PLATO, ARISTOTLE, ROUSSEAU AND HEGEL ON WOMEN : A CRITIQUE

Author(s): Chandrakala Padia

Source: The Indian Journal of Political Science , January - March 1994, Vol. 55, No. 1
(January - March 1994), pp. 27-36
Published by: Indian Political Science Association

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/41855678

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 PLATO, ARISTOTLE, ROUSSEAU AND HEGEL ON WOMEN :

A CRITIQUE

Chandrakala Padia*

Western political thought suffers from dualism on several dimensions;

correlating with them is a further polarity between male and female.1 Male
is to dominate female. The female principle, as represented by nature, flesh
and appetite, is rooted in subordination of female to male. It is fortified
by culture, spirit and reason. It structures the entire range of male-female
relationships and authority patterns.2 Aristotle, Rousseau and Hegel adopt
a common stand: there is "a natural and unassailable difference between the
sexes". It gets reflected in social place and function of the sexes. Hierarchy
is very much there, with woman occupying the lower rung. Woman does
have a significant role, in the realms of reproduction and domesticity. In
sum, woman belongs to an inferior category than man. According to Plato,
woman could attain equality if she can subdue the dominant feminine
characteristics: passion, emotion and intution and even her relation to repro-
duction. However, a few women could transcend their sexual identity, but
it leaves them a precarious and unhappy lot. The qualities attributed to female
sex are functional to culture. The present paper is a study of some select
philosophers' views on woman. The paper attempts to discuss the subject
with reference to a set of allied questions. Which of the philosophers picked
for treatment have denigrated woman and how did they go about it? Is their
attitude warranted? Quite a few eminent thinkers have supported a sexist
social order that grossly undervalues woman as an individual. They look
on her as a mere means to some end and without any intrinsic value. Their
conceptualisation tends to disfigure the very ethos of Western civilization.
Little do they realise that in the very act conducive to the welfare of the
family, which is the basic unit of social organisation, woman acquires a
singular value of her own. Any one who takes care of some other's lives
at once improves his or her ability to love and care.

* Reader, Dept. of Political Science, Benares Hindu University, Varanasi.

Indian Journal of Political Science ,

Vol. 55, No. I, Jan.-March, 1994.

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28 The Indian Journal of Political Science

In his Works and Days and Theogony , Hesiod alleges that all ev
is traceable to the world's first woman, and so advises us never to trust he
The great epic poet Homer seems to share the vie^v.4 Further, in the Repub
and the Laws,6 even Plato regards woman as inferior to man in quite a fe
ways. Thus, in the discussion (in the Republic ) on the norms of education
for the guardians to be, Socrates, who obviously represents Plato himself
declares that in theatrical performances it is only men of virtue, not wom
who are to be initated. Plato observes:7

"Then those who are educating to become good men ought not -
since ihey are men - to play the parts of women, young or old. They should
not imitate a woman quarreling with her husband, blaspheming against heaven,
boasting and swollen in her own conceit, or grieving and wailing over
misfortunes, still less should they impassionate a woman who is sick or who
is in love or in labor". (395 E, p. 93)
"Then we must adhere to our original principle: Those who are to
become guardians .... They should neither do nor imitate other things. If they
must imitate, let them imitate what is appropriate to their vocation. From
childhood on, let them pattern themselves after men who are - among other
tilings - courageous, temperate, reverent, and free." (395, pp.93-93.)

What is worse, Plato declares (in the Laws) not only that woman is by nature
inclined to be 'secretive and crafty, because of her weakness', but that her
'natural potential for virtue is inferior to a man's (and that) so she is potentially
a greater danger, perhaps even twice as great.'8

Plato is of the view that woman is weaker than man, but he does not
specify what he means by being weak - physically or emotionally. If
a woman's weakness is to be taken as physical, it would not necessarily follow
that she is 'secretive' and 'crafty'. What would follow from her alleged
physical weakness is that she needs protection and security from, and so
tends to be dependent on man, who is physically stronger. And if weakness
be taken as emotional, we will have to make a distinction. Woman may
well be said to be emotionally weak in the sense that, when a tragedy occurs
in the family, she is likely to cry sooner and longer than man. But if we
take emotional weakness as fickleness in love, woman cannot be categorically
said to be weaker than man. She has a greater ability to remain steadfast
in love in spite of continued non co-operation from the other members of
her family. Nor can it be maintained that 'a woman's natural potential for
virtue is inferior to man's. If Plato could put forth such an odd view, it is
perhaps because his list of cardinal virtues - namely, justice, wisdom,
courage, and temperance - does not include the highly prized capacity for

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 Plato , .... on Women : A Critique 29

service and self-sacrifice. But this capacity is surely an importa

Because of this excellenci trail society is able to maintain the requisit
of cohesion in its basic unit, i,e., the family.

