie Upper Officer Officer
Officer 34 Control 53 53
Officer
Officer 53
Officer 35 8 Charlie 53
8 Delta Upper Officer Officer
Officer 36 Control 54 54
106
APPENDIX F: SAMPLE POST ROSTER
Staff Name Post Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday
Officer Officer
Officer 37 8 Delta 54 54
Officer Officer
Officer 38 8 Rover 1 54 55
Officer
Officer 55
Officer 39 8 Rover 2 55
Lieutenant LT 4th LT 4th LT 5th
LT 5th FL LT 6th FL OFF OFF
6 RDO LT 2017 FL FL FL
Lieutenant LT 7thh LT 8th LT 8th LT 6th
OFF OFF LT 7th FL
7 RDO LT 2018 FL FL FL FL
Lieutenant
OFF OFF
8 RFM Lieutenant
Lieutenanat
OFF OFF
9 RFM Lieutenant
Officer 40 RDO 2001 MC#1 MC#1 MC#2 MC#2 Infirm 1 OFF OFF
Infirm
Infirm 2 Infirm 3 Infirm 3 OFF OFF Infirm 2
Officer 41 RDO 2002 1
MC Rvr MC Rvr
OFF OFF Clinic Clinic MC Rvr 1
Officer 42 RDO 2003 2 1
MC Rvr 5 Unit 5 Unit
OFF 5 Alpha 5 Alpha OFF
Officer 43 RDO 2004 2 Ctrl Ctrl
5 5
5 Bravo 5 Delta OFF OFF 5 Bravo
Officer 44 RDO 2005 Charlie Charlie
Officer 45 RDO 2006 5 Rvr 2 5 Rvr 2 OFF OFF 5 Delta 5 Rvr 1 5 Rvr 1
6 Unit 6 Unit
OFF OFF 6 Alpha 6 Alpha 6 Bravo
Officer 46 RDO 2007 Ctrl Ctrl
6 6
6 Bravo 6 Delta 6 Delta OFF OFF
Officer 47 RDO 2008 Charlie Charlie
7 Unit
6 Rvr 2 6 Rvr 2 OFF OFF 6 Rvr 1 r Rvr 1
Officer 49 RDO 2009 Ctrl
7 Unit
7 Bravo OFF OFF 7 Alpha 7 Alpha 7 Bravo
Officer 49 RDO 2010 Ctrl
107
APPENDIX F: SAMPLE POST ROSTER
Staff Name Post Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday
7 7
OFF 7 Delta 7 Delta 7 Rvr 1 OFF
Officer 50 RDO 2011 Charlie Charlie
8 Unit 8 Unit
7 Rvr 2 7 Rvr 2 OFF OFF 7 Rvr 1
Officer 51 RDO 2012 Ctrl Ctrl
8B
8 Bravo OFF OFF 8 Alpha 8 Alpha 8 B upper
Officer 52 RDO 2013 Upper
8
OFF OFF 8 Bravo 8C Upper 8C Upper 8 Charlie
Officer 53 RDO 2014 Charlie
8D 8D
8 Delta 8 Delta 8 Rover OFF OFF
Officer 54 RDO 2015 Upper Upper
8 Rover 8 Rover
RFM RFM OFF OFF 8 Rover 2
Officer 55 RDO 2016/RFM 2 1
Officer 56 RFM OFF OFF
Officer 57 RFM OFF OFF
Officer 58 RFM OFF OFF
Officer 59 RFM OFF OFF
Officer 60 RFM OFF OFF
Officer 61 RFM OFF OFF
Officer 62 RFM OFF OFF
Officer 63 RFM OFF OFF
Officer 64 RFM OFF OFF
Officer 65 RFM OFF OFF
Officer 66 RFM OFF OFF
Officer 67 RFM OFF OFF
Officer 68 RFM OFF OFF
Officer 69 RFM OFF OFF
Officer 70 RFM OFF OFF
Officer 71 RFM OFF OFF
Officer 72 RFM OFF OFF
108
APPENDIX F: SAMPLE POST ROSTER
Staff Name Post Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday
Lieutenant
3 Floor Lieutenant LT 6 LT 6
1
Lieutenant
5th Floor Lieutenant LT 6 LT 6
2
Lieutenant
6th Floor Lieutenant LT 6 LT 7
3
Lieutenant
7th Floor Lieutenant LT 7 LT 7
4
Lieutenant
8th Floor Lieutenant LT 7 LT 7
5
Sergeant 1 5th Floor Sergeant OFF OFF
Sergeant 2 6th Floor Sergeant OFF OFF
Officer Officer
3 Master Control #1
Officer 1 33 33
Officer Officer
3 Master Control #2
Officer 2 33 33
Officer Officer
3 Infirmary #1
Officer 3 33 34
Officer
3 Infirmary #2 Officer 34
Officer 4 34
Officer Officer
3 Rover (MC) #1
Officer 5 34 34
109
APPENDIX F: SAMPLE POST ROSTER
Staff Name Post Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday
Officer Officer
Officer 6 5 Unit Control 35 35
Officer
Officer 35
Officer 7 5 Alpha 35
Officer Officer
Officer 8 5 Bravo 35 36
Officer Officer
Officer 9 5 Charlie 36 36
Officer Officer
Officer 10 5 Delta 36 36
Officer
Officer 37
Officer 11 5 Rover #1 37
Officer Officer
Officer 12 6 Unit Control 37 37
Officer Officer
Officer 13 6 Alpha 37 38
Officer
Officer 38
Officer 14 6 Bravo 38
Officer Officer
