CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

One Belt One Road comprised two components; one is land based ―Silk Road Economic
Belt‖ (SREB) with six developmental corridors, which mostly has an agricultural base
and is supposed to connect China with Central Asia, Eastern Europe and Western Europe
and second is sea based ―21st century Maritime Silk Road‖ (MSR)1 to connect East China
sea, South china sea, Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden and Red Sea to the Mediterranean sea.

Source: - Trade Development Council, Hong Kong.

One Belt One Road (OBOR) is an ambitious business project to improve connectivity
and cooperation between several countries in Asia, Africa and Europe. The OBOR idea
was proposed by President Xi Jinping on September 7, 2013, visiting Kazakhstan
(Nazarbaya University). He gave the speech on ―Promote people-to-people Friendship

1
https://www.beltroad-initiative.com/info/ (Accessed on 17 March, 2017)

1
and create a better Future‖.2 During his speech he proposed the idea to join/be part the
Silk Road Economic Belt for better connectivity in Central Asia. Xi Jinping expressed the
old/ancient Silk Route during Han Dynasty (206 BC to 24 AD) to connect East to West,
Central Asia and Europe for trade, culture and economic co-operation with neighboring
countries and other parts of world.

The Silk Road is a unique example of history, intercontinental cooperation and

cooperation, not only in the fields of trade and commerce, but also in the world of ideas
and culture. Highly romantic and sometimes fictional in the literature of the Silk Road
countries, and in countless journeys over the centuries, this Silk Road stretched for nearly
7,000 miles from China to Central Asia, North India, and the Parthian Empire to the
Roman Empire between 200 BC to 14th century AD. It connects the valley of the China
River with the Mediterranean Sea, which consists of roughly two continents, Asia and
Europe, east and west. The term Silk Road was coined by the German scholar and
geographer Baron von Richtofen in 1877 and has since been the subject of much
academic, worldwide and international study, research, study and debate.3

One Belt One Road (OBOR), the opinion of Chinese President Xi Jinping, is an
ambitious economic and commercial development project aimed at developing ties and
cooperation among several countries across the continents of Asia, Africa and Europe.
The Chinese authorities have called it the "Project of the Century", OBOR covers about
78 countries initially.

The Belt and Street Initiative is a global infrastructure development policy which the
Chinese government introduced in 2013 to invest in approximately 70 countries with the
help of foreign organisations. This is named "One Belt one Road" or OBOR. This
initiative is a global infrastructure development strategic initiative. The plan was initially
announced as the "Silk Road Economic Belt" during an official visit to Kazakhstan in

2
Xi Jinping,―proposed to build a Silk Road Economic Belt with Central Asian countries‖, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, China, President, 07 September, 2013. (Accessed on 2 July, 2017)
3
Subhakanta Behera, ―India's Encounter with the Silk Road‖, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 37, No.
51, Dec. 21-27, 2002, p.5077.http://www.jstor.org/stable/4412978 (Accessed 19-12-2017 16:12 UTC)

2
September 2013, and is considered to be a core piece of Chinese Communist Party
General Secretary and President Xi Jinping's foreign policy.4

The word "Belt" applies to the planned routes of overland road and rail transport to
landscape central Asia through the popular trading roads of the Western area and is short
of the path to the 21st century maritime silk road to South Asia, the Middle East and
Africa via South-east Asia.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce in March 2015 and titled
―Vision and Actions on Jointly Building (Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century
Maritime Silk Road‖) states that:

“…The Belt and Road runs through the continents of Asia,

Europe, and Africa, connecting the vibrant economic circle of
East Asia at one end and developing a European economic circle
at the other, and circling countries with high economic
development potential. The Silk Road Economic Zone aims to
bring together China, Central Asia, Russia and Europe (the
Baltic); connecting China with the Persian Gulf and the
Mediterranean Sea through Central and West Asia; and
connecting China with Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Indian
Ocean. The 21st Century Silk Sea Road is designed to run from
the Chinese coast to Europe via the South China Sea and Indian
Ocean in one direction and from the Chinese coast through the
South China Sea to the South Pacific by road”.5

The Chinese government calls this initiative "an effort to strengthen regional ties and
embrace a brighter future." The project has a goal date of completion 2049, coinciding
with the centenary of the People Republic of China (PRC's) establishment. Some analysts
and skeptics, particularly from countries outside the European Union (EU), see this as an
international trade network-centric Sino strategy.

4
―The Belt and Road Initiative and Global Governance‖, International Conference, 31 August 2018, Royal
Academy, Brussels.
5
―Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road‖,
issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce of the People‘s Republic of
China, March 2015, http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html. Also see Nadège
Rolland, ―China‘s New Silk Road,‖ National Bureau of Asian Research, February 12,
2015,https://www.nbr.org/publication/chinas-new-silk-road/#.VOD-XP7mN10.twitter.

3
The ‗Silk Road Economic Belt‘ and the ‗Maritime Silk Road‘ Growth Plan of the 21st
century are the official term for this initiative. This initially became an abbreviation as
the OBOR or One Belt One Road. Since 2016, when the Chinese Government took into
account that emphasizes "one" and that "strategy" was vulnerable to confusion, the
English version has shifted to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). "One Belt One Road"
remains however the reference term in Chinese media.6

The OBOR initiative has specific risks and opportunities for India. India needs to
particularly study these before committing to any course of action as it can have grave
strategic consequences.

1. The west, particularly the US is banking on India to counter a growing China with
their pivot to Asia. In case, India accepts the OBOR initiative, it might lose its
strategic autonomy.
2. While India cannot compete with China economically, it has cultural as well as
reputational advantages over China. Thus, a similar initiative by India
dubbed Project Mausam could suffer if India were to join hands with China.
3. A stronger China is a strategic risk for India given the fact India has 4078 km of
disputed border with China and China claims a large portion of Indian Territory
(nearly 80,000 sq km).
4. However, India is not included in the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic
Partnership and the US-led Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership,
leaving the country feeling marginalized on a global economic platform. As a
result, participating in "One Belt and One Road" is another useful option.
5. India can be benefited by having better connectivity to landlocked oil rich Central
Asia for its energy needs. Also, it can be used by India to improve its
infrastructure significantly. This initiative can also be seen by India as an
alternative to TPP.

India shall need to ensure that its strategic maritime interests in Indian Ocean are not
compromised by Chinese presence. Also, given long festering boundary issue with China
6
Yubaraj Sangroula, ―China South Asia Connectivity: Reflections on Benefits of OBOR”, Vol.5 No.1,
Kathmandu Sch. L. Rev. 1, 2017.

4
and its recent China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) initiative in Pakistan Occupied
Kashmir (POJ- now Ladak Occupied Jammu Kashmir (LOJK) despite India‘s
reservations make it a fit case for closer scrutiny by India before taking a final decision.
Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank were originally conceived by china as a
multilateral institution for financing the infrastructure needs of the Asian region.
‗Belt and road‘ initiative is again the Chinese conception of modern version of the
historical silk route that once existed between China and Europe. Under this initiative
china will be building a maritime link and a road link with Europe, Africa and Asian
countries.

The financing needs for infrastructure like road construction and ports construction,
customs clearance houses etc. will be invariably financed from institutions like AIIB and
NDB (Brics Bank).
Thus the 2 projects are complementary to each other. However there are certain
differences and contradictions:

1. AIIB seems more benign whereas countries are wary of Belt & Road. Example being
India.
2. AIIB seeks to involve other stakeholders whereas Belt & Road is implementation of
Chinese plans.

Positive implications for Asia:

1. The infrastructure needs of the region will get adequate funding.

2. The region will be less dependent on European and American markets.
3. This will put pressure on the troika of WB, IMF and ADB to be more efficient in
its lending priorities.
4. With initiatives of road corridors like Kolkata to Kunming initiatives, the positive
economic effects of the belt might help develop the erstwhile underdeveloped
regions and thus put an end to militancy, terrorism in countries like Myanmar and
Pakistan.

5
The ―Silk Road Economic Belt‖ - a Chinese initiative to connect the Asian and European
economies along the Eurasian corridor with the Chinese economy; by developing
transport infrastructure and communication networks, including rail, road and fiber-optic
highways, which would connect South Asia, Southeast Asia, Central Asia and Europe
towards a single terrestrial corridor.

China is trying to implement its export approach, which has lifted millions out of poverty.
The "One Belt, One Road" initiative (OBOR) has been defined by leaders as a soft power
tool that seeks to boost regional viability. It seeks to unify the Silk Road and Silk Road
economic zones through an extensive network of railways, roads, pipelines, ports and
telecommunications infrastructure that encourages economic integration from China to
Asia, the Middle East and Africa to Europe. . To finance some of these international
projects, China has invested $50 billion in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, half
of the bank's fixed capital. Beijing has also pledged $40 billion to the Silk Road Fund,
$25 billion to the Silk Road Fund and $41 billion to the New Development Bank (created
by the BRICS states: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa).

International relations

Some scholars say that the Belt and Road Project is a way to improve China's economic
and political power. Behind Halford Mackinder‘s theory, the Belt and Road Initiative has
been covered by a number of strategic observers. Some other scholars have also noticed
that the official media of the People‘s Republic of China (PRC) tends to be disguised as
the motivator of all political aspects of the Road and Belt Campaign. China has also spent
trillions of dollars to strengthen its central infrastructure, with influence on the trading
system as well as its military influence, in many South Asian countries including
Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Afghanistan. China has emerged as one of
the growing centers of FDI. According to India's official ranking of FDI inflows, China
was the 17th highest in 2016, rising from 28th in 2014 and 35th in 2011.

6
In May 2017, China hosted the Belt and Road International Cooperation Forum, which
brought together more than 1,600 delegates from more than 140 countries and 80
international organizations, including 29 heads of state and government.7

Belt and Road Initiative (BRIs) priorities involve internal government building and the
stabilisation of ethnic instability in its wide western inland regions, including Yunnan and
Xinjiang, connecting these less established regions with expanded foreign trade flows
that encourage closer economic integration with the centre of China.

