1~'.]*,*J"'I.nM"1AI'''.

1 I
LAND POWER
THE COALITION AND
IRAQI ARMIES

TI:\I RIPLEY
lel.liL,MHl4.iuIlJj'w:JQliljK1- 1 I

LAND POWER
THE COALITION AND
IRAQI ARMIES
Text by
TIM RIPLEY
 ~ ~ ~ ~
-
~ ~ ~ ~
B,ili"I.;J"-.ryC".I~.. ~,.hlh,",,..
Ripl<y,Tim
D.,. ~ ~ ~ ~
L.."ll"'~"·-(lJ<s<rt"'Ofm,~ial'·,r)
:: ~\~dtclt~~lfW" Mili"'yf""",
9O\I·09J.-J'7011,
W ~ ~ ~
~ ~ ~ ~
C!J B ~ ~
Editor'snote
For more infom,.tionon 'he units mentioned in this ~ ,~ ~~

.. -.- obo
,-olume see Osprey's/T.len-at-_,I,rms and Elite series
~
__ v
Aclmowledgements 1,1,1 -XX

-
-X
l\numberofindi,idualsgaYegenerouslyoftheirtime --@ -""'
tohelpmakethi'book possihle. Special th.nks go to ~ (LT)
Hob1\-1orrison, l'etorJohnson. David Nicullc and all at
Hcadqu.tersUKI.andFOfces
Front cover
US Marines on a li"e_fire e'ercisc j1r>ctice for the
as""ult on Kuw.it. They are equipped with M r6.'\os.
dCSCT! camouflage b,ltlcdrc". PASGT bod}" armour
and ALICE webbing. (Military Scene)

For."".loguenf.llhoohpubli,hedbyOspreyMili'.ry
pleosewri,.'0
Th.,\-brketinKManag«,
'.onsumcc Cualoguc Departrnenl,
Ospcey Puhlishing L'd.
Miehdinlluuse.8,FulhamRoad.
I.nndonSWJ6RU
 LAND POWER I
INTRODUCTION
During the cady houT$ of 2 August 1990 Irnqi troops
launched their in\,,~ion of Kuwait. Within hours the
United Nations had condemned the unpromkcd
Iraqi attack and the United States of America started
to plan a mass;'", miliury response. A coalition of 29
states sent forces to suppon the US effort.
On 17 January ''}9' the coalition forces bcg-.ln
Operation [)er;erl Storm to liberate Kuwait. This
book profiles the bnd forces invoh"cd in the Gulf
conflict, looking at their wC:lPQns, doctrine, or~r-lnis­
ation and deployment
THE INVASION
OF KUWAIT
At 2am on" August 1990 Iraqi troops launched their
assault on Kuw<lit. Armoured units and hclicoptcr-
borne special forces units led the invasion with
mad.s on key points throughout the Emirate.
The Iraqi build-up bcganon 21 July when 30,000
trO<,lps started to move towards Kuwait from their
peacetime bases around Basl"2. This was the first
stage of the mm'emcnt of three armoured and four
infantry di,'isioll$ towards Kuwait. By the end of the
week the roads from Basrol towards Kuwait were
jammed with tanks, armoured personnel carriers,
artillery and trueh moving south. Giant temcd
encampments sprolng up and artillery emplacements
were built. Some 100,000 lroops backed by hundreds
ofl'-54, T -55 and T -72 tanks were positioned along
the border. Many of them from aite Republican
Guard Corps formations. Numerous deception mea-
sures were taken by the IroIqis to mask their inten-
tions from Western imclligencc services and con-
vince the Kuwaitis that the concentration was only
harmless sabre rattling. Important orders werc sent
{JIICII('hc 'All Americsrt.<· ,1K:S~uc1i-Ku"'~iriI>w-tler.
o(thefJ~IId Airborne I Ie has "titled his own
co,·e,... his lIqu~d "';rh hi.. 1',:n'on,,1 i'''''';QII <:hr.'ronsl
M "Uz ,,-hile 011 1"""01 ,m (USDolJ "i:t Ru""rt J-~ f)_,
by despatch riders or telephone bnd lines and
movement of strategic ammunition stocks were kept
to a minimum. When the Iraqis 'struck they took
C\"eryone by surprise.
With tactical surprise achieved, the 350 ronks of
the leading two Iraqi armoured divisions met nO
rcsisroncc when they crossed the border. The
Kuwaiti army had no lime to move up to positions on
the frontier and could only mount resistance on the
outskirts of Kuwait City itself. Bea,'y fighting took
place atJahreon the main road into Kuwait City from
the north. Two Kuwaiti &orpion light tanks thaI
tried to hold ba<;k the i""aders were quickly de-
stroyed b)' Iraqi T-72s, Here the Iraqi deception
measures slarted to work to their disadvan{:;lge. The
leading armoured units went into battle with hudly
any ammunition and they had to halt when resistan~'C
was encountered to allow the Ocner-armed Repub-
lican Guard units to e'llch up. Onl)' SOme 2~ T-72
tanks of the Guard carried full ammunition loads. It
took until mid-afternoon for the Republican Guard
to figbt their way through the streets of Kuy.",il City
t'\ the sea front arca.
As tbe main armOUr drove for Kuwait City
artillery fire was hrought down on Ali Al Salin airbase
10 Iry to pre,'em Kuy.",iti Air Force's Mirage FICKs
from taking off. Some t5 of the Kuwlliti planes
 \,-~:-\ / ,-----,/'
TURKEY

.
(n",u'i,lfil
____?_,.----l.)\,
: \
\ .r.b,1<
(,., If.,", \
If:"."-
SYRIA
) s.:_. (,
IR;l,N

~fIh"#
/(,,1»1.. .1f;;F-",
II.~,.

IRAQ
'-',

S;l,UOI ARABIA

.. '
.'--
SUDAN

rJ ETHIOPIA
/
i _ _. _
(
A Challe"gerMBT
adva"d"ga's,-.I,hrows
upacl()ud()r"""d~1>;"d
i~~~i;:;~~~:;;ntof
pro'c<"h,gogglt."and
SC:M"'es,,·oN>by,he<'rew.
(.tIoUArmJ'public
rclaljvn.»
how~wr got airborn~ and attaded the innders
bcforefl)'ing to safety in Dahrain. South of Kuwait
City troop-carrying '\li-8 I'lip hdicoplcl> landcd
Iraqi commandos in an attempt to take Ahmad At
Jabir airba"" but again the Kuwaiti bas~d
there managed to Other
landed sp"cial forces on """rn",,irnlly i",~,",",
llubipnandWarbahisiands, the
channels to Iraq's Umm (bar naval base. A tanl.:
column hcadcd for thc Intcrnational Airport and
otherlroops wereordcred direct to key points in the
city, including the Emir of Kuwait's Dasman Palace
Things howcvcr did not go according to plan and the
Emir and his close family were ablc to escapc in his
armourcd Mercedcs to safety in Saudi Arabia. Four
hours of heavy fighting took plaee in the grounds of
the paIacc and the Kuwaiti .o\ir force I-Ieadquarters
i\ numbcrofIraqi tanks were destroyed in the palace
gr(lunds bcfure its defenders, who were trained by the
British Special Air Service Regiment, were
overwhelmed. The Emir's younger brother, Prince
Sheikh Fadh,was killed fighring during this hattie. A
key target for the Iraqis was the Kuwaiti Central
Bank and its massive gold bullion reservcs
The Iraqis soon crushed organised resistance by
Kuwait's 20,000 troops, bur all oyer Kuwait City
smaH groups of troops or armed ciyilians start~d to
buneh ,poradic attacks On Iraqi units.llehind the
comhattroopscamc unitsofthc ltaqis~"(;ret policc,
th~ f~ar~d MukhahlJrat, who quickly start~d l<> round
up opponents of the new ord~r. With Kuwait City
un<l~r lra,!i control, reinforcem<·nts nOw start~d to
flow in from Basra in ait-conditioned buses. Three
armoured di,'isions were dispatched down to the
Kuwait-Saudi border to start work building up
defensivc p-ositions to hlock any counter arrack from
the south, Four infantry divisions occupic<1 Kuwait
City and ,~cured the lines of communications back
into Iraq. Tanhandartill~ryweredugin along the
Sea from in Kuwait to~"(lunteras<:abortle invasion
Whik the Iraqi m~>p' swiftly crushed the small
Kuwaiti Ann~' it seemS Pr~sident Saddam Hussein
wasnottooimpre,"edhyhisarmy'sperformanceand
amonrh laterhc ordered theex~cUlionofthe Iraqi
ChiefofStalfl\'!aj.Gen, Abd aI-Karim, together with
a numbcrofhisseniorstalfolfieers, who planned the
invasion of Kuwait.
lruqConsolidates
Over the next six months the Iraqis consolidated
their forces in Kuwait, or as they termed it Iraq's
Provincc. Some 590,000 troops with 4,200
3,000 heavy artillery pieces and 2,600
armoured vehides were moved into the occupied
country or deployed insourhern Iraq 10 support
them. Th~ Septemh~r '990 peace accord with I ran
freed more than to div;sions to mo'·e inlO Kuwait.
The2n-30 Iraqi divisions in the Kuwait theatre of
operation, were deployed in depth wirh heavy
armoured reserves p",itioned bchind rhick frontline
defene~s. Along the Saudi horder heavy minefields
were sown and giant earthworh «·alled herms) were
built to h~p tanb at bay. This outer line was
intermingled with barhed wire and booby traps to
disrupt infantry attach. Just behind thi, line were
the main infamry trench and hunkcr')"t~m" often
~"'''h
.5.t>da"."

'!' ~:;:::;::::""""'"
® K"~.itl"Wn",o".(Aj,pot'
\Zl ~1",otI.1 J.bi, .., 1>. . .
(JJ AlioiSoli,..i,I>.,.
f()rmeu int()tTiang"ulareanhw()rk f',rts. These posi-
tionswere sup!"lrIed hy tanh dug into hull-down
firing positions. Some zo di,-isi()nsofthe Iraqi 11,111
and VII (:nrps manned this first echelon position,
which extended along the Kuwaiticoast, round along
the Saudi-Kuwait horder Jnd 50 miles westward into
Ih.. dc>en aslride Ihe Jra']i-Saudi oonkr, A number
of armOutcd and mechanised wcrc posi-

local counterattacks. As an added defcne'c apinst

amphibious landings, Chincse-madc SiLlworm anti-
shipping missiles wne pusitioned along the coastline
Mobile SCUD surfacc-to--surfacc missile (SSM)
batterics wcrcalso movcd into Kuwait to bring lhe
majorwalition bascsatDhahrAnandRi~'adhwithin
range. Backing up the fitst cchclon were at lcaslfivc
indel'l'ndent artillery battalions with long-rangc
Aflcrn<pid:>hipmt"n'w dochide. Th~y\""u1d
'55mm, T;zmmand T30mm towed howitrers ,be 6,,11; Md., wnh ,m'
Stretching back to Basra were two more echelons off:loadedrro""h~Capt: '!:\71Y.{,,':r=;h:(~:';;~~ln
Meodoclnobyal/aa',nl( Armyd~J>Q"AJabama
conrainingthe Jra']is' hestm~,ps, with the Repuh- crnnc on to a Saudi (USlJol) vi" TimJl.iplcy)
lican Guard heing held in strategic re",rve to the
sOUlh ofB"ra, In the descrt to the west of Kuwait swallow up yehicles by the dozen, Strctching out into
Cily were six armnured or mechanised divisions who the de,ert the g<>ing gets distinctly firmer as the sand
wen' assil>ncd to Ihe GHQmohile resen'e to counler becomes ml>re gritty. Running along the
breaches in Ihe first echelon defences. Two Kuwait-Iraq horder into Saudi Arabia is the Wadi al
Balin, a three-mile-wide valle~', It i, ,'ery e"y to
construct deep field defenccs inthi,,,,nd,huron the
counter allY flallling mmTS againsl lhe expo~d o[hcrhandilisexeellenrtmkeounrry.Thedesertin
wNlcrncnd oflhc fTtst cchelon, The eil:ht Repub- Ir.qbqondlheWadiisgrittyhutd<>ttedwithrody
lican Guard di.,isiollS werC held back as strategic ollteropsand depressions which turn inwsmaillake,
rescrvc formations tomakcdccisi,'ccountcrallacl.:s during wintctrain storms, Arollndflasra andaJong
toattempl 10 lurn the land baulein InQ's favour. the banks of the EuphrAles and Rinrs the
Controlliog thc Kuwait theatre of operAtions was an
army group headquarters locatcd in the Basta arC"•.
To support this build-up, huge ammunition dumps
weresetupallthrollghKuwaitandanumbcrofroads
wereSl'I'ciallyconstrllcted to allow armour to mo'"c
speedilytothreatcncd sectors ofthc front. Many
dummy positions wercalsQbllilt to confuse coalition
aeri.lreconnaissance

ThcB,ltIlcficld the Fao Bubi}'an and

Thelerrain ill Kuwait and southern Iraq provided
Warhahi,land,openmndflatsarecommon,provid_
somcunusualprohlemsf,lt Iraqi defenders. To the
ing,erylittle""verfiltdefendersorarrackersalike
soulh of Kuwait Cir~- ale"'g the (i"lf""a.st are a serk..
Kuwait City it,elf i, a modern Westcrn-stylc city
ofsaltmar,he,knownassahHa,whichal"t'treacher~ with many con~rete huildings and industrial com-
ous for annournl vehicles. These are plexes which provided ideal c<,,-cr from aerial

WAR WITH IRAN
The Iraqi Army that invaded Kuwait was shaped
grcal1y by its eight-year strugglc wjth Iran that ended
instalcmatcin 1988. It Jcd to the dcvclopmcnt of
Iraq's chemical warfare capability until it bcC"JffiCan
imcgr.lICd part of its war fighting doctrine and the
growth of the Rcpubliull Guard as Iraq's main
mobiJcfighlingforcc
President Sadrlam Hussein launched his war
against Jran in September 11)80 with the objective of
capturing the oil-rich region of Khuzistan. The
Iranians wece still in the midst of their Islamic
Revolution and Saddam hoped that the Iranian
military would bc socnfccbJcd by Islamic purges that
it would put up only token resistance, lIe couldn't
have bccn more wrong. The Iranians rallicd (0 the
defence of their homeland and many oftbe Shia
militiamen of the Iraqi para-military Popular Army
desertcd in large numbers as soon as they realised That
they would have to do some real fighting
By T9~3 the Tranians had g".Iined thc tipper hand
and mounted a series ofoffcnsi\'csaimed at pushing
into Traq and deposing Saddam Hussein. They
eoneentrated thcirelforrsoneaplllring Basra, which,
if it had fallen, would have opened up the fiaT
Euphrate, plain to the hanians and allowed them a
lree run against Baghdad. Using World War l-sty1e
infiltration Tactics Iranian Revolutionary Guard as-
sauhtroopsbrOXethroughlraqidelenccsonnumer-
ous occasions. Iraqi conscripts manning frontline
trenchsystemssurrendercdorfledwhenthcyfound
Tb<-sclJri,i,J,AnnyM,"'I
bQ,.·i'~<""'''''''~pe>'rec'
eXilmJlleofthecutting
edgeofthecmJli'ioo's
themseh-es surrounded. Lack of supplies and tank
support, howner, ,,,ually pre,'ented the Iranians
IrompressinghomeTheiradvantagetoenablethemto
achievcadecisi,-evictory
Three ~'ears 01 this type of arrad graduall)' wore
the Iraqis down toan eXlcntthatin r986 they had
hardly any reser\'es left to plug the gaps made by the
Iranians.Rynowthelraqisweregerringincreasingly
desperate. han had a population of 54 million
comparedtolraq's.8million,so.helranianleaders
correctly presumed ThaT Iraq would run out of
soldiers before Iran if This pattern olwarlare con-
tinued. To lIUIl the tidc, Iraq started to usc chemical
weapons in massive artillery strikes against poorly
defended Iranian infantry. Their main agent wa,
Distilled MusTard (HD), a form of mustard ps which
causes insTantaneous inflammation ollungsand eyes;
laterse\-ereblistersappearonTheskin.hlorms.n
odourless du,t when released into the air and wa,
dubbed 'DusTy Mus.ard'. 1t is. non-persisTenT agent
and rapidly dispersed in the desert heaT,an important
point given that Iraqi troops were"" equally ill-
prepared to defend themselves again't it,eftect, as
the Iranian,. lndeed,onanumherolr>cc""ions!,a,
landed on Iraqi po,itiohs hy mistake causing con-
,idnable casualties. haqi troop' were puorl~'
equipped with chcmical worfare protection suits.
The few S(l\'iet-supplied suit, or locally produced
,uiT,wcre sent only to a few f.voured uniL' ,ucha,
the Republican Guard
blal:;;tu~r;~a~;:~::::a~:~e:~~;'~~:a~,~esnw~:~~ I"
everrhey rhought fit, panieularly in situations where
Iraqi forees were in danger of being ovelTun. When
the Iranians achieved whar seemed lih dccixive
breakrhroughs their assault rroops would be quickly
dowsed in heav)'eloudsof'Dusty.lvlustard'ddivcted
byIraqilong-rangeanill~ryor.ireraft.ConvcntionaI
artillery shells were mixed in with the chemical shclls
to increase the panic and confusion among the
Iranian troops. 1r was always successful .nd the
Iraqis managed to hold their line together. In 19S7
and 1988 they start~d to USe ch~mical weapons to
support offensive operations with some success.
Cyanide gas and Tabun (GA) nerv~ ag~nt was used
during these final baulcsofthe war, hut thcy werc
verydifficultweap<>nstouscsuce~sxfuly.1raqitroops
needed toqukkl)'advance to occupy territoty blitzed
by chemical weapons befi)rc the Iranians had time to
rcroverfromtheinitialshock.Theweath~rhadtohc
perfect to ensure that the chemical agent.~ did not
lingetandpoisonIraqitroopswhohadadvancedimo
the contaminated area. During this pha<;c of the war
the Iraqis carried out theirnotorioux nerve agcnt
anackon the rebel Kurdish Iown <>fHalabja, killing
some 5,000 civilians. This attack prowd vcry effcc-
tiveinterrorisingtheKurdsimowindingdowntheir
revolt.
The Republican Guard
In tandem with the development of Iraq's chemical
weapons capability, President S.ddam built up an
elite armoured corps that was politically reliable and
loyal only 1<) him. Regular Army armoured unit.s
pn:l\"cd themsc1ves very inept at carrying out compIcx
mechanised operations, so the expansion of the
Republican Guard Corps filled thiserueialvaeuum in
the Iraqi ground forces. II wax formed first as a
brig:lde-sizcd formation to protect the Presidential
PalaceinBaghdad.ltsoriginaleadreswererecrllited
exclusively from residents of President Husse;n's
home town ofTikri1. Their first action was to counrer
an Iranian breakthrol1gh at Mari.an in 1983, bill they
could only seal the hr~achnot turn back the Iran;a"s
In March 1985, now at divisi')flal xtrength under the
command of Maj.Gen. Talie Khalil Dl1ri, they
scored a major vicrory at Haur al j·Iawizch and
President Husse;n began a large expansion of the
,---1>-------,
lI.cnJini~ccntoftbcLonlf ,,·hichhdpedprt,..iderhe
RangcD<:scr,Groupuf eyesat>d"",.. Qfthe (orce.,·
f;,~:tRI:':;:~:~::e~;~Z,..c
a"""",h/jng i" Saudi
Arahia.(Mili.atyS<xnc)
Guard toenablethem to take the ofFen,ive again't the
Iranians. Their first offensive again't the Iranian
foothold on the Fao Peninsula in early 1986 ended in
dismal failure when the Guards' tanks got stuck in
marshy terrain
By 1986 the Guards had expanded from si.~
mcchanisedbrig"adeSI017androralledsomez5,000
highlytraincd elite troops. They got first ehoiccofaH
new foreign cquipment pllrchased by the Iraqis Th~
Gl1ard carried out thcir most successful and decisive
atlaeks in the spring of 1988 against Fan and the
Majnoon Islands. Tank unirs and spccial forces units,
landed by helicopters, broke rhe Iranian resistane~
aft<;r the defenders were shelled with chemical
wcapons. In the Majnoon assault hm·ercraft were
used to carry Guard commando units across
marshland
Thcse attacks broke the back of the Ir.mian will to
eontinue the warofattrition, and a grateful President
showered its commanders and soldiers with honours,
extra pay and promotions. The Guard led the Kuwait
in"asion force because of it., politiealrcliahility.
Their equipment and training made them a
narural choice to fulfil the strategiercxCtvcrolcin the
Kuwait theatre of operations. In August 1990 the
Guard Corps fielded eight divisi,)()s, (our infantry,
one mechanised, three armoured. It also had marine
and special forces brigades. The armoured division"
titled Tarrakalma, Medina and Harnmurabi, wCre

