Specific Performance - Principles Revisited - SCC Blog

8/10/22, 3:42 PM Specific Performance -- Principles Revisited | SCC Blog
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The law relating to specific performance as engrafted in the

Specific Relief Act, 1963 (“the Act”) is an extremely important
facet of civil law. The Act inter alia covers most aspects
pertaining to performance of contracts as also injunctive
reliefs which can be granted and claimed.
This article shall acquaint and take you through the basic
principles and important aspects to be borne in mind while
seeking specific performance of contracts in relation to
immoveable property and related aspects.
In respect of moveable property, the general rule is that
specific relief is refused as there is a presumption that the
failure to perform can be compensated in terms of money in
view of Section 10 of the Act as unamended. Even though
Section 10 of the Act now stands amended, it does not mean
that specific performance for moveables will be ordinarily
granted. The law will still provide and presume that breach of
a contract in respect of moveables can be compensated and
therefore refuse performance. The exception to this will be
amongst others when the moveable property is not an
ordinary article of commerce, or is of special value or interest
to the plaintiff, or consists of goods which are not easily
obtainable in the market.
Nature of Specific Performance
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https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2020/06/18/specific-performance-principles-revisited/ 2/27
Specific performance is an equitable relief granted by the

Court to enforce contractual obligations between the parties.
It is a remedy in performance as opposed to a claim sounding
in damages for breach of contract where pecuniary
compensation is granted as relief for failure to carry out the
terms of the contract.
What are the factors a Court considers when decoding to
grant or refuse specific performance
Section 10 of the Act as now amended[4] emphasises that
specific performance is usually to be granted and denied only
in circumstances as set out in Sections 11, 14 and 16 of the
Act[5].
Section 10 of the Act as amended by the Specific Relief
(Amendment) Act, 2018 seeks to make a departure and is an
attempt to reduce the discretion of the Courts relating to
enforcement of specific performance of contracts in keeping
with the Statement of Objects and Reasons for the amending
Act of 2018[6].
Similarly, Section 20 of the Act as it stood earlier provided that
the grant of relief was discretionary. It provided as under:
“20. Discretion as to decreeing specific

performance.—(1) The jurisdiction to decree
specific performance is discretionary, and
the court is not bound to grant such relief
merely because it is lawful to do so; but the
discretion of the court is not arbitrary but
sound and reasonable, guided by judicial
principles and capable of correction by a
court of appeal….”
However with the amendment to Section 20 by the
Amendment Act in 2018, it now also seeks to take away the
discretion to an extent[7].
Despite the amendments as above, the Courts still consider
the following well-settled criteria and principles while granting
or denying specific performance.
1. Readiness and Willingness.
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Section 16(c)[8] of the Act makes it mandatory for the plaintiff

to prove that he has already performed or was always ready
and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract
which were to be performed by him.
Section 16(c) of the Act as amended by the Specific Relief
(Amendment) Act, 2018 no longer requires the plaintiff to
plead readiness and willingness as it was earlier mandated by
a mantra in the plaint. However, in my view it is still
mandatory for the plaintiff to prove that he has already
performed or was always ready and willing to perform the
essential terms of the contract which were to be performed by
him. This cannot be done unless the plaintiff seeking
performance also makes necessary averments in the plaint
showing and disclosing facts which disclose the readiness
and willingness and or performance. It is settled law that
evidence cannot be contrary to pleadings and therefore it
would still be necessary to have sufficient pleadings which
would enable the Court to infer the ingredients of the
amended Section 16 i.e. proof of readiness and willingness or
performance.
The obligation cast by Section 16(c) of the Act upon the
plaintiff to prove that he has already performed or was always
ready and willing to perform essential terms of the contract
which were to be performed by him have been emphasised
by the Supreme Court in the following judgments:
Mehboob-ur-Rehman v. Ahsanul Ghani[9]
“14. Though, with the amendment of the