China’s OBOR Agreement

Other Countries Involved year Documents/Statement

European Union members March 2014 Joint Statement: Deepening the

Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for
Mutual Benefit

Timor-Leste April 2014 Joint Statement on Establishing

Comprehensive Partnership of Good-
Neighborly Friendship, Mutual Trust and
Mutual Benefit
Timor-Leste April 2014 Joint Statement on Establishing
Comprehensive Partnership of Good-
Neighborly Friendship, Mutual Trust and
Mutual Benefit
Thailand April 2014 Joint press communiqué
Indonesia March 2015 Joint Statement on Strengthening
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership
Hungary June 2015 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)
on Jointly Promoting the Construction of
the Silk Road Economic Belt and the
Twenty-first Century Maritime Silk Road
Kazakhstan August 2015 Joint Declaration on New Stage of
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership
Myanmar September Joint news release
2015

7
Ren Weimin, Director-General, ―The Belt and Road Initiative Leads to Enhanced Euro-Asia
Connectivity‖, Department of International Cooperation, Ministry of Transport, China September 4,
2017, Geneva, Switzerland, https:///C:/Users/acer/Downloads/5_WP5_4Sept2017_Mr_Ren.pdf

7
South Korea November Free trade agreement
2015
Albania, Bosnia and November Suzhou Guidelines for Cooperation
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, 2015
the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Macedonia, Montenegro,
Poland, Romania, Serbia,
Slovakia, and Slovenia
African Union members December Declaration of the Johannesburg Summit
2015 of the Forum on ChinaAfrica
Cooperation
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, March 2016 Sanya Declaration of the First Lancang-
Thailand, and Vietnam Mekong Cooperation Leaders‘ Meeting
UN Economic and Social April 2016 Letter of intent with the Chinese Ministry
Commission for Asia and the of Foreign Affairs
Pacific
Afghanistan May 2016 Joint statement
Papua New Guinea July 2016 Joint press release
Myanmar August 2016 Joint press release
UN Development Program September MoU on cooperation on the Belt and
2016 Road Initiative
Albania, Bosnia and November Riga Declaration
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, 2016
the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Macedonia, Montenegro,
Poland, Romania, Serbia,
Slovakia, and Slovenia
Pakistan February Long-Term Plan for China-Pakistan
2017 Economic Corridor (2017–2030)

New Zealand March 2017 Memorandum of Arrangement On

Strengthening Cooperation on the Belt
and Road Initiative
Finland April 2017 Joint Declaration on Establishing and
Promoting the Future Oriented New-
TypeCooperative Partnership
Nepal April 2017 MoU on cooperation on the Belt and
Road Initiative
Argentina, Belarus, Cambodia, May 2017 Guiding Principles on Financing the

8
Chile, the Czech Republic, Development of the Belt and Road
Ethiopia, Fiji, Georgia, Greece,
Hungary, Indonesia, Iran,
Kenya, Laos, Malaysia,
Mongolia, Myanmar, Pakistan,
Qatar, Russia, Serbia, Sudan,
Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey,
and the UK
Argentina, Belarus, Cambodia, May 2017 Joint Communique of the Leaders
Chile, the Czech Republic, Roundtable of the Belt and Road Forum
Ethiopia, Fiji, Greece, for International Cooperation
Hungary, Indonesia, Italy,
Kazakhstan, Kenya,
Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Malaysia,
Mongolia, Myanmar, Pakistan,
the Philippines, Poland, Russia,
Serbia, Spain, Sri Lanka,
Switzerland, Turkey,
Uzbekistan, and Vietnam
United Arab Emirates (UAE) June 2017 Framework Agreement on Strengthening
Cooperation on Production Capacity and
Investment between China‘s National
Development and Reform Commission
and the UAE‘s Ministry of Economy
UN Economic Commission for June 2017 MoU with China‘s National
Europe Development and Reform Commission

Source: Darshana M. Baruah ―India‘s Answer to the Belt and Road: A Road Map for South Asia‖
(Working Paper) Carnegie India Publication,New Delhi, India, AUGUST 2018,(P.7-10)
https://carnegieendowment.org/files/WP_Darshana_Baruah_Belt_Road_FINAL.pdf

HOW ONE BELT ONE ROAD WORKS

The scope of the project has been expanded over the years to accommodate new sectors
and infrastructure projects, which were first proposed in 2013 to restore the former Silk
Road, which connected Asia with Europe. The project, also known as the Belt and Road

9
Initiative, involves the construction of a wider network of bridges, trains, shipping
facilities, power supplies, oil and gas pipelines, and related infrastructure projects.8

There are two pieces in the project. The first is considered the "Economic Belt for the
Silk Road," which has an agricultural center and is to be linked to China and Central
Asia, Eastern Europe and Western Europe. One route is called the 21st-century
"Maritime Silk Road", which is offshore and aims to reach the southern coast of China's
Mediterranean, Africa, South-East Asia and Central Asia. The names are misleading,
because the ―belt‖ is a network of bridges, and the ―road‖ is the sea road.

Source: Director-General Ren Weimin The Belt and Road Initiative Leads to Enhanced Euro-Asia Connectivity,
Department of International Cooperation Ministry of Transport of the People‘s Republic of China September 4, 2017,
Geneva, Switzerland, file:///C:/Users/acer/Downloads/5_WP5_4Sept2017_Mr_Ren.pdf

8
Wang Chen, ―Preface to Scientific Development in China: Volume Summary‖, China in the last Ten
Years, Wang Guoliang et al. eds., People‘s Publishing House, 2012.

10
The following six corridors are included:

1. The “New Eurasian Land Bridge”, West China Linking West Russia

Source: HM Ambassador Barbara Woodward CMG OBE, Stephen Phillips Chief Executive, China- Britain Business
Council, ONE BELT ONE ROAD: A role for UK companies is developing China‘s new Initiative, new opportunity in
China and beyond, Sept. 2015 published by The British Business Centre.(p.11-14)
http://www.chinagoabroad.com/en/article/a-role-for-uk-companies-in-developing-china-s-new-initiative.

The Eurasia Continental Bridge Corridor is a high-speed rail corridor that connects
Lianyungang, the northern port of northern Yangshuoa, to Urumqi, the regional capital of
Xinjiang. The corridor passes through Xuzhou (Jiangsu), Zhengzhou (Henan), Xi'an
(Shaanxi), Lanzhou (Gansu) and Xining (Qinghai) cities. Announced in 2016 as part of
the "Eight Vertical Eight Horizontal" railway network project, the railway corridor is an
extension of the existing Xuzhou - Lanzhou high-speed rail line.

The Eurasia Continental Bridge Corridor is a high-speed railway connecting

Lianyungang, a port north of Yangshuoa, and Urumqi, the capital city of Xinjiang. The
tunnel passes through Xuzhou (Jiangsu), Zhengzhou (Henan), Xi'an (Shaanxi), Lanzhou
(Gansu) and Xining (Qinghai). Announced in 2016 as part of the "Network Vertical Eight

11
Horizontal" railway project, the railway line extends the Xuzhou - Lanzhou high-speed
railway line.

All Chinese rail freight over the Eurasian Land Bridge will have to cross the Caspian Sea
through Russia at some point. Another option would be through Turkey and Bulgaria, but
any route south of the Caspian Sea must pass through Iran.

China's Minister of Transport Li Shenglin said that

"…China is a first-rate partner of Bulgaria. Bulgaria is in the

position to offer maximum good conditions to port operators.
We believe that the Bulgarian ports can be attractive enough
to compete with the routes of Central and Eastern Asia".9

Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev has called on Eurasian and Chinese

leaders at the 18th Shanghai Cooperation Group to build a high-speed Eurasian train
(EHSRW) behind Beijing-Astana-Moscow-Berlin. On November 7, 2019, China's first
freight train traveled the Mararay tunnel to Europe, departing from Xi'an using a Chinese
train. This has shown that the line, which has been in operation since October 30, 2017,
has reduced the loading time between China and Turkey from a month to 12 days., And is
part of the Silk Road. Turhan said―…The Iron Silk Road, which benefits some 5 billion
people and 60 countries, has become a new and very important choice for global trade
networks‖.10

9
China Invites Bulgaria to Join High-Speed Asia-Europe Rail with Turkey,
https://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=121602 (Accessed on 17 May, 2018)
10
Mustafa Hatipoglu and Emrah Gokmen , ―First China Railway Express line train reaches Turkey Train
uses Istanbul's, Subsea Marmaray railway tunnel to cross into Europe‖, on 07 November, 2019.
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/first-china-railway-express-line-train-reaches-turkey/1637811
(Accessed on 17 Mach, 2020).

12
2. The “China-Mongolia-Russia Corridor”, Linking Northern China to Eastern
Russia via Mongolia

Source: The geographical coverage of the One Belt, One Road Initiative. Source: - The
Economist Newspaper Limited, London (2 July 2016).

This route includes high speed rail and road links and is divided into two lines:
• Beijing / Tianjin / Hebei to Russia (via Hohhot, Inner Mongolia)
• Dalian to Chita in Russia (via Shenyang, Changchun, Harbin, Manzhouli and Inner
Mongolia)
There are already international freight trains working this way, connecting major
cities across China including Guangzhou, Shenyang, Suzhou and Tianjin with
international destinations. A north pass will be built through China-Mongolia-Russia
Corridor to connect Bohai Bay Economic Circle, including the main cities of Beijing,
Dalian and Tianjin, with Western Europe. This corridor corresponds not only to
China‘s OBOR campaign, but also with Russia Transcontinental Railway Plan (which
also including road and rail links between Moscow and Beijing) and Mongolia‘s
Prairie Road Program (also known as such as Steppe Road, which has five projects
including roads and rail construction, natural gas and oil pipes). China is also
cooperating with the Eurasian Economic Union led by Russia. In May 2015,

13
 President Xi Jinping signed a series of infrastructure agreements worth US $ 25
billion (£ 16 billion) with Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan on high-speed, energy rail
infrastructure and aerospace, too such as business parks providing finance services
such as RMB settlement.
3. The “China-Central Asia-West Asia Corridor”, Connecting Central and West Asia
with Turkey Western China

Source: The geographical coverage of the One Belt, One Road Initiative. Source: - The
Economist Newspaper Limited, London (2 July 2016).

It will be an important gateway for oil and natural gas to Xinjiang from the Arabian
Peninsula, Turkey and Iran. The world's longest gas pipeline is China - Central Asia.
It starts on the Turkmen-Uzbekistan border, passes through Uzbekistan and southern
Kazakhstan and ends at Horgos Xinjiang. From there, it will be connected to a
second pipeline in northwest China, built. China has also signed cooperation
agreements with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to work to support trade and
property management. China has pledged to expand its strategic partnership with
Middle Eastern countries (known as the "1 + 2 + 3") strategy, which includes nuclear
power and renewable energy, a key component, and cooperation in infrastructure,
aerospace technology and trade and investment financial. They aim to trade three

14
 times in both a decade until the China-Gulf Cooperation Council Exchange
Agreement.

4. The “China-Indochina Peninsula Corridor”, Connection South China to Singapore

via Indo-China.

Source: The geographical coverage of the One Belt, One Road Initiative. Source: - The
Economist Newspaper Limited, London (2 July 2016).

The route connects the Pearl River Delta economic circle (probably Guangzhou,
Hong Kong and Shenzhen) with Southeast Asian countries, Vietnam, Thailand,
Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia. New railways and highways from Pearl River Delta
in southern China will run to Singapore via Nanning in the province of Guxi and
Hanoi in Vietnam. The initiative in this area is the common goal of the Greater
Mekong Sub region, an economic region created by the Asian Development Bank,
which is a platform for business cooperation and the joint construction of transport
networks across the Mekong River.

5. The “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor‖ South-west China connects Pakistan

with Arabia, connecting Kashgar in Xinjiang with Pakistan‘s deepwater port of

15
 Gwadar, this corridor has allowed China to travel a short route to the Middle East and
Africa through Dubai and Oman, passing through the Straits of Malacca. It should be
noted that the corridor runs through Kashmir, and the Government of India is
categorically against it. China and Pakistan signed an agreement on CPEC, about £ 29
billion, when President Xi Jinping visited in April 2015. That agreement covered,
inter alia, the energy sector, ICT and transport infrastructure. There is no
infrastructure development in Pakistan, and this project is expected to become a
priority part of OBOR.
6. The “Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Corridor”, Connecting Bangladesh with
India to South China and Myanmar11

Source: The geographical coverage of the One Belt, One Road Initiative. Source: - The
Economist Newspaper Limited, London (2 July 2016).

This route connects China and South Asia. China views India as a key partner for
integration with West Asia and beyond, co-operatives have been established in the
construction of this route, and railway construction, business cooperation and training
services are expected to continue. During a visit by Indian Prime Minister Modi to China
in May 2015, the parties signed agreements worth more than $ 22 billion (14.1 kg) in

11
Xi Jinping,―The Governance of China‖, Foreign Language Press 2014, p.p. 315–19.

16
terms of communications, metal, energy and cinema, but it is important that much of this
is aimed at Chinese investment in India, the passage of divided development.

