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An analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for
Dam Failure (Case study: Gomit micro earth dam irrigation project; Ethiopia)
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
An analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for
Dam Failure (Case study: Gomit micro earth dam irrigation project; Ethiopia)
Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of civil and water resource engineering in partial fulfillment of
requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Hydraulics engineering
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
DECLARATION
I, the undersigned, declare that the thesis comprises my own work. In compliance with internationally accepted
practices, I have dually acknowledged and refereed all materials used in this work. I understand that non-
adherence to the principles of academic honesty and integrity, misrepresentation/ fabrication of any
idea/data/fact/source will constitute sufficient ground for disciplinary action by the university and can also
evoke penal action from the sources which have not been properly cited or acknowledged.
___________
Kassahun Dejen
__________
Date
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
An analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for
Dam Failure (Case study: Gomit micro earth dam irrigation project; Ethiopia)
________________________ ___________________
School Director
________________________ ___________________
Advisor
___________________ ___________________
External Examiner
________________________ ___________________
Internal Examiner
________________________ ___________________
Chairperson
July, 2015
Bahir Dar
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
Abstract
Accurate prediction of peak discharges due to embankment dam failure is essential to identifying and reducing
potential for loss of life and damage in the downstream floodplain. Because, when a dam fails the damage is certain,
but the extent of this damage cannot be evaluated in advance. The loss of life and property damage can vary
depending on flood area and population. In order to cope with embankment dam breaching and to take necessary
steps beforehand many researchers worked on parametric breach models based on Regression Analysis (RA) to
estimate the peak outflow from a breached embankment dam since 1970s. RA is a widely-used approach that could
provide acceptable results. Since, this approach bears restrictive assumptions, direct application of RA ignoring
these assumptions might cause pitfalls and biased calculations. In this study, it is shown that previous works
generated by RA gives biased calculations and a new alternative approach, based on Artificial Neural Networks
(ANN), is suggested in replacement of classical RA, which gives more accurate results according to both numerical
error criteria and scientific background.
Abstract: The one of the most dangerous conditions of earth dams for the upstream side slope is rapid
drawdown condition when the countervailing upstream water pressure has disappeared, it causes a danger to the
upstream slope. In this work, by applying the Morgenstern-Price presented by the computer program SLIDE
V.6.0 is applied to define the potential slip surface and calculate the factor of safety of zoned earth dams
(Mandali dam in Iraq) under rapid drawdown condition for maximum elevation with seismic forces effects. It
founded that the stability of the upstream slope of Mandali dam is dramatically decreased but still in stable
during rapid drawdown condition.
An analysis of dam failure models provides a scenario generating tool for identifying the resulting hazards.
Floodplain managers and emergency management personnel may then utilize the resulting contingencies to
protect against the loss of life and property damage. The Hydrologic Engineering Center’s River Analysis
System (HEC-RAS) can be used in concert with HEC-GeoRAS to develop a dam failure model. HEC-GeoRAS
is used to extract geometric information from a digital terrain model and then imported into HEC-RAS.
Unsteady-flow simulation of the dam break is performed using HEC-RAS and results are mapped using the
GIS. Inundation mapping of water surface profile results from dam failure models provides a preliminary
assessment of the flood hazard and provides insight for emergency preparedness. The process for gathering and
preparing data, creating an unsteady-flow model in HEC-RAS, entry of dam breach parameters, performing a
dam failure analysis, and mapping of the flood progression is discussed.
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
Acknowledgement
I would like to thank the almighty God and his beloved mother st. marry for helping to accomplish my study.
I want to express my sincere thanks to Bahir Dar University for giving the admission and Ethiopian road
authority (ERA) for financial support for the education as well as the whole study. Appreciation is also goes to
GIZ SLM and Bahir dar polytechnic college for covering all field work costs thought the accomplishment of the
field works.
I would like to express my appreciation to D.r Michael Meharie (PhD) (Bahir Dar University) for his scientific
advice and for his guidance to be familiar with HEC-RAS, HEC-GEORAS and GeoStudio software, valuable
suggestions and comments for the full accomplishment of my thesis work. My appreciation also goes to the
school of civil and water resource engineering instructors and lectures for their supporting and valuable
comments on the thesis works.
I want to thank to Amhara water resources development bureau and Amhara design and supervision bureau for
their willingness to give me all the data what I need for my thesis work. Thanks all of my friends for the
willingness to send some data’s and helps (specially: H/Geberial (Amhara water resources development
bureau).
At last but not least, my heart full appreciation goes to my father, mother, brothers, sisters and my beloved wife
Haymanot Azeze for their encouragement and moral support.
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------I
ACKNOWLEDGMENT ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------II
TABLE OF CONTENTS-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------III
LIST OF TABLES-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------V
LIST OF FIGURES-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------VI
LIST OF ACRONYMS------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------VII
LIST OF SYMBOLS--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------VIII
1. INTRODUCTION ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1
1.1 Gomit dam failure--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1
1.2 Statement of the problem------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1
1.3 Objectives of the study--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1
1.3.1 General objective----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1
1.3.2 Specific objectives--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------5
1.4 Research question--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------6
2: LITERATURE REVIEW OF DAM FAILURE ANALYSIS -----------------------------------------------------7
2.2.3 Permeability--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------12
2.2.4 Shear strength parameter-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------12
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
LIST OF TABLES
Table 2.1.Summary of LE methods---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------12
Table 2.2.Values of Effective Depth Based on Hydrometer and Sedimentation Cylinder of Specific Sizes----12
Table 2.3.Values of k for Use in Equation for Computing Diameter of Particle in Hydrometer Analysis------12
Table 2.4.Temperature Correction Factors CT---------------------------------------------------------------------------12
Table 2.5.Correction Factors a for Unit Weight of Solids--------------------------------------------------------------12
Table 2.6.Baseline recommended minimum acceptable factors of safety and load conditions-------------------12
Table 2.7.Selection of a minimum acceptable factor of safety and their extent of influence----------------------12
Figure 2.8.uncertainty estimates for breach parameters-----------------------------------------------------------------12
Table 2.9.the four major components of the potential hazard classification system used by USACE------------12
Table 3.1.Grain size material-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------12
Table 3.2.Grain size distribution of Gomit dam foundation material-------------------------------------------------12
Table 3.3.Proctor density test (moisture- density relationship) of shell------------------------------------------------12
Table 3.4. Proctor density test (moisture- density relationship) of core------------------------------------------------12
Table 3.5.soil index parameters----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------12
Table 3.6.permeability of foundation materials--------------------------------------------------------------------------12
Table 3.7 permeability of core materials----------------------------------------------------------------------------------12
Table 3.8.permeability of shell materials----------------------------------------------------------------------------------12
Table 3.9.Average Foundation materials Liquid Limit and Plastic Limit value-------------------------------------12
Table.3.10. Average Core materials Liquid Limit and Plastic Limit value--------------------------------------------12
Table 3.11.Average shell materials Liquid Limit and Plastic Limit value--------------------------------------------12
Table 3.12.foundation materials shear parameters-----------------------------------------------------------------------12
Table3.13.Core materials shear parameters------------------------------------------------------------------------------12
Table 3.14.specific gravity--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------12
Table 3.14.Coordinates Points of phreatic Lines of Homogeneous Dam---------------------------------------------12
Table 3.15.Coordinates Points of phreatic Lines of zoned dam--------------------------------------------------------12
Table 3.16.The material properties used for slope stability obtained from the laboratory--------------------------12
Table 3.17.variation of FOS of upstream dam slope with reservoir drawdown--------------------------------------12
Table 3.18.variation of FOS of upstream dam slope with reservoir drawdown--------------------------------------12
Table 3.19.Geotechnical and hydraulic data in each node of interest within the body of the earth dam --------12
Table 3.20.average pore water pressure------------------------------------------------------------------------------------12
Table 4.1.Daily heaviest rainfalls at Mekan-Eyesus metrological station--------------------------------------------12
Table 4.2.Computation of data consistency------------------------------------------------------------------------------12
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure1.2. Location Map of the study area-------------------------------------------------------------------------------12
Figure 2.1The forces considered in Morgenstern‐ Price method------------------------------------------------------12
Figure 2.2 Relationship of strength and water content------------------------------------------------------------------12
Figure 2.3 liquid limit flow curve ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------12
Figure 2.4 Embankment slopes--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------12
Figure 2.5 phearatic lines without drainage system-----------------------------------------------------------------------12
Figure 2.6 Phearatic line with horizontal filter---------------------------------------------------------------------------12
Figure 3.1 Location Map of the study area-------------------------------------------------------------------------------12
Figure 3.2 Topography of the Area----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------12
Figure 3.3 Gomit dam geological map-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------12
Figure 3.4.Downstream slope sliding of Gomit dam--------------------------------------------------------------------12
Figure 3.5.core sample from the body of the dam------------------------------------------------------------------------12
Figure 3.6.Shell matrials from the body of the dam---------------------------------------------------------------------12
Figure 3.7.block sample from the dam foundation-----------------------------------------------------------------------12
Figure-3.8: surveying data collection from the dam axis to the downstream------------------------------------------12
Figure 3.9.Gomit dam invetigation detail proces-------------------------------------------------------------------------12
Figure 3.10. Gomit dam break detail working proces-------------------------------------------------------------------12
Figure-3.11: weight-volum relationship------------------------------------------------------------------------------------12
Figure 3.12. Grain size curve of Gomit dam shell material--------------------------------------------------------------12
Figure 3.13. Grain size curve of Gomit dam foundation material-------------------------------------------------------12
Figure 3.14.Foundation materials Liquid Limit flow curve-------------------------------------------------------------12
Figure 3.15: core materials Liquid Limit flow curve---------------------------------------------------------------------12
Figure-3.16 shell materials Liquid Limit flow curve---------------------------------------------------------------------12
Figure-3.17: dam materials from the block sample to permeability head---------------------------------------------12
Figure-3.18: core materials compaction curve-----------------------------------------------------------------------------12
Figure 3.19. Shell materials compaction curve--------------------------------------------------------------------------12
Figure 3.20. Soil sampling from the block sample using shear box----------------------------------------------------12
Figure 3.21.Foundation failure envelop-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------12
Figure 3.22. Core failure envelop--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------12
Figure.3.23.Simplified Sketch for Possible Failure Mechanism of D/S Embankment------------------------------12
Figure 3.24.Sliding surface during maintenance-------------------------------------------------------------------------12
Figure 3.25. Ground water in the dam foundation ------------------------------------------------------------------------12
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
ASTM
LIST OF SYMBOLS
a Cross-sectional area of standpipe (burette) -----------------------------------------------------------------------
A Cross-sectional area of soil specimen------------------------------------------------------------------------------
a the distance of intersecting point of phearatic line with downstream slope of the dam toe--------------------
av the coefficient of compressibility------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
B hydrometer reading of reference mixture of dispersing agent and distilled water ---------------------
Bave average breach width --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C cohesion------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C’ effective cohesion-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cb coeffient which is the function of reservoir size---------------------------------------------------------------------
CNIII antecedent moisture condition III---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
D diameter of solid particle--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
D Rain fall excess duration---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
d the distance between A & D from figure 2.5-------------------------------------------------------------------------
D 10 the diameter corresponding the percentage finer than 10% ---------------------------------------------------
D15 (F) diameter through which 15% of filter material will pass---------------------------------------------------
D15(S) diameter through which 15% of soil to be protected will pass---------------------------------------------
D60 the diameter corresponding the percentage finer than 60%------------------------------------------------------
D85(S) diameter through which 85% of soil to be protected will pass dam break-------------------------------
e the void ratio. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
eo the initial void ratio-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
f (x) = interslice force function that varies continuously along the slip surface-------------------------------------
F200 % finer of #200 sieves as a percent-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
P= Calculate percent--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PA= Adjusted percent--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Q Direct runoff----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
The Gomit M.E.D. irrigation project is one of the identified irrigation projects in Este Woreda of South - Gondar
administrative zone. It was designed and constructed by Commission for Sustainable Agricultural and
Environmental Rehabilitation in Amhara Region (Co-SAERAR) in 1994 and 1996 G.C respectively. It is a
strong project to be constructed on the river Gomit to irrigate 90ha of agricultural land by impounding the flood
for dry season irrigation. The Gomit M.E.D irrigation project is situated between valley gorges having wider
reservoir area and agricultural land. The catchment area is 23.43km2 which is largely cultivated and highly
exposed to severe erosion hazard. A cutoff trench is excavated up to the sand bedrock and keyed into the bedrock
so as to improve the water tightness of the foundation. Gomit micro earth dam have a section with outer
upstream slope of 1V:2H and downstream slope of 1V:2H and impervious core of slope 1V:1 H on both sides. A
core and shell top width of 2m and 4m respectively. Consequently, the width of the base of the core and shell, at
river bottom level (EL 2350.36m), was approximately 26 m and 45m.
The history of water retention structures for different purpose coexists with the history of their failures. Around
the world thousands of dams have been constructed over many centuries. But also, hundreds of dams have failed
every year. When dams fail, property damage is certain, but loss of life can vary dramatically with the extent of
the inundation area, the size of the population at risk, and the amount of warning time available .Nowadays there
are more than 800,000 dams constructed around the world for different purposes: flood control (the most
common purpose), irrigation, electricity generation, water supply, recreation, etc.While planning and
implementing dams, taking a good care of their safety is currently becoming an important issue since lots of
dams have been breached out in history in different corners of the world and have resulted in a catastrophic
damage to human lives, property and the environment. In the world the worst dam disaster occurred in Henan
province in China, in August 1975, when the Banqiao Dam and the Shimantan Dam failed catastrophically due
to the overtopping caused by torrential rains. Approximately 85,000 people died from flooding and many more
died during subsequent epidemics and starvation; millions of residents lost their homes.
Costa (1985) reports that sixty percent of more than 11,100 fatalities associated with all dam failures worldwide
have occurred in just three failures: Vaiont, Italy, 1963 (2,600 dead); Johnstown Dam, Pennsylvania, 1889
(2,200 dead) and Machhu II, India, 1974 (2,000+ dead). In each of these cases, large populations were given
little or no warning.
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
Slope stability is an important aspect of geotechnical engineering. The factor of safety obtained using a limit
equilibrium method and estimation of flow quantities due to steady state needed to evaluate the dam stability.
One of the primary focuses of this research was to analyze the slope stability and seepage of the Gomit dam
under different loading conditions and to investigate the causes of downstream sliding of slope of the Gomit
MED. Slope stability and seepage analysis using computers are easy task for engineers when the slope
configuration and the soil parameters are known. However, the selection of the slope stability method is not an
easy task and the field conditions should be collected and the failure observations in order to understand the
failure mechanism, which determines the slope stability method that should be used in the analysis. Therefore,
the theoretical background of each slope stability method should be investigated in order to analyze the slope
failure and assess the reliability of the results. GeoStudio software is one of the popular geotechnical programs
based on the finite element and can consider the analysis like seepage, slope stability. In this research, seepage
analysis in Gomit earth dam has been done by Seep/W software in order to evaluate flow quantity, determine the
phreatic surface through the cross-section of the dam. Slope/W software is used under different conditions to
evaluate slope stability of the dam. Analyses for each state and each slope with Morgenstern-Price method are
calculated the minimum safety factor in each of these methods and considered as a safety factor of slope
stability.
Laboratory tests on Gomit construction materials are carried out to determine its physical and mechanical
properties. ASTM D422 for sieve analysis and hydrometer analysis, ASTM D2216 for natural moisture content,
ASTM D4318 for Atterberg limits, ASTM D3080 for shear strength parameter and ASTM D1557 modified
compaction were used to determine the soil properties and strength of the Gomit earth dam
The use of geographic information systems (GIS) and has become more mainstream and data have become more
readily available. In particular, the availability of terrain data has improved the proficiency with which skilled
engineers can develop hydraulic models capable of simulating a dam breach scenario and evaluating the resultant
flood wave.The use of HEC-RAS in modeling dam failure scenarios and HEC-GeoRAS in model development
and analysis of the downstream flooded area using a GIS.