Hriri.hlroo".wai'<>JJrhe
cdgc <>fthe tarmacfor
'hcirrraru>p<Jrtafrcr
",.,.iv;nginS,,,,,/jQnthc
equipped with ,,00-600 modern T-7Z;\h tanks.
Around 400 "1"-"5 ami "1"-62 Links were used by the
mechanised ~nd infmtry unit, of the Guard. It had
1ar~e numbers of SOUlh African G-5 '55 mm towed
arTillery pieces and f'rmch Gel" '55 mm self-
propelled howitzers. Ami-aircraft defence was pro-
videdbyFrenchRolandandSo,'ietSA---.f>surface_ro-
air missiles. GuardsolJier; wore a distinctive small
red trian~leshoulderpaleh.
With ",me' 5°,000 men under arms, the Guard
were mainly polirical soldiers. They were all volun-
teefSoftheSunnifailh, Extra pay, rations and Ica\'e
ensured their loyalty ro 5addam J-1ussein. The Guard
also had its own logisric support system to enSure its
imkpendcnce from rhe Regular Army. Spedalunits
of the Guard were al,o assigned to Regular Army
unilS to cn,ure their 10yaiTyro President I Iusscin anJ
prevemdeserrions.All seniorcommalldersofGuanJ
units "ercchoscn for their personal loyalty to
5addam. Their commander in January 1991 was
LI.Gen, Ayad al-Kawaii, a ,'eteran of the Iran-Iraq
war, who commanded thelinal victorious attack on
the Fao Peninsula. He had undergone military
traininginth<·UnitedStatesamlw.,,,,,nsideredone
of Iraq's best liddeommanders.
lnmany ways the Guard were similar 10 the Nazi
Walfcn-SS'"fWorld Warll infamy, In their fir;t
}'cars they were ,'ery much political soldin, who we...-e
primarill'conccrncd with countcr-coups apinst Prc-
sidem Hussein's rule. Their !aek ofeolh'entional
military training was reflected ill their poor combat
pcrformallcedllring the early years of the Iran-Iraq
War. Like the Walfen-55 they were expanded and
sllpcrblyequippedbeC"Auscoftheirpoliticalrclia-
biliry.Ittookthemmanyyearstomastertheskills
necessary to mount successful mechanised oper-
ations. The Guard were vcry Jllllch a law unto
themsel\'es and operated olltsidethe normal military
chainofcommand.TheirdircctlinkstothePrcsidelll
often meanT they werc ordered to carry 0111 opcraTions
forpolirical rather than military reasons and suffered
disaSTrously as a result
THE IRAQI ARMY
J'rior to the invasion of Kuwait the Iraqi army fiddcd
around 50 divisions in its Regular Army, with some
800,000 men underarms. This,ofcourse,excludcd
men serving with the Republican Guard. Roughly
half of the army was deployed along the
Syrian Turkish-Iranian bordcrs to Ihe north of
Baghdad. The remainder \<'erepositioncd along the
sOlllhern section of the Traq-Iran bordet region
aroundB.-ra.ltwasfromTheseforcesthattheblilk
of the Kuwair invasion fotce was drawn. An ad-
diti,,,,a! 'J divisions, includingtwoatmoured divi-
sions, weref"rmed in August '9'JOwhen the Iraqis
recaUcJoyerlOo,ooore,ervists.TokeeplhearmYIiP
to strength during the Iran-Iraq war few conscripts
were allowed tolea\·e the army after completing their
two-)·car pcriod of military "''''icc. This practice
eominucd after the end of the war in 1988 and
allowed Iraq to maintai'n its huge ground army
o<·eranycon...ideNhI£
di...tanc£.Onlyoncedru;c
'.;0'://;::,,;;:::.=::;:.,
unde"I,e;r"w"p" ....'r.
(US1JoDviaTi",Riplq)
lhcM~f9£'SqW"/
Autom,,,i,, Ilbp<m (SA IV)
fK,ifl/(<>p<"",",dby tl>is
""notrooperor'heli,"d
:;;:7,,:~~:i~~~(i;~~~::.;or<:
."dh•.• "ow/argel,
repl,,,,,dthcftl6t>in ,hj~
role. (V8DoO ,·iaRof><:r.
F.Dorr)
Ordinary soldiers were paid between 8oand87 dinars
a mnnth (aOOUl 5'00 US), but hi;::h-rankin;:: pm-
fessional nfficers received considerably more along
with other fringebcnel1ts
The hi;::hest o!""rational-leyc1 formation u,ed b)'
the lra'lisw", the army corps, of which thcrc wcrc
Sewn in '990. Each COqlS WU allocatcd a number of
army diyisions and independent brigades depending
on their specific task. Corps usually were a"igned at
1eaSloneartiller)' hrigade, a 'pecial forccsbrigadcand
anti-mnk banalions. A numher of these types of units
werenot.-signed t1J<XJrps but wcrehdd asccntral
resene formations by the Armed Forces General
StaIr (GHQ), The artillcr)' brigade was equipped
with lOwed l]Omm, 152 mm and l;;mm howitzers
ney also were assigncd multiple rockct launchers
Chemical weapons were usuallyalJocated to this level
of unit. Special forces brigades were equipped Wilh
light infanlry weapons and were transported by
lrucks. They were tasked with reo:onnaissance,
harassing operations, air-assault. and imposing
diseipline. Anti-tank units were equipped with wire_
guided anti-tank weapons and light armoured veh-
ides. j\ largenumkr of anti_aircraft artillery and
surface-to-air missiles were assigned looorps-ie,'e1
anti-aircraft units
lra'l'sse\'enannouredamlmel'haniseddi,'isions
mustered around 15,000 mcncach,organised along
thcSo\'iettriangularpattern. With armourcd di,'i-
sionsha~ingtwoarmoured brigadcsand oncmech-
anised infantry brigadc. In mechanised divisions
lhcre was ollearmourcd brigade and two mechanised
infantry brigades. Thcirartillcry rcgimcllts usuaHv
had 84 towcd 122 mm howitzcrs, with self-propellcd
artillcry being rescn·cd exdusively for thc Rcpub-
lican Guard Corps, Armonred and mechanised
brigades each fielded four battalions, which were
termed regiments in the British fash;oll, lnrhebener
trained di ..;sions all-arms combat groupings were
formed at baualionk.·e1lOconduclspecificoper-
ations. Tank baualionsconlained around 40 tanks in
three companies, each w;th four platoonsofrhree
tanks. Light amlOured vehieles were used as com-
mand and support ,chicles. Mechanised infantry
battalions also used a threc-<:ompany strucrure. Each
company was made lip ofrhree rifle platoons and a
weaponsplatOOll,Therifleplatoonswcremadeupof
three ,o-man sections armed with Snvie' small arms
and RPG-7 anti-tank weapons. Weapons platoons
had 82mm mortars and recoilless rifles or anli-lank
guidcd .....eapons, Some 40 t04S armoured personnel
carriers and 30 trucks were on strength
lnfantrydivisiollsusuallyhadaroundr2,ooomen
 formed illlo three brig:ldes,eaeh with four hatt:llions
Mosrwere\wypoorlyequippcdalldreeeivnl the WEAPONSAND
oldestequipmellT. Hardly any had armollTed pctsOll-
nel carriers and they had ro re1yon trucks for EQUIPMENT
transport. Company and platoon organisation was
<imilar to that in mechanised battalions. Their Upumilthe'980sthcS"v-ierUnionw,lo;Iraq'smain
artiller~' regimcnt.' usually had three barralions of arms,upplier,butrheptnSllreofrhelran-lrnqwar
122mmlOw~dhowirzer, Icdthclraqistodiversifythcirsourec.,,,fsupplyand
Supportin~ Ihe groond fnrccs were almost 500 set up indigenous production facilities for small arms,
helicoptersofrhe Army Air Corps. In Au~ust t')9O it artillery, all typcsofammunition, communications
hadl59armedhe1ioopters,incJuding40S0v'iet-made equipmcnt, ehemic.l weapons, and surfaee-ro-
...ti-24 Hind" 56 German Bo-tOSs with lIOT mis- surfacemissilcs.
siles,JoFrenchSA-JI6s,IJSA-J21Sand20SA-J42 There were four principal rypes nfmain banle
Gazelles armed wirh HOT The air corps saw plcnty tanh. Some 500 to 600 1'-72"'1 IS servcd with the
of service during the Iran-Iraq war, and on one Rcpubliean Gnard. 1'he<c were mainly of Sovict and
occasion a I-lind <hot down an Iranian F-4 Phantom Poli,h oriB'in, althollgh the Inqis ",id they had
jct with an anti-tank missile. Sovin-made Hips produced their own vcrsion called thc 'Lion of
providc the nllcJeusof the Iraqi tran'porl bdicopter Babylon'. Oyer 1,,\00 Sovier-madc 1'-62s, sOme wirh
fleer along wirh assorted French machines. Weo;rcrn lasetrangefindcrsfitred, servcd withRL~
To defend rear areas and lines of communication puhlican GlJard and the hettcr Regular Army
the Iraqi, de"eloped rhe para-military Popular armoured divisions. SovictT-S4/sssand its Chinese-
Army. More than half of irs 850,000 strength was made dcrivative, the Type 59/6<Js, were the most
made up ofreservi,rs and Ra'arh Party aetiv'ists who numerous rank deployed, wirh almost J,OOO in
sen·edduringweclendsandeyening,.lrwasalocally service. A numherofeaptured Jranian and Kuwaiti
based force withdctacbments in every city, rown and Chieftains,!1.1-47Sand M-60s wcrc aJ<o in usc
\'illageofrraq.Afteritsvcr~'poorperf"rmanceinrhe Only arouod Soosclf~propdled (SP) guns WCrc in
early days of the Tran-Iraq war,PresidemSaddam serviec,mainl~' SOI.'ict-madezSlsand zSJs. French
resrricted its activitics to rear areas and onl~' allowed Gel' tssmm SP gum were al,o Ilscd along with
it light arms capturcd Iranian and Kuwairi .\11(1) 'ssmm SP
guns. The Iraqis manllfanurc their own "ersion of
the Sm"iet D-Jo t22mm towed howitzer. Some 200
South African_made G-S t55mm howi17ers were in
sen'iec and gaye the Jraqis an imprcssi'T long-ranB'c
eapabilit~, rhanks Ie> irs enended-range, full-bore,
base-bleed (.ERFIl-BH) ammunition. So,'iet ,\1-46
130nun howitzrrs with their z7,lso-metre range
furrherboostedlraq'ssrrongartilleryforce, In total
rhe In>qisficlded SOme J,ooohca\'ytowcdartillery
pilX'es, indnding Austrian rss mm (jH N~45, Soviet
122mmi\11938,I52mmM19J7<and1\1l<J43sand
Jralian ,osmm pack howitzcrs, Morc than zoo
muhiplcrockct launchers wcrein the lraqian;enalin
August 1990, including Sovier 8M-us and
B!>-1-I3/16s,llrnzilian Asrrnsvariantsandanumher

;;':~\~~~'Ab~~',1);:;;~~~1 '!j~:~t":i~':!r~~7,)~~~Jc
:?£:;~~E~~:i: ~;:;;'!,,',C:::t~'S:,r;;'
 Gulf War Tank Comparison
]\hAI Challenger T-71 T-61 T-55 M60A.
Aiain urmmnent 115 lJlm IT5mm 105 mm
Engine 15001-IP 1200 lIP 7&oliP 700 lIP 52011P 75 0BIIP
Crew 4 4 3 4 4 4
Max speed on road 67km/h 6ol:m/h 6ol:m/h 50 l: m/h 50km / h 48.28km/h
Wcight(kg) 57,'50 62,000 36,500 36,000 48 ,0) 87
Fuclellpacity(Jjrres) 1,908 1,797 9" 900

Gulf War Artillery Comparison

Iraqi Coalilion
Type G-S BM2I ZS3 M1I).),\2MlloAa MLRS
Calibre '55mm IzzmmR"det Issmm 155mm a03mm aa7 mm
Range a5miles Izmilcs IJmilcs IImilcs 13 miles aomiles(l)
7amiles(z)
Projecri/eweighr I03IbH£ 1,800IbH£ 961bl-Ic loolbllE aoolbIIE (I) uxrocl:ets
in full sal.. o each with 644
Mn homhlcts
(a) Army Tactical
Missile System
withI,oooM74
bomblelS
in one rocket