The Chinese OBOR project will connect Central Asia, Russia and Europe, the Persian
Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea through Central and West Asia, connecting China with
Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Indian Ocean.

Special consideration: One Belt One Road importance to China

For China, ―One Belt - One Road‖ (OBOR) is paramount as it seeks to promote domestic
development and is also part of the country‘s economic diplomacy policy. China intends
to develop economic growth by connecting less viable regions, such as Xinjiang, to
neighboring countries. One Belt One Road (OBOR‘s) would open up and build new
Chinese products markets. It will also enable the productive superpower to conveniently
monitor economic routes for the export of materials.

Any surplus output resources can be efficiently channelled to regions along OBOR roads.
In many development ventures, China has spent more than $1 Trillion and is offering
low-cost loans for these projects through participating countries.12

Many countries involved, such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, finance the OBOR through
major investments from China in these countries' local transmission projects. Landlocked
Nepal has recently entered OBOR via an agreement that will help and boost the cross-
border connection with China and that will enable Pakistan access to the Arab Sea routes
by making the $46 billion Chinese Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).13

As China proceeds to position the OBOR as an all-inclusive regional development

initiative, it is perceived in other nations as a strategic phase by the Asian superpower for
regional importance and influence and for the creation and control of a China-oriented
trade network to play an increasingly significant global role.

China sees this undertaking as a chance for regional leadership. It will be a rise in
Chinese yuan in the future with expanded use in OBOR.

12
Yong Deng, ―Chinas struggle for status: Realignment of International Relations”, Cambridge Univ. Press
2008.
13
Sangroula, supra note 6.

17
Chinese President Xi Jinping declared in the Indonesian parliament on October 2013,
One Belt One Road on the South Asian Development Corridor/Asia Africa Economic
Corridor Posting China's most aggressive initiative in the twenty-first century One Belt
One Road (hereafter OBOR). The OBOR initiative comprises the Silk road (hereinafter
SREB), the economic belt and the maritime Silk Road, which links land and maritime
economic corridors to and integrates with ports, commercial tunnels, pipelines for
pet/gas, rail and transport connectivity. The scheme involves the OBOR Highway
(hereinafter SREB).14 The OBOR revives the old Silk Road and the roads linking
commerce, trade and the commercial arteries of the sea. In order to bind the dynamic
economic circles in the world, the OBOR initiative operates through Asia, Africa and
European continents. It ties China via the land routes with Central Asia, Europe and
Russia. The geostrategic proximity of China along the South China Sea to the Persian
Gulf is booming across the Indian Ocean, much as on maritime roads. It opens doors to
Chinese market connectivity across the Mediterranean to African countries (Swaine,
2015; People's Republic of China's National Growth and Reform Committee, 2015).
Beijing sees this initiative as an attempt to put back its glory in foreign relations in the
fields of history, society, economy and civilisation. Some foreign scholars nevertheless
assessed that the One Belt One Road (OBORs) initiative in Beijing would help China
develop the outskirts of the Sino-centered world order. Moreover, South Asia, because of
the geostrategic significance of the area of South Asia and a threshold to China's
accession to the broader Indian Ocean Rim (IOR), has the highest goal regions of the One
Belt One Road (OBORs) ventures. Since India opposes it and Pakistan's more
enthusiastic contribution to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and other
infrastructural ventures the South Asian zone is the frontline for China's One Belt One
Road (OBORs) initiative. Much like Nepal and Maldives, two major forces are now
facing divided views. The balance then moves towards the Sino-centered Asian century
(Small, 2018; Ploberger, 2017). The overall budget expenditure for One Belt One Road
(OBORs) initiative is expected to be about US$ 6 trillion in Chinese policymakers.
Investment funds would be given from the Asian Infrastructural Investment Bank

14
Wang Yiwei, ―The Belt and Road Initiative: What will China Offer the World in Its Rise”, New World
Press, 2016.

18
(following AIIB) and China led financial institutions. The Chinese Export-Import Bank
also supported initial ventures in the 49 countries in 2015. Nevertheless, in 400 big
ventures in 48 countries with substantial foundations, China Development Bank still
plays a major role in financing. These recent technologies and acquisitions in China
contributed to the new discussion by geopolitical environment scholars in the hinterland
area of the Rimland. Tell the Mackinder geopolitical transition, for example, by the
introduction of the One Belt One Road (OBORs) projects focused on train and transport
connectivity, preceded by Chinese state makes (Aoyama, 2016; Blanchard & Flint,
2017). One Belt One Road (OBORs) ventures have therefore brought about fresh foreign
policy shifts in Beijing. For example, claim the emphasis on the circular rim land area in
the larger Indo-Pacific region under the One Belt One Road (OBORs). Beijing is
optimistic for the area of South and South West with the introduction of a vertical
strategy to the execution of strategy and geostrategic commitments by launching a
number of projects like China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), China-Myanmar
Economic Corridor (CMEC), Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM), China-
Indochina Economic Corridor and the 21st century Maritime Silk Road in the form of
One Belt One Road (OBORs). As a result, China's geostrategic construction forces the
Indo-Pacific zone to be a more debatable region. Chinese major initiatives, collaborator
nations, major infrastructures and their status in compliance with the One Belt One Road
(OBORs) initiative are shown in Table 1.1. As a consequence of the new economic routes
and ports across the Indian Ocean, new regional protection dynamics are being developed
for nearby coastal countries, in particular for India and Southeast Asia.15 In this way,
China's swift growth, which challenged the regional forces of the region, stimulates the
Indo-Pacific new development. As a consequence, the US, ASEAN, and China-centric
Asia-Pacific strategy cannot be taken as Maritime Asia. In the Indo-Pacific field, it is
larger than the Asia-Pacific zone (Saran, 2018). China's vertical pivot in the direction of
South Asia is bringing new confusion for India policymakers in this region, especially the
China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), China-Myanmar Economic Corridor
(CMEC) and China-Indochina peninsula. India, due to sovereignty issues over Pakistan

15
M.R. Dahlan, ―Dimensions of the New Belt & Road International Order: An Analysis of the ,Emerging
Legal Norms and a Conceptionalisation of the Regulation of Disputes”, Vol.9,No.1, Beijing L. Rev. 87
2018.

19
Occupied Kashmir (POK), has strong objections, particularly with regard to China
Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). As the new force in the country, India has also
shifted to its western and eastern neighboring countries with extra-regional inspiration.
New Delhi also took initiative to revitalise its historical, cultural and economic
connectivity to the neighboring countries across regional and trans-regional development
corridors. New Delhi came with the concept of South Asia Sub-Regional Economic
Cooperation (SASEC) to expand, exchange and business prospects with its eastern
neighborhood countries in order to offer a new option to China's One Belt One Road
(OBORs) initiative.16 New Delhi a shared vision for inter-regional trading and economic
collaboration, the South Asia Sub-Regional Economic Cooperation (SASEC) programme
brings together South Asian countries such as India, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar, Sri
Lanka and the Maldives. However, in New Delhi in 2010 the ASEAN organisation and in
2006 the South Asian Free Trade Region (SAFTA) agreements with South Asia
(hereafter SAFTA) had already been concluded by the New Delhi organisation in the
following year (De & Lyengar, 2014).

China’s Major Projects, Ports and infrastructural Developments under OBOR

Sr. China’s Major Projects Partner Countries Expected Major Current Status
No. under OBOR Infrastructure
Development
1. China Pakistan Pakistan-China Transports, Railway, Under Construction
Economic Corridor Gwadar Port and
(CPEC) Infrastructure
2. China-Myanmar China-Myanmar - Proposed
Economic Corridor
3. Bangladesh-China- Bangladesh-China-Myanmar- - Proposed
Myanmar-India India
Economic Corridor
4. China-Indochina China & ASEAN Members Transport, railway and Under Construction
Peninsula economic Countries Air Connectivity
Corridor
5. China-Central Asia-West China-Kazakhstan- Transport, railway and Under Construction
Economic Corridor Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan- Air connectivity
Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan,
Iran & Turkey
6. China-Mongolia-Russia China-Russia & Mongolia Transports, Proposed

16
The Belt and Road Initiative will transcend the Marshal Plan. As early as 5 January 2009, The New York
Times tagged China‘s going global strategy as the Marshal Plan for Beijing. This rhetoric has become
more popular after the Belt and Road Initiative was proposed. As a matter of fact, the initiative, while not
being a Chinese Marshal Plan, has gone beyond the level of Marshal Plan.

20
 Economic Corridor
7. New Eurasia Land Connect China to Europe
Bridge Economic through Kazakhstan, Russia
Corridor and Belarus (Cover approx.
30 Countries)
8. Twenty-First Century It stars from South China
Maritime Silk Road Sea(SCS) to Europe & Africa
through Indian Ocean Region
(IOR) China & small islands
countries part of the Maritime
Silk Road
Source : Nedopil, Christoph (2021): ―Countries of Belt and Road Initiative‖; Beijing, IIGF Green BRI
Center, www.green-bri.org
Telecommunication &
Energy Network
Railway connectivity Under Construction
and energy is major
preference areas
Ports, Railway, Under Construction
Transports, Air and
infrastructural
Developments

After the Chinese government's first plan in 2013, The Chinese One Belt One Road
Initiative (OBOR) has also received significant global coverage as the Belt & Road
Initiative (BRI). The "Belt" — the so-called Seed Route Economic and the "Road"- 21st
Century is a highly ambitious initiative aimed at improving multilateral companies
between economic partners, regional cooperation, and increasing connectivity. Over the
past five years, it has seen enormous strides.17 OBOR was appointed its biggest trading
partner before the 2018 People's Daily Survey (see Yidaiyilu.gov 2019) by more than 120
nations, and 25 countries have ratified the Cooperation Agreement with China, China has
total trade and foreign investment in the countries of OBOR exceeding $5 trillion. This
major undertaking, affecting countries with a combined population of over four billion
citizens, has, consequently, had a big effect on the Eurasian mass. This work is meant to
complete two things in order to fully analyse the initiative. First of all, OBOR is
operating in a top-down structure spanning three regional levels - global, national and
local. Secondly, it attempts to track the results on each stage of OBOR. OBOR already
has a large range of literature, mostly from Chinese scholars. The literature can be
summed up approximately three key types of topics examined: OBOR's big strategic
ramifications, OBOR's total economic viewpoints and OBOR's basis for the ideology and
theory. In the first group, for example, Liu (2015) addressed the role of OBOR in global
economic integration and predicted OBOR's geostrategic significance for Chinese foreign
policy. Yuan (2014) took OBOR into the light of China's geopolitical fight against the
U.S, It stated that to improve Chinese regional authority it was necessary for OBOR to be
instituted. The economic effect of the initiation of OBOR on foreign transactions between

17
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, Annual Report 1995–96, New Delhi, 7, 118, 1996.