Specific Relief Act, 1963 by Act 18 of 2018,
the expression “who fails to aver and prove”
is substituted by the expression “who fails to
prove” and the expression “must aver”
stands substituted by the expression “must
prove” but then, the position on all the
material aspects remains the same that,
specific performance of a contract cannot be
enforced in favor to the person who fails to
prove that he has already performed or has
always been ready and willing to perform the
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essential terms of the contract which are to

be performed by him, other than the terms of
which, the performance has been prevented
or waived by the other party.”
(emphasis supplied)
Umabai v. Nilkanth Dhondiba Chavan[10]
“30. It is now well settled that the conduct of

the parties, with a view to arrive at a finding
as to whether the plaintiff-respondents were
all along and still are ready and willing to
perform their part of contract as is
mandatorily required under Section 16(c) of
the Specific Relief Act must be determined
having regard to the entire attending
circumstances. A bare averment in the plaint
or a statement made in the examination-in-
chief would not suffice. The conduct of the
plaintiff-respondents must be judged having
regard to the entirety of the pleadings as also
the evidences brought on records.”
(emphasis supplied)
2. Conduct Unblemished.
It is necessary that a plaintiff’s conduct in performance of the
contract or attempting to fulfil the same shows an unwavering
intention of wanting to perform. The Supreme Court has in
para 12 of its judgment in Aniglase Yohannan v.
Ramlatha[11] held that:
“12. The basic principle behind Section 16(c)

read with Explanation (ii) is that any person
seeking benefit of the specific performance
of contract must manifest that his conduct
has been blemishless throughout entitling
him to the specific relief. The provision
imposes a personal bar. The Court is to grant
relief on the basis of the conduct of the
person seeking relief. If
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the pleadings
manifest that the conduct of the plaintiff

entitles him to get the relief on perusal of the
plaint he should not be denied the relief.”
(emphasis supplied)
3. Readiness must be shown throughout up to the date of
the decree.
A plaintiff in order to succeed must prove facts which would
show his readiness and willingness at all times. It is not
enough to show the readiness uptil the time of the plaint but
the conduct must be such as discloses readiness and
willingness at all times from the time of the contract till the suit
and up to the decree. This principle was laid down in the
following judgements:
Gomathinayagam Pillai v. Palaniswami Nadar[12]
“6. But the respondent has claimed a decree

for specific performance and it is for him to
establish that he was, since the date of the
contract, continuously ready and willing to
perform his part of the contract. If he fails to
do so, his claim for specific performance
must fail. As observed by the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council in Ardeshir
Mama v. Flora Sassoon[13]:
“In a suit for specific performance, on the
other hand, he treated and was required by
the Court to treat the contract as still
subsisting. He had in that suit to allege, and
if the fact was traversed, he was required to
prove a continuous readiness and
willingness, from the date of the contract to
the time of the hearing, to perform the
contract on his part. Failure to make good
that averment brought with it the inevitable
dismissal of his suit.”
The respondent must in a suit for specific
performance of an agreement plead and
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prove that he was ready and willing to

perform his part of the contract continuously
between the date of the contract and the date
of hearing of the suit.”
(emphasis supplied)
Vijay Kumar v. Om Parkash[14]
“7. In order to obtain a decree for specific

performance, the plaintiff has to prove his
readiness and willingness to perform his part
of the contract and the readiness and
willingness has to be shown through out and
has to be established by the plaintiff.”
(emphasis supplied)
J.P.Builders v. A. Ramadas Rao[15]
“27. It is settled law that even in the absence

of specific plea by the opposite party, it is the
mandate of the statute that the plaintiff has to
comply with Section 16(c) of the Specific
Relief Act and when there is non-compliance
with this statutory mandate, the court is not
bound to grant specific performance and is
left with no other alternative but to dismiss
the suit. It is also clear that readiness to
perform must be established throughout the
relevant points of time. “Readiness and
willingness” to perform the part of the
contract has to be determined/ascertained
from the conduct of the parties.”
(emphasis supplied)
4. It is not necessary that the plaintiff must tender the
money due under a contract.
Although one of the factors showing the readiness and
willingness may be the ability of a plaintiff to make payment
that cannot be a factor by itself to disentitle the plaintiff the
grant of relief.
A. Kanthamani v. Nasreen
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Ahmed [16]
“24. The expression “readiness and

