Russo-Ukrainian War

The Russo-Ukrainian War[20][e] is an ongoing

Russo-Ukrainian War
war between Russia (together with pro-Russian
separatist forces) and Ukraine.[f] It began in
February 2014 following the Ukrainian Revolution
of Dignity, and initially focused on the status of
Crimea and parts of the Donbas, internationally
recognised as part of Ukraine. The first eight years
of the conflict included the Russian annexation of
Crimea (2014) and the war in Donbas (2014–
present) between Ukraine and Russian-backed
separatists, as well as naval incidents, cyberwarfare,
and political tensions. Following a Russian military
build-up on the Russia–Ukraine border from late
2021, the conflict expanded significantly when The military situation as of 6 April 2022, during the
Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine

24 February 2022.    Controlled by Ukraine

   Occupied by Russia and pro-Russian forces

Following the Euromaidan protests and a revolution
resulting in the removal of pro-Russian President
Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014, pro-Russian
For a more detailed map, see the Russo-Ukrainian War
unrest erupted in parts of Ukraine. Russian soldiers
detailed map
without insignia took control of strategic positions
and infrastructure in the Ukrainian territory of Date 20 February 2014[c] – ongoing
Crimea, and seized the Crimean Parliament. Russia (8 years, 1 month, 3 weeks and
organized a widely criticised referendum, whose 4 days)
outcome was for Crimea to join Russia. It then
annexed Crimea. In April 2014, demonstrations by Russian invasion of Ukraine: 24
pro-Russian groups in the Donbas region of Ukraine February 2022 – ongoing
escalated into a war between the Ukrainian military
Location Ukraine (with spillover into Russia)
and Russian-backed separatists of the self-declared
Donetsk and Luhansk republics. Status Ongoing
Territorial
In August 2014, unmarked Russian military vehicles Changes prior to 2022 invasion:
changes
crossed the border into the Donetsk republic. An
undeclared war began between Ukrainian forces on Annexation of Crimea by Russia
one side, and separatists intermingled with Russian
Occupation of the Kherson
troops on the other, although Russia attempted to
Oblast portion of Crimean
hide its involvement. The war settled into a static
conflict, with repeated failed attempts at a ceasefire. peninsula (Strilkove) from March
In 2015, the Minsk II agreements were signed by to December 2014
Russia and Ukraine, but a number of disputes Pro-Russian forces control the
prevented them being fully implemented. By 2019, eastern Donbas
7% of Ukraine was classified by the Ukrainian
Belligerents
 Ukraine Russia
government as temporarily occupied territories, Supported by Donetsk PR
while the Russian government had indirectly  NATO[a][1] Luhansk PR
acknowledged the presence of its troops in Ukraine.
For countries Supported by
In 2021 and early 2022, there was a major Russian
military build-up around Ukraine's borders. NATO supporting Ukraine  Belarus (2022)[b]
accused Russia of planning an invasion, which it during the 2022
denied. Russian President Vladimir Putin criticized invasion, see 2022
the enlargement of NATO as a threat to his country Russian invasion of
and demanded Ukraine be barred from ever joining Ukraine
the military alliance. He also expressed Russian
Commanders and leaders
irredentist views, questioned Ukraine's right to exist,
and stated wrongfully that Ukraine was created by Volodymyr Zelenskyy Vladimir Putin

Soviet Russia. On 21 February 2022, Russia (2019–present) (2014–present)

officially recognised the two self-proclaimed
Petro Poroshenko
separatist states in the Donbas, and openly sent
(2014–2019)
troops into the territories. Three days later, Russia
invaded Ukraine. Much of the international Oleksandr Turchynov
community has condemned Russia for its actions in (Acting; 2014)
post-revolutionary Ukraine, accusing it of breaking
Strength
international law and violating Ukrainian
sovereignty. Many countries implemented economic For details of strengths and units involved at key
sanctions against Russia, Russian individuals, or points in the war, see:
companies,[21] especially after the 2022 invasion. * Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation
* Combatants of the war in Donbas
* Order of battle for the 2022 Russian invasion of

Contents Ukraine
Casualties and losses
Background
Ukraine and allies Russia and allies
Post-Soviet context and Orange
Revolution 4,619 killed[8][9] 5,768 killed[10][17][d]
Euromaidan, Revolution of Dignity, and 9,700–10,700 12,700–13,700
pro-Russian unrest wounded[10] wounded[10]
Russian bases in Crimea 70 missing[11]
History 2,768 captured[12][13][14]
2014 Russian annexation of Crimea
9,268 joined Russian
2014–2015 war in Donbas
forces after
2015–2020 frozen conflict phase annexation[15]
2021–2022 Russian military buildup
300+ T-64 tanks[16]
2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine
Violations of human rights Civilian casualties:
Related issues 3,393 killed[19]
Russia–Ukraine gas disputes 7,000–9,000 wounded[10]
Russian propaganda and disinformation
campaigns See 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine for
casualties resulting from the 2022 invasion.
Reactions
To the Russian invasion in Crimea
To the Russian intervention in Donbas
 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine
See also
Notes
References
Further reading
External links

Background

Post-Soviet context and Orange Revolution

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union (USSR) in 1991, Ukraine and Russia maintained close ties. In
1994, Ukraine agreed to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-
nuclear-weapon state. Former Soviet nuclear weapons in Ukraine were removed from Russia and
dismantled.[22] In return, Russia, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US) agreed to uphold
the territorial integrity and political independence of Ukraine through the Budapest Memorandum on
Security Assurances.[23][24] In 1999, Russia was one of the signatories of the Charter for European
Security, which "reaffirmed the inherent right of each and every participating State to be free to choose or
change its security arrangements, including treaties of alliance, as they evolve."[25] In the years after the
dissolution of the USSR, several former Eastern Bloc countries joined NATO, partly in response to
regional security threats involving Russia such as the 1993 Russian constitutional crisis, the War in
Abkhazia (1992–1993) and the First Chechen War (1994–1996). Russian leaders described this expansion
as a violation of Western powers' informal assurances that NATO would not expand eastward.[26][27]

The 2004 Ukrainian presidential election was controversial. During the election campaign, opposition
candidate Viktor Yushchenko was poisoned by TCDD dioxin;[28][29] he later implicated Russian
involvement.[30] In November, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych was declared the winner, despite
allegations of vote-rigging by election observers.[31] During a two-month period which became known as
the Orange Revolution, large peaceful protests successfully challenged the outcome. After the Supreme
Court of Ukraine annulled the initial result due to widespread electoral fraud, a second round re-run was
held, bringing to power Yushchenko as president and Yulia Tymoshenko as prime minister, and leaving
Yanukovych in opposition.[32] The Orange Revolution is often grouped together with other early-21st
century protest movements, particularly within the former USSR, known as colour revolutions. According
to Anthony Cordesman, Russian military officers viewed such colour revolutions as an attempt by the US
and European states to destabilise neighbouring countries and undermine Russia's national security.[33]
Russian President Vladimir Putin accused organisers of the 2011–2013 Russian protests of being former
advisors to Yushchenko, and described the protests as an attempt to transfer the Orange Revolution to
Russia.[34] Rallies in favour of Putin during this period were called "anti-Orange protests".[35]

At the 2008 Bucharest summit, Ukraine and Georgia sought to join NATO. The response among NATO
members was divided; Western European countries opposed offering Membership Action Plans (MAP) in
order to avoid antagonising Russia, while US President George W. Bush pushed for their admission.[36]
NATO ultimately refused to offer Ukraine and Georgia MAPs, but also issued a statement agreeing that
"these countries will become members of NATO". Putin voiced strong opposition to Georgia and Ukraine's
NATO membership bids.[37] By January 2022, the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO remained
remote.[38]
Euromaidan, Revolution of Dignity, and pro-Russian unrest

In 2009, Yanukovych announced his intent to again run for president in the 2010 Ukrainian presidential
election,[39] which he subsequently won.[40] In November 2013, a wave of large, pro-European Union
(EU) protests erupted in response to Yanukovych's sudden decision not to sign the EU–Ukraine
Association Agreement, instead choosing closer ties to Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union. The
Ukrainian parliament had overwhelmingly approved of finalizing the agreement with the EU.[41] Russia
had put pressure on Ukraine to reject it.[42]

Following months of protests as part of the Euromaidan movement, on 21 February 2014 Yanukovych and
the leaders of the parliamentary opposition signed a settlement agreement that called for early elections. The
following day, Yanukovych fled from the capital ahead of an impeachment vote that stripped him of his
powers as president.[43][44][45][46]

On 27 February, an interim government was established and early presidential elections were scheduled.
The following day, Yanukovych resurfaced in Russia and in a press conference declared that he remained
the acting president of Ukraine, just as Russia was beginning its overt military campaign in Crimea.
Leaders of Russian-speaking eastern regions of Ukraine declared continuing loyalty to Yanukovych,[44][47]
causing the 2014 pro-Russian unrest in Ukraine. On 23 February, the parliament adopted a bill to repeal the
2012 law which gave Russian language an official status.[48] The bill was not enacted,[49] however, the
proposal provoked negative reactions in the Russian-speaking regions of Ukraine,[50] intensified by
Russian media saying that the ethnic Russian population were in imminent danger.[51]

On 27 February, Berkut special police units from Crimea and other regions of Ukraine, which had been
dissolved on 25 February, seized checkpoints on the Isthmus of Perekop and Chonhar peninsula.[52][53]
According to Ukrainian MP Hennadiy Moskal, former chief of the Crimean police, these Berkut had
armored personnel carriers, grenade launchers, assault rifles, machine guns, and other weapons.[53] Since
then, they have controlled all land traffic between Crimea and continental Ukraine.[53] On 7 February
2014, a leaked audio revealed that United States Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian
Affairs Victoria Nuland in Kyiv, was weighing in on the make-up of the next Ukrainian government.
Nuland told United States Ambassador Geoffrey Pyatt that she did not think Vitaly Klitschko should be in
a new government. The audio clip was first posted on Twitter by Dmitry Loskutov, an aide to Russian
Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin.[54]

