ARGENTINA'S POSITION ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS: Making Waves

Author(s): Siân Herbert

Source: The World Today, Vol. 66, No. 4 (April 2010), pp. 8-10
Published by: Royal Institute of International Affairs
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41962508
Accessed: 07-02-2017 20:26 UTC

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PAGE 8
ARGENTINA'S POSITION ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
Siân Herbert, FREELANCE RESEARCHER AND POSTGRADUATE STUDENT AT LA FACULTAD LATINOAMERICANA DE CIENCIAS SOCIALES (FLASCO),

Making Wives
Political expediency, international politicking
Falklands story may have come
and oil exploration are creating a perfect as a surprise to many in Britain,
but when analysing the
storm around the tiny Atlantic Falkland changing political landscape of
Islands. Argentina's invasion 28 years ago tHE Argentine but changing as Falklands a LATEST when surpArrgiesnetinpeopolliitticisc,aitlisacnleaarlythsating story TWIST politics, to many may IN landscape it THE the is have in
this is ue has be n simmering since the eighties.
this month produced a dramatic crisis in Reas es ing Argentina's position on Las Islas
Malvinas is now more important than ever.
Anglo-Argentine relations, which the
The sovereignty of the Falkland Islands has
surrender of Argentine troops two months be n contested by Argentina for 17 years.
However, many did not predict that Desire
later only partly resolved. For Britain, winning Petroleum's announcement, in October, of a new
the war marked an end to conflict in the search for oil and gas, would provoke the
cur ent diplomatic fal out. In fact, similar
region, yet for Argentina the Islands have dril ing by Shel in 19 8 did not at ract nearly as
remained central to national ambitions and much at ention from Argentina or the
international community. So what has changed?
tensions are again at boiling point. Reclaiming the Islands is of icial y
Argentina's top foreign policy objective.

y CHATHAM HOUSE | INDEPENDENT THINKING ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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 PAGE 9

ARGENTĪNA

However, its strategy is now radically different opportunity to stage a media war enticing both
from that in the 1990s. The recent reaction can international attention and domestic support.
be understood as part of the traditional
strategic approach to the Falkland Islands,
which frames the conflict as an issue of SHIFTING STRATEGIES
sovereignty and decolonisation. The Argentine failure to win the Falklands
This policy was reinstated by former war marked a dramatic change in domestic
President Néstor Kirchner in 2003 and stands politics, fostering a new period of democracy.
in opposition to the pragmatic strategic Since the fall of the last military President
approach used by former President Carlos Reynaldo Bignone in 1983, there have been
Menem during the nineties, when the last oil three distinct foreign policy strategy phases and
exploration took place. these illuminate how and why policy towards
the Islands has changed.
The first phase marks the final period of the
PERFECT TRIGGER Cold War, from 1983-1989, in which President
The current search for oil is the perfect
Raúl Alfonsin introduced a non-aligned foreign
trigger for the political class in Argentina to
policy and a traditional approach to the
reinvigorate the international debate, asFalklands.
well as However, political and economic
to draw domestic public support for theproblems, combined with limited progress on
government. Internationally, the debatethe
is Islands, established a strong public
stagnant. The United Nations' Decolonisation
mandate for change.
Committee has issued multiple resolutions The second phase, 1989-1999, saw Menem
calling for negotiations, however Britain initiate these changes. He established an
declared these 'flawed' and declined to internationalist policy, strengthening
participate, as they do not refer to the Islanders' relationships with the United States, European
right to self-determination. Union, Britain and neighbouring South
At a national level, public support for the American countries. Menem also reformed the
Falklands cause has remained high since the Falklands strategy with a pragmatist approach.
eighties; although it is important to note that This broadened the debate by formally
this does not include backing for military recognising and including the Falkland
action. But support for current President, Islanders in negotiations - 'the seduction
Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, the wife of the strategy' - and pursuing cooperative
former president, who is believed still to be agreements with a view to sharing resources.
involved in running the country, is at an all This period saw the reestablishment of
time low of 18.4 percent, according to the Anglo-Argentine diplomatic relations in 1990,
consultancy Giacobbe and Asociados. the signing of the 1995 Hydrocarbons
Winning concessions on the Falkland Declaration and an Agreement on air travel,
Islands could prove advantageous for Kirchner passport control and fisheries in 1999. It also
in next year's presidential elections. It could heralded the first oil and gas exploration.
also help divert attention from the contentious Argentina supported this and drafted a law
battle in which she is currently embroiled, after requesting three percent of the profits made
she transferred $6.6 billion from the from any oil discovery. However, this met with
'independent' Central Bank to the Treasury, to protest from Britain and was thrown out in
repay national debts owed to foreign creditors. favour of 'better relations'. No complaint was
Moreover, Argentina's present economic made to the UN and everything passed beneath
difficulties have raised the stakes in discovering the radar of the international media.
'black gold', especially considering that the Nonetheless, recovering the Falklands
current oil price is around $80 per barrel, remained the core strategic objective through
compared to $12 in 1998. this period. In fact, in 1994 the Argentine
If geologists are correct, up to sixty billion Constitution was amended to state that 'The
barrels of oil could be found in the region. Such recovery of said territories [Malvinas] and the
a discovery would come at a good time for full exercise of sovereignty, respectful of the
Argentina which is facing a possible energy way of life of their inhabitants and in
crisis after years of underinvestment in accordance with the principles of international
exploration and production. law, are a permanent and irrenounceable
Desire Petroleum's endeavours have objective of the Argentine people.'
therefore given the Kirchners the perfect Towards the end of Menem's term, the

