Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Prepared for
Ehsanul Haque
Adjunct Faculty
Department of Social Relations
East West University
Prepared by
Farhan Rafique
2019-1-10-031
ii | P a g e
Letter of Transmittal
Ehsanul Haque
Adjunct Faculty
Department of Social Relations
East West University
Aftabnagar, Dhaka-1212, Bangladesh
Sincerely,
Farhan Rafique
ID: 2019-1-10-031
iii | P a g e
Acknowledgement
First of all, I would like to thank my honorable faculty, Ehsanul Haque, Adjunct
Faculty, Department of Social Relations, East West University for providing me
with the opportunity to observe and analyze such an interesting topic and for his
supervision, relentless guidance and invaluable advice whenever needed.
iv | P a g e
Table of Contents
1. Introduction:......................................................................................................................................1
Background of the study:.........................................................................................................................1
Origin of the Report:...............................................................................................................................1
Objective of the Study:.............................................................................................................................1
Methodology of the Study:.......................................................................................................................1
Limitation of the study:............................................................................................................................2
2. Discussion and Analysis....................................................................................................................2
Russia-Ukraine conflict and Russia's invasion of Ukraine...................................................................2
1. What was Putin's goal?................................................................................................................4
2. What's Putin's problem with NATO?...........................................................................................4
Bangladesh's stand on the crisis............................................................................................................5
First,....................................................................................................................................................6
Second,................................................................................................................................................7
Third,..................................................................................................................................................7
Fourth,................................................................................................................................................8
3. Findings..............................................................................................................................................8
4. Conclusion..........................................................................................................................................9
References.................................................................................................................................................10
v|Page
1. Introduction:
1|Page
Limitation of the study:
As we have collected our data from internet our data won’t be 100% real and we can’t go for the
field work. We can’t give all information like the real sources. We face some problems regarding
collecting data because websites give different information through our work.
It began in February 2014 following the Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity, and initially focused
on the status of Crimea and parts of the Donbas, internationally recognized as part of Ukraine.
The first eight years of the conflict included the Russian annexation of Crimea (2014) and the
war in Donbas (2014–present) between Ukraine and Russian-backed separatists, as well as naval
incidents, cyberwarfare, and political tensions. Following a Russian military build-up on the
Russia–Ukraine border from late 2021, the conflict expanded significantly when Russia launched
a full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022.
Following the Euromaidan protests and a revolution resulting in the removal of pro-Russian
President Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014, pro-Russian unrest erupted in parts of Ukraine.
Russian soldiers without insignia took control of strategic positions and infrastructure in the
Ukrainian territory of Crimea, and seized the Crimean Parliament. Russia organized a widely
criticized referendum,
whose outcome was for
Crimea to join Russia. It
then annexed Crimea. In
April 2014,
demonstrations by pro-
Russian groups in the
Donbas region of
Ukraine escalated into a
war between the
Ukrainian military and
Russian-backed
separatists of the self-
declared Donetsk and
Luhansk republics.
A pre-invasion map of Ukraine and surrounding countries, including areas already annexed
by Russia.
2|Page
In August 2014, unmarked Russian military vehicles crossed the border into the Donetsk
republic. An undeclared war began between Ukrainian forces on one side, and separatists
intermingled with Russian troops on the other, although Russia attempted to hide its
involvement. The war settled into a static conflict, with repeated failed attempts at a ceasefire. In
2015, the Minsk II agreements were signed by Russia and Ukraine, but a number of disputes
prevented them being fully implemented. By 2019, 7% of Ukraine was classified by the
Ukrainian government as temporarily occupied territories, while the Russian government had
indirectly acknowledged the presence of its troops in Ukraine.
In 2021
and early
2022, there
was a
major
Russian
military
build-up
around
Ukraine's
borders.
NATO
accused
Russia of
planning
Ukrainian soldiers prepare to repel an attack in Ukraine’s Luhansk region on February 24 an
invasion,
which it denied. Russian President Vladimir Putin criticized the enlargement of NATO as a
threat to his country and demanded Ukraine be barred from ever joining the military alliance. He
also expressed Russian irredentist views, questioned Ukraine's right to exist, and stated
wrongfully that Ukraine was created by Soviet Russia. On 21 February 2022, Russia officially
recognized the two self-proclaimed separatist states in the Donbas, and openly sent troops into
the territories. Three days later, Russia invaded Ukraine. Much of the international community
has condemned Russia for its actions in post-revolutionary Ukraine, accusing it of breaking
international law and violating Ukrainian sovereignty. Many countries implemented economic
sanctions against Russia, Russian individuals, or companies, especially after the 2022 invasion.
(Russo-Ukrainian War, 2022)
3|Page
1. What was Putin's goal?
The Russian leader's initial aim was to overrun Ukraine and depose its government, ending for
good its desire to join the Western defensive alliance, NATO. He failed to capture the capital
Kyiv and after a month of setbacks turned his ambitions to Ukraine's east and south.
