Belt and Road

Initiative

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI, or B&R[1]), formerly known as One Belt One Road (Chinese: 一
带一路) or OBOR for short, is a global infrastructure development strategy adopted by the
Chinese government in 2013 to invest in nearly 150 countries and international
organizations.[2][3] It is considered a centerpiece of the Chinese leader Xi Jinping's foreign
policy.[4] The BRI forms a central component of Xi's "Major Country Diplomacy" (Chinese: 大国外
交) strategy, which calls for China to assume a greater leadership role for global affairs in
accordance with its rising power and status.[5] As of August 2022, 149 countries were listed as
having signed up to the BRI.[6]
 Belt and Road Initiative

Belt and Road Initiative and related projects as of 2018 (in German)

Abbreviation BRI

Formation 2013

2017 (Forum)

Founder  China

Purpose Promote economic development and inter-

regional connectivity

Location Worldwide

Website https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/
 The Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-century Maritime Silk Road

Simplified Chinese 丝绸之路经济带和21世纪海上丝绸之路

Traditional Chinese 絲綢之路經濟帶和21世紀海上絲綢之路
Transcriptions

Standard Mandarin

Hanyu Sīchóu zhī lù jīngjìdài hé èrshíyī shìjì

hǎishàng sīchóu zhī lù
Pinyin

Yue: Cantonese

Jyutping si1 cau4 zi1 lou6 ging1 zai3 daai3 wo4 ji6 sap6 jat1 sai3 gei2 hoi2 soeng6 si1 cau4 zi1
lou6

Southern Min

Hokkien POJ si-tiû-chi-lo͘ keng-chè-tài hô jī-si̍p-it sè-kí hái-siōng si-tiû-chi-lo͘

One Belt, One Road (OBOR)

Simplified Chinese 一带一路

Traditional Chinese 一帶一路
Transcriptions

Standard Mandarin

Hanyu Pinyin Yídài yílù

Yue: Cantonese

Jyutping jat1 daai3 jat1 lou6

Southern Min

Hokkien POJ It-tài It-lō͘

Xi originally announced the strategy as the "Silk Road Economic Belt" during an official visit to
Kazakhstan in September 2013.[7][8][9] "Belt" is short for the "Silk Road Economic Belt," referring
to the proposed overland routes for road and rail transportation through landlocked Central Asia
along the famed historical trade routes of the Western Regions; whereas "road" is short for the
"21st Century Maritime Silk Road", referring to the Indo-Pacific sea routes through Southeast
Asia to South Asia, the Middle East and Africa.[10] Examples of Belt and Road Initiative
infrastructure investments include ports, skyscrapers, railroads, roads, bridges, airports, dams,
coal-fired power stations, and railroad tunnels.

The initiative was incorporated into the Constitution of China in 2018.[4] The Xi Jinping
Administration calls the initiative "a bid to enhance regional connectivity and embrace a brighter
future."[11] The project has a target completion date of 2049,[12] which will coincide with the
centennial of the People's Republic of China (PRC)'s founding.

Numerous studies conducted by the World Bank have estimated that BRI can boost trade flows
in 149 participating countries by 4.1 percent, as well as cutting the cost of global trade by 1.1
percent to 2.2 percent, and grow the GDP of East Asian and Pacific developing countries by an
average of 2.6 to 3.9 percent.[13][14] According to London-based CEBR consultants, BRI is likely to
increase the world GDP by $7.1 trillion per annum by 2040, and that "benefits will likely to be
widespread", as global trade increases from increasing infrastructure that reduces "frictions that
hold back world trade". CEBR also concludes that the project will be likely to attract further
countries to join, if the global infrastructure initiative progresses and gains momentum.[15][16][17]

Supporters praise the BRI for its potential to boost the global GDP, particularly in developing
countries. However, there has also been criticism over human rights violations and
environmental impact, as well as concerns of debt-trap diplomacy resulting in neocolonialism
and economic imperialism.

Objectives

Background

The initiative was unveiled by general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and
paramount leader Xi Jinping in September and October 2013 during visits to Kazakhstan and
Indonesia,[9] and was thereafter promoted by Chinese premier Li Keqiang during state visits to
Asia and Europe. The initiative was given intensive coverage by Chinese state media, and by
2016 had become often featured in the People's Daily.[18]
The stated objectives are "to construct a unified large market and make full use of both
international and domestic markets, through cultural exchange and integration, to enhance
mutual understanding and trust of member nations, resulting in an innovative pattern of capital
inflows, talent pools, and technology databases."[19] The Belt and Road Initiative addresses an
"infrastructure gap" and thus has the potential to accelerate economic growth across the Asia
Pacific, Africa and Central and Eastern Europe. A report from the World Pensions Council (WPC)
estimates that Asia, excluding China, requires up to US$900 billion of infrastructure investments
per year over the next decade, mostly in debt instruments, 50% above current infrastructure
spending rates.[20] The gaping need for long term capital explains why many Asian and Eastern
European heads of state "gladly expressed their interest to join this new international financial
institution focusing solely on 'real assets' and infrastructure-driven economic growth".[21]