willingness” has been the subject-matter of
interpretation in many cases even prior to its
insertion in Section 16(c) of the Specific
Relief Act, 1963. While examining the
question as to how and in what manner, the
plaintiff is required to prove his financial
readiness so as to enable him to claim
specific performance of the
contract/agreement, the Privy Council in a
leading case which arose from the Indian
courts (Bombay) in Bank of India Ltd. v.
Jamsetji A.H. Chinoy[17] , approved the view
taken by Chagla, Actg. C.J., and held inter
alia that:
“it is not necessary for the plaintiff to
produce the money or vouch a concluded
scheme for financing the transaction to
prove his readiness and willingness.”
25. The following observations of the Privy
Council are apposite: (Jamsetji case[18] ,
SCC OnLine PC)
“… Their Lordships agree with this
conclusion and the grounds on which it was
based. It is true that Plaintiff 1 stated that he
was buying for himself, that he had not
sufficient ready money to meet the price and
that no definite arrangements had been made
for finding it at the time of repudiation. But in
order to prove himself ready and willing a
purchaser has not necessarily to produce the
money or to vouch a concluded scheme for
financing the transaction. … Their Lordships
would only add in this connection that they
fully concur with Chagla, Actg. C.J. when he
says:
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‘In my opinion, on the evidence already on

record it was sufficient for the court to come
to the conclusion that Plaintiff 1 was ready
and willing to perform his part of the
contract. It was not necessary for him to
work out actual figures and satisfy the court
what specific amount a bank would have
advanced ……’.”
(emphasis supplied)
Boramma v. Krishna Gowda[19]
“10. Ms. Agarwal has read to us the

statement of PW 2. In the cross-
examination, PW2 stated that he had not
offered at any time to Boramma the amount
and that he had not deposited any amount in
court. Explanation to clause (c) of Section
16 makes it clear that where a contract
involves the payment of money, it is not
essential for the plaintiff to actually tender to
the defendant or to deposit in court any
money, except when so directed by the
court.”
(emphasis supplied)
Azhar Sultana v. B. Rajamani[20]
“31. We are, however, in agreement with Mr.

Lalit that for the aforementioned purpose, it
was not necessary that the entire amount of
consideration should be kept ready and the
plaintiff must file proof in respect thereof. ”

(emphasis supplied)
Apart from the aforesaid the following must also be borne in
mind while conducting a suit for performance.
5. The plaintiff must seek appropriate relief.
It often happens that a contract is terminated and that fact
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gives rise to a cause of action to file a suit for performance. In
such cases the failure to apply to have the termination set

aside would be fatal to performance as without an appropriate
relief to set aside the termination it would be deemed the
plaintiff has accepted the same and then cannot sue for
performance of a contract treated as at an end by his
conduct.
In I.S. Sikandar v. K. Subramani[21],the Supreme Court held
that on failure to pray for and seek to declare that a
termination was wrongful the further relief to perform the
terminated agreement could not be granted:
“37. As could be seen from the prayer sought

for in the original suit, the plaintiff has not
sought for declaratory relief to declare the
termination of agreement of sale as bad in
law. In the absence of such prayer by the
plaintiff the original suit filed by him before
the trial court for grant of decree for specific
performance in respect of the suit scheduled
property on the basis of agreement of sale
and consequential relief of decree for
permanent injunction is not maintainable in
law.”
(emphasis supplied)
The provisions of Section 22[22] must also be considered
when seeking relief in cases where the plaintiff is not in
possession of the land or property in dispute.
Adcon Electronics (P) Ltd. v. Daulat[23]
“16. In a suit for specific performance of

contract for sale of immovable property
containing a stipulation that on execution of
the sale deed the possession of the
immovable property will be handed over to
the purchaser, it is implied that delivery of
possession of the immovable property is part
of the decree of specific performance of
contract. But in this connection it is
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necessary to refer to Section 22 of the