Russian bases in Crimea

At the onset of its conflict, Russia had roughly 12,000 military personnel in the Black Sea Fleet,[51] located
in several localities throughout Crimean peninsula like Sevastopol, Kacha, Hvardiiske, Simferopol Raion,
Sarych, and several others. The disposition of the Russian armed forces in Crimea was not disclosed clearly
to the public which led to several incidents like the 2005 conflict near Sarych cape lighthouse.[55] Russian
presence was allowed by the basing and transit agreement with Ukraine. According to the agreements
Russian military component in Crimea was constrained, including a maximum of 25,000 troops, the
requirement to respect the sovereignty of Ukraine, honor its legislation and not interfere in the internal
affairs of the country, and show their "military identification cards" when crossing the international border
and their operations beyond designated deployment sites were permitted only after coordination with the
competent agencies of Ukraine.[56] Early in the conflict, the agreement's sizeable troop limit allowed Russia
to significantly reinforce its military presence under the plausible guise of security concern, deploy special
forces and other required capabilities to conduct the operation in Crimea.[51]
According to the original treaty on division of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet signed in 1997, Russia was
allowed to have its military bases in Crimea until 2017, after which it had to evacuate all its military units
including its portion of the Black Sea Fleet out of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol. A
Russian construction project to re-home to fleet in Novorossiysk launched in 2005 and was expected to be
fully completed by 2020; as of 2010, the project faced major budget cuts and construction delays.[57] On
21 April 2010, former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych signed a new deal known as the Kharkiv
Pact, to resolve the 2009 Russia–Ukraine gas dispute; it extended the stay until 2042 with an option to
renew and in return receiving some discount on gas delivered from Russian.[58]

The Kharkiv Pact was rather an update to complex of several fundamental treaties that were signed in
1990s between prime ministers of both countries Viktor Chernomyrdin (Russia) and Pavlo Lazarenko
(Ukraine), and presidents Boris Yeltsin (Russia) and Leonid Kuchma (Ukraine).[59][60][61][62] The
Constitution of Ukraine, whilst having a general prohibition of a deployment of foreign bases on the
country's soil, originally also had a transitional provision, which allowed the use of existing military bases
on the territory of Ukraine for the temporary stationing of foreign military formations; this permitted
Russian military to keep its basing in Crimea as an "existing military base". The constitutional provision on
"[pre]-existing bases" was revoked in 2019, when Russia had already annexed Crimea and withdrew from
the basing treaties unilaterally.[63]

History

2014 Russian annexation of Crimea

On 20 February 2014, Russia began its annexation of

Crimea.[64][65][66][67] On 22 and 23 February, Russian troops and
special forces began moving into Crimea through
Novorossiysk.[66] On 27 February, Russian forces without
insignias began their advance into the Crimean Peninsula.[68] They
took hold of strategic positions and captured the Crimean
Parliament, raising a Russian flag. Security checkpoints were used
to cut the Crimean Peninsula off from the rest of Ukraine and to The blockade of military units of the
restrict movement within the territory.[69][70][71][72] Armed Forces of Ukraine during the
capture of Crimea by Russia in
In the following days, Russian soldiers secured key airports and a February–March 2014
communications center.[73] Russian cyberattacks shut down
websites associated with the Ukrainian Government, news media,
and social media. Cyberattacks also enabled Russian access to the
mobile phones of Ukrainian officials and members of parliament
over the next few days—some of which had their phones disabled
as a result—further severing lines of communication.[74]

On 1 March, the Russian legislature approved the use of armed

forces, leading to an influx of Russian troops and military hardware
into the peninsula.[73] In the following days, all remaining
Ukrainian military bases and installations were surrounded and Russian troops blocking the
besieged, including the Southern Naval Base. After Russia Ukrainian military base in Perevalne
formally annexed the peninsula on 18 March, Ukrainian military
bases and ships were stormed by Russian forces. On 24 March,
Ukraine ordered troops to withdraw; by 30 March, all Ukrainian forces had left the peninsula.
On 15 April, the Ukrainian parliament declared Crimea a territory temporarily occupied by Russia.[75]
After the annexation, the Russian government increased its military presence in the region and leveraged
nuclear threats to solidify the new status quo on the ground.[76] Russian president Vladimir Putin said that a
Russian military task force would be established in Crimea.[77] In November, NATO stated that it believed
Russia was deploying nuclear-capable weapons to Crimea.[78]

2014–2015 war in Donbas

Pro-Russian unrest

The initial protests across southern and eastern Ukraine were largely native expressions of discontent with
the new Ukrainian government.[79] Russian involvement at this stage was limited to voicing support for the
demonstrations, and the emergence of the separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk began as a small fringe group
of protesters, independent of Russian control.[79][80] Russia would go on to take advantage of this,
however, to launch a co-ordinated political and military campaign against Ukraine, as part of the broader
Russo-Ukrainian War.[79][81] Putin gave legitimacy to the nascent separatist movement when he described
the Donbas as part of the historic "New Russia" (Novorossiya) region, and issued a statement of
bewilderment as how the region had ever become part of Ukraine in 1922 with the foundation of the
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.[82]

When the Ukrainian authorities cracked down on the pro-Russian protests and arrested local separatist
leaders in early March, these were replaced by people with ties to the Russian security services and interests
in Russian businesses, probably by order of Russian intelligence.[83] By April 2014, Russians citizens had
taken control of the separatist movement, and were supported by volunteers and materiel from Russia,
including Chechen and Cossack militants.[84][85][86][87] According to DPR insurgent commander Igor
Girkin, without this support in April, the movement would have fizzled out, as in it did in Kharkiv and
Odessa.[88] The disputed referendum on the status of Donetsk Oblast was held on 11 May.[89][90][91]

These demonstrations, which followed the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, and which
were part of a wider group of concurrent pro-Russian protests across southern and eastern Ukraine,
escalated into an armed conflict between the Russia-backed separatist forces of the self-declared Donetsk
and Luhansk People's Republics (DPR and LPR respectively), and the Ukrainian government.[92][93] The
SBU claimed key commanders of the rebel movement during the beginning of the conflict, including Igor
Strelkov and Igor Bezler were Russian agents.[94][95] The prime minister of Donetsk People's Republic
from May to August 2014 was a Russian citizen Alexander Borodai.[86]

From August 2014 all top positions in Donetsk and Luhansk have been held by Ukrainian citizens.[96][85]
Russian volunteers are reported to make up from 15% to 80% of the combatants,[86][97][98][99][100] with
many claimed to be former military personnel.[101][102] Recruitment for the Donbas insurgents was
performed openly in Russian cities using private or voyenkomat facilities, as was confirmed by a number of
Russian media.[101][103]

Economic and material circumstances in Donbas had generated neither necessary nor sufficient conditions
for a locally rooted, internally driven armed conflict. The role of the Kremlin's military intervention was
paramount for the commencement of hostilities.[104]

March–July 2014
In late March, Russia continued the buildup of military forces near
the Ukrainian eastern border, reaching 30–40,000 troops by
April.[105][51] The deployment was likely used to threaten
escalation and stymie Ukraine's response to unfolding events.[51]
Concerns were expressed that Russia may again be readying an
incursion into Ukraine following its annexation of Crimea.[105]
This threat forced Ukraine to divert force deployment to its borders
instead of the conflict zone.[51]
The Russian military buildup along
In April, armed conflict begins in eastern Ukraine between
Ukraine's eastern border in February–
Russian-backed separatist forces and Ukrainian government. The
March 2014
separatists declared the People's Republics of Donetsk and
Luhansk. From 6 April, Militants occupied government buildings
in many cities, as well as, taking control of border crossings to
Russia, transport hubs, broadcasting center, and other strategic
infrastructure. Faced with continued expansion of separatist
territorial control, on 15 April the Ukrainian interim government
launched an "Anti-Terrorist Operation" (ATO), however, Ukrainian
military and security services were poorly prepared and ill-
positioned and the operation quickly stalled.[106]

By the end of April, the Ukrainian Government announced it had

The Donbas status referendums in
no full control of the provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk, being on May 2014 were not officially
"full combat alert" against a possible Russian invasion and recognised by the Ukrainian
reinstatement of conscription to the armed forces.[107] Through government or any UN member
May, Ukrainian campaign focused on containing the separatists by state.[89]
securing key positions around the ETO zone to position the military
for a decisive offensive against the rebel enclave once Ukraine's
national mobilization complete.

As conflict between the separatists and the Ukrainian government escalated in May, Russia began to
employ a "hybrid approach", deploying a combination of disinformation tactics, irregular fighters, regular
Russian troops, and conventional military support to support the separatists and destabilise the Donbas
region.[108][109][110] The First Battle of Donetsk Airport that followed the Ukrainian presidential elections
marked a turning point in conflict; it was the first battle between the separatists and the Ukrainian
government that involved large numbers of Russian volunteers.[111][112]: 1 5  According to the Ukrainian
government, at the height of the conflict in the summer of 2014, Russian paramilitaries were reported to
make up between 15% to 80% of the combatants.[86] From June Russia trickled in arms, armor, and
munitions to the separatist forces.

By the end of July, they were pushing into Donetsk and Luhansk cities, to cut off supply routes between
the two, isolating Donetsk and thought to restore control of the Russo-Ukrainian border. By 28 July, the
strategic heights of Savur-Mohyla were under Ukrainian control, along with the town of Debaltseve an
important railroad hub.[113] These operational successes of Ukrainian forces threatened the very existence
of Russian-supported DPR and LPR statelets, prompting Russian cross-border artillery shelling targeted
against advancing Ukrainian troops on their own soil, from mid-July onwards.