21
China and others has been addressed in the second community, Zou et al. (2015). Liu,
Dunford, Gao (2017) in the third group explored the ability of OBOR to shape the
theoretical basis of the idea of "including globalisation." Few analysts have, however,
tried to examine how at a global stage, OBOR's priorities and strategies are related to
initiatives at national and local levels by states, businesses and citizens. In other terms, no
specific structure still exists that ties OBOR to global, and then local, actions as a foreign
initiative. Consequently, the key contribution of this analysis to the present OBOR debate
is to map the mechanism of this broad initiative in order to study the impacts of OBOR
from global accounts to unique national and local programs on each scale. The functions
of economic corridors –the OBOR skeleton – at national level, to meet the goals and
objectives of this ambitious initiative; and, on the local level, concentrate on a particular
category of sites—the land ports that lie at national frontiers—and the part that the
OBOR will play in the foreign sense.18

Furthermore, this work leads in two additional forms relative to previous literatures. First,
previous posts, particularly those of Chinese experts, discussing OBOR on an
international scale, paid little focus to the positions of other major economies regarding
OBOR. Therefore it includes in this global study, the United state of America and
European Union views of this initiative in order to better comprehend how OBOR is seen
differently from various areas of the globe, which could help avoid excessively reliant on
China or western self rhetoric. Secondly, besides China and the Western understanding
varying in regard to OBOR's distinguishing existence, the analysis of land ports at local
scale is another vacuum in literature to be filled. Till date, the work and reporting of
OBOR appeared to be too concerned with the position of maritime ports than land
harbours. An international port is a national border where people and property are legally
allowed to enter the country. Despite the growing focus on political and economic change
in Chinese border areas of domestic provinces, including Xinjiang, Tibet and the
autonomous inland Mongolian region, Chinese port literature is focused on its
geographical distribution (Wang, Cheng and Mo 2014) (Yang, Jiang and Wang 2017).
The multidimensional role they play in OBOR other than economies at land port is
ignored in several different literature fields. My study is focused on two pairs of land-port

18
Rajen Harshe, ―South Asian Regional Co-operation: Problems and Prospects”, Economic and Political
Weekly, 1999, p.p.1100–05.

22
and investigates the pluralistic land-port ecosystems of the OBOR system. For the rest of
this report, three chapters are organised. This first chapter deals with the OBOR
worldwide, with the inclusion of various viewpoints of these countries—China, the USA,
the EU and China—to this initiative and the relevance of its rhetoric. The second chapter
explores the theory and the reality of economic tunnels, OBOR skeletons and examines
the national transition from macro to micro scenario. The third chapter contains two
international ports within the economic corridors - Pass Alata and Khorgos, Xinjiang
Province, the Erenhot and Manzhouli counties, the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region
and policy review, economic and cultural transformation of the port in the sense that the
case is a case study. Throughout the method of monitoring the 'global national locals
mechanism, This study focused to look at how OBOR operates, and claim that at any
size, OBOR has generated an effect of significant conflict and disagreement with the
OBOR initiative.19

President Xi Jinping visited and lectured in September 2013 in Kazakhstan at Nazarbayev

University. The word 'Economic Belt on the Silk Lane' was first introduced in his
address. A month later, in October, Xi Jinping came to Indonesia to announce "Maritime
Silk Road 21st Century." Ever since, OBOR has unified the "Belt" and the "Road."

A paper that is included both in the implementation and as a guideline on values of the
OBOR, was jointly published in 2015 by the Chinese National Growth and Reform
Committee, the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs and the Ministries of Commerce on the
'Vision and Intervention on the Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Route'
This work would use this paper to define briefly OBOR's roles and attributes.

It specifically refers early in the announcement to the past of the ancient Silk Road, to
link it to the old iterations and to the modern ones on the Silk Road; it also refers to the
continuity of Silk Road's history-wide mission: harmony and cooperation, tolerance and
inclusiveness, shared learning and mutual gain (National D). In the 21st century, the
Chinese Government still views this mission as the key topic of foreign affairs. Following
the historical background, this work places OBOR into the changing global economic

19
Dhrubjyoti Bhattacharjee, ―India‘s Vision on Act East Policy‖, Paper presented at national seminar on
„India‟s Act East Policy: Problems and Prospects in North East India‟ Indian Council of World Affairs
at Imphal, Manipur, 28–29 January 2016

23
climate - the continuation of the 2008 financial crash, spending and market shifts, etc., as
a consequence of the negative shocks of the financial crisis. OBOR is planned to
economically connect Eastern Asia and Europe, including many relatively less advanced
countries with economic potential within Eurasia in the goal of "preserve the world's free
trading regime and open world economy in the spirit of open regional co-operation"
Itineraries are considered trade corridors between China and other areas. The Asian
Development Bank states that the urban corridor is a network of facilities serving a
specific region to facilitate economic development (Brunner 2013). They can be
classified into four major categories in the "Cooperation Priorities" segment for particular
ventures along economic corridors. This include: facilitation of networking, unimpeded
exchange, financial inclusion and bond between individuals. In other terms, OBOR seeks
to improve networks, expanding transport infrastructures, such as dams, motorways and
railways, Reinforce bilateral and multilateral trade by – removing trade walls and – trade
zones. by increasing bilateral currencies exchanges and settlements with OBOR countries
and the final settlement mechanism in Asia, by creating a stability in currency,
investment and financing system According to the OBOR's key guidance "Vision and
Actions," China aims, through infrastructure growth, foreign trade, financial inclusion
and cultural links, across six separate economic corridors, to improve its partnership with
countries. To further understand; how China as the supporter of and leader of OBOR
finds this violent effort in the USA, circumvented by OBOR, and the EU, the other pole
of OBOR's, contrasting OBOR reports from China, the United States and the EU in the
next portion.20

OBOR is a huge undertaking and its creation is strongly informed by OBOR views and
experiences. Three distinct narratives, from China, the USA and the EU, on this work to
better explain how OBOR is shaped by several players traditionally and in principle, and
the impact of constructing OBOR beyond China.

In the first instance, for many years, the Chinese government has stressed OBOR's main
feature—a strategic policy rather than an economic programme. For e.g. OBOR is subject

20
ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference, Statement by His Excellency Mr. I.K. Gujral, Minister of External
Affairs of India (Jakarta, 20–21 July 1996), http://www.asean.org/?static_post<hig>=</hig>joint-press-
release-the-first-asean-india-joint-cooperation-committee-meeting-new-delhi-14–16-november-1996

24
to a shifting economic order in "Vision and Action" and this announcement ignores
mention of both the political motifs and repercussions of OBOR. Moreover, it is the
technique of the documentary 'Belt and Path' which China produces that underlines the
significance of economics to OBOR from a historical viewpoint (CCTV). In episode one
of this documentary, like "Vision and Action" the old Silk Road was listed at first again,
which means both that of the old Silk Road and of the new OBOR: support citizens by
exchange which is economic rather than political.

Second, In May 2017, President Xi Jinping has specifically confirmed that OBOR would
not replicate an ancient tradition of geopolitical rivalry at the International Partnership
Belt and Road Platform (Zhang 2018). OBOR is basically a win-win programme that
supports China and other stakeholders alike, both by Chinese government and by
research scholars. In August 2018 for example, during his visit to Mongol, Chinese
Foreign Minister Wang Yi said that OBOR is the public echo that was given by China in
an international way and that this has little to do with the so-called "Marshall Plan" in
China (Liu 2018). More broadly, OBOR is usually referred to in Chinese discourse as
"initiative," rather than a "strategy;" scholars including Huang Fengzhi, and Ge Hanwen,
in 2018, further argued that OBOR's practise is not China's geostrategic.21 In August
2018, President Xi Jinping used a word to describe the OBOR's ultimate purpose – to
create a culture of mutual development for mankind that is the same value as the "Tian
xia" for Chinese people — peace between all nations, following the rhetoric that OBOR
is not politically-oriented (Han 2018). It must be remembered that this concept was first
suggested in 2012, but this term was not commonly used in similar literature until the
launch of OBOR (Chang and Zhao 2012). Indeed, the notion of a "community of shared
future for mankind," or "community of shared interests and goals," at times, suggests a
circumstance in which the interests and destinies of all countries are linked in an age of
globalisation, and the future of each other is associated (Qu 2013). OBOR can only
contribute to such global peace by means of numerous forms of foreign alliances, both in
economic and cultural terms, in line with the official rhetors of the Chinese Government.
It is a really great rhetoric, composed of any single citizen or nation on this earth. The

21
Vinod Anand & Rahul Mishra, ―India‘s ‗Act East‘ Policy: A Perspective”, Vivekananda Int‘l. Found., 20
November 2014. http://www.vifindia.org/article/2014/november/20/india-s-act-east-policy-a-perspective

25
next segment addresses the 10 explanations why Chinese OBOR reports are highly based
on these three points. Meantime, the United States and the EU vary from two other global
economies. In general, I think that the central sound of America's reaction to OBOR is
"ambivalence with more negativity" since OBOR is a major problem in the United States,
though OBOR often poses itself as an opportunity to render any ex-narrative of OBOR a
major challenge for the United States. The US, on the one side, is not physically
protected by OBOR, meaning that the main economy of the planet is segregated.
Therefore, one of the key rhetoric‘s that American scholars share was that Eurasia,
headed by China, is likely to arise from a new global order rather than the United States.
Both China and other Asian countries increasing economic reliance on China will build
this possible new order by infrastructure building (Meltzer 2017). In comparison, the
American storey, which involves the United States Defense Plan, the Atlantic Council
study, the Latest American Security Research Center, and the US-Chinese Commission
Evaluation Meeting, contrast with China's discourse in which OBOR is distinctly distinct
from a diplomatic initiative OBOR has been regarded favourably in certain ways,
though." (Wuthnow 2018, 2) Commentators are similar to the Marshall Plan...."
(Wuthnow 2018, 2) The strongest indication is the US Delegation's participation at the
2017 Foreign Partnership Belt and Path Forum (Blanchard and Wen 2017). "US
businesses have plenty to sell OBOR," said Matthew Pottinger, the head of the American
delegation" (Hsu 2017).

Both countries, for example, might improve their degree of cooperation in areas like
infrastructure growth, a favourite for the administration of Trump and a field China is
experiencing. The European Union narrative to explain to OBOR as the word
"conditional acceptance." OBOR's position in growing Europe and Asia's connectivity is
usually welcomed by the EU, but it is still wary about whether it will comply with strict
industry laws. In the background of the Belt and Road Forum for International
Cooperation, for example, Jyrki Katainen, Vice President of the European Commission,
represented the EU and argued that an emphasis is on developing communication, and
further expenditure in cross-border OBOR ties might open up huge growth opportunities
to China and the European Union, but OBOR should 'substance the EU and its members'

26
(Katainen 2017)22. It should be remembered, however, that opinions on OBOR vary
considerably across various countries across Europe. Geographically, Western Europe
seems to applaud OBOR more carefully. More than a dozen Central and Eastern Europe
countries such as Poland, Hungary and Romania have instead been quite excited by and
signed with China Memoranda (Corre 2018). For eg, while visiting Peking, French
President Macron said that China should be aware that intellectual property should be
protected and access for public transport should not be determined by OBOR itself
(Fouquet and Shi 2018). "We looked at China's leading position in the railway field as the
16 01 forum, established in 2012 by 16 Central and Eastern European countries and
China," said Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto, and the Budapest–Belgrade
Railway, one of Europe's leading East-European projects, was very welcome (Peto 2017).
Ideological, partial and even deceptive might be behind narrative rhetoric. Consequently
the reasoning and incentives which underpin rhetoric are more essential compared to the
rhetoric itself. This segment also discusses the logic behind three separate narratives.
First of all, stressing OBOR's economic character indicates that China's key reason for
pursuing this project is economic. Demand for an OBOR into two categories: global
demand, which primarily tackles the issue and the internal problem—overcapacity and
resources.