Officer 15 6 Charlie 38 38
Officer Officer
Officer 16 6 Delta 39 39
Officer Officer
Officer 17 6 Rover #1 39 39
Officer
Officer 39
Officer 18 7 Unit Control 40
Officer Officer
Officer 19 7 Alpha 40 40
Officer Officer
Officer 20 7 Bravo 40 40
Officer
Officer 41
Officer 21 7 Charlie 41
110
APPENDIX F: SAMPLE POST ROSTER
Staff Name Post Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday
Officer Officer
Officer 22 7 Delta 41 41
Officer Officer
Officer 23 7 Rover #1 41 42
Officer Officer
Officer 24 8 Unit Control 42 42
Officer
Officer 42
Officer 25 8 Alpha 42
8 Bravo Upper Officer Officer
Officer 26 Control 43 43
Officer Officer
Officer 27 8 Bravo 43 43
8 Charlie Upper Officer
Officer 44
Officer 28 Control 43
Officer Officer
Officer 29 8 Charlie 44 44
8 Delta Upper Officer Officer
Officer 30 Control 44 44
Officer Officer
Officer 31 8 Delta 45 45
Officer
Officer 45
Officer 32 8 Rover 1 45
Lieutenant 3rd FL 3rd FL 5th FL
5th FL LT 6th FL LT
6 RDO LT 3017 LT LT LT
Lieutenant 7th FL 8th FL 8th FL 6th FL
7th FL LT
7 RDO LT 3018 LT LT LT LT
Lieutenant
8 RFM Lieutenant
Lieutenanat
9 RFM Lieutenant
Officer 33 RDO 3001 MC#1 MC#1 MC#2 MC#2 Infirm 1
111
APPENDIX F: SAMPLE POST ROSTER
Staff Name Post Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday
MC MC
Infirm 2 Infirm 1 Infirm1
Officer 34 RDO 3002 Rover Rover
5 Unit 5 Unit
5 Bravo 5 Alpha 5 Alpha
Officer 35 RDO 3003 Ctrl Ctrl
5
5 Bravo 5 Charlie 5 Delta 5 Delta
Officer 36 RDO 3004 Charlie
6 Unit 6 Unit
5 Rover 6 Alpha 5 Rover
Officer 37 RDO 3005 Ctrl Ctrl
6 6
6 Alpha 6 Bravo 6 Bravo
Officer 38 RDO 3006 Charlie Charlie
Officer 39 RDO 3007 6 Delta 6 Delta 6 Rover 6 Rover 7 Unit Ctrl
7 Unit
7 Alpha 7 Alpha 7 Bravo 7 Bravo
Officer 40 RDO 3008 Ctrl
7
7 Delta 7 Delta 7 Rover 7 Charlie
Officer 41 RDO 3009 Charlie
8 Unit 8 Unit
8 Alpha 7 Rover 8 Alpha
Officer 42 RDO 3010 Ctrl Ctrl
8B 8B 8C
8 Bravo 8 Bravo
Officer 43 RDO 3011 Upper Upper Upper
8 8 8D 8D
8 C Upper
Officer 44 RDO 3012 Charlie Charlie Upper Upper
Officer 45 RDO 3013/ RFM 8 Rover Relief 8 Delta 8 Delta 8 Rover
Officer 46 RFM
Officer 47 RFM
Officer 48 RFM
Officer 49 RFM
Officer 50 RFM
Officer 51 RFM
Officer 52 RFM
Officer 53 RFM
Officer 54 RFM
112
APPENDIX F: SAMPLE POST ROSTER
Staff Name Post Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday
Officer 55 RFM
Officer 56 RFM
Officer 57 RFM
Officer 58 RFM
Officer 59 RFM
Officer 60 RFM
113
APPENDIX F: SAMPLE POST ROSTER
Staff Name Post Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday
Major Major OFF OFF
Captain
Captain OFF OFF
Intake/Transportation
Lieutenant 1 Lieutenant Intake LT 3 LT 3
Lieutenant 2 Lieutenant Transport OFF OFF
Officer Officer
Officer 1
Law Enforcement Lobby 34 34
Officer Officer
Officer 2
Booking Officer 1 34 34
Officer Officer
Officer 3
Booking Officer 2 34 35
Officer
Officer 4 Officer 35
Booking Officer 3 35
Officer Officer
Officer 5 Booking Officer 4 35 35
Officer Officer
Officer 6 Booking Officer 5 36 36
Officer
Property Officer Officer 36
Officer 7 36
114
APPENDIX F: SAMPLE POST ROSTER
Staff Name Post Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday
Officer Officer
Release Officer
Officer 8 36 37
Officer 9 Transport Officer 1 OFF OFF
Officer 10 Transport Officer 2 OFF OFF
Officer 11 Transport Officer 3 OFF OFF
Officer 12 Transport Officer 4 OFF OFF
Officer 13 Transport Officer 5 OFF OFF
Officer 14 Transport Officer 6 OFF OFF
Officer 15 Transport Officer 7 OFF OFF