ofhome-produceusyslcms,.",hnyofthescsystem,
wcrceapableofflringchcmiealwarheaus
Light armoured ,'chicles came from a variety of
sources, bllt with lhe Soviet Union being the main
source. Elile Ilnils were eqoipp<:u with 1,500
BMP-Ilzs while olher units made do with some 6,000
inferior ,'chicles, such as Ihe IJTR-50/ho, MT-LB,
and Chinese YW-53IS, Gcch OT-6a/64s, Freneh
Panhard M3S and Brazilian EE-I I Urotus
Stralcgicweapons
A brge amnont of re,nurees were devoted by the
Iraqis \0 the development ofstratq~ie missiles and
other exotic weaponry. They pUI great effort into
extendingthe300kmrangeofthcirSoviet-supplied
SCUD-B missiles The 'AI-Hus""in' "ersion had a
range of 600 km, but 10 boost its range it could only
carry a 500kg warhead compared 10 1,000 kg on the
 number ofsurfac<:-to-air missi1cs (SAM) converted
to surfac<:_to-surface role. A "e"ionofrheSA-3 Goa
was called the 'Barq' and the SA-6 Gainful was called
rhe 'K.er'. Some 50 !'ROG TEL. were supplied to
Iraq bur numbers of the converted SAi\-ls were not
known. The Iraqi mis.ile fOR'" wa, nominally formed
into two brigades, but they usually'wcredeployed in
small groups of one Or two TELs that took their
orders dir""t from the Pre,ident's head<juarters
One of the more exotic weapons that the Iraqis
\\erc producing was the so-.:alled 'Supcr Gun'. The
Canadian artillery designer Dr, Gerald Bull proposed
theidC".ttocreateagun on themodcl of World War II
~«mc.mr<>rl<match,,>bcc"
,mlhcre""i,-i'We"d. giant artillery. The project foundered when Or. Hull
(M<>DAI7J1ypublic was assassinated in Brussels in lWO and British
cd",iQ"S)
customs officials intercepred parts of one of the
barrels, Other producrs of Dr. Rull did find their way
standard SCuD. To extend the range of the 'AI- into the Iraqi arsenal thanks to rhe South African
Abbas' version to 900km the Iraqis had reduce the company AR,\1SCOR. Thepupplied the Ira<jis with
warhead to only some 300 kg. A number of SCUD G-5 howitzers and the ERFB-llll ammunition which
had lobe cannibalised to provide the extra fucl tanls extends the range ofSovict '30mmhowitzersfrom
and olher parts required to construct the lra<ji 27" mI0 40"m
\"ersionsofrhemissile. Due to the incrcased length of
Ihe 'AI-Hussein' and 'AI-Abbas' missile:; they could
n01 be carried On the standard SCUD .1"'IAZ-543
transporter-crcctor-lalm"h (TEL) ,-chicle so a new
one had to be devcloped. Called the 'AI-Walced', it
DESERT SHIELD
WaS plI1led by a Saab Scania tractor unit and
rcscmblcd a low-loadcrtrailer. The missile wasraiscd In the six months following the Iraqi in...sion of
into the "eflical at the rear of the TEL prior to Kuwait the United States dispatched alm",t haIfa
launch. Thc Soviets supplied the Iraqis wilh 36 million men ro the Middle East under the code name
MAZ-543 TELs, but an unknown number of '.'1.1- Operation Desert Shield. The first wa\-e of forces
Walttds'wereproduced arrived in Saudi Arabia in Augu,t, September and
During the Iran-lra<j war more than 360 SeeDS November '990 with the task of defending the
were fired at Iran with varying degrees of inaccuracy. "ingdom from further lraqiaggrcssion. Starting in
rheyliveduptotheirrepotationforbeing-hig-hly N,wembcr an additional 200,000 troops were ordered
inaccurate with circular error prubable (CEP - the to the Middle East to give US commanders the
sileofthe area a missile islikcl)' to fall in) of4-50m. option of offensive action toejecl the Iraqis from
Iraqi derivatives of the SCUD were twice as inaecu-' Kuwait.
rate and in five testsmonitot-ed by theeoalition forces This unprecedented movement of forces was
in December did not produce CEPs better than possiblc thanks 10 more than a dc<;adeofcontingency
I,ooom. The SCUD and ils Iraqi deri"atives proved planning and tr.tining by the US armed forces to
to be a uscfulterror weapon in the Tran-Iraq war, r.tpidl)" deploy combat units to the crisis-torn Middle
particularl)" when the threat ofmouming- chemical East The first moves ro enhance lJS capabilit)· for
warheads was raised in the later days of the war. No this type of operation were taken by Pre,ident]immy
chemical warheads, howC\'er, were ever fired at Iran Carter in November 1979 at the height of the Iranian
The SCUD force was supplemenred by shorter- Hostage crisis. He was horrified to lcarn that apart
range FROG-7 missiles of Soviet origin and a from US I\'avycarrier battle groups and the lightly
umed 8znd Airborne Di,ision, few US forces wuld
inten'ene in the area. To eo-ordinatc a
US intenention he ordered the ~st.blish-
ment of the Rapid Deploy'mem Joint T.sk Force
(RDJTF). This multi-service h~.d'lu.rters w", re-
sponsible for any opcrJtions in the Arabi.n l'~nin­
sular, Iran, l'akisl:ln, Afghmistm, th~ Horn of
Africa, Egypt and Sudan.
While the Iranian crisis lIlay havc been the
stimulus for its creation, thc Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan in December 19;9 rcfocu,~d th~
RDJTF's efforts.t count~ring Soviet incursion into
thcMiddleEasI.Topractiscoperatinginthe.\1iddl~
East a seriesofcxcrciscs waS hcld with friendly states
in the fo,liddJc £ast, such as thc 'Uright Star' scries in
Egypt from Novcmber J9</O. US j\,hrin~, of the
RDJTF .lso practised amphibious a"aults on
beachcs in Oman. Agreem~ms w~re reaeh~d with
Kenp, Somalia and Pakistan for their ports to be
us~d by US support ship" The f(>rm~r British island
of Dieg" Garcia was trnnsformed into. major base
furll-.'iz bomrn,rs, maritime patrol aircrafrand.fleet
of,hipswntainingweapon"vehiclesanilequipment
for.~1arineCorpscxpcditi(Jnarybrigad~s
Of crucial importmce to the success of any US
intervention in the r(-ginn was the political and
military supportofthcGulfstates, partieuJarJy Saudi
Arahia. ,\liliun tic, were increased with Saudi
.... r.bia and mu~h of the kingdom's military infra-
struetur~wasbuilt'peeiallytoaceommodatealarge
influx "fUS aircraft and trOOP';, Am~ricm vchicles
and aircraft supporr equipment w~re al,o Pf(~
positioned in th~ kingdom. Similar arrangements
were made with othcr Gulf st.tes. The Flagship of
the US )\-av)' in the Gulf, the USS Lli Salle, waS
hom~ port~d in Uahrain and the Omani island of
1\hsirah was established a~ a forward airbase and
suppl} in~l:I11ation
Th~ Il.DJTF's pr~parations gath"r~d mom~ntom
throughoUltheJ98osasmoreresource~weredn'oted
to it hy th~ n~w uS President, Ronald Reagan. In
198J its importance was considerably increased when
iJ was trnnsformed into Central Command, with its
headquarters at MaeDil1 Air Force Ha~e in Florida.
Asa fully fledged joinrcommand it was pUlon an
: XVIII
equal footing with US eommands;n Europe and the
Pacific ill the chain of command, The US Third
Anny was activated at Fort MacPherwn, Georgia, ro "-- - ' -_ _ ==----'
control US Army c1cmcnts ~ssigncd to Centr~1
Command, By thc mid-H)Sos thc US Army was
contributillg three full divisions and ~ number of
independent brigades, but in e~se of cmergencics
contingency pl~ns were m~de to dl'~w in other US
Armyun;ts
The first clements of ~nv CS interyelltion were to
be from the XVIII Airborne Corps and the 82nd
Airborne Division based at Fort Bragg, ~orth
Carolina. Elementsofthe8znd.'\irbornearekept OIl
$
~
.It )I~III~II. II.
[:@'][Q] B ~1!5.51
l,s.'lbrmcCorpsVIV1!JJOn
imm~diat~r~adines~ to deploy anywhere in the world
by USAF transport plan~s.One parachute company
isont"ohours'rcadin~>slOmOy~,ahartali()nison
18
hours nOlicc, and the division's ready hrigade, Wilh
lhrec paratroop bal!lliions and an artillery h.ttalion,
can bc airboTlle in 2{hoUN. Airmohile tnK'pSOflhe
10"1 Airhornc (Air As,",ult) Divisi(>n were also
3<signed to the corps along with heavy armour ofrhe
24th Infantry Division (M~hanised), Afler the
failure of US ,pccial/ilTces operations in [ran and
Grenada, lh~ command arrangements for lhese uniTs
were r~organiscd. Th.,y were laken <>ur of the norm.l
ann}' chain of command and special joint service
headqnnlcrsestablishedateommandlC\'cI, Speei.1
Opcrations Command of Centrol Command was set
up at l\1.cDill with. t"rward command clemenT on
lheUSSI41Sdll(
(.enrr.l Comm.nd gor irs firsT tasTe of action in
19~7 during the so-called Tanker "Var, wh~n US
U~Il0rlh~'SI
;;:~~t-:~:~::;:~k~;;~~zm
"" a" ~x~rcis~ i" Ih~.~·audi
d~erl ...hilslpracli.<ingror
lhcrcallhing.(MoPAnny
pubJicrdar;om;)
l'c.-lO,mc<lwith dc"","'
=:~.f~~i:::;lh'''c
LVTP-7sorll,~ Ma';11~
C"'l'Slak~ad...mtagellJ"il
hrieJ"halttoopcnlhe
::;ij.~::h:~:~;jiAc
inlcr;ur.(MUital"}·SuIleJ
naval and special forces were deployed to protect
shipping under Jranianatlaek inlhe Persian Gulfand
.... r.bi.nSe.
The First \Vavc
On 3 Augusl '9')0 CS Defence Secrelar~' Did,
Cheney flew ro S.udi Arabia.ndafleralhree-hour
meeting with King Fahd it was agreed thaI US forces
shOlJldbedispaTehedroeounterrbeJr.qirhrear
Three days laler Ihe ~2nd !\irbome's readiness
brigade w.s alerled 10 prepare to move and on II
August President George Bush announced rhal he
h.d ordered the division and USAF aircraft to Saudi
Arabi.
Hundreds of USi\F (;_; Galaxy and C-rfr
Slarliflerlransport planes flew inloPope Air Force
base near ForI Rragg to eollecl the 82nd Airborne\
r2,790 troops before flying rhem oUl to Dhahran
.irbasc in e.stern Saudi Arabia, Included in the first
contingent w"' Ihe 'All American' di"ision', light
lank baltalion, Ihe Jrd Raltali,,,,, 73rd Armour
Regiment, with some 40 M;5' A, Sheridan ranks and
Ihe belicoplers of tbe H2nd Avi.lion Brig.de. 11
mustered some 12 AH-,S Cohras, 43 OH-SIlCs, 40
UH-60 B1ackbawks and ,8 AH--fl4 Ap.ehe attack
helicoplers. A number oflhe new Multiple Launch
Rockel Splcm< (MLRS) wne quickly flown out to
provide the di"ision wilh addcd fircpowcr. Patriot
surfaee-tt>-air missi1e baltnie, ofthc ttlh Air De-
fence Brigade were also flo"'n in to prO\'ide air
defence around tbe DhahranandJubayl airbase,
This deployment was ~onducled in a blaze of
publicily, but a more co\'erl mo"emcnt ofLS Army
forces wa,taking place in,'o!>'ing lhl' threebalt"lions
of the sth Special Forces Group, thc 160lh Special
Operations .'hiation Uri~de and Spccial Operations
Detachmcnt Ddla - America's dite anti-terrorist
force. Thesc sccreti,e units were quidJ~' hiddcn
away from thc world's prcss in desert bases to preparc
for operations deep inside lraqi-hcld territory, The
5th SF Group was im'ohcd in training members of
the Saudi armed f,>rces ami the Kuwaitir<'.,istancc.
Specially modified_"'1H-6 and MH-60 night-fiying
hdicopteT> of the 160thUrigadeearried om intcnsc
training in descrtflying.
Thl'Scinitial deployments wcre the first part ofa
massi"e deployment plan cotle-namcd Operations
Plan <)0-[002, which cll\'isagcd the mO"cment of
more than 200,000 fifn, Ihousands of armoured
,'chides,hdicoptets, tanks and aircrafl to the theatre
of opl'rations, JUSI as impottant as the combat
equipment "ere hundreds of thousands of tons of
ammunition, food anti olher supplies nceded to
enable them to sustain Iheir opl'rations. The units
imol\'ed put pre-preparcd contingency plans fot
mobilising Iheir troops into action, while Central
Command dusted olf flnible loading plans and
movement schedules to match units to available
Shicld,as the deploymem
was code-named, quickly moved into high
gear.
Air transport was the main me.ns of moving men
andurgeTlISUppliestoSaudiArabiaandshippingwas
usedforthelransportofarmouredvehicles,hclicop-
leT'<, ammunition and other hea\'~' items from the
continental USA. Most US Ann)' units followed this
procfdurcandweremarriedllpw;lhtheireqllipmenr
~fteritwasunloaded from ships in Saudi Arabia in
early September and October
Anexcepti,m to this pro,:edure were the lStand
7thUS.\1ariner:nrpsJ':xp"ditionaryBri~adeswhich erediblclldcnsi\'c
arrived in Saudi Arabia in mid-,\ugu_tto meet up
with 1\1aritime I'repo_itioned Ships from llicl(o
Garda The_e ships hrought 200 L V'J'P-7 amphibi-
ous amloured troop carriers, ,ooM60Altanh,_ix
.\1'0<) '5-"mm self-propelled howitzer>, six ,"ltlO
203mm self-ptopellcd howitzcrs, SO towcd I55mm
howitzers, ~itcnft support equipment and enough
suppJiesforJl,oooM~rinesforJodays, Jnaninrense
48-hour airlift some JO,OOO Marines were flown
direetftom thcir bases tomcet up with,the preposit-
ioned ships and mOI'eout into the desert. Thcarrival
ofthelo..f60ranl:sofrhClst.nd Jrd MarineT.nk
B.ttalions was a p.rticuJarly we!come addition to the
lightly.rmed airborne soldiers of the fbnd Airhnrne
This remarkable operarion effectively trebled US
for",," on the ground in Saudi Arabia and turned the
US I(fOunll J'Jrcc>; hom a meagre trip-wire into a
force, The Marines were justitl-
ably proull of their achievement and haiJed itasa
yinllieationoftheir'meananllJean'eoneeptofhighJy
mobile, all-arms interyention forces. The _"brine
units lOok their intq~rJted air ullits with them,
ineluding largc numbers of CH-53, CH-46, UH-l
and All-IVi helicopters, as well as F-I8 and AV-8B
srrikeaircraft. i\.fostofrheseaircraftweredrawn from
the znd and JrdMarine Air\Vings, CH-SJsquad-
rons included HM.\1.j.61, {6S, {66 and {6z, CH-46
squadrons ineluded H.\U...J ,65,263, 16l and 265
!\H-,\\'> came from z67, 26<), 36<) and 367. AV-SB
Harricrs wcre dra",n from VMA-33', 3", 231 and
5+2,1'-18 units included VMFA 333, 45', 3'+ and
235,'ro,upportthe,m-,hore.\1ariocunit_,amphihi-
ousforeeswcrep",itionedintbcPef'ianGulfaboard
assault ships, A.n Amphibioos Task Group ccntred
ontheUSS/'lassauhadthc4thMarinc£xpcdition-
ar~ Brib':ldc embarked, The 2,soo-strong IJth
Marinc Expediliorutr~, Unit was cmbarkcd on a task
group lcdblthcUSSOhniJ",aandthc26thMarinc
Expeditionary Unit was embarked on the USS
lnchQn task group, Thcsethree unirsall contained
integrated air support and helicoptereJements
In the Ii"t weck of Scprember 1990 ships
carrying the equipment and 350 helicopters ofIhe
JOIst Airborne (Air A"ault) Division .rrived in
Saudi Arahia, The'Scrcaming EagJes' specialised in
\Trtic'alen\'c1opmcothyhclicoptertoassoultenemy
Dcrmmstraringits
awcso.mcfir<p<Jw,-rrhis
FSAmlyMLRS
represe"rsrheSrllle-<>(.."rr
inmooer""rrillery',
:;::~~::fz:c;;~-~:::':::~ran
pilch in a siDlflc=hu.
rr.;SlMDArmypublic
rclarirulS)
positionsoruseitsstrongf(,rceorAH-64Apach~sto
destroy rank rhrosrs. Next ofrth~ Sea Lift Command
rasr transport ships w~rethe 21J<1J1.11 Abrams tanls
and 275 Bradl~y infanrry fighting ychieles of the 24th
Infantry Oivisi(>n (M~chani,cd). It., fi,'e tanl and fIH'
mechanis~d inEmtry battalions prO\'ided the first
modern hea,'y armour able to tale on Iraqi ..rmo"ron
eqoal terms. The division had recently relUrned from
d~se.rt war/arc training at the National Training
Cen!~r at lion Irwin, California, and was wdl
prepared for opcrations in the Saudi desert. Only two
brigades ofth~ 'Victory Division' tool part in the
Oeser! Shield deployment, its National Guard
'roundout' brigade from lhe Gcnrgia National Goard
was left behind and the IQith Infantry Brigade
(Meehanised}(S~parate)toolitsplacc.
!'he first US unit 10 deploy the most modern
Am~riean tanks, the MIAI Abnms, waS the .lrd
'Brav~ Rifl~s' Arrnour~d Cavalry Regimen!, which
took 120 of th~ tanls with them, US armoured
cavalrv unirs arc tasked with battlcfieldrewnnais-
S3neeandfightingdclayingaetionsandforthesc
missions Ihe Brave Rifles also had 115 M.l Bradleys,
24 MIOQ sdf-propdled I55mm howitzers, 25
AH-IS Cobras, 25 011-.:;85 and 18 UII-60
Blackhawls
Larly in October the .150 Ml tanks of the 1St
Covalry Division st:lrted warri,'e to complete the
fIrSt wa,'e of the US deploym~m. Like rhe 24th
Division, the'Cav' had T<l leavebchindrheirNarional
Guard 'roundout' hrigade and took along the 3rd
Drigade of the znd Armoured Divi,ion tohring irup
to 'tren~th
rhe US Army De<~rt Shield force., were concen-
trated under the command of the XVIII Airborne
Corps, which waS ahle to draw on a number or
specialist brigades l<J rnK>st it,eomhat power. The
18th A,'iation Uripde d~ployed it, thr~e helicoprer
battalions. III Corps Artillery with thr~~ field artil-
lery' brilfades, with i\110t)S, MllOS and MLRS, was
attached, along with the 'Dragon Corps' Own 18th
Field Artillery Brigade, which had thn-c battalions of
towed 155 mm howitlcrs. The 12th Combat Aviation
Brigade "nd the 22Qth lhiation R~giment hrought
their Apache attack helicopters from Germany. Its
arri,-alin Saudi Ar"bia bronght the total nnmberof
US Army helicopters in thc .\1iddl~ East to 950, plu,
50 fixed-wing obset\'ation and communication air-
craft. i\lcdicalsupport was pro,ided by thc 7th and
44th.McdicaIBrigades;525thMilitary Intelligence
Brigade looked after electronic warfare and .lSth
Signal, Brigade pro,-ided in-theatre communi-
cations, The three battalionsofthc ,6th Military
Police Battalions orpni,eda traffie control system
and the zoth Engineer Brib'1lde buill ten!ednmps
and other facilities for US Army uniL-' in Saudi