This research is expected to contribute some useful information to Gomit Dam administrating body regarding to
dam safety issues that should be considered, precautions to bear in mind while implementing infrastructures on
downstream areas and input data in preparing EAP. Moreover, designers, consultants and contractors engaged on
dam works may gain an input data for their work.
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
Agricultural land
Gomit River
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
Loss of impounded water that has been accumulated for years and could irrigate an enormous area of
land.
Inundation of downstream area causing loss of human life and property.
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
Ff = -------------------------------------------------------------Eq.2.2
Fm = -----------------------------------------------------------------------------Eq.2.3
In summary, M‐PM
• considers both interslice forces and shear forces
• assumes a interslice force function, f(x),
• allows selection for interslice force function,
• computes FOS for both force and moment equilibrium.
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
They are calibrated for soils that have a specific gravity of 2.65, for soils of other specific gravities a correction
must be made (Das and Sobhan, 2014). By knowing the amount of soil in suspension, L and t, we can calculate
the percentage of soil by weight finer than a given diameter.
Usually for simplicity, it is assumed that all the soil particles are spheres and that the velocity of soil particles
can be expressed by Stroke’s law according to which (Das and Sobhan, 2014).
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
V= *D2------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ (2.4)
Where:
v=Velocity,
D=diameter of solid particle
S Density of soil particles
w density of water
viscosity
Thus from equation 1,
η η
D= = ------------------------------------------------------------------------ (2.5)
Where v= Distance/time=L/t
Note that S G S
Thus combining equation 2.1 and 2.2 gives:
D= = ------------------------------------------------------------------------ (2.6)
D= = ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ (2.7)
D= ------------------------------------------------------------------------- (2.8)
So that:
K= -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------2.9)
D =K --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (2.10)
Where:
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
Table 2.2: Values of Effective Depth Based on Hydrometer and Sedimentation Cylinder of Specific Sizes
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
Where:
Table 2.3: Values of k for Use in Equation for Computing Diameter of Particle in Hydrometer Analysis
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
Temperature factor CT
oC
15 1.10
16 -0.90
17 -0.70
18 -0.50
19 -0.30
20 0.00
21 +0.20
22 +0.40
23 +0.70
24 +1.00
25 +1.30
26 +1.65
27 +2.00
28 +2.50
29 +3.05
30 +3.80
Table 2.4: Temperature Correction Factors CT
2.85 0.96
2.80 0.97
2.75 0.98
2.70 0.99
2.65 1.00
2.60 1.01
2.55 1.02
2.50 1.04
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
2.2.3 Permeability
Hydraulic conductivity of soil is a measure of the ability to transmit water when submitted to a hydraulic
gradient. The coefficient of permeability (k) represents the soil’s ability to transmit and drain water. This, in turn,
indicates the ability of the soil to change Matric suction as a result of environmental changes (Fredlund and
Rahardjo, 1993).Water coefficient of permeability of saturated soil is a function of void ratio (e) only. For
unsaturated soil, the water coefficient of permeability is a function of void ratio (e) and volumetric water content
(θ). This relationship is commonly expressed by a suction-dependent hydraulic conductivity function. In
unsaturated soils it is essential to know that the hydraulic conductivity is a function of water content, θ, or pressure
head, K(h), (van Genuchten, 1999)) for many problems linking water flow and solute transport.
2.2.4 Shear strength parameter
The shears strength f a soil mass is the internal resistance per unit area that the soil mass can offer to resist failure
and sliding along any plane inside it. One must understand the nature of shearing resistance in order to analyze
soil stability problems such as bearing capacity, slope stability, and lateral pressure on earth retaining structures.
Mohr (1900) presented a theory for rupture in materials that contended that a material fails because of a critical
combination of normal stress and shearing stress not from either maximum normal or shear stress alone. Thus,
the functional relationship between normal stress and shear stress on a failure plane can be expressed in the
followings form:
τf = f (σ) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (2.12)
For most soil mechanics problems, it is sufficient to approximate the shear stress on the failure plane as a linear
function of the normal stress (Coulomb. 1776). This linear function can be written as:
τf = σ tan ø +C--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (2.13)
ø = tan-1(slope) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ (2.14)
Where:
C: cohesion
Ø: angle of internal friction
σ: normal stress on the failure plane
τf: shear strength
Shear strength parameters cohesion (C) and angle of internal friction (Ø) usually determined in the laboratory
from the ASTM D 3080 - Standard Test Method for Direct Shear Test.
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
Slope stability is based on the interplay between two types of forces, driving forces and resisting forces. Driving
forces promote down slope movement of material, whereas resisting forces deter movement. So, when driving
forces overcome resisting forces, the slope is unstable and results in mass wasting. The main driving force in
most land movements is gravity. The main resisting force is the material's shear strength.
Slope angle, climate, slope material, and water contribute to the effect of gravity. Mass movement occurs much
more frequently on steep slopes than on shallow slopes. Water plays a key role in producing slope failure. In the
form of rivers and wave action, water erodes the base of slopes, removing support, which increases driving
forces. Water can also increase the driving force by loading, i.e., adding to the total mass that is subjected to the
force of gravity. An increase in water also contributes to driving forces that result in slope failure. The weight
(load) on the slope increases when water fills previously empty pore spaces and fractures. The shear strength of
the slope material is decreased by increasing the pore water pressure (pressure that develops in pore spaces due
to the increased amount of water).
Resisting forces act oppositely of driving forces. The resistance to down slope movement is dependent on
the shear strength of the slope material. And shear strength is a function of cohesion (ability of particles to
attract and hold each other together) and internal friction (friction between grains within a material) (Keller,
2000).
The stability of an embankment slope depend on the height of the slope (H), slope angle (β) and the shear
strength parameters such as cohesion (C) and the friction angle (φ). Among these three parameters, the height
and the slope angle reduces the stability with respect to increased amount but, increasing shear strength
parameters giving a more stable slope(Sivakugan and Das 2009).
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
Table 2.6 Baseline recommended minimum acceptable factors of safety and load conditions.
These factors of safety apply to design of new high consequence of failure dams, on high strength foundations,
with low permeability zones constructed of soil which is not strain weakening, using reasonably conservative
shear strengths and pore pressures developed from extensive geotechnical investigations of borrow areas,
laboratory testing and analysis of the results and using the methods of analysis detailed above. It is assumed
there will be monitoring of deformations by surface settlement points during construction.
Table 2.7 Selection of a minimum acceptable factor of safety and their extent of influence
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
The designing and construction of an Earth fill dam is one of the key challenging in the field of Geotechnical
engineering, because of the nature of the varying foundation condition and the range of properties of the material
available for construction (U.S. Army corps engineers 2004). The major advantages of the earth fill dams are
easily adapting to the foundation and accommodate even in difficult site condition. The most common and basic
earth fill dams are known as homogeneous. (Jansen et al. 1988). However, at present designing of earth fill dam
with relatively impervious core is increased for the purpose of controlling seepage through the dam (Jansen et al.
1988).
The failure mode of an embankment dam is directly connected with the type of cause of failure and the type of
the dam. Biswas and Chatterjee (1971) and (Singh 1996b) examined the case of 300 dam failure and they have
concluded that the 35% of the worlds dam failure is caused by the direct overflow. Other 25% of failure is
caused because of foundation problems such as excessive seepage, abnormal increases of pore-pressure and
internal erosion. Improper design and construction caused the remaining 40% of the failure.
Failure of an embankment dam can result from instability of either the upstream or downstream slopes. The
failure surface may lie within the embankment or may pass through the embankment and the foundation soil.
The critical stages in an upstream slope are at the end of construction and during rapid drawdown. The critical
stages for the downstream slope are at the end of construction and during steady seepage when the reservoir is
full.
2.4.1Overtopping is one of the most common failure modes for earth fill dams. It can be triggered by inflows
higher than the design inflow, malfunctioning or a mistake in the operation of the spillway or outlet structure,
inadequate carrying capacity of spillways, settlement of the dam or as a result of landslides into the reservoir.
The overtopping flow can be computed by the broad crested weir equation:
1.5
q = CH ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (2.15)
Where:
q - Flow over the dam per unit length of the dam.
C - Weir coefficient with a value of 2.6 for broad crested and 3.2 for sharp crested
H - Head over the crest
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
Generally, Piping failure is a failure mode caused by water penetrating through the dam's body, carrying with it
small particles of dam material, continuously widening the gap. If the initial piping can be detected before it
reaches the critical condition, remedy might be possible. Penetration of water in the dam body can cause slope
failure. To prevent this type of failure, appropriate instrumentation is needed to estimate the rate of infiltration
within an embankment. Flow through the pipe is computed by the orifice formula;
Q = CdA -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------2.16
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
Where:
Cd - coefficient of discharge with value 0.5- 0.6 for inefficient pipe entrance
Seepage failure or foundation failure occurs due to the saturation of the foundation material leading to either
washout of the material or a weakening of the rock towards a sliding failure. The flow of water through a
pervious foundation produces seepage forces as a result of the friction between the percolating water and the
walls of the pores of the soil through which it flows.
(i) Dam Body
Piping is the progressive backward erosion staring from the exit point and subsequent removal of the soil from
within the body of the dam, occurs when the seepage force is very large and concentrated flows take place, and
form pipe-like conduit inside the dam and the hydraulic gradient further increase. The process continues and
ultimately a pipe like conduit is formed and rush of water and soil occurs leading to piping [Arora, K.R1996].
(ii) Dam Foundation
Foundation failures are not uncommon among earth fill structures, where a weak layer of soil or rock exists at
shallow depth in the foundation below the structure, movement along the a failure plane will occur if the earth
fill loading produces stresses in excess of the shear strength of the soil in the weak layer[www.des.nh.gov].
Piping in the foundation occurs when the rate of pressure drop (i.e. hydraulic gradient) resulting from seepage
through the soil particle exceeds the resistance of the soil particle, and also occur when there are pockets of loose
soil in the foundation failure .
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
It has been implicated that seepage plays a major role on dam failures due to its potential to cause endogenous
rather than exogenous eruption of soil mass (Cedergen, 1989), as well as slope instability and failure (Sachpazis,
2013); hence embankment dams and especially earth fill dams require seepage control (Fell, 1992; Fredlund et
al, 1994). Many researches indicated that failure of embankment dams due to seepage alone stands for about
25% of the total failure cases, apart from overtopping, piping, internal erosion, etc (Singh, 1995).
Studying the causes of destruction in 200 destroyed embankment dam around the world, we conclude that 25
percent of destructions have been due to wash out of the fine granules of the body or the dam foundation (Foster
and Fell 1999).Some seepage is inevitable through all earth dams. If the seepage is suitably controlled, it doesn’t
cause any harm other than loss of some water. However, if the seepage is uncontrolled and concentrated, it may
lead to piping and the subsequent failure of the earth dam .
Earth dams should be designed to utilize available material to the best advantage and to conform to actual
conditions at site. Sherard et al. (1963 a) say,”…the characteristics of the particular site have a great influence on
the design of an earth dam than they do on many other engineering structure”. Detail design sometimes will be
influenced heavily by the strengths of foundation and construction materials, but the basic features are usually
ditched by seepage considerations .
The following criteria are commonly accepted for safe design of embankment dams
1) There should be no risk of overtopping of the dam section. The most important aspect of this criterion is
estimation of the design flood and provisions of adequate spillway capacity to pass that flood with require net
freeboard to protect the dam crest against wave splash.
2) The seepage line should be well within the downstream face of the dam section. If the dam section is
homogeneous and no drainage arrangements are made, any seepage is going to emerge on the downstream face.
This results in 'sloughing' or softening of the d/s face and may lead to local toe failure, which may progressively
develop upwards. This can be safeguarded against by providing a free drainage zone on the d/s face or by
intercepting the seepage inside the dam section by internal drainage.
3) There should be no possibility of 'piping' through the embankment or the foundations. In the dam section the
main protection against piping is provided by filters or transition zones which prevent migration of soil particles
with seepage water.
4) There should be no opportunity for free flow of water from the u/s and d/s face. Free flow implies flow of
water under pressure through a continuous crack or passage and not seepage flow through soil pores. Once a
concentrated leak starts, it rapidly enlarges and is almost impossible to stop. Hence it is essential that every
precaution be taken against leakage to ensure the safety of the dam.
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
5) The u/s and d/s slopes of the dam should be stable and safe against sliding under the most critical conditions
to which they might be subjected. At the end of construction, there may be high residual pore pressures in the
impervious zone of the dam, a condition which may be critical for both faces, especially for dams with thick
cores rapidly constructed.
6) The u/s face will be subject to wave action from the reservoir. It has to protect by some kind of protective
layer, the preferred choice being dumped rock riprap or stone pitching .The d/s face, if of erodible material,
needs protection against rainfall.
7) The embankment, foundation, and abutments must be stable under all conditions of construction and reservoir
operation including seismic.
8) Freeboard must be sufficient to prevent overtopping by waves and include an allowance settlement of the
foundation and embankment as well as for seismic effects where applicable (U.S Army Corps of Engineers,
1993).
Selecting the appropriate material for each zone and ensuring proper construction will provide control of normal
seepage as well as leakage arising from distortion of the fill or from foundation displacement. The character of
the materials comprising the foundation and the embankment of earth dam has a very important influence on
seepage and its effect (Bharat S. & R.S Vershney, 1995).
2.4.2.1 Estimation of seepage
The methods used to quantify the expected amount of seepage through the embankment dams are analytical and
computer approach.
a) Analytical approach of seepage analysis.
Several Analytical solutions are practiced in order to determine the quantity of seepage through earth dam resting
on an impervious base.
a.1) Schaffernak solution
The quantity of seepage through a unit length at right angles to the cross-section can be given by Darcy’s law as
q =kiA---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (2.17)
Dupuit’s assumed that the hydraulic gradient i is equal to the slope of the free surface and is constant with depth,
i.e. i=
For calculation of seepage through a homogeneous earth dam, Schaffernak (2.18) proposed that the phreatic
surface will be following line A &D shown in Figure 2.5, i.e., it will intersect the downstream slope at a distance
a from the impervious base. As per Dupuit’s assumption, the hydraulic gradient is given by i= =tan
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
For fully saturated condition under continuous flow of water by seepage (2.19) which gives an estimate of the
distance of intersecting point of phearatic line with downstream slope of the dam toe (a).this is express as
a= - ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (2.19)
Where:
a = the distance of intersecting point of phearatic line with downstream slope of the dam toe
d= the distance between A & D from figure 2.7
h= the upstream water level
= downstream slope angle of the dam
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
+ +Q = 0------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ (3.24)
Changes in volumetric water content are dependent on changes in the stress state and the properties of the soil.
The stress state for both saturated and unsaturated conditions can be described by two state variables (see
Fredlund and Morgenstern, 1976 and Fredlund and Morgenstern, 1977).
c) Flow Net Analysis
Seepage flow through a homogeneous isotropic medium under steady state conditions is described by the
Laplacian equation. Combining the well known equations, i.e. continuity equation for steady state and Darcy’s
equations and for the case of isotropic soil, the permeability coefficient is independent of direction (Craig, 2004).
Thus, kx = KY = k and an equation is produced, known as the Laplace’s equation:
= 0----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (3.25)
According to Casagrande (Casagrande, 1940), the following rules should be obeyed in drawing flow nets:
Flow lines and equipotential should always be perpendicular to each other, in a homogeneous isotropic
system, and form curvilinear “squares”.
Flow lines should always be parallel to an impermeable boundary, and equipotential lines are always
perpendicular to it.
Flow lines should always be perpendicular to a constant head boundary, and equipotential lines are
always parallel to it.
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
The Boldwin Hill dam in Los Angeles, California, was constructed on April 18, 1951.The dam was designed as a
homogeneous earth fill dam and it was 71m high and 195m long. The design was considered under drain systems
and a reservoir lining. The reservoir was in service continuously from July 1951 until failure on December 14,
1963 except for a short time in 1957 when it was drained.
