Cambridge Review of International Affairs,

Volume 21, Number 3, September 2008

European small states’ military policies after the

Cold War: from territorial to niche strategies

Jean-Marc Rickli1
University of Oxford

Abstract This article looks at the evolution of European small states’ military policies
after the Cold War. Traditionally, small states faced a security dilemma between favouring
influence and guaranteeing sovereignty. These security options were embodied by the
strategy of alliance and the policy of neutrality. This article argues that in today’s unipolar
world small states’ security policy must be cooperative either in the form of joining a
security institution or an ad hoc coalition. This has two consequences for small states’
military policies. These can either favour niche or lead/framework nation strategies. This in
turn, depends on the strategic ambitions of the small states, which are ultimately mediated
by their strategic culture. This article concludes by looking at the military policies of Cold
War neutral states after the Cold War.

Introduction
An important characteristic of the European strategic environment since the end
of the Cold War has been the proliferation of small states, which represent the
majority of the new European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) member states. The aim of this article is to explore European small states’
military policies after the Cold War. Military policy concerns the use of military
power to uphold defence and security policies. It has a broader meaning than
most states assign to defence policy—which relates to the defence of the national
territory—and a narrower sense than security policy, which coordinates all
relevant state instruments to ensure the security of the nation and its people
(Art 2003, 3; Posen 1984, 13; Rosecrance and Stein 1993, 4). Military policy
encompasses four dimensions: the military aspects of security policy, military
doctrines, force structure and operational deployments.
The current European strategic environment is very different than that existing
20 years ago. Former divisions have been subsumed through the integration of the
EU and the enlargement of NATO. As a corollary, traditional territorial threats
have been replaced by multifaceted risks, and the use of military force for
territorial purposes has become increasingly irrelevant. A new paradigm focusing
on expeditionary operations has emerged. In order for military power to be
relevant it has to be projectable. Small states invested considerable resources for

1
The author would like to thank Webster University Geneva for the research grant
provided to write this article.

ISSN 0955-7571 print/ISSN 1474-449X online/08/030307–19 q 2008 Centre of International Studies

DOI: 10.1080/09557570802253435
308 Jean-Marc Rickli

their territorial defence during the Cold War. Since, by definition, small states lack
resources yet military restructuring is costly, an interesting question arises: what
military options do small states have at their disposal in the current unipolar
environment? In other words how have European small states’ military policies
changed after the Cold War?
The interest in small states’ security has been cyclical (Neumann and Gstöhl
2004). With the decolonization, from the 1950s to the mid-1970s, the main interest
was in the survival of small states in a world dominated by two superpowers. It
contrasted those arguing for cooperation through alignment (Keohane 1969;
Rothstein 1968; Vital 1971) with those favouring an independent policy through
neutrality (Däniker 1966; Ralston 1969). From the mid-1970s to the end of the 1980s
small states’ security was discarded. The proliferation of small states after the
Cold War especially in Europe has aroused a renewed interest in small states’
security (Inbar and Sheffer 1997; Neumann et al 2006; Wiberg 1996). Some studies
have looked at the impact of the EU on small states’ security (Baillie 1998;
Goetschel 2000; Molis 2006; Thorhallsson 2000; Wivel 2005), others on the security
options of small states within a military alliance (Gärtner 2001; Mouritzen 1991;
Wivel 2003) and in NATO (Männik 2004; Setälä 2004; Simon 2005) or
independently (Matthews and Zhang Yan 2007). Though there has been an
interest in small states’ foreign policy (Fendius Elman 1995; Hey 2003; Jazbec
2001), very few studies have discussed the general security options that small
states face since the end of the Cold War (Goetschel 1998). Similarly, the issue of
the use of force for small states has hardly been analysed after the Cold War
(de Wijk 2004).
The aim of this article is to contribute to filling these gaps. It argues that
European small states’ security options in today’s unipolar world have been
narrowed down to adopting cooperative strategies, either in the form of joining ad
hoc coalitions or security institutions. It follows that small states have two options
to conduct their military policy: they can either adopt niche or lead/framework
nations’ strategies.2 These arguments are developed by first defining small states
and then looking at the security dilemma they are facing. The next two sections
discuss small states’ military strategies during the Cold War: alliance and
neutrality. Changes in the strategic environment are then highlighted and their
consequences for small states’ military policy options are the subject of the next
two sections. This article concludes by confronting the assumptions with the
actual development of the European neutral and nonallied states’ military policies
after the Cold War. The states discussed below have been chosen because they
represent—due to their Cold War experience—the most unlikely candidates for
adapting according to the assumptions laid down in this article.