Specific Relief Act, 1963. ……….
17. It may be seen that sub-section (1) is an
enabling provision. A plaintiff in a suit of
specific performance may ask for further
reliefs mentioned in clauses (a) and (b)
thereof. Clause (a) contains reliefs of
possession and partition and separate
possession of the property, in addition to
specific performance. The mandate of sub-
section (2) of Section 22 is that no relief
under clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1)
shall be granted by the court unless it has
been specifically claimed. Thus it follows
that no court can grant the relief of
possession of land or other immovable
property, subject-matter of the agreement for
sale in regard to which specific performance
is claimed, unless the possession of the
immovable property is specifically prayed
for.”
6. Who are the necessary parties to a suit for specific
performance.
It is not unusual that during the pendency of an action or even
before in case a party to the contract creates third party rights
then such persons claiming title from one of the contracting
parties becomes a necessary party. Who would be
appropriate parties to a suit for performance would depend on
the facts of a case, Order I Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure
Code, 1908 and Section 19[24] of the Act which provides an
indication. The Supreme Court in Kasturi case[25] has
succinctly laid down the principles to consider i.e. who should
be a necessary party in a suit for performance.
Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal [26]
“7. In our view, a bare reading of this

provision, namely, second part of Order 1
Rule 10 sub-rule (2) CPC would clearly show
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that the necessary parties in a suit for

specific performance of a contract for sale
are the parties to the contract or if they are
dead, their legal representatives as also a
person who had purchased the contracted
property from the vendor. In equity as well as
in law, the contract constitutes rights and
also regulates the liabilities of the parties. A
purchaser is a necessary party as he would
be affected if he had purchased with or
without notice of the contract, but a person
who claims adversely to the claim of a
vendor is, however, not a necessary party.
From the above, it is now clear that two tests
are to be satisfied for determining the
question who is a necessary party. Tests are
— (1) there must be a right to some relief
against such party in respect of the
controversies involved in the proceedings;
(2) no effective decree can be passed in the
absence of such party.
* *
*
10. That apart, from a plain reading of

Section 19 of the Act we are also of the view
that this section is exhaustive on the
question as to who are the parties against
whom a contract for specific performance
may be enforced.
* *
*
15…Therefore, in our view, a third party or a

stranger to the contract cannot be added so
as to convert a suit of one character into a
suit of different character.”
(emphasis supplied)
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7. The proper form of decree.

In cases where there is a transfer of the suit property by the
contracting party and then the party in default suffers a decree
for performance the proper form of a decree is as laid down in
Durga Prasad v. Deep Chand[27] where it was held that the
defendant and the transferee must join in the performance.
The principle was again applied recently in Vijay A. Mittal v.
Kulwant Rai.[28]
“38. The question arose before this Court

in Durga Prasad v. Deep Chand as to what
form of decree should be passed in the case
of specific performance of contract where
the suit property is sold by the defendant i.e.
the owner of the suit property to another
person and later he suffers a decree for
specific performance of contract directing
him to transfer the suit property to the
plaintiff in term of contract.
39. The learned Judge, Vivian Bose, J.
examined this issue and speaking for the
Bench in his inimitable style of writing, held
as under: (Durga Prasad case[30] )
“Where there is a sale of the same property
in favour of a prior and subsequent
transferee and the subsequent transferee
has, under the conveyance outstanding in
his favour, paid the purchase-money to the
vendor, then in a suit for specific
performance brought by the prior transferee,
in case he succeeds, the question arises as
to the proper form of decree in such a case.
The practice of the courts in India has not
been uniform and three distinct lines of
thought emerge. According to one point of
view, the proper form of decree is to declare
the subsequent purchase void as against the
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prior transferee and direct conveyance by
the vendor alone. A second considers that

both vendor and vendee should join, while a
third would limit execution of the
conveyance to the subsequent purchaser
alone. According to the Supreme Court, the
proper form of decree is to direct specific
performance of the contract between the
vendor and the prior transferee and direct
the subsequent transferee to join in the
conveyance so as to pass on the title which
resides in him to the prior transferee. He
does not join in any special covenants made
between the prior transferee and his vendor;
all he does is to pass on his title to the prior
transferee.”
8. Limitation for an action.
The prescribed period of limitation for a suit of specific
performance is three years from the date fixed for
performance or if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has
notice that performance is refused[31].
Rathnavathi v. Kavita Ganashamdas[32]
“42. A mere reading of Article 54 of the