Aristotle outdoes even Plato in denigrating woman. On this

differences of opinion exist among scholars. Some feel that Plato is
while Aristotle is conservative. For in Plato's ideal state, woman
the highest positions. Aristotle always sees woman in functionalist
Diana Coole, a leading scholar also feels the same way. To quot

A compari sion of the Politics with the Republic seems at first si

to suggest that Aristotle reverted to, and reinforced, gender distinctions
had been transcended by Plato.... while the Platonic method favours r
change, its Aristotelian successor offers a conservative argument pred
upon naturalist and functionalist premises.0

He turns die thesis of the comparative inferiority of woman i

justification of her general domination by men. It is n< i that he d
advance any argument in support of his contention. Butitis easy to
his reasoning hereis a misshappen fusion of his teleological theory
and his views on reproduction. It is, however, necessary to ou
argument before criticising it. Reality is dynamic. But growth and de
are nowhere random. Be it an animal or a plant, each individual
is determined by its final cause, that is, by what it is to become in
Tlius, a seed develops into a tree and a child into a grown-up human
Likewise, a girl realizes her full significance as a female in becoming
that is, by participating in the function of reproduction. But in so
a woman (according to Aristotle) is only a passive participant ;
provides matter to the process of reproduction ; and the imprint o
personality (or the human form) on this matter is provided by the
Man is the active agent ; that is why, he may be regarded as superior to
Note Artistotle's views from the following quote:

Since "the Form, is better and more divine in its nature than the Mat
it is better also that the superior one should be separate from the inferio
That is why whenever possible and so far as possible the male is sep
from the female". (Generation of Animals, II, 932 a, ef. 1, 727b and II
Woman is was it were an infertile male", and even in regard to reprodu
"a male is male in virtue of a particular ability, and a female in vir
a particular inability" 1! (Genvemüon of Animais, 1. 729a, 731a.)

Aristotle's reasoning is clearly suspect. First, though it may w

regarded as one of the important functions of woman, reproductio

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30 The Indian Journal of Political Science

all that a woman does for the family. Here, her role is rich and many-sid
She may be a daughter, a sister, a mother, or just a devoted wife. But
all such cases, she lends to die family a touch of sweetness, and of sol
whenever necessary. It is this embracive aroma of love and genteelness whi
may be regarded as a woman's essential contribution to society. She m
indeed be regarded as a check on man's tendency to be harsh and aggressi
and in that sense as superior to man. Secondly, would it be fair to d
that, as a mother, woman is an activ e and a powerful determinant of a grow
child's character? Thirdly, the latest scientific researches tend to sugg
that in respect of intuitive power, woman is superior to man.12 Many ot
details of Aristotle's views on women are as questionable as the ones cited
Consider, for instance, the statement noted below:

"Virtues and actions are nobler, when they proceed from those who
are naturally worthier, for instance, from a man rather than from a woman."13

Following Aristotle himself, one is tempted to comment that su

general writing is hardly enlightening. The view posited here may be evalua
from the standpoint of application to a particular virtue. Take the case of
courage in relation to both men and women. Woman, according to Aristo
is weaker and less noble than man. Now suppose that a family is attac
violently by a thief; and further suppose that both wife and husband try
protect each other, hi this case, it would be fair to assume that the two sh
courage in equal measure, and in approximately the same mannner. Bu
this be admitted, would it not be fair to regard woman as the nobler of
two, just because here she has outshone in bravery though she is physical
weaker? It can, therefore, be argued that the link that Aristotle posits betw
a woman as physically weaker and less noble is not tenable.