Small states’ security

There are fierce disagreements over the definition of small states, which can be
delineated by four generations of scholars dealing with this issue. The first

2
A lead nation provides strategic decision-making and command including the
provision of command, control, communication, computer and intelligence (C4I), whereas
a framework nation provides the basic organization for carrying out an operation.
 Military policy strategies of European small states 309

generation, which stems from the realist tradition, adopted a definition that was
based on the geographic or demographic size of the country or the gross domestic
product (GDP) (Vital 1966, 1971). As a reaction to these quantitative definitions
other theorists choose a more qualitative standpoint. The second generation,
associated with the neoliberals, focused on the role and the influence of small
states in the system (Keohane 1969; Rothstein 1968), whereas the third generation
influenced by the constructivists, adopted a psychological definition which
maintained that smallness was a matter of self-perception (Hey 2003). These
definitions are not really helpful because they are static and do not improve our
understanding of the behavioural consequences of smallness. This has led some
scholars to reject small states as a conceptual tool of analysis (Baehr 1975; Handel
1990). However, a fourth generation of scholars has adopted a dynamic definition
by considering smallness through its relation with power (Goetschel 1998; Wivel
2005): a small state is a state that has a deficit of power due to its weak ability to
mobilize resources, which could be material, relational or normative. Rather than
considering small states on the basis of the power they possess, the focus is thus
on the actual power they exercise (Mouritzen and Wivel 2005, 3). Power is here
conceived as both the capacity to modify the conduct of other states while at the
same time preventing other from affecting its own behaviour (Goetschel 1998, 15).
In other words, power represents the ability to remain autonomous while
influencing other. Adopting such a definition avoids the problems highlighted
above by relating small states’ behaviour to power, which in return is defined by
the norms and rules in the international system. Moreover, this relational
perspective accounts for power differential in different relations as a state can be
weak in one area but powerful in another. For instance, Switzerland is a small state
in all but the financial field where it exerts some global influence.
This article adopts the relational approach of the fourth generation. Thus,
smallness will be treated not as primarily stemming from the size or the
population of states but from the lack of power that can be exerted (Thorhallsson
and Wivel 2006, 655). Due to their lack of resources, small states lack the power to
set agendas—meaning they have a limited capacity to influence or modify the
conduct of others and lack the power to prevent others from influencing their own
behaviour (Fendius Elman 1995, 171). The aim of small states’ security policies
therefore becomes to minimize or compensate for this power deficit (Goetschel
1998, 19).
Due to their lack of resources, small states have to choose between two security
policy options: they can either opt for influence or autonomy (Mouritzen 1997,
101 –106; Wivel 2005, 396) (see Figure 1). If a small state decides to maximize
its influence, it adopts a cooperative strategy, which corresponds to joining an

SECURITY

Defensive Cooperative
Great powers

AUTONOMY Offensive INFLUENCE

strategy
Figure 1. Small state’s strategic dilemma (with small states’ strategic options in italic)
310 Jean-Marc Rickli

alliance. The security policy options for a small state favouring influence are thus
either balancing or bandwagoning strategies (Waltz 1979). A small state can either
ally against or with the threats (Walt 1987). This allows the small state to benefit
from the protection and the dissuasion engendered by a great power but at the
expense of its autonomy. A small state risks being entrapped by the policy of its
bigger partner and, therefore, fighting wars that are not in its direct interests.
Moreover, uncertainty is always present since protection by the bigger partner can
never be taken for granted (Wiberg 1996, 37). On the other hand, a small state can
choose to protect its autonomy. In this case, it adopts a defensive policy. This
security policy option favours sovereignty. The small state does not expect
protection from major powers and consequently can expect to stay out of
others’ wars. The corollary to this is that the small state risks being abandoned by
the great powers in the system. Traditionally this option was characterized by the
adoption of a policy of neutrality (Reiter 1996).
In any case, because of their deficit of power, small states cannot adopt an
offensive strategy. This requires that they would be capable of both exerting
influence while guaranteeing autonomy. As former Finnish President Urho
Kekkonen argued,
One of the lessons which history teaches us is that a small people like the Finns
cannot coerce its neighbours into the kind of settlements which it would like. Our
own resources are not adequate for that and relying on outside support would
mean throwing oneself on the mercy of the unknown as well as sowing the seeds of
discord. (1982, 17 – 18)
Because only great powers have the ability to influence the structure of the
international system while guaranteeing their security, they can have an offensive
strategy (Reiter 1996, 65). They do it for reasons of self-preservation and to
maintain their relative positions and prestige in the system (Claude 1986, 725). It is
important to note that small states can nonetheless sometimes use offensive
strategies if they are confronted with smaller states. Yet, their military policies are
always modelled on defensive or cooperative structures because it is the only way
to compensate for their power deficit vis-à-vis more powerful states.
The traditional security dilemma for small states is therefore between
protecting autonomy or maximizing influence. The means chosen to deal with this
dilemma depend in turn both on the meaning of power within the international
system and on the domestic acceptability of different policy strategies within the
given small state. According to Hedley Bull, states live in a society of states
defined as ‘a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common
values’ which ‘conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their
relations with one another, and share in the working of common organizations’
(1977, 13). Since power is a relational concept, it is affected not only by states’
material capabilities but also by the norms and organizations of the international
society. It follows that the perception and significance of smallness depend on the
nature of the international society (Goetschel 1997, 37). As Goetschel rightly puts
it, ‘depending on the general normative nature of the international system and the
specific international arrangement concerned[,] small states have to make
different kinds of reflections in order to maximize their sovereignty or to minimize
their power deficit’ (1998, 27). In situations of mature anarchy—that is, when the
system reaches a certain degree of institutionalization—the influence of norms
 Military policy strategies of European small states 311