Limitation Act would show that if the date is
fixed for performance of the agreement, then
non-compliance with the agreement on the
date would give a cause of action to file suit
for specific performance within three years
from the date so fixed. However, when no such
date is fixed, limitation of three years to file a
suit for specific performance would begin
when the plaintiff has noticed that the
defendant has refused the performance of the
agreement.
43. The case at hand admittedly does not fall
in the first category of Article 54 of the
Limitation ActNAVIGATION
because as observed supra,
no date was fixed in the agreement for its

performance. The case would thus be
governed by the second category viz. when
the plaintiff has a notice that performance is
refused.
44. As mentioned above, it was the case of
the plaintiff that she came to know on 2-1-
2000 and 9-1-2000 that the owner of the suit
house along with the so-called intending
purchaser are trying to dispossess her from
the suit house on the strength of their
ownership over the suit house. This event
was, therefore, rightly taken as starting point
of refusal to perform the agreement by
Defendant 2, resulting in giving notice to
Defendant 2 by the plaintiff on 6-3-2000 and
then filing of suit on 31-3-2000.”
9. Court Passing the decree retains control over the
decree even after the decree is passed.
This principle enables the Court to provide assistance to the
successful Plaintiff even after the decree to effectuate
complete satisfaction of the relief claimed and prevent it from
being rendered useless.
The Supreme Court has in Hungerford Investment Trust Ltd.
v. Haridas Mundhra[33] explained the power of the Court in
the following terms:
“22. It is settled by a long course of

decisions of the Indian High Courts that the
Court which passes a decree for specific
performance retains control over the decree
even after the decree has been passed. In
Mahommadalli Sahib v. Abdul Khadir
Saheb[34],it was held that the Court which
passes a decree for specific performance
has the power to extend the time fixed in the
decree for the reason that Court retains
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control over the decree, that the contract
between the parties is not extinguished by

the passing of a decree for specific
performance and that the contract subsists
notwithstanding the passing of the decree. In
Pearisundari Dassee v. Hari Charan
Mozumdar Chowdhry[35],the Calcutta High
Court said that the Court retains control over
the proceedings even after a decree for
specific performance has been passed, that
the decree passed in a suit for specific
performance is not a final decree and that the
suit must be deemed to be pending even
after the decree…….Fry in his book[36]on
specific performance stated the law in
England as follows:
“It may and not unfrequently does happen
that after judgment has been given for the
specific performance of a contract, some
further relief becomes necessary, in
consequence of one or other of the parties
making default in the performance of
something which ought under the judgment
to be performed by him or on his part; as for
instance, where a vendor refuses or is
unable to execute a proper conveyance of
the property or a purchaser to pay the
purchase money . . . .
There are two kinds of relief after judgment
for specific performance of which either
party to the contract may, in a proper case,
avail himself —
(i) He may obtain (on motion in the action) an
order appointing a definite time and place for
the completion of the contract by payment of
the un-paid purchase-money and delivery
over of the executed conveyance and title
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deeds, or a period within which the judgment

is to be obeyed, and if the other party fails to
obey the order, may thereupon at once issue
a writ of sequestration against the defaulting
party’s estate and effects. . . . . . .
(ii) He may apply to the Court (by motion in
the action) for an order rescinding the
contract. On an application of this kind, if it
appears that the party moved against has
positively refused to complete the contract,
its immediate rescission may be ordered;
otherwise, the order will be for rescission in
default of completion within a limited time . . .
. . .”
All the aforesaid principles would apply with equal force to a
party seeking specific performance in an arbitration.
* Advocate, High Court, Bombay. Assisted by Arjun