Officer 16 Transport Officer 8 OFF OFF
Officer 17 Transport Officer 9 OFF OFF
Officer 18 Transport Officer 10 OFF OFF
Officer 19 Transport Officer 11 OFF OFF
Officer 20 Transport Officer 12 OFF OFF
Officer 21 Transport Officer 13 OFF OFF
Officer 22 Transport Officer 14 OFF OFF
Officer 23 Transport Officer 15 OFF OFF
Officer 24 Transport Officer 16 OFF OFF
Officer 25 Transport Officer 17 OFF OFF
Officer 26 Transport Officer 18 OFF OFF
Officer 27 Transport Officer 19 OFF OFF
Officer 28 Transport Officer 20 OFF OFF
Officer 29 Transport Officer 21 OFF OFF
Officer 30 Transport Officer 22 OFF OFF
Officer 31 Transport Officer 23 OFF OFF
Officer 32 Transport Officer 24 OFF OFF
Officer 33 Transport Officer 25 OFF OFF
Intake Intake
Relief
Lieutenant 3 Relief Lieutenant LT LT OFF OFF Relief Relief
115
APPENDIX F: SAMPLE POST ROSTER
Staff Name Post Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday
LE LE
Officer 34 RDO 1001 Lobby Lobby BKG 1 BKG 1 BKG 2 OFF OFF
Officer 35 RDO 1002 BKG 3 BKG 4 BKG 4 OFF OFF BKG 2 BKG 3
Officer 36 RDO 1003 Release OFF OFF BKG 5 BKG 5 Property Property
Officer 37 RDO 1004/RFM OFF Release Relief Relief Relief Relief OFF
Officer 38 RFM OFF OFF
Officer 39 RFM OFF OFF
Officer 40 RFM OFF OFF
116
APPENDIX F: SAMPLE POST ROSTER
Staff Name Post Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday
Captain
Captain OFF OFF
Intake/Transportation
Lieutenant 1 Lieutenant Intake LT 2 LT 2
Officer Officer
Officer 1
Law Enforcement Lobby 9 9
Officer
Officer 2 Officer 9
Booking Officer 1 9
Officer
Officer 3 Officer 9
Booking Officer 2 10
Officer
Officer 4 Officer 10
Booking Officer 3 10
Officer Officer
Officer 5 Booking Officer 4 10 10
Officer Officer
Officer 6 Booking Officer 5 11 11
Officer
Property Officer Officer 11
Officer 7 11
Officer Officer
Release Officer
Officer 8 11 12
Intake Intake
OFF OFF
Lieutenant 2 Relief Lieutenant LT LT Relief Relief Relief
LE LE
Officer 9 RDO 2001 Lobby Lobby BKG 1 BKG 1 BKG 2 OFF OFF
Officer 10 RDO 2002 BKG 3 BKG 4 BKG 4 OFF OFF BKG 2 BKG 3
117
APPENDIX F: SAMPLE POST ROSTER
Staff Name Post Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday
Officer 11 RDO 2003 Release OFF OFF BKG 5 BKG 5 Property Property
Officer 12 RDO 2004/RFM OFF Release Relief Relief Relief Relief OFF
Officer 13 RFM OFF OFF
Officer 14 RFM OFF OFF
Officer 15 RFM OFF OFF
118
APPENDIX F: SAMPLE POST ROSTER
Staff Name Post Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday
Captain
Captain OFF OFF
Intake/Transportation
Lieutenant 1 Lieutenant Intake LT 2 LT 2
Officer Officer
Officer 1
Law Enforcement Lobby 9 9
Officer
Officer 2 Officer 9
Booking Officer 1 9
Officer
Officer 3 Officer 9
Booking Officer 2 10
Officer
Officer 4 Officer 10
Booking Officer 3 10
Officer Officer
Officer 5 Booking Officer 4 10 10
Officer Officer
Officer 6 Booking Officer 5 11 11
Officer
Property Officer Officer 11
Officer 7 11
Officer Officer
Release Officer
Officer 8 11 12
Intake Intake
OFF OFF
Lieutenant 2 Relief Lieutenant LT LT Relief Relief Relief
LE LE
Officer 9 RDO 3001 Lobby Lobby BKG 1 BKG 1 BKG 2 OFF OFF
Officer 10 RDO 3002 BKG 3 BKG 4 BKG 4 OFF OFF BKG 2 BKG 3
119
APPENDIX F: SAMPLE POST ROSTER
Staff Name Post Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday
Officer 11 RDO 3003 Release OFF OFF BKG 5 BKG 5 Property Property
Officer 12 RDO 3004/RFM OFF Release Relief Relief Relief Relief OFF
Officer 13 RFM OFF OFF
Officer 14 RFM OFF OFF
Officer 15 RFM OFF OFF
120