The initial focus has been infrastructure investment, education, construction materials, railway
and highway, automobile, real estate, power grid, and iron and steel.[22] Already, some estimates
list the Belt and Road Initiative as one of the largest infrastructure and investment projects in
history, covering more than 68 countries, including 65% of the world's population and 40% of the
global gross domestic product as of 2017.[23][24] The project builds on the old trade routes that
once connected China to the west, Marco Polo and Ibn Battuta's routes in the north and the
maritime expedition routes of Ming dynasty admiral Zheng He in the south. The Belt and Road
Initiative now refers to the entire geographical area of the historic "Silk Road" trade route, which
has been continuously used in antiquity.[25] Development of the Renminbi as a currency of
international transactions, development of the infrastructures of Asian countries, strengthening
diplomatic relations whilst reducing dependency on the US and creating new markets for
Chinese products, exporting surplus industrial capacity, and integrating commodities-rich
countries more closely into the Chinese economy are all objectives of the BRI.[26]

While some countries, especially in the United States, view the project critically because of
possible Chinese influence, others point to the creation of a new global growth engine by
connecting and moving Asia, Europe and Africa closer together.

The G7 industrial country Italy has been a partner in the development of the project since March
2019. According to estimates, the entire project today affects more than 60% of the world's
population and approximately 35% of the global economy. Trade along the Silk Road could soon
account for almost 40% of total world trade, with a large part being by sea. The land route of the
Silk Road also appears to remain a niche project in terms of transport volume in the future.[27]
In the maritime silk road, which is already the route for more than half of all containers in the
world, deepwater ports are being expanded, logistical hubs are being built and new traffic routes
are being created in the hinterland. The maritime silk road runs with its connections from the
Chinese coast to the south via Hanoi to Jakarta, Singapore and Kuala Lumpur through the Strait
of Malacca via the Sri Lankan Colombo towards the southern tip of India via Malé, the capital of
the Maldives, to the East African Mombasa, from there to Djibouti, then through the Red Sea via
the Suez Canal to the Mediterranean, there via Haifa, Istanbul and Athens to the Upper Adriatic
region to the northern Italian hub of Trieste with its international free port and its rail
connections to Central Europe and the North Sea.[28][29][30][31]

As a result, Poland, the Baltic States, Northern Europe, and Central Europe are also connected to
the maritime silk road and logistically linked to East Africa, India and China via the Adriatic ports
and Piraeus. All in all, the ship connections for container transports between Asia and Europe
will be reorganized. In contrast to the longer East Asian traffic via north-west Europe, the
southern sea route through the Suez Canal towards the junction Trieste shortens the goods
transport by at least four days.[32][33][34]

In connection with the Silk Road project, China is also trying to network worldwide research
activities.[35]

Project name

The official name for the initiative is the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk
Road Development Strategy ( 丝绸之路经济带和21世纪海上丝绸之路发展战略),[36] which was
initially abbreviated as the One Belt One Road (Chinese: 一带一路) or the OBOR strategy. The
English translation has been changed to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) since 2016, when the
Chinese government considered the emphasis on the words "one" and "strategy" were prone to
misinterpretation so they opted for the more inclusive term "initiative" in its translation.[37][38]
However, "One Belt One Road" is still the reference term in Chinese-language media.[39]

International relations

The Belt and Road Initiative is believed by some analysts to be a way to extend Chinese
economic and political influence.[24][40] Some geopolitical analysts have couched the Belt and
Road Initiative in the context of Halford Mackinder's heartland theory.[41][42][43] Scholars have
noted that official PRC media attempts to mask any strategic dimensions of the Belt and Road
Initiative as a motivation.[44] China has already invested billions of dollars in several South Asian
countries like Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Afghanistan to improve their basic
infrastructure, with implications for China's trade regime as well as its military influence. This
project can also become a new economic corridor for different regions. For example, in the
Caucasus region, China considered cooperations with Armenia from May 2019. Chinese and
Armenian sides had multiple meetings, signed contracts, initiated a north–south road program
to solve even infrastructure-related aspects.[45]

China has emerged as one of the fastest-growing sources of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
into India – it was the 17th largest in 2016, up from the 28th rank in 2014 and 35th in 2011,
according to India's official ranking of FDI inflows.