American and Ukrainian officials said they had evidence of Russian interference in Ukraine, including
intercepted communications between Russian officials and Donbas insurgents.[114][115]
Ukrainian media have described the well-organised and well-armed pro-Russian militants as similar to
those which occupied regions of Crimea during the Crimean crisis.[116][117] The former deputy Chief of
the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Admiral Ihor Kabanenko, said that the militants are
Russian military reconnaissance and sabotage units.[118] Arsen Avakov stated that the militants in Krasnyi
Lyman used Russian-made AK-100 series assault rifles fitted with grenade launchers, and that such
weapons are only issued in the Russian Federation. "The Government of Ukraine is considering the facts of
today as a manifestation of external aggression by Russia," said Avakov.[119] Militants in Sloviansk arrived
in military lorries without license plates.[120] A reporter from Russia's Novaya Gazeta, having visited
separatist artillery positions in Avdeyevka, wrote that in his opinion "it's impossible that the cannons are
handled by volunteers" as they require a trained and experienced team, including observers and adjustment
experts.[121]

August 2014 Russian invasion

After a series of military defeats and setbacks for the Donetsk and
Luhansk separatists, who united under the banner of
"Novorossiya", a term Russian President Vladimir Putin used to
describe southeastern Ukraine,[122][123] Russia dispatched what it
called a "humanitarian convoy" of trucks across the Russo-
Ukrainian border in mid-August 2014. Ukraine reacted to the move
by calling it a "direct invasion".[124] Ukraine's National Security
and Defence Council published a report on the number and
contents of these convoys, claiming they were arriving almost daily
in November (up to 9 convoys on 30 November) and their contents
were mainly arms and ammunition. In early August, according to
Igor Strelkov, Russian servicemen, supposedly on "vacation" from
the army, began to arrive in Donbas.[125]

By August 2014, the Ukrainian "Anti-Terrorist Operation" was

able to vastly shrink the territory under the control of the pro-
Russian forces, and came close to regaining control of the Russo- June–August 2014 progression map
Ukrainian border. [126] Igor Girkin urged Russian military
intervention, and said that the combat inexperience of his irregular
forces, along with recruitment difficulties amongst the local population in Donetsk Oblast had caused the
setbacks. He addressed Russian president Vladimir Putin, saying that: "Losing this war on the territory that
President Vladimir Putin personally named New Russia would threaten the Kremlin's power and,
personally, the power of the president".[127]

In response to the deteriorating situation in the Donbas, Russia abandoned its hybrid approach, and began a
conventional invasion of the region.[126][128] The first sign of this invasion was 25 August 2014 capture of
a group of Russian paratroopers on active service in Ukrainian territory by the Ukrainian security service
(SBU).[129] The SBU released photographs of them, and their names.[130] On the following day, the
Russian defence Ministry said these soldiers had crossed the border "by accident".[131][132][133] According
to Nikolai Mitrokhin's estimates, by mid-August 2014 during the Battle of Ilovaisk, there were between
20,000 and 25,000 troops fighting in the Donbas on the separatist side, and only between 40% and 45%
were "locals".[134]

On 24 August 2014, President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko referred to the anti-terrorist operation (ATO)
as Ukraine's "Patriotic War of 2014" and a war against "external aggression".[135][136] The Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Ukraine labeled the conflict an invasion on 27 August 2014.[137] The same day,
Amvrosiivka was occupied by Russian paratroopers,[138] supported by 250 armoured vehicles and artillery
pieces.[139] Ten Russian paratroopers of the 331st Guards Airborne Regiment, military unit 71211 from
Kostroma, were captured in Dzerkalne that day, a village near Amvrosiivka, 20 kilometres (12 mi) from the
border,[140] after their armoured vehicles were hit by Ukrainian artillery. On 25 August, the Security
Service of Ukraine reported about the captured paratroopers, claiming they've crossed Ukrainian border in
the night of 23 August.[141] The SBU also released their photos and names.[142] The next day, the Russian
Ministry of Defence said that they had crossed the border "by accident".[140][143]

On 25 August, a column of Russian tanks and military vehicles was reported to have crossed into Ukraine
in the southeast, near the town of Novoazovsk located on the Azov sea coast, and headed towards
Ukrainian-held Mariupol,[144][145][146][147][148] in an area that had not seen pro-Russian presence for
weeks.[149] The Bellingcat's investigation reveals some details of this operation.[150] Russian forces
captured the city of Novoazovsk.[151] and Russian soldiers began arresting and deporting to unknown
locations all Ukrainians who did not have an address registered within the town.[152] Pro-Ukrainian anti-
war protests took place in Mariupol which was threatened by Russian troops.[152][153] The UN Security
Council called an emergency meeting to discuss the situation.[154]

The 76th Guards Air Assault Division based in Pskov allegedly

entered Ukrainian territory in August and engaged in a skirmish
near Luhansk, suffering 80 dead. The Ukrainian Defence Ministry
said that they had seized two of the unit's armoured vehicles near
Luhansk city, and reported about another three tanks and two
armoured vehicles of pro-Russian forces destroyed in other
regions.[155][156] The Russian government denied the skirmish
took place[156] but on 18 August, the 76th Guards Air Assault
Division was awarded with Order of Suvorov, one of Russia's Residents of Kyiv with Sich Battalion
highest awards, by Russian minister of defence Sergey Shoigu for volunteers on 26 August 2014
the "successful completion of military missions" and "courage and
heroism".[156]

Russian media highlighted that the medal is awarded exclusively for combat operations and reported that a
large number of soldiers from this division had died in Ukraine just days before, but their burials were
conducted in secret.[157][158][159] Some Russian media, such as Pskovskaya Guberniya,[160] reported that
Russian paratroopers may have been killed in Ukraine. Journalists traveled to Pskov, the reported burial
location of the troops, to investigate. Multiple reporters said they had been attacked or threatened there, and
that the attackers erased several camera memory cards.[161] Pskovskaya Guberniya revealed transcripts of
phone conversations between Russian soldiers being treated in a Pskov hospital for wounds received while
fighting in Ukraine. The soldiers reveal that they were sent to the war, but told by their officers that they
were going on "an exercise".[162][163]

The speaker of Russia's upper house of parliament and Russian state television channels acknowledged that
Russian soldiers entered Ukraine, but referred to them as "volunteers".[164] A reporter for Novaya Gazeta,
an opposition newspaper in Russia, stated that the Russian military leadership paid soldiers to resign their
commissions and fight in Ukraine in the early summer of 2014, and then began ordering soldiers into
Ukraine. This reporter mentioned knowledge of at least one case when soldiers who refused were
threatened with prosecution.[165] Russian opposition MP Lev Shlosberg made similar statements, although
he said combatants from his country are "regular Russian troops", disguised as units of the DPR and
LPR.[166]

In early September 2014, Russian state-owned television channels reported on the funerals of Russian
soldiers who died in Ukraine during the war in Donbas, but described them as "volunteers" fighting for the
"Russian world". Valentina Matviyenko, a top politician in the ruling United Russia party, also praised
"volunteers" fighting in "our fraternal nation", referring to Ukraine.[164] Russian state television for the first
time showed the funeral of a soldier killed fighting in east Ukraine. State-controlled TV station Channel
One showed the burial of paratrooper Anatoly Travkin in the central Russian city of Kostroma. The
broadcaster said Travkin had not told his wife or commanders about his decision to fight alongside pro-
Russia rebels battling government forces. "Officially he just went on leave", the news reader said.[167]

Mariupol offensive and first Minsk ceasefire

On 3 September 2014, a Sky News team filmed groups of troops near Novoazovsk wearing modern
combat gear typical for Russian units and traveling in new military vehicles with number plates and other
markings removed. Specialists consulted by the journalists identified parts of the equipment (uniform, rifles)
as currently used by Russian ground forces and paratroopers.[168]

Also on, 3 September, Ukrainian President Poroshenko said he had reached a "permanent ceasefire"
agreement with Russian President Putin.[169] Russia denied the ceasefire agreement took place, denying
being party to the conflict at all, adding that "they only discussed how to settle the conflict".[170][171]
Poroshenko then backtracked from his previous statement about the agreement.[172][173]

Mick Krever wrote on the CNN blog that on 5 September Russia's Permanent Representative to the OSCE,
Andrey Kelin had said it was natural pro-Russian separatists "are going to liberate" Mariupol. Ukrainian
forces stated that Russian intelligence groups had been spotted in the area. Kelin said 'there might be
volunteers over there.'[174] On 4 September 2014, a NATO officer said there were several thousand regular
Russian forces operating in Ukraine.[175]

On 5 September 2014, the ceasefire agreement called the Minsk Protocol, drew a line of demarcation
between Ukraine and separatist-controlled portions of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts in the southeast of the
country.

November 2014 escalation

On 7 November, NATO officials confirmed the continued invasion

of Ukraine, with 32 Russian tanks, 16 howitzer cannons and 30
trucks of troops entering the country.[176] On 12 November, NATO
reiterated the prevalence of Russian troops; US general Philip
Breedlove said "Russian tanks, Russian artillery, Russian air
defence systems and Russian combat troops" were sighted.[78] The
Lithuanian Mission to the United Nations denounced Russia's
'undeclared war' on Ukraine.[177] Journalist Menahem Kahana
took a picture showing a 1RL232 "Leopard" battlefield
surveillance radar system in Torez, east of Donetsk; and Dutch
freelance journalist Stefan Huijboom took pictures which showed
A map of the line of control and
the 1RL232 traveling with the 1RL239 "Lynx" radar system.[178] buffer zone established by the Minsk
Protocol on 5 September 2014
OSCE monitors further observed vehicles apparently used to
transport soldiers' dead bodies crossing the Russian-Ukrainian
border – in one case a vehicle marked with Russia's military code for soldiers killed in action crossed from
Russia into Ukraine on 11 November 2014, and later returned.[179] On 23 January 2015 the Committee of
Soldiers' Mothers warned about conscripts being sent to east Ukraine.[180] NATO said it had seen an
increase in Russian tanks, artillery pieces and other heavy military equipment in eastern Ukraine and
renewed its call for Moscow to withdraw its forces.[181]
The centre for Eurasian Strategic Intelligence estimated, based on "official statements and interrogation
records of captured military men from these units, satellite surveillance data" as well as verified
announcements from relatives and profiles in social networks, that over 30 Russian military units were
taking part in the conflict in Ukraine. In total, over 8,000 soldiers had fought there at different
moments.[182] The Chicago Council on Global Affairs stated that the Russian separatists enjoyed technical
advantages over the Ukrainian army since the large inflow of advanced military systems in mid-2014:
effective anti-aircraft weapons ("Buk", MANPADS) suppressed Ukrainian air strikes, Russian drones
provided intelligence, and Russian secure communications system thwarted the Ukrainian side from
communications intelligence. The Russian side also frequently employed electronic warfare systems that
Ukraine lacked. Similar conclusions about the technical advantage of the Russian separatists were voiced
by the Conflict Studies Research Centre.[183]

Numerous reports of Russian troops and warfare on Ukrainian territory were raised in United Nations
Security Council meetings. In 12 November meeting, the representative of the United Kingdom also
accused Russia of intentionally constraining OSCE observatory missions' capabilities, pointing out that the
observers were allowed to monitor only two kilometers of border between Ukraine and Russia, and drones
deployed to extend their capabilities were being jammed or shot down.[184]

2015 and ceasefire

In January, Donetsk, Luhansk, and Mariupol were the three cities

that represented the three fronts on which Ukraine was pressed by
forces allegedly armed, trained and backed by Russia.[186]

Poroshenko spoke of a dangerous escalation on 21 January amid

reports of more than 2,000 additional Russian troops crossing the
border, together with 200 tanks and armed personnel carriers. He
abbreviated his visit to the World Economic Forum in Davos
Pro-Russian rebels in Donetsk in
because of his concerns at the worsening situation.[187] On 29
May 2015. Ukraine declared the
January, the chief of Ukraine's General Military Staff Viktor
Russia-backed separatist republics
Muzhenko said 'the Ukrainian army is not engaged in combat from eastern Ukraine to be terrorist
operations against Russian regular units,' but that he had organizations.[185]
information about Russian civilian and military individuals fighting
alongside 'illegal armed groups in combat activities.'[188]

Reporting from DPR-controlled areas on 28 January, the OSCE observed on the outskirts of Khartsyzk,
east of Donetsk, "a column of five T-72 tanks facing east, and immediately after, another column of four T-
72 tanks moving east on the same road which was accompanied by four unmarked military trucks, type
URAL. All vehicles and tanks were unmarked." It reported on an intensified movement of unmarked
military trucks, covered with canvas.[189] After the shelling of residential areas in Mariupol, NATO's Jens
Stoltenberg said: "Russian troops in eastern Ukraine are supporting these offensive operations with
command and control systems, air defence systems with advanced surface-to-air missiles, unmanned aerial
systems, advanced multiple rocket launcher systems, and electronic warfare systems."'[181][190]

A new package of measures to end the conflict, known as Minsk II, was agreed on 15 February 2015.[191]

2015–2020 frozen conflict phase

According to a top U.S. general in January, Russian supplied drones and electronic jamming have ensured
Ukrainian troops struggle to counter artillery fire by pro-Russian militants. "The rebels have Russian-
provided UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) that are giving the rebels the detection capability and the ability
to target Ukrainian forces".[192] Advanced electronic jamming was also reported by OSCE observers on
numerous occasions.[193]

US Army commander in Europe Ben Hodges stated in February 2015 that "it's very obvious from the
amount of ammunition, type of equipment, there's direct Russian military intervention in the Debaltseve
area".[194]
According to estimates by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs in February, Russian
separatists forces number around 36,000 troops (as compared to 34,000 Ukrainian), of which 8,500–10,000
are purely Russian soldiers. Additionally, around 1,000 GRU troops are operating in the area.[195]
According to a military expert, Ilya Kramnik, total Ukrainian forces outnumber the Russian forces by a
factor of two (20,000 Russian separatists vs. 40,000 fighting for Ukraine).[196]

In February 2015, the independent Russian newspaper Novaya

Gazeta had obtained documents,[197] allegedly written by oligarch
Konstantin Malofayev and others, which provided the Russian
government with a strategy in the event of Viktor Yanukovych's
removal from power and the break-up of Ukraine, which were
considered likely. The documents outlined plans for the annexation
of Crimea and the eastern portions of the country, closely
describing the events that actually followed after Yanukovych's fall.
The documents also described plans for a public relations campaign Casualties of the War in Donbas
which would seek to justify Russian actions.[198][199][200]

Russian financing of militias and Glazyev tapes

In August 2016, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) published the first batch of telephone intercepts
from 2014 of Sergey Glazyev (Russian presidential adviser), Konstantin Zatulin, and other people in which
they discussed covert funding of pro-Russian activists in Eastern Ukraine, the occupation of administration
buildings and other actions that in due course led to the armed conflict.[201]

As early as February 2014, Glazyev give direct instructions to various pro-Russian parties in Ukraine to
instigate unrest in Donetsk, Kharkiv, Zaporizhia, and Odessa. He told various pro-Russian actors to take
over local administration offices, what to do afterwards, and how to formulate their demands, and promised
support from Russia, including "sending our guys".[202][203][204] In further calls recorded in February and
March 2014, Glazyev points out that the "peninsula doesn't have its own electricity, water, or gas" and a
"quick and effective" solution would be expansion to the north. According to Ukrainian journalists, this
indicates that the plans for military intervention in Donbas to form a Russia-controlled puppet state of
Novorossiya to ensure supplies to annexed Crimea was discussed long before the conflict actually started in
April.

Russian troop deployments

A report by Igor Sutyagin published by the Royal United Services Institute in March 2015 stated that a total
of 42,000 regular Russian combat troops have been involved in the fighting, with a peak strength of 10,000
in December 2014. The direct involvement of the Russian troops on Ukrainian territory began in August
2014, at a time when Ukrainian military successes created the possibility that the pro-Russian rebels would
collapse. According to the report, the Russian troops are the most capable units on the anti-Ukrainian side,
with the regular Donetsk and Luhansk rebel formations being used essentially as "cannon fodder".[205][206]

The Chicago Council on Global Affairs stated that the Russian separatists enjoyed technical advantages
over the Ukrainian army since the large inflow of advanced military systems in mid-2014: effective anti-
aircraft weapons ("Buk", MANPADS) suppressed Ukrainian air strikes, Russian drones provided
intelligence, and Russian secure communications system thwarted the Ukrainian side from communications
intelligence. The Russian side also frequently employed electronic warfare systems that Ukraine lacked.
Similar conclusions about the technical advantage of the Russian separatists were voiced by the Conflict
Studies Research Centre.[206]

Cases of Russian soldiers killed and wounded in Ukraine are widely discussed in local Russian media in
the republics from which they originated.[207] Recruitment for Donbas is performed rather openly via
veteran and other paramilitary organisations. Vladimir Yefimov, leader of one of such organisations,
explained in details in an interview how the process works in the Ural area. The organisation recruits
mostly army veterans, but also policemen, firefighters etc. with military experience. The cost of equipping
one volunteer is estimated at around 350,000 rubles (around $6500) plus the cost of the volunteer's salary
from 60,000 to 240,000 rubles per month depending on their experience.[208]

The volunteers are issued a document claiming that their participation is limited to "offering humanitarian
help" to avoid Russian mercenary laws. In Russia's anti-mercenary legislation a mercenary is defined as
someone who "takes part [in fighting] with aims counter to the interests of the Russian Federation".[208]
The recruits travel to the conflict zone without weapons, which are given at the destination. Often, Russian
troops have travelled disguised as Red Cross personnel.[102][209][210][211] Igor Trunov, head of Russian
Red Cross in Moscow condemned these convoys, saying they made delivery of real humanitarian aid more
difficult.[212]

On 22 April 2015, the US Department of State accused the "combined Russian-separatist forces" of
accumulating air defence systems, UAV along with command and control equipment in eastern Ukraine,
and of conducting "complex" military training that "leaves no doubt that Russia is involved in the training".
Russia is also reinforcing its military presence on the eastern border with Ukraine as well as near Belgorod
which is close to Kharkiv.[213] In June 2015, Vice News reporter Simon Ostrovsky investigated the
movements of Bato Dambaev, a Russian contract soldier from Buryatia, through a military camp in Rostov
Oblast to Vuhlehirsk in Ukraine during the battle of Debaltseve and back to Buryatia, finding exact
locations where Dambaev photographed himself, and came to a conclusion that Dambaev had fought in
Ukraine while in active service in the Russian army.[214]

With Russia refusing to allow the OSCE to expand its mission, OSCE observer Paul Picard stated that "We
often see how Russian media outlets manipulate our statements. They say that we have not seen Russian
troops crossing the borders. But that only applies to two border crossings. We have no idea what is going
on at the others."[215]

In September 2015 the United Nations Human Rights Office estimated that 8000 casualties had resulted
from the conflict, noting that the violence had been "fuelled by the presence and continuing influx of
foreign fighters and sophisticated weapons and ammunition from the Russian Federation."[216]

In 2020 analysis of publicly available Russian railway traffic data (gdevagon.ru) indicated that in January
2015, period of especially heavy fighting, thousands of tons of cargo declared "high explosives" was sent
by railway from various places in Russia into Uspenskaya, a small train station on a line crossing from
Rostovskaya oblast' (Russia) into separatist-controlled part of Ukraine.[217]

2016 escalation

On 8 August 2016, Ukraine reported that Russia had increased its military presence along the Crimea
demarcation line. Border crossings were then closed.[218] On 10 August, the Russian security agency FSB
claimed it had prevented "Ukrainian terrorist attacks" and that two servicemen were killed in clashes in
Armiansk (Crimea), adding that "several" Ukrainian and Russian citizens were detained.[219][220][221]
Russian media reported that one of the killed soldiers was a commander of the Russian GRU, and later was
buried in Simferopol.[222]

The Ukrainian government denied that the incident took

place.[223][224] Parallel to the incident on 9 August, a Ukrainian
official claimed that a number of Russian soldiers had deserted but
had not entered into Ukraine,[225] and that skirmishes broke out
between Russian intelligence officers and border guards.[226]
Russian President Putin accused Ukraine of turning to the "practice
of terror".[227] Ukrainian President Poroshenko called the Russian Russian-backed separatists in May
version of events "equally cynical and insane".[228] The U.S. 2016
denied Russia's claims, with its ambassador to Ukraine (Geoffrey
R. Pyatt) stating "The U.S. Government has seen nothing so far
that corroborates Russian allegations of a "Crimea incursion".[229]

Russia had used the allegation to engage in a rapid military build-up in Crimea,[230] followed by drills and
military movement near the Ukrainian border.[230][231] Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko warned that
Russia was preparing for a full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[232][233]

2018 Kerch Strait incident

The Kerch Strait offers a critical link for Ukraine's eastern ports in
the Azov Sea to the Black Sea, over which Russia gained de facto
control in the aftermath of 2014. In 2017, Ukraine appealed to
court of arbitration over the use of the strait, but, by 2018 Russia
had built a bridge over it, limiting the size of ships that could transit
the strait, imposed new regulations, and subsequently detained
Ukrainian vessels on several occasions.

Tensions over the issue had been rising for months.[234] On 25 The Kerch Strait incident over the
November 2018, three Ukrainian boats traveling from Odessa to passage between the Black and
Azov seas
Mariupol attempted to cross the Kerch Strait caused an incident, in
which Russian warships fired on and seized the Ukrainian boats;
24 Ukrainian sailors were detained.[235][236] A day later on 26
November 2018, lawmakers in the Ukrainian parliament overwhelmingly backed the imposition of martial
law along Ukraine's coastal regions and those bordering Russia in response to the firing and seizure of
Ukrainian naval ships by Russia near the Crimean peninsula. A total of 276 lawmakers in Kyiv approved
the measure, to take effect on 28 November 2018 and automatically expire after 30 days.[237]

2019–2020

More than 110 Ukrainian soldiers were killed in the conflict between Ukrainian government forces and
Russian-backed separatists in 2019.[238] In May 2019, the newly elected Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky took office promising to end the War in Donbas.[238] In December 2019, Ukraine and pro-
Russian separatists began swapping prisoners of war. Around 200 prisoners were exchanged on 29
December 2019.[239][240][241][242] According to Ukrainian authorities, 50 Ukrainian soldiers were killed in
the conflict between Ukrainian government forces and Russian-backed separatists in 2020.[243] Since
2019, Russia has issued over 650,000 internal Russian passports among an unconfirmed overall
population,[244] which is considered by Ukrainian government as a step towards annexation of the
region.[245]
2021–2022 Russian military buildup

Rise in tensions

From March to April 2021, Russia commenced a major military

build-up near the Russo-Ukrainian border, followed by a second
build-up between October 2021 to February 2022 in both Russia
and Belarus.[247] During these developments, the Russian From left, Russian President
government repeatedly denied it had plans to invade or attack Vladimir Putin, French President
Emmanuel Macron, German
Ukraine;[248][249] those who issued the denials included Putin's
Chancellor Angela Merkel and
spokesman Dmitry Peskov in November 2021, Deputy Foreign
Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Minister Sergei Ryabkov in January 2022,[250] Russian
Zelensky in Paris, France, December
ambassador to the US Anatoly Antonov on 20 February 2022,[248]
2019
and Russian ambassador to the Czech Republic Alexander
Zmeevsky on 23 February 2022.[251]

In early December 2021, following Russian denials, the US

released intelligence of Russian invasion plans, including satellite
photographs showing Russian troops and equipment near the
Ukrainian border.[252] The intelligence reported the existence of a
Russian list of key sites and individuals to be killed or neutralized
upon invasion.[253] The US continued to release reports that
accurately predicted the invasion plans,[253] but according to
Michael Kofman of the Center for Naval Analyses, the Ukrainian US paratroopers of 2nd Battalion,
government did not adequately prepare for a large invasion.[254] 503rd Infantry Regiment depart
Italy's Aviano Air Base for Latvia, 23
February 2022. Thousands of US
Russian accusations and demands troops were deployed to Eastern
Europe amid Russia's military build-
In the months preceding the invasion, Russian officials accused
up.[246]
Ukraine of inciting tensions, Russophobia, and the repression of
Russian speakers in Ukraine. They also made multiple security
demands of Ukraine, NATO, and non-NATO allies in the EU.
These actions were described by commentators and Western
officials as attempts to justify war.[255][256] On 9 December 2021
Putin said that "Russophobia is a first step towards
genocide".[257][258] Putin's claims were dismissed by the
international community,[259] and Russian claims of genocide have
been widely rejected as baseless.[260][261][262]
Ukrainian deputy prime minister Olha
In a 21 February speech,[263] Putin questioned the legitimacy of the Stefanishyna with NATO secretary-
Ukrainian state, repeating an inaccurate claim that "Ukraine never general Jens Stoltenberg at a
had a tradition of genuine statehood".[264] He incorrectly described conference on 10 January 2022
the country as having been created by Soviet Russia. [265] To justify regarding a potential Russian
an invasion, Putin falsely accused Ukrainian society and invasion
government of being dominated by neo-Nazism, invoking the
history of collaboration in German-occupied Ukraine during World
War II,[266][267] and echoing an antisemitic conspiracy theory which casts Russian Christians, rather than
Jews, as the true victims of Nazi Germany.[268][259] While Ukraine has a far-right fringe, including the
neo-Nazi Azov Battalion and Right Sector,[269][270] analysts have described Putin's rhetoric as greatly
exaggerating the influence of far-right groups within Ukraine; there is no widespread support for the
ideology in the government, military, or electorate.[255][266] The Poroshenko administration enforced the
law condemning the Soviet Union and the Nazis in 2015. Ukrainian president Zelenskyy, who is Jewish,
stated that his grandfather served in the Soviet army fighting against the Nazis;[271] three of his family
members died in the Holocaust.[272]

During the second build-up, Russia issued demands to the US and

NATO, including a legally binding arrangement preventing
Ukraine from ever joining NATO, and the removal of multinational
forces stationed in NATO's Eastern European member states.[274]
Russia threatened an unspecified military response if NATO
continued to follow an "aggressive line".[275] These demands were
widely interpreted as being non-viable; new NATO members in
Central and Eastern Europe had joined the alliance because their
populations broadly preferred to move towards the safety and A U.S. intelligence assessment map
economic opportunities offered by NATO and the EU, and their and imagery on Russian military
governments sought protection from Russian irredentism.[276] The movement nearby the Ukrainian
demand for a formal treaty preventing Ukraine from joining NATO border, as on 3 December 2021. It
was also seen as unviable by Western officials as it would assessed that Russia had deployed
contravene the treaty's "open door" policy, although NATO about 70,000 military personnel
showed no desire to accede to Ukraine's requests to join.[277] mostly about 100–200 kilometres
(62–124 mi) from the Ukrainian
border, with an assessment this
Alleged clashes (17–21 February) could be increased to 175,000
personnel. Published by The
Fighting in Donbas escalated significantly from 17 February 2022 Washington Post.[273]
onwards. [278] The Ukrainians and the Russian separatists each
accused the other of firing into their territory.[279][280] On 18
February, the Donetsk and Luhansk people's republics ordered mandatory emergency evacuations of
civilians from their respective capital cities,[281][282][283] although observers noted that full evacuations
would take months.[284] Ukrainian media reported a sharp increase in artillery shelling by the Russian-led
militants in Donbas as attempts to provoke the Ukrainian army.[285][286]

In the days leading up to the invasion, the Russian government intensified its disinformation campaign,
with Russian state media promoting fabricated videos (false flags) on a nearly hourly basis purporting to
show Ukrainian forces attacking Russia, in a bid to justify an invasion of Ukraine.[287] Many of the
disinformation videos were poor and amateur in quality, and evidence showed that the claimed attacks,
explosions, and evacuations in Donbas were staged by Russia.[287][288][289]

Escalation (21–23 February)

On 21 February at 22:35 (UTC+3),[290] Putin announced that the

Russian government would diplomatically recognize the Donetsk
and Luhansk people's republics.[291] The same evening, Putin
directed that Russian troops be deployed into Donbas, in what
Russia referred to as a "peacekeeping mission".[292][293] The 21
February intervention in Donbas was condemned by several
members of the UN Security Council; none voiced support for Play media
it.[294] On 22 February, the Federation Council unanimously Putin's address to the nation on 21
authorised Putin to use military force outside Russia.[295] February (English subtitles available)
In response, Zelenskyy ordered the conscription of army reservists;[296] The following day, Ukraine's
parliament proclaimed a 30-day nationwide state of emergency and ordered the mobilisation of all
reservists.[297][298][299] Meanwhile, Russia began to evacuate its embassy in Kyiv.[300] The websites of
the Ukrainian parliament and government, along with banking websites, were hit by DDoS attacks,[301]
widely attributed to Russian-backed hackers.[302][303]

On the night of 23 February,[304] Zelenskyy gave a speech in Russian in which he appealed to the citizens
of Russia to prevent war.[305][306] He also refuted Russia's claims about the presence of neo-Nazis in the
Ukrainian government and stated that he had no intention of attacking the Donbas region.[307] Kremlin
spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on 23 February that the separatist leaders in Donetsk and Luhansk had sent
a letter to Putin stating that Ukrainian shelling had caused civilian deaths and appealing for military support
from Russia.[308]

In response, Ukraine requested an urgent UN Security Council meeting,[309] which convened at 21:30
(UTC−5).[310] Half an hour into the emergency meeting, Putin announced the start of military operations in
Ukraine. Sergiy Kyslytsya, the Ukrainian representative, subsequently called on the Russian representative,
Vasily Nebenzya, to "do everything possible to stop the war" or relinquish his position as president of the
UN Security Council; Nebenzya refused.[311][312]

2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine

On 21 February 2022, the Russian government claimed that

Ukrainian shelling had destroyed an FSB border facility on the
Russia-Ukraine border, and claimed that it had killed 5 Ukrainian
soldiers who tried to cross into Russian territory. Ukraine denied
having been involved in both incidents and called them false flag
operations.[313][314] On the same day, the Russian government
formally recognized the self-proclaimed DPR and LPR as
independent states, not only in their de facto controlled areas, but
An animated map of Russia's
throughout each of the Ukrainian oblasts,[315] and Putin ordered invasion of Ukraine
Russian military forces to enter the regions.[316][317][318]

On 24 February 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an invasion of Ukraine by Russian armed
forces previously concentrated along the border.[319] The invasion included attacks across the Belarus-
Ukraine border and was followed by targeted airstrikes on military buildings in Ukraine.[320][321] The
Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy, in response, enacted martial law and general mobilization
throughout Ukraine.[322] Air raid sirens were heard throughout Ukraine for most of the day.[323]

Ukraine's ICT infrastructure has been degraded as a result of Russian cyber-attacks and
bombardments.[324][325] Several Ukrainian cities and infrastructure sites have been occupied, including the
Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant.[326][327][328] According to a US defence official, commenting on 25
February, Russian forces are "meeting more resistance" in their advance towards Kyiv "than they
expected";[329] this was repeated by James Heappey, Britain's Minister for the Armed Forces the next
day.[330]