Consider again the following quote from Aristotle's Politics :

"They musi all share in (moral goodness), but not in the same way
- each sharing only to the extent required for the discharge of his or her
function. The ruler, accordingly, must possess moral goodness in its full or
perfect form because his function ... demands a master - artificer, and reason
is such a master artificer; but all other persons need only possess moral
goodness to the extent required of them. It is thus clear that ... temperance
- and similarly fortitude and justice - are not, as Socrates held, the same in
a woman as they are in a man. Fortitude in the one, for example, is shown
in connection with ruling; in the other, it is shown in connection with serving;
and the same is true of the other forms of goodness .... To speak in general
terms, and to maintain that goodness consists in "a good condition of the

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 Plato , .... on Women : A Critique 31

soul" or in "right action" or in anything of the kind, is to be guilty o

- deception. Far better than such general definitions is the method of s
enumeration of the different forms of goodness

Here, we may react as under:

First, it is too much to say that only a ruler needs goodnes

wholeness, and that 'all others' need only a part of it. What sha
of a man who not only controls and leads but tries to uplift vast m
men? To be sure, a social reformer needs at least as much moral
as a ruler. Secondly, even if we agree that a woman needs less g
than man, and that her actions express a virtue differently from a
conduct, how does it follow that the virtue in question itself becomes
in the two cases? A simple example will bear out the point we are s
to make. Milk does not suffer any change in quality when unequal a
of it are put in glass bottles of diverse colours. Thirdly, it is no
accept Aristotle's view that the listing of different forms of a virt
goodness, is clearly preferable to defining it in general terms. It is
when we define goodness essentially as a virtue which is grounded i
condition of the soul', we do not say everything about the exce
question. On the other hand, can the computation of the actual and
forms of goodness, which Aristotle fixes as an ideal requirement
exhaustive? Further, while the definition of goodness which Aristotle
certainly hints at the truth that goodness is not merely a matter of
show, in the different forms of actual goodness it is not possible to com
what goodness is or what it is not. Finally, which of the two attitude
goodness - essentialist or empiricist - is a better one, would d
the viewpoint of the individual who compares them. If the attitude in
is that of a moral philosopher whose essential concern is with c
defining a virtue in general terms may be preferable ; and where o
of looking is that of a social scientist, the enumerative approach may
relevent.

Even Rousseau's attitude to woman is just as uncharitable, which is

surprising, because he places a great deal of emphasis on equality. He defines
woman's nature in terms of her function - her sexual and procreative purposes
in life. On die other hand, man has, according to him, a limitless potential
for rational thought and creativity. Consider in this context, the following
statement of Rousseau:

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32 The Indian Journal of Political Science

...it is not enough that a woman should be faithful; her husband,

along with his friends and neighbours, must believe in her fidelity ... Nature
herself has decreed that woman, both for herself and her children, should be
at the mercy of man's judgement ... worth alone will not suffice, a woman
must be thought -worthy ; nor beauty, she must be admired ; nor virtue, she
must be respected ... "What will, people think" is the grave of a man's virtue
and the throne of a woman's.15

Now, in respect of the above, our objections may not elicit a favourable
response from Rousseau ; for, according to him, a man, if he is truly manly,
should not pay any heed to what others think about him ( refer to his statement
: "what will people think" is the grave of man s virtue). But, on the other
hand, if (again in Rousseau's view) man is possessed of an infinite potential
for rationality', it is relevant to pinpoint the objections. First, it is too sweeping
to say that a woman's fidelity will suffice as a virtue only when it is recognized
as such by people around her. There are cases where the husband is suspicious
(due to some weakness in his own character), and where his friends and
neighbours may find it convenient to go by his judgement, hi such cases,
it would be clearly unfair to suspect a woman's faithfulness. Even generally,
it is wrong to make the value of an individual's virtue dependent on public
opinion. A virtue is an excellence which man grows up into; it is rooted
in his character; it can not be put on or taken away like clothes. It is also
too much to say that woman can claim to be truly beautiful only if her beauty
is acknowledged as such by others. A simple example is suffice to expose
the falsity of this view. Suppose an Englishman marries a black beauty and
takes her to his country. There, precisely because of her colour, she may
not be regarded as beautiful by the (white) people in general. But will this
in any way detract from her beauty as her own countrymen regard it ? Here,
however, Rousseau may hasten to point out that in so arguing we only subscribe
to his view, if unknowingly; for, we still do not cease to regard the beauty
in question as dependent on the opinion of others, it being immaterial whether
others are white or black. But our rejoinder to this argument too can be
quick, though somewhat qualified. The positive reaction of others to an
individual's beauty is relevant only when they belong to that individual's own
cultural environment. Rousseau fails to specify this. So, it is reasonable
to argue that his view on the matter is somewhat indiscrete. Some of
Rousseau's other remarks are similarly questionable. It is rather glib to suggest
that a woman becomes truly worthy only when others admit her worth, for
she may possess an exceptional quality which ordinary persons may simply
fail to see.

