George J. A.

O’Toole Interview 1
Bold = portions of the interview which were not filmed.

TAPE 050 CONT’D

BEGIN INTERVIEW
O’TOOLE: Well, Maximo Gomez was an officer, I think he was a major in
the Spanish army. He wasn't originally a Cuban. He was a Dominican. And during the
Ten Years War he abandoned the Spanish side and fought on the side of the--the Cuban
insurrectionists. And he regarded the--the end of the war as sort of a--a failure, a
compromise, not--not at all what he had been out for. So after the--the end of the war he
began looking about to organize a new resistance among the--the Cubans who had
emigrated to the United States and elsewhere.
INT: And how about Garcia?
O’TOOLE: Garcia was also a former Spanish soldier and he had--during
the--the Ten Years War he was about to be captured and he put a--a gun to a--a rifle to
his--under his chin and tried to commit suicide. He--he failed in that. He--the bullet
came out between his eyes and left him with a very curious looking depression there.
The Spanish surgeons were able to save his life. Um, but he was not really in the same
league as Gomez. Gomez was a real hard-bitten soldier who --a no-nonsense type.
Whereas Garcia was more of a get-along kind of fellow.
INT: If you can we're going to characterize Weyler, General Weyler.
There's a couple of important things that we need to include. First the fact that he
set up the first concentration camps. And somehow include that in it.
O’TOOLE: Okay. But do you want his background first?
INT: Yeah. The background as well. And also if you can somehow
include the story about Secretary of State John Sherman, how he sent, you know,
this letter justifying his actions.
O’TOOLE: Weyler's parents were Germans who emigrated to Spain. And
he became a--a--an officer in the Spanish army. But he was much more Germanic in his
personality than--than Spanish. He was characterized in the American press during the--
the second Span--second Cuban revolution as being evil incarnate. But he--he really
wasn't. He was a--a man who was prepared to do whatever was necessary to get the job
done. And if that meant burning the villages and the--and the fields in Cuba and moving
the population into concentration camps on the--in the coastal cities he was prepared to
do that even if it meant that it was going to result in--in terrible suffering and death on the
part of the Cubans. Um, but he--he was not setting out to kill off the population of Cuba.
He just was willing to do it if that's what it took.
INT: And can you tell the story about Sherman.
(OFF-MIKE)
O’TOOLE: Weyler had been a Spanish military attaché in Washington
during the Civil War and he, uh, became an admirer of General Sherman who was very
much of the same disposition in fighting a war or doing what's necessary and marching
through Georgia and burning everything in his path. And the--when the American
Secretary of State, who was a brother of General Sherman, complained to a man--I think
his name was O' Donnell, even though he was Spanish, who was the Spanish Foreign
George J. A. O’Toole Interview 2
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Minister at that time--he complained of Weyler's tactics. The--O'Donnell replied by

saying that Weyler was a--a great admirer of General Sherman and that was where he
learned to do these things. Which was sort of a--a--an impolitic way of explaining things
to the General's brother.
INT: We talked a little bit earlier about that people sometimes confuse
that the first concentration camps were in Germany when actually, you know, they
existed in Cuba 50 years earlier.
O’TOOLE: Yeah. Well--well, I'd like to make a distinction between
the--what were really the death camps in--in Germany and the concentration camps
in Cuba and in South Africa and then the ones--or the concentration camps in the
Philippines and then the ones in the West during World War II that these--these
things were not a--a day at the beach. But neither were they Auschwitz.
INT: Yeah.
O’TOOLE: Um, the--it was literally concentration. Getting all of these
people together in one place where they could be watched closely. And it was not
intended to--
(BACKGROUND NOISE)
O’TOOLE: ... drive them to death the way the SS and the Nazis did.
INT: Okay. So maybe that's like a little bit blurry--blurry distinction
(Inaudible) Okay, so let's move on.
O’TOOLE: There was something in the news recently in the last six
months--
INT: Yeah.
O’TOOLE: ... a debate on this. What--what--what's a concentration
camp and is it fair to call these things concentration camps, I guess, that we had in--
in the West with the Japanese. And, uh, I think that--that literally they were true
and before World War II everybody would have known what you meant. But--
INT: Yeah.
O’TOOLE: The Nazis gave concentration camps a bad name.