Prabhu, Mayur Agarwal and Sheetal Parkash. Author can
be reached at karlshroff@gmail.com.
[1] Specific Relief Act, 1963
[2] Section 10 (prior to its amendment). Cases in which
specific performance of contract enforceable.—Except as
otherwise provided in this Chapter, the specific performance
of any contract may, in the discretion of the court, be
enforced……
Explanation.—Unless and until the contrary is proved, the
court shall presume—
(i) that the breach of a contract to transfer immovable property
cannot be adequately relieved by compensation in money;
and
(ii) that the breach of a contract to transfer moveable property
can be so relieved except in the following cases—
(a) where the property is not an ordinary article of commerce,
or is of special value or interest to the plaintiff, or consists of
goods which are not easily obtainable in the market;
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(b) where the property is held by the defendant as the agent

or trustee of the plaintiff.
[3] As amended by the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act,
2018
[4] As amended by the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act,
2018
[5] Section10. Specific performance in respect of
contracts. — The specific performance of a contract shall be
enforced by the court subject to the provisions contained in
sub-section (2) of Section 11, Section 14 and Section 16
[6] Statement of Objects and Reasons of Amending Act
18 of 2018.—The Specific Relief Act, 1963 was enacted to
define and amend the law relating to certain kinds of specific
relief. It contains provisions, inter alia, specific performance of
contracts, contracts not specifically enforceable, parties who
may obtain and against whom specific performance may be
obtained, etc. It also confers wide discretionary powers upon
the courts to decree specific performance and to refuse
injunction, etc. As a result of wide discretionary powers, the
courts in majority of cases award damages as a general rule
and grant specific performance as an exception.
(2) The tremendous economic development since the
enactment of the Act have brought in enormous commercial
activities in India including foreign direct investments, public
private partnerships, public utilities infrastructure
developments, etc.; which have prompted extensive reforms
in the related laws to facilitate enforcement of contracts,
settlement of disputes in speedy manner. It has been felt that
the Act is not in tune with the rapid economic growth
happening in our country and the expansion of infrastructure
activities that are needed for the overall development of the
country.
(3) In view of the above, it is proposed to do away with the
wider discretion of courts to grant specific performance and to
make specific performance of contract a general rule than
exception subject to certain limited grounds.
[7] Section 20. Substituted performance of contract.— (1)
Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained
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in the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), and, except as

otherwise agreed upon by the parties, where the contract is
broken due to non-performance of promise by any party, the
party who suffers by such breach shall have the option of
substituted performance through a third party or by his own
agency, and, recover the expenses and other costs actually
incurred, spent or suffered by him, from the party committing
such breach.
(2) No substituted performance of contract under sub-section
(1) shall be undertaken unless the party who suffers such
breach has given a notice in writing, of not less than thirty
days, to the party in breach calling upon him to perform the
contract within such time as specified in the notice, and on his
refusal or failure to do so, he may get the same performed by
a third party or by his own agency:
Provided that the party who suffers such breach shall not be
entitled to recover the expenses and costs under sub-section
(1) unless he has got the contract performed through a third
party or by his own agency.
(3) Where the party suffering breach of contract has got the
contract performed through a third party or by his own agency
after giving notice under sub-section (1), he shall not be
entitled to claim relief of specific performance against the
party in breach.
(4) Nothing in this section shall prevent the party who has
suffered breach of contract from claiming compensation from
the party in breach.
[8] 16. Personal bars to relief – Specific performance of a
contract cannot be enforced in favor of a person –
(a) – (b) * * *
(c) who fails to prove that he has performed or has always
been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the
contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms
the performance of which has been prevented or waived by
the defendant.
Explanation. – For the purposes of clause (c) –
(i) where a contract involves the payment of money, it is not
essential for the plaintiff NAVIGATION
to actually tender to the defendant or
to deposit in court any money except when so directed by the