China is more concerned abroad with the "Malaca dilemma," which explains the
condition of 80% of Chinese Middle Eastern shipments of energy through the Malaca
Strait, although this crossing is insecure (Winn 2014). Given that United State of
America safety architecture is heavily based on Pacific island chains, China needs to
explore other new supply lines, In order to safeguard and diversify resources and energy
supply, in particular on land routes that reach deeper into Eurasia. In many areas,
including steel, charcoal, aluminums, cement, energy machinery and non-ferrous metal
mining in China, China's voltage crisis in recent years has become unsustainable.
Moreover, the internationalization of RMB, China's official currency, also encourages the
development of a B&R economic roadmap. China's long-term monetary policy target
(Liu et al. 2017). More RMBs will reduce trade danger and reliance on US dollars if

22
Seminar Report, Indian Council of World Affairs, Integrating Northeast in India‘s Act East Policy (23
February 2015), http://www.icwa.in/pdfs/creports/2014/seminarreport23022015.pdf

27
cross-border trade is developed gradually. The focus on Chinese economic motivation
therefore represents the need for the government of China to make reform to face the
difficulties of the economy.23

Secondly, because of the need to separate OBOR from conventional strategic rivalry and
the determination to transcend classical geo-politics, which was used as a guideline for
empires in order to attain hegemonic objectives, the official Chinese narrative avoids
connecting OBOR with politics. In particular, China's growth has been a heated subject
for 10-year duration and countless conversations have taken place on whether China's
rise will endanger stability in East Asia. The Chinese government continues to
emphasise, this project is progressive initiative that might spark connectivity tensions in
order to prevent the circumstance in which OBOR is being manipulated under China's
growth, to validate the Western claim of China pursuing the ancient geopolitical trend
and endanger regional stability. Thirdly, the Chinese government is proposing to create
"a community with shared future for humanity" as a way of addressing the geopolitical
problem to further improve its second argument. It evokes a feeling of peace and helps
create a pleasant picture of the Chinese government across the globe, connecting desires
and destinies in various countries. In addition, this can be seen in the Chinese community
as a kind of value export. This work claim therefore that Chinese OBOR stories originate
from (1)' justifying the primary economic motive for beginning OBOR; (2) countering
the statement that OBOR is conventional geopolitical rivalry and (3) offering an
optimistic and pleasant image, and exporting the long term importance of 'the society of
common interests and destinies.' "OBOR is an example of traditional geopolitical
competition. In reality, the American tale is decided by the present partnership between
the United States and China. There are two things which represent the impetus for OBOR
to be launched in geopolitics. The United States is first of all worried about the likely
change of power dynamic between China and the USA ,as a "revisionist country" in the
United States' National Security Policy (White House 2017, 25). In other terms,
American rhetoric claims that through OBOR China can boost its regional power,
become Asia's future leader and shift its geopolitical order. Second, after cautious
23
Sebastian Biba, ―Desecuritisation in China Behavior Towards Its Transbound River: The Mekong river,
The Brahmaputra River and the Irytish and ILI Rivers‖, Vol. 23 Journal, Contemp. China, 2014, p.p. 21–
43.

28
geopolitical estimates, the effects of the possible "change in the geopolitical order" are
risky for the US.24 The classical geopolitical principles are utilised to quantify the
geopolitical consequences of OBOR, as pointed out by Wuthnow — "OBOR is a new
manifestation of British geographer Halford Mackiner's idea that dominating Eurasia is a
condition for global hegemony" (Wuthnow 2018, (2). According to the Heartland
hypothesis, the integration of the planet of Iceland—Africa, Europe and Asia together,
which has been a continuously attempting to escape the United States since the 20th
century, is predictable through Eurasian dominance of Eurasia's Heartland—a big portion
of land mass in the Eurasian interior. OBOR will enable China to expand the depth of its
global strategy and eradicate US benefits from the Pacific through major infrastructure
projects, particularly high-speed railways, built to cross the Eurasia region. This therefore
suggests that the language of rivalry as to which OBOR is strategic shows a deliberate
positioning of a rising force and a defence of its behaviour, as well as a fear of a
multinational power over changes of power. Arguments from OBOR's opinion
nevertheless represent positively the reality that current near economic interdependence
between the USA and China hardly causes the bilateral partnership to deteriorate entirely.
For example, infrastructure construction is seen as a partnership forum between the
United States and China, So it can play a similar function to the Obama administration's
"climate change" (Luft 2017, 14). On the 9th China-US in April 2018. Transport Forum
Yang Chuantang, the Party Secretary to the Transport Ministry, said that "China is
willing to work in the context of China's roads and infrastructure rehabilitation plan and
transport development, within the framework of its Belt and Road Initiative" (Wong
2018). For the European Union, exclusivity focuses on "connectivity" primarily based on
China's 'Council Decisions on EU policies,' which indicated that connections between the
EU and China should prioritise 'infrastructure, commerce, digital and personal ties'. In
addition, independent debt crises and refugee problems in the euro area encourage global
investment movements and increase connectivity to trade opportunities. Similar to the US
worry, however, that the EU should not wait to completely accept this ambitious
undertaking, namely whether OBOR is able to meet with high standards in European

24
Modi government plans venture fund to promote start-ups in Northeast, The Econ. Times, 20 January
2016, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2016–01-20

29
industry and whether it could be built solely economically without geostrategic
considerations. Regarding the difference of attitudes across countries in Europe, the
different economic conditions in different countries can best be clarified. In order to
improve the poorly-organized local infrastructure networks, several Central and Eastern
European countries have need for China's skills in infrastructure and finance. On the
other hand, Western European countries like Britain and France, while they are still
involved in international investment beyond Europe, struggle with the possible negative
shocks brought about by the OBOR domestic economies, such as enhanced
competitiveness by Chinese building firms, such as construction companies running high-
speeding railway, and the effects of the labour sector. In conclusion, China aims to
strengthen links with neighbouring countries by promoting OBOR by means of enhanced
connectivity in networks, convenient cross-border commerce, an equitable financial
system and more strong cultural connections, all of which seem to expect a global effect.
In the meantime, conflicts occur as narratives competing. The United States and the EU,
for example, have made their positions distinct on OBOR on a global basis. Although, in
addition to the rhetoric revealing fears regarding OBOR's global effect, we have to dig
into the process lying between OBOR's fantastic rhetoric and the concrete projects it
proposes in the plan to grasp how OBOR operates on a different scale.25 In the next part,
the theoretical foundations and development realities at the national level and discuss
how the economic corridors, The central skeleton of the OBOR should follow this
project's strategic goals.

OBOR's goal is to increase interaction, to increase commerce, to integrate financial

structures and to enhance cultural exchange. However, A relation should be built between
China and the OBOR countries, to achieve all four goals listed above. Specifically the
enhancement in accessibility needs for constructing networks. The growth in trade is
conditioned on the shipment of commodities. Financial inclusion calls for organisations.
All four goals warrant a spatial link between China and other countries in the real
universe. Under this light a passage must be developed and named an economic corridor
in a geographical sense. The economic corridor, as described briefly is geographically

25
J. Chaisse, D. Chakraborty & B. Nag, ―The Three-Pronged Strategy of India‘s Preferential Trade
Policy”, Vol.26, Connecticut journal of Int. Law, 2011, p.p. 435-40.

30
oriented growth. The concept of a corridor can actually be traced back to at least 1949
when the corridor is identified in a geographical sense by Thomas Taylor (1949, 278-
300). Charles Whebell (1969, 1-26) defined "corridor" in 1969 as a linear system that
links geographically through transport infrastructure in various areas. At the Second
European Conference on Transport ten "Pan-European Transport Corridors" were
introduced in 1996 (Reynaud 2003). These corridors are, as the name implies, mostly
orientated to transport and involve road, rail and canal development. In the same sense
the OBOR proposal also relies on the economic theory of the geography, which notes that
corridors that are focused on foreign transportation will adapt the structure of the
industries through the agglomeration of labour powers, as well as enhancing regional
economic integration through the production of capital (Zhang and Shi 2017). The
economic axis may also be perceived to spread to neighbouring towns and thereby
become a more geographically-relevant economic region.26

It should also be noted that the roles of the OBOR's economic corridor in relation to other
areas of international growth, as they are opposed to the duties defined by the economic
corridor, primarily economic, and the four primary goals of the OBOR, which are to be
achieved by economic corridors, are multi-disciplinary. In this regard, The OBOR
economic corridor is different from the conventional transport road that focuses on
economic growth only, But it is a trip that spans numerous landscapes and aims at cross-
border collaboration, including economic growth, structural transformation, social and
cultural patrimony communications. In brief, from a theoretical viewpoint, the Economic
Corridor inside OBOR is a regional transformation centred on transportation networks,
connecting several countries with a view to facilitating bilateral and multilateral
economic, institutional and cultural cooperation. (1) The Current Eurasian Land Bridg:
(2) The Central Asia-West Corridor; (3) The Chinese-Mongolese-Russian Corridors; (4)
The New Eurasian Land Bridge; China's proposal for the development of China's six
economic corridors with six regional areas: Thus, OBOR is translated in six passages on
a globe, by the construction of these six corridors. The next segment of the six

26
A Kawharu & L. Nottage, ―Models for Investment Treaties in the Asia–Pacific Region: An Underview”,
Vol. 34, Ariz. Journal Int‟l. & Comp. L.,2017, p. 461.

31
corridors.27

Economic Corridor: Fact After a brief analysis of the theories which support the idea of
economic corridor, the utility of the theories must be understood. The first portion of this
segment covers the six corridors individually, based on projects that have been or are
being built alongside them, such as electricity plants, dams, railway lines, and claims that,
as a part of OBOR, various corridors seek to accomplish economic prosperity in different
ways. Instead of providing a project list only in the second half of the segment, the
complexities of how socially negotiated, challenged and created the latest projects in the
Chinese bureaucratic political arena.

Method containing a range of players. The second part of this segment reflects on China's
place in economic corridors and suggests that it is a reality than the theory that describes
its function. It's not just that. Economic Corridor ‗Chinese-Mongolia-Russia‘. This
corridor is divided in two sections: one from Beijing, the capital of Independent Internal
Mongolia and the other from Moscow, Mongolia capital and Krasnoyarsk, Siberia's 3rd
largest and 3rd most wealthy city, and Mongolia capital, Ulan Bator.

The main mechanisms of mutual cooperation are infrastructure development and trading
according to 'Chinese Mongolia-Russia Financial Corridor Strategy'. First of all, OBOR
is to link Russia's Greater Eurasian Alliance to the 'Steppe Path Initiative' in Mongolia,
all aimed at improving connectivity through infrastructure development in the field of
economic cooperation. They will focus on improving networking and promoting the
transformation of the region. The key networks comprised the Arxan Chibalsan Railway,
High Speed Railway Moscow-Kazan, and the East China-Russia Pipeline (Railway
Technology 2018). Secondly, there has been a substantial growth in bilateral exchange.
Bilateral trade between China and Russia peaked for the first time in 2018 at more than
$100 trillion, based on a year-on-year growth of 27.1 percent (PRC Trade Minister 2019);
As of January 2019, China-Russia trade volume surpassed $9.2 billion. However,
frustration arose as Russia, as regards the future of this commercial route, took note of
bilateral ties. Although Russia is now a geopolitical 'comprehensive strategic partner,' a
powerful land force in the history of the world, Russia is still keen to retain its sphere of
27
J. Mohan Malik, ―China–India Relations in the Post-Soviet Era: The Continuing Rivalry”, Vol.
142, China Quarterly Journal, 1995, p. 317.