and organizations will be greater than in a zero-sum game situation typical of

immature anarchy. This fact is even truer for small states since they have limited
access to material resources and therefore tend to ‘favour discourses that
institutionalize rules and norms, such as international law, international regimes
and international organizations’ (Neumann and Gstöhl 2004, 19). Institutionaliza-
tion, by formalizing certain sets of norms and rules, opens them to debate and
question and therefore makes them subject to revisions.
It follows that in international society, the existing international norms and
international organizations ‘qualify the power deficit of small states and the policy
strategies open to them’ (Goetschel 1998, 19). Although all small states evolve in
the same international system they do not respond to its challenges in similar
ways. Indeed, strategic culture defined as ‘a nation’s tradition, values, attitudes,
pattern of behaviour, habits, symbols, achievements and particular way of
adapting to the environment and solving problems with respect to the threat and
use of force’ (Booth 1990, 121), determines the shape and the content of its military
policy by acting as a lens through which the international system is seen and by
defining the ranges of military responses that a state can choose from. The deficit
of power of small states forces them to adopt cooperative or defensive strategies,
but strategic culture impacts on their interests by determining the ideal ratio
between their dual goals of autonomy and influence in the international system.
Strategic culture therefore contributes to explaining why a small state chooses a
rather cooperative or defensive policy as well as variations between states
adopting a similar defence posture.3 The next section analyses the different
European small states’ military policies during the Cold War.

Neutral military policies during the Cold War

During the Cold War, the content of the security policy of the armed neutral states4
derived from the legal definition of neutrality codified in the 1907 Hague
Convention. Since such states must abstain from war directly and indirectly—they
are not able to support or favour parties with military forces—therefore their
security policy was marked by the impossibility of taking part in any military
alliance or collective defence agreement. This condition was even stronger for
permanent neutral states that worked unequivocally to prevent themselves from
being drawn into future conflicts. The choice of neutrality also implies that the
neutral state acknowledges that greater security cannot be guaranteed by joining a
defence alliance or a collective security organization, which obliges its members to
join military sanctions. Consequently, the armed neutrals had to demonstrate the
ability to defend themselves autonomously against violation of their neutrality
and to maintain their territorial integrity. Moreover, their neutral status required
that they achieved this by conducting a nonaggressive policy.

3
For reasons of space and also because of the focus of this article, I will not deal with
the influence of strategic culture and domestic factors to explain variations between similar
strategic postures or of the process of policy adaptation. These issues are addressed in
Rickli (forthcoming).
4
These were Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland.
312 Jean-Marc Rickli

The military policy of armed neutrality relied on a two-tier military doctrine

composed of dissuasion and territorial defence. The former relied on the
assumption that the military cost the aggressor would be prepared to risk in
fighting would be relatively low because of the marginal strategic value of the
small neutral states (Karsh 1988, 64). Dissuasion was achieved by the adoption of
an independent and comprehensive conception of defence: total defence, which
combined military forces with a ‘well-developed civil defence structure and an
attempt to “link” the civilian economy and political infrastructure explicitly in
defence planning’ (Stein 1990, 17). The territorial defence system could take
different forms as long as it upheld a nonaggressive policy that was not adapted to
the conduct of external military operations (Roberts 1986, 43). The force structure
of the armed neutrals derived from the requirements imposed by their defence
strategy, namely being dissuasive and autonomous. The linchpin of the neutrals’
armed forces organization relied on its draft system, which considers the ‘citizen’s
capability to fight’ as a ‘prerequisite for the success of the defence strategy’
(Callaghan and Kernic 2001, 193). The epitome of this draft conception is the
militia system.5 Unlike conscription, this draft system is not aimed at winning a
war or defeating the enemy’s army but at preserving the country’s independence;
therefore, the neutrals’ concept of a soldier was closer to the idea of ‘citizen in
uniform than the one of warriors’ (193).
In terms of operational engagements, since the neutral state had to avoid
anything that would entangle them in war, their armed neutrality policy was
characterized by an aversion to use force outside one’s own territory. Although
Austria, Finland and Sweden contributed to peace-keeping operations during the
Cold War, they did not conceive their participation as a military contribution to
international security. Peace-keeping was considered a political practice, rather
than a military option, undertaken by the United Nations (UN) as the neutral third
party, to prevent conflict escalation. Moreover, for the neutral states participating
in peace-keeping operations, such operations were considered as enhancing their
national and international prestige and thus increased the political cost of
violating their neutrality, which in turn strengthened their own security
(Sundelius 1989, 110). Still, the constraints linked to the conduct of a credible
military policy of armed neutrality required that this policy should not be
perceived as threatening. This was achieved by the build-up of dissuasive military
capability, which could not be used beyond the neutral state’s territory. This
military policy was upheld by a neutral strategic culture, which was composed of
an unmitigated objective to remain in peace even when the others are at war and
of a general aversion to the use of military force (Vetschera 1985, 67). In short, the
neutrals’ strategic culture was underpinned by a peace culture. Yet, it did not
mean that neutral states could not have a military policy: these states adopted a
defensive military policy, which justified the use of force only for the preservation
of the national territory (Penttilä 1994, 65). The neutral strategic culture was
therefore based on Vegetius’ aphorism ‘if you want peace, prepare for war.’