Court.
(ii) the plaintiff must prove performance of, or readiness and
willingness to perform, the contract according to its true
construction.
[9] 2019 SCC OnLine SC 203
[10] (2005) 6 SCC 243
[11] (2005) 7 SCC 534
[12] (1967) 1 SCR 227
[13] 1928 SCC OnLine PC 43
[14] 2018 SCC OnLine SC 1913
[15] (2011) 1 SCC 429
[16] (2017) 4 SCC 654
[17] 1949 SCC OnLine PC 81
[18]. Bank of India Ltd. v. Jamsetji A.H. Chinoy, 1949 SCC
OnLine PC 81
[19] (2000) 9 SCC 214
[20] (2009) 17 SCC 27
[21] (2013) 15 SCC 27 at page 38
[22] Section 22. Power to grant relief for possession,
partition, refund of earnest money, etc.— (1)
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, any person suing for the
specific performance of a contract for the transfer of
immovable property may, in an appropriate case, ask for—
(a) possession, or partition and separate possession, of the
property, in addition to such performance; or
(b) any other relief to which he may be entitled, including the
refund of any earnest money or deposit paid or made by
him, in case his claim for specific performance is refused.
(2) No relief under clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1)
shall be granted by the court unless it has been specifically
claimed:
Provided that where the plaintiff has not claimed any such
relief in the plaint, the court shall, at any stage of the
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proceeding, allow him to amend the plaint on such terms as

may be just for including a claim for such relief.”
[23] (2001) 7 SCC 698

[24] Section 19. Except as otherwise provided by this
Chapter, specific performance of a contract may be
enforced against.—
(a) either party thereto;
(b) any other person claiming under him by a title arising
subsequently to the contract, except a transferee for value
who has paid his money in good faith and without notice of
the original contract;
(c) any person claiming under a title which, though prior to the
contract and known to the plaintiff, might have been displaced
by the defendant.
[25] Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal, (2005) 6 SCC 733
[26] Ibid
[27] 1954 SCR 360
[28] (2019) 3 SCC 520
[29] 1954 SCR 360
[30] Ibid
[31] Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963
For specific performance of a contract. Three years The date
fixed for the performance, or, if no such date is fixed, when
the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused.
[32] (2015) 5 SCC 223
[33] (1972) 3 SCC 684
[34] 1927 SCC OnLine Mad 135
[35] ILR (1888) 15 Cal 211
[36] Fry on Specific Performance, 6th Edn., p. 546
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8/10/22, 3:42 PM Specific Performance -- Principles Revisited | SCC Blog

The law relating to specific performance as engrafted in the

Specific performance is an equitable relief granted by the

“20. Discretion as to decreeing specific

Section 16(c)[8] of the Act makes it mandatory for the plaintiff

“14. Though, with the amendment of the

essential terms of the contract which are to

“30. It is now well settled that the conduct of

“12. The basic principle behind Section 16(c)

manifest that the conduct of the plaintiff

“6. But the respondent has claimed a decree

prove that he was ready and willing to

“7. In order to obtain a decree for specific

“27. It is settled law that even in the absence

“24. The expression “readiness and

‘In my opinion, on the evidence already on

“10. Ms. Agarwal has read to us the

“31. We are, however, in agreement with Mr.

such cases the failure to apply to have the termination set

“37. As could be seen from the prayer sought

“16. In a suit for specific performance of

necessary to refer to Section 22 of the

“7. In our view, a bare reading of this

that the necessary parties in a suit for

10. That apart, from a plain reading of

15…Therefore, in our view, a third party or a

7. The proper form of decree.

“38. The question arose before this Court

the vendor alone. A second considers that

“42. A mere reading of Article 54 of the

no date was fixed in the agreement for its

“22. It is settled by a long course of

between the parties is not extinguished by

deeds, or a period within which the judgment

* Advocate, High Court, Bombay. Assisted by Arjun

(b) where the property is held by the defendant as the agent

in the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), and, except as

to deposit in court any money except when so directed by the

proceeding, allow him to amend the plaint on such terms as

[23] (2001) 7 SCC 698

TAGGED WITH: Contracts, Contractual Obligations, Injunctive

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