Arabia. Running the huge lOj(istie oper~tion to
support DcscrtShidd were the lSt and 13th Corps
Support Command,.
Many US units ,,'ere dependent on part-time
National Guard or ArlllY rescn'e soldiers to provide
key logistic support, p".trtieularly water supplies, so
on 22 AllgUSt President Bush authorised the mobilis-
ation of up to 47,000 rcse,,·ists. Most sen'ed in
support units in the USA or tool. the place ofaeti"e
dUly servicemen ordered to the Gulf. At this point of
the crisis it was not deemed necessary to mobilise
reserve combat lin its, mneh 10 the annoyance of the
'ronndont' brigades of the 24th Division and 'st
Canlry, wh" had trained with them in peac"Ctime as
partofthel'entagnn'sT<>taIForcepolicy
After the CS tronps collected their tanks and
Olherequipment from the'luayside in Sandi Arabia
they moved ont into the desert and began a pro-
gramme of intense training. Thousands of rounds
wcre tired as unit:s praetiscd taetieal manoeuvres and
fine-tuned their weapon,. Army unit, were mostly
eonc..,ntrated inland from the Dhahran area in reserve
positions to eountcr any Iraqi thru,t through Arab
units stationed along the Kuwaiti-Saudi border. The
two Ahrine brigade' were ,tati'>lIed further north
ncarJubaylin po,ition' which were more cxp'>scd W
a surprise Iraqi attack. Ucfore the heavy army
divisions arrived in September and October, the US
j\1arines were justifiably nervous and there were
nUmerous 'invasion scares' among their forward
troops. On one occasion a Marines CH-S3E crashed
after frontline US Marines 1ct fiy into the night sl.y
with tracer during an alcrt. The helicoptcr crew
sur"i'-ed theincidcnt, but thcirmachine was ridd1cd
with bulletholcsand brol.ein two on impact
Th~ f;"KitJ~~". ~,..,~ vit,.}
I"'rtofa"ymoocrt>
m;lita~yfortX~8thi.•
~;r~~~"n::::fj, :~:~ ~
orlcorlhcR()y~JNavy's
mai"oo"""o(opcration,
dmlO"8r""'e50"lytoo
il"cll.(Mi/ilaryXetJc)
The smooth deployment of such a large US forcc
was largely possible be.;ause ofa massive support
ef'fortlaid on by t.heSaudi government.l;nlimited
supplies offucl were made available 10 U$ I,>"-,,s,
food and water from local soureesal,oreduccdthe
amount required to be ,hipped in Ii'om US stocks and
the large number of low~loadeTh a,-ailable greatly
speeded upthe movement ofU$ tank units ont into
thede'ert
Starting on '9 October '990 the 2"t Theatre
Area Support (~>mmand ,tarted 10 move the fir<t of
750M,A,tanksfromfive,toragesitesinGermanyto
railheads before movement b)' ship to Saudi Arabia
rhe tanh wcre >'alucd at S4.8 million and were to bc
di,trihuted to the 24th Division and tst Cavalry to
replace their older MIS. Some of the MIAts were
alsopycnto,\1arinetanhballalionstoreplacelheir
older ."160s. Other .\1,Aj' were to be held in storage
as casualty replacements. The .lmost new ,\'hAts
boasted better chemical warfarc protcction equip-
mcntandt20mmguns.
The Sec"",] Wave
To give the US forccsin Saudi Arabia the capability
to takc thc olfells;"eagainst Iraqi forces in Kuwait,
Presidem Dush ordercd 200,000 additional US ser-
vicc personnel to the Middlc East on 8 Xovembcr
'9'/0. Defence Secretary Dick Chelley also an-
nouncedthataplanncdrotatiollOfUStroopsalready
in Saudi Arabia would not take placcto enSllte that
thelna"imumlcvelofforceswouldbcavailableifthe
US forces had to take the of'fensive. The additional
uS Army units were drawn from bases in Germany
and the continental USA. More Marines were also
sent and T.;S reserve combat units were mobilised for
th~ tina tim~ since th~ Vietnam War, This deploy-
menr1ad:edth~franticairtransportopcrationsthat
marked the first weeks of D~,~rt Shield d~pl"yments
in Aug-ost. Manyofthele"onslearntiothatp~riod
were put tog-ood use to ensure the new units arri"ed
in Saodi Arahia quickly aot! dl1cicntly, Because of
planned d~fencc cotbaeks after the collapse of the
Berlin Wan sOme Gcrman}-based tan.k units were
under str~ng-th and reinforcemcots were drafted in
from other onits to bring them op to baltlcstrength.
llcfore the mo,'e to Saudi Arabia they were put
through int~nse firing practice on the Grafenhowhr
ranges to boild up the team wor.k and gunnery skills
of the ncwly arrived crewmen.
At the centre of new ground force deployment
was the US VII Corps from Germany llnder Lt.Gen
Fr~derickFranks.lts!woarmoureddiv;sions,theISl
'Old Ironsides' and Jrd 'Spearhead DiYision', were
highly trained and well equipped for armoured
warf're against the Soviets. Their deploymem g".ll'e
Central (~,mmand the armoured punch necessary to
take on Ir.q's 5,000 tanks 00 beHer rhan cqual terms.
The 1St Diyision, commanded by Maj.Gen
Ronald GTiffiths, mustered some 17,000 rroops .nd
w.s equippcd with MlAl tanks and Bradley fighting
,'chiclcs.ltssixlankb'lI.alioo,andfourmech.nised
infantry ballalion, WCT~ supported by MlO9S,
_\1.LRS .nd Apache attack helicopters from the two
battalions of the lSt Ayiation Regimellt
Maj.Gen. Paul Funk commanded the Jrd
Annoured Di,-ision, which was <>rganised and
equippcd in a similar way to the 1st niyision. IT. was
llotmally part of V Corps and wa, only attached to
VII Corps for Opcration Descr! Shield, Pan <>f its
a,'iation brigade, thc 229th A,'iation Regiment, h.d
already moved 10 Saudi Arabia as part of the first_
w~,"edeploymenl.
From FOri Riley', Kansas, the lxl Infantry Divi_
sion(!>Icchaniscd) was ordered wlink up with VII
Corps in Saudi Arabi~. The 'Dig Red On~' was to be
augmented by the forw~rd brigade of Ihe 2nd
Armoured Division from Garlsledt in German}' with
ilSl2oM1AltanksandsoBradlC)'infanlryfighting
,ehicles Maj,Gen. Thomas Rhame's stateside-based
units however were only equipped with Ml tanks in
fj"ebmalions. Two oflhe division's thrcemech-
anised infantry bal.talions aod a (~nk balt~lion arc
n"noaHy based in Germany bllllhcy werc dcaeti-
Thcthrmtposedl>ythr thj~ U.~MC mooel..-e,..,
Tl'"~qiAirFQf·c"C..-asta1rn drplo,wltoprovidra
:;~~E'£S~~~~~t::
drfrm,;vt'c"p"hility, (MoD
Am,_vp"h1ic>rcl.~t;(m.)
vatedindefenceeUl.bachandwerenntClmsideredin
a fit condirion to be scnt to Ihe desert. The division's
helicopterassetsincludedanassaultcomranywirhlS
UH-60s, an attack battalion of AH-TS and AH-64S
and • comm~nd comr~ny with six UH-lS, ,is
OH-sllsandthTeeUH---60s
VII C,rpxwok a strong force of suppOri units
with it, including the 17th, 72nd, 2JOth Field
Artillcry Brigade-equipped with M1O{jS, Ml lQ!; and
1\lLRS. Engineers from Ihe 71h Engineer Urigade
aI,,, w~nr with the Corp,. The 11th CJmbat A,'iation
Brigade shirped out more than 300 helicopters
through Rot!crdam Docks. Ayiation units inc1uded
the 2/227th, 3/227th, 4i229th lhialion Regts and
2/61h and S/6th Cavalry with AI-I-li4S. The 23lith
1\'ledieal Company and 6/15Qth Aviation Regiment
took lheir UH-60As, the 4/15Qlh Avialion Regiment
tlKlk its lJH-1S and OH-58s and the S/159th took
some 24 CI-I-47 Chinooks. Logistic support for VII
Corps waS provided by2nd Support ColHTlland.
The 2nd Armoured Cavalry Regiment provided
rhecotps with reconnaissance support; 120!>lIAIS,
"5 Bradleys, 24 ,\1I09S, 25 AH_lFs, 25 OT-T-58s and
18 UH-60smanned by 4,500 soldiers
In addition (0 disp~tching Ihis massive force of
active dury units to Salldi Arabia the US Army also
mobilised rhree i\ational Guard brig~desin prepar-
ation for possibledeploymelll. They were first sent to
the For( Jr"ing N~lional Tr.ining Center for inten-
sive rraini"g in desert w~rfare before US military
chiefswoulddecidetodeploylhemIOSa\ldiAr~bia
 rq~iontoalmost90,ooo.'I'hell Marine Amphibious
Force wos mohilised at Camp Lejeune, ).Iorth
Carolina, to command part of the expanded Marine
contingent, with iLs2nd Marine Division joining the
1St Marine Division ashore in ea_tern Saudi !\rabia
US amphibious capability was enhanced by the
deployment of an additional Amphibious Task
Group centred on the L'SS Tarawa and the 51h
l\hrineLxpcditionaryDrigade,ln)anuarY'99'this
expanded amphibious force carried out manoeuYres
on the coast of Oman to build On expertise gained
during similar exercises On Ihe Saudi coast in
:Sovember 199t code-named Exercise Imminent
Thunder. Some 800 USMC reservi,ts were also
mobilised by President Bush to support the ad-
ditional Marine Corps units moving to the Gulf.
Units mobilised includedtank,infantry, amphibiou:;
assault, military potice,headquartcr"engineer, re-
connaissance,anti-aircraftandtran<;portelements
By late January t99I US forees in the Middle
East numbered sOTlle47S,000 men, 2(-,0,000 !fom the
US Army, 7.';,000 sailors,')O,ooo US '\hrines and
50,000 airmen. The final elements "fVII Corps were
still mO"ing into Saudi Arabia after <;lOrms in the Bay
·ShcrryLym,c'i.• alkll gu",.lJi.• i.'()"CF-,,-"'gl~dy
of BisC"J}' delayed their shipping. VII Corp:; units
Aff-fIl'S"p"rCubrn{nu" .• nylr.,qiw"uld~gJad already in thecountr~' Were carrying Out final training
Ca",pPcndIClQl'. nO. W1J1<-e'. (/llJIu"ry before moving forward to their assembly areaS ncar
Cali{urnia.I'addnga" Sec"")
M-'97 ~n",m awo",~.ic The Iraqi-Saudi border. XVIII Corp, units had
already mo,ed to this region, with the 1St (British)
RyFebruarYI99·nodecisionhadbecnmadeontbeir Armoured Division in support. Hdi""pteT> and
fuwre employment. The Georgia National Guard C-IJO trJusport planes wereu,ed to ferry tank crews
mobilised tbe48th InfanTry Drigade (Mechanised) andinfantrymenforward,whilehugeeom'oysoftank
which was originally intended to 'roundout' tbe z4th transportersmoyedthearmourforward.Thelstand
Division, lthad two mechanised infantry battalinns and ....brinc Divisions mOYed up to near rhe
witb Bt'adlcys, a tank battalion "'ith M,s and an Kuwait-Saudi border in support of Arab forces
artillery ball~lion with 1\·IIOI)s. The bri~de's com- al.eadydeployed there. Dehiud the combat units the
manding officer, Col. (P) W. Alroona Holland, is a supporl commands worked round the dod to stock-
~";lrpct manufacturing plant manager in ci"ilian life pile supplies of ammunition and fud in forward oreas
The I55th Armoured Brigade from IUi"i'sippi using Trucks, hclicopters and C-t"os. '1'0 increasc the
mustered some 120M, tanks and 54Bradleys.lt' firepower of the two Marine Divisions near Kuwait,
J,900soldierswereoriginallyinlendcdlO'rou~doUl' the Tiger Brigade of the 2nd Armoured DiYision,
the 1st Cavalry Di,·ision. Thez561h Infantry Brigade with ~1TA, tanks, was detached from VII Corps to
(Mechanised) of the Loui,iana National Guard was supporr The Marine units in late January.
(Jr~nised in a similar way to the 4gth Brigade and
fields 65 MIS and '00 Bradleys. Brig,Gen, Garry The Hmnvee
Whipplc had 4,i77 men in his hrilfade While hi-tech Patriot surface-to-air missiles or
Further deployments in the' second wa,'C r-hA, lanks may ha"e grabbed all the headlines
"irtually douhled the number of Marines in the dming the Gulf crisis a more low-tech piece of

A JcaJlyoombin,u;on- besl rroq; >Innour.
:~~u~,jfsh:';~:::~~'~~:::J~~c
mi~.;I~ lau"ch~, =pah/e E~!;:¥£:E*;;~,:my ~:~,:~3,:;r~i:~~ ::;hr~eJ~;~:2:~1a~~~~:~~n~'1~::r
o{1;nf>Chngoutthc.-ery The srandard US Army TOW ami-tank missile
SC~'nc)
formation. (Military
equipment the HMMWV or IIumvc<: - was
emuring rhar US troops got into the battle zone or
had the righr supplies to dothcir iob
HM1\tWV is the US military designation for lhe
High Mobilit)' Multi~putpose Wheeled Vehiele, bUI
it soon became known 10 the troops as the Hum,'C<:. It
traces its ancestry back to the famous World War
TwoWiJlys]eepand has taken over many ofthcrolcs
of the classic '·chiele. The successor eOlnpany lO
Willys Overland, AM General, produecd thcir first
H.\1MWV prototype in 1981 which e"entually ",on a
?entagoncompetitionforanewutilit)'vehide.
A stiff banle with Congressional budgd cutlerS
ensued before the Hl\lMWV was officially accepted
into service. AM General, ho",evcr, did notsur\"iye
this strugglc and it wasthc"ictim ofa corporate take-
over by LTV Aero,pace and D.,fence Com pan)' in
Soon lhc first of 60,000 HMM\VV. were
production lin<' at.\1i,hawab, In-
diana, IS dilferent \'Crsions for the US Army,
Marine Corps and Navy.llrcplaccd thcM!SI ~-!On
truck, M;61{M7Qa Gama Goat and M880 series
The H.\1MWV is designcd to operate in all t)'pe'
ofterrainandelimates.ltisfullyair-portahleandair-
droppablc, A C~130 Hercules Can take rhree dlhe
"ehieles, a C-141 Starlifter six, a C-s Galaxy r5 and
the CH-47 Chinook and CH-53 Sea Stallion can both
carry two
In ilS standard form, thc M998, thc IIi\.lMWV
can seal lhrcc prople, and has a lopspccd of
loSlm{h,Ithasarangcof48almonaQ4·Q-Iitrcfuel
tanl,Thegros,weighloflhe,'ehidei'.:;'465kgandil
cancarryaJ,125lgpayloodinlernallyorl,530kg
when lOwing a tniler. A 6,a-litre V8 diesel engine
powers the HMMWV through an aUlOmalie threc-
spced gear box
!"he .~1998 gencral purposc unarmoured
eargo{troopcarrieri,supplememcdhythc,\'1 103S,
which is very ,imilar bm equipped wilh a winch
l"hree ambulance \'<"f);ions have been buill, thc
M996, 1\1<)97 and !\tl035, of which twO arc
armoured. Two ,heller-carrying vchides, the_"'1I037
and 1'1'11O+2,are ins<"fvice. There arc four armed
version" which all haw annoured bodies. The
armed version is the M1045,whieh is based on an
armoured body, Other TOW versions are rhe M966.
MlOJ6andMl046.TheM100<)isdesigneda,agun
tractor for the 1\111<) 105mm Light Gun and can
carry its six-man crew, n rounds and gun spares
US MILITARY
DOCTRINE
America'sdefeatinViernamhadaprofoundd'fecton
Atmy
thc l..;S Military 3lId its doctrine, The US and
Air Force profoundly queslioncd the way the Vict-
nam War had been fought and sought to go back toa
tnditional war-fighting 'trateg~'. In particular they
rejected rhe concepr of using force for limited
political aims andcscalating \ioleneclO bring the
enemy to the conference table. This was seen as
Inthe 10 years l,>llowing Ihe end of the Vietnam
War the American Military CamC round to the \'iew
that ground forces should onl)' be committcd to
aehieye decisive military ,'ietor)", O\'erwhclming
Force would haverobeemploycdwdefealenemies
 hightcchnology. The envclopmenr and subsequenr
dcsrruction of the encmy's armed forces was ro rake
place in many dimensions, on land, in the air,
electronically and psychologicall)', in all weathers,
terrain and climates. This stress on rhe destrucrion 01
enemy armed for"", intrinsically rejected the idc",
tharhad governed US srratcgy in Vietnam. Whercas
in Vietnam violence was escalated deliberately in
attempts to li>rce political conees,ions from thl'
enemy, in AirLand Battlc all military forces are to be
utilised ",soon as possible in an unlimited way to
militarily defeat the enemy. The territorial limit-
atiollS on opcrations that allowed the North Vietnam-
esc sanctuary in Laos and Cambodia and cbccked any
land operatiolls iu North Viemam arc also rejected in
AirLand Battle. The enemy has to be soughr out
whereverheishidingandkjlJed
AirLand Battle is not a rigid doctrine but a
concept of operations that can be used from balTalion
up to theatre level,anywhere in rhe world. Toenahle
US Army units to pili it into pracrice a massive re-
cquipmentandtrainingprogrammewascarriedout
during the 19805, culminating in the 'Army of
Fxcellence'rwrganisations of the lale--198os. Under
this programme e'-ery manocuvl"<' unit - hatulion,
brigade,divisinn or corps-wa, given the capability
wtight in fronI of,dccp behind or abovc Ihe enemy
and to paralys-c hi,c<>mmand capabilit),
The division is the ba,ic formation and it is
provided with three ground manoeuvre brigades
formed wilh a mix of tanh, mechanised infantry,
airborne illfanIry or airmobile trl>Ops, a combat
a"iation brigade ofhelieoplCts, long-rangc artillery
Thi. Mari~,~ rak~.• a dci"k "'ad~a<'YP<QIQ"g",1".., or
units with rcmOlC target acquisition support, higbly
lhroughh,s:\iRC lhis/fCacasllccroUlcw mobile ground and air reconnaissance assets,
I'rott,etjvehood.<.IJc.•ecl rapidhralexham-li"" c1cetronie warfarc units, air dcfcncc and integrated
COJldj,i""s ..."uldha,'c (MiljlurJ'f;ccnr)
supply units. Thetypeofdh-isional formation may
quickly with minimum los, of US live,. US oper- diffct depending on its role: either beavy armour nr
ations in Grenada and Panama illustTJtcd thc use of light infantry or airmobile, but themix of arms to all
the Overwhelming Force concept. The mcssy US types of divisions w.. standard to enable them to
retreat from Lebanon further convinced US military apply the 'AirLand BatTle' concept. C<,mmandsys-
Icadm; of the limited utility of committing US terns were highly tlexihle to allow divisions to bc
ground forces on dubiolls political ad"cnrures with broken down inlO hrigade, and batlalions but still
limitedobjcctivcs. allow li>r them to rerain the full mix offorccs needed
Thisrcturn toa traditional l'iar strategy finally to operate 'AirLand Hattie' on a smaller sealc. Going
took shape in the 'AirLand Battle' concept of Army up the chain of command, corps and armies eon-
Field Manllal FM 100-5 in 1982, It envisaged the US tainedthc ...memixofforeesasdivisionsbutona
Arm~'defcatingtheenemybytheuseofallthelatest largescale
 The use of tanks and mcehanised infantry to
UNIT surround and dL'SlrOy enemy formatiolls dates back to
World War lI,but in thcintegratioll of helicopters
ORGANIZATION into battlefield operations the US Army has trans-
formed its tactical thinking, making AirLand Battle a
Heavy divisions are termed armoured, mechanised reality. i':aeh division has attack helicopter battalions
infantr~'or"a\'a[rydiyisions,buttherulmesarereally which field either 22 A1i-l Cobns or III AH~4
only used for administrat;vcor hislor;".l rCasOn, Apaches and 13 01 I-S8 scout helicopters. A comp,ny
They are all basitallythe .... meand theyonl}' diller of ",sault hclicopters with around IsUH-60Black-
slightly in the mix oftanl and mechanised infantry
battalions depending on their base localion. Di"i~
Major Central Command US Anny Units
sions based in Gcrmanygcncnlly ficldmorc bat-
XVIII AirborneC.orps
taJioosandha"cahighcrpcrccntagcoftanlbat-
18th Avi,tion Brigade
talionsthancontincntaIUSA-basc<lunits,rcficcting
18th Field Artillery Brigade
the greater SO"jcl tank threat in Europc. Gcrmany-
12th Aviation Brigade
based d;v;sionsalsousuallyfield two attack hclicopter
111 Corps Artillery
banalions in lheiroombat aviation brigades rather
8211d Airborne Division
lhanoneasinUS-haseddi";sions
lotstAirhorne f)ivision (!\irAssault)
Germany-based heavy divisions field to
24th Infantry lJivisi<>n (Mechaniscd)
manoeuvre battalions, usually with six or five of them
1st Ca"alr~' Di,'isi,m
heingtank battalions. F..ch division has four brigade
.ltd Armoured C,valry Regiment
headquarters, three ground and oneaviarion,which
are assigned tiJrees-tank, infamry orhelicoprers- VII Corps
depending On therask they arere<juired to pedilrm 'rth Aviation Urigade
Within brigade"battalion headquarters are assigned 17th Ficld Arlillery IJrigade
companies depcnding on thcirspceifie t.sk. They are 7211d Field Attillery Brigade
termed Task Force and take the designation of the 2lothFieidArtilieryBrigade
unit headquatters commanding the mixed force. For 1st Armourcd Dh'ision
examplcifthelstllattalion,.llsthlnfamry(.\1eeh- JrdArmourcdDivision
anised) Regiment WaS formed into a combined arms lSI Infanrry Di"ision (Mcehani.cll)
fOTCeitwouldadoptthedesignationTaskForee.lIS· 2nd Armourerl Cavalr}" Rcgimclll
Unlike the British combined arms concept, which
TOT.A.L 2,500 main battle tanks
allows for company-sized all-arms groups to be
1,400 battlcfield hclieoptcrs
formed, the US concept sees the company as the
smallest unit to be split up between task forces