5
It is worth nothing that Switzerland is the only state to have adopted a true militia
system.
 Military policy strategies of European small states 313

Allied military policies during the Cold War

In contrast to the neutrals, the allies’ military policy was strongly influenced
by their membership in a military alliance, either NATO or the Warsaw Pact.6
For NATO member states,7 the obligation of collective defence defined the
overarching aim of their security policy as these states agreed to assist each other
by any actions deemed necessary, ‘including the use of armed force’, in case of
armed aggression (NATO 1949, article 5). Unlike neutral states, the hallmark of
NATO member states’ military policy was that their national security was heavily
dependent on their allies’ military policy. Potentially divergent national security
interests were brought together by an underlying sense of common security
interests—associated with the predominant threat of the Soviet Union—as well as
through NATO integrated military structure. This provided the umbrella for
bilateral and multilateral cooperation between the allied armed forces.8
Collective defence was implemented at the strategic level by the doctrine of
nuclear deterrence with all European allied states relying on the American nuclear
umbrella to deter any attack from the Soviet Union. At the operational level, each
national member states’ armed forces were tailored for territorial defence. Yet,
contrary to the neutrals, NATO members’ armed forces were trained for the
defence of both national territory and neighbouring NATO countries. To this
purpose, eight allied army corps were lined up in the Federal Republic of
Germany and the bulk of NATO armed forces were trained to stop a conventional
territorial invasion of the Warsaw Pact armed forces in central Europe and
Germany (Rearden 1995). Similarly, multinational units such as the Allied
Command Europe Mobile Force (AMF) were created so as to integrate forces from
several allied nations.9 However, it is important to note that although NATO
provided an integrated military structure, the bulk of the Allies’ national armed
forces were still primarily designed to fight on their national territory and were
therefore structured for territorial defence missions and relied on conscription.10
In terms of operational engagement, the NATO armed forces’ deployments were
primarily focused on national territories and those of the neighbours. Although
the Allies’ armed forces were never committed in real combat operations, they
nonetheless acquired international experience through various joint military
exercises such as the yearly multinational naval exercise Ocean Safari.
Unlike the neutral strategic culture, the allied strategic culture was thus
marked neither by a desire to remain in peace when others are at war, nor by an
aversion to use military power. On the contrary, the obligation linked to collective

6
The Warsaw Pact was composed originally of Albania (which left in 1961), Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union since 1955 and then the
Democratic Republic of Germany since 1956.
7
During the Cold War, NATO founding members comprised Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the
United Kingdom and the United States since 1949, which were joined by Greece and Turkey
in 1952, the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955 and Spain in 1982.
8
France left the NATO integrated military structure in 1966; Spain never joined.
9
The AMF was originally composed of Belgium, Germany, United States and United
Kingdom but counted troops from 17 allied nations when it was disbanded in 2002. It
originally aimed at responding to any crisis on NATO’s flanks (Gambles 1989).
10
One exception was the United Kingdom, which switched to professional troops in 1963.
314 Jean-Marc Rickli

defence compelled NATO member states to adopt a very proactive military policy
to support a collective endeavour in order to thwart a potential Soviet aggression.
The allied strategic culture was therefore based around the concept of deterrence
through ‘l’union fait la force’. By pooling military capabilities together and
demonstrating the willingness to adopt offensive behaviour, it was hoped that the
Soviet Union would be deterred from resorting to force.