32
control, especially in Central Asia, according to some nationalists of China, is also
important and OBOR-crossed (Tremin 2012). Via the potential conflicts of interest in
Central Asia, China-Mongolia-Russia is still unsure regarding the nature of the corridor.28

International train from Lianyungang to Rotterdam (Denmark) on the Pacific Coast with
10900 km gross miles, has also been recognised as the Second Eurasian Continental
Bridge.

The OBOR flagship project is one of the train systems in this regional railway – China-
Europe Railway Express, by increasing the 'connectivity' suggested by the Chinese
Government, directly improves the trade volume. Land Bridge's contribution to foreign
trade in recent years has improved significantly: the total value of goods shipped from $
600 million to $ 160 billion worldwide has increased from $ 17 million sent in 2011 to $
6300 in 2017 (Sohu 2018). In particular, the number of trains from Europe to China has
increased dramatically. There were 2090 train services from Europe to China in 2018,
twice as many as in 2017, and a wide range of products:

From devices such as computers or mobile phones to machinery parts, agricultural items
and garments (CINIC 2019). Halford Mackinder's famous geographical centrepiece,
where Mackinder claimed that "trans-continental railways are now transmuting
conditions on land power," is the important workload of this railway line. The 'persistent
spatial partnership' he stressed extends as a strategic occurrence, the temporality of
improved connectivity in Eurasia. In other terms, constructing and upgrading the New
Eurasian Nation Bridge would dramatically strengthen the mobility and accessibility of
land forces that theoretically set the groundwork for the project.29 Thus, China-Europe
Railway Express modernisation is a geopolitical challenge and not only an economic one.
However, a big question can be instantly expressed: does it work properly to render
shipping a modern economic order for transport the cornerstone of the existing Eurasian
Land Bridge? In general, it is a conventional fact that ship transport costs are much
smaller than rail transport, although as the value of merchandise is bigger, this difference

28
Jyoti, ―India‘s Look East Policy: In Its Second Phase”, Vol. 2, Global Journal of Pharmaceutical Sci. &
Education, 2013, p.p. 1–14.
29
Yaduvendra Mathur, India‟s Look East-Act East Policy: A Bridge to the Asian Neighbourhood,
Symbiosis Institute of International Studies, International Relations Conference (2014).
http://www.irconference.in/assets/ IRC_conference_proceedings.pdf

33
can expand (Rodrigue et al. 2017). But ground transport may also be reasonably
beneficial for OBOR, which extends through the greatest region on earth — Eurasia. The
market trend of transport productivity between rail and sea travel approaches dynamic
balance on the Eurasian landmass, according to Lu et al. (2018), following all transport
costs and time costs. This implies, that the costs are split between ground transport and
shipping, which stretches from Berlin to Chumikan, from Khabarovsk Krai, via the
Schwarzmeer, the Caspian Peninsula, Iran, Afghanistan, China's inner Mongolia, the
Tibetan Plateau. Beijing and Berlin, with less freight prices, are the two main towns at the
two OBOR poles north of the railway line. Most of the Eurasia Nation Bridge and China
Conduit from Mongolia to Russia is now in the north section of the line, suggesting that
the land transport capacity for the economic integration of the Eurasian hinterland can be
utilised. This land bridge, covering almost half the world, spans approximate 30 counties,
including 14 language varieties and 4 religious types. However, Central Asia, with its
complex ethnicity, low levels of education, stagnant economic growth, countries such as
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have proved to be a fertile area for greater zeal, contributing to
the construction of a fragile and vulnerable global bridge. The China-Central Asia-West
Asia Economic Path is one of the biggest mistakes in the next corridor. China-Central
Asia-West Asia Economic Path This route extends across the Persian Gulf, including five
Central Asian countries, Iran and Turkey, starting in Xinjiang province.30

Energy cooperation is a major component of the corridor's construction. The main

ventures involved pipelines for natural gas from Central Asia, China (A, B, C and D),
connecting China to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, the Tajikistani Dushanbe No.2, the
Thermal Power Plant from Angren, the Uzbekistani Karakol gas field and so forth. In
Uzbekistan, over 20,000 more jobs were created as construction projects along this
economic corridor were introduced (Jiang 2019). Central Asia-China pipeline, 1830 km
under Central Asia (CAs), Allow 47 billion Standard Cubic Foot gas per year to flow into
China, accounting for about 15% of China's annual gas demand. In constructing this
corridor, cultural exchange plays a key role. The historical relation between Central Asia,
West Asia and China is particularly important to consider as Central Asia and the Middle
East are widely recognized for their unfamiliar places in Chinese history that can only be
30
Supra note 10.

34
found physically in the vast desert or high mountains before modern times. In Tashkent,
Samarkand and other corridors Confucius institutes set up by the Chinese Government
(Jiang 2019) during the OBOR time in order to increase China's cultural visibility in the
countries of Central Asia; events such as the Annual Central Asian Cultural Exchange
and Cooperation Forum and the International Movie Festival of Silk Road have taken
place (Zeng 2019). Cooperation between China and its Western neighbors both
economically and culturally improved after the start of OBOR but their usefulness
remains undecided.31

In general, the ties between China and Pakistan are exceptional. Pakistan is the only "all-
weathers strategic partner" under Chinese diplomacy, which ensures that regardless of
how foreign or domestic circumstances shift, friendship with China Pakistan continues.
China Pakistan is the only nation that will take steps. Wang Yi, Foreign Minister, made a
clear comparison in 2015, while on visit in Islamabad with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif
of Pakistan: 'Where a Belt One Direction has become a symphony' (Associated Press of
Pakistan 2017). This economic corridor is certainly granted importance. It begins in
Xinjiang province from Kashgar, spreads through Pakistan and finishes at Gwadar port. It
goes across the whole of Pakistan.

The Economic Path aims to achieve all four OBORs - the best institutions, advanced
trade, established financial institutions, and cultural exchanges - unlike other channels
that emphasize one or two aspects of bilateral relations, such as trade and power.
Pakistan's road development, the construction of new highways, and the growth of the
metropolitan area in Lahore are significant developments, in terms of infrastructure
(Malik 2017). Moreover, since 2013, a variety of power plants have been installed in
Suki Kinari, Sahiwal, etc., including hydroelectric power, solar, wind and nuclear power.
It helps to stable the domestic textile industry from the move to India besides the major
increase in the supply of electricity (Syed 2018).32

31
Indo-Asian News Service (IANS), ―India Needs Policy to Look East, Link West: Narendra
Modi”, Deccan Herald, 25 September 2014, http://www.deccanherald.com/content/432698/india-needs-
policy-look-east.htm
32
Namrata Goswami, Act East Policy: Northeast India as a Strategic Catalyst, CLAWS J. 70, 74
(2015), http://www.claws.in/images/journals_doc/1548193442_NamrataGoswami.pdf

35
The Gwadar Port, which began operating in 2016, The key project is this economic
tunnel. Investments from Gwadar Port in China have accelerated the development of an
offshore port that is directly linked to the China-Pakistan economic corridor will
accommodate for importing petroleum into Gwadar Port from the Persian Gulf and then
into the Xinjiang province via China-Pakistan Railway. The introduction of this initiative
did not, however, deter the growing resistance in the country. The Baloch group in
Balochistan, where Gwadar Harbor is situated, opposed the project during the
construction time through a range of strikes and confrontations because Balochistan is
considered its homeland (Lim 2017). The assault on the Chinese consulate, launched by
the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), a Baluch insurgent group supporting separatism in
Balokhistan in November 2018, will possibly better explain the opposition (Notezai
2018). This issue concerns the cultural impact of China on Pakistan. While Peking
strengthened its cultural image in Pakistani society by creating Confucius Institutes and
drawing Pakistani pursuants to China, it is still necessary to decide the future of this
corridor if the local people of Pakistan would recognise Chinese influence within their
own territory.

This corridor focuses on commerce, systemic collaboration and alignment of policies. For
eg, in the years following the declaration of OBOR, The four countries also signed a
cross-border cargo facilitation agreement through the Bangladesh/China-India-Myanmar
Economic Corridor, an agreement between China and Myanmar on joint transport via the
Ayawady River and an agreement between the two countries on mutual development
(Yao and He 2018). However, India's hesitation is the greatest obstacle to construct this
road. India has always tried to increase its own dominance over the India Ocean as
another large land force that is steadily growing (Pant 2018). However, this field is
protected by OBOR. In reality, The Monsoon program was launched shortly after China
proposed that OBOR in New Delhi establish an order in the Indian Ocean, which
includes East Africa, the Arab Peninsula, the Indian subsoil and Southeast Asia, with a
focus on India (Pioneer 2017) . Because of the similarities, the Monsoon system is often
referred to as the "Indian version of One Belt One Road" (Zhu 2017).

There are two opposing views of the Monsoon system: (1) linking the B&R in China with
a mutually advantageous system and a win-win condition, or (2) countering the B&R in

36
China to the regional power of India. The government of Modi's preference of the second
alternative would contribute to deteriorations in political and financial bilateral ties
between China and India, eventually raising the challenge of completing an economic
corridor between Bangladesh, China and India and Myanmar.33

Starting in Kunming, Yunnan's provincial capital, it finishes in Singapore and goes

through a variety of countries in South-east Asia including Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and
Thailand.

This corridor looks for deeper economic integration by fewer infrastructural growths, like
Bangladesh-China-India/Myanmar Corridor, Southeast Asian Nations' Multilateral
Negotiations and Arrangements between China and the Organisation. The ten ASEAN
members play a major role in Southeast Relations, in particular in Vietnam, Laos,
Cambodia, Thailand and Malaysia. This corridor offers a means of strengthening China's
economic cooperation, increasing China's presence on ASEAN, and thereby growing its
regional effect on Southeast Asia. In short, six OBOR economic corridors have all
transport infrastructure crossings intended to promote the establishment of the scheme,
institutional development and cultural communications of bilateral and multilateral
cooperation in economic growth. In addition, with regard to particular forms of
collaboration, multiple hallways can have different focus. The Latest Eurasian Land
Bridge, for example, is built almost entirely to facilitate Eurosian exchange, although
corridors extending through Central Asia and the Middle East are also linked in various
directions to energy cooperation. More precisely, in the OBOR sense, the building of
economic corridors has also increased China's trade volume with its neighbours.
Meanwhile, Peking also paid close attention to the multi-faceted role played by cultural
communication between countries, but the effectiveness of strengthening cultural ties
remains unclear. The conflicts between Chinese power's existence in foreign countries
and diverse local socio-economic conditions will illustrate this. The shaping of the
programmes in question is not easy. It should also be remembered. Conflict and dispute,
which deserve more study, lie behind the corridor building. The manner in which
domestic Chinese politics are applied by defining three key issues behind these ventures.

33
J. Huang, ―Silk Road Economic Belt: Can Old BITs Fulfill China‘s New Initiative”, Vol. 50, Journal
World Trade, 2016, p.p.746–750.

37
Firstly, in comparison to a traditional knowledge of the Chinese Communist Party
Central Committee alone dictating policy-making and policies such as OBOR, a range of
players in Chinese political structures are currently vying with each other to share their
opinions on OBOR and the development of economic corridors. The Commerce Ministry
may, for example, provide multiple interest-based opinions on particular infrastructure
projects (Yu 2018, 9). The Ministry of Trade concentrated primarily on the returns and
dangers of this project as an undertaking in the face of railway building in Central Asian
countries, The Transport Minister gave further attention to building facilities efficiency
and practicality. In addition to ministerial competition, provincial governments often bid
for initiatives in the metropolitan corridors approved by the Central Committee (Yu 2018,
8). Beijing has also managed to draw further funds from Beijing, as it has planned to
devote a large sum of money to OBOR.34 For eg, since OBOR was introduced, the
Province of Yunnan and Guangxi have been competitive with others as China's gateway
to South East Asia, which will boost its reputation and draw both domestical and foreign
investment in the province that is called "Gateway" (He 2018, 8). Secondly, the academy
is also interested in developing economic corridors as well as bureaucratic agents inside
the Chinese Government who compete in the OBOR Interests Competition. In particular,
Beijing has given valuable study grants to Chinese academics in domestic universities,
responsible for detailed advice by the Parties on how to improve multilateral trade
relations, for instance in neighbouring countries, on how to raise Chinese soft power
(Lanzhou University News 2019). Besides the viability of study results, Peking's
techniques have been at least unveiled to effectively mould this important initiative by
scientists. Tsinghua University, for example, China's largest institution, established a
Central Administration-led OBOR-research institute which periodically published OBOR
reports on "Structure an Upgraded One Belt One Road: from top design to international
consents" (Zhang 2018).

Bruce Dickson describes this process as a 'co-optation,' which includes the mobilisation
of elites, such as academics, and incorporation into social policy-making, a crucial
'survival tactic' (Dickson 2016, 14). In this regard, the mechanism of recruiting more

34
X. L. Han & Y. M. Zhai, ―Investor-State Arbitration Mechanism in Sino-Foreign Investment Agreement
under the ‗Belt and Road‘ Initiative‖, Chinese Rev. Int‟l. Law, Vol. 5, 2017, p. 32.

38
scientists to take part in OBOR forming and the creation of economic corridors will also
provide an incentive for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to build prominence and
improve its seat in power, in addition to the future outcome of OBOR—sustainable
economic growth—which will help it strengthen its credibility in control.

Third, OBOR is a somewhat ambiguous project, while official papers, "Vision and
action" plan (2018--2020)" released by the Chinese government which have vaguely
outlined the OBOR's course. Currently, this opacity is a blade that has two rims. On the
other side the degree of mistrust in other countries further enhances because this opacities
hardly reassure partners - The EU in particular - that China's domestic policy operators
have enough room to be agile without many restrictions - their infrastructures ventures
are covered by an underwriter. China always influence the manner in which OBOR is
built, it is important to determine if unique investment and financial guidances can be
developed inside the OBOR boundary, as argued in the first section, to finance this huge
initiative. Finally, it becomes clear that, in China and in the other participating countries,
six trade corridors, as the skeletons of OBOR, had a major economic and cultural impact.
However, there are disagreements about the influence of Russia, as is the case with some
Chinese nationalist alarm over the China-Mongolya-Rusia route, and the local resistance
to Gwadar in Pakistan. Moreover, in terms of the negotiating phase of economic
corridors, the influence and claims of OBOR are inferred inside the Chinese domestic
political framework. Competitiveness perspectives through regional and ministry
administrations are valued, and this ambitious programme incorporates non-political
participants, such as scholars. The third section of this analysis focuses on a central node
along the corridor that reveals how OBOR is manifested in local growth, after a
description of both the principle and experience of economic corridors.35

Land Port: Theory

There are a propensity to arbitrarily separate economic corridors that connect up

countries into two areas: domestic and international. The main relation between these two
elements - port of entry - is overlooked in this dichotomy (POE). The POE has the right,

35
Lu, Yang, ―The Establishment of ‗Belt and Road‘ International Investment Disputes Settlement
Institution”, Journal Law Commerce, Vol. 37, No. 1, 2019.

39
through people and by goods, to enter a nation and has three key categories: Land port,
airport and sea port. OBOR economic corridors, therefore, on ground, are linked to one
type of port—land ports both domestic and foreign. Land ports compose, by restricted
definition, of road harbours and railways on national frontiers. However, in general, land
ports often have river harbours since certain national borders either cross the river or have
their own waterway. According to 'Vision and Motion' (P6-7), the key responsibilities
are: 'enhancing customs clearance services'; and 'defining a single window within border
ports,' around economic corridors.' In terms of infrastructure funding, identify the first
two roles and the last two as operational support. There are, in effect, double incentive
theoretical elements for the development of land ports along economic corridors:
enhancing mobility by infrastructure of economic movements, including labour, money,
technology, intelligence, etc.; and developing well defined structures, including political
cooperation and thinking contact, to undermine the barrier functioning of borders. More
precisely, two economic hypotheses foster infrastructure and structural advancement in
land ports: the theory of pole growth and the theory of frontier benefit.36

The growth pole hypothesis, which was originally suggested by French economist
Francois Perroux, holds that the economic centre of a country is considered a "growth
pole" (Parr 1999). The growth pole also drives economic growth of neighbouring areas
by the creation of growth pole through the absorption and aggregation of different output
factors and economies. Land port is considered to have the economic capacity to function
as a development pole and could contribute to economic growth in borderlands, as a
location from which people and products travel. Therefore, ideally, the ports of land are
built to become commercial centres. In addition to the theory of pole expansion, Also an
important theoretical method for encouraging port development is the principle of border
advantage. It concentrates on three aspects: (1) boundary duality, (2) border spatial
gradients and (3) domestic border criteria (Hu 1993). Firstly, the boundary duality applies
to the positions of culture and economy in frontier regions. The most significant aspect in
borderlands, which offer a conducive climate for the regional stability of the land ports, is
cultural interaction and economic growth in period of peace rather than militaries.

36
J. Hanson & D. Yosifon, ―The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism,
Power Economics, and Deep Capture‖, Vol. 152, No. 1, U. Pa. L. Rev., 2003, p. 129.

40
Second, the regional boundary gradient relates to the variation in the social characteristics
of two countries that share the border (Zhang and Shi 2017). This is that all countries
partake in trade and trade, and will both profit. That is the distinction. Thirdly, it is
important to find an inland route through the sea to establish foreign trade with the
landlocked countries. China is significant in terms of neighbouring countries' economies
as Mongolia and Kazakhstan, with its long boundaries shared with landlocked countries
and long coastlines. Land-port ports act as points of communication to the sea, so they
need to cross boundaries to extend commerce from domestic countries.

Further it will address how OBOR impacts land ports' current development and their
degree of theoretical trajectory in case studies in some land port areas. Land Port: the
reality is that, due to the spatial location of the ports in terms of OBOR, there are several
big land port across more than 300 land ports distributed through Chinese 2,2800 kms.
These ports specifically pass through the economic corridors as outline.

Instead, The study looks at two pairs of land ports in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous
Zone of Alataw Pass and Khorgos in the Province Xinjiang, Manzhouli and Erenhot,
instead. In addition, it looks at all large land ports. Two key facts have contributed to the
identification of these two land ports as the topic of case study. Second, all four of them
can be counted as one of China's largest land ports. Secondly, OBOR is typically a
western-faced effort aimed at connecting China with the West's nations, all of which are
western gateways, in the context of OBOR, they all play a significant part. The following
case studies investigate how OBOR communicates with certain ports.37 In this portion,
how OBOR affects the multiple land ports' ecosystems and at the same time how these
land ports evolve and turn to promote OBOR's development at a locale stage. Since the
literature on developing land ports mostly focuses on their economic perspectives and
lacks other factors, It takes a significant approach from Arjun Appadurai to set out an
extensive paradigm used to examine OBOR's impact on land ports: the five scenarios
principle. In Appadurai's opinion (1991), conflict between cultural homogenisation and
Heterogenisation occurred in the post-Cold War environment, and hence the global order

37
Ivan Krastev & Mark Leonard, ―New World Order: The Balance of Soft Power and the Rise of
Herbivorous Powers”, Eur. Council on Foreign Relations, 24 October 2007.
http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/one_belt_one_road_chinas_greatleap_outward3055

41
is defined by divisions within economies, culture and politics. Five disjointing "scapes":
ethnoscapes, human flows, media panoramas and cultural flows, technology flows,
flows—financed funding and ideoscapes—the philosophy flow. In this study, techno
scape to characterise the growth of technological-based infrastructure projects, ethno
scape to explore people's influx, ideoscape and media environment, and finanscape to
explaine the economic and financial impact for the purpose of rendering the model more
suitable to OBOR.

Hypothesis:

We are seeing a shift of economic and strategic weight to the OBOR, it is also fair to say
that we are witnessing shifts in power relativities within the OBOR. OBOR is likely the
convergence of economic and strategic spheres in a globalised world. The focus will be
to see how India will protect its geo-politics, economic and security interest. The strategic
challenges for India is to analysis its strengths and acknowledgement of weakness in this
region.

OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

 To analysis strategic policy of India in this region.

 To study the security challenges for India in this region in the context of China.
 To analysis the economic interest of India in this region.
 To study friendly relation with countries of this region.
 To analyse OBOR structure and process of implementation.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Devdutt (1962) published a article ―Non-Alignment and India‖, Vol. 23, No. ¼, The
Indian Journal of Political Science, discussed in detail about Better economic relations
improves political relocations and mutual trust. Being part of the initiative will improve
India – China relations and also with Central Asian nations predominantly. The author is
in the opinion that Non-Alignment policy can be beneficial in present era for mutual
benefit of the two powers. This is the basic principle India‘s foreign policy to foster the

42
realtion between India and China because both countries are aware about their interests
and historical legacies.

Duval, Yann, Utoktham, Chorthip (2011), ―Intraregional Trade Costs in Asia: A

Primer‖, Asia-Pacific Development Journal, Vol.18, No. 2 discussed in detail that this
initiative is a platform to open new trade routes for the region including SAARC and
ASEAN, NAFTA, EU etc. but also will be in doubtful position within these economic
platforms. The only way to get from western China to the middle of Pakistan, the high-
altitude transport corridor that in many ways could be called the 20th-century blueprint
for the Belt and Road Initiative. This road was started to built by China and Pakistan
1979.

Kearney Bolton (2013) in his book ―Geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific: Emerging

Conflicts, New Alliances discussed‖ published by Black House Publishing Ltd. London
discussed in detail about regional globalization and Sino- American relationship
regarding the positional of economic strength and strategic sphere. After Second World
War during cold war US and former USSR were two major powers, those decided about
the world power politics and trade routes but after disintegration of former USSR, there is
a Unipollar power structure which is dominated by USA. The Ind-Pacific term is newly
developed by US in last fifteen years to show their hegemony over the area tp counter
China.

Rajiv K. Bhatia & Vijay Sakhuja (2014) in his edited book ―Indo-Pacific Region:-
Political and Strategic Prospects‖, published by Vij Books India Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi
underlines the intrinsic significance of the Indo-Pacific region, at least from three
different angles. Maritime supremacy is the hallmark of a great power. There can be no
two views about the fact that India‘s future lies in its ability to harness the power of the
ocean – the Indian Ocean and the extended ―Indian-Pacific‖ Ocean region. The author
highlight Maritime significance, examine competing political priorities, economic and
strategic importance. They are in the opinion that after the cold war political priorities
have shifted towards economy interest and US and European countries have specific
interest in Indo-Pacific region.