ACombarEn/(inccrinK
Tracr<ff(CET)oper:lTi"K
"/onKsid.,,,Fasci,,.,carr;er.
::;;::~~",,;~~~ehicles
hridged""dI'WlChcdhoics
inrhcl",qidcfcns;."a
clcarmg rhc .."y (orthe
r;:::/;~~;.r:;~)""d.
A pl"I0""QflourMrs Lvonlin"ti()I> (){mQ.'e",e'" During the post-war period thi, e\""lveu into
",,,,,,,",uvrecRrefi,lIyinw andfircpowcr;s rhc "q't> what is known as the Marine Air-Ground Task Force
:~~;:''i;~=;':':'7The
mOOcmsnJ>Qurcdrvar{"rc.
(liS Don vi" Ti", Ripley) (MAGTF) concept to enahle amphihious assaults to
hawks complete the eombalaviation brigade, At a bc earricd om successfully by units from company to
corps1evelcombatavialionhrigauesmusterthrcror divisional size. In many ways it predated AirLand
fOllral1ackbatralions,oneortwo.,;saultcompanies Battle, particularly in the usc of helicopters to
and a battalion of 24 CH-47 Chinook transport support and transport ground tr<~>p,. AmphibioliS
helicopters
Attack bclimpters ha,'cboth oftcnsi"cand de-
fensin·roles.Theirtasksarerapidresponsetnenemy lJS Marine Expeditionary IJrigade
lank breakthroughs, offensi,'e air attacks On frontline Main units
deep missions to de- 2-sinfanlrybatmlions
oppocwo;'ploo,doffr;endly tank mnkcompany
columns pushing enemy terrilory and flank artillery battalion
protection of such fonnations. The UII-60s and re<:onnaissancecompany
CH-47' also give Amcrican commanders the ability amphibiolls aSS<llllt company
to ropidlymovc troops around the battlefield and engineer company
carry out ",'crti",l cm'elopment' of enemy positions SEAL-spcrialfo.cesteam
Onc USdi,'ision, thc tOtst Airborne, is trained and
Total manpower: '5,C>OO
equippcd soldy for this mission, It bas wme 350
al1ack and assault hclicopters to enab1c it to move one Equipment
complete brigadc of three infantry battalions deep '7.M60tan~s
bchindcncmylinesinonel;ft 2f/l.-I'09'55mmse1f-prope11edhowitzcl>
6M"0203mmself-propelledhowitzers
United States _l\larine Corps 24115mmtowedhowitzers
Duc to its specialist role as America's amphibious 241.AV wheeled armoured ..chides
assault corps the US Marines have had anall-anns 47 I.VTl'amphih;ousassault ,'chidcs
combat uoctrinc since World War n. Their island- 4~ TOW ami-tank mi"iJes
hoppingC"ampaign in the Pacific against the Japancsc 72 Dragon ami-mnk mis.~il"
taught the Marines the need to have all-arms imeg- 248,mmmortan;
rawudfecti"clvatalllevclsofcommand
 forces, bYlheir v~ry":l.ture, bel the hca"y armour
aod artiJler)' ofcom-enl:ional ground forccs, SO Ihe US
\t.armes$lwlhe dose i"":gr:lIion of air !>upport 15 an
dfocti,·e ""'y of comp.,ns:lIing for !heir lad of tanks
and artillery.
MAGTF;!> mission.....n.:nrated, 50 M.arine com-
bat formarions are formrd to arTy our panicubr
lads. Th«e a.., Ihrre main Iypes of l\tAGTf. The
largest IflX' is Ih., \larin., Amphibious Force: (M.~F),
Ylhiehfieldsafulldivisionofall-armsgroundtroops
andan air wingofmore rhan aO squadrons ofAV-8R
lIarrier5andF-,Sstrikeaircraft,O·I-5JandCII-·n
transport hcli~uplcrs and AH-I Cohra attack heli-
OOpters. All the !\1arioe aircraft are able 10 operare
from US Na,'y carriers or rough forward airstrips
The introduction of the V/STOL ItV-SBs has even
made if possibl~ for them 10 oper.ne alongside
hdicoptel'll on amphibious a$$lull ships. Marine
Expeditionary Hripdes(MED) contain a regimental-
sized ground foroe and a miltcd air group ofsome half
I dO«1l squldrons. Thesmal1C:Sl-$ized unit is the
l\tariDe Amphibiocu; Unit (MAU). ,,-Itich il; b.1sed
around a ground b.1na1ion and is wpported b)' a
eomposite air !i<luadron.
Durin!: the 19705 !here wu much deb.1le about
the future of !he US Marine Corps ... ith som.,
seetion~ ..fthe Pentagon prCS$ing for illO mm'e more
towards mechanised unils lailored to fighr in a
European conDiet againsl Soviet tank formatinns.
Thismo'·c wasrcsisted by the Marines and the)· ronk
up the Rapid Dcployment JOiOl Task Force
(RDJTF) ~,mcept with enthusiasm. Third World
intervention operations became their main r~ison
"'il.(. Luge sums ofmoney .....,re dc\·utcd to pur-
chasing-equipment to preposition un ships in the
Indian Oct:an for uS(' in emergencics. The l;S
Marines'lc:anandmean'equipmentpolicyooolinued
10 pre,·enllheir mobility being hampered by large
amounlS ofh.,:,,)' tanh and OIher armoured ,·ehiclcs.
This enabled quiek responses by lhc: US Marines
during the Grenada conJliCI, lhe Lebanon inlen'co-
lion and in lhefirsr ,,'eeksofOperaIK>n Desert Shield.
THE BRITISH
ARMY DEPLOYS
British rcaclion to thc Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was
swifl,andwithindaysofthccrisisbrcaking,shipsand
aircrafr had bccnordered lorhe Middle East to hdp
prore<:tSaudiAnbiaandOlherGulfstates
The im·o[.·emenl of British Ann)' lroops "...s at
firsr limiled to assisting the RAF and pro,·iding
military asmtancc 10 Gulf allies armed foru:s. Oper-
alion Granby I, as lhe lirsl Brilish deployment
operation eommiunml "''ali oode-named. got under
",,,yon 9 Augusl when RAF Tornado FJ fighlers
louchcd down al Dhahran in CIStern Saudi Arabia ttl
hclprhe!llliedairdefence~n.
Detachments of 30 Signals Regiment, from
Dlandford,deployeddetachmenlsequippedwilhlhe
new vehicle s.ltcllite communications equipmenf
(\'C5 501) to provide eommUniC.llions links fnr R,\ F
unitsb.lsed at Dhahran and Riyadh in S.udiAr.hia,
Thlllnnir and Seeb in Oman. and with the R,\F on
I)ahr.lin. Thc dctachment at Thumr.it had to work in
primitive condilions and H-degrcc temper::Ilures.
When the RAF Jaguars II Thumrait redeplo)·ed to
Bahrain !he: Ro)·al Signals delachmem p.acked up
shop and mo,·ed to supporr 7th Armoured Brigade in
easr~ Saudi Arabia. As RAF deplorrncnts '" Saudi
Arabll conlinued, a funher delachmenl rook up
residence at Tabuk airbasc in "·Clilcm Saudi Arabia
10Support RllFTomadoGRls based Ihe....
To provide medical support fUf the RAF, Royal
KaY) and Armyunits mo,·ingiOlo rh.,Gulfregion, aa

Iff"di$.hc/dcbload"f
,.,,,,,owwJfonllQt;,,,,,.'lx'n
.. .,.,u~"fnju~1
i/flpor,.ncetoanyde><:rI
"pernli,,,,,.ndDROI'S
.-(hic~!WdI>lSlhisonc
(MwwJ ~"I'I'Ii~or,hi~
~il~1 """"',00'-"', (MoD
Arrnypublic,.../~'ion..)

Thi. 7th lJri!Jadc~vrp<J=1
on'~"'K'a,dw4dcrcnd~ :;i:7a~,';,:/:~:~:~:;' gutJ,
hishcayjJy""ndb"gg~~1 ,..,Uahlc w c"potl.(Milir,1r)
P'-'S;ti,m with "'h"'''PPCMS &c>lc)
Field Ilospital esmhli,hed it'elfnear the RAJ' ba~e
on Bahnin. A Z9-strongsurgical team from the unit
...as already in Dhahran rosupporttheRAF
Elements of 22nd Special Air Sen-ice Rcgimcnt
and the Special Roat Squadron were flown out to
Saudi Arabia late in Augusr, reportedly equipped
with large quantiries of laser rarger markers 1<> help
RAFJaguarsdcliversmarrbomhscmwtheirtargcts
The armed forces of mosr of Brirain's Golf allie~
were without any defence against Iraqi chcmical
weapons so a major effort wa, moontct!to provide
them with Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC)
warfare protecrive e'luipment and advice. Teams of
insrrucrors from the l\"BC Centre at Winterh.]ornc
Gunner, assisted by Brirish Anvspacepersonneland
members of the Terrirorial Army, were qoiekly
desparched to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf,tates
The instructors worked at locati"m;all oyer Saudi
Arabia to enahle local f"rces to withstand an Iraqi
chemicalattack,l'artofthcirt"kwa'alst>tocoJ!ect
>amplesofany Iraqi chcmieal agents used alf.!inst
coalition 1,l'ccs and quid.!y return them to the
Chemical Warfan: Estahlishment at POrion Down for
analy'is
The Dcscrt Rats
Although liritain's rapid reaction force, the 5th
Airbt>rneBrigade,wasalcnedsoonaftertheinvasion
of Kuwait thc~' wne ne'Yer deplo~'ed when it became
clear that heavy arrnouT<'d ullilswould be needed to
eounterlraq'sS,500tanks.
On 14 Septl'mher 1990 Drili~h Defence Secretary
Torn King announced that the 7th Armoured
Brigade, commanded by Brig. Patrick Cordingle)"
would be moved from its hase at Fallinghostel in
Germany ro Saudi Arahia to support the US _".hrine
Corps' I Marine Amphibious Force. The Brigade's
deploymenr immediately evoked memories of the
World 'Var" campaign in :\orth Afrka, hut serious
military reasons, rarher rhan senrimentality, lay
behind rhe choice of the unit to spearhead Britain's
Middle E",r commitment, It possessed the Arm~"s
modem Challen~cr tanh and the new Warrior
inEmtryfighting \'ehide,ltsarmouredinfantr~'bat-
talion, 1st Battalion'rhe Stalfordshire Regiment, had
al", recentl~' returned from inten,c training on the
giant Suffield training area in Canada
In theory the brigade was a wcll-cquippcd and
powerful formation, but it was far from ready to be
shipped out 10 Saudi Arabia, Many regimenrs in rhe
British Arm~ of the Rhine (BAOR) were under-
manned bccauscofrecntiting problems, rhe need to
sopply manpower for Northern Ireland and other
tasls. A fire at the main tank spare parrs warehousc at
Donnington had also reduced (he flow of parts to
units in Germany toatrickle,putringman)" "ehides
ofrtheroad.
A crash programme was pur in train to bring the
brig".!de lip to srrengrh, repaint vehicles in desert
camouilage and carry our last-minute gunnery and
NBC training. The Scots Dragoon (iuards swapped
their Challenger Mk 1-& for rhe more modem Mk 3
'-ersions belonging to the Life Guards and al~n
'tripped their SU: IS of any useful spares. Complete
troops of tank crews from the 14th/20th King's
Ilussusandl7th/ZlstLancerswerealsodraftedinto
maLe up numbers. The brigade's other armoured
regiment, The Queen's Royal Irish Hossars, wo<
reinforeed by four rroops from the 17th/21,tLanccn;
which were attached to each nfits squadrons. The
Stalfords were reinforced by a company of the
Grenadier Guards, while 40 Field Regiment received
clcmentsof43and2TAirDefenceBarteriesequipped
withthehand-hcldJavelinsurface-tl>-airmi>sile.
E'"entually the Desert Rats, as the 7th Brigade
were now universally known, wete read~' to go and
thcirvehiciesweredespatchedwBremerha\-endoch
for shipment ro Saudi Arahia in late September and
early October. While the vehicles and equipment
were afloat, the troops carried out more training
before flying oUl 10 Saudi Arabia on RAF and
chartered transport aircraft
As the comhat units of 7th AmlOured Brigade
were making their preparations to move from their
German bases, a major operation was in progress TO
cnsure their arriv:tl in SaodiArabia went smooThly
The first task to be undertaken was the consTruction
ofa massiye tcnt city aT the Saudi port ofJubayl to
accommodate the Dri~dc while it collected its
equipment aftcr unloading from the chartered trans-
port ships and Royal Flcet Auxilliary landing ships.
Known officially as the Force MaintenanC<' Area
(FMA) bot dubbed Balbrick Lines h)' its residents,
the tent ciTy waS constructed fromseratch by Ropl
Engineers of 39 .Engineer Regiment, wh" were flown
OUT from the UK at short notice to star! their
Hercu1eantask.
Medical ,uppott was bo<J<;tedhythearril'al of33
Field Hospital and 15 RAF Puma helicupters sup-
p<>r!ed h)' medics of 24 (Airmohile) Field Ambu-
lance. A number of regimental band"indudingthose
of the King'- Own Border regiment, 13th/18th
Hussars, Hampshire Regimenl, Green Howards,
Light Infantry, Deyon and Dorset Rcgiment and
Parachute Regiment, were also flown out·to provide
additional medic-<l1 support and man NBC dccon-
t.minationfacilities
A major logistic supply sysTem was set up to
,oppon the 7th Brigade with large ammunition,
lJri.;&hInfantrYS'ortna
~::;;::Ci.:.~.1,':I~:~QIJ'ye
lis"n carr;"" a PKC-J49
r;/,:,";,,~~e:c'::a":::/:':o"d_
i,,-rommanJ.(.HoD
Armyp"bl;crdar;o".)
water pillow tanks and fucl dumps bcingestablished
deep in Ihe desert in preparation foropcrations
against the Iraqis. The supply domp system
strelched from Jubayl OUl to Ihe 7th Brigade's
deplo)"fficm area. 10 Regiment, Royal Corps of
Transport, had 80 14-tonFodenlorries and 60 of the
new DROPS \"Chicles, which were being used in large
numbers for the first time for the bulk distribution of
watcr. DROPS - Demountable Rack Off-Loading
and Pick-Up System - was put into service by the
regiment a momh carlyfotOpcration Granby. It
enables containers to be put on and off trucks by an
integrally mounted hydraulic lifting device. This
spccds up loading and cutsoUl The nccd for fork-lift
lruels. The rcgiment'stank transporter troop played
a key rolemo,'ing armour from the doclsout inTo the
descrt to save wearancl tear on trachd vehicles. New
roads were also built inlO the desert by 21 Engineer
Regiment's thrce ficld squadrons
Elements of 17 Port Regiment, Royal Corps of
l"ransport,werconllandtoonloadtheship,carrying
the 7th Brigade's "ehicles when they arrived at
Jubayl.lJ.cforetheshipseameintodock,Royall\'avy
minesweepers cleared a channel to en<urc that no
Iraqi mines interrupted the unloading
To prepare the 7lh Rrigade for combal a scries of
live firing e~erciscs was conclodcd on impro\-iscd
firing ranges 011I in thedeserr. A team of experts from
the Royal Artillery (illnnery School at Larkhill, the