Western regions

BRI's goals include internal state-building and stabilisation of ethnic unrest for its vast inland
western regions such as Xinjiang and Yunnan, linking these less developed regions, with
increased flows of international trade facilitating closer economic integration with China's inland
core.[46]

Leadership

A leading group was formed sometime in late 2014, and its leadership line-up publicized on 1
February 2015. This steering committee reports directly into the State Council of China and is
composed of several political heavyweights, evidence of the importance of the program to the
government. Then Vice-Premier Zhang Gaoli, who was also a member of the 7-man CCP
Politburo Standing Committee, was named leader of the group, and Wang Huning, Wang Yang,
Yang Jing, and Yang Jiechi named deputy leaders.[47]

On 28 March 2015, China's State Council outlined the principles, framework, key areas of
cooperation and cooperation mechanisms with regard to the initiative.[48] The BRI is considered
a strategic element within the foreign policy of China, and was incorporated into its constitution
in 2017.[4]

With regard to China and the African countries, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)
is a significant multi-lateral cooperation mechanism for facilitating BRI projects.[49] The China-
Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF) serves a similar coordinating role with regard to BRI
projects in the Arab states.[49]
Financing

Infrastructure networks

The Belt and Road Initiative is about improving the physical infrastructure through land corridors
that roughly equate to the old Silk Road. The Silk Road, or Silk Roads, has proven to be a
productive but at the same time elusive concept, increasingly used as an evocative metaphor.[63]
With China's ‘Belt and Road Initiative’, it has found fresh invocations and audiences.[64]
These are
the belts in the name, and there is also a maritime silk road.[65] Infrastructure corridors spanning
some 60 countries, primarily in Asia and Europe but also including Oceania and East Africa, will
cost an estimated US$4–8 trillion.[66][67] The initiative has been contrasted with the two US-
centric trading arrangements, the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership.[67] The initiative projects receive financial support from the Silk Road
Fund and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank while they are technically coordinated by the
B&R Summit Forum. The land corridors include:[65]

The New Eurasian Land Bridge, which runs from Western China to Western Russia through
Kazakhstan, and includes the Silk Road Railway through China's Xinjiang Autonomous Region,
Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland and Germany.

Another corridor will run from Northern China through Mongolia to the Russian Far East. The
Russian government-established Russian Direct Investment Fund and China's China
Investment Corporation, a Chinese government investment agency, partnered in 2012 to
create the Russia-China Investment Fund, which concentrates on opportunities in bilateral
integration.[68][69]

The China–Central Asia–West Asia Corridor, which will run from Western China to Turkey.

The China-Indochina Peninsula economic corridor, which will run from Southern China to
Singapore.

The Trans-Himalayan Multi-dimensional Connectivity Network, which will turn Nepal from a
landlocked to a land-linked country.

The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) (Chinese: 中国-巴基斯坦经济走廊; Urdu:

‫چین اقتصادی راہداری‬-‫ )پاكستان‬which is also classified as "closely related to the Belt and Road
Initiative",[70] a US$62 billion collection of infrastructure projects throughout Pakistan[71][72][73]
which aims to rapidly modernize Pakistan's transportation networks, energy infrastructure, and
 economy.[72][73][74][75] On 13 November 2016, CPEC became partly operational when Chinese
cargo was transported overland to Gwadar Port for onward maritime shipment to Africa and
West Asia.[76]

Silk Road Economic Belt

China's leader Xi Jinping visited Astana, Kazakhstan, and Southeast Asia in September and
October 2013, and proposed jointly building a new economic area, the Silk Road Economic Belt
(SREB) (Chinese: 丝绸之路经济带).[77] The "belt" includes countries on the original Silk Road
through Central Asia, West Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. The initiative would create a
cohesive economic area by building both hard infrastructure such as rail and road links and soft
infrastructure such as trade agreements and a common commercial legal structure with a court
system to police the agreements.[10] It would increase cultural exchanges and expand trade.
Besides a zone largely analogous to the historical Silk Road, an expansion includes South Asia
and Southeast Asia.

Many of the countries in this belt are also members of the China-led Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank (AIIB).