43
Pardeep Kaushiva & Abhijit Singh (2014) in his edited book ―Geopolitics of the Indo-
Pacific‖ published by KW publication New Delhi discussed in detail about Maritime
security challenges in the region include piracy, terrorism, gun running, illegal fishing,
human and drug trafficking, climate change, global warming, and natural disaster,
strategic importance, US rebalance, conflict and cooperation in Indo- Pacific, Geo-
Political Challenges and non traditional threats.

Sandeep Dewan (2014) in his edited book ―Perspectives of the Indo-Pacific Region:
Aspiration, Challenges and strategy published by Vij Books India Pvt. Ltd. New Delhi
discussed in detail about changing Geo-Strategic landscape, Indo-Pacific with great
powers rivalries, evolving political-security, economic and maritime challenges,
nontraditional issues.

Ravi Bhoothalingam (2016), ―The Silk Road as a Global Brand‖, China Report, Vol 52,
No. 1. Discussed in details about "One Belt One Road" regarding ―China's Silk Road
Economic Belt‖ and "Maritime Silk Road". Communications cover five main areas of
interest: policy coordination, infrastructure construction (including railways and
highways), unlicensed trade, financial integration, and human relations. Among them,
infrastructure construction is a key feature of the New Silk Road. These five platforms
are the base of above concept which will lead Chinese initiative as an alternate of world
trade route. However US will counter due to their hegemonic nature. The alternate can
be beneficial for other countries but it will be always be in doubtful position regarding
their survival because last 100 years. European power structure regarding trade routes are
in supreme position. It depends on the time whether Chinese initiative will be in the
action or not.

Shivshankar Menon (2016) ―China, The World and India‖, China Report, Vol. 16, No.
2 discussed in detail about the focus on maritime affairs is reflected in the growth of
Indian Navy-led shipping with countries, such as Vietnam, Singapore and Japan. India‘s
approach to the region is reflected in its evolving Look East Policy, which begins with
economic engagement with Southeast Asia and now extends to strategic cooperation
across Southeast Asia. They are in the opinion that CPEC is focusing to nationalism to

44
give legistimacy to their own citizens and want to make good relation with neighbouring
countries. They want specific focus on Indo Pacific Region with dominance in South
China Sea.

Gulshan Sachdeva (2016) in his book ―India in a Reconnecting Eurasia: Foreign

Economic and Security Interests‖ published by Centre for Strategic & International
Studies, Washington, DC discussed in detail about Belt and Road program and
sufficient progress has been made in this regard so far. This project is an external policy
initiative that has economic, economic and strategic implications. The project aims to
revive the old Chinese silk route that connects its east coast with Europe, Africa and
South Asia. After disintegration former USSR this is a focused initiative to integrate
world trade route through new five routes with the dominance of China but the matter of
fact is that whether US and Europe will help or ot to established a new world trade order
with Asian power because they are having their own hegemony on world power politics.
Undoubtedly these five routes will connect most of the countries through land and sea
routes.

D. Gopal & Dalbir Ahlawat (2016) in his edited book ―Indo-Pacific:-Emerging Powers,
Evolving Regions and Challenges to Global Governance‖ pubished by Aakar Book,
Delhi discussed in detail the compendium brings to fore the implication of the shift in the
power to the indo-pacific region. As a new constellation of economic and political power,
the Indo-pacific is undoubtedly influenced by the rise of both China and India rapidly
dwarfing all other regional constructs and centres of trade, investment, security,
competition, across the world. The Indo-Pacific power opinion is not about China and
India alone. The book therefore devotes attention to the stakes of erstwhile world powers
as well as central powers of the region such as Australia, Indonesia and Japan who by all
means are no less the partners in the evolving regional construct.

Bal Kishan Sharma & Nivedita Das Kundu (2016) in his edited book ― Chin‘s One
Belt One Road: Initiative, Challenges and Prospects‖ pubished by Vij Boos India Pvt.
Ltd., New Delhi discussed in detail through many authors about China One Belt One
Road Initiative and its concerns specially Maritime Silk Road and India‘s Perspectives.
The first section describes about Indian perspective its alignment, approaches and rational

45
choices. In this book the authors describes how OBOR will affect India‘s Foreign Policy.
Certainly, it is evident through contemporary examples that India is not a part of OBOR
in present. Undoubtedly this connectivity provides opportunities to more than 150
countries. It is the replacement of present world order regarding trade routes. It is
substitute about the trade routes having China‘s hegemony. European countries can not a
bear this hegemonic route due to their hegemonic presence in world trade routes.

D.S. Rajan (eds.)(2018) in his article ―China Factor in India‘s South Asia Policy in the
Modi Era‖ in the book Neighbourhood Initiatives of the Modi Government Challenges
and Road Ahead by Nalini Kant Jha & Sreelekha K.R., published by Pentagon Press,
New Delhi discussed about China factor during Modi regime in detail about South
Asiapolicy is being pushed at many level. India‘s leaders have accelerated their context
with regional powers through exchanging high level visit : Modi to Bhutan, Nepal, Sri
Lanka, Foreign Minister Sushma Sawraj to SAARC Nations except Pakistan and Foreign
Secretary to Bhutan, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Afghanistan. China had always been a factor
in india‘s South Asia Policy. According to Former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was
in the opinion that India can not ignore China at any level. Writer was in the opinion that
China is encircling India through Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Myanmar, and Bangladesh. There
is an opinion that India must be a strong power on economic front, a must develop its self
in the production and manufacturing sector so that we can compete not only China , the
other developed countries.

Nadege Rolland (2018) in his book ―China‘s Eurasian Century? Political and Strategic
Implication of the Belt and Road Initiative‖ published by Pentagaon Press, New Delhi
discussed in detail about mapping the Slik Roads, Belt and Road Initiative, Drivers of
The Belt and Road Initiatives, vision for a china as a risen power, hurdles on the way,
political and strategic implications of BRI and in-depth understanding India China
relation with super power USA in South East Asia.

Jagannath P. Panda (2019) in his edited book ―India and China in Asia: between
Equilibrium and Equations‖ published by Routledge and Distributed by Manohar
Publisher, New Delhi discussed in detail through many authors about Asian Equilibrium,
Chinese perspectives and it diplomacy, Boundaries disputes, Geo-Politics. They are in the

46
opinion that mutual cooperation between India China is an integral part of Asia‘s politics
and the effects on the Asian order and disorder. How classical and contemporary
characteristics of their boundaries and border disputes are shaping Asia‘s political
relations. In order to offer equal importance to both countries, this book does not accept
uniformly India China perspectives about Asian order. Some articles are offering
importance to India and China in their on opinion. The strategic equation are complex in
character about Asian politics at present which need special analysis and deliberation.
Literature encompassing India and Chinese mutual perspectives in Asia and beyond only
stimulates this demand further in the era of globalization because the liberal policies are
spreading everywhere and economic policies are taking place over political issues. Both
countries have their own economic growth and pattern of development. Authors are in
opinion that India must have bigger strength on economic front and must provide the
domestic need to their citizen firstly.

Bruno Macaes (2019) in his book ―Belt and Raod: A Chinese world order‖ published by
Penguin Random House Pvt. Ltd. Gurgaon, India discussed in the detail about what is the
Belt and Road, world economy, world politics, world after Belt and Road initiative. In
this book, first chapter deals with some fundamental sense, the key to the Belt and Road.
It has fewer amounts to discuss about history and geography of both regions. Both
countries will play disproportionate role in shaping the changed world political and
economic order. China is a growing power and exchanging the world order which is
dominated by US and European power politics. It is question whether India can provide
the answer or not. Both countries are capable to align their foreign policies, the
revolutionary leadership spirit that can brought them together, then only this initiative
provides the chances to increase success proportionately. India can decide that growth
within the western political order will be good then other alternative arrangement. India
has much to think about the growth and development itself in coming years. The same
China can do into a playing grater role in world politics. By investing much amount in
Chhabhar Port in Iran by India, may hope to prevent and outcome where it finds itself
isolated from growing countries. China is encircling India through many of the ports
Djibouti, Hambanthota, Gwadar Port etc. it is not surprising for India that Belt and Road
initiative is not an opportunities but also a threat.

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R.S. Yadev(2021) in his book ― India‘s Foreign Policy: Post Cold War Years‖ published
by Pearson publications, New Delhi discussed in detail about India China relation after
cold war having emphasis on political economic and strategic relations. The author has
emphasized to develop economic potential of India in comparison with China. He is in
the opinion that India is having his own historical Legacies in their foreign policy to
foster the relation in South Asia and in South East Asia. India must use the policy of
engagement with the China and resolve territorial disputes through dialogues. We cannot
ignore China as growing power and big trade partner with major powers due to his
production, manufacturing sector, low cost productivity. We must learn the same things
from China for rapid economic development. India should develop security parameters
own boundaries issues.

CHAPTERISATION

First Chapter is Introduction. One Belt One Road comprised two components;
one is land based ―Silk Road Economic Belt‖ (SREB) with six developmental corridors,
which mostly has an agricultural base and is supposed to connect China with Central
Asia, Eastern Europe and Western Europe and second is sea based ―21st century Maritime
Silk Road‖ (MSR) to connect East China sea, South china sea, Indian Ocean, Gulf of
Aden and Red Sea to the Mediterranean sea.

Second Chapter is OBOR Structure. In the second chapter introduce the OBOR
Structure , its negative and positive impact on the international level. I have told about
the India‘s options with the New Silk.

Third Chapter deals in Theoretical Perspectives. In this chapter told about the
theoretical perspective of One Belt One Road and objectives of Belt Road Initiative and
how India counter OBOR. China's most ambitious One-Belt One Road (OBOR) project
was launched by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013 and involves the construction of
two projects, namely Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) and 21st century Maritime Silk
Road (MSR). Belt and Road Initiative was later named OBOR (BRI).

Fourth Chapter is India‘s Strategic Challenges in Reference to OBOR. In this

chapter told about the India‘s strategic challenges in reference to OBOR and India‘s

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efforts to connectivity and perspective of OBOR, lastly analysis the Indian strategy
towards OBOR. The Chinese One Belt One Road initiative or OBOR, focused on an
ancient trade path on the Silk Road, hopes to link more than 65 countries, which account
for up to 40% of global GDP. Xi's hallmark regional paradigm – connecting China
through an extensive network of ports, highways, rail and other connectivity ventures to
Asia, Europe and Africa. Starting in the Fujian Province of China and passing over
Malacca to the Indian Ocean, the planned maritime Silk Route brings us across the Red
Sea and the Mediterranean, and finishes in Venice.

Chapter Fifth is Prospects for India. In this chapter told about the India‘s options
in reference to OBOR and Political, Economic and strategic Implication for India.
President Xi Jinping of China shocked Prime Minister Narendra Modi when he took
away the PM in May 2015, and suggested connecting China and India to Nepal, during a
long walk at the Xian Giant Wild Goose Pagoda. Modi heard Xi outline a proposal for a
Himalayan highways and railways corridor that would be part of his pet project to rebuild
the ancient xian Silk Path. After that tour, Xi's brilliant 'One Belt, One Road' (OBOR),
the Modi government has been very open about his warmth. India was the only
significant absentee of Xi in Beijing at the May Belt and Road Forum. Nevertheless,
China is ahead of the game.

Last Chapter is Conclusion. In this chapter One Belt One Road Conclusion. It is
not unwise to say that India is the country that holds it all. There is a significant
intersection between the overland and sea silk paths. It might be time for us to think
again—it could be the foundation of stronger collaboration between state governments
and cooperation. The way it is used for its own benefit by India relies on it. India would
undoubtedly defend its dominance, but if the proposal materialises, it would be
impossible to discern.

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