Launching the invasion on 24 February he told the Russian people his goal was to "demilitarize
and de-Nazify Ukraine", to protect people subjected to what he called eight years of bullying and
genocide by Ukraine's government.
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov spoke of freeing Ukraine from oppression. Ukraine's
democratically elected president, Volodymyr Zelensky, said "the enemy has designated me as
target number one; my family is target number two".
Russia's leader refused to call it an invasion or a war, and made doing so a criminal offence.
Instead, it can only be termed a "special military operation". (Kirby, 2022)
2. What's Putin's problem with NATO?
For Russia's leader the West's 30-member defensive military alliance has one aim - to split
society in Russia and ultimately destroy it.
Ahead of the war, he demanded
that NATO turn the clock back
to 1997 and reverse its eastward
expansion, removing its forces
and military infrastructure from
member states that joined the
alliance from 1997 and not
deploying "strike weapons near
Russia's borders". That means
Central Europe, Eastern Europe
and the Baltics.
In President Putin's eyes, the
West promised back in 1990
that NATO would expand "not
an inch to the east", but did so
anyway.
That was before the collapse of
the Soviet Union, however, so
4|Page
the promise made to then Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev only referred to East Germany in
the context of a reunified Germany. Mr. Gorbachev said later that "the topic of NATO expansion
was never discussed" at the time. (Kirby, 2022)
Since the onset of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February, two UN General
Assembly votes – consisting of 193 members – took place on 2 March and then again on 25
March.
While Bangladesh, including India and China and some others, abstained on 2 March,
Bangladesh voted in favor of the Ukrainian resolution 23 days later.
"There hasn't been any change in Bangladesh's policy really," said Shahab Enam Khan, a
professor of International Relations at Jahangirnagar University, "these two resolutions are
basically different things."
According to the professor, before jumping to a conclusion, it is vital to understand the core
nature of the resolutions that were put forward. The first resolution was primarily based on
reprimanding Russia and calling for an immediate end to the invasion.
While Bangladesh abstained from voting in the first UNGA resolution on Ukraine, it voted in favor in the second one
5|Page
"There was a geopolitical and geostrategic component to it," said Khan.
However, the second vote called for providing humanitarian assistance to Ukraine.
Voting in support of "welfare of the civilians complies with Bangladesh's constitution Article no.
25 and values," added Khan, "Bangladesh values humanitarian assistance. The country hosts a
huge [displaced Rohingya] population from Myanmar."
Among the 193 member states, 35 abstained on 25 March, including China and India, two major
economies and powers. Unlike Bangladesh, it can be deduced that China and India have more at
stake. "India's relationship with Russia is complex and vast," said Khan, which can explain why
they chose to abstain yet again.
"At the end of the day, Ukrainians and Russians have to sit together," said Imtiaz Ahmed,
professor of International Relations at the University of Dhaka, "regardless of how much we plan
or discuss" it comes down to the two parties sitting down to negotiate and resolve the conflict at
hand. (Lohani, 2022)
This is not the first time Bangladesh abstained from voting on the Russia-Ukraine issue at the
United Nations. Bangladesh also excused itself from the UNGA voting on the annexation of
Crimea in 2014 to remain neutral in the Washington-Moscow rivalry. But this time, as it is a full-
fledged invasion, it is vital to understand the factors that motivated most South Asian nations,
including Bangladesh, to abstain from voting against Russia. Bangladesh’s official stance on this
“stress test” at the UN has divided Bangladeshis into two groups with opposing viewpoints. One
group, the critics, accuse Dhaka of preferring “realpolitik” over “morals,” asking the question —
“How reasonable is Dhaka’s decision to take a neutral stance on the Russian Invasion of
Ukraine?”. Their counterparts, another group, raise a different question — “Did Dhaka really
have the option to be ‘practical’ and ‘moral’ at the same time?” Four factors contributed to
Dhaka’s decision.
First,
the core mantra of the foreign policy of Bangladesh is “Friendship Towards All, Malice Towards
None” which seemingly prohibits Dhaka from taking a stance in this kind of conflict. Although
in some ways this is just a “slogan”, it is one that Bangladesh has consistently practiced — since
its birth, Bangladesh has tried to strike a fine diplomatic balance among the major global powers.
So, Bangladesh’s decision to sit on the fence in the Russia-Ukraine war is consistent with the
country’s existing foreign policy. Moreover, the constitution of Bangladesh advocates for
dialogue and discussion in finding a peaceful solution to any crisis.
6|Page
Second,
there is a historical perspective that could be helpful to understand why Bangladesh abstained
from voting. In 1971, during the liberation war of Bangladesh, the then USSR, now Russia,
directly supported Bangladesh with extensive aid which created a “soft corner”, emotional
attachment, among Bangladeshis. Because of this support, Bangladeshis perceive Russia as a
“time-tested friend”. And, since the birth of Bangladesh, these two countries have maintained
warm ties with remarkable cooperation in the field of trade, investment, military cooperation,
cultural exchange and so on. This historical connection with Russia has emotional value, which
might have an indirect influence on Bangladesh in taking a neutral stance in the voting.