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 Plato , .... on Women : A Critique 33

Unfortunately, even a great philosopher like Hegel is not able

the possibility of exceptional qualities in women. Hegel develops
argument in his book, The Philosophy of Right:

The difference in the physical characteristics of the two sexes h

rational basis and consequently acquires an intellectual and ethical sig
cance. This significance is determined by the difference into which the et
substanti veness as the concept, internally sunders itself in order that its vita
may become a concrete unity consequent upon this difference.
Thus one sex is mind in its self-diremption into explicit personal sel
subsistence and the knowledge and volition of free universality, i.e. the
consciousness of conceptual thought and the volition of the objective f
end. The other sex is mind maintaining itself in unity, as knowledg
volition of the substantive, but knowledge and volition in the form of con
individually and feeling. In relation to externality, the former is pow
and active , the latter is passive and subjective16

According to Hegel, man is naturally capable of many activitie

are ordinarily beyond the power of woman. The more important of
activities are: struggle for existence; abstract thinking, such as we
theoretical science and philosophy; and pursuit of impersonal ends.
is more dynamic, reflective, and capable of steadfast endeavour dir
superpersonal ends. Woman, on the other hand, is rather passive and
confined to the pursuit of more or less personal ends. Secondly
the distinctive capacities of man flower in state management which
him not only to learn and labour but to discipline himself in order
and control vast massesof men. Woman attains her destiny as a per
exercising and cultivating her native capacity for service and sa
looking after the family and keeping it as one. Thirdly, Hegel state
is only in a limited number of disciplines that woman can be educat
profit. Subjects which do not suit her native capacities are those whi
the use of abstract reasoning and creative imagination in abundant
such as 'advanced science, philosophy, and certain forms of artistic
tion'. The fair sex excels in intuition and feeling, not in logical
and art activity. Finally, Hegel notes that whereas a grown up m
a great extent capable of regulating his own development, a young
because of her very vulnerability, has to depend on, and be guided
care and counsel. A woman grows best in the quest of love; a man d
himself in the heat and turmoil of toil and struggle. According

It follows that man has his actual substantive life in the state, in learni
and so forth, as well as in labour and struggle with the external worl

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34 The Indian Journal of Political Science

with himself, so that it is only out of his diremption that he fights his way
to self-subsistent unity with himself. In the family, he has a tranquil intuition
of this unity and there he Uves a subjective ethical Ufe on the plane of feeling.
Woman, on the other hand, lias her substantive destiny in the family, and
to be imbued with family piety is her ethical frame of mind.

Hegel continues:

Women are capable of education, but they are not made for activities
which demand a universal faculty such as the more advanced sciences,
philosophy, and certain forms of artistic production. Women may have happy
ideas, taste, and elegance, but they cannot attain to the ideal. The difference
between men and women is like that between animals and plants. Men
correspond to animals, while women correspond to plants because their
development is more placid and the principle that underlies it is the rather
vague unity of feeling. When women hold the helm of government, the state
is at once in jeopardy , because women regulate their actions not by the demands
of universality butby arbitrary inclinations and opinions.(pp. 263-64). 17