Violations of human rights

The war has been accompanied by violations of human rights. From 2014 to 2021, there were more than
3,000 civilian casualties.[331] The right of movement was impeded for the inhabitants of the conflict
zone.[332] The arbitrary detention was practiced by both sides in the first years of the conflict. It decreased
after 2016 in the government-held areas while in the separatist-held ones it continued in 2021.[333] The
investigation into the abuses, including torture, committed by both sides made little progress.[334][335]
According to OHCHR the closure of three TV channels amounted to a violation of the freedom of
expression.[334] There were cases of conflict-related sexual violence, however OHCHR believe that "there
are no grounds to believe that sexual violence has been used for strategic or tactical ends by Government
forces or the armed groups in the eastern regions of Ukraine."[336]

Related issues

Russia–Ukraine gas disputes

Ukraine remains the main transit route for Russian natural gas
sold to Europe, which earns Ukraine about $3 billion a year in
transit fees, making it the country's most lucrative export
service.[337] Following Russia's launch of the Nord Stream
pipeline, which bypasses Ukraine, gas transit volumes have
been steadily decreasing.[337] During the Ukrainian crisis,
starting in February 2014 with the Russian annexation of
Crimea, severe tensions extended to the gas sector.[338][339]
The outbreak of war in the Donbas region forced the
suspension of a project to develop Ukraine's own shale gas
reserves at the Yuzivska gas field, which had been planned as
a way to reduce Ukrainian dependence on Russian gas
imports.[340] Eventually, the EU commissioner for energy
Günther Oettinger was called in to broker a deal securing Major Russian natural gas pipelines to
supplies to Ukraine and transit to the EU.[341] Europe

A terrorist explosion damaged Russia's Urengoy–Pomary–

Uzhhorod pipeline in Rozhniativ district in Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast, Ukraine in May 2014.[342] Another
section of the pipeline exploded in the Poltava Oblast on 17 June 2014, one day after Russia limited the
supply of gas to Ukrainian customers due to non-payment. Ukraine's Interior Minister Arsen Avakov said
the next day, that the explosion had been caused by a bomb.[343]

Russia planned to completely abandon gas supplies to Europe through Ukraine after 2018.[344][345]
Russia's state-owned energy giant Gazprom has already substantially reduced the volumes of gas it transits
across Ukraine, and expressed its intention of reducing the level further by means of transit diversification
pipelines (Turkish Stream, Nord Stream, etc.).[346] Gazprom and Ukraine agreed a five-year deal on
Russian gas transit to Europe at the end of 2019.[347][348]

In 2020, the TurkStream natural gas pipeline running from Russia to Turkey changed the regional gas flows
in South-East Europe by diverting the transit through Ukraine and the Trans Balkan Pipeline
system.[349][350]

In May 2021, the Biden administration waived Trump's CAATSA sanctions on the company behind
Russia's Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline to Germany and its chief executive.[351][352] Ukrainian President
Zelensky said he was "surprised" and "disappointed" by Joe Biden's decision.[353] In July 2021, the U.S.
urged Ukraine not to criticise a forthcoming agreement with Germany over the pipeline.[354][355]
On 20 July 2021, Joe Biden and German Chancellor Angela Merkel reached a conclusive deal that the
U.S. may trigger sanctions if Russia uses Nord Stream as a "political weapon". The deal aims to prevent
Poland and Ukraine from being cut off from Russian gas supplies. Ukraine will get a $50 million loan for
green technology until 2024 and Germany will set up a billion dollar fund to promote Ukraine's transition
to green energy to compensate the loss of the gas transit fees. The contract for transiting Russian gas
through Ukraine will be prolonged until 2034, if the Russian government agrees.[356][357][358]

In August 2021, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that the Nord Stream 2 natural gas
pipeline between Russia and Germany was "a dangerous weapon, not only for Ukraine but for the whole
of Europe."[359][360] In September 2021, Ukraine's Naftogaz CEO Yuriy Vitrenko accused Russia of using
natural gas as a "geopolitical weapon".[361] Vitrenko stated that "A joint statement from the United States
and Germany said that if the Kremlin used gas as a weapon, there would be an appropriate response. We
are now waiting for the imposition of sanctions on a 100% subsidiary of Gazprom, the operator of Nord
Stream 2."[362]

Russian propaganda and disinformation campaigns

False stories have been used to provoke public uproar during the war. In April 2014, Russian news
channels Russia-1 and NTV showed a man saying he was attacked by a fascist Ukrainian gang on one
channel and on the other channel saying he was funding the training of right-wing anti-Russia
radicals.[363][364] A third segment portrayed the man as a neo-Nazi surgeon.[365] In May 2014, Russia-1
aired a story about Ukrainian atrocities using footage of a 2012 Russian operation in North Caucasus.[366]
In the same month, the Russian news network Life presented a 2013 photograph of a wounded child in
Syria as a victim of Ukrainian troops who had just retaken Donetsk International Airport.[367]

In June 2014, several Russian state news outlets reported that Ukraine was using white phosphorus using
2004 footage of white phosphorus being used by the United States in Iraq.[366] In July 2014, Channel One
Russia broadcast an interview with a woman who said that a 3-year-old boy who spoke Russian was
crucified by Ukrainian nationalists in a fictitious square in Sloviansk that turned to be
false.[368][369][364][366]

In 2022, Russian state media told stories of genocide and mass graves full of ethnic Russians in eastern
Ukraine. One set of graves outside Luhansk was dug when intense fighting in 2014 cut off the electricity in
the local morgue. Amnesty International investigated 2014 Russian claims of mass graves filled with
hundreds of bodies and instead found isolated incidents of extrajudicial executions by both
sides.[370][371][372]

Putin and Russian media have described the government of Ukraine as being led by neo-Nazis persecuting
ethnic Russians who are in need of protection by Russia, despite Ukraine's President Zelensky being
Jewish.[373][374][371] Ukraine's rejection of the adoption of Russia-initiated General Assembly resolutions
on combating the glorification of Nazism, the latest iteration of which is General Assembly Resolution
A/C.3/76/L.57/Rev.1 on Combating Glorification of Nazism, Neo-Nazism and other Practices that
Contribute to Fueling Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related
Intolerance, serve to present Ukraine as a pro-Nazi state, and indeed likely forms the basis for Russia's
claims, with the only other state rejecting the adoption of the resolution being the US.[375][376] The Deputy
US Representative for ECOSOC describes such resolutions as "thinly veiled attempts to legitimize Russian
disinformation campaigns denigrating neighboring nations and promoting the distorted Soviet narrative of
much of contemporary European history, using the cynical guise of halting Nazi glorification".[377]

Reactions
To the Russian invasion in Crimea

Ukrainian response

Interim Ukrainian President Oleksandr Turchynov accused Russia

of "provoking a conflict" by backing the seizure of the Crimean
parliament building and other government offices on the Crimean
peninsula. He compared Russia's military actions to the 2008
Russo-Georgian War, when Russian troops occupied parts of the
Republic of Georgia and the breakaway enclaves of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia were established under the control of Russian-
backed administrations. He called on Putin to withdraw Russian
troops from Crimea and stated that Ukraine will "preserve its
Following Russia's annexation of
territory" and "defend its independence".[379] On 1 March, he Crimea, Ukraine blocked the North
warned, "Military intervention would be the beginning of war and Crimean Canal, which provided 85%
the end of any relations between Ukraine and Russia."[380] On 1 of Crimea's drinking and irrigation
March, Acting President Oleksandr Turchynov placed the Armed water.[378]
Forces of Ukraine on full alert and combat readiness.[381]

The Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories and IDPs was established by Ukrainian government on
20 April 2016 to manage occupied parts of Donetsk, Luhansk and Crimea regions affected by Russian
military intervention of 2014.[382]

NATO and United States military response

On 4 March 2014, the United States pledged $1 billion in aid to

Ukraine.[383] Russia's actions increased tensions in nearby
countries historically within its sphere of influence, particularly the
Baltic and Moldova. All have large Russian-speaking populations,
and Russian troops are stationed in the breakaway Moldovan
territory of Transnistria.[384] Some devoted resources to increasing
defensive capabilities,[385] and many requested increased support
from the U.S. and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which US officials Assistant Secretary
they had joined in recent years.[384][385] The conflict Nuland and Ambassador to Ukraine
"reinvigorated" NATO, which had been created to face the Soviet Pyatt greet Ukrainian President Petro
Union, but had devoted more resources to "expeditionary missions" Poroshenko in Warsaw on 4 June
in recent years.[386] 2014

In 2014, Alexander Vershbow said, that Russia "have declared

NATO as an adversary", adding, that NATO must do the same.[387] Initial deployments in March and early
April were restricted to increased air force monitoring and training in the Baltics and Poland, and single
ships in the Black Sea.[387][388] On 16 April, officials announced the deployment of ships to the Baltic and
Mediterranean Seas, and increasing exercises in "Eastern Europe". The measures were apparently limited
so as not to appear aggressive.[389]

Leaders emphasized that the conflict was not a new Cold War[390] but Robert Legvold disagreed.[390]
Others supported applying George F. Kennan's concept of containment to possible Russian
expansion.[391][392] Former U.S. Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul said, "We are enduring a drift of
disengagement in world affairs. As we pull back, Russia is pushing
forward. I worry about the new nationalism that Putin has
unleashed and understand that many young Russians also embrace
these extremist ideas."[393]

In addition to diplomatic support in its conflict with Russia, the

U.S. provided Ukraine with US$1.5 billion in military aid during
the 2010s.[394] In 2018 the U.S. House of Representatives passed a
provision blocking any training of Azov Battalion of the Ukrainian A U.S. Army convoy in Vilseck,
National Guard by American forces. In previous years, between Germany during Operation Atlantic
2014 and 2017, the U.S. House of Representatives passed Resolve, NATO's efforts to reassert
amendments banning support of Azov, but due to pressure from the its military presence in central and
Pentagon, the amendments were quietly lifted.[395][396][397] eastern Europe that began in April
2014.
On 24 September 2019 the U.S. House of Representatives initiated
an impeachment inquiry against incumbent U.S. president Donald
Trump in the wake of scandal surrounding a phone conversation
that Trump had with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on
25 July.[398] In December 2021, Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin
spoke on the phone for two hours and they discussed the issue.
Biden mentioned that he would put sanctions on Russia if Russian
army men entered Ukraine.[399]