However, of course this does not mean that the Bangladeshis support Russia’s aggression in
Ukraine.
Third,
if the US intention was to stop war, then it should have addressed the root cause of the war to
resolve the tension through diplomatic dialogue. The aim of this US-backed resolution was not to
stop war but to blame Russia and wall off Moscow diplomatically from the rest of the world.
7|Page
This resolution on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine once again turned over a new leaf in the “new
cold war” that has simmered between the Soviet Union, the US, and their respective allies since
1990. As a member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) — a platform of 120 developing
countries that are not officially aligned with or against any major power bloc — Bangladesh is
not supposed to be officially aligned with, or take a formal stance against, any major global
power.
Fourth,
Bangladesh is on track to graduate from the category of Least Developed Countries (LDCs), but
the country has a diverse range of development stakeholders. Dhaka has a vision to be a
developed nation by 2041, and to achieve this has emphasized economic diplomacy with all the
major global actors. It is crucial for a country like Bangladesh to take a neutral stance on such
cases, as the country has “complex interdependence” with all the “great powers”. For example,
the US is the single largest export destination for Bangladesh’s flagship ready-made garments
(RMG), accounting for more than 80 percent of the country’s total export earnings, China is the
largest trading partner of Bangladesh whereas Japan has become the single largest bilateral
donors of Bangladesh with accumulated $24.72 billion financial assistance since the 1972.
Complicating matters further Russia has directly assisted Bangladesh in materializing the latter’s
aspiration of joining the prestigious “nuclear club” by financing US $12.65 billion for the
country’s first-ever nuclear power plant. Bangladesh’s development pace will halt if it takes a
stance against any major global actors, which leads the country to abstain from voting.
Noteworthy, because of such complex interdependencies, India, Washington’s most trusted ally
in South Asia, also abstained from voting.
Voting against or in favor of Russia means picking a side in this new cold war. Diplomatically, it
is not wise for Bangladesh to pick the side of any global power. Moreover, refraining from the
vote doesn’t necessarily mean that Dhaka is supporting the Russian invasion in Ukraine. Not to
mention, Dhaka strongly believes that “diplomatic dialogue” is the only way to resolve the
disputes and differences that escalated the crisis. (Shazzad, 2022)
3. Findings
Well from the vast analysis of this study I have come to collect some major insights of the
8|Page
aspects and these are explained here:
President Putin has been stunned by the scale of the Western response to his invasion and he is
furious. Not only has Ukraine been supplied with weaponry but a wide array of sanctions
threatens to contract Russia's economy by 10% this year.
The EU, US, UK and other Western nations have targeted Russia's economy in a variety of
ways:
Russia's central bank has had its assets frozen and major banks are shut out of the
international SWIFT payment transfer network.
The US has banned imports of Russian oil and gas; the EU aims to cut gas imports by
two-thirds within a year; and the UK aims to phase out Russian oil by the end of 2022
Germany has halted approval on Russia's Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, a major
investment by both Russia and European companies.
Russian airlines have been barred from airspace over the EU, UK, US and Canada
Personal sanctions have been imposed on President Putin and his daughters, Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov and many other individuals. (Kirby, 2022)
4. Conclusion
Russia has its own reasons and facts to start this war, and Ukraine has its own decisions and
opinions. Due to the absolute dependence of the United States on sanctions as a weapon to
achieve foreign policy goals, at least during President Joe Biden's administration. The United
States is not involved in military conflicts to protect its strategic interests, much less to protect its
allies. This is very important for Washington's allies in the Middle East and Southeast Asia.
Everyone saw Washington and NATO see the Russian invasion of Ukraine because the alliance
only defended its members. Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky's statement is ready to
concede on the issue of Ukraine's separatist status and the willingness to abandon its dream of
joining NATO in exchange for Russia-US-Turkey security guarantees to preserve Ukraine’s
independence and sovereignty. These statements are understandable in the light of the reality of
the field, but not in terms of timing. This suggests that the President of Ukraine recently
9|Page
misjudged Russia's position, understanding that NATO would not participate in the war to
defend non-NATO members.
References
Kirby, P. (2022). Why has Russia invaded Ukraine and what does Putin want? BBC. Retrieved from
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56720589
Lohani, N. (2022). How is Bangladesh handling the Ukraine crisis? The Business Standard. Retrieved from
https://www.tbsnews.net/features/panorama/how-bangladesh-handling-ukraine-crisis-395514
Russia-Ukraine relations:A timeline. (2022, April 12). Times of India. Retrieved from
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/data/russia-ukraine-history
Shazzad, H. (2022). “Friendship Towards All”: Explaining Bangladesh’s Abstention From the UN
Resolution Over Ukraine. Australian Institute of International Affairs. Retrieved from
https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/friendship-towards-all-explaining-
bangladeshs-abstention-from-the-un-resolution-over-ukraine/
10 | P a g e