Three belts are proposed. The North belt would go through Central Asia and Russia to Europe.
The Central belt passes through Central Asia and West Asia to the Persian Gulf and the
Mediterranean. The South belt runs from China through Southeast Asia and South Asia and on
to the Indian Ocean through Pakistan. The strategy will integrate China with Central Asia through
Kazakhstan's Nurly Zhol infrastructure program.[78]

21st Century Maritime Silk Road

The "21st Century Maritime Silk Road" (Chinese:21 世纪海上丝绸之路), or just the Maritime Silk
Road, is the sea route 'corridor.'[10] It is a complementary initiative aimed at investing and
fostering collaboration in Southeast Asia, Oceania and Africa through several contiguous bodies
of water: the South China Sea, the South Pacific Ocean, and the wider Indian Ocean
area.[79][80][81] It was first proposed in October 2013 by Xi Jinping in a speech to the Indonesian
Parliament.[82] As with the Silk Road Economic Belt initiative, most member countries have
joined the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

The maritime Silk Road runs with its links from the Chinese coast to the south via Hanoi to
Jakarta, Singapore and Kuala Lumpur through the Strait of Malacca via the Sri Lankan Colombo
opposite the southern tip of India via Malé, the capital of the Maldives, to the East African
Mombasa, from there to Djibouti, then through the Red Sea over the Suez Canal into the
Mediterranean, there via Haifa, Istanbul and Athens to the Upper Adriatic to the northern Italian
junction of Trieste with its international free port and its rail connections to Central Europe and
the North Sea.

Yangshan Port of Shanghai, China

Container terminals in Kwai Chung, Hong Kong

According to estimates in 2019, the land route of the Silk Road remains a niche project and the
bulk of the Silk Road trade continues to be carried out by sea. The reasons are primarily due to
the cost of container transport. The maritime Silk Road is also considered to be particularly
attractive for trade because, in contrast to the land-based Silk Road leading through the sparsely
populated Central Asia, there are on the one hand far more states on the way to Europe and, on
the other hand, their markets, development opportunities, and population numbers are far larger.
In particular, there are many land-based links such as the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar
Corridor (BCIM). Due to the attractiveness of this now subsidized sea route and the related
investments, there have been major shifts in the logistics chains of the shipping sector in recent
years.[83] Due to its unique geographical location, Myanmar is viewed to be playing a pivotal role
for China's BRI projects.[84]

From the Chinese point of view, Africa is important as a market, raw material supplier and
platform for the expansion of the new Silk Road – the coasts of Africa should be included. In
Kenya's port of Mombasa, China has built a rail and road connection to the inland and to the
capital Nairobi. To the northeast of Mombasa, a large port with 32 berths including an adjacent
industrial area including infrastructure with new traffic corridors to South Sudan and Ethiopia is
being built. A modern deep-water port, a satellite city, an airfield and an industrial area are being
built in Bagamoyo, Tanzania. Further towards the Mediterranean, the Teda Egypt special
economic zone is being built near the Egyptian coastal town of Ain Sochna as a joint Chinese-
Egyptian project.[85][86]
 Suez Canal

Container ship transiting the Suez Canal

Mombasa Port on Kenya's Indian Ocean coast

As part of its Silk Road strategy, China is participating in large areas of Africa in the construction
and operation of train routes, roads, airports and industry. In several countries such as Zambia,
Ethiopia and Ghana, dams have been built with Chinese help. In Nairobi, China is funding the
construction of the tallest building in Africa, the Pinnacle Towers. With the Chinese investments
of 60 billion dollars for Africa announced in September 2018, on the one hand, sales markets are
created and the local economy is promoted, and, on the other hand, African raw materials are
made available for China.[87]

One of the Chinese bridgeheads in Europe is the port of Piraeus. Overall, Chinese companies are
to invest a total of 350 million euros directly in the port facilities there by 2026 and a further
200 million euros in associated projects such as hotels.[88] In Europe, China wants to continue
investing in Portugal with its deep-water port in Sines, but especially in Italy and there at the
Adriatic logistics hub around Trieste. Venice, the historically important European endpoint of the
maritime Silk Road, has less and less commercial importance today due to the shallow depth or
silting of its port.[89]

The international free zone of Trieste provides in particular special areas for storage, handling
and processing as well as transit zones for goods.[90][91] At the same time, logistics and shipping
companies invest in their technology and locations in order to benefit from ongoing
developments.[92][93] This also applies to the logistics connections between Turkey and the free
port of Trieste, which are important for the Silk Road, and from there by train to Rotterdam and
Zeebrugge. There is also direct cooperation, for example between Trieste, Bettembourg, and the
Chinese province of Sichuan. While direct train connections from China to Europe, such as from
Chengdu to Vienna overland, are partially stagnating or discontinued, there are (as of 2019) new
weekly rail connections between Wolfurt or Nuremberg and Trieste or between Trieste, Vienna
and Linz on the maritime Silk Road.[94][95]

Port of Trieste
There are also extensive intra-European infrastructure projects to adapt trade flows to current
needs. Concrete projects (as well as their financing), which are to ensure the connection of the
Mediterranean ports with the European hinterland, are decided among others at the annual
China-Central-East-Europe summit, which was launched in 2012. This applies, for example, to
the expansion of the Belgrade-Budapest railway line, the construction of the high-speed train
between Milan, Venice and Trieste[96] and connections on the Adriatic-Baltic and Adriatic-North
Sea axis. Poland, the Baltic States, Northern Europe and Central Europe are also connected to
the maritime Silk Road through many links and are thus logistically networked via the Adriatic
ports and Piraeus to East Africa, India and China. Overall, the ship connections for container
transports between Asia and Europe will be reorganized. In contrast to the longer East Asia
traffic via northwest Europe, the south-facing sea route through the Suez Canal towards the
Trieste bridgehead shortens the transport of goods by at least four days.[97]

According to a study by the University of Antwerp, the maritime route via Trieste dramatically
reduces transport costs. The example of Munich shows that the transport there from Shanghai
via Trieste takes 33 days, while the northern route takes 43 days. From Hong Kong, the southern
route reduces transport to Munich from 37 to 28 days. The shorter transport means, on the one
hand, better use of the liner ships for the shipping companies and, on the other hand,
considerable ecological advantages, also with regard to the lower CO2 emissions, because
shipping is a heavy burden on the climate. Therefore, in the Mediterranean area, where the
economic zone of the Liverpool–Milan Axis meets functioning railroad connections and deep-
water ports, there are significant growth zones. Henning Vöpel, Director of the Hamburg World
Economic Institute, recognizes that the North Range (i.e. transport via the North Sea ports to
Europe) is not necessarily the one that will remain dominant in the medium term.[98]

From 2025, the Brenner Base Tunnel will also link the upper Adriatic with southern Germany. The
port of Trieste, next to Gioia Tauro the only deep water port in the central Mediterranean for
container ships of the seventh generation, is therefore a special target for Chinese investments.
In March 2019, the China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) signed agreements
to promote the ports of Trieste and Genoa. Accordingly, the port's annual handling capacity will
be increased from 10,000 to 25,000 trains in Trieste (Trihub project) and a reciprocal platform to
promote and handle trade between Europe and China will be created. It is also about logistics
promotion between the North Adriatic port and Shanghai or Guangdong. This also includes a
state Hungarian investment of 100 million euros for a 32 hectare logistics center and funding
from the European Union of 45 million euros in 2020 for the development of the railway system
in the port city.[99] Furthermore, the Hamburg port logistics group HHLA invested in the logistics
platform of the port of Trieste (PLT) in September 2020.[100] In 2020, Duisburger Hafen AG
(Duisport), the world's largest intermodal terminal operator, took a 15% stake in the Trieste
freight terminal.[101] There are also further contacts between Hamburg, Bremen and Trieste with
regard to cooperation.[102] There are also numerous collaborations in the Upper Adriatic, for
example with the logistics platform in Cervignano.[103] In particular, the area of the upper Adriatic
is developing into an extended intersection of the economic areas known as the Blue Banana
and the Golden Banana. The importance of the free port of Trieste will continue to increase in
the coming years due to the planned port expansion and the expansion of the Baltic-Adriatic
railway axis (Semmering Base Tunnel, Koralm Tunnel and in the wider area Brenner Base
Tunnel).[104][105][106]

Ice Silk Road

In addition to the Maritime Silk Road, Russia and China are reported to have agreed to jointly
build an 'Ice Silk Road' along the Northern Sea Route in the Arctic, along a maritime route within
Russian territorial waters.[107][108]

China COSCO Shipping Corp. has completed several trial trips on Arctic shipping routes, and
Chinese and Russian companies are cooperating on oil and gas exploration in the area and to
advance comprehensive collaboration on infrastructure construction, tourism and scientific
expeditions.[108]

Russia together with China approached the practical discussion of the global infrastructure
project Ice Silk Road. This was stated by representatives of Vnesheconombank at the
International conference Development of the shelf of Russia[109] and the CIS — 2019 (Petroleum
Offshore of Russia), held in Moscow.