Hegel's reasoning is clearly suspect. To begin with, it is not true to

say that woman is incapable of abstract reasoning. So far there is no empi
evidence to suggest that women students do not do as well as their m
classmates in the study of subjects like science and philosophy. Even if t
inferiority in question were a fact, it would not follow that women are
the whole inferior to men. For, if we press the point (as Hegel does)
woman is deficient in the capacity for abstract reasoning, the implicatio
would be that she is well equipped in respect of concrete reasoning; and s
reasoning, it is easy to see, is at least as important for the conduct of lif
as abstract reasoning. Further, it is also difficult to accept Hegel's view t
woman is inferior to man on account of her being governed by feeling inst
of reason. Much would, however, depend on what Hegel exactly me
by 'feeling' . He himself does not specify its meaning; so, we have to constr
its meaning ourselves. Three are at least three widely shared meaning
'feeling': feeling for others or sympathy; emotion, taken generally; and
ability to discriminate, as when we say : 'she has a feeling for colour
tone'. Now, if we take 'feeling' in the first sense - that is, as concern
the needy - it would not appear to be any less important than reason
every day life. And if we take 'feeling' as emotion, would it be poss
for Hegel to deny that the sustained pursuit of any ideal is impossible with
having the feeling of intense love for the ideal in question? Further, so

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 Plato , .... on Women : A Critique 35

as the maintenance of inter-personal relations is concerned, love is

more helpful than reason. Finally, if we take feeling as the ab
discriminate, say, two adjacent shades of colour, or of a musical note
be fair to assume that since she is (according to Hegel) governed ess
by feeling, woman can also do well in the region of arts like paintin
music.

This view can be supported with an additional argument. Any

of art activity is the manipulation of some given material. So, the r
here involved may be said to be concrete. And the presence of this
may be said to be adequate in women, in Hegel's own view; for
emphasises the lack of abstract reasoning in women, the implication
is that she is not deficient in concrete reasoning. Further, this too
to hold, quite generally, that a woman grows in the passive way of
and that she does not actively regulate her own development. Th
the matter is that the growth of a woman's personality as a wif
mother, proceeds not only by assimilating the love and affection of her
other members, but by actively sharing and steadfastly and cou
wrestling with their problems. To conclude, of the four thinkers w
chosen for discussion, neither the idealists, Plato and Hegel, nor Ar
and Rousseau who are commonly thought to be more alive to the cl
empirical reality, have been able to do justice to the value of w
an individual or as a member of the human family.

NOTES

* For the greater part of this essay, the author is indebted to Prof. S.K. Saxena,
Professor of Philosophy (retd.), University of Delhi.
I. See Coole, Diama H., Women in Politicai Theory: From Ancient Misogyny to
Contemporary Feminism. Wheatsheaf Books, Sussex, 1988, pp. 1-2.
2. Ibid.

3. Hesiod, The Works ofHesiod, Callimachus and Theogonis, trans. J. Banks, London, 18
Hesiod, Works; Theogony, p. 585 and cf. pp. 57 Works dnd Days, pp. 73 ff.
4. Homer, The Odyssey, VII, trans. E.V. Rieu, London, 1946, pp.50-60.
5. See The Republic , Book III, trans. Richard W. Sterling and William C. Scott, W. W. Norton, N
York, 1985 387e-388a, 395, 431b-c, 605 d-e.
6. The Laws, 639b.

7. The Republic, op.cit, 395 E, p. 93 and 395 C, pp. 92-93.

8. Plato, TheLaws, trans, with an introduction by Trevor J. Saunders, Penguin Books,
London, 781, pp. 262-263.

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36 The Indian Journal of Political Science

9. Coole, op.cit., pp. 29, 35.

10. Aristotle, Generation of Animals, II, trans. A.L. Peck, Loeb Classical Library, London, 1
11. Ibid.

12. The female brain may have an ability to integrate complex material in a way the male
brainsimply doesn't. Weston H. Agor found, in his study of over 2,000 executives and
government leaders, that women score slightly higher than men on a scale designed to measure
their intuitive ability. See Bricklin, Mary, Mark, Golin, Deborah Grandinetti and Alexis
Lieberman, "Female Intuition : Myth or Fact?" in Positive Living and Health , Rajendra
Publishing House, Bombay, 1990, p.477.
13. Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric, I, 1367a, trans. John Henry, Loeb Classical
Library, London, 1967.
14. Aristotle, Politics, I, 1260a, trans. Ernest Barker, Oxford Unversity Press, London, 1946.
Emphasis the author's.
15. Emile, trans. B. Foxley, New York, 1969, p. 325, 328. Emphasis mine.
16. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. T.M. Knox, Oxford University Press, London, 1973, p. 144.

17. Ibid, pp. 263-'64.

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