Ropl Armoured Corps Gunnny School at Larkhill,
thc Gunncry Wing at Hohne in Gennany md the
Small Arm,; School Corps flew out to construct the
rangc,whiehwaspredictablysoonnicknamcd}erboa
Range. Each banlcgroup of the 7th Brigade look rurns
10 go down theeighl-mile-Ioog Ji,-e firing 'battle run'
10 flIle rnne lheir all-arms combat skills. The range
"'as patrolled every morning, ensuring wandering
Bedouin tribesmen didn't sTray inTorhedanger wne
1\11 weapons In The brigade were fired on The range,
from infanrrymen's SA-80stoM'09 ,ssmm howit-
urs of 40 Field regimenT and Glam Viper mlne-
clearing de,'ices of <:5 Engineer Regiment, Royal
Engineers
Ar rhis phase oflhe Gulfcrlsls the American and
Brlti,h forcc, were deployed in defensi,-e positions
behind Ihe Arab lilfcc, positioned along Ihe Kuwait
border. The 7th Brigade wa, imeg-Taled with the US
Matinespo,;itionedaround)ubayLAdetaehmentof
Ropl Signals wos established at the 1St US Marine
Divi,ion's headquarters toeo-ordinalc theiropet-
ations, USMC J-JA WK surfaee-to-air missile baT-
teries pro,'ided air defence for British units and
US.\lCforward air controllers \\'ereallached toThe
7Th Brigade. They were of greaT imporlanccbecausc
the 7th Brigade relied on lhe USMC for air support
andheilcoplerTranspon.lthad been dedded noT TO
send any British helicopTers 10 Saudi Arabia at rhis
stage of Operation GranbydueTologisricproblemsof
fkli>ce ,hcild,'ent "fthc
:::;j;;'1D~t.X1!A;C~}tis
7th Brip<!espcdme"
<-~rriesilcll""cru/lookinlI
/fCOUP "I"pu.<enger!< "ndil
,.,,'her .•uJlC/,looking
Amcri""ncollcaguc
(Mi/ifarySce"e)
using helicopters in the dcsert. The intcgrationofthe
Drilish brigade to the CSMC was a logical IllO\c
gi\'en the lack of armOUr availablc 10 the US Marines
1St (Brirish) Armoured Division
AfTer the CS decision in early November 1l)<)0 to
almosrdoublcitsOperarion DescrrShieidcolllmit-
menrbydcspatchinganorher2oo,oootroopSloSaudi
Arabia, Defence Secretary Tom King announced on
22 November the Brirain would also be signlficamly
boosting the offensive capability of II~ forces In the
i\fiddlel'.asr
The e~panded British Force conrained some of
the Brirish Army's 1ll0S1 powerful artillery and
comhatengineer unit, to enahle it to break through
thema"ivelraqidefeoce,arouodKuwait.lt,main
combat tilTmation wa, the 4th Armoured Brigade,
with a bnk regiment, twu armoured infantry bat-
talions, artillery and supporting arms. An ait dcfence
ami twoheJ\')'artillct)'rcgimcntsformed the Divi-
sionalArtilicryGroup.
Under the command of Maj.Gen. Rupert Smith,
the lSI Division mo,'ed out to Saudi Arabia just
before Christmas 1990 and Took o"er command of the
7Th Brigade. In the firsT weeks of irs deployment The
division cemained dose TO rhe US Marines around
}ubayl,bulasTheUNdcadlineloomedill}anuHY
'99' ir srarted 10 move further inland, giving Ihe
BriTish the option of supporting The US marines or
the heavy US tank f(lfmations gathering On the
Saudi-Ira'lihorder.
The preparations to get 1st Division out 10 the
desert followed the pattern sU<X:essfully eSlablished
by the 7th Brigade. Operation Granby 1.5 began with
inrensework taking place in Gcrmany 10 bring units
uptostrength,preparc "ehidcs, lood equipment for
shipmentoul 10 the Gulfand carryoll1 final refresher
training. Again many men had to bcdrJfted in to
bring units up to their wartime strength; sometimes it
in\'olvcd individual soldiers or whole units being
cross-postcd. The 1st Battalion The Scots Guards
had rheQlJeen's Company, 1St Battalion Thc Grena-
dier Guards attached for Operalion Gran!»' 1.5
2 Field Rcgimem was reinforced by the Javelin-
armed 46 Air Defence Battery, Feverish work took
place at German garrisons supplying units to the
division,OneunfoTtunateo/ficerfromthcQuecn's
Own Highlanders fell victim to the mad rush to paim
every pioce ofeqiiipment sand pink and one morning
found his VW Beetle had a new coat of desert
camouflage
Massive fire sUpp<Jrt for the ,sr Division was
provided by 39 He","y Regiment with 12 uhhc new
MulJiple LacJllch Rocket System (MLRS). It was
nicknamed the'batdewinner' or 'grid square removal
ser\'icc' because of its multiple warhead system,
which distributed 644 Mn bomblcts O\'cr a large area
at range' up to 25 miles, Conventional heavy tub<:
artillery was pro"ided by 32 llcavy Regiment, which
mustercd l'l 203 mm MllO >clf-propdIcd howitzers
and J6 15smm Ml09 self-propelled howitzers
Divisional air defence was provided by the Rapier
surface-to-air missile launcher, of '2 Air Dcfence
ArmourcdRecceRegimcttl
Regiment. p Armoured Engioeer Regiment
equipped with lal)l;e numhers of armoured engineer-
ing vehicle, provided thedi"ision with a capability 10
breach Iraqi field defence,. The regiment's Chieftain
armoured bridges, Giant Viper mine-dearing
rocket" FV ,Ro C.omhat Engineering Tractors (CET)
and Centurion AVREs arc all designed to enable
engineers to blast holes through minefieldsand field
defences for follow-on forces to pass through and
engage the enemy. These units arc normally consi-
deredas 'corps assets' and their deployment with I~r
Division indicated the offensive nature of the in_
creased British contribution to the coalition ground
forces
When planning 'st Division's deployment it wa,
decided to give the formation its own integrated
nationalhelicoprersupporl,unlike7thllrigadewbieh
had ro rely on the lJS marine,'large""iation assets, 4
Army Air Corps Regiment supplied 23 Gazelle AH.I
observation helicopters and 23 Lynx AH,7 TOW-
armed ami-tan\: helicopter>. Its thre<: squadrons,
6S4,6S9 and 661, pr<>\'ided "tDi,oision with a fast-
movingairhorne ami-tank and reconnaissance force.
For transport and casualty C>'aluation [he Support
Helicopter Force (SHF) was formed from Royal Air
Force and Flect Air Arm assets. Its first helicopters,
IS RAF Puma IICls and 3 Chinook He,s, were
flown out to Saudi Ambia by USAF C-S Galax),
aircraft in NO\'CllIbcr 19')0 and itlHs brought op to
full strength in Januar)' 1991, when the chartered
cargo ship Allantic Co~""yor arrived in Saudi waters.
On board the ship were vehicles of rhe Commando
Helicopter Oper.ltions and SUpp<JrI Cdl, eight RAt'
Chinook HC" of Nos, 7 and ,R Squadrons and
,""".. ''J~~'"'''-'''''
'''-1-'·
Annourrd Krgm,t'n!
 THE PLATES

,,",. ~,m ",., ""'''',

~':"~'~&<""
:1:~''''""m''Ii'" ';" " '~o
I ~. ", U, A,m,

.W',""""," n"""."

i
":"~;'"'i;"";&<",I~i;i"~""'"1
t ,2";;" M. D"",,, c" ili, ,«,,'& '"'m", ,I"," "
n" ,,"," ,," Om ." ",", n"",~ 1m ,,""

I,,,,,,.n,,,,,,,''''' ••,"" "". "",=.,'.mm

A
B
D AnM2Bradleyonthedock.id·
F lnfanuyoflhelsI Staffordshi",s
Syriantroopsp....deforKingFahdofS• .,djA...bia G
H
K
M
N Milit.ryl'olicecorponol,4thBrig.de
Chieftain ARRV with ChallengeT poweTVad o
No, 240 OCU, four RAF Puma He" and 12 Sea thest·tung upofanetworlofna\'i~.tionbeacons in
King H(4 'jllnglcs' of Nos. 845 and 848 Naval Air the descrt by 14 Independent Topographic Squad-
S'lliadrons. All the helicopters were filted with ron, Royal Engineers. Using the i\fagellan satellite
equipment to protect them from dcsertsand and the navigation system rhey positioned a large numbcrof
Chinooks al>o boasted newly fitted infra-red jam- oil drums mOllnted in concrete at regular intervals
mers, chatii'f1are dispensers and two j ,62 mm mini- throughout the desert. The drums had geographic
guns. CQ-<)rdinarcspainted on theside to hc1p 'Iosr' Desert
To support this enlarged British force consider- Ratseonfirm their posirion, This wasofpaniclilar
able additional logistic and medical support was lise to the Royal Arrillery, who needed exaer navi_
provided. One RAF and four Armr field hospitals gation equipment to help lay their gon, accurately
were despatched after the mobilisarion of the Terri- Thousands of maps were run oft' the ,quadron's
torial Army's 205 General Hospital in December mobile printjng pre,s and its terrain analysis eom-
'99'· Every type ofsupporrunit needed to keep the pUlers provided invaluable information on descrt
hghting tnKlPS operational wa, ,ent Out to thedcwrt 'going'. To provide inerea,ed armOl1r protection for
from Royal Milimry Police traffic ~~)()trollers to extra the divi,ion's Challengers and \Varriol"'i, they were
trocks,cooks,signal,units, tank transporters, postal up-armoured at Royal Mechanical Electronic En-
and courier detachmcnts, ordnancc experts, tanl gineers forward workshops in Saudi Arabia under the
repair worhh"p' and even a bomb disposal squad- supervision of engineers from Vid.ers and GK1\'
ron, To extend the 1St Division's logistic chain OUI ·f·helstDi,'ision'ssoldiersweremadeaw~rethat
into the desert to support its mov·e inland a Forward their deployment to Salldi AT:lbia waS a real opcr-
Force Maintenance Area (FFMA) was established. IT ationalone rather than an extended training exercise
wasconllttted tojubayl by a Military Supply Route by the inclusion of some unusual logistic arrange-
(MSR) run b~' the Royal .\lilitary Police. Along the ments. Some 2,000 tanl crewmen, infantr}men and
MSR were harbour areas to allow driv·ers to rest gunners were sellt out (0 Saudi Arabia as 'battle
Four Roy,.l Corps of Transport regiments moved easualt}' replacements' along with 007.ens of spare
supplies forward torhe FFMA. which was protected Challenger tanks and Olherarmoured vehieles. They
by giant sand worh, or bern", built hythe Royal were hcld at various desert ,opply bases in readiness
Engineers 10 be sel1r forward to rake the place nfother soldiers
One of the more unusual tash undertaken waS and vehicles put OUI ofacrion in battle. Three
.4/rhough ilproJU'·' ufrhc
'7osn"JuT,h;m,hc'90Slhe
FVlOJSpa",."S/iJ1
pedQrttl,~i,,.lr61,,,,fQrthe
ArttlJ,jncludingc,."ying
RopIArrjJ/<Tyjilvclill
Hl;mp<>",.hleSAMle"m,
""dpcQvidi"glhr
'rHn<portfi>rRoJ,,.1
l:;ngjn""r""""~UI"CaHl~

A SaJ.",mrll COJlUllandcr,
thrlJrj'iohArmy'~pu,~
b"jltT.•nJ,lnmspoclrr,
J:;~~':f~:::JJ~';f"I:<t
:::~~?:o?~~EE.'f:~:gJ,iS
({\foVArmyPubli,'
Rcla,ions)
infantry batTalions, 1<1 Battalion The Grenadier
Guards, 1St Balmlion King's Own ScoTtish Borderers
and 1St Battalion Royal Highland Fusiliers, were
flown out to Saudi Arallia from the UK to provide a
guard force for prisoners of war handling facilities
bcingselupbYlstDivision
AIIIlleuni!Softhc 1st Di\'ision hadarri\'ed io
Saudi Arabia hy Ihc time the Uniled Kalions
deadline for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait ran out on
16 Januar)' '991. Uurinl> Ihe first weeks of January,
4th Brigade and other newl)' arrived combat units
carried out field firing to fine lune their weapons and
lraining bcfnre dcploying deep into the Saudi desert
alongside the 7lh Brigade. Helieopters of the SHF
and RAF G'30 transport planes flew the tank crews,
armoured inlantrymen and gunners forward ruthe
a"emlll)' areas, while more Ihan '00 Scammell
Commandertanl transporters of7 Tank Transp<>rtcr
Regiment, Royal C..orps of Transport, carried the
armoured\'ehides.
On3' January nerything was ready and thc lsI
(British) Armourcd Oi,'ision was declared oper-
ational. h only awaited the final wnfirmatoryorders
bcfore heillglaunehed into battle.
DesertRatlnsil(Ilia
Whcn the British 71h Armoured Brigade was ordered
to Saudi Arabia in September '990 it quickly re-
adopted the Jerboa or Desert Rat S)'mbol "fthcu!<.!
World \Var II 7th Armoured Division, The ral waS
adopted by the division during its scn'ic"C il1:-"orth
Africa, where it fought against the German Africa
Corps
After rhellrigade's \'ehiclcsreeeived their sand
pinldeserlcamounagetheyrecei\'edaredDcsertRat
badge based 00 a remplate produced Ily '4- Topo-
graphic Squadron, Royal Enginccrs. According to
tndition the I1lrshould face right, Ilutin the haste to
get vehic!es painled and OUI. t<> the Middle East some
combat painters had theirra" facing Icft.
All ranh in thehrigade alsolUok to wearing a red
Desert Rat hadgc on their right upper sleeve, The
badgehadadarkhlueback~ound
NOl wishing to be outdone, the 4th Armoured
Brigade also adopted a type ofDescrtRat badge, Its
rat was blaekand Ihe tail was curled aboye the rat's
head. 1\ new brigade motto - 'Hell for leather' - was
also adopled Ily the brilfade commander, Brig
ChrisropherHammcrhcck.
British vehidcs were all painted wilh inverted V
air recognition marlings to try to enab1eeoalition
pilots toav"id mistaking them for Traqi "ehicles
Large Ol1lnge plastic sheet panels were carried on
upper decks of"ehick-s for the same pllrpose
BRITISH
ARMOURED
WARFARE
In the decade prcceding the Gulferisis the British
Army'> armoured doctrine had been transformed
thanks tu new equipment and operational thinking
During th<' Cold \\/1r Britain's armoured forces were
concentrated in northern \Vest Germany to c<>unter a
Sovici armoured thrust lo....ardslheRhine.nd Iheir .... hik pol'isessing armoured units of great tactical
operalional docrrine, t:lctics and equipment wcre mobil;ry, ....assr....tegK... Jlyafor<:eableonl~·lofighta
lailoredtomeerrhislhreat fi~ed hattie. It lu.d limited logistic support, fe....
The amount or resource!> allocated to BAQR and hd;oopte~ 10 mou: air mobile anti-lank teams to
iISCOI1lXptofopc.... tiooi> ..·c:renOlal..lI)"sasrhey block unk breaklhmugh~ no self-propelled anti-
should hne been. During the 1'}80s tJlis changed aircraft mi!i:'>i1es, outdated armourcd pcrsonnclar-
bccause of increascd derrnlXspending b)' the O>n- rien and primiri"e command and control i)"itcms.
senati"cgo>cmmenl of~targaret Thatcher and new Thiioommand ....akncss'n>Uldlu.n:ma.ntWtc>·en
NATO srrucgies 10 cotInlcr deep So"iet armoured if a rapid tank oprntion nt:cded to be mounted some
penetrations. DurinS tlte '960s and '9705, SAOR, pundilS doubled ...ho:thcr 1St British Corps head-
,- ---, qoancl"li ....ould ha..., hl:en able to communicate Inc
orden to subordin.ate unitll in time (or them to be of
1St (Brilish) Armoured Division any ~Ie.-a~on a fast_mo~ing banlcfK:ld.
Division Troops Cnder &r-sighted oomnundcn such as Generals
r6th/5thThe (bteen's Ropl Unl-eTS(n...·l,:c) Sir Nigel Bagnall and Sir Manin Famdalc. BAOR
-4 Regiment, Army Air Corps ,,'asrrorganised to enable it to mounl .... pid cotIntcr-
strolr.csapinstS<>~ietlankhrt.'llkthrOllghs.This..·asa
Divisional Artilkry Group
~turn to true armournl warfart: based on manocu~~
ra Air Dc:fcncc Regiment (6 Traeled
.... thcrthanastarie ..... rofattririonen>isagedundcr
Rapier SAM, 6 rowed Rapier SA,\1)
old NATO 'Forward D.:fenc<:' conCCpts. SAOR
.19 ilc~>')' Regiment (12 .\-tLRS)
divisions and brigadl:'s ....crc t....incd to carry out
]2 J-1ca"y Rqiment(12 M11020] mm
opcrations at fut tempos (l\"er long distances and new
Sl'huw,)
cquipmcnrwasintroducedromakcthisncwthinking
26 Fidd Regiment (16.\11()() 155 mm
ar<:ality
Sl'how,)
"ew Challenger h.ttlc tanks slarled to replac<:
4th Armourcd Oripdc rhe Army's worn-out LOtIOS vimage Chieftains;
t4lh/:zothKing'i>I h'i>Sllrs(57 Challcnger rracked R.pier ....l l deploY'ed toghe the Army mobik
MilTs) .ir defen~ Warrior fighting ,'chicles p"C BAOR's
,sl11ntalioll, Royal Sooti>(;fS Warrior APCs) infantry. arrier to match the So> ict R\-lP and
Jrd Ban:llioD, RO)':li Regiment of F u!>ilicrs American Bradley; Lyn~ anti-tank helicopters ap-
(45 Warrior APCs) peared in largl: numhers; DROPs supply >'chicles
a Field Rcwiment(24 ,\hO(j 'S5mm SP ho..·.) t....nsformed SAOR's logistic support; the .'>ILRS
rocket i>rstem g:ne SAOR a lrue deep strilc apa-
ilh Armoured Bri~dc
bility and inf:mlr~..men n:cehcd ne...· helmets, l\'"BC
Queen's RO)1I.11rish Huss:m; (57 Qu,lkngcr
kit and lhe SA-So small anns systcm. Britilih tanks
MBTs)
alS(lWlrred to be fitted ..ilhutn foci unlson the
Scot:s Draroon Guards (5; OlaIlenger Mlns)
rear decking to enable lhem 10 operate o"er long
1st Ebllalion, Stalfonlshire Regimenl
dista.rw,;es_ On the cummunications front, the
(45 \hrrior APes)
WAVELL data link S)'Slem enabled oornmanders to
40Ficld Rqimeot (24 ,\hoq Ijj mnl
be pnn-ided wid! realrimecomputcrcommuniatioos
SPho...·.)
and PTARi\lIGAi\" enabled senior commanders 10
A Sqn, Queen's Dragoon Guards
communiCllte by FAX or telephone in a totally secure
(rl Scimitar, 4 Striker, 4 Spanan)
WIly. With :llmost in~-u.nlaneous communications
~ote; During operations companies, Bririi>harmnurcdunirshadthdr'Oashtobangtimc'
squadrons,plalllonsandlTOopswouldbc dramaticallyimprowd
split up between lnttlegroups and squadrunf Alld!is new kit,:lS wdlllS boosdng mONic, made
cnmpanygro\,ps. di,-i,iollaland brigadc commaoders think in a differ_
entwayabouthowlOfightanarmourcdbanlc.They
he<-'llmemorequiek thinking and flexihle, taking their
inspiration mOre from the German panzcr gcnerals
such as Erwin Rommel or Heinz Guderian rather
than Field .\la"hal Montgomery, A serie, of NATO
exercises in the earl}'and mid-I<)SoS pur flesh on the
bones of these ncW concepts, culminating in Esercise
'Iron Hammer' in November were a full
divisional counter attack was agamst a
strong armollred opposing force.
i\tbattalion and eOJupan}'Ie,cl British armoured
warbre dr";trine also owes a lot to German \\'orld
W" 11 cxpcrienee. During rhe earl)' years of the
North African campaign, British tank and infantry
units f'>und themse!>'es outclassed by Rommel's
p.nzerdi,'isi"ns On many occasion, becau,'IC the
Germans wetc octter able to oper.te in all-arms
were reorganised after the war, rheGerman Kamp-
grupp, concept waS adopted as the model ti,r
hrigades,hattalionandcompanylc'·eloper.rion,
Whik in pcaeetime the infantryb.rtalion or tank
regiment was the normal administrati,'c unit and
pcrsolUlc1 managemel1f organisation, during field
training the batrlegroup became thc standard form-
ation, Each infantry barralion headquarre" or tank
regiment headquarters woold be eqoipped .nd
rrained to command mixed formarions nf tanks,
infantry, artillery and engineers, On operations"r
exerciscsunitidentitie'brokedown.ndthefamous
Uritish regimental system ceased roexisr, Regimental
namcsarconlyuscdtoidentifyballlegroups,i,c.,il
the Scots Dragoon Guards regimental headquarters
were the command clement of a mixed infamry
battlcgroup thell it would be known as the 'Scms
Ul'llgoon Guards Battlegroup'. The composition of
hattlcgrollps is ficxible depending on thera,k it is
givcn; for example, an inf.ntry batt.lion mighr
exchange one of its companies for a squadron e>ftanks
if it needed an armoured coonter allad: fon-x: to
protcct its defens;\'e posirinn, while a tankrcgimelll
would be given a companyofarm'lllred infantry, an
artillery banery and an armoored cnginecring troop if
it needed to rapture an enemy-occupied hill or
viHage. The lieutenanr---eolonels in ~"{)lIllIland of
British infanrryhatrahonsortankregimcntsand their
staff officers were trained !O ~'tH)rdinatt all-arms
formarions r.therthan just thcir own arm.
The baltlegroup may have hteen rhe main kvcl of
all-armsintegtationintheBritishArmy,bUlall-arms
concepts arc not restricted tothisleve1of~"(Jmmand
MO>'ing down the chain of command rhereare what
arc known as squadron or company groups, mixing
infantry platoons and tanktTOOps. Brigades are also
all-amls formations and areaHocared banlegroup-
sized units bydivi,ional headquarrers depending on
theirobjcctives and tasking, Arail le\'els of command
from company/squadron group up to hrigade, there
arc standard communicat;on, equipment, ,t.ft'and
eommandprocedures,lOensurethatthe,l\rmy's.ll-
arms bauk concepts arc pm inro practiceeffective1y
Combat arm tactics are the cuning edge of the
British Army, but to keep it fighting a huge logisric
tailisnttessary, Kllown as rhe 'Ioggies', the Army's
logistic support is comprised of units such as the
Royal Corps of Transport, Royal Army Ordnance
Corps and Royal i\ltthanical and Electrical En-
ginccrs.AdualsysremofJogisricheadquartersexists
side-by-sidewith the fighting headquarters, at every
level of command. The REME for example has a
light aid detachment anached ro each banlegroup
which is responsible for running repairs on all the
,'chides, while at brigade level an armoured work-
shop is responsihle for more "'rious repairs ofaH
types of armoured vehicle,. J~aehhattlq;:rouphasan
echelon or re.rheadquarter' under the hattalionor
regimental quartermaster which is respon,ihle for
organising the disrribution of supplies To the unit., of
its battlegroup. At divisionallnel, its rear heJd-
'luarters administers the movement of supplies to its
hrigJdesandhattlegroups.Ro}'JIC..orpsofTransporr
and Royal Army Ordnance Corps assets arc assigned
l<JCOJblc it to manage its supplies
ArrrlOuredEngineers
Ever since the 79th Armoured Division's specialist
tan.ksblJSted throughrhe German Arlamic WalJ on
D-Day, rhe Brirish have always pill great faith in
armoured engineering vehi<:les and taeries. A whole
family ofspedalist vehicles has been developed by
theRoyalEngineerSlOclearparhsthroughminefields
and field defences and breach anti-tank ditches. The
I ::~::'7:::
Ann"U"'" Enlf;,'~er Squad",,,
I'V-180 Combal Engineering 'Ihnor (CET) i< an
Jmphibiou< tracked hulldozer vehide designed to
cleJT paths Ihrough earthworks under enemy fire.nd
hdp prepare bridging sires. Armoured "ehide
launched hridges (AVLB) are mounted On standard
tllnk ehassis and are used to phcr hridges oyer 'mall
water ohstades or anti-t.nl ditches, A key yehide in
the British .rmoured engineering im'cntory is the
Armoured Vehicle Royal Engineers (AVRE), which
i< a eo"Yerred Centurion tank. There arc t",o main
,'ersions,one, the AVRE 16-" has a 16srrundemo-
lition gun which fires a 29kg H£SHround todc<tro)'
enemy bunkers or punch holes through earthworl~.
'I'he AVRE l0S carries a standard 105 mm gun with
sf't'eial HESH demolition wnnds, All AVRh are
eithcrfltted withadoZ<.'rbladeora minc plough and
some un also carrv fascines to fill in ami-tank ditches
or rolls of metal trackw.)'s. The AVRE and CETcan
to", specialised trailcrs loaded with cngineering
stores or thc Giant Viper mine clearing system. This
is a roclct that pulls a tube ofcxplosiYe behind it
Once the tube ofexplosi'es is astridc themincfidd it
is detonatcd md the shock wa,'ccxplodesanyminc,
ncarby. Friendly forces call then pass through the
cleared MC' of the minefidd
Two types of units opcrare this equipment. 32
Armoured Engine'er Regiment has three squadrons,
which each muster some nine AVREs, nine AVLBs
and four CETs, As the Brirish Army adopted more
mobile operations concepts duringrhe 1980s it was
decided that rhis eap.bility should be available at
lo",er levels ofcommalld. Close-support engineer
squadrons were given trials during NATO exercises
andrheypro'"edverysueeessflll.AsquadtonficJded
three troops, each with two AVREs, two CETs and
two AVLBs. The two armoured brigades that de-
ployed to Saudi Arabia borh took a close-support
engineer squadron with them
British all-arms doctrincuJls for engineer sup-
portiO be madewailable tobrigades,bartlegroups
and squadron/company groups depending on the
t.sk they arc called on to perform. At all times the
engineers would be supported by infantry, Tanks and
arrilierYlOprovidccoveringfircand.llowforrapid
exploitation of.ny breaches made in enemy defences
In dcfensivc oper.t.i'>llS rhe)" also provide ranl and
infantry commanders wirh rhe ability roquickly dig
anri-tank obstacles and field defences.

The m~",<;'-e~IJ';·I~IJ~·
~;":;;"~~~~';:,~:,:r~qi'$
ar1Uourcdfor<=ipro"ed
p"inli,lIyinadeq=teinthc
FRENCH FORCES
French forces started to deploy to Saudi Arabia in
September 1<)90 after Iraqi troops \'iolated the
l,..-"srre"ch'roops.uch
""he~.equippcd..-i,h
Il>eirfAM,tSriflc:>,/hat,
7~::~i:d:t:·~~:~~~~
ou,fl.,nJ,ingmu,eme"r
~F!£~:~~:'5E:t;:e
(MiHlary &ene)
diplomatic immunity of the French Embass~' in
Kuwait City and abducted thrcediplomats
The ground dements of the force were all drawn
from the 6th Light Armoured Division of the French
Force d'Acrion Rapide, which is tasked to respond 10
threats to French intercsts outside Europe. Foreign
Legionnaires lrom the 2' Regiment Etranger
d'lnEmterieand VAfl armoured personnel carriers
and 48 AMX-IORC light armoured fighling vehicles
of the " Regiment £tranger de Cava1erie were
shipped out 10 the Middle East on carferril.-"S from
Toulon 10 the Red Sea pon of Yanbu. Engineers
from the 6' Regiment Etnnger de Genie were also
deployed A Inng land journey followed across Ihe
Arabian Peninsnla to King Khalid Military City,
where they eo-operated with the main group of Arab
forces until]anuary, when theystartN to wor\; with
USforees
For many years the French ha\'eled the way in
the development of hattiefield helicopter tactics and
l;'eco["ehide~~",,J,,,s,hc
Q,ieE",in A VLB IJ,idg<- it was not surprising that clements of the 4th
1~)'er_(MQf)ArmYl'ublic Airmobile Dh-ision shonld be included in the French
rel~'i()(,_<)
contingent. Some roPuma transport helicopters and
32 HOT_armed Gazelle helicopters sailed from
Toulon 011 the aircraft carrier Clun~naau for the
Middle East before flying olr to join the land
contingent. They were supported by a t40 strong
company from the ,'Regimentd'infanterie.
In December 1990 lurther ground forces and
 Elements of the following French regiments formed the 6th Light Annoured Division
or Oaguet (Oagger) Division
ler Regiment de Spahis (AMX-IORC) 2emeRegimentEtrangerd'Inbnterie{armcmred
ler regiment Etr~nger de Cav~lerie infanrry)
(AMX-IoRC) 4eme Regiment d'Dragons (AJl.lX-joIh)
Regiment d'Tnfanterie de Chars ,Ic Marine 1 'erne Regiment d'Arrillerie de Marine (artil\cr~')
(AMX-IORC) jeme Regiment de Genic (armoured engineer)
ler regiment de I lussars Parachutistes (reccc) 6eme Regiment EtI'1lnger de Genie (enginc<:r)
lerRcgimcll1 d'lnfanterie(airmobile infantry) ler Regiment de Helicopter de Com hal (anti-rank
jeme Regiment d'lnfanterie de M~rine (infantry) helicopters)
2IcmcRcgil1lcll1d'Infa1l1eriedei\l~rine jeme Regiment de Helicopter de Comhar (anri-
(molOrisedinfantry) tankhelicoplers)

hclicoplcrs were dispatched to Saudi Arabia tob<Xl'>t
thecotnbatpotcntialofrhcFrcnchconringent.Some
40 .....\ fX-joB2 main banle tanks, ofrhe 4< Regiment
Dragons, and H more A:'>lX-IORCs proved a wel-
comcaddilion as did some 50 more hclicopler,trom
Ihe4rhAirmobileDivision. By January '990 'j.joo
French military personnel were deplnyed 1<> rhe
Middle E~st ~s part of Operation Daguet (Dagger) as
theFrencheffortw~scode-named
The operational role was the subject of much
conrro.ersyduring rhe first months nflhe Gulfcri,is
bccause French forccs in Saudi Arahiadid nmfully
parlicipncin joint exercises with the American, and
no heavy armour was deployed with the contingent
rhalarrived io (kwhcr. France', low-key approach
w it, military deployment had much to do with thc
pohti~,,1 light_rope being walked hy I'resident
Frano;ois-"1inerandinhi,arremptlOfindadipl'fma-
ticsolmionlOlhecri,is
On the ground French soldie,.,; trained hard to>
·,,"-",!!""'.IIM
missions into Irnq. Theseacrivitieswere rcvealedin
Ocrol>er when. five-man patrol fT<11l1 the 13< Regi-
mentdesDragoonsl'arachmj'les(alnng-rangereece
unil) were caprured inside Iraqi territory. They were
handed ,,..erto lhe Freoeh Ernha'5Y in Baghdad hy
the lra,]is, who wanted to encourage French dip-
lomarieactiviry
ARAB
COALITION
FORCES
A ,ignificanr percenrageofthecoalition force, were
I11ade lip ofa d;verse collection of units from I:lArab
and Third Worldcounrries. Some provided import-
ant mili\ary assistallce ro Ihe coalition while orhe,.,;
could besl be described as tokens ofp<>liljcal suppnrl
Saudi ,'.rabia fielded a we\1--equipped array of
ground forces from the kingdom's Army and Na-
tional Guard. The Army's 41h, 8th and :loth
Armoored Brigades and another brig"4de m(wed up to
the Kuwairj frontier early in the crisis to provide a
first Ii lIe of defence in front of US forces. A
mechanised infanrry hrigade of the National Guard
also moved up to the trontier region, along with units
of the Army Airborne llrigade anu Ropl S.udi
Marines
AvelJicle .. hicl,I'appily dnchidei"s,.udiArahia
~""'erJ'litt/eacrioni"the stillsportingitsl::uropean

~~~~~~~~::..,':~:;;~:~"the
c"<Jluurs<'hcmc.(Mi/itary
S<-cne)
 The Saudi forces were eqllippcd with some of the
OCst military equipment oil dollars could buy, indud-
ing French and Amcriuo lanks, armoured ,chides,
millery, anli-tank missiles and small arms. A lad, of
m~npower, ho"cver, meant that much of the Saudi
arsenal had to be mothb~lIed. Tn
8,ooo-sttong Pakistani Brigade was to
:':';",;d~j~A:'~';':bij~';~";li,~c,t;i::v~a~"'d~;~::;~~:::i:~:i:~t:0
Guard were some of the
kingdom's best trained ~nd equipped troops. This
elite force eyol.'ed from Bcdollin tribes who were
knownfortheirloyaltytotheS~udiroyalfamily,and
have a key role in the kingdoln's internal securily
forces
EgyptprovidedtheSlrongestmilitaryconringent
to lhe coalition with some 35,000 troop' being
deployed to Saudi Arabia. The 3rd Me<;h'nised
Dil'isioo and lhe 4-lh Armourcd Division along wilh
the 6th Armoured Brigade arrived inlare '9'lO· The
SlhPanidlUlcBrigadecol1lp1cted the Egyprian con-
tingeol. Egyplianunitsoperatcdami~ofSovietand
American equipmcnt, including Mrr3 APes and
122mmlowecl1\1I938 howitzers,.-'I 4-00--600 strong
parachute ballalioll was also based in lhe United
Arab Emirales
WhiIcEgyplianconscriptswerebe'ld~crihedas
having variable fighting qltaliry, Egyptian oflkers
weTe some of the most experienced of the Arab
coalilion forces thanks toexlensive training at Soyiet
and Western military academies and theircomhal
experience during the '973 Ar,b-I'raeli war. Tbe
country's special forces and pam<;hute units wer<: also
of a high quality; heiog profe"ional soldiers, they
also gained combat experience tighling on Ihe Traqi
side during the "-J80 88 Tr~n_Traq war
The coalition threw rogether ,orne str~nge hed
fellow, and none wa, stranger than the in\'(lh'ement
considering the wuntr)"s
and anti-American previ,m,
st:lnce. strong
A 19,000-
strong L~,ntingent wa, dc, patched to Saudi Arabia by
S)'rian l're,id"nt A"ad hctween ScpKml><;r 'nd
November 1990. A spe<;ial fi,rces regiment and the
9th Armoured Di"i,ion equipped wilh some 200
'1'-62 and '1'-"tanks formed the core of the Syrian
contingent. They were fre,h !i-om
Lehanon and were all highly trained
.\lemhers of the Gulf CH>pcration Council
alrcadyhadahrigadestalioncdinS,udiArahiawhcn
the Iraqi, invaded Kuwait. The brigade strenglh
multi-national l'enin,ula Shield Force was hascd at
thc King Khalid.\lilitary Cilyin nmth---<:a'ternSaudi
Arabia. 11 contained amtin!(ents from Qitlar, lhh-
rain, Oman, Kuwail and the Lnitcd Arab Emir'tc'
lly latc December H;?O it mu~tered >Orne 10,000
xx
Cl
Sy,-;"nArmouredOiv;siOl>
troops and a few hundred tanks and armoured
vehieles
Supporting the m.in Arab forces were. ragtag
selecrion of light inf.ntr~· forces, induding 8,000
Bangladeshi rroopsin rw"hri~d~s, 5ooseneg.!cse,
300 soldiers from Niger .nd ~,'~n • ,m.ll hand of
Afghan Mujahadeen. Some 1,300 Moro'.:tan mOlor-
ised troops guarded the Assafaniya uil
complex. These conringent~ were of
military value bur they provid~d welcome political
supJXIrt for the coalirion. Cynics, howC\'er, put their
participationdoWlltotheliberal disrribution ofSaudi
oildollarsratherrhancommirmenttoth~anti-lra'li

FREE KUWAITI
FORCES
Some of the most highly motivated troops oflhe
coalition wer~ th~ Free Kuwaiti forces which escaped
toS.udi Arahia after the Iraqi im'asion. A largc part
of thc 20,.:;oo-strong Kuwait armed forces were
captured or deslroyed during the August invasion,
Imt lh~ niJed Frcc Kuwaili gO"ernment used some of
its S,05 billion war chest to re-equip il~ depleted
trl~'ps

Uemcnlsoftwobrigades,somei,oootroop"and
a banalion of 50 British-built Chieftain main barrl~
tanh cscaped to Saudi Arabia. Dozens of Soviet-
made B,\U'-2 infantry fighling ,-chides alsoescapcrl
wirh their crews alier fighling reargltard actions
through the streelS of Kuwait city. A number of
aircrafi were flown to in Saudi Arabia and
Bahrain, induding eight Gazelle heli-
coprer, fined wilh HOT anli-lan\;. guided missiles,
one Puma tran'port helicopter, 19 A-4 S\;.yhawk
fighlerbombersandlsilliragcl'-lfightCTs
Muchofthe Kuwaitiarscnal fcJlinlolraqi hands
Many weapons, ,uch as 2+ Hawk surfaec-to-air
missile systems, 36 MIO<) ,eU~propdJcd ,ssmm
howiners and 20 AMX ilU F-3 ISS mm sclf-
propelled howitzer" were integrated into the Iraqi
armywithtcchnicalhclplromj')fdanianadvisen;
The 35th Free Kuwaiti Brigade was re~built at
llafiral-Batill,drawingonescap"dsold;~n;ofthe,,!d
army, new ,'olunteersand soldiers serving abroad at
lbc time Oflhc lraqiim'asion. Sparcswerc bought
from the original m.uufacturers of the Km....it
c'luipmcnt lO\;.eep the brig".lde's tanks anrl armoured
vehide, operational and new stocks of ammunition
w~r<' purchased. Some 300 1'1--18+ (T-;2 derivatives)
w~reorderc<1 from Yugoslavia 10 re-cquip the other
Frec Kowaiti Lhigade. During the liberation of
Kuwait the Chi~ftJin-c'luipped bri~ade was desig-
nated thc Shid ('Martyr's') Drigade and the other
formation was caJl~d thc Fah,th ('The Opening')
Brigade
Many ll1~mhcrs of lbe Kuwaili armed forces
opted to 'tay behind aftcr the lraqiim'asion lolead
groupsofresi,tanccfighlers.lntheconfusiolJofthe
firsr day, ofoccupati"n KuwaiLi police and military
armouries were 0p"n~d up. Weapons were distri-
buterllOrheresi,tanee bd(>reth~ Jraqi,e,talJlished
firm control
 Whcn the sth US Special forces Group arrived
in Saudi Arabia in August 1990 ilstaTled roprovide
training and as.,ist3nee 10 Kuwaiti resistance groups
operalingochind Iraqi lincs. As well as harassing the
Iraqi invaders, the resislaneegroupscollected vital
intelligenceonlra'Jitrooppositionsandprorecred
Westerners hiding in Kuwait City
COALITION
HIGH
COMMAND
Command arrangcments for the coalition forces
deployed in Saudi Arabia were built up over six
momhs prior 10 the outbreak of war and reflcetthe
delie3te political make-upoftheanti-1ra'l coalition.
Nominally all forces in Saudi Arahiawereunder
thc command of the Kingdom's defence minister,
Prince KhaJcd bin Sliltan. bur in realit)· US Central
Command was the driving force behind coalition
operations. A dual operational and political com-
mand arrangement operated roCnSure all coalition
forces were tactically but polilieal
scnsitivities were observed. At a level the
based in Riyadh and they were the with their
respectrvegovernments
Operational command was vested in Ceotral
Command at Riyadh lmuet Gcn, H, Norman
Schwarzkopf. His air commander, Lt. Gen. Charles
Horner, controlled all thc coolition air forces and
produecd dailyco--<>rdinated operational plans. The
ground elemen! "fCemral Command was the US Jrd
Army under Lt.Gcn. john Ycasod. Subordinated
elementsineluded the US VII and XVTII Corps, US
Marine Amphihious Forces and Arab ground l,>rccs
under Saudi command, French and Britishdivi,iotls
were both cvcntually put under tactical wmmand of
USCOtps.
Gcn. Sehwarzlwpf, "nown 10 his troops as
'stonnin Norman' or 'The Bear', served a number of
lOu", in Vietnam and was land commander during
the US invasion of Grenada. J-1e isa former comman-
der of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechaniscd)
From bmily connections he is wellexpcricneed in the
Middle Easi. Lieut.Gen, Yeosod aJso had plenty of
experience of Saudi AT:lhia after servin;:: as an
advisor, to the Saudi National Guard
rhe Commander British Forces Middle East,
T.t,Gen.SirPeteruelaBilliere,wasanoldMiddlc
East hand, He sen'ed a number of times in the area
durin!> his time with the Special Air Service Regi-
ment. He won tbe.'viilitary Cross in Oman in r959
"nd speaks Arabic fluemly. The commander of the
1st (British) Armoured Division, Maj.Gen. Rupert
Smith,repotted on operational matterstoa US corps
commander
The overall French commander in the Middle
East, Gen. Michel Roquejcaffre, like his British
cOllnterpart, was bascd in Riyadh. Gen,jean-Charles
.Mouseardes, the commander of French ground
forces until he was replaced beeauseofilinesshyGen
Dcrnardjanviers,opentedfromaforwardheadquar-
terswithUSforees
LeGen. Abdul Rahman, the Saudi land forces
commander, commanded F.gyptian, Syrian and other
,A,r-ab forces operating in eastern Saudi Arabia. 'J'hesc
forces worked closely with thc US Marines in the area
and had US artiHery obscners and forward air
controllcr;attached.
NBC
PROTECTION
British and l:nited States Army units that deployed
to Saudi Anbia were wdl equipped and trained to
protect themselves from Iraqi chemical weapons
1\lore than threeuecades of preparing to counter the
Soviet chemical warfare threat in Europe had led to a
wide range of protIX:tive suits, respirators
masks), decontamination, detection and
eqllipmem beingdeveJoped by hoth cnuntries
The British equipmenr and defensivc procedures
"ere developed by the Nudear, Chemical ami
Diological (:\"1lC) cenrre at \'v"interbourne Gunner
and the Chemical Warfare F.Slahli,hmem at Ponon
Down. They are regarded hy experts as the best
a,'ailableand the l)nited States Marine Corps, along
with a number of Gulf ,talcs and Saudi Arabia,

Adi~"'rb;nf(. b"r cQm(Qrt.."glyIQw .....1JC
"llim"rclyrcd""dallt Ic¥eI.Thelhreal"nraqi
n«cssilyi"thc(iul( chemicalweapt>Jl-,prfwcd
Iheatre,thi.• N1Jecdl I"Mapaper Tigcr. (MoD
Qperati"galallQ.,how~a Arrnypuhlicrelations)
quickly pl~ced ordcrs for I~rge quantilies of British
NBC cquiprnel11 in the weds afrer the Ir~qi invasion
ofKuw~il.
Each British serviceman is isslled with whal is
tcrmed NBC individual Proteclive Equipment (IPE),
consisling of~ charco~l-lined Iwo-piecc suit, rubber
o,-cr~h<Jotsand Klo\'cs,an S-lO respirator, chemical
dek"Ctor paper and dcrontamin~tion powdcr. Thc
suits ~nd respirator canislers h~"e a fmile life in
chemicalJ}' contaminated em·ironments so serviee-
men are issued with spare suils and canisters. The
S-lO has a drinking de"icc so servicemen can drink
fmm their watn hottles without rem(wing the rcspi-
rator.Chaliengertanhandotherormourcdvehides
are fitted'with forced air systems to keep chemical
agents outside of "ehicles. Hand-held detedors
called CAMs (Chemical !\gent Moniror) are <!istri_
blHed ro troops 10 hc1p rhem locateehemieal agents
aod NAIAD (Nerve Agent ImnlObilised Enzyme
AI~rm ~nd Detecror) warning devices c~n be sited
~round defensh'e positions 10 W~rn of chemical
~t1acks
At batt~lion, brigade ~nd divisional headquarters
special teams of officers and NCOs ~re assigned to
NBC reporting cdls 10 issue warnings of chemical
attacks and monitor the Ievd of contamination.
L'nlikelhe Soviets Or Americans, the ilritish do not
ha'-c speeialisl decontamination n'hiclcs 10 c!ear up
afterehemiC"Jlauaels, Insk<ldspecial bleaches and
dcc'mtamination agents are applied standard
hoscs or scruhhing hrushe, 10 aircraft,
stores, ground or personncl
L'"S NBCtc<;hnology is considered not to be as
.dvaneedas flritish equipment. The American suits
do not have an integral hood like the British suilso
American GIs ha\'c to take their full hood off to
change their respirator canister, M.p chemical alarm
units are of an older vintage to the llritish NAIAD.
All US armoured vehiclcs have filtration systems 10
protect their crews for chemical atlael. The Amcr-
icanstcrmedthcirdifferentJcvclsofNBCalertst:ltes
asMissionOrientatedProreetionPostore(MOPPj.
US Army divisions each ha>'e a NllC company to
train its soldiers in the use of NBC equipmem,
monitorcontamjoation and operate special-purpo,e
decontamination sysrems. They are also trained to
plan the launching ofcbcmical strikes by US chem-
ical weapon delivery S)'stt'ms, Like British armoured
reC(Jnnai"aneeunits,USarmourcdcavalryunits~re
trainedtoearryoutreeonllaissaneeofNBCcontami-
nared areas. The capability of US units to conduct
such missions was enhanced in October tQ90 when
the German Bundeswehr donated 30 Fuchs I\'BC
reconnaissance vehicles to the US Army. A number
of these very capable vehicles were also made
available to British units in the l"liddle bst.
While US Army unilS deployed to Saudi Arabia
from Germany were well lrained and equipped
thanls to the e'"er prcscnt Soviet chemical threat, US
Marine Corps units, which have primarily a Third
W"r1dimen-entionrole,werenotsowellequippcdor
trained and had to undergo a crash programme of
NBC preparations when they arrived in Saudi Arahia
in Ihe autumn of tQ90. A la'1le quantity of the
USMC's NBC equipment waS also found to be
obsolete or rohave overrun it'shclflifesonew stocks
had to be rapidly dclivcred 10 in-theatre units.
The coalition's chemical defcnn' c-~pahilit}' re-
ceived a boosr trom an unexpected source when
Czechoslovakia deployed a tSs-man dt'Cont~min­
ation unit. II was flown out to Saudi Arahia hy USAF
C-; G~laxy transport aircraft and was attached to the
main Arab forccs based around Hafiral-llatin
SMART
WEAPONS
Coalition forces in the Gulf were armed with some of
the world', most nlre and other crucial inf(,rmation afl;,et gun ac-
eu,",cy to make ,urea tank hits it., target on the fir't
'8mart' weapons. Thanh to recent advances in shot, even when moving. Laser raoge finders have
computer and lascr systems this new generation of played a vcry important pan in this revolution b~'
weapons are ahle to thinl f"r themselves and find giving ballistic computers vital information on the
theirtargct., with remorkablc accuracy. rangenftargets. Thermal imaging advances ha>-c alsl>
I'he Copperhead 155mm artillery round \8 enabled Western-made tanh, such as the MIAI and
guided to its target by a laser beam operated h~' the Challengn, to fight just as "dl at night as in
ground troops or from a helicopter. It transforms daylight
standardanillerypiecesfromheingrelativdyinaeclI- A similar lire conlrol system is fitted to the
rate area fire weapons imo accurate tanl killcrs. The i\llthiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) to enable
helicopter_mountedHel1firemi-,sileisalsoguidedb~' targets to be engaged atupro zs mi1cs range wirh pin_
laser beams, 1r is a 'fire and forget' missile whicb poinr accuraey_ Computer navigation systems are
means the firing helicopter crew docs not have to Ilsed ro allow MJ,RS crews to preci,e1yehart their
guide the mi«ile t" its targl'l, The firing helicopter own locations and theo calculate the firing <.lata
can thcn stay well Ol>t of sight or rJ.nge of enemy anti- oeeded to put their roekctson target
Jircraft,~,<temS High tcrhnology has also been uSfti to impro'·e
Laser target designators come in many shapes the tlestrllCli,'C power of existing munitions. To
and ,izc,. Small S~'S[elliS can be carried by special <.Ideat ntra armOur filted to the latcst$encration
for<:cs teams and large long range systems are fitted to S""iet tanls, such as the T-]z, anti-tank missiles
helicopters or aircraft. Once the target is illuminated have been fitted with double warheads. The TOW-z
by the lasct, guidcd missilcs or bombs fly down the mi"ile has a first-stage warhead that blows a path
!:I,er bcam on to thetargct. Sand storm8, eloud or through a target's extra armour and the primary
rain, howe>'er, can interrupt the laser beam and <:ause
the guided weapon to go OllT of control
Tank gunnery has beeo rC\'olutioni,cd b~' com- A VS,UCLVI'J'~porti"g d<'Sis"edwdcF<""R'X'lcl
putersand lasers. Ballistic cl>mputcnl ha>'c madc tanl 'hcB/(xl'/Apphqu" P",pdl",IKt,,,,,,d,,,,,,,,d
Arm"urKil(AAK)pauvl., REA Tro""c1>, (Mili"'')'
guns remarkably accurate. They calculate how "1""f!lhcK""",,il;oor<!u, &etle)
weather conditions, barrel warp. propdlant tempna- T1>e"ddil;"""I"m",,,ris
warhead then penetl1ltcs the main armour. Rocket
Assisted Projc£tilcs (RA P) arc now standard in most
US T 55 mm howi17er balleries and they extend the
gun's range byup to a third
Il"llq was also able 10 draw on Western high
lechnology, thanks largcJy 10 Ihe efforts of Western
arms salesmen led by Dr. Gerald Bull. His Extended-
Range, Full-Bore, Base-Bleed (ERFB-BB) ammu-
nition when fired from his G-S artillery system is ablc
to hit targets up t040km away. The ammunition is
fitted with a buring charge at the ha>e of its shell that
reduces drag during flight and hence increases the
shdl'srangeconsiderahly. Soviet RAI' rounds were
ahma"ailablefortheirS""iet-suppliedartiHery
I.aser range finders were also adapted by the
Iraqis into ami-per,onnel weapons during the
lran-Iraqwar.Thcmodificdlascrrangefindcrswcrc
usedtosweepthcranhofmassedlranianinfamr),'
formation during 'hulllan wave' attacks ru cauSe eye
injuries. Some a,ooo Iranians wnereported toha"e
sulfcred retinal injuries during sevcral battles.
SATELLITE
INTELLIGENCE
Coalition c<:>mmanders in the.\1iddleEast had access
wunprecedented imelligence on Iraqi military prep-
arations thanks to spedal satellite terminals. US
Army and US Marine Corps headquarters down to
divisional level were all equipped with 'Constant
Source' terminab which enabled them to plug
straight imo US phOlographic and electronic eaves-
dropping satellites orbiting over the Middle East
The terminals enabled commanders to receive prim-
outs of satellite photographs and e1utronie data in
their Own headquartns. This information was madc
available to coalition allies
The small terminals were casily transpottable
and allowed intelligencc stalls to tailor the 'raw dat:l'
specifically 10 their own needs, for example by
scJecting photographic images rclevant to their own
scction of the batdeficld. 'Conslant Source' is part of
a US programme called 'Tactical Employment of
National Capabilities' which was established as a
rCSlllr of previOilS problems in getting vilal intclli-
gence information toficld commanders, During the
Vielnam \Var a special forces unit was selll torescu.e
US POWs from Son Tay POW camp, but satellite
information received davs before the mi,sion showed
rhal rhe rows had been moved, The rescue pany
only discovered this fact when they fought rheirway
into the prison camp and found il was empty
Then, were three KII-tt phol,-,!\raphic rccon-
naissanee satellites, a Lacrosse radar satellite and two
electronic 'ferret' satellites o,er the Middle East.
Lacrosse satdlit~s map terrain and arc ideal for
spouing ships and large structures such as bridges.
Ferretsatellitcs were able 10 locale the positions of
radars, command posts and other military equipment
that emitted electronic signals, Pholographic and
radar sarellites, however, were nor a panacea for
intelligence problems becausc their orbits meant they
were only over Iraq alld Kuwaitforafewhoursaday
This prevented the supply of realrime il1lelligence
needed for fast-mO"ing armoured hartle
E1ecrronic eavesdropping by sarelliles and
ground stations was a more reliahle snurce of in for-
mation aboUlwhat was happcning behind Iraqi lines
Each US corps, division and hrigade contained a
military intelligence unit l<> keep track ofencmy
deetronic emi>sions. Photographic reconnaissance
aircraft were useful, bur they also suffered from
-11:li~llu",,-.,..uflhcUS
,\brilH:~MiHl ..r,
PoJi.,..(n"":'hcbf",,lillfu)
1u,;.fonnid.I>kf1.o.• _f<:d
~:::;"j;~7tU;~r;'
.;~t;mk.(Uf;OuD,-;"
Ti",Ripk,1
probkms ,,'cr time-lag ~twun th~ photographs
~ingtaken and the film being r~turned to b<lsc for
processin~.
For reahimc imclligcnce, remOldy piloted ,·eh.
ides (RI'V) pru,'cd to be a great advance. Most
Rriti,hand US tugctlocaringunit. WCre equipped
with th~s-e useful systcms. Rl'V. arc ,cry .m~lI
remOldy oontrollcd aircraft that are fillcd wirh
television ameru. Their function i. to fly o,'er
enemylincsandscndbacl<'e:lltimetelevisionimagcs
of the current sitwllion. The Israelis lLo;e.:! th\.;n to
grear effect during the ,l)821,....elii"'·asiono(
Lebanon whl..'Il they 1000rcd S~-ri:m surfaee--tQ-II.ir
mi<sik sites. Israeli COIItrollers ,,-en then able to
targel ai.and a.tiJIl'r)· SIril<e:s on to the missilcs.
THE COALITION
COUNTER
ATTACK
Afrermonth.sofcarcful preparation and planninglhe
coalitionlaum:hcdtheircampaigntoliJ>t,ratcKu"ait
wirh massive air strikes against "ntegic rargels
throughour[raqinthccarlyhoursof'7January
'99'- A wide rangc of rargers were hit in the
coalition'sl..lllllpaiglltodCSTroyJraq'scommmdaud
rontrol sysTem. air !"'l.."C and WC:lpons of rna,S
deStrucTion
While Jraq's"ratcgic infraslnleture was J>t,ing
demolished. coalition ground forces moved up to
thcirjllltlping-offpointsncorKuwairinprepuarion
for the ground "fJcn,ive
In a propaganda ploy I-'rcsiderlr Saddam Hussein
launched a seri"" of spoiling. tucks agaiost Saudi
Af1lbiau rheend ..rJanuuy. MOSloflhesewen:dcalt
wilh by L"S Marine:t.ntj·armoor units, hur On 30
January a brig:ade ..r th". lrd Iraqi Mechanisco.l
Dh·isionad.-ancedinrothCllndefcndcd$J.udiIxml.cr
to"n ofKhafji_ Hea\)' fighting fonoll-cd as The Saudi
8th Nalional Guard Ualul.ion. sopponcd by ~t:t.ri
troop5 and L"S \1.:arine AI.I·.W Cob... gunships,
dro\-e out tbe Iraqis "ith 1ft( loss of more than 100
tanlsandannournlvehiclcs.
I.ncn::asing:coalition unicaJ ai. Rrikes:t.nd:ntil-
kryfin:"'"'R5no..-broughtdo"nondwlraqifrontlinc
positions in prepM:t1ion rorrhegroondoffensi,·e.
Within hours of the coalilion's az February
deadline m withdra... from KU"llit the ground
olfensi\'e began. Amerian, British, French, s..udi,
Egyptian. Syrian, ~uri, Omani and Free Ku..-,oit
troops ad\4.n.,.,d nonh apinst the Iraqis. !\nb fo.cc:s
and US \hrinestookoll Ihemain I.raqidcfcncesin
front of Kuwait. The L"S Army heavy armour,
IJritishandFrencbunilsmounredamas,ivcourflan-
king manoeuVTC IhTOugh Ihcdl$Crlllllhe wesT or
Kuwait. They swept nOfth iuta Iraq and thcll swung
 WI
••• ··AJ'wiJ,..p_..,
AIf'~iJCi,
ea51 10 hit the Iraq armoun:d miC""'e and Republican
GUaTdinlheOan~.
All along the fronl, Iraqi mocalecollapsed under
the ..·eightofcoalition firepo,,·er. ro.·lon:lhan :roo.ooo
Iraqis surrenden'd and UplO loo,ooo ....en: ki1letl or
wounded in the rout. Coalition forces!>Uffered under
100 f,ualities and a similar number of wounded. In
10001s<,..",.pof42 lnqidilisiolU"'·cn:smashedin
loohounofgroondfighling.
B~· 1.; February Kuw:tit w:as liberated and liS
President George Uu:J, declared a CC25Cfin: on 1.7
Fcbruar)·. CooJlition forces, however, had alread)·
stopped fighring-thcrc were no Iraqi lroops left to
engage
 TIM RIPLEY weighs up the annies that confronted each other across the 5,alOdJ border In IWwalt and
In the deserts of SOI.Ithem Iraq. He re¥eaJs tt>e con.iderable stTenltho and wea!<nl!Hl!S which
ch,.,.lICtI!f"i~edeach";de.T'tIe IrMji.. f(WflJ<ample, had an ad¥allure In Ionl·ranreartillery.
Weapon syot,......, tanks, tralnlnl, .."all arms, Special Fore.... atta<:k t>elicopten, Scud mi"iles, defended
position.. spy satellites, ammunition ty...., combat enllneerlnl, the threae of chemical and bloloslcal
warl:u<l, and many other factors which helped detennine the cotlrJe of the conflict ,.,.., e"amined
In detail.
Particular emphulo 10 II¥en by the author to the eq<Iipment and OI"lanlution of tt>e combatant forces.
General Schwarzkopf's command tu«eeded, as no other modem army, In comblnlnl a hure ¥arlety of
natlonallti.... (Wlanlutlons and equipment Into a potent and highly effecti.... filheinl force.

DESERT STORM SPECIALS

2 AIR POWER J SEA POWER
Roy Braybrook Peter Gilchrist

COMPANION SERIES FROM OSPREY

MEN-AT-ARMS
An unri\'alled source ofinfonnation on the history and appearance of the world's fighting men
Each 4S-page book indudes some 40 photographs and diagrams, and eight pages of fuJl-wlour artwork

VANGUARD
Key units and weapons systerns af 20th century warfare, with a strong emphasis On armoured ,·"hides.

ELITE
Detailed infonnation on the hislory, weapons and uniforms of the warld's mOSl famous fighting units.
Each 64-pagc book contains SOme 50 photographs and diagrams, plus 12 pages of fuJl-wlaur a".,.~rk

CAMPAIGN
Concise,authoritati\·c acrounts of the greatconiliets in rusIOl)·.
Each 96-page book conlains mare than 90 illustr:ltions including maps, charts and colour platcs, plus a series
oflhree-dimensionalbattle maps thai mark thecritkal stages ofa campaign.

9111,1~~1(1~~11