The delegates of the conference were representatives of the leadership of Russian and
corporations (Gazprom, Lukoil, Rosatom, Rosgeologiya, Vnesheconombank, Morneftegazproekt,
Murmanshelf, Russian Helicopters, etc.), as well as foreign auditors (Deloitte, member of the
world Big Four) and consulting centers (Norwegian Rystad Energy and others.).[110]

Super grid
The super grid project aims to develop six ultra high voltage electrical grids across China,
Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia and West Asia. The wind power
resources of Central Asia would form one component of this grid.[111][112]

Additionally proposed

The Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM) was proposed to run from

southern China to Myanmar and was initially officially classified as "closely related to the Belt
and Road Initiative".[70] Since the second Belt and Road Forum in 2019, BCIM has been dropped
from the list of projects due to India's refusal to participate in the Belt and Road Initiative.[113]

Projects

Reactions and criticism

Support

To date, more than 130 countries have issued endorsements.[4] Moscow has been an early
partner of China, and Russia and China now have altogether 150 common projects including
natural gas pipelines and the Polar Silk Road.[145] In March 2015, Russia's First Deputy Prime
Minister Igor Shuvalov asserted that "Russia should not view the Silk Road Economic Belt as a
threat to its traditional, regional sphere of influence […] but as an opportunity for the Eurasian
Economic Union".

Polish President Andrzej Duda and Chinese leader Xi Jinping signed a declaration on strategic partnership in June 2016
In June 2016, Polish President Andrzej Duda met with China's leader Xi Jinping,[146][147] saying
that "Polish companies will benefit hugely" from Belt and Road Initiative.[148] Duda and Xi signed
a declaration on strategic partnership in which they reiterated that Poland and China viewed
each other as long-term strategic partners.[149]

Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Chinese leader Xi Jinping on 4 February 2022

As a wealthy country, Singapore does not need massive external financing or technical
assistance for domestic infrastructure building, but repeatedly endorsed the BRI and cooperated
in related projects in a quest for global relevance and to strengthen economic ties with BRI
recipients. It is also one of the largest investors in the project. Furthermore, there is a strategic
defensive factor: making sure a single country is not the single dominant factor in Asian
economics.[150]

While the Philippines historically has been closely tied to the United States, China sought its
support for the BRI in terms of the quest for dominance in the South China Sea. The Philippines
adjusted its policy in favor of Chinese claims in the South China Sea under former Philippines
President Rodrigo Roa Duterte.[151]

In 2017, Yanis Varoufakis, the former Greek Minister of Finance, wrote in Project Syndicate that
his experience with the Belt and Road Initiative has been highly encouraging.[152] He remarked
that the Chinese authorities managed to combine their sense of self-interest with a patient
investment attitude and a genuine commitment to negotiate over and over again, in order to
achieve a mutually advantageous agreement.[152]

In April 2019 and during the second Arab Forum for Environment and Development, China
engaged in an array of partnerships called "Build the Belt and Road, Share Development and
Prosperity" with 18 Arab countries. The general stand of African countries sees BRI as a
tremendous opportunity for independence from foreign aid and influence.[153]

Greece, Croatia and 14 other Eastern European countries are already dealing with China within
the framework of the BRI. In March 2019, Italy was the first member of the Group of Seven
nations to join the BRI. The new partners signed a Memorandum of Understanding worth
€2.5 billion across an array of sectors such as transport, logistics and port infrastructure.[154]

Despite initially criticising BRI, the former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad pledged
support for the BRI project in 2019. He stated that he was fully in support of the Belt and Road
Initiative and that his country would benefit from BRI. “Yes, the Belt and Road idea is great. It can
bring the land-locked countries of Central Asia closer to the sea. They can grow in wealth and
their poverty reduced,” Mahathir said.[155]

Russian political scientist Sergey Karaganov, who is considered close to Russian President
Vladimir Putin, has advocated for a united Sino-Russian strategy to unify a Eurasian bloc. He
argues that the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and China's Belt and Road Initiative, will work
together to promote economic integration throughout the region.[156][157]

Opposition

Some observers and skeptics, mainly from non-participant countries, including the United
States, interpret it as a plan for a sinocentric international trade network.[158][159] In response the
United States, Japan and Australia had formed a counter initiative, the Blue Dot Network in 2019,
followed by the G7's Build Back Better World initiative in 2021.[160][161]

The United States proposes a counter-initiative called the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy"
(FOIP). US officials have articulated the strategy as having three pillars – security, economics,
and governance.[162] At the beginning of June 2019, there has been a redefinition of the general
definitions of "free" and "open" into four stated principles – respect for sovereignty and
independence; peaceful resolution of disputes; free, fair, and reciprocal trade; and adherence to
international rules and norms.[163]

Government officials in India have repeatedly objected to China's Belt and Road Initiative.[164] In
particular, they believe the "China–Pakistan Economic Corridor" (CPEC) project ignores New
Delhi's essential concerns on its sovereignty and territorial integrity.[165]
Former Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamad had initially found the terms of BRI to be
too harsh for most countries and recommended countries avoid joining the BRI, but has changed
his stance since.[166][167]

Mixed

Vietnam historically has been at odds with China, so it has been indecisive about supporting or
opposing BRI.[168]

