THE SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE ROLE OF THE COURTS (cases only)

Francisco vs. House of Representatives

 The major difference between judicial power of the Philippines Supreme Court and that of the US Supreme
Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is
discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for
in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the
power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality.
“deemed instituted” – fact of filing the first impeachment complaint
The SC has the power to interpret, to construe. It is the SC that has the final say

Marbury vs. Madison (1803)

 US Supreme Court had the occasion to articulate that power of the Courts.
 The Courts and other departments of the government are bound by the Constitution which has been committed
to writing that defines and limits the exercise of their respective powers. Any law that contradicts the
Constitution shall be struck down as void. The exercise of this duty is to emphasize that Constitution is supreme
and paramount for it originates from the will of the people.

Angara vs. Electoral Commission

 Justice Laurel pointed out that “judicial Review” is the “moderating power” to “determine the proper
allocation of powers” of the different branches of government and “to direct the course of government along
constitutional channels” is inherent in all courts as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is
the “power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable.
 In justifying the power of judicial review, J. Laurel pointed out in Angara vs. Electoral Commission that when the
court allocated constitutional boundaries, it neither asserts supremacy, nor annuls the acts of the legislature.
It simply carries out the obligations imposed upon it by the constitution to determine conflicting claims and to
establish for the parties the rights which the constitution grants to them.

Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court,

 In Ynot v IAC, the SC reversed the RTC's holding that it had no authority to rule on the validity of EO 626-A,
banning the transporting of carabaos from one province to another. The Court pointed out, that since it has
jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm final judgments of lower courts in constitutional cases,
then the lower courts can pass upon the validity of a statute in the first instance. The SC then struck down the
law for being arbitrary and for unduly delegating legislative power.

Santiago vs. Guingona

 The case involved the issue of who should be considered as minority floor leader of the Senate.
 The Supreme Court reviewed its past rulings, particularly the case of Avelino vs. Cuenco where it cautiously
tackled the scope of the Court’s power of judicial review that concerns questions involving the interpretation or
application of a provision/s of the Constitution or the law, including the rules of either house of Congress. 
 Within this scope falls the jurisdiction of the Court over questions on the validity of legislative or executive acts
that are political in nature, whenever the tribunal finds constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
conferred upon political bodies.
 The exercise of judicial review was even made imperative because no one can settle or decide the vital
constitutional questions raised if the Supreme Court should refuse to decide them.

People v Vera
 J. Laurel laid down the conditions for the exercise of judicial review, to wit:
(1) a party with a personal and substantial interest, (2) an appropriate case, (3) a constitutional question raised at the
earliest possible time, and (4) a constitutional question that is the very lis mota of the case, i.e. an unavoidable question.
(refer to Judicial Review handout, re: requirements for courts to exercise Judicial review)

In Re: Saturnina Bermudez

 The action was for declaratory relief to interpret Section 5 of Art. XVIII, which provides that: The six year term of
the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the 7 February 1986 election, is for purposes of synchronization of
election, hereby extended to noon of 30 June 1991.
 The question was who the "incumbent President" referred to in said provision was --- whether Aquino (the one
in office) or Marcos (the one proclaimed by the Batasan).
 The confusion arose because in Proclamation No. 3, Pres. Aquino referred to the "direct exercise of the power of
the Filipino people assisted by the units of the new AFP" as the cause for the installation of the new government.
 If President Aquino was not elected but came into office as a result of the EDSA Revolution, then she would not
be the "incumbent" who was elected in the February 7 election, referred to in the provision.
  The SC ruled that
(a) the petitioner had no standing
(b) the SC had no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief
(c) the suit was against the President who cannot be sued
(d) the petitioner had no cause of action because, reiterating the decision in Lawyer's League for a Better
Philippines v Aquino, the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but is a political
question.

 And yet, the SC ruled that the "incumbent" referred to was President Aquino who was in effective control of the
country and had been recognized by the rest of the world.
 The Court, disregarding the limits of judicial review, felt compelled to render a decision on the legitimacy of the
Aquino government so as to avoid any doubt as to its very own legitimacy. It must be noted, though that his
case is the entitlement of an actual case and controversy.)

Baker v. Carr, 369 US 186 (1962)

 attempted to formulate some guidelines for determining whether a question is political or not, to wit:
“Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of
a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made, or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.”

Dumlao v COMELEC
 Section 4 of BP 52 provided that any retired elective local official who had received retirement pay to which he
was entitled under the law and who have been 65 years old at the commencement of the term of office to
which he sought to be elected, was not qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he had
retired. Dumlao filed for prohibition to enjoin the enforcement of the law, claiming that this was directed at him
as former governor of Nueva Vizcaya.
 The SC held that
(a) he had no standing, since he had not been injured by the operation of the law, no petition for his
disqualification having been filed and
(b) the action was a request for advisory opinion.
 And yet, the SC upheld the validity "because of paramount public interest", declaring that the legislative purpose
of infusing younger blood in local government was valid.