Failure Sequence
On December 14, 1963, at about 11:15 A.M an unprecedented flow of water was heard in the spillway pipe at
the dam. The water came from drains under the reservoir lining. At approximately 1:00P.M, muddy leakage was
discovered d/s from east abutment of the dam. At 2:20 P.M., lowering of the reservoir water level revealed a 3ft
wide break in the reservoir’s inner lining. Futile attempt was made to plug the hole with sandbags and water
broke violently through the d/s face of the dam. By 5:00P.M. The reservoir had
Hydraulic Failure of Micro‐Embankment Dams and Remedial Measures emptied, revealing a crack in the lining
extending across the reservoir bottom in line with the breach in the dam.
In general, analysis and post failure measurements showed the fault plans being separated in the order of 6
to13mm. In some places, the opening had been enlarge by erosion, which could be attributed to rainwater
infiltration in years prior to construction, reservoir seepage in the period 1951-63, or out rush of water during the
failure.
Tatton Dam
The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation designed Teton Dam. It was a compacted, central core, Zoned, Earth and gravel
fill embankment. Its gross height was 126m and it was 950m long at the crest. Its total volume was about
7.65million cubic meter. The dam construction was completed on November 26, 1975.Teton Dam failed during
the morning of June 5, 1976. Failure occurred during first filling of the reservoir storage having begun on
October 3, 1975. At the time of failure, water depth above the original streambed was about 84m, which was
within 7m of max normal reservoir level. There was no obvious evidence of impending failure ten hours before
commencement of its final stage. Between 7:00A.M. On June 5, when initial damaging leaks were first seen in
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
the right groin of the dam, and noon of that day, total breaching and failure occurred, beginning with the
appearance of muddy springs in the right groin, followed quickly by piping through the embankment and ending
with collapse of the crest into the rapidly enlarged “pipe”.
Failure Sequence
On June 4, 1976, there was no evidence of appreciable leakage as late as 9:00 P.M. On
June 5, shortly after 7:00A.M., several individuals viewed from across the gap the appearance of small seepage
emerging at the downstream toe and about one-third the way up the right groin of the dam. By 7:30A.M., the
outflows were reported to appear muddy. Hydraulic Failure of Micro‐Embankment Dams and Remedial Measures
By 8:30A.M., the muddy flows had increased reportedly from 0.57 to 0.85m3/sec, coming from the right
abutment dam contact. By 10:30 A.M., the point of emergence of muddy leakage had progressed up the right
groin to a level about two-thirds the height of the dam. By 11:20A.M., a large hole had been washed out of the
face of the dam at the groin. In the next 30minuts, as a result of violent discharge and caving fill, the hole or
“tunnel” enlarged and progressed head ward to the crest. Five minutes later, the crest collapsed and breaching
was complete. By 6:00P.M., the reservoir was virtually empty, with an estimated peak outflow rate in excess of
28300 m3/sec.
Two principal engineering investigations of the failure were undertaken. Their considerations, in varying degree,
focused chiefly on the following potential causes:
1. Erosion of the underside of the core zone (zone 1) of brittle, erodible, compacted silt (loess) by excessive
leakage through or just over the grout curtain in the intensely jointed rhyolite, into which the right abutment
cutoff trench had been excavated.
2. Erosion of Zone 1 via transverse cracking of Zone 1 within the cutoff trench due to differential settlement
along the steep right abutment.
3. Erosion of zone 1 via hydraulic fracturing of zone 1 due to arching of zone 1 across the deep, steeply sided,
right abutment cutoff trench, such fracturing promoted by full reservoir pressure against the u/s face of the
cutoff-fill-to jointed-rhyolite contact.
Lower Baker Dam
Lower Baker Dam is a thick arch dam of 87m height. Shortly after its completion in
1924, seepage through the abutments was noticed. This increased in time, and the abutments were grouted using
asphalt in 1934. By 1960 seepage flow had again increased to undesirable amounts about 1.7 m3/sec. Asphalt
grouting followed by Portland cement Hydraulic Failure of Micro‐Embankment Dams and Remedial Measures
grouting in 1960 reduced leakage to 0.11 m3/sec. Studies were made before grouting on possible means of
reducing flow, such as blanketing or blocking entries with gravel.
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
These studies were inconclusive. Leakage again increased with time, and by 1982 was about 3.4 m3/sec. The
abutments were again grouted in late 1982 and early 1983. The work was competed using asphalt, reducing total
leakage to about 0.28 to 0.34 m3/sec, a 90% reduction [Advanced Dam Engineering, 1988].
2.5 Dam Break Analyses
The primary tasks in dam break analysis are predicting the out flow hydrograph and routing the flood through
the downstream river channel and flood plain. To predict the outflow hydrograph the parameters of the breach
through which the reservoir water escapes have to be determined initially.
2.5.1 Breach Parameter Estimation
Estimation of dam breach parameters is a necessary first step in performing the analysis of the downstream
consequences of possible dam failures. These parameters are used to compute breach outflow hydrographs using
estimated inflow hydrographs, reservoir elevation-capacity data and. A trapezoidal breach growing with time
was assumed.
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
2.5.1.1 Froehlich(1995a)
Froehlich(1995a) utilized 63 earthen,zoned earthen,earthen with a core wall(i.e clay) and rock fill data sets to
develop as a set of equations to predict average width,side slopes, and failure time.The data that Froehlich(1995a)
used for his regeression analysis had the following ranges:
Height of the dam:3.66-92.96meters(with 90% < 30meters, and 76% < 15meters)
Volume of water at time:0.013-660.0m3x106 (with 87% < 25.0m3x106, and 76% < 15.0m3x106)
Froehlich’s regression equation for average breach width and failure time are:
Bave = 0.1803kovw0.32 hb0.19----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (3.26)
tf = 0.00254vw0.53 hb-0.9----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (3.27)
Where:
Bave = average breach width(m)
Ko=constant(1.4for overtopping failure,1.0for piping)
Vw= reservoir volume at time of failure (m3)
Hb= height of the final breach(m)
tf = breach formation time(hrs)
Froehlich 1995a states that the average side slopes should be:
1.4H:1V overtopping failures
0.9H:1V otherwise(i.e piping/seepage)
2.5.1.2 Froehlich(2008)
In 2008,Dr. Froehlich update his breach equations based on the addition of new data. In 2008,Dr. Froehlich
utilized 74 earthen,zoned earthen,earthen with a core wall(i.e clay) and rock fill data sets to develop as a set of
equations to predict average width,side slopes, and failure time.The data that Froehlich(2008) used for his
regeression analysis had the following ranges:
Height of the dam:3.05-92.96meters(with 93% < 30meters, and 81% < 15meters)
Volume of water at time:0.0139-660.0m3x106 (with 86% < 25.0m3x106, and 82% < 15.0m3x106)
Froehlich’s regression equation for average breach width and failure time are:
Bave = 0.27kovw0.32 hb0.04----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (3.28)
Where:
Bave = average breach width(m)
Ko=constant(1.3 for overtopping failure,1.0for piping)
Vw=reservoir volume at time of failure (m3)
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
The following is MacDonald and Langridge-Monopolis(1984) equation for volume of materials eroded and
breach formation time, as reported by wahl(1998):
Veroded =0.0261(Vout*hw)0.769----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (3.31)
t = 0.364
f 0.0179(Veroded) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (3.32)
where:
V
eroded =
volume of materials eroded from the dam embankments(m3)
Vout= volume of water that passes through the breach (m3):for example storage volume at the time of breach pluse
volume of inflow after breach begins,minus any spillway and gate flow after breach begins
hw=depth of water above the bottom of breach(m)
tf = breach formation time(hrs)
MacDonald and Langridge-Monopolis stated that the breach should be trapezoidal with side slope of 0.5:1v.
the base width of the breach can be computed from the dam geometry with the following equation(state of
washington 1992):
wb = ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (3.33)
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
The Von thun and gillette equation for average breach width is:
Bave=2.5hw+cb----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (3.34)
Where:
wb=bottom width of the breach(m)
hb =depth of water above the bottom of breach(m)
Cb =coeffient which is the function of reservoir size
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
+ -q1=0----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (3.38)
Where:
At = the transverse area at a point in the reservoir.
t = time
Q = discharge
x = stream wise distance
ql = unit lateral inflow
And reduces to the discrete form:
O=I- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (3.39)
Where:
I = average reservoir inflow over the time step, Δt.
O = average reservoir outflow over the time step, Δt.
∆S= the increase (+) or decrease (-) of the reservoir storage over the time step.
∆t= the time step interval.
To apply this to reservoir routing, the continuity equation must be coupled with a function that describes the
relationship between storage and outflow. Specifically for dam breach modeling, this relationship can be
expressed as the outflow discharge for a given stage in the reservoir using either the weir equation for
overtopping failures or the orifice equation for piping failures.
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
The primary factors affecting the routing properties of a dam breach drawdown are the reservoir length, the dam
height, the breach development time, and the breach width. The four independent variables were combined into a
Compaction Factor, which measures the “Compactness” of a reservoir, and a Translation Factor, which measures
the rate at which water can replenish the drawdown effect.
The Compactness Factor, Fc, is simply the ratio of the dam height (H) to the reservoir length (L). The longer and
shallower the reservoir, the lower the Compactness Factor and the more the reservoir acts like a river during its
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
drawdown. Thus dynamic routing would be more appropriate in this situation. Short, relatively deep reservoirs
are more compact, have a larger Fc value, and can be adequately described using a level pool analysis.
Fc=H/L---------------------------------------------------------------Eq.2.40
Where:
Fc = reservoir compaction factors
H=breach height
L= Reservoir Length
The Translation Factor, Ft, describes the relationship between the speed of the breach development and the
ability of the reservoir to supply water to replace the water leaving through the breach. The easier the reservoir
can deliver water to the breach, the more it can be described by a level pool analysis. Fast breach developments
and long reservoirs are more appropriate to be modeled by dynamic routing. The Translation Factor is computed
as:
Ft = ct/L---------------------------------------------------------------Eq.2.41
Where:
Ft=reservoir translation factor
T=failure time
c = water wave celerity =
A third parameter is Drawdown Number. The Drawdown Number, Dn, is defined as the product of the
Translation Factor and the Compactness Factor.
Dn=Fc*Ft
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
Figure 2.12.Drawdown Number for Dynamic vs. Level Pool Reservoir Routing
From the envelope curve the data points which are 5% threshold Drawdown Number is shown to be 0.41 or
greater will produce peak outflow results within 5% of a dynamic routing simulation. That means that a reservoir
with a Drawdown Number of 0.41which is level pool routing would be appropriate to model the dam failure.
The following examples illustrate World Experience the effectiveness of the two techniques.
Taum Sauk Dam failed in 2005; Oroville and Fort Randall Dams have never failed. The Taum Sauk Reservoir
was impounded by a rim dam in Southeast Missouri. It failed in 2005 due to a malfunction of the reservoir
control software (Figure 2).Subsequently; it was the subject of dam breach analyses.
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
The height of the rim dam was about 28 meters.The maximum flow path lengths in the reservoir of 820 meters.
This result in a Compactness Factor of Fc = H/L = 0.034. Taum Sauk’s reservoir depth was relatively consistent
throughout, so for the computation of the average wave celerity, the maximum depth of 28 meters was used. The
failure time of the rim dam was known to be about 0.5 hours (1800 seconds). This produced a Translation Factor
of Ft = ct/L = 36.4. The Drawdown Number is then computed to be 1.24, which yields a peak dam breach flow
difference of about 3% (from Figure 2.131). Thus, level pool routing would be appropriate to model the Taum
Sauk failure.
Oroville Dam in Northern California is the highest dam in the United States at about 230 meters. Figure 2.14
shows an aerial view of Lake Oroville. It’s long extended tributary reaches suggest this reservoir’s dam breach
drawdown might be better modeled with dynamic reservoir routing. However, because of the height of the dam
and the associated long breach development times, it is unclear whether dynamic routing would be necessary.
Lake Oroville’s preferred flow path length is about 15 kilometers, measured from the dam up the north tributary.
Though the reservoir is very long, the Compactness Factor of 0.015 is in the same order of magnitude as
Taum Sauk, a much more visibly compact reservoir. Assuming a linear bed slope through the reservoir, the
average depth is 115 meters. This results in average wave celerity of 33.6 m/s. The extreme height of Oroville
Dam yields very long breach development times. A hypothetical breach development time of 3.5 hours (12,600
seconds) was computed using Von Thun and Gillette’s equation for erosion resistant dams (Von Thun and
Gillette, 1990). This provides a Translation Factor of 28.22. The resulting Drawdown Number, Dn = 0.42. From
the envelope curve presented in Figure 1, this is very close to the 5% threshold mark. A level pool drawdown
analysis is probably warranted in this case.
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
Fort Randall Dam in South Dakota impounds a completely different type of reservoir than the previous two
examples. Figure 2.15 shows the riverine characteristics of Lake Francis Case, suggesting its dam breach
drawdown would be better modeled with dynamic reservoir routing.
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
located in a heavy residential or commercial area and at least one fatality is expected as a result of a dam breach,
a high hazard classification is assigned. If loss of life in the downstream area is uncertain or is not expected, a
significant hazard and a low hazard rating are assigned, respectively.
Property losses are evaluated based on direct and indirect losses experienced by the downstream population.
Direct losses include property damaged by the flood wave whereas indirect losses include loss of services
provided by the damaged dam or other damaged downstream infrastructure such as loss of power or water.
Loss of lifelines includes inaccessible bridges or roads and disruption of major medical facilities. If disruption
of or loss of access to essential or critical facilities is expected, a significant or high hazard rating is assigned.
Otherwise, if such facilities experience cosmetic damage that is rapidly repairable, a low hazard rating is
assigned instead. Environmental losses resulting from a dam failure are also considered. If major or extensive
mitigation costs are incurred, the dam is classified as significant hazard and high hazard, respectively.
Property losses Private agricultural lands, Major public and private Extensive public and
equipment and isolated buildings facilities private facilities
Table 2.10 the four major components of the potential hazard classification system used by USACE
Warning and evacuation time can dramatically influence the loss of life from the dam failure. When establishing
hazard classifications, preparing emergency action plans, or designing early warning system, good estimates of
warning time are crucial. Warning time is the sum of breach initiation time, breach formation time, and flood
wave travel time from the dam to a population center. Case history based procedures developed by the bureau of
reclamation that the loss of life can vary from 0.02 percent of the population at risk when the warning time is 90
minutes to 50 percent of the population at risk when less than 15 minutes (Brown and Graham, 1988). Costa
(1985) reported that the average number of fatalities per dam failure is 19 times greater when there is little to no
warning.
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
3.1.2Topography
Gomit micro embankment dams lay on the high land part of Ethiopia. The topography showed that, the left
abutment is flattered compared with the right and do not have saddle for spillway. The dam axis lay on across
the Gomit River. The topography of the study area has good land grading for surface.
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
3.1.4 Geology
According to the geological map of Ethiopia (scale 1:2,000,000) the area Along the dam axis about 10 test pit
have been dug on different places and depths from these pits different soil and rock formation with their
vertical and lateral extensions are investigated, geological cross section and pit logs are developed. On the
right part of the dam axis (abutment) test pits 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 have been dug and from these pits 1, 2 and 6
end on highly weathered and vesiculated treachy basalt rock and this rock shows saturation condition. While
3, r, and 5 ends on a thick black and brown clay soil and water strikes in these pits in an average depth of 4m
and the other pits (7, 8, 9 and 10) left abutment end on highly vesiculated and weathered treachy basalt rock.
The left part rock differs from the right part by its dry and hard condition. On the left part of the dam axis
there is joint sets whose orientation is about 700NW and located in b/n test pit 7 and 8 and this joint extends
especially u/s side in the reservoir area and the joint is closed type.
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
Reservoir
Catchments area=23.43km2
N.P.L = 2367.00 masl
M.W.L = 2369.36 masl
River bed level = 2350.36 masl
Full Reservoir level:236.86
Probable Maximum Flood: 104.1m3/sec.
SPILLWAY
Spillway type: ogee weir
Location: right end of the dam
Crest level:2367m
Spillway height = 0.7m
Peak discharge:63.3m3/sec
Crest length = 25m
Design head = 1.40m
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
44
Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
45
Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
Figure 3.9 surveying data collection from the dam axis to the downstream
46
Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
Soil sampling
Data collection
Laboratory work
Sieve and hydrometer analysis Compaction test
Lab. work
47
Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
Field Observation
and Data
Collection
Ok
HEC-GeoRAS
(Data
Preprocessing)
HEC-RAS (Dam
breach
modeling)
HEC-GeoRAS
(Flood Mapping)
Result and
Discussion
48
Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam 2015
Failure
A calibrated (ASTM D422) hydrometer was used to analyze the finer grains (d < 2 μm) in the laboratory.
Hydrometer analysis is based on the principle of sedimentation of soil particles in water. This test involves
the use of 50gm of dry, pulverized soil. A deflocculating agent is always added to soil. The most common
49
Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam 2015
Failure
deflocculating used for hydrometer analysis is 125cc to 4% solution of sodium hexametaphosphate. The
soil is allowed to soak for at least hours the deflocculating agent. After soaking period, distilled water is
added, and the soil deflocculating agent mixture is thoroughly agitated. The sample is then transferred to a
100ml glass cylinder. More distilled water is added to the cylinder to fill it to the 1000ml mark, and then
the mixture is again thoroughly agitated. A hydrometer placed in the cylinder to measure the specific
gravity of the soil water suspension in the vicinity of the instrument bulbs, usually over 24-hours period.
Hydrometer are calibrated to show the amounts of soil that is still in suspension at any given time t.the
largest diameter of the soil particles still in suspension at a time can be determined by stokes’ law.
50
Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam 2015
Failure
120.00
100.00
80.00
% finer(%)
60.00
40.00
20.00
0.00
0.01 0.10 1.00 10.00 100.00
particle size D(mm)
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam 2015
Failure
110.00
100.00
90.00
80.00
Percent Finer,N(%)
70.00
60.00
50.00
40.00
30.00
20.00
10.00
0.00
0.001 0.01 0.1 1 10 100
Particle size, D(mm)
m= --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Eq.3.1
The volumetric water content, in the soil (also called the volume wetness or volume fraction of soil water)
represents the fraction of the total volume of soil that is occupied by the water contained in the soil. The
volumetric water content (θw) can be defined as follows:
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam 2015
Failure
Ɵw = ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Eq.3.2
Where:
Vw= Volume of water
Vt =total volume
Ɵw= volumetric water content
Ɵw = w --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Eq.3.3
Volumetric water content of the soil shell, core and foundation 0.41, 0.67and 0.87 respectively
The bulk density (ρb) of the soil samples was computed from the known volume of the Proctor cylinder
and the following relationship was used to compute the dry density (ρd):
ρd = -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Eq.3.4
compaction curve
1.38
1.35
Dry Density (gm/cc)
1.33
1.30
1.28
1.25
1.23
1.20
25 30 35 40 45
Moisture Content (%)
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam 2015
Failure
compaction curve
1.70
1.65
Dry Density (gm/cc)
1.60
1.55
1.50
1.45
1.40
10 15 20 25 30 35
Moisture Content (%)
8 40.18 1.27
OMC= 35.33 % MDD= 1.34 g/cc
The index parameters obtained from the laboratory tests are summarized in Table 3.5for the different soils.
Sample Moisture OMC dry density Degree of Density of Voids Volumetric water The bulk
content w (%) (ρd) g/cm3 saturation Grain ρs e (%) content Ɵw (%) density ρb
(%) S (%) (g/cm3) (g/cm3)
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam 2015
Failure
Figure 3.17 dam materials from the block sample to permeability head
K at test temp.
Time (sec) Head, h1(cm) (h1/h2) log(h1/h2) (cm/sec) K (Average) K210 (cm/sec)
3600 137 1.00439883 0.001906197 3.39011E-07 3.76776E-07 3.76625E-07
136.4
3600 137 1.00513573 0.002224711 3.95658E-07
136.3
3600 137 1.00513573 0.002224711 3.95658E-07
136.3
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam 2015
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K at test temp.
Time (sec) Head, h1(cm) (h1/h2) log(h1/h2) (cm/sec) K (Average) K210 (cm/sec)
3600 137 1.115635 0.0475222 8.45168E-06 4.79E-06 4.78831E-06
122.8
3600 137 1.040243 0.017134792 3.04737E-06
131.7
3600 137 1.037879 0.016146636 2.87163E-06
132
Table 3.9 Average Foundation materials Liquid Limit and Plastic Limit value
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam 2015
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Flow Curve
70
moisture content ( % )
60
50
40
30
10 100
No of blows
Table 3.10 Average Core materials Liquid Limit and Plastic Limit value
Flow Curve
100
90
moisture content ( % )
80
70
60
50
40
30
10 100
No of blows
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam 2015
Failure
Table 3.11 Average shell materials Liquid Limit and Plastic Limit value
Flow Curve
60
moisture content ( % )
50
40
30
10 100
No of blows
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam 2015
Failure
Figure 3.21 soil sampling from the block sample using shear box
Test No. Normal Normal Stress Proving Ring Proving Ring Shear Shear Stress Shear
Load (kg) (KN/m2) Reading Reading Force(KN) (KN/m2) Parameters
(division) (division)*5mm
failure envelope
y = 0.1302x + 13.579
Shear Stress,(KN/m2)
40
20
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110
Normal Stress,(KN/m2)
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam 2015
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Test No. Normal Normal Proving Proving Ring Shear Shear Stress Shear Parameters
Load Stress Ring Reading Force(KN) (KN/m2)
(kg) (KN/m2) Reading (division)*5mm
(division)
1 9 24.5 2 10 0.06 15.97 C = 11.18KN/m2
0
2 18 49.05 4 20 0.12 31.94 Ø = 18
3 36 98.1 5.2 26 0.15 41.53
failure envelope
y = 0.3256x + 11.187
100
Shear Stress,(KN/m2)
80
60
40
20
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110
Normal Stress,(KN/m2)
Determination No. A B C A B C A B C
Pycnometer No. 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Mass of Pycnometer 46.98 35.62 35.32 46.79 35.46 35.32 46.79 35.46 35.32
Mass of dry soil, Ms, in g 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
Mass of Pycnometer + water + Soil, M1 152.00 143.82 143.32 151.88 143.49 146.69 152.59 143.78 143.17
in g
Mass of Pycnometer + Water, M2 in g 146.07 137.66 137.21 146.07 137.66 140.88 146.66 137.66 137.21
Test temperature T °C 24.50 23.90 23.90 24.50 23.90 23.90 24.50 23.90 23.90
Specific gravity of soil at test 2.457 2.604 2.571 2.387 2.398 2.387 2.457 2.577 2.475
temperature
GatT=Ms/(Ms+M2-M1)
Correction factor, K 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06
Specific gravity of soil at 20 ° C = GatT K 2.60 2.76 2.72 2.53 2.54 2.53 2.60 2.73 2.62
Average Specific gravity of soil at 20° C 2.70 2.53 2.65
Table 3.14 specific gravity
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam 2015
Failure
γ=γw -------------------------------------------------------------------------------Eq.3.9
Where:
γw = the unit weight of water,
G = specific gravity,
S = the degree of saturation, and
e = the void ratio.
γs=unit weight of soil( KN/m3)
The unit weights of soil are 17.53, 17.7 and 19.78 foundation, core and shell respectively.
3.4 Assessment and Evaluation of the Case Study Area
Amhara design and supervision beauru concluded in its report (2005) that the downstream foundation
material which is black cotton clay soil is being saturated for long time by water coming from the reservoir
due to lack of sufficient embankment seepage control structures. This continued saturation of the black
cotton clay foundation soil that resulted in significant reduction of the shear strength of the soil, which in
turn brought about bearing capacity failure. Just following the foundation bearing capacity failure,
downstream portion of the embankment failed by sliding. This is the most likely cause of the embankment
failure.
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam 2015
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Figure 3.24 Simplified Sketches for Possible Failure Mechanism of D/S Embankment
As indicated above, the previous design did not consider sufficient embankment seepage control drainage
structure, like chimney drains. This normally results in some saturation of the downstream embankment
materials. This embankment saturation is intense at the central section where the water level is higher.
Even if it is not the major cause of failure, some degree of contribution is expected for the observed failure
from the embankment saturation due to lack of drainage provisions.
Although the suggested mechanism seemed conceivable, they had many drawbacks in describing the
initiation of failure. Moreover, Amhara design and supervision beauru did not consider the possibility of
structural failure caused by upstream failure due to sudden drawdown in the reservoir water level,
upstream and downstream slope failure due to formation of excessive pore pressure, seepage Failure due to
piping and sloughing of the embankment.
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam 2015
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam 2015
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3.5 Slope stability and seepage analysis of Gomit micro-earthen dam using different approaches
In this study the seepage and slope stability analysis is done in two ways (i) Analytical approach (ii)
Computer approach.
a) Analytical approach
The analytically the seepage analysis is calculated by using Darcy’s law phearatic line and flow net
analysis. This analytical approach is done based on the earthen dam details and with their material
properties.
b) Computer approach
In order to achieve the objectives of this study, Geo-studio software is used. The Geo-studio software is
mainly based on limit equilibrium method that can be used for evaluate the performance of dams. The
Geo-studio software is suitable for eight products. On this study we used only SLOPE/W and SEEP/W.
The product SLPOE/W is calculate the analysis of slope stability and pore-water pressure conditions, soil
properties, analysis of methods and loading conditions. Geo-studio software is mostly obtained in varies
civil engineering applications along with its problem analysis from considering other consideration. Now
days it’s widely used the particular usually are mostly intended for finite element analysis, slope stability,
seepage analysis so at some other applications.
3.5.1 Seepage analysis through the earth dam by analytically
The methods used to quantify the expected amount of seepage through the embankment are Darcy’s Law -
phreatic line and flow net.
3.5.1.1 Darcy’s Law -phreatic line
Even though Gomit MED is zoned type dam; the analysis of seepage at the design document is only for
homogeneous dam without filter drain. In our case this technique has been used to estimate the expected
quantity of seepage for two cases i.e. homogeneous and zoned dam without drainage system. The detail
analysis has been show below. The Permeability coefficient for Shell material, ks = 4.78331E-06 cm/sec
and Core material, kc= 2.25766E-07cm/sec was obtained from the laboratory (see table 3.7 and 3.8).
a) Homogeneous Dam
In the case of a homogeneous earth dam resting on an impervious foundation with no drainage filter, the
top flow line ends at some point on the downstream face of the dam; the focus of the base parabola in this
case happens to be the downstream toe of the dam itself as shown in Figure 2.7.Homogeneous dam
analysis has been carried without provision of drainage system. The permeability of the shell is 4.78331E-
07cm/sec. In this case the seepage line cuts the d/s faces and is going to emerge on the downstream face.
The point C is the point where the seepage line cut d/s faces of the dam at a distance of ‘a’ meter from the
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam 2015
Failure
toe. This results in 'sloughing ' or softening of the d/s face and may lead to local toe failure .Therefore this
point needs an exit Correction.
Based on the method of Schaffernak and Van Iterson the analytical solution for an angle < 300 is expressed
as it is shown below.
Base width of the dam(B) =89.4m
Upstream:
slope above the berm(2:1)
slope below the berm(2.5:1)
downstream:
slope above the berm(2:1)
slope below the berm(2.5:1)
The following are the steps in the graphical determination of the top flow line for a homogeneous dam
resting on an impervious foundation without filters:
1. Draw the earth dam section and upstream water level (H) to some convenient scale. Let Point-B is the
point on the upstream face coinciding with water level.
H =16.64m
2. Let M be the horizontal distance between point- B and upstream heel of the dam. Locate Point-A at a
distance of 0.3 times M from Point-B on the water surface. That is distance A-B is 0.3M
Distance (M) = (12.64*2+2.5*4) =35.28m
Distance (1- 2) =0.3*35.28=10.58m
3. Focus of the base parabola is located at the downstream toe of the dam, that is Point-D (distance D- A is
d). Select x-z reference axis with focus D as origin.
d =B- Distance (M) + Distance (A- B) =64.70m
4. Directrix of the parabola is at distance 2p from the focus D, where p is given by, p = – )
p= – =1.05m
5. Compute the x-ordinates of the Equation of basic parabola using the relation:
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam 2015
Failure
Every point on the parabola is equidistant from focus and directrix Therefore,
FA AB
Also,
FG= GE P=
Focus = F (0, 0)
Any point, A on the parabola is given by,
That is,
x= ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (Eq.3.10) or
x= = -1.05
The top most phearatic (flow) line is established form basic parabola equation of which is coordinates
from at F (0, 0) point in the AutoCAD (110.9699, -17.7028)
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam 2015
Failure
a= - = - = 16.4m
9. Finally the quantity of seepage flow through may be compute from the following equations,
For α β<300
q =Ks (tan α) (a sin α β)
Where, coefficient of permeability of shell Ks = 3.76625*10-09 m/sec
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam 2015
Failure
*
Figure 3.29 Phreatic Line at the Homogeneous Dam
b) Zoned Dam
The following are the steps in the graphical determination of the top flow line for a Zoned dam with filter:
In the case of zoned dam the phreatic line (Seepage line) is also determined using the principle of parabola
equation with certain modification at the upstream. As shown on fig 2.8, the distance of any point p (x, y)
on the parabola from its focus, F is the same as the distance of that point P (x, y) from a line called
directrix. Taking the focus (F) as the origin and located at d/s toe of the core. The equation of the parabola
can be written as:
x 2 y 2 = X +FD-----------------------------------------------------------------------------Eq.3.11
Where:
FD= the distance of the focus from the directrix called focal distance and is generally represented by S
x 2 y 2 = X+S------------------------------------------------------------------------Eq.3.12
If the horizontal distance between the already determined point A (AB= 0.3HB) and the focus (F) is taken
as b, then (b, H) represents the coordinate of the point A on the parabola.
b2 H 2 = b+S, H = 16.64m
S= b2 H 2 - b,
b= bottom width – HB +AB = 33.9m
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam 2015
Failure
Y=
( x S )2 x 2
y= ( x 2.78) 2 x 2 --------------------------------------------------------------Eq.3.13
=21.21
21.21>20
Seepage per unit width of the dam (q1)
q1 = KS
Where:
K= Permeability of core material =2.25766*10-9 m/sec.
S = 2.78m
q1 = 2.25766*10-9 m/sec.* 2.78cm = 6.2763 X 10-9 m3/s/ unit width of dam
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam 2015
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam 2015
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and 3-31. When visually the combination of total head contours and flow paths in SEEP/W look very
much like a flow net, the amount of flow in each channel will be approximately the same. Flow quantities
can be estimated from a flow net as the total head drop times the conductivity times a ratio of the number
of flow channels to the number of equipotential drops.
The total flow per unit length of cross-section:
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Eq.3.14
Where:
Nd = Number of equipotential drops
Nf = Number of flow channels
k = Coefficient of permeability, and
H = Net hydraulic head (i.e. the difference in total head between the first and last equipotential)
a) Homogenous dam
65
Homogeneous dam analysis has been carried without provision of drainage system. The permeability of
the shell material that has permeability of 4.78331 *10-8m/sec.In this case flow net diagram was made
60
using55 GeoStudio software (seep/w) and free hand sketch. Flow net diagram for homogeneous dam is
shown
50 in Fig-3.30 and have 4 flows channel (Nf) and 14 Equipotential lines (Nd). The expected amount of
seepage
45
through Homogeneous dam is estimated using Eq-3.14
40
Elevation
35
Equipotential line
30
flow lines(stream lines)
flow channel
25
20
15
10
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110
Distance
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam 2015
Failure
= =2.125*10-7m3/sec
65
b) Zoned Dam
60
In case of zoned dam, as it has been mentioned earlier, the shell material has no impact on the core
55
material, the analysis considered only the core of the dam that has permeability coefficient of 2.25766E-
09cm3/sec.
50
Flow net diagram for Zoned dam is shown in fig-10 and have 19 flow lines (Nf) and 31
Equipotential
45 lines (Nd)
40
Elevation
35
30
25
20
15
10
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 1
Distance
= =1.5027*10-8m3/sec
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
Aubertin et al (2003) presented a method to predict the volumetric water content function which is modified
from the method proposed by Kovacs (1981). The modifications were made to Kovac's method to better
represent materials. The function is initially determined as a degree of saturation function and then is later
converted to volumetric water content function.
Homogneous dam
0.42
0.41
0.4
Vol. Water Content (m³/m³)
0.39
0.38
0.37
0.36
0.35
0.34
0.1 1 10 100
0.7
0.6
0.5 Core
Vol. Water Content (m³/m³)
0.4
shell
0.3
Horizontal filter
0.2
Rock toe
0.1
0
0.1 1 10 100
Figure 3.34 volumetric water content function of zoned dam without considering foundation
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
0.9
0.8
0.7
foundation
Vol. Water Content (m³/m³)
0.6
core
0.5
shell
0.4
0.1
0
0.01 0.1 1 10 100
Figure 3.35 volumetric water content function of zoned dam with considering foundation
Where:
Mv=coefficient of volume of compressibility
av = the coefficient of compressibility, and
eo = the initial void ratio.
The coefficient of volume compressibility does not need to be accurately defined for most unsaturated soil
seepage problems unless it is expected that a significant amount of water can be generated or lost through soil
matrix volume change in saturated regions of the problem geometry. In most cases, we can simply specify a
small value such as 1.0e-5 1/kPa (or equivalent in other units) (seep/w, 2007)
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
1.0e-09
1.0e-10
1.0e-11
0.1 1 10 100
1.0e+00
1.0e-01
1.0e-02
1.0e-03
1.0e-04
1.0e-05
1.0e-06
1.0e-07 core
1.0e-08
X-Conductivity (m/sec)
1.0e-09
1.0e-10
1.0e-11 shell
1.0e-12
1.0e-13
1.0e-14
1.0e-15 horizontal filter
1.0e-16
1.0e-17
1.0e-18
1.0e-19
rock toe
1.0e-20
1.0e-21
1.0e-22
1.0e-23
1.0e-24
0.1 1 10 100
Figure 3.37 Hydraulic conductivity function of zoned dam without considering foundation
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
1.0e-02
1.0e-03
1.0e-04
1.0e-05
fondation
1.0e-06
X-Conductivity (m/sec)
1.0e-07
core
1.0e-08
1.0e-09
shell
1.0e-10
1.0e-11
Horizontal filter
1.0e-12
1.0e-14
1.0e-15
0.1 1 10 100
Figure 3.38 Hydraulic conductivity function of zoned dam with considering foundation
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
40
Elevation
35
30
25
20
15
1065
560
055
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110
50 Distance
Figure
45
3.39 Finite element mesh of Homogeneous Dam
40
Elevation
35
30
1.5542e-008 m³/sec
25
20
15
10
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110
Distance
Figure 3.40 Seepage Analysis through Homogeneous Dam body without drainage (qH=1.5542E-08 m3/s)
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
b) Zoned dam
The65 analysis of zoned dam with drainage filter using SEEP/W software model was presented below. The
analysis considered the dam with filter drainage system and neglected the impact of foundation seepage. Its
60
permeability coefficient have a value of 2.257666E-09, 4.78331E-08, 1.00E-04 and1.00E-03 for core
55
materials, shell materials, Horizontal filter material and rock toe respectively. The adopted parameters of the
50
dam are 89.4m of bottom width, 4m top width and a dam height of 20m.As shown from the figure the
45
estimated quantity of seepage of the dam 4.234E-09m3/s.
40
Elevation
35
30
25
20
15
65
10
60
5
55
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110
50
Distance
45
Figure 3.41Finite element mesh of Zoned dam with filter
40
Elevation
35
30
25
20
4.234e-009 m³/sec
15
10
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110
Distance
Figure 3.42 Seepage Analysis through Zoned dam body with filter (qZ=4.234E-09m3/s)
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
40
Elevation
35
30
25
20
15
65
10
60
5
55
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
50 Distance
45
35
30
25
1.052e-008 m³/sec
20
15
10
2.517e-009 m³/sec
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110
Distance
Figure 3.44Seepage Analysis through Zoned dam considering foundation (qcomb. =1.052*10E-08 m3/s
80
Analysis
65
of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
60
40
Elevation
35
30
25
20
c
15 ³/se
09 m
4.2404e-009 m³/sec
9 3 e-0
4.23
10
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110
Distance
Figure 3.45 Flux section used to check balance of inflow and outflow (q=4.2400E-9m3/sec.)
3.5.3 Slope stability analysis using computer approach (SLOPE/W)
The slope stability investigation was carried out using the Slope/W computer program based on the limit
equilibrium method and the Morgenstern-Price method was used to obtain the factors of safety. This particular
method has been adopted because, unlike Fellenius or Bishop’s or Janbu’s methods, the Morgenstern-Price
method satisfies both the force and moment equilibrium conditions. The pore water pressures developed within
the body of the dam and in the foundation under steady state seepage has been initially estimated with the help
of the SEEP/W software. These pore pressures in terms of head have been incorporated in the slope stability
analysis.
3.5.3.1 Limit Equilibrium Methods
Stability Analysis of dams is usually carried out using Limit Equilibrium Methods. Limit equilibrium
formulations based on the method of slices are also being applied more and more to the stability analysis of
structures. All limit equilibrium methods employ the same definition of the factor of safety.
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
a. Mohr-Coulomb
The most common way of describing the shear strength of geotechnical materials is by Coulomb’s equation
which is:
τ= σ tan ø +C --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Eq.3.17
Where:
τ = shear strength (i.e., shear at failure),
c = cohesion,
σ= normal stress on shear plane, and
φ = angle of internal friction (phi).
The equation 3.18 represents a straight line on shear strength versus normal stress plot (Figure 3.45). The
intercept on the shear strength axis is the cohesion c and the slope of the line is the angle of internal friction φ.
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
1) Selection of analysis method (Morgenstern-Price method) - Identify what method of analysis you are
going to use. For this study select Morgenstern-Price and ensure that a half-sine function was being
applied
2) Setting the working - When developing a numerical model, the first step is usually to set the working
area, which defines the size of the space available for defining the problem.
3) Define (Draw) the geometry - Before defining the geometry in SLOPE/W, it is convenient to first sketch
the problem.
4) Defining soil properties and assigning for the corresponding soil layer - Materials were created and
assigned to geometry objects of Material model as Mohr-Coulomb of basic material properties soil unit
weight and shear strength parameters.
5) Defining the water table (pore-water pressure) - The pore-water pressure conditions for soils will be
defined by a single piezometric line.
6) Slip surface fixing- Earlier we selected the entry and exit method to control the location of the trial slip
surfaces. For Entry range (left side) and Exit Range (Right side) for downstream slope analysis ranges
but for upstream side the entry will right side and exit will be the left side.
7) Problem solving and display the results
The required information for numerical SLOPE/W modeling and analysis of the dam:
Dam layout of the map and cross-section profile
Soil shear strength parameter, like internal frictional and soil cohesion
Soil Unit weight
Table 3.17 the material properties used for the upstream and downstream face slope stability obtained from the
laboratory
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
45
40
1.167
Elevation
35
30
25
20
15
65
10
60
5
55
0
50 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110
Distance
45
0.748
Elevation
35
30
25
20
15
10
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110
Distance
Figure 3.49 Failure FOS for SSS (downstream face) (FOS=0.748)
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
b) Surcharge pool
65
The surcharge pool is considered a temporary pool, higher than the storage pool that adds a load to the driving
60
force but often does not persist long enough to establish a steady seepage condition. The stability of the
55
downstream slope should be analyzed at maximum surcharge pool. Analyses of this surcharge pool condition
50
should be performed using drained strengths in the embankment, assuming the extreme possibility of steady-
state 45seepage at the surcharge pool level.
40
0.694
Elevation
35
30
25
20
15
10
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110
Distance
86
55
50
Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
45
40
1.143
Elevation
35
30
G H
I
F
25
Drawdown
20 E
15 CD
A
10
B
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110
Distance
Figure 3.51 some of trial failure surfaces used in stability analysis in SLOPE/W
To investigate the effects of drawdown rate (R) on the stability of the upstream slope during the reservoir
drawdown, the method of analysis described in the above figurer 3.50 for various drawdown rates. It was
reported that the common range of drawdown rate is from 0.5 to 1 m/day in dam engineering applications.
3.5.4. Pore pressure ratio (ru) and slope stability
Estimation of the pore pressure ratio for an embankment is highly important, as this value is extremely useful in
embankment stability analysis problems (Smith, 2006). Pore pressure ratio, Ru, is the ratio of pore water
pressure at any given point of the earth dam model to the weight of the soil material acting on unit area at that
point (Tsuyoshi, 2006). The concept of Ru is relevant to both granular and cohesive soils. The pore pressure
ratio is expressed as:
Where:
u = Pore water pressure at any given point of the earth dam
γw = Unit weight of water (9.81 KN/m3)
γs = unit weight of soil (17.58KN/m3)
H= depth corresponding to pore pressure considering (m)
In order that the pore water pressure and the weight of the soil material (overburden pressure, γ x H) acting at
certain points (nodes) of the earth dam can be calculated, a grid of such points (nodes) was created and
numbered accordingly, as shown in figures-3.52 and Table 2.18.
87
60
Analysis
55
of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
50
45
40
Elevation
35
5 17
30
72 82
128
62 71 81 90
25 53 61 70 80 89 98
45 52 60 69 79 88 97 104
38 44 51 59 68 78 87 96 103 110
20
32 37 43 50 58 67 77 86 95 102 109 115 16 15
27 31 36 42 49 57 66 76 129 94 101 108 114 119 123
15 7 6 23 26 30 35 41 48 56 65 75 85 93 100 107 113 118 122 125
14 18
20 22 25 29 34 40 47 55 64 74 84 92 99 106 112 117 121 124 126 127
2 105 111 116 120 13 3
9 8 19 21 24 28 33 39 46 54 63 73 83 91 1 4 12
10
10 11
5
065
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110
60
Distance
Figures 3.52 Grid of points and their corresponding numbers in the body of the earth dam
55
Additionally, the following diagram in figure -3.53 shows the overlay between the grid of points (nodes) and
the pore
50 water pressure contours within the body of the earth dam model, in order to facilitate the determination
45 the pore water pressure and the overburden pressure, γ x H.
of both
40
Elevation
35
5 17
30
72 82
128
62 71 81 90
25 53 61 0 70 80 89 98
45 52 6020 69 79 88 97 104
38 44 51 59 68 78 87 96 103 110
20 40
32 37 43 50 58 67 77 86 95 102 109 115 16 15
27 31 36 42 49 57 60 66 76 129 94 101 108 114 119 123
15 7 6 23 26 30 35 41 48 56 65 75 85 93 100 107 113 118 122 125
80 14 18
20 22 25 29 34 40 47 55 64 74 84 92 99 106 112 117 121 124 126 127
1 2 105 111 116 120 13 3
9 8 19 21 24 28 33 39 46 54 00 63 73 83 91 1 4 12
10
10 11
5
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 1
Distance
Figure 3.53 static ground water levels with the pore water pressure contours and the flow lines.
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
Depth
Node X (m) Elevation Total Pressure PWP u corresponding to Overburden Pore
No. Head (m) Head (m) Head (m) (kPa) pore pressure Pressure pressure
(H) (kPa) ratio( ru )
1 66.00 10.00 10.03 0.03 0.30 14.00 252.00 0.00
19 18.00 10.00 26.97 16.97 166.47 4.00 72.00 2.31
20 18.00 12.00 26.99 14.99 146.99 2.00 36.00 4.08
21 24.00 10.00 26.84 16.84 165.17 5.95 107.10 1.54
22 24.00 12.00 26.90 14.90 146.09 3.95 71.10 2.05
23 24.00 14.00 26.95 12.95 127.02 1.95 35.10 3.62
24 28.00 10.00 26.63 16.63 163.10 7.89 142.02 1.15
25 28.00 12.00 26.73 14.73 144.44 5.89 106.02 1.36
26 28.00 14.00 26.83 12.83 125.79 3.89 70.02 1.80
27 28.00 16.00 26.92 10.92 107.10 1.89 34.02 3.15
28 32.00 10.00 26.24 16.24 159.23 9.82 176.76 0.90
29 32.00 12.00 26.40 14.40 141.20 7.82 140.76 1.00
30 32.00 14.00 26.56 12.56 123.19 5.82 104.76 1.18
31 32.00 16.00 26.72 10.72 105.16 3.82 68.76 1.53
32 32.00 18.00 26.88 8.88 87.08 1.82 32.76 2.66
33 36.00 10.00 26.61 15.61 153.10 11.77 211.86 0.72
34 36.00 12.00 25.84 13.84 135.73 9.77 175.86 0.77
35 36.00 14.00 26.08 12.08 118.49 7.77 139.86 0.85
36 36.00 16.00 26.33 10.33 101.29 5.77 103.86 0.98
37 36.00 18.00 26.58 8.58 84.10 3.77 67.86 1.24
38 36.00 20.00 26.81 6.81 66.83 1.77 31.86 2.10
39 40.00 10.00 24.69 14.69 144.02 13.70 246.60 0.58
40 40.00 12.00 24.98 12.98 127.33 11.70 210.60 0.60
41 40.00 14.00 25.30 11.30 110.83 9.70 174.60 0.63
42 40.00 16.00 25.64 9.64 94.52 7.70 138.60 0.68
43 40.00 18.00 25.99 7.99 78.39 5.70 102.60 0.76
44 40.00 20.00 26.36 6.36 62.39 3.70 66.60 0.94
45 40.00 22.00 26.74 4.74 46.43 1.70 30.60 1.52
46 44.00 10.00 23.45 13.45 131.86 15.64 281.52 0.47
47 44.00 12.00 23.80 11.80 115.73 13.64 245.52 0.47
48 44.00 14.00 24.17 10.17 99.78 11.64 209.52 0.48
49 44.00 16.00 24.57 8.57 84.08 9.64 173.52 0.48
50 44.00 18.00 25.00 7.00 68.68 7.64 137.52 0.50
51 44.00 20.00 25.47 5.47 53.65 5.64 101.52 0.53
52 44.00 22.00 25.98 3.98 39.05 3.64 65.52 0.60
53 44.00 24.00 26.55 2.55 24.96 1.64 29.52 0.85
54 48.00 10.00 21.94 11.94 117.06 17.58 316.44 0.37
55 48.00 12.00 22.33 10.33 101.26 15.58 280.44 0.36
56 48.00 14.00 22.74 8.74 85.72 13.64 245.52 0.35
57 48.00 16.00 23.17 7.17 70.32 11.58 208.44 0.34
58 48.00 18.00 23.62 5.61 55.13 9.58 172.44 0.32
59 48.00 20.00 24.11 4.11 40.26 7.58 136.44 0.30
60 48.00 22.00 24.63 2.63 25.84 5.58 100.44 0.26
61 48.00 24.00 25.22 1.22 11.96 3.38 60.84 0.20
63 53.00 10.00 19.67 9.67 94.81 20.00 360.00 0.26
64 53.00 12.00 20.13 8.13 79.77 18.00 324.00 0.25
65 53.00 14.00 20.62 6.62 64.93 16.00 288.00 0.23
66 53.00 16.00 21.09 5.09 49.92 14.00 252.00 0.20
67 53.00 18.00 21.57 3.57 34.97 12.00 216.00 0.16
68 53.00 20.00 22.05 2.05 20.13 10.00 180.00 0.11
69 53.00 22.00 22.56 0.56 5.46 8.00 144.00 0.04
73 57.00 10.00 17.58 7.58 74.29 20.00 360.00 0.21
74 57.00 12.00 18.13 6.13 60.07 18.00 324.00 0.19
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
Table 3.18 Geotechnical and hydraulic data in each node of interest within the body of the earth dam
The average pore pressure ratio, ru, for the whole embankment of the earth dam have been calculated in
accordance to statistical procedure and algorithms / equations that were carried out. The equations used for this
calculation are presented below.
And
ru =
Where:
A= area of each column of the earth dam
h= height of the each column
ru = pore pressure coefficient
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
The risk for Gomit dam failure and the potential catastrophic damage in the downstream will sever problems
because the failure of a dam can result in the uncontrollable release of water flooding downstream areas and
Flooding caused by a dam failure can occur in a relatively short period. Downstream communities located close
to the dam will have warning times. Public pay more and more attention to how to ensure the safety of Gomit
dam downstream people and property.