Small states’ security after the Cold War

The end of the Cold War has been marked by three important developments for
military policy. Firstly, the United States’ (US) power has consistently outpaced
those of its rivals since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Thus, in 2006 US military spending
amounted to 46 per cent of the world total military expenditure and accounted for
62 per cent of the total increase in world military expenditure (Stalenheim et al 2007,
269). This imbalance is characteristic of a unipolar system (Mowle and Sacko 2007b;
Reus-Smit 2004; Wohlforth 1999). The direct security implication for small states is
that the incentive for bandwagoning increases and cooperative strategies become
the only realistic strategic option (Mowle and Sacko 2007a, 603). By allying with the
most powerful state in the system, small states increase their power without being
as concerned about possible retaliations from other states, as they would in a bipolar
or multipolar system. This can be illustrated by South Korea’s support of the US war
in Iraq: the rationale behind the decision was not related to a perceived threat of the
Iraqi nuclear program but rather linked to Seoul’s attempt to influence
Washington’s policy towards Pyongyang (Geunwook Lee 2006). The only danger
associated with this cooperative strategy is represented by the punishment that the
hegemon can exert on the small state. Yet, the US is depicted as rather benevolent
(Kagan 1998) and when faced with a benevolent hegemon, small states will try to
increase their influence by siding with the strongest side. That the US did not seem
to represent a danger to small states despite the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan was
demonstrated by the support of 13 post-communist states—most of them small
states—to the Anglo-American position on Iraq in 2003 (Fawn 2006).
Secondly, in a benevolent unipolar strategic environment threats of strategic
importance are replaced by risks (Bailes 2007). As Moskos rightly argues, ‘one key
difference between Modern and Postmodern societies lies in the character of the
threats they face and the ways they perceive them’ (2000, 16). The clearly
identified territorial threats arising from the bipolar struggle, which served as the
guidelines of defence planning, have been replaced by increasing uncertainty
embodied in the concept of ‘risks’ (Fitzsimmons 2006). Unlike threats, which are
precisely identified through hostile intent supported by the required capabilities,
risks are the ‘product of the probability and utility of some future event’ (Adams
1995, 30). They give more importance to perceived future consequences than do
threats. As Rasmussen convincingly argues, ‘it is not present actions that are to
produce future results but perceived future results that produce present actions’
(2006, 38), thus meaning that if states know that they might be able to prevent an
unwanted occurrence from happening this gives them the duty to protect the
future from the present. It therefore follows that the logic of risks leads to
preemptive and preventive strategies (39). Yet, these strategies are characterized
by the subjective perception of risks. Therefore the main consequence of the
 Military policy strategies of European small states 315

replacement of concrete territorial threats by risks is that European states have

become more selective in their use of military force (Rickli 2007a). This in turn
implies that they no longer fight wars of necessity but wars of choice. Before 2001,
military power was used by the European states when it became obvious that
crisis at their doorstep could destabilize Europe, such as in the case of Bosnia or
Kosovo. They also used force for humanitarian purposes (Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti,
Sierra Leone) or for reestablishing a regional (Kosovo) or global order (Iraq). Thus
far, the EU has conducted eight military operations or operations with a military
component (Concordia, Artemis, AMIS Darfur, EUFOR Althea, EUSEC RDC,
EUFOR RDC, EU SSR Guinea-Bissau, EUFOR Tchad), and NATO is strongly
committed in Afghanistan (ISAF) and Kosovo (KFOR) (Rickli 2007b). More
recently, although the terrorist attacks in the US on 11 September 2001 and in
Madrid on 11 March 2004 have contributed to giving priority to fighting terrorism,
European small states’ military policies are nonetheless marked by an increasing
selectivity of the use of military force after the Cold War.
Finally, the last development pertains to the transformation of the European
security environment. The transformation of NATO and the EU into security and risk
management organizations represents a typical example of a situation of mature
anarchy. These organizations now provide security governance in Europe and are
building blocks on which a European security community develops (Webber et al
2004). In this environment, where the threats of territorial attack have vanished,
adopting a policy favouring autonomy is counterproductive. As Wivel rightly notes,
defending autonomy by means of institutional opt-outs has little effect when the
greatest threat against state autonomy is the ability of other states to carry out their
agenda either inside or outside EU institutions. (2005, 407)
It follows that the adoption of a cooperative strategy has become the most efficient
strategic option and that European security organizations are therefore the main
channel for the conduct of small states’ military policy. In the case of NATO, small
states use the organization to strengthen their security and to influence the policy
of the US in their favour (Simon 2005). Unlike great and middle powers, which
have access to larger resources and, therefore, greater room of manoeuvre, small
states’ military policies are mainly influenced by the developments within these
organizations. Faced with new risks and challenges that can only be addressed
through multinational cooperation, both the EU and NATO have been very
instrumental in shaping European security policies towards greater solidarity
beyond the sole case of territorial aggression (European Council 2003, 1, 13; NATO
1999, article 8). Both the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and NATO
have promoted a vision of international politics, which relies on states’ cooperation
to address any challenges that may destabilize the Euro-Atlantic areas and to
promote a liberal order (European Council 2003, 13; NATO 1999, article 26).
To sum up, the current unipolar strategic environment characterized by risks
and a high level of security institutionalization renders a defensive posture for
small states counterproductive. During the Cold War, neutral states’ autonomy
was acceptable because their defence preparations contributed to international
stability, but in today’s environment an autonomous posture is equated with
security free-riding. Opting out cannot combat global risks. Therefore, small
states’ security strategy must favour cooperation. The best way to achieve this is
by joining and exerting influence through either institutional membership or
316 Jean-Marc Rickli

participation in coalitions. The next section identifies the main military policy
options for small states in this new strategic environment (see Table 1).

Post-Cold War military policy options for European small states

In an era of global risks, adopting preventive and preemptive strategies, which rely
on the projection of military power, is the only way to defuse crisis and avert
dangers. As the European Security Strategy (ESS) puts it, ‘we need to develop a
strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary robust intervention’
(European Council 2003, 11). The hallmark of the post-Cold War European strategic
culture is thus based on the requirement of prevention, which aims at defusing
conflicts before they erupt (7). The Europeans acknowledged the importance of
crisis management early on by making the Petersberg tasks11 the core functions
of the Western European Union (WEU) and then of the EU. The 1999 NATO Strategic
Concept reached the same conclusions (NATO 1999). However, the rise of strategic
terrorism and other asymmetric threats has extended the scope of the use of military
force beyond crisis management. The ESS has therefore expanded the Petersberg
tasks to include ‘joint disarmament operations, support for third countries in
combating terrorism and security sector reform’, and NATO, with the creation of the
NATO Response Force (NRF), is ready to project a war-fighting force wherever it is
needed (European Council 2003, 13). As Lindley-French rightly observes, the post-
Cold War strategic reality has imposed on European armed forces the need to ‘go
further, fight harder, stand tougher and stay longer’ (2004, 202).
The new strategic environment requires the abandonment of the fixed legacy
capabilities of the Cold War and the development of new capabilities to project
and maintain forces, as well as fight in distant places (NATO 1999, article 52). Yet,
adopting expeditionary capabilities to cover the full spectrum of risks implies the
ability to sustain extensive combat operations far beyond one’s national territory
and is therefore beyond the reach of small states. On the other hand, the ability to
work and to fight jointly has set the standard for the reform of European military
forces. Thus, interventions supported by the ability of joint power projection
represent the hallmark of post-Cold War European military doctrines.
Small states can basically contribute to two types of operations, which in turn
depend on the strategic ambitions of the country (de Wijk 2004). In the framework of
a cooperative strategy, the strategic ambition of a small state is defined by the extent
of the influence it would like to exert on a coalition or an alliance. This influence is
conditioned by its strategic culture and is strongly related to the type of operations
the small state is ready to contribute. Small states with low strategic ambition limit
their participations to low intensity Petersberg operations (Howorth 2006, 59). These
comprise stabilization and reconstruction operations. In terms of assets required,
light armoured infantry, civil-military units, C4I and combat service support
elements such as maintenance, construction, medical services and transportation are
sufficient (Kerttunen 2005, 29). Small states with higher strategic ambitions can
participate in high intensity Petersberg operations. These comprise small-scaled
enforcement or counterterrorist operations. In addition to the aforementioned assets

11
These operations consist in ‘humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and
tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking’ (WEU 1992).
 Table 1. Small states’ military policies options after the Cold War

Expeditionary operations

Homeland defence Low strategic ambitions High strategic ambitions

Strategic level Prevention/protection Stabilization/reconstruction Enforcement

Operational level † Territorial protection Niche: Niche:
† Subsidiary assistance † Logistics † Special operations forces
† Police mission † Transportation † NBC protection and combat
† Intelligence † Medical † Counterterrorism
† C4I Lead/framework nation
† Civil/military cooperation (CIMIC)
Lead/framework nation
Armed forces structure † Conscription † Division of tasks between conscripts and professional † Professional
† Professional † Modularity † Modularity
† Interoperability † Network-centric
Military policy strategies of European small states 317
318 Jean-Marc Rickli

this type of operations also requires combat support elements such as special
operations forces, nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) protections, air defence,
unmanned aerial vehicles or mine hunters.
For each type of operation, a small state has two basic operational choices. It
can adopt a niche strategy by specializing in a specific type of force, which is in
need. For instance, Norway has specialized in special operations forces, the
Czech Republic in NBC elements, and Lithuania is developing water purification
capabilities. Niche strategy can also be developed within a multinational pool of
forces gathering military forces of several small states. Thus, the Benelux countries
have developed an integrated staff structure of their naval units for use in external
operations (Admiral Benelux),12 and the Nordic states have pooled some of their
military resources through the Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military
Peace Support (NORDCAPS),13 to enhance cooperation in crisis management
operations. Adopting a niche strategy allows the small state to have codecision
power at the operational level and strategic leverage if its specialized capabilities
are desperately needed. However, the disadvantage of such a strategy is that
scarce resources will be used extensively and, therefore, small states’ capabilities
can be overstretched. If a small state wants to play a more important operational
role it can adopt a framework or a lead nation strategy. In that case, it will be
responsible for planning the operation and providing the key elements of C4I. For
instance, Sweden has adopted this strategy by deciding to become the framework
nation of the Nordic EU Battlegroup (EUBG). This operational choice provides the
small state with a strategic role since it is responsible for the conduct of an
operation. Yet, in addition to the disadvantages mentioned for a niche strategy, a
framework/lead nation strategy also entails international responsibilities, making
the small state more vulnerable to international pressures. These two strategies
imply role specialization that can only be achieved through enhanced defence
integration, which pools resources and creates more collective capabilities (de
Wijk 2004). The EU 2010 Headline Goal (HG 2010) through the European Defence
Agency is working in this direction by favouring role specialization.
The complex nature of intervention operations and the increasing sophisti-
cation of weapon systems have also imposed strong constraints on the structure of
the armed forces. The necessities of power projection require armed forces to be
structured along the principles of deployability, sustainability, interoperability,
flexibility, mobility, survivability and command and control (European Council
2001, 98; 2005, 111; NATO 1999, article 53d). In particular, based on the European
approach and experiences in crisis management, interoperability includes not
only military, but also civilian and civil-military aspects (European Council 2005,
112). Moreover, in order to maintain a minimal interoperability with the US
military, the Europeans must transform their armed forces along the lines of
network enabled operations and effect based operations (de Wijk 2004, 132).14

12
Luxemburg participates only financially.
13
After the establishment of the Nordic EU Battle group, the NORDCAPS pool of forces
was abolished in May 2006.
14
Network enabled operations rely on the ability to work along the principles of
network centric warfare (Garstka 2003, 58). Effect-based operations can be defined as
‘coordinated set of actions directed at shaping the behaviour of friends, neutrals and foes in
peace, crisis and war’ (Smith 2002, 108).
 Military policy strategies of European small states 319

With the obsolescence of a major territorial conflict in Europe, the time of

Western mass armies appears over and instead there is an increasing demand for
highly flexible, mobile and well-trained military forces. At the same time, the
internationalization of crisis management operations requires armed forces
to become interoperable so as to be plugged into a pool of multinational forces.
The requirement for jointness thus imposes that military units adopt the same
standard operating procedures and language. A direct consequence of this
evolution is the necessary professionalization of armed forces.15 This tendency is
also confirmed by the rise of multinational rapid reaction forces (NATO NRF or
EUBG). For instance, with the creation of the EU Battlegroups, contributing states
must be able to provide forces within 5 – 10 days. The short deadlines, as well as
the complexity of the missions, mean that nonprofessional units become
increasingly unqualified for these new military tasks. Thus, the structure of
European armed forces after the Cold War has evolved towards the abolition of
conscript military units and a generalization of small, highly flexible and
professional armed forces deployable at very short notice.
The transformation of the strategic environment not only has consequences for
the use of force in external operations but also for the domestic sphere.
Traditionally, a strict division between the use of the military in territorial defence
and the use of the police for the maintenance of order was held. This functional
distinction stemmed from the internal pacification that produced the modern
nation state (Giddens 1985). The post-Cold War developments and processes of
globalization have blurred the dividing line between ‘external military security
and internal policing functions of states’ (Andreas and Price 2001, 33). This
implies an expansion of traditional military tasks beyond war-fighting towards
crime-fighting and the protection of critical infrastructures. Concretely, military
forces are increasingly used for law enforcement purposes and in cooperation
with civilian security forces. The consequences of 9/11 have magnified this
evolution by profoundly questioning the relationship between the domestic and
the external dimension of security. The EU clause on terrorism adopted on
25 March 2004 is a perfect example of this change. It states that the EU member
states ‘shall mobilize all the instruments at their disposal, including military
resources to prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of one of them’ (European
Council 2004). This clause therefore links the member state and the EU levels to
provide military assistance for internal EU use. This has immediate consequences
regarding the traditional divisions of roles between the police and the military
(Lutterbeck 2004).
However, the national legal frameworks inherited from the Cold War
concerning military assistance to civilian authorities and the police have impeded
the creation of new means to counter terrorism. Traditionally, the domestic use of
the military below the war threshold was conceived only in case of natural
disasters or exceptional circumstances, which required heavy logistical

15
Belgium abandoned conscription for a professional army in 1992, Holland in 1993,
France in 1996, Spain in 1998, Italy and Portugal in 1999. Hungary and Slovenia have
fully professional militaries since 2004, the Czech Republic since 2005 and Slovakia
since 2006. Ireland, the United Kingdom and Luxembourg already had professional
armies during the Cold War (Howorth 2006, 43). Germany, Denmark and Greece are on
their way to professionalize units participating in peace support operations.
320 Jean-Marc Rickli

contributions. Yet, current needs for the domestic use of the military include
intelligence, deployment of special forces, transport, nuclear, biological and
chemical weapon expertise, command and control, medical support and
evacuations, logistic support, borders and maritime patrolling and law
enforcement support (Ekengren 2006, 274). There are no typical models of how
security forces should look like to fulfil these functions, but the French Gendarmerie
or the Italian Carabinieri provide good examples of paramilitary forces addressing
these security issues. Austria, Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg have
all developed concepts along these lines. These forces are specialized in terms of
training, capabilities and lines of command for tasks that straddle the border
between internal order and security and external security (Ekengren 2006, 275).
This suggests that domestically small states’ military policy must shift from
territorial defence to territorial protection so as to help civilian security forces
preventing new risks.

The Cold War neutral states’ military policies after the Cold War
This last section confronts the above assumptions through a brief analysis of the
evolution of Cold War neutral states’ military policies after the Cold War. As these
states adopted a defensive strategy during the Cold War, they represent the best
candidates to test the expectation that small states’ strategies must be cooperative
and that their military policies must be oriented towards expeditionary
operations. The neutral states that had an active military policy during the Cold
War can be divided into two categories after 1989.
The first group represents the neutral states that joined the EU after the Cold
War, namely Austria, Finland and Sweden. These three states, together with
Ireland, have abandoned their defensive posture and adopted a cooperative
strategy by streamlining their military policy on the requirements of the EU.
Though these states were initially reluctant to promote defence integration, they
lobbied strongly to include the Petersberg tasks in the EU treaty (Laursen 1998).
During the Finnish Presidency in 1999, the Helsinki Headline Goals that laid
down the basis for military capabilities integration were launched. In 2003,
Sweden participated in Operation Artemis. This represented a departure from
Cold War practices not so much because Swedish forces were deployed in Africa,
but because of the nature of the military contribution. During this operation,
Swedish special operation forces were deployed, together with French forces, as a
spearhead to secure the airport of Bunia to guarantee the safe arrival of follow-on
forces. The engagement of military forces for such an operation no longer had
anything to do with merely providing peace-keeping forces that monitor a truce,
such as was the case during the Cold War. Though Austria and Finland have not
gone as far in the type of offensive operation they are ready to carry out, together
with Sweden they have adapted their military policies to be interoperable with the
armed forces of the other EU member states. Thus, all have reformed their armed
forces towards expeditionary operations. For Sweden and Austria, these
operations have become the main raison d’être of their military forces
(Bundesheerreformkommission 2004; Swedish Government 2004). This was
demonstrated by Austria taking the lead as a framework nation for the EUFOR
Multinational Task Force North in Operation Althea on 1 December 2005. In the
 Military policy strategies of European small states 321

case of Finland, though territorial defence still plays an important role,

participation in international operations has become on a par with the defence
of the country (Finnish Government 2004). Finland has specialized in
communication system and in 2003 it became the first non-NATO member to
lead a multinational brigade in NATO KFOR (Finnish Ministry of Defence 2004).
These three states and Ireland—which did not have military capabilities during
the Cold War—have all earmarked some of their forces for the EUBG. Ireland,
with the lowest strategic ambitions, contributes 80 soldiers specialized in bomb
disposal. Sweden has accepted to become the framework nation of the Nordic
Battlegroup; this commitment completely drives the reform of the Swedish armed
forces. From this overview, it appears that the traditional Cold War defence
posture of former neutral states has been abandoned in favour of a cooperative
strategy that has led to the adoption of niche or lead/framework nation strategies.
The second group is composed of Switzerland, which has adopted a different
military policy orientation. The latest armed forces reform, Army XXI, has
transformed the military so that they can contribute to domestic subsidiary
operations and area protection. This more inward orientation is nonetheless met
with an increasing internationalization of military policy. The catchword of the
Swiss security policy reform is ‘Security through Cooperation’ (Conseil Fédéral
1999). This has been translated notably by the first important contribution of Swiss
military forces in international operations through the engagement of an
armoured military company (Swisscoy) in NATO KFOR. Swisscoy mainly has a
logistical role, but still represents a total departure from Switzerland’s Cold War
practice of nonmilitary participation in international operations. The bulk of the
Swiss armed forces though, remain trained for domestic operations.
This brief description confirms the predictions regarding the shape of small
states’ military policies after the Cold War. Even the most unlikely candidates, the
Cold War neutral states, have shifted their security strategy towards cooperation.
For the EU nonallied states, and to a lesser extent Switzerland, this has implied
increasing defence integration and role specialization to become interoperable
with the standards set by NATO and the EU.

Conclusions
Traditionally, the highest security threat for a state was the one that violated its
border because it implied a threat to its sovereignty and indeed its very existence.
Territorial defence supported by military capabilities and international law were
the key instruments to uphold states’ security during the Cold War. This was even
more acute for small states since they had limited means to protect their
sovereignty. With the obsolescence of territorial threats in Europe after the Cold
War, the use of military force has become less centred on traditional wars and
more focused on dealing with domestic and foreign crisis situations and the
prevention of conflicts and international crimes. External operations have become
the major source of operational engagement for European armed forces, and
support to domestic civilian authorities has increased. The rise of military
interventions has compelled armed forces to work far beyond their national
territories. This imposes a complete shift in military policy from fixed ‘legacy’
weapons and systems towards power projection and crisis management enablers.
322 Jean-Marc Rickli

Expeditionary capabilities require both the means to project power and the ability
to cooperate between armed forces. Power projection has thus become the priority
for European small states’ military forces since risks to national and Euro-Atlantic
security are often located beyond their immediate territorial boundaries. This
poses demanding strategic challenges for European small states. Due to their lack
of power small states cannot shape events. They seek to position themselves as
advantageously as possible in the system. Not only is an autonomous defence
option no longer feasible but the adoption of a cooperative strategy imposes
difficult military choices. In today’s globalized environment, depending on their
political ambitions, small states can maximize their influence through the
adoption of niche or lead/framework nation strategies. This role specialization,
however, implies a convergence of strategic cultures and practices, which can only
be reached through further institutional integration in Europe.

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