(LAUGHTER)
INT: Okay. Okay, so let's move on to McKinley now. If you can give
some background to McKinley. (Inaudible) for his election in 1896 and maybe how
his campaign was conducted and, you know, where he came from before (Inaudible)
(OFF-MIKE)
O’TOOLE: McKinley, uh, ran again--against William Jennings Bryan and
the big issue in that campaign was the--the metal money issue, whether the gold standard
should be abandoned for the silver or--or--or what. And it really had very little to do with
Spain or Cuba. Um, McKinley himself was not what we would call a hawk, at least not
then. Um, he--he had fought in the Civil War. And he often said that he had seen the
bodies piled up at Antietam and he knew what war was all about and he didn't want to see
any more of it again.
George J. A. O’Toole Interview 3
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INT: Do you know about how--like about his campaign from his porch
or--?
(OFF-MIKE)
O’TOOLE: He took the unusual step of not going on the road to campaign.
He just sat on his back porch and invited visitors to come and talk to him there or rally in
his front yard, his back yard. It was an unusual way to campaign. But, uh, it was
effective. He was elected in a--with a very, very sizable margin.
INT: Okay, can you describe September 1897, McKinley invited
Roosevelt on a carriage ride through Washington. Could you describe how that
came about and exactly what transpired?
O’TOOLE: Well, in September of '97, um, Theodore Roosevelt was the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy. And he took charge of the navy whenever his--his boss,
Secretary Long, was out of town. And in September of that year Long was away for an
extended period of time. Uh, I'm not sure why McKinley invited him on that first
carriage ride but probably just to get to know him a little bit better. McKinley had been
very reluctant to appoint Roosevelt because he knew that Roosevelt was a hawk and was
possibly likely to get us involved in a war. But Roosevelt took the opportunity (Clears
throat) to present the war plans that the navy was creating. And going over these with
McKinley during that carriage ride subsequently I think a day or two later McKinley
invited him to the White House to continue their talk and then there was another carriage
ride a few days later. And I--I think by the end of this it may not have turned McKinley
into a hawk. But he--he did convey the fact that the U.S. Navy was very well-prepared
with war plans what they would do if they had to fight Cuba--uh, had to fight Spain over
Cuba.
INT: Do you know exactly what his war plans were at the time?
O’TOOLE: Yeah, now, this is--we could get into a little bit of length
if--I'll try and keep it short.
(OFF-MIKE)
O’TOOLE: War--war planning was--was a very new thing at this time.
And it--it logically should have been done by the Office of Naval Intelligence. But the
way things worked out the plans were--were actually generated at the Naval War College
in Newport, Rhode Island, with input from the Office of Naval Intelligence. The--the
thing about the war college was that it was trying to teach naval science to a generation
of--a new generation of naval officers. And in the past this instruction would be done by
using historical examples. But this was a turning point in the--in the technology of war
upon the sea. Um, the--all of the--the good examples that you would find, for example,
in--in Admiral Mahan's "The Influence of Sea Power on History" were based on the idea
of the day of fighting sail. The--the effect of steam driven warships, breach loading
artillery, which was far more--could fire up more--fast--faster and more accurately than--
than the old smooth board cannons and had much greater range. These--these things,
uh,--no--nobody could find examples because there weren't any. So they worked out a
war game. War gaming was familiar to the armies because they used sand tables for this
George J. A. O’Toole Interview 4
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kind of thing in the past. But how you would war game a sea battle was--was a--was a
brand new idea. And the--the navy rose to the occasion at the Naval War College. And
they came out initially with a plan of how they would deal with--with Spain over Cuba by
blockading the island and essentially telling the--the Spanish to get out. That--then this
became more sophisticated. They used a--they developed a new plan every year. And I
think it was--I think it was '97, the year before the--the Spanish War, that they came up
with this elaborate plan of, uh, sending a fleet to the Philippines, blockading Manila, and
using that as a diversion on the Spanish, which would--which would permit them--permit
us,
, to impose this effective blockade and take our time about organizing the amphibious
invasion of Cuba.
INT: Good. I'm going to jump ahead a little bit several months to the
Maine. If you can describe or set the scene for us a little bit in terms of what was
going on on the Maine right before it exploded actually on deck. And, you know,
what happened during the explosion of the Maine afterwards in terms of the ship
itself. You know, if you feel like going on, if you do feel like being a little bit more
descriptive, you know, feel free. We can always cut down.