Results from the dam break modeling can be used in the development of an outline Emergency Action Plan
(EAP) for the Gomit Dam.
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
Figure 3.54 predicted inundated area for failure of the Gomit dam
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
Scenarios 3: Assuming the geotechnical shear parameters of dam material would be decrease due to excess
pore water pressures and the downstream of slope of dam body materials eroded during the summer season,
leading to the dam would be create wide opening breach from the existing dam and releasing excess amount of
water from the barrier reservoir, which is the most catastrophic scenario compared to others.
The three scenarios would be expected to occur due to a piping failure mechanism. This could occur due to a
localized failure of the downstream face allowing water seepage through the dam to erode the earth fill
embankments. The worst location for a piping failure to occur is considered to be at the base of the dam with
the greatest depth of water above. Erosion of the earth fill dam embankment would be expected to accelerate
quickly leading to a dam breach.
3.6.2 Model selection
Selection of an appropriate model to undertake dam breach flood modeling is essential to ensure the right
balance between modeling accuracy and cost in terms of time spent developing the model setup. In this study,
HEC-RAS version 5.0 model developed by Hydrologic Engineering Center of U. S. Army Corps of Engineers
has been selected. HEC-RAS is an integrated system of software, designed for interactive use in a multitasking
environment. The system comprises a graphical user interface, separate hydraulic analysis components, data
storage and management capabilities, graphics and reporting facilities. The model contains advanced features
for dam break simulation.
The present version of HEC-RAS system contains two one-dimensional and two- dimensional hydraulic
components for: i) Steady flow surface profile computations; ii) unsteady flow simulation. The steady/unsteady
flow components are capable of modeling sub critical, super critical, and mixed flow regime water surface
profiles.
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
The graphics include X- Y plots of the river system, schematic cross sections, profiles, rating curves,
hydrographs, and many other hydraulic variables. Users can select from pre-defined tables or develop their own
customized tables. All graphical and tabular output can be displayed on the screen, sent directly to a printer, or
passed through the Windows clipboard to other software's, such as word processor or spread sheet. Reports can
be customized taking into account the amount and type of information desired.
3.6.3 Software used for dam break assessment and its description
To assess the dam break we used the following software:
3.6.3.1 HEC-RAS
A comparison is done among mostly used physically based numerical models in the previous section. It is
clearly stated that the BREACH model is highly suitable in that it takes many aspects into consideration as
described in detail in the section. However, due to financial constraint and the availability of the model free of
cost, HEC-RAS is going to be used in this study.
This model is developed by the USACE (United States Army Corps of Engineers) and is used for modeling the
breach of the dam and predicting the catastrophic outflow hydrograph. It can be used both for overtopping and
piping failure breaches for earthen dams and for instantaneous failure of gravity dams. The resulting flood wave
is routed downstream using unsteady flow equations. Upstream reservoir area can be modeled using cross
section data and then performing full unsteady flow routing through the reservoir pool and downstream of the
dam. It can also be modeled using a storage area. In this case level pool routing through the lake is conducted
followed by unsteady flow routing downstream of the dam.
To use this software, the modeler must estimate the maximum breach parameters and breach formation time
initially based on different sets of regression equations and come up with a matrix of potential breach
parameters and time. These ranges of estimated breach parameters shall be run as separate trials in the model in
order to test the sensitivity of the results. The model gives different outflow hydrograph for each breach
parameter estimated. These various hydrographs are then routed downstream to identify the most hazardous
flood.
HEC-RAS gives several plots, tables, cross sections, profiles and plots for evaluating the results of a dam break
analysis. The hydrograph can be viewed at any desired location. The model is based on an implicit finite
difference solution of the complete one-dimensional continuity and momentum equations for unsteady flow.
HEC-RAS version 5.0 is used for the breach analysis of the Gomit Dam. HEC-RAS has the capability of
modeling dam breach events under a wide range of scenarios. Cross sections, stream centerlines, and other
geometric features of the stream were extracted from GIS using HEC-GeoRAS and ArcGIS. Dam failure
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
scenarios were analyzed for the Sunny Day and Probable Maximum Precipitation (PMP) meteorological events.
The PMP and Sunny Day failure scenarios will run to determine maximum water surface elevations in the study
area and generate flood inundation maps.
HEC-RAS is a one or two-dimensional river hydraulics model used for steady flow and unsteady-flow water
surface profile computations though a network of open channels Because HEC-RAS solves the full Saint-
Venant equations, it is well suited for computing the flood wave propagation resulting from a dam failure
scenario. Initial model development may be performed using HEC-GeoRAS and using an HEC-RAS option to
import the GIS data. At a minimum, the data import should establish the river/reach schematic and the
description of cross sections. The river hydraulics model will need additional cross section information,
hydraulic structures data, flow data, and boundary conditions prior to simulation. This section will focus on just
a few of the more important data considerations.
3.6.3.2 HEC-GeoRAS
HEC-GeoRAS (Geographic River Analysis System) is an ArcGIS extension tools developed by the HEC. This
model contains a set of tools specifically designed to process geospatial data to support hydraulic model
development and analysis of water surface profile results. It assists in creating data sets in GIS to extract
information essential for hydraulic modeling.
After steady or unsteady flow simulation, HEC-RAS results can be exported for processing in the GIS
(Geographical Information System) by GeoRAS. The user can read the HEC-RAS results into the HEC-
GeoRAS and perform the flood inundation mapping. Moreover, a pre-processing of data is done in HEC-
GeoRAS/ArcGIS and imported to HEC-RAS to generate geo-spatial based output data for post-processing in
HEC-GeoRAS once again to produce flood inundation map.
HEC-GeoRAS is a set of tools specifically designed to process geospatial data to support hydraulic model
development and analysis of water surface profile results .GeoRAS assists engineers in creating datasets
(referred to collectively as RAS Layers) in ArcGIS to extract information essential for hydraulic modeling. The
latest release of HEC-GeoRAS supports the extraction of elevation data from DEM in either the TIN or grid
format.
GeoRAS requires that the user have a DTM. The DTM must be projected into a coordinate system – the
coordinate system of the DEM is used as the basis for developing each of the RAS Layers. GeoRAS also
requires that the Stream Centerline layer and Cross-Sectional Cut Line layer be created. The development of all
other RAS Layers is optional based on the data needs for the river hydraulics model. A summary of RAS Layers
and their use in building a hydraulic model is provided in Table-4.1.
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
The Stream Centerline layer is used to identify the connectivity of the river system. It is created in the
downstream direction and is used to assign river stations to the cross sections, bridges, and other structures to
order computational nodes in the HEC-RAS model.
The Cross-Sectional Cut Lines layer is the principal data constructed using HEC-GeoRAS. Cut lines are
digitized across the floodplain area to capture the profile of the land surface. Cross sections should be digitized
perpendicular to the path of flow in the channel and overbank areas to be consistent with one-dimensional flow
characteristics. Having created the bank lines and flow path centerlines prior to laying out cut line locations is
advantageous. Once the RAS Layers have been created, GeoRAS tools and menus are available to assign and
populate attribute data. Lastly the data are written out to the HEC-RAS geospatial data exchange format and can
be imported into HEC-RAS.
Stream Centerline Used to identify the connectivity of the river network and assign river stations to
computation points.
Cross-Sectional Cut Used to extract elevation transects from the DTM at specified locations and other
Lines cross-sectional properties.
Bank Lines Used in conjunction with the cut lines to identify the main channel from overbank
areas.
Flow Path Centerlines Used to identify the center of mass of flow in the main channel and overbanks to
compute the downstream reach lengths between cross sections.
Inline Structures Used to extract the weir profile from the DTM for inline structures (dams).
Storage Areas Used to define the extent of detention areas and develop the elevation volume
relationship.
Table 3.19 Summary of HEC-GeoRAS layers and corresponding output for HEC-RAS.
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
Developing a stable model is a common problem when working with an unsteady flow model of any size or
complexity. Modeling a dam break flood wave is one of the most difficult unsteady flow problems to model. An
unstable numerical model is one for which certain types of numerical errors grow to the extent at which the
solution begins to oscillate, or the errors become so large that the computations cannot continue. The common
problem of instability in the case of unsteady flow simulation can be overcome by suitable selection of
following:
x= ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Eq.3.21
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
Minimum spacing for a dam break model should be in the range of 15m to30m (HEC-RAS, 2014). The average
main channel bank full depth from the dam toe to the end of the reach was 1.7m and the cross-section spacing
distance based on equation 4.1 was 60m.
3.6.4.2 Computational Time Step
When the solution scheme solves the unsteady flow equations, derivatives are calculated with respect to
distance and time. Too large a time step will cause numerical diffusion (attenuation of the peak) and also model
instability. To small of a time step can also lead to model instability as well as very long computation times.
Too large of a time step: When the solution scheme solves the unsteady flow equations, derivatives are
calculated with respect to distance and time. If the changes in hydraulic properties at a give cross section are
changing rapidly with respect to time, the program may go unstable. The solution to this problem in general is
to decrease the time step.
Too small of a Time Step: If a time step is selected that is much smaller than what the Courant condition
would dictate for a given flood wave, this can also cause model stability problems. In general to small of a time
step will cause the leading edge of the flood wave to steepen, possible to the point of oscillating and going
unstable.
Stability and accuracy can be achieved by selecting a computational time step that satisfies the Courant
condition:
Cr = Vw (Δt/Δx) ≤ 1.0. Therefore, Δt ≤ Δx/Vw),
For most of the rivers, the flood wave speed (Vw) can be calculated as:
Vw =
Vw = the flood wave speed, which is normally greater than the average velocity.
V = Average velocity of the flow
Δx = Distance between cross sections
Δt = computational time step
Q = flow rate
A = Flow area
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
Table 3.20 factors for computing wave speed from average velocity
For Dam break models, typical time steps are in the range of 1- 60 seconds due to the very fast flood wave
velocities (HEC-RAS, 2014). We should pay close attention to the Courant condition for selecting the
computational interval.
3.6.4.3 Calculation Options and Tolerances
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
3.6.4.3.5 Time Slicing: The user can control the maximum number of time slices and the minimum time step
used during time slicing. There are two ways to invoke time slicing: rate of change of an inflow hydrograph or
when a maximum number of iterations are reached.
3.6.4.3.6 Spillway stability factor
Weirs and spillways can often be a source of instability in the solution. During each time step, the flow over a
spillway is assumed to be constant. This can cause oscillations by sending too much flow during a time step.
3.6.4.4 Manning’s roughness
Manning’s n values can also be a source of model instability.Manning’s n values that are too low, will cause
shallow depths of water, higher velocities, and possibly even supercritical flows.there are several references a
user can access that show manning’s n values for typical channels. An extensive compilation of n values for
stream and floodplains can be found in chow’s book “open channel hydraulics “ .The Manning’s
n values for the stream channel downstream of the dam 0.08 to reflect the dynamic and extreme nature of a dam
breach flood wave as well as the heavy amount of woody debris within the channel. The left and right
overbank n-values ranged 0.04 reflecting cultivated areas along the flood path.
3.6.5 Input data requirement for dam breach analysis
In general, the data required for dam breach analysis can be categorized as described below:
3.6.5.1 Reservoir data
In this study, to predict the flood hydrograph from the reservoir, it is necessary to have an elevation- storage
relationship for the reservoir along with details of typical flow through the reservoir and normal retained water
level.
3.6.5.2 Catchment hydrology
Inflow into the reservoir, reservoir condition at the time of failure and base flow conditions in the river valley
downstream may combine to have a significant effect on the predicted flood conditions, depending on the size
and nature of the reservoir and dam. Potential reservoir inflow and river base flow data should be collected to
allow a sensitivity analysis to be undertaken as part of the dam break analysis.
A hydrologic analysis for Gomit Reservoir was conducted to develop the PMF inflow hydrograph to the
reservoir during the first design using the nearest and most representative meteorological station operated by the
national meteorological services agency (NMSA) of Debre - Tabor town that is 54km far from the project site.
But the nearest and most influential metrological station was the Mekan-Eyesus metrological station rather than
Debre - Tabor metrological station for Hydrologic analysis of this study (Appendix B – Flood Hydrology).
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
Topographic data representing the whole area potentially liable to flooding was collected. Floods resulting from
dam failure can be significantly larger than natural floods-- meaning that flood flow is often through areas
considered safe from flooding view-point. The collected topographic data will therefore extend widely across
floodplains and up-valley slopes well above normal flood levels.
The accuracy of a dam breach study is different from that of a river modeling study. Traditional river modeling
simulates natural floods that occur within defined floodplain areas. For a dam break model the flow conditions
typically exceed natural events by a large margin meaning that there is little calibration data and the flooded
terrain is outside of the normal floodplain areas making the estimation of channel roughness difficult. Similarly
there is uncertainty in prediction of the failure mechanisms leading to the initial flood hydro graph, in
understanding 3D flow effects and in predicting the movement and impact of debris and sediment. With this
range of uncertainty, it is inappropriate to attempt flow modeling to the same level of accuracy as for normal
river flow modeling. The accuracy of topographic data collected should also relate to the location within the
area at risk.
3.6.6 HEC-RAS Dam break model setup
The development of an HEC-RAS hydraulic model requires accurate representations of the terrain data and the
hydrological inputs used as boundary condition. Additionally, appropriate model parameters for the terrain
roughness and hydraulic structures must be estimated. For Gomit dam breach model set up different
components of the project have been represent the model as follows:
3.6.6.1. Gomit River
The Gomit River for the length of 4.58 km from the dam site has been represent in the model by cross-section
at about different interval in the position just downstream of Gomit dam and it increase as the distance.
Chainage “0” Km of the Gomit River has been connected to a storage- area representing the reservoir. As the
dam breach flood levels far exceed the normal flood level marks and the flood spread beyond the normal river
course, the manning’s roughness coefficients for dam break studies should be assumed normally more than the
other hydro-dynamic studies employing observed data.
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
3.6.6.2 Reservoir
The reservoir has been representing in the model by storage-area of the graphical editors of the model and its
stage-volume relationship has been specified. Different methods can be utilized to obtain water level – storage
capacity from the contour map prepared at the reservoir site and select the highest stage –storage capacity. The
volume of storage of water between successive contours is calculated by end–area method:
V= h/2 (Ao + 2 (A1 +A2 +A3 +.... An-1) +An) ---------------------------------------Eq.3.22
Where: Ao, A1, A3... An = the area enclosing each contour
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
2370 Legend
Vol-Elev
2365
Elevation (m)
2360
2355
2350
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600
Volume (1000 m3)
1278500
1278400
1278300
1278200
1278100
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
Time(hr) Inflow(m3/s)
0.00 0.01
0.00 0.01
0.00 0.10
1.43 3.08
1.50 3.57
1.93 29.88
2.00 34.14
2.43 67.58
2.50 72.27
0.00 104.23
3.00 103.36
3.43 98.14
5.00 82.11
3.93 77.21
4.00 73.42
4.31 55.03
4.81 28.42
5.00 19.07
5.31 3.82
5.81 1.92
6.00 1.19
6.31 0.01
Table 3.22 Inflow for the reservoir
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
River profile
2360
2350
2340 y = -0.013x + 2352,R² = 0.993
Elevation(m)
2330
2320
2310
2300
2290
2280
0.00 500.00 1000.00 1500.00 2000.00 2500.00 3000.00 3500.00 4000.00 4500.00 5000.00
Distance(m)
2303
2302
2301
Elevation(m)
2300
2299
2298
2297
2296
2295
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
Distance(m)
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
Flow
S. Water depth Wetted Wetted Hydraulics manning's
No Level (m) (m) perimeter(m) area(m2) radius(m) roughness so Velocity(m/s) Discharge Remarks
1 2295.44 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.013 0.000 0.00 River bed
2 2296.44 1 33.23 19.27 1.72 0.04 0.013 4.10 78.99
3 2297.44 2 76.38 69.71 1.10 0.04 0.013 3.03 211.20
4 2298.44 3 105.79 161.48 0.66 0.04 0.013 2.15 347.21
5 2299.44 4 135.22 281.17 0.48 0.04 0.013 1.75 491.96
6 2300.44 5 168.44 432.28 0.39 0.04 0.013 1.52 657.36
7 2301.44 6 203.70 617.09 0.33 0.04 0.013 1.36 840.13
8 2302.84 7.4 274.79 954.40 0.29 0.04 0.013 1.24 1186.21
2301
2300
2299
2298
2297
2296
2295
0.00 200.00 400.00 600.00 800.00 1000.00 1200.00 1400.00
Distance(m)
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
used a basic dam data concerning height of water in the reservoir, storage volume in the reservoirs and height of
breach.