South Korea has tried to develop the "Eurasia Initiative" (EAI) as its own vision for an east–west
connection. In calling for a revival of the ancient Silk Road, the main goal of President Park
Geun-hye was to encourage a flow of economic, political, and social interaction from Europe
through the Korean Peninsula. Her successor, President Moon Jae-in announced his own foreign
policy initiative, the "New Southern Policy" (NSP), which seeks to strengthen relations with
Southeast Asia.[169]

While Italy and Greece have joined the Belt and Road Initiative, other European countries have
voiced ambivalent opinions. German chancellor Angela Merkel declared that the BRI "must lead
to a certain reciprocity, and we are still wrangling over that bit". In January 2019 French president
Emmanuel Macron said: "the ancient Silk Roads were never just Chinese … New roads cannot go
just one way."[154] European Commission Chief Jean-Claude Juncker and Japanese Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe signed an infrastructure agreement in Brussels in September 2019 to
counter China's Belt and Road Initiative and link Europe and Asia to coordinate infrastructure,
transport and digital projects.[170][171]

In 2018, the premier of the south-eastern Australian state of Victoria, Daniel Andrews, signed a
memorandum of understanding on the Belt and Road Initiative to establish infrastructure ties
and further relations with China.[172][173] Home Affairs Minister Peter Dutton described the BRI as
"a propaganda initiative from China" that brings an "enormous amount of foreign interference",
while arguing that "Victoria needs to explain why it is the only state in the country that has
entered into this agreement". Prime Minister Scott Morrison said Victoria was stepping into
federal government policy territory, stating "We didn't support that decision at the time [the
Victoria State Government and the National Development and Reform Commission of the
People's Republic of China] made [the agreement]. And national interest issues on foreign affairs
are determined by the federal government, and I respect their jurisdiction when it comes to the
issues they're responsible for and it's always been the usual practice for states to respect and
recognise the role of the federal government in setting foreign policy". In April 2021, Foreign
Minister Marise Payne declared Australia would pull out of the Belt and Road Initiative, tearing
up Victoria's agreements signed throughout with China and pulling out of the "Belt and Road"
initiative completely.[174][173][175][176] The federal government's decision to veto the deal reflected
the increasingly soured relationship between the Australian Government and the Chinese
Government, after the China's alleged attempts to employ economic coercion[177] in response to
the Australian Government's support for an inquest into the origins of COVID-19,[178] as well as
the Australian Government's decision to support the US in several regional disputes opposing
China, such as the issue of Taiwan[179] or the South China Sea.[180]

Accusations of neo-imperialism and debt-trap diplomacy

Accusations

There has been concern over the project being a form of neo-colonialism. Some governments
have accused the Belt and Road Initiative of being neocolonial due to what they allege is China's
practice of debt-trap diplomacy to fund the initiative's infrastructure projects.[181][182] The idea of
debt trap diplomacy was created by an Indian think tank before being expanded on by papers by
two Harvard students, which gained media attention.[183]

China contends that the initiative has provided markets for commodities, improved prices of
resources and thereby reduced inequalities in exchange, improved infrastructure, created
employment, stimulated industrialization, and expanded technology transfer, thereby benefiting
host countries.[184]

Tanzanian President John Magufuli said the loan agreements of BRI projects in his country were
"exploitative and awkward."[185] He said Chinese financiers set "tough conditions that can only be
accepted by mad people," because his government was asked to give them a guarantee of 33
years and an extensive lease of 99 years on a port construction. Magufuli said Chinese
contractors wanted to take the land as their own but his government had to compensate them
for drilling the project construction.[186]

Indian commentator S. K. Chatterji considers debt traps an economic dimension of China's

salami slice strategy.[187] According to Chatterji, China's sovereignty slicing tactic dilutes the
sovereignty of the target nations mainly using the debt trap. An example provided is Beijing
pressuring Tajikistan to handover 1,158 km2 territory, which still owes China US$1.2 billion out of
a total US$2.9bn of debt. Other nations with a similar risk of sovereignty slicing are Pakistan,
Madagascar, Mongolia, Maldives, Kyrgyzstan, Montenegro, Sri Lanka, and Laos which have
borrowed large sums from China.[187]

In May 2021, DRC’s President Félix Tshisekedi called for a review of mining contracts signed
with China by his predecessor Joseph Kabila,[188] in particular the Sicomines multibillion-dollar
'minerals-for-infrastructure' agreement.[189][190][191]
China's plans to link its western Xinjiang
province to Gwadar in the Balochistan province of Pakistan with its US$500 million investment in
the Gwadar Port has met resistance from local fishermen protesting against Chinese trawlers
and illegal fishing.[192][193]