International diplomatic and economic responses U.S. Paratroopers and Ukrainian

National Guard during the Fearless
Several members of the international community have expressed Guardian exercise near Yavoriv,
grave concerns over the Russian intervention in Ukraine and Ukraine, 6 June 2015
criticized Russia for its actions in post-revolutionary Ukraine,
including the United States,[400] the United Kingdom,[401]
France,[402] Germany,[403] Italy,[404] Poland,[405] Canada,[406]
Japan,[407] the Netherlands,[408] Norway,[409] South Korea,[410]
Georgia,[411] Moldova,[412] Turkey,[413] Australia[414] and the
European Union as a whole, which condemned Russia, accusing it
of breaking international law and violating Ukrainian
sovereignty.[415]

Many of these countries implemented economic sanctions against

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry
Russia or Russian individuals or companies, to which Russia
meets with Ukrainian members of
responded in kind. Amnesty International has expressed its belief
parliament, 4 March 2014
that Russia is fuelling the conflict.[416]
The UN Security Council
held a special meeting 1 March 2014 on the crisis.[417] The G7
countries condemned the violation of Ukraine's sovereignty, and urged Russia to withdraw.[418][419] All
G7 leaders are refusing to participate in it due to assumed violation of the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of Ukraine, in contravention of Russia's obligations under the UN Charter and its 1997 basing
agreement with Ukraine.[420]

In 2014, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly published a statement (the "Baku Declaration") discussing the
events in Ukraine in detail. Specifically, it pointed out that Russia is a signatory of the Helsinki Accords
and committed to observing its rules, including respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other
member countries, as well as the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances that specifically
guaranteed the integrity of Ukraine's borders. As noted by the OSCE, "Russian Federation has, since
February 2014, violated every one of the ten Helsinki principles in its relations with Ukraine, some in a
clear, gross and thus far uncorrected manner, and is in violation with the commitments it undertook in the
Budapest Memorandum, as well as other international obligations". OSCE condemned actions of the
Russian Federation, calling them "coercion" and "military aggression" that are "designed to subordinate the
rights inherent in Ukraine's sovereignty to the Russian Federation's own interests".[421]

In 2016 the OSCE deputy mission head in Ukraine Alexander Hug summarized the mission's two years of
observations stating that "since the beginning of the conflict" the mission has seen "armed people with
Russian insignia", vehicle tracks crossing border between Russia and Ukraine as well as talked to prisoners
who were declaring themselves Russian soldiers.[422]

In January 2015, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) accepted a resolution that
noted "the direct involvement of the Russian Federation in the emergence and worsening of the situation in
these parts of Ukraine" and called both sides to fully respect the terms of Minsk Agreement.[423]

In June 2015, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly repeated condemnation of "Russia's aggression against
Ukraine, including its illegal annexation and occupation of Crimea" ("Helsinki Declaration").[424] On 28
August 2015 Poland's newly elected President Andrzej Duda said in Berlin during talks with German
President Joachim Gauck and Chancellor Angela Merkel that Poland is already taking in large numbers of
refugees from the Ukraine conflict as part of the EU's refugee programme, and does not intend to join in
talks conducted since 2014 by France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine.[425]

The policy of strategic partnership between Kyiv and

Warsaw requires further strengthening of military and
technical cooperation,[426] best exemplified by the
Lithuanian–Polish–Ukrainian Brigade.[427] The more
immediate task that informed Poland's State secretary
Krzysztof Szczerski, is Ukraine's constitutional reform
leading to broad decentralization of power, in which
Poland's post-Soviet experience is going to be
used.[426]
   Russia
In August 2017, President Donald Trump signed the
Countries that have introduced sanctions on
Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions
Russia in 2014:
Act (CAATSA), which has targeted Russia's oil and
   Countries that have introduced sanctions
gas industry, defence and security sectors, and
   European Union countries that have
financial institutions.[428][429] Trump's administration
collectively introduced sanctions
imposed sanctions on several third countries for
buying Russian weapons.[430][431]

Financial markets

The initial reaction to the escalation of tensions in Crimea caused the Russian and European stock market to
tumble.[432]
The intervention caused the Swiss franc climbed to a 2-year high against the dollar and 1-year
high against the Euro. The Euro and the US dollar both rose, as did the Australian dollar.[433] The Russian
stock market declined by more than 10 percent, whilst the Russian ruble hit all-time lows against the US
dollar and the Euro.[434][435][436] The Russian central bank hiked interest rates and intervened in the
foreign exchange markets to the tune of $12 billion to try to stabilize its currency.[433] Prices for wheat and
grain rose, with Ukraine being a major exporter of both crops.[437]
Later in March 2014, the reaction of the financial markets to the Crimea annexation was surprisingly
mellow, with global financial markets rising immediately after the referendum held in Crimea, one
explanation being that the sanctions were already priced in following the earlier Russian incursion.[438]
Other observers considered that the positive reaction of the global financial markets on Monday 17 March
2014, after the announcement of sanctions against Russia by the EU and the US, revealed that these
sanctions were too weak to hurt Russia.[439]
In early August 2014, the German DAX was down by 6
percent for the year, and 11 percent since June, over concerns Russia, Germany's 13th biggest trade partner,
would retaliate against sanctions.[440]

To the Russian intervention in Donbas

Amnesty International considers the war to be "an international armed conflict" and
presented an independent satellite photo analysis proving involvement of regular Russian
army in the conflict. It accuses Ukrainian militia and separatist forces as being responsible
for war crimes and has called on all parties, including Russia, to stop violations of the laws
of war.[416] Amnesty has expressed its belief that Russia is fueling the conflict, 'both through
direct interference and by supporting the separatists in the East' and called on Russia to
'stop the steady flow of weapons and other support to an insurgent force heavily implicated
in gross human rights violations.'[416]
 NATO – The Russian government's decision to send a truck convoy into Luhansk on 22
August 2014 without Ukrainian consent was condemned by NATO and several NATO
member states, including the United States.[441] NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh
Rasmussen called it "a blatant breach of Russia's international commitments" and "a further
violation of Ukraine's sovereignty by Russia".[442]
 European Union – Leaders warned that Russia faced harsher economic sanctions than
the EU had previously imposed if it failed to withdraw troops from Ukraine.[443] In 2015 the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe [PACE] published a resolution that openly
speaks about a "Russian aggression in Ukraine".[444]
 Ukraine – Chairman of the Ukrainian Parliament Oleksandr Turchynov said "It's a hybrid
war that Russia has begun against Ukraine, a war with the participation of the Russian
security services and the army."[445]
 United States – US Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power commented on
the invasion by noting that "At every step, Russia has come before this council to say
everything but the truth. It has manipulated, obfuscated and outright lied. Russia has to stop
lying and has to stop fuelling this conflict."[154][446] The United States government said it
supported stiffer sanctions as well.[447]
Nordic countries  – On 9 April 2015, a joint declaration by the ministers of defence of
Norway, Denmark, Finland and Sweden and the minister of foreign affairs of Iceland (which
does not have a ministry of defence) was brought by the Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten.
The declaration first asserts that the Russian aggression against Ukraine and the illegal
annexation of Crimea is a violation of international law and other international treaties and
that the Nordic countries must judge Russia not by the rhetoric of the Kremlin, but by the
actions of the country. After pointing out that Russia has increased its military exercise and
intelligence gathering activity in the Baltic and Northern areas violating Nordic borders and
jeopardizing civilian air traffic, the declaration states the intention of the Nordic countries to
face this new situation with solidarity and increased cooperation. The Nordic unity
commitment is extended to include solidarity with the Baltic countries and to a collaboration
within NATO and EU to strengthen also the unity within these entities and to maintain the
cross-Atlantic link.[448]
Russian protests

Street protests against the war in Ukraine have arisen in Russia

itself. Notable protests first occurred in March[449][450] and large
protests occurred in September when "tens of thousands" protested
the war in Ukraine with a peace march in downtown Moscow on
Sunday, 21 September 2014, "under heavy police
supervision".[451]

Critics of Vladimir Putin also express cautious criticism in the press

and social media. Garry Kasparov, a consistent critic of Putin, Protests in Moscow, 21 September
whom he has called "a revanchist KGB thug", has written[452] on 2014
the Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 shootdown and called for Western
action.[453][454]

An August 2014 survey by the Levada Centre reported that only

13% of those Russians polled would support the Russian
government in an open war with Ukraine.[455]

Ukrainian public opinion

A poll of the Ukrainian public, excluding Russian-annexed Crimea,

was taken by the International Republican Institute from 12 to 25
Pro-Russian supporters in Donetsk,
September 2014.[456] 89% of those polled opposed 2014 Russian
20 December 2014
military intervention in Ukraine. As broken down by region, 78%
of those polled from Eastern Ukraine (including Dnipropetrovsk
Oblast) opposed said intervention, along with 89% in Southern
Ukraine, 93% in Central Ukraine, and 99% in Western Ukraine.[456] As broken down by native language,
79% of Russian speakers and 95% of Ukrainian speakers opposed the intervention. 80% of those polled
said the country should remain a unitary country.[456]

A poll of the Crimean public in Russian-annexed Crimea was taken by the Ukrainian branch of Germany's
biggest market research organization, GfK, on 16–22 January 2015. According to its results: "Eighty-two
percent of those polled said they fully supported Crimea's inclusion in Russia, and another 11 percent
expressed partial support. Only 4 percent spoke out against it."[457][458][459]

International reaction

In March 2014, Estonia's president Toomas Hendrik Ilves said:

"Justification of a military invasion by a fabricated need to protect
ethnic "compatriots" resuscitates the arguments used to annex
Sudetenland in 1938."[460] During the Group of 20 (G-20) summit
of world leaders in Brisbane, Australia in November 2014, an
incident occurred during private meetings that became quite public.
At the private leaders' retreat, held the weekend before the official
opening of the summit, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper U.S. President Joe Biden holds a
told Russian President Vladimir Putin "I guess I'll shake your hand video call with Russian President
but I have only one thing to say to you: You need to get out of Vladimir Putin on 7 December 2021
Ukraine." The incident occurred as Putin approached Harper and a
group of G-20 leaders and extended his hand toward Harper. After the event was over, a "spokesman for
the Russian delegation said Putin's response was: 'That's impossible because we are not there'."[461]

In March 2015, NATO's top commander in Europe General Philip M. Breedlove has been criticized by
German politicians and diplomats as spreading "dangerous propaganda" by constantly inflating the figures
of Russian military involvement in an attempt to subvert the diplomatic solution of the war in Donbas
spearheaded by German Chancellor Angela Merkel.[462][463] According to Germany's Der Spiegel
magazine, "the German government, supported by intelligence gathered by the Bundesnachrichtendienst
(BND), Germany's foreign intelligence agency, did not share the view of NATO's Supreme Allied
Commander Europe (SACEUR)."[462]