ARGENTINIAN PRESIDENT CRISTINA KIRCHNER WITH HER HUSBAND AND FORMER PRESIDENT, NESTOR j
FLICKR.COM/PHOTOS/MARIANOEFE/ ;

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PAGE 10

pragmatist and seduction strategies

has significantly strengthened relationships in
were widely seen to have failed; they
Latin America and prompted public
had won few concessions and were announcements of support for their claim.
viewed as having undermined the The timely meeting of the Rio Group in
country's claim to sovereignty by Mexico in February presented the ideal
elevating the position of the Islanders. opportunity to thrust the issue into the
The economic crisis of 2001 entirely spotlight and Kirchner devoted almost all
undermined Menem's economic and her speech to it. The Group, which has
political policies, prompting a supported Argentina's case for years, reiterated
clamour for change once again. its stance, but this time the announcement
These phases set the context for attracted global attention.
the current regionalist foreign policy Strong statements of support from Brazilian
introduced by the Kirchners in 2003: President, Lula da Silva, and Venezuelan
strengthening relationships and President, Hugo Chávez, only fanned the
coordination within Latin America. flames, both have significant influence in the
As Peronists, the Kirchners define region. Brazil, as a BRIC country, is already an
themselves as anti colonial. This has influential international player. It seized the
resonated with a number of other opportunity to publicly attack the UN Security
'FROM A BRITISH
countries in the region, possibly Council for being incompetent and unfair,
PERSPECTIVE
winning the friendship of Venezuela, thereby boosting its longstanding bid for a
YOU'VE GOT TO BE which agreed to lend Argentina $5 permanent Brazilian seat.
COMPLETELY billion to service its public debt in 2005. These relationships have helped legitimise
UNAMBIGUOUS. There has also been a complete Argentina's claims and contributed to

THIS IS BRITISH reversal of strategy towards the heightened international media coverage.
Falkland Islands: the traditional They have also attracted the attention of the
TERRITORY, BRITISH approach has been reinstated, US, which seems keen to appease Latin
SOVEREIGNTY IS AT focussing on sovereignty and America, in light of President Barack Obama's
STAKE. JUST bilateral negotiations between new foreign policy realignment.
BECAUSE IT'S ON Britain and Argentina, with the US Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, paid a
Islanders excluded. surprise visit to Kirchner in March when she
THE OTHER SIDE OF
This is demonstrated by talked publicly about the need for dialogue and
THE WORLD DOES
Argentina's withdrawal from the referred to the Islands using both titles. This
NOT ALTER THE FACT 1995 Hydrocarbons Declaration on has led some to suspect a shift in Washington's
THERE ARE BRITISH the eve of the twenty-fifth traditionally neutral policy.
CITIZENS LIVING anniversary of the war in 2007 and

THERE AND THEY by Kirchner's decree to restrict

maritime activity between Argentina MISTY FUTURE
ARE ENTITLED TO
and the Falkland Islands in February. Current internal problems put Argentina in
LIVE THERE FREE This recent event is really a a precarious position, both politically and
FROM ARBITRARY continuation of policies set in motion economically. As history shows, presidents
MOLESTATION OR in 2003. However, what is new and come and go, bringing with them new policies

THREAT FROM surprising, is the amount of
international attention it has
ARGENTINA. I THINK
received. The question remains, why
YOU'LL FIND VERY has Kirchner's decree provoked such
STRONG CROSS- an eruption of diplomatic statements
PARTY SUPPORT ON and global media coverage?
and new objectives. However, one war and 28
years later, the Falklands issue is still far from
being resolved and will remain the official top
objective for Argentine foreign policy.
The Kirchners will also continue to employ
the traditional approach, seeking sovereignty of

THE FALKLAND the Islands without compromise. When

Argentina goes to the polls next year, things
ISLANDS.' DIPLOMATIC
look set to change in domestic politics but are
FRENZY unlikely to on the international front;
Kirchner's decree has already been officially
The recent Falklands frenzy has put
the issue back on the foreign policy supported by all other political parties.
agenda of both Britain and the Meanwhile, Desire Petroleum plans to drill six
international community. This success
to eight more wells this year. If it succeeds in
confirming oil reserves, the situation could F~i
for Argentina is, in part, a result of the
be
Kirchners' regionalist approach, which diplomatically explosive. EH

□ CHATHAM HOUSE | INDEPENDENT THINKING ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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