Rebuttals

Deborah Bräutigam, a professor at the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns
Hopkins University, described the debt-trap diplomacy theory as a "meme" that became popular
due to "human negativity bias" based on anxiety about the rise of China.[194] A 2019 research
paper by Bräutigam revealed that most of the debtor countries voluntarily signed on to the loans
and had positive experiences working with China, and "the evidence so far, including the Sri
Lankan case, shows that the drumbeat of alarm about Chinese banks' funding of infrastructure
across the BRI and beyond is overblown" and "a large number of people have favorable opinions
of China as an economic model and consider China an attractive partner for their
development."[194] She said that the theory lacked evidence and criticized the media for
promoting a narrative that "wrongfully misrepresents the relationship between China and the
developing countries that it deals with," highlighting the fact that Sri Lanka owed more to Japan,
the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank than to China.[195] A 2018 China Africa
Research Initiative report, co-authored by Bräutigam, remarked that "Chinese loans are not
currently a major contributor to debt distress in Africa."[196]

According to New York-based economist Anastasia Papadimitriou, partnering countries are

equally responsible when making deals with China. China's alleged "neocolonialist intentions"
can be disproved by Sri Lanka's Hambantota Port project on the southeast coast of Sri Lanka,
one of the most cited examples of "Debt-trap diplomacy".[197] After an analysis of the Belt and
Road Initiative, Papadimitriou concludes that it is "not so much neocolonialism, rather it is
economic regionalism".[197] Additionally, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, a London-
based international affairs think tank, asserted that the debt crisis in Sri Lanka was unrelated to
Chinese lending, but was instead caused mainly from "the misconduct of local elites and
Western-dominated financial markets".[198] It was confirmed by Lowy Institute. A 2019 report by
the Lowy Institute said that China had not engaged in deliberate actions in the Pacific which
justified accusations of debt-trap diplomacy (based on contemporaneous evidence), and China
had not been the primary driver behind rising debt risks in the Pacific; the report expressed
concern about the scale of the country's lending, however, and the institutional weakness of
Pacific states which posed the risk of small states being overwhelmed by debt.[199] A 2020 Lowy
Institute article called Sri Lanka's Hambantota International Port the "case par excellence" for
China's debt-trap diplomacy, but called the narrative a "myth" because the project was proposed
by former Sri Lankan president Mahinda Rajapaksa, not Beijing.[200] The article added that Sri
Lanka's debt distress was not caused by Chinese lending, but by "excessive borrowing on
Western-dominated capital markets."[200]

The Rhodium Group, an American research company, analyzed Chinese debt renegotiations and
concluded that China's leverage in them are often exaggerated and realistically limited in power.
The findings of their study frequently showed an outcome in favor of the borrower rather than
the supposedly predatory Chinese lender. The firm found that "asset seizures are a very rare
occurrence" and that instead debt write-off was the most common outcome.[201]

Darren Lim, senior lecturer at the Australian National University, said that the "debt-trap
diplomacy" claim was never credible, despite the Trump administration pushing it.[202] Dawn C.
Murphy, Professor of International Security Studies at the U.S. Air War College, concludes that
describing China's behavior as "neocolonialist" is an "exaggeration and misrepresentation."[203]

According to political scientist and researcher Zhexin Zhang, the overwhelming enthusiasm of
developing countries in the Belt and Road Initiative, as seen first in the "Belt and Road Forum for
International Cooperation" held in May 2017, is sufficient enough to invalidate the neo-
colonialism argument.[204]

A March 2018 study released by the Center for Global Development, a Washington-based think
tank, remarks that between 2001 and 2017, China restructured or waived loan payments for 51
debtor nations, the majority of BRI participants, without seizing state assets.[205] In September
2018, W. Gyude Moore, a former Liberian public works minister and senior policy fellow at the
Center for Global Development, stated that "[t]he language of “debt-trap diplomacy” resonates
more in Western countries, especially the United States, and is rooted in anxiety about China's
rise as a global power rather than in the reality of Africa."[206] He also stated that "China has been
a net positive partner with most African countries.”[207]
According to Pradumna Bickram Rana
and Jason Ji Xianbai of Singapore's Nanyang Technological University, although there is a
number of implementation issues confronting the Belt and Road Initiative mostly due to the
COVID-19 Pandemic, China's alleged debt-trap diplomacy "more myth than reality".[208] While
they acknowledge that various countries are facing difficulties in paying their debts to China,
they highlight China's willingness to help these countries restructure their debt through forgiving
policies, such as partial debt relief.[208] In eleven cases, China postponed loans for indebted
countries, one being Tonga.[202]

Belt and Road educational community

See also

References

Further reading

External links

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