(OFF-MIKE)
O’TOOLE: Well, the Maine of course arrived in Havana from Key West I
think it was on the 25th of January in '98. And feelings were very very high among the--
the Cubans, the Cuban peninsulares. These were the people whose loyalty were to the--to
the--to Spain and not to--not to Cuba. And they resented American interference. So the
Maine kept all of the enlisted men aboard during the time that--the weeks that it was in--
in the harbor at Havana. Some of the officers went aboard--went--went ashore. But, uh,
only briefly for--and the--they were very careful about not stepping on anybody's toes.
Well, on the night of February 15th about nine--
(OFF-MIKE/CUT)
END TAPE 050
START TAPE 051
O’TOOLE: Well, on the night of February 15th I guess "Taps" aboard the
Maine, it must have been about 9:00, 9:30. And the--the ship was--was quieting down.
All of the enlisted men were in the--in their bunks, which was in the nav--naval tradition
was in the focsal, the front forward point of the ship. And Captain Sigsbee, who was the
Commander of the Maine, was in his--in his stateroom and he was writing a--a letter to
his wife. And I suppose that--I think there were a couple of officers ashore. But it was
all quite quiet. The--Sigsbee later recalled that the--the marine sergeant who played
"Taps" on the bugle was--was achieving some very elaborate flourishes with it that night.
But the sense was tranquillity, peaceful. And then at 9:40 or thereabouts the explosion
struck the Maine.
INT: As soon as the explosion happened what--what was the scene aboard
the ship?
George J. A. O’Toole Interview 5
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O’TOOLE: Well, the--the explosion took place on the forward part of the
ship. It--it took place in the ammunition bunker which was next to a cold bunker. And
this was all in prox--proximity to where the enlisted men were--had their bunks. It--it--it
raised the--the front part of the ship out of the water. Uh, and it threw a great number of
people into the--into the water--into the harbor. Uh, the ones who--who were not thrown
into the harbor were--were badly injured. As--as were many of the people in the water.
Um, and many of them died immediately. They--the front part of the ship began to sink
rapidly because the integrity of the hull was completely gone. And Sigsbee recalled later
that he could hear the--the air rushing out of the hull as the water moved inwards. And,
um, he immediately tried to direct some sort of rescue efforts to these people who were
screaming in the water from, you know, the--the effect of the explosion. Um, then when
he was convinced that he could do no more he and several of the other officers got into a
dinghy and--and made away from the--from the ship.
INT: Good. Okay, now McKinley sort of struggled to go to war even
after the Maine exploded.
O’TOOLE: He struggled not to go to war.
INT: Yeah, not to go to war. Excuse me. Struggled--struggled with
going to war. And the public sort of reacted to this in a very negative way. Can you
describe the public reaction (Inaudible) to McKinley's (Inaudible)
O’TOOLE: The--the immediate public reaction was that the Spanish had
done this. Uh, William Randolph Hearst's, uh, New York newspaper--I forget which one
it was--published a--a full page--full front page article with fairly imaginative
illustrations explaining how the Spanish had done this. This is--the Spanish had done this
through an act of treachery. And the--the navy, when they man--managed to sort things
out in the following few days appointed a--a Court of Inquiry to meet aboard a U.S.
Naval vessel in Havana Harbor and take testimony from various witnesses, etcetera. Uh,
and this--this lasted for--I don't know maybe perhaps--two months in both Havana Harbor
and also in the--in Key West at the Customs House. Uh, and the navy was careful not to
release its findings. But in the meanwhile there was this ground swell of public opinion
driven to some extent by the yellow press but also to a large extent by the existing
situation in Cuba which Americans had been aware of for the--the three years prior to
this, of the--the terrible plight of the--the Cuba people in the concentration camps and
the--the atrocities that were attributed to the Spanish, which were not all imagin--
imaginary, despite what you might read. Um, so the--the--the pressure was building to
say, well, we know the Spanish did this and we're going to war. Um, but it was--it--it
was almost 66 days before any action was taken. And it happened unfortunately at this
point when a letter was written by the--the Spanish ambassador to Washington, which
was very impolitic and it was not meant for publication but it--it--it did find its way into
the hands of the press and that further inflamed public opinion. So at that point
coincidentally the--the report of the Court of Inquiry was--was handed over to the
President and it said that this explosion had been the result of a submerged mine outside
of the hull and that had set off the ammunition bunker. Um, and after that point there was
George J. A. O’Toole Interview 6
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really--McKinley had a tiger by the tail. There really wasn't anyway for him to--to--to
stop events at--at that point.