The Gomit dam was within the range of the data used to develop these regression equation,therefore the equation
are considered to be an appropriate methodology for estimating the breach parameters.the mode of the failure of
the dam may piping or seepage because of the the dam body aleready leaft thin ticknes of the core material as
well the foundation part of the dam show there is seepage or leakage.
Bottom
Scenario WL the Water average Breach Failure time Breach
Breach parameter
number dam(m.a.s.l.) height width (m) (hr) width(W)
predictor
in( m) (m)
Froehlich(1995a)
1 2367.0 9.0 42.38 0.44 29.45
2 2369.36 11.36 50.35 0.59 37.43
Froehlich(2008)
1 2367.0 9.0 32.96 0.49 22.91
2 2369.36 11.36 39.16 0.64 29.11
Von thun and Gillette(1990)
1 2367.0 9.0 40.8 1.13 33.62
2 2369.4 11.4 46.8 1.03 39.62
MacDonald and Langridge Monopolis (1984)
1 2367.0 9.0 19.37 0.47 12.19
2 2369.4 11.4 33.45 0.59 26.27
Table 3.24 shows that the Recommended values of the breach parameters for three scenarios of water level of
reservoirs that was fed to the HEC-RAS model as input data for the simulation process. The water level in the
reservoir represents the normal or sunny day and PMF loading condition (i.e. the dam during normal pool
failure and PMF failure); this is because the present hypothetical dam failure was assumed due to piping. In this
study the simulation process using HEC-RAS model, piping in the dam was proposed to be the reason of dam
failure.
Froehlich (1995a) was considered one of the most reliable methods for estimating a dam breach, as it takes into
account the failure mode (overtopping or piping), the water depth, and the total water storage. The formation
time of 0.44hour (26.4 minutes) for scenario one and three and 0.59 hours for scenario two for the dam breach
has been based on Von thun and Gillette (1990) .Other formulae were used to check the variability of the
predicted formation time including Froehlich (2008), MacDonald and Langridge Monopolis (1984) and Von
thun and Gillette (1990) which provided times of 0.49, 0.47 and 1.13 hours for scenario one and three and 0.34,
0.64, 0.59 and 1.03 for scenario two respectively. High breach formation time shows that the dam erodes
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
slowly (low erosion) and vice versa. In comparison to other methods Froehlich (1995a) could be considered
conservative with a shorter formation time and large opening breach width.
Center station of dam breach
The horizontal location of the breach within the inline structure.This field is used to enter the cross-section
stationing of the centreline of the breach.
Final bottom elevation of dam breach
The final bottom width of the breach at full formation.This field is used to enter the bottom elevation of
the breach when it has reached maximum size.
Side slope of dam breach
Side slope of the breach as it forms in a trapezoidal shape. Side slope of the dam breach was used an input for
regression equation to estimate the dam breach width and an input for directly for HEC-RAS to analysis the
dam break. Left side slope is used to enter the left side slope for the trapezoid that will represent the final breach
shape and Right side slope is used to enter the right side slope for the trapezoid that will represent the final
breach slope.
Breach Weir Coefficient
The coefficient that is used for weir flow over the embankment in the standard weir equation.This analysis
chose 2.6 due to the expectation that the composition of the dam would cause the weir surface to be relatively
smooth.
Failure Mode
Failure mode can be set to piping or overtopping. In this study, the piping mode was selected and
Recommended value for the piping/pressure flow coefficient are in the range of 0.5 to 0.6 and the initial
piping elevation was 2358m a.m.s.l.
Trigger Mechanism
The trigger mechanism can be based on time, water surface elevation, or both. For this analysis, it was set to
water surface elevation 2360m for sunny day failure scenarios and PMF failure scenarios for the model. This
field is used to enter the mode in which the breach initiation will be triggered.
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S.n Breach parameter Sunny day Failure PMF failure Existing breach failure
1 Center station(m) 174 174 174
2 Final bottom width(m) 29.45 37.43 50
3 Final bottom elevation(m) 2356 2356 2356
4 Full formation time 0.44 0.59 0.4
5 Left side slope 0.9 0.9 1.5
6 Right side slope 0.9 0.9 1.5
8 Breach weir coefficient 2.6 2.6 2.6
9 Failure mode piping piping piping
10 Piping coefficient 0.5 0.5 0.5
11 Initial piping elevation(m) 2358 2358 2358
12 Trigger failure at WS Elev. WS Elev. WS Elev.
2360 2360 2360
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
represent the bathymetric terrain in the reservoir, and is prone to instabilities, which can require a great deal of
time and effort to work out. While Level Pool reservoir routing is a convenient method to simulate dam breach
reservoir drawdown, it is not always appropriate and if misused, can lead to significant errors in computing the
dam breach outflow hydrograph. Level Pool analysis is appropriate for dam breach modeling and demonstrates
the input requirements and geometry setup for both Level Pool and dynamic routing in HEC-RAS.
3.6.8. Deriving the Basic HEC-RAS Geometry File from HEC-GeoRAS
A digital elevation model of the dam and it downstream from the dam axis was developed from the surveyed
data using Global mapper.3D Analyst was used to generate a triangular irregular network (TIN) of the region
since a TIN is required by HEC-GeoRAS.
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
10) Use the GeoRAS | RAS Geometry | XS Cut Line Attributes | Elevations menu tools to extract the elevation
data from the TIN and store it within a feature class called XSCutLines3D. View the cross-sections for
initial data verification using the GeoRAS | XS Plot menu tool.
11) Use the GeoRAS | RAS Geometry | XS Cut Line Attributes | Reach/River Names and XS Cut Line
Attributes | Stationing menu tools to assign reach and river data to each section and to calculate the relative
stationing of each section. Use the XS Cut Lines | Downstream Reach Lengths menu tool to calculate the
stream centreline and valley flow path distances between sections. Bank stationing was not assigned using
GeoRAS.
12) Use the GeoRAS | RAS Geometry | XS Cut Line Attributes | Elevations menu tools to extract the elevation
data from the TIN and store it within a feature class called XSCutLines3D. View the cross-sections for
initial data verification using the GeoRAS | XS Plot menu tool.
13) Use the GeoRAS | RAS Geometry | inline structures Attributes | Reach/River Names and inline structures
Attributes | Stationing menu tools to assign reach and river data to each section and to calculate the relative
stationing of each section.
14) Use the GeoRAS | RAS Geometry | inline structures Attributes | Elevations menu tools to extract the
elevation data from the TIN and store it within a feature class called inlinestructures3D.
15) Use the GeoRAS | RAS Geometry | inline structures Attributes | Reach/River Names and inline structures
Attributes | Stationing menu tools to assign reach and river data to each section and to calculate the relative
stationing of each section.
16) Use the GeoRAS | RAS Geometry | inline structures Attributes | Elevations menu tools to extract the
elevation data from the TIN and store it within a feature class called inlinestructures3D.
17) Use the GeoRAS | RAS Geometry | storage areas Attributes | Elevations range menu item. This will
identify the lowest and highest point within the storage areas and assign those attributes to the storage areas
table under the names of minElev and MaxEle.
18) Use the GeoRAS | RAS Geometry | storage areas Attributes | Elevation-volum Data menu item.
19) Generating the RAS GIS import file
Use the GeoRAS | RAS Geometry | layer set up menu item.
Use the GeoRAS | RAS Geometry | Extract GIS Data menu tool to export the data to an intermediate
ASCII file that is read by HEC-GeoRAS. The export file carries the extension (*.RASExport.sdf).
20) Import the RAS GIS import file
Start HEC-RAS and create a new project. Open the Geometric Data editor and use the HEC-RAS | Edit |
Geometric Data | File | Import Geometry Data | GIS Format menu tool to import the GeoRAS data
(*.RASExport.sdf). The Import Options dialog box regulates the process. Save the imported geometry as anew
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
HEC-RAS geometry file (*.g01). The import process provides the basic cross-section and reaches data for
HEC-RAS modeling.
21) flow Data and Boundary Conditions
22) Running HEC-RAS
23) Exporting HEC-RAS result
24) RAS mapping
To model a reservoir using level pool routing in HEC-RAS, the pool area is modeled with a storage area (HEC-
RAS option for modeling an area with level pool routing) that storage area is connected to the downstream river
reach, and that river reach must have a cross-section that is inside the reservoir pool in section 4.8. The first
cross-section in the reach is tied to the storage area by the fact that it will always have the same water surface
elevation during the computation.
The Dam was modeled as an inline structure, which requires one cross-section upstream of the inline structure.
An inline structure is represented with a weir profile (that includes the spillway).However, the cross-section
upstream of the inline structure boundary condition and it cannot be the first cross-section of the reach. The
model must have two cross-sections upstream of the inline structure: one cross-section for the connection to the
storage area, and the second cross-section the inline structure for boundary condition. Both of the upstream
cross-sections should be representative of the reservoir area immediately the upstream of the dam. The initial
internal stage must be set at the section immediately upstream of the dam that matches the initial pool elevation.
This makes water surface equal to the pool elevation in the approach reach at time zero.
Figure 3.62 storage area and cross-section layout for level pool routing of Gomit Dam using HEC-GeoRAS
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
Reservoir
4368.102
4330.752
4200.362
4068.692
2998.942
3941.339 2836.082
3724.972 3331.73 2750.942
3587.908 2613.895
r
Ri ve
2400.731
2199.125
t
River Reach
i
1978.268
G om 1825.098
1541.629 1333.097 1130.35
1009.25
936.7293
819.5548
751.4203
648.7446
586.8773
497.861
380.3104
311.4928
231.0668
Figure 3.63 storage area and cross-section layout for level pool routing of Gomit Dam using HEC-RAS
Dam break study Plan: Dam break study breach plaqn
Geom: Dam break study Geometry
River = Gomit River Reach = River Reach RS = 4358.011
2375 Legend
Ground
Bank Sta
2370
2365
Elevation (m)
2360
2355
2350
0 100 200 300 400
Station (m)
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
Figure 3.65 Dam breach information entered in HEC-RAS for sunny day failure
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
Figure 3.66 Dam breach information entered in HEC-RAS for PMF day failure
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
Figure 3.67 Dam breach information entered in HEC-RAS for existing breach failure
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
Methods of analysis Homogenous dam seepage Zoned Dam Zoned Dam with foundation
quantity(m3/se. (m3/sec) (m3/sec)
Phreatic line analysis 1.16.x10-7 6.2763x10-9 1.68x10-8
SEEP/W model analysis 1.5542x10-8 4.234x10-9 1.052x10-8
Flow net analysis 2.125x10-7 1.5027*10-8
Table 4.1: results of expected quantity of seepage with different method and cases
As shown from the above table, the expected quantity of seepage estimated with these different methods
relatively resembles to each other in quantity. The Finite Element Models used in the analyses for the Gomit
dam are shown on Figures 3.42. The Seep/W analyses results together with the computed discharges are shown
on Figures 3.43. The estimated quantities of seepage at foundation were 2.517*10- 9 m3/sec/m and the computed
discharges through the dam and through the dam plus foundation are 0.8003×10-8 m3/s/m and 1.052x10-8
m3/sec/m, respectively. These results indicate that the seepage quantity through the dam is about 76.07 % of the
seepage through the foundation. In this study, the maximum seepage through the dam as per the phreatic line
analysis that includes foundation seepage is 1.68x10-8m3/sec. This value is compared with the quantity seepage
estimated at the designed document that is 4.738*10-8m3/sec.This value is estimated that the foundation seepage
very small when you compare that of embankment. Therefore, the design document has no problem of
quantifying the expected quantity of seepage. In view of this fact, the intention of the paper is to evaluate the
seepage of the dam and propose remedial measure for it. Further exploration on the design document was
needed giving emphasize to the design of filter/ drainage system.
• The total discharge through dam & foundation, q = 1.68×10-8m3/s/m length from seepage analysis by phreatic
line analysis. Permeability of filter, k = 1.0 × 10-4 m/s, Length of blanket filter, L = 32 m
Thickness of blanket filter, t, is given by:
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
q=
If we are considering the factor of safety of 2, the Horizontal Filter thickness is 0.134 m which is very small.
But it was proposed a 1.0 m thick horizontal filter which was sufficient to drain the incoming Seepage through
dam body and foundation.
4.2. Slope Stability Results and discussion
4.2.1. Steady state conditions
The minimum required and computed factors of safety against slope failures under the different loading
conditions for Gomit dam are summarized in Table 4.2
Loading Recommende Methods of analysis Computed Recommended Computed change
change to the to the baseline
Condition d FOSmin FOS
baseline minimum factor
minimum factor
of safety
of safety
SSS at normal 1.5 Morgenstern and Price 1.167 0 to -0.1 -0.333
pool level (U/S)
SSS at normal 1.5 Morgenstern and Price 0.748 0 to -0.1 -0.752
pool level (D/S)
SSS surge pool 1.4 Morgenstern and Price 0.694 0 to -0.1 -0.706
level (D/S)
Drawdown 1.3 Morgenstern and Price 0.554 0 to -0.1 -0.746
In Steady state of both upstream and downstream conditions of a limit equilibrium stability analysis using the
Morgenstern-Price method results in a factor of safety of 1.167 and 0.748 respectively. Figure 3.47 shows the
critical slip surface and factor of safety after rapid drawdown. Recall that the factor of safety before drawdown
was 1.167. Following rapid drawdown, the factor of safety has been reduced to 0.554.befor and after the
construction stability analysis of a dam, engineering properties of the embankment materials, which was
determined in the laboratory was different. Table 4.2 shows that the recommended values of the factor of safety
and Computed Factors of Safety using Morgenstern-Price method were not agreed because of the increase of
pore water pressure due to ground water rise and shear strength of the embankment dam materials decrease.
Upstream and Downstream face of the dam is not stable under all cases of water condition. As can be seen from
Table 4.2 the Gomit dam is not stable under all loading conditions.
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
Table 4.3 variation of FOS of upstream dam slope with reservoir drawdown
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
1.4
1.2
0.8
FOS
0.6 R=0.5m/day
R=1m/day
0.4
0.2
Reservoir drawdown(m)
Figure 4.1 variation of FOS of upstream dam slope with different drawdown rates
5.2.3.Pore water pressure coefficient
The excess pore-pressures can cause slope instability and, consequently, this is an important issue in the
operation of water retention structures such as embankment dams.Values of ru vary between zero for
groundwater at a considerable depth below the toe of slope and about 0.7.
A ru A*ru
16.00 3.20 51.16
27.90 2.41 67.10
26.60 1.86 49.58
35.41 1.45 51.47
43.20 1.11 47.91
50.98 0.82 41.68
58.76 0.55 32.10
66.59 0.31 20.69
94.12 0.18 16.74
80.00 0.13 10.17
76.20 0.11 8.57
67.15 0.11 7.69
48.00 0.00 0.00
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
The average pore pressure ratio, ru, for the whole embankment of the earth dam was calculated equal to 0.53.
A value of about 0.5 for ru indicates that ground water conditions are close to the surface. Therefore, that was
true in our case study of the embankment of the Gomit micro-earth dam, where the value for ru is equal to 0.53,
which indicates that ground water conditions are close to the surface.
During the field visit we observed the downstream of the dam was slide and there was leakage of water under
the dam toe. We asked the Farmers, forman and site engineer of the area about the general situation of the dam.
The Farmers said that, before the dam constructed there was high amount of ground water that we were fetching
and the forman and site engineer also said that, during the dam construction there was high amount of ground
water that was difficult to construct the project. Figure-3.25 and 26 supports the result of pore water pressure
ratio that obtained in table 3.19 and the interview of Farmers, forman and site engineer.