In 2017, Ukraine opened a case against Russia for involvement and financing of terrorism and racial
discrimination in military occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and part of Donbas.[464][465]

In 2022, UK defence minister Ben Wallace characterized President Putin's article "On the Historical Unity
of Russians and Ukrainians" as "a seven-thousand-word essay that puts ethnonationalism at the heart of his
ambitions... It provides the skewed and selective reasoning to justify, at best, the subjugation of Ukraine
and at worse the forced unification of that sovereign country."[466]

A Normandy Format meeting was planned between Russia, Ukraine, Germany and France in Paris on 26
January 2022,[467] with a follow-up phone call between French President Emmanuel Macron and Russian
President Putin.[468] Ukraine fulfilled Russia's condition for a meeting in Paris and decided to withdraw
from Parliament the controversial draft law on the reintegration of the Crimea and Donbas region, because
the law was contrary to the Minsk peace agreements.[469][470]

In February 2022, Russia held the rotating presidency of the United Nations Security Council, and
diplomats from other countries warned that Russia could take advantage of the UNSC presidency to delay
meetings on actions by Russia.[471]

The deliveries of the United States lethal aid to Ukraine included .50 BMG caliber ammunition, M141
Bunker Defeat Munition and FGM-148 Javelin anti-tank missiles.[472] US also intends to transfer Mi-17
helicopters to Ukraine, previously used by Afghan Air Force.[473] In January 2022, the Biden
administration approved deliveries of U.S.-made FIM-92 Stinger surface-to-air missiles to Ukraine.[474] On
21 January 2022, White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki stated that "In the last year alone, we committed
$650 million in security assistance to Ukraine; in total, since 2014, we've committed $2.7 billion. These
deliveries are ongoing, including today there's more deliveries coming."[475][476][477][478]

Russophobia has increased because Russian citizens' low level of protest activity against the 2022 Russian
invasion of Ukraine. Some in the EU believe this means support for the Kremlin's militaristic actions.[479]

2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine

On 5 March 2022, Israeli prime minister Naftali Bennett met with Russian President Putin in Moscow as a
mediator between Russia and Ukraine, as requested by Ukrainian President Zelensky. The meeting
occurred after a series of phone calls between Bennett and Putin, and with the coordination of France,
Germany, and the United States.[480]

On 20 March 2022, Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida visited India, urging his Indian counterpart
Narendra Modi to take tougher line against the Russian invasion.[481] It was reported a few days earlier that
the Indian Oil Corporation bought 3 million barrels of oil from Russia despite pressure for
sanctions.[482][483]
On 20 March 2022, Chinese diplomat Qin Gang denied US allegations that China was willing to provide
military aid to Russia.[484] Reuters reported a day later that China would provide 10 million yuan of
humanitarian aid to Ukraine, in addition to an earlier donation of 5 million.[485][486] Ambassador to
Ukraine Fan Xianrong said a few days earlier that China and Ukraine were "strategic partners" and that
they would "respect the path chosen by Ukrainians because this is the sovereign right of every
nation".[487][488]

See also
Asymmetric warfare
Buhas bus attack near Volnovakha
Cherkasy (film)
The Forgotten (2019 film)
Casualties of the Russo-Ukrainian War
Hybrid warfare
Military history of the Russian Federation
Ministry of Reintegration of Temporarily
Occupied Territories
New generation warfare
Occupied territories of Georgia
Russian military intervention in Syria
Russian-Ukrainian cyberwarfare
December 2015 Ukraine power grid
cyberattack
May 2017 WannaCry ransomware
attack
June 2017 cyberattacks on Ukraine
Russia–Ukraine gas disputes
Russian sabotage in Ukraine
Temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine
Related to Ukrainian military supply chain
2014 Vrbětice ammunition warehouses
explosions in the Czech Republic
2015 poisoning of Emiliyan Gebrev
and several arms depot explosions in
Bulgaria[489]
2015 depot explosion in Svatove,
Ukraine
2017 Kalynivka ammunition depot
explosion, Ukraine
2017 depot explosion in Balakliia,
Ukraine
Maritime activities
Black Sea incidents involving Russia
and Ukraine
Russian restrictions on navigation in
the Kerch Strait; soft blockade of
Ukraine's Azov Sea coast
General:
List of ongoing armed conflicts
List of wars involving Ukraine
List of wars involving Russia
List of invasions

Notes
a. Arms, military exercises and general aid.
b. For further details, see Belarusian involvement in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.
c. There remain "some contradictions and inherent problems" regarding date on which the
annexation began.[2] Ukraine claims 20 February 2014 as the date of "the beginning of the
temporary occupation of Crimea and Sevastopol by Russia", citing timeframe inscribed on
the Russian medal "For the Return of Crimea",[3] and in 2015 the Ukrainian parliament
officially designated the date as such.[4] On 20 February 2014, Vladimir Konstantinov who at
that time was a chairman of the republican council of Crimea and representing the Party of
Regions expressed his thoughts about secession of the region from Ukraine.[5] On 23
February 2014 the Russian ambassador to Ukraine Mikhail Zurabov was recalled to
Moscow to due "worsening of situation in Ukraine". In early March 2015, President Putin
stated in a Russian movie about the annexation of Crimea that he ordered the operation to
 "restore" Crimea to Russia following an all-night emergency meeting of 22–23 February
2014,[2][6] and in 2018 the Russian Foreign Minister claimed that the earlier "start date" on
the medal was due to "technical misunderstanding".[7]
d. Includes 400–500 Russian servicemen (US claim, March 2015)[18]
e. Russian: pоссийско-украинская война, romanized: rossiysko-ukrainskaya voyna; Ukrainian:
російсько-українська війна, romanized: rosiisko-ukrainska viina.
f. Many countries have provided various levels of support to Ukraine short of becoming
belligerents in the war, while Belarus has provided Russian forces territorial access for the
2022 invasion.

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Further reading
 Bowen, Andrew (2017). "Coercive Diplomacy and the Donbas: Explaining Russian Strategy
in Eastern Ukraine". Journal of Strategic Studies. 42 (3–4): 312–343.
doi:10.1080/01402390.2017.1413550
(https://doi.org/10.1080%2F01402390.2017.1413550). S2CID 158522112 (https://api.seman
ticscholar.org/CorpusID:158522112).
Bremmer, Ian (1994). "The Politics of Ethnicity: Russians in the New Ukraine". Europe-Asia
Studies. 46 (2): 261–283. doi:10.1080/09668139408412161 (https://doi.org/10.1080%2F096
68139408412161).
Hagendoorn, A.; Linssen, H.; Tumanov, S. V. (2001). Intergroup Relations in States of the
former Soviet Union: The Perception of Russians. New York: Taylor & Francis. ISBN 978-1-
84169-231-9.
Legvold, Robert (2013). Russian Foreign Policy in the Twenty-first Century and the Shadow
of the Past. New York: Columbia University Press. ISBN 978-0-231-51217-6.

External links
Гай-Нижник Павло Павлович Росія проти України (1990–2016 рр.): від політики
шантажу і примусу до війни на поглинання та спроби знищення. (https://hai-nyzhnyk.in.u
a/doc/2017doc.rosiya-proty-ukrainy.php) – К.: «МП Леся», 2017. – 332 с. ISBN 978-617-
7530-02-1
"Anchor quits: I can't be part of network 'that whitewashes' Putin's actions" (https://www.cnn.
com/2014/03/05/world/europe/russia-news-anchor-resigns/index.html?hpt=hp_t1). CNN
World. 5 March 2014. Retrieved 11 April 2015.
"Russia's invasion of Ukraine (March 2 live updates)" (https://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukr
aine/russias-invasion-of-crimea-live-updates-338096.html). Kyiv Post. 2 March 2014.
Retrieved 11 April 2015.
"Путін vs народ України. 2 березня. ОНЛАЙН" (https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2014/0
3/2/7016686/) [Putin vs the people of Ukraine. 2 March. ONLINE] (in Ukrainian). Ukrayinska
Pravda. 2 March 2014. Retrieved 11 April 2015.
"Ukraine crisis: an essential guide to everything that's happened so far" (https://www.theguar
dian.com/world/2014/apr/11/ukraine-russia-crimea-sanctions-us-eu-guide-explainer). The
Guardian. Retrieved 11 April 2015.
Granholm, Niklas; Malminen, Johannes; Persson, Gudrun (June 2014). "A Rude
Awakening. Ramifications of Russian Aggression Towards Ukraine" (https://web.archive.or
g/web/20141110102048/https://www.foi.se/ReportFiles/foir_3892.pdf) (PDF). Swedish
Defence Research Agency. 91 pages. Archived from the original (https://www.foi.se/ReportF
iles/foir_3892.pdf) (PDF) on 10 November 2014. Retrieved 11 April 2015.
"Ukraine crisis: Timeline" (https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-26248275). BBC
Online. 13 November 2014. Retrieved 11 April 2015.
"As it happened: Russia troops 'inside Ukraine' " (https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-
28966679). BBC News. Retrieved 11 April 2015.
Список российских военных и добровольцев, погибших на Украине (https://web.archive.
org/web/20171019052243/https://openrussia.org/post/view/1679/) [List of Russian military
and volunteers who were killed in Ukraine]. openrussia.org (in Russian). 22 December
2014. Archived from the original (https://openrussia.org/post/view/1679) on 19 October 2017.
Retrieved 11 April 2015.
Открытая Россия устанавливает личности погибших из списка "Груз-200" (https://web.ar
chive.org/web/20171019052247/https://openrussia.org/post/view/1772/) [Open Russia is in
the process of establishing identities of the victims from the list "Груз-200"]. openrussia.org
(in Russian). 1 April 2015. Archived from the original (https://openrussia.org/post/view/1772/)
on 19 October 2017. Retrieved 11 April 2015.
 "Bellingcat Launches the Ukraine Conflict Vehicle Tracking Project" (https://www.bellingcat.
com/resources/2015/02/03/ukraine-conflict-vehicle-tracking-launch/). Bellingcat. 3 February
2015. Retrieved 11 April 2015.

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