(OFF-MIKE)
INT: Okay, there's a--McKinley has this war appropriation of $50
million. And I've never really seen this before (Inaudible) about who had the
immediate reaction (Inaudible) Can you tell that story?
(OFF-MIKE)
O’TOOLE: Well, President McKinley asked Congress for an allocation of
a large sum of money to--to fight the war. And they gave him $50 million. Uh, and this
was no secret. It was--it was reported in the press both in this country and in Spain. And
at this time the--the--the Spanish leadership consisted of the--the Queen Regent, who--
who was an--an Aus--Austrian princess, wasn't Spanish at all. But she was holding the
reins of government until her son, who was then 13, would come of age. And she saw
this and she was--she was really impressed by the fact that McKinley could get $50
million to fight Spain simply by asking for it.
INT: So what did she do in turn? She was about to sell Cuba?
O’TOOLE: She--she considered selling Cuba to the United States. But this
was politically unacceptable in Spain so that--that went nowhere. It certainly would have
been preferable to what happened.
INT: After Dewey won--after Dewey won his famous victory
(Inaudible) can you describe not the--not the battle itself but describe America's
reaction to (Inaudible)
O’TOOLE: Okay. The--the victory at Manila Bay took place on May first.
And, um, through a curious, uh, accident the--it was un--Dewey was unable to report it to
Washington. What happened was there was one telegraph line from Manila to Hong
Kong. And anything you wanted to send to the rest of the world had to go over that way.
And Dewey said to the Spanish Captain General in Manila, let us use this and--and you
can use it, too. Otherwise I'm going to dredge it up and cut it. Um, and the--the Spaniard
said, I'm not going to let you use this thing. So he--so Dew--Dewey did in fact cut the
line (BACKGROUND NOISE). And the--and Manila was disconnected from the rest of
the world except by sending a dispatch boat to Hong Kong and filing dispatches from
there which of course the Spanish couldn't do but we could--we could. As a result of all
this there was a long period--I think it was a week--in which there was this ominous
silence from Manila and--and people were beginning to worry what had happened there.
Had the Spanish sunk our squadron or--or--or what? And the--the word finally got to
Washington. The official--Dewey's official dispatch was encrypted. And because an
encrypted message is just a lot of gobbledygook, it has no internal redundancy to--to add
the telegraphers along their route so they could--they--of course they would receive the
message and then they would relay it by key it in again, the--there--there was a--a--a
journalist aboard the--Dewey's fleet. He sent his in the clear and his got to where it was
going maybe an hour in advance of the official report. But as soon as those two reports
were received in Washington there was a vast sigh of relief and then a euphoric
George J. A. O’Toole Interview 7
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celebration of Dewey. Dewey was the man of the hour. And people were, of course,
quite pleased. In--in Europe, um, the--the--the British and the French and the Germans
and the Spanish, of course, couldn't believe it, that an American fleet had been able to
sink a major squadron of--of the Spanish Navy.
` INT: You mentioned in your book--we didn't really talk about
(Inaudible) but when originally volunteers were called there was like this huge
enthusiasm for the draft. There were all kinds of weird sort of takes on how people
volunteered for it. You know, (Inaudible) at Buffalo Buffalo Bill volunteered 100
Indians to do (Inaudible) and Jesse James' brother. Would you be able to relate
some of that?
O’TOOLE: I--I remember from what you're saying but I can't
remember the--I didn't go over this, so--so I--but it wasn't a draft.
INT: Yes.
O’TOOLE: The thing is the--the--that the--the army had to beat them
off with a stick. They--they were--they were just--
(OFF-MIKE)
O’TOOLE: It--it was not necessary to conscript people into the army for
this. Uh, they--there was such enthusiastic support for going to war with Spain that there
were long lines at recruiting stations and people had to be turned away. Uh, and they
were quite unhappy and disappointed. And you had to have some pull, some influence, if
you were going to get--get into--into the army to go to Cuba or--or the Philippines.
(OFF-MIKE/CUT)
INT: This is where moving down to Tampa if you could intro Shafter,
characterize him a little bit. Kind of portray him as a character. Also I understand
that he wanted to delay the embarkation to Cuba because of threat of