5.3. Dam breach simulation results and discussion
5.3.1 Predicted Dam Breach Hydrographs
The predicted breach outflow hydrograph was very important for the assessment of flooding characteristics in
the downstream areas. As we have discussed in section 3.6.6 the dam breach parameter estimation using
regression equations was crucial to predict the amount of outflow using HEC-RAS model. The HEC-RAS
model has been used to determine the downstream flood inundation extent, expected peak flows and
downstream travel times from dam breach parameters and identification of the Potential Impact. Using a matrix
of breach parameters, three breach scenarios were simulated. But for this study, existing dam breach was the
most catastrophic scenario compared to the other two scenarios which releasing excess amount of water from
the barrier reservoir. The identified set of existing dam breach parameters that resulting travel time and
magnitude of peak discharge was also estimated below table 4.5.
Failure scenario Model Chainage (m) Location Time to Flood Modeled Peak Flow
Peak (min) (m³/s)
Sunny day failure 4358 Inline structure 17 1230.6
PMF failure 4358 Inline structure 19 1605.3
Existing breach failure 4358 Inline structure 15 2306.05
Table 4.5 Description of model chainage locations along with peak flow rates and travel times.
From the three scenarios in table 4.5, the Existing breach failure scenario was the worst scenarios with short
periods of time releasing 1503000m3 of flood downstream of the dam.
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
2370 Legend
WS Max WS
2360 Ground
2350
2340
Elevation (m)
2330
2320
2310
2300
3 11 .49 2 8...
3 80 .31 0 4...
1 06 9 .2 6 1
1 27 0 .4 9 9
1 33 3 .0 9 7
1 40 6 .3 7 9
1 54 1 .6 2 9
1 60 9 .4 1 4
1 68 4 .4 6 3
1 75 7 .2 7 8
1 82 5 .0 9 8
1 88 2 .5 4 5
1 97 8 .2 6 8
2 11 1 .5 7 1
2 19 9 .1 2 5
2 27 8 .3 7 9
2 34 4 .5 1 2
2 40 0 .7 3 1
2 48 3 .4 0 9
2 54 9 .5 5 5
2 61 3 .8 9 5
2 68 5 .2 3 7
2 75 0 .9 4 2
2 83 6 .0 8 2
2 90 2 .8 0 1
2 99 8 .9 4 2
3 05 7 .2 6 1
3 12 1 .0 0 2
3 42 5 .6 8 9
3 51 5 .0 9 9
3 58 7 .9 0 8
3 66 2 .5 7 2
3 72 4 .9 7 2
3 79 5 .1 5 7
3 86 5 .2 5 9
3 94 1 .3 3 9
4 00 6 .0 6 9
4 06 8 .6 9 2
4 13 8 .4 5 4
4 20 0 .3 6 2
4 26 5 .2 6 7
4 33 0 .7 5 2
5 86 .87 7 3
6 48 .74 4 6
7 51 .42 0 3
8 19 .55 4 8
8 79 .53 1 9
9 36 .72 9 3
1 00 9 .2 5
1 13 0 .3 5
1 19 7 .2 7
1 47 7 .7 5
2 04 6 .8 9
3 24 5 .2 7
3 33 1 .7 3
4 97 .86 1
2 31 .0...
2290
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
Main Channel Dis tance (m)
WS M ax WS
Ground
2365
Elevation (m)
2360
2355
2350
0 100 200 300 400
Station (m )
Figure.4.3 Inline structure before breach of existing dam breach scenarios using HEC-RAS
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
WS 16DEC2015 0100
Ground
2365
Elevation (m)
2360
2355
2350
0 100 200 300 400
Station (m )
Figure.4.4 Inline structure after breach of existing dam breach scenarios using HEC-RAS
Plan: dam break study analys is River: Gomit River Reach: River Reach RS: 4368.102
2370 2000 Legend
Stage
2368 Flow
1500
2366
Flow (m3/s)
2364
Stage (m)
1000
2362
2360
500
2358
2356 0
2400 0015 0030 0045 0100
16Dec2015
Tim e
Figure 4.5 Breach outflow and water level at dam site (existing dam breach failure scenario Condition)
The flow hydrographs (water level versus time plots) at the dam site presented in Figure 4.5 above.The
hydrographs provide a description of the flood wave experienced at the inline structure. The dam breach (piping
failure) commenced at a time of 0 minutes with full failure of the dam occurring at 59 minutes. Figure 4.5
shows the computed breach outflow hydrograph at the dam site during normal operation. The green line shows
a peak value of 2306.05m3/s and a total duration of breach outflow of about 15 minutes. This short time flood
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
wave is due to the small reservoir. Given a constant discharge rate of 2306.05m3/s, it would take less than 12
minutes to drain 1503000m3 of water from the reservoir.
Plan: dam break study analys is River: Gomit River Reach: River Reach RS: 4358.011
2370 Legend
Stage
2368
2366
2364
Stage (m)
2362
2360
2358
2356
2354
2352
2400 0015 0030 0045 0100
16Dec2015
Tim e
Plan: dam break study analys is River: Gomit River Reach: River Reach RS: 3587.908
2351 2500 Legend
Stage
2350
Flow
2000
2349
2348
1500 Flow (m3/s)
Stage (m)
2347
2346
1000
2345
2344
500
2343
2342 0
2400 0015 0030 0045 0100
16Dec2015
Tim e
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
Plan: dam break study analys is River: Gomit River Reach: River Reach RS: 2344.512
2333 2500 Legend
Stage
Flow
2332
2000
2331
1500
Flow (m3/s)
Stage (m)
2330
1000
2329
500
2328
2327 0
2400 0015 0030 0045 0100
16Dec2015
Tim e
Plan: dam break study analys is River: Gomit River Reach: River Reach RS: 311.4928
2305 1800 Legend
Stage
1600
2304 Flow
1400
2303
1200
Flow (m3/s)
2302
Stage (m)
1000
2301 800
600
2300
400
2299
200
2298 0
2400 0015 0030 0045 0100
16Dec2015
Tim e
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
Table 4.6 Percentages of flooded areas in the left and right banks of Gomit River
5.3.3 Flood Inundation Mapping
Dam-breach flood-inundation maps indicate areas that may be flooded as a result of a dam failure. The maps are
used by wide range of end-users for planning and as a response tool to determine the effects of dam failure in
downstream areas. For this study, flood inundation maps were generated using HEC-GeoRAS and ArcGIS. The
maps were plotted using the worst-case scenario in order to show the largest area that could be inundated.
Subsequently, incremental consequence analyses were conducted separately using spreadsheets to assess
hazards and dam classifications.HEC-GeoRAS produces inundation maps for flood extent and depth and, as
shown in Figure 4.10, when displayed with aerial photographs can be used to identify the area impacted during
a dam failure scenario.
Figure 4.10 Inundation maps displaying flood warning times after dam failure.
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
Legend
4368.102
4265.267 WS Max WS
4138.454
4006.069 Ground
3865.259 Bank Sta
3724.972
3587.908
3331.73
3057.261
2998.942
2902.801
2836.082
2750.942
2613.895
2483.409
2344.512
2199.125
2046.89
1978.268
1825.098
1609.414
1477.75
1333.097
1197.27
1069.261
1009.25
936.7293
819.5548
648.7446
497.861
231.0668
To check up the validity of model generated output for its reliability for the model’s successful convergence and
to show the variation in the resulting hydraulic variables due to uncertainties involved in determination of
various inputs such as manning’s roughness, probable maximum flood(PMF),Dam breach parameters, and
cross-section spacing (∆x) & time steps(∆t). A sensitivity analysis of these inputs has been discussed below in
tables 4.7-4.8.In this study, the three interested location have been selected for describing the sensitivity
analysis of existing breach failure scenarios as follows.
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
The Sensitivity of time step (∆t), as above, was also examined for evaluating the stability of model computation,
as shown in table 4.12. As we have seen, as time step increases from to 30secondes to 120minutes, the
maximum water surface elevation changes from 2350.15m to2349.7m (difference of 0.46m only at cross-
section 12, and this difference were 0.3m and 0.35m at cross-section 28 and 57 respectively. These differences
are also insignificant compared to the value of total depth of flows at these cross-sections. A similare
presumption can be draw for velocity and time of travel.Thuse,the model results can be treated as
computationally stable.
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
4.2 Recommendation
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Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
Appendix-Hydrology
Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Max.
1994 0.51 1.63 0.48 2.97 9.13 46.70 40.10 30.40 44.80 16.60 15.30 1.20 46.70
1995 0.00 1.00 6.30 23.00 25.00 23.00 57.90 33.40 20.80 0.20 5.00 14.50 57.90
1996 5.90 7.00 23.00 20.10 24.20 27.60 84.80 66.00 41.00 8.30 12.50 2.30 84.80
1997 0.30 0.00 16.00 10.20 20.40 27.70 35.50 45.20 18.30 21.00 22.90 3.90 45.20
1998 1.60 0.00 18.00 10.10 15.00 47.60 29.40 23.50 40.00 22.50 1.20 0.00 47.60
1999 12.50 0.00 0.00 46.00 10.00 20.20 49.40 26.90 48.90 39.60 4.40 16.10 49.40
2000 0.00 0.00 6.80 15.70 27.00 46.80 43.50 31.70 16.60 28.00 20.00 20.30 46.80
2001 0.00 1.80 24.90 33.40 12.50 39.50 33.40 70.20 16.40 37.00 0.00 4.10 70.20
2002 3.00 1.20 12.60 15.50 2.80 31.40 29.20 37.30 51.80 6.70 6.00 2.00 51.80
2003 0.00 7.10 4.20 4.11 4.37 56.83 28.72 41.61 29.30 8.45 8.31 5.18 56.83
2004 5.20 5.70 6.70 11.30 18.00 21.40 45.20 36.30 21.80 12.20 8.00 2.20 45.20
2005 3.90 2.10 15.30 2.00 12.90 25.50 47.30 32.20 29.08 6.64 7.84 0.00 47.30
2006 0.00 1.10 9.30 13.80 23.00 79.60 38.30 32.70 29.10 15.30 15.30 4.40 79.60
2007 0.00 4.20 28.00 11.00 16.50 43.30 50.80 31.50 26.80 29.90 43.30 0.00 50.80
2008 4.30 5.00 0.00 43.30 45.60 21.30 40.00 27.10 16.00 19.00 7.40 6.20 45.60
2009 0.00 8.20 23.80 2.43 5.20 34.80 43.34 30.20 12.30 30.20 0.86 0.57 43.34
2010 6.30 0.00 7.40 12.50 34.40 30.70 65.60 38.30 35.30 7.50 10.50 7.90 65.60
2011 8.20 0.00 9.00 5.20 21.00 10.13 50.00 72.30 23.30 12.00 21.90 21.90 72.30
Avg. 12.50 8.20 28.00 46.00 45.60 79.60 84.80 72.30 51.80 39.60 43.30 21.90 84.80
Skewness 0.90
134
Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
135
Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
136
Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
EG Max WS
WS Max WS
Ground
Bank Sta
2370
2365
Elevation (m)
2360
2355
2350
0 100 200 300 400
Station (m)
Figure.5.4 Inline structure before breach of PMF failure scenarios using HEC-RAS
WS 16DEC2015 0100
EG 16DEC2015 0100
Ground
Bank Sta
2370
2365
Elevation (m)
2360
2355
2350
0 100 200 300 400
Station (m)
Figure.5.4 Inline structure after breach of PMF failure scenarios using HEC-RAS
137
Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
EG Max WS
WS Max WS
2360 Crit Max WS
Ground
2350
2340
Elevation (m)
2330
2320
2310
2300
2290
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
Main Channel Distance (m)
EG Max WS
WS Max WS
Ground
Bank Sta
2370
2365
Elevation (m)
2360
2355
2350
0 100 200 300 400
Station (m)
Figure upstream cross-sections inside the reservoir in HEC-RAS during PMF failure
138
Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
EG Max WS
WS Max WS
Ground
Bank Sta
2338
2336
Elevation (m)
2334
2332
2330
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
Station (m)
EG Max WS
WS Max WS
2302
Crit Max WS
Ground
Bank Sta
2301
2300
Elevation (m)
2299
2298
2297
2296
2295
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
Station (m)
Legend
4368.102
4265.267 WS Max WS
4138.454 Ground
4006.069 Bank Sta
3865.259
3724.972
3587.908
3331.73
3057.261
2998.942
2902.801
2836.082
2750.942
2613.895
2483.409
2344.512
2199.125
2046.89
1978.268
1825.098
1609.414
1477.75
1333.097
1197.27
1069.261
1009.25
936.7293
819.5548
648.7446
497.861
311.4928
Plan: dam break study analysis River: Gomit River Reach: River Reach RS: 2836.082
2338 1600 Legend
Stage
Flow
1400
2337
1200
1000
2336
Flow (m3/s)
Stage (m)
800
2335
600
400
2334
200
2333 0
2400 0015 0030 0045 0100
16Dec2015
Time
140
Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
Plan: dam break study analysis River: Gomit River Reach: River Reach RS: 4358.011
2370 1800 Legend
Stage
1600 Flow
2368
1400
2366
1200
2364
1000
Flow (m3/s)
Stage (m)
800
2362
600
2360
400
2358
200
2356 0
2400 0015 0030 0045 0100
16Dec2015
Time
Plan: dam break study analysis River: Gomit River Reach: River Reach RS: 145.6574
2300.0 1400 Legend
Stage
Flow
2299.5 1200
2299.0 1000
2298.5 800
Flow (m3/s)
Stage (m)
2298.0 600
2297.5 400
2297.0 200
2296.5 0
2400 0015 0030 0045 0100
16Dec2015
Time
141
Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
WS Max WS
EG Max WS
Ground
Bank Sta
2370
2365
Elevation (m)
2360
2355
2350
0 100 200 300 400
Station (m)
WS 16DEC2015 0100
EG 16DEC2015 0100
Ground
Bank Sta
2370
2365
Elevation (m)
2360
2355
2350
0 100 200 300 400
Station (m)
142
Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
EG Max WS
WS Max WS
2360 Crit Max WS
Ground
2350
2340
Elevation (m)
2330
2320
2310
2300
2290
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
Main Channel Distance (m)
143
Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
EG Max WS
WS Max WS
Ground
2336
Elevation (m)
2334
2332
2330
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
Station (m)
D/S XS-2
EG Max WS
WS Max WS
2302
Crit Max WS
Ground
Bank Sta
2301
2300
Elevation (m)
2299
2298
2297
2296
2295
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
Station (m)
144
Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
Plan: dam break study analysis River: Gomit River Reach: River Reach RS: 2836.082
2337.5 1200 Legend
Stage
2337.0 Flow
1000
2336.5
2336.0 800
2335.5
Flow (m3/s)
Stage (m)
600
2335.0
2334.5 400
2334.0
200
2333.5
2333.0 0
2400 0015 0030 0045 0100
16Dec2015
Time
Plan: dam break study analysis River: Gomit River Reach: River Reach RS: 4358.011
2368 1400 Legend
Stage
Flow
1200
2366
1000
2364
800
Flow (m3/s)
Stage (m)
2362
600
2360
400
2358
200
2356 0
2400 0015 0030 0045 0100
16Dec2015
Time
145
Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
Plan: dam break study analysis River: Gomit River Reach: River Reach RS: 145.6574
2299.5 1000 Legend
Stage
Flow
2299.0
800
2298.5
600
Flow (m3/s)
Stage (m)
2298.0
400
2297.5
200
2297.0
2296.5 0
2400 0015 0030 0045 0100
16Dec2015
Time
Legend
4368.102
4265.267 WS Max WS
4138.454 Ground
4006.069 Bank Sta
3865.259
3724.972
3587.908
3331.73
3057.261
2998.942
2902.801
2836.082
2750.942
2613.895
2483.409
2344.512
2199.125
2046.89
1978.268
1825.098
1609.414
1477.75
1333.097
1197.27
1069.261
1009.25
936.7293
819.5548
648.7446
497.861
311.4928
146
Analysis of earth dam failure and Assessment of Downstream Hazard Potential for Dam Failure 2015
References
147