Igot v COMELEC
 Sec. 4 of BP 52 also provided in part that any person convicted of subversion, insurrection or rebellion, or similar
offenses was disqualified from running for any local position, and the filing of charges for such crimes before a
civil or military court after preliminary investigation was prima facie evidence of such fact. Igot sought to
question the validity of this provision.
 The SC held that he had no standing because
(a) he had never been convicted nor charged of any these crimes,
(b) he had not been disqualified from being a candidate,
(c) he had no personal nor substantial interest at stake, and
(d) he could not sue as taxpayer since the statute did not directly involve the disbursement of public funds.
 And yet, although abstaining from ruling on the first part of the provision, the SC held that the second part
regarding the presumption of guilt was unconstitutional for violating the presumption of innocence.

PBA v COMELEC, 140 SCRA 455

 there was a reversal of judicial review (from judicial review to political question).
 The case was clearly a justiciable controversy.
 Is the resignation submitted by Marcos, which was conditioned on the election, proclamation and assumption
into office by the elected President, a valid resignation as to authorize the Batasan to pass a Snap Election Law?
 The Court could have validly issued an injunction to stop the COMELEC from proceeding with the preparations
for the election. But it did not, citing its delay in deciding the case and the sentiments of the people that
developed in the meantime as reason for its inaction.
 According to the court, what at first was a legal question became a political question because it was overtaken
by events.
  A Court which does not issue an injunction to enjoin an official act when it could have issued one is actually
deciding the case in favor of the validity of the act. Failure to issue an injunction is as much an exercise of
judicial review.
Romulo vs. Yniguez
 We see another trend of judicial review.
 What seems like a legal question when viewed in isolation (namely, whether the rules of the Batasan enabling it
to shelf a complaint for impeachment against the President is constitutional.) is really a political question when
viewed in a broader context (i.e., that the case was filed against the Speaker of a co-equal branch to compel him
by mandamus to recall the complaint from the archive, and that the ultimate result of the case was to question
the decision of the Batasan to shelve the case, a matter, that is solely committed to that department.)
 Yet, despite the really political nature of the question, the SC passed on the validity of the rules to erase doubts
that may still be entertained.

Occena vs. COMELEC

 sought an injunction to prohibit the COMELEC from proceeding with the plebiscite for the proposed 1981
amendments, and in Mitra v COMELEC, which sought a mandamus to compel the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite
to ratify the 1973 Constitution, both prayers based on the premise that the 1973 Constitution had not been
ratified, the SC held that the failure of the Court in the Javellana v Executive Secretary case to muster the votes
required to declare the 1973 Constitution as being invalidly ratified, which resulted in the dismissal of the suit
questioning the validity of the ratification of the Constitution, in effect legitimated the ratification. In Occena,
the Court ruled that:
"The Supreme Court can check as well as legitimate. In the latter case, there is an affirmation that what was done cannot
be stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. The mere dismissal of a suit of this character suffices. That is the meaning of
the concluding statement in the Javellana resolution. Since then, the Court has invariably applied the present Constitution."

Salonga vs. Cruz-Pano

 The case against petitioner for subversion which was filed by the fiscal on the basis of flimsy testimony given by
Victor Lovely was already dismissed without prejudice by the fiscal (upon anticipation of adverse ruling). And
yet, the SC noting that as the fiscal said the dismissal of the charges was without prejudice to the filing of new
ones for the same acts because the petitioner has not been arraigned and double jeopardy does not apply, the
case is not entirely moot, decided to perform its duty to "formulate guiding and controlling constitutional
principles, precepts and doctrines or rules" for the guidance of the bar and bench. It thus, went on to lecture
about its antiquated understanding of the inciting test, and how it could not be proved by a mere photograph.

Javier vs. COMELEC

 The case was already mooted not only by the death of Evelio Javier, but also by the abolition of Batasan, the
Antique seat which he and Pacificador were contesting for.
 And yet the SC, claiming to be "not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the conscience of the
government," decided the case anyway "for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future. The citizen
comes to us in quest of law but we must also give him justice.
 The 2 are not always the same. There are times when we cannot grant the latter because the issue has been
settled and the decision is no longer possible according to the law. But there are also times when although the
dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be resolved.
 Justice demands that we act then, not only for the vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but also for
the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future."

Demeteria vs. Alba, 148 SCRA 208,

 the SC struck down Sec. 44 of PD 1177, authorizing the President to transfer funds from one department to
another, on the ground that it overextended the privilege granted under Art. VIII, sec. 16(5) of the 1973
Constitution, even if such provision was already abrogated by the Freedom Constitution. Then, citing the Javier
case on the need "not only for the vindication of an outraged right, though gone, but also for the guidance of
and as a restraint upon the future," it lectured on how this law would open the floodgates for the enactment of
unfunded appropriations, uncontrolled executive expenditures, diffusion of accountability for budgetary
performance, and entrenchment of the pork barrel system, and on how this would create temptations for
misappropriation and embezzlement.

J.M. Tuason & Co. v CA

 RA 2616, which provided for the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate, was claimed to be unconstitutional.
 This issue said the SC, could be resolved by the CFI in the ejectment case filed before it by the evictees of the
estate, since the 1935 Constitution contemplated that inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving
constitutionality issues, that it spoke of appellate review of "final judgment of inferior courts" in cases where
such constitutionality happens to be in issue.
 The 2/3 vote of the SC required by Sec. 10 of Art. VII restricted the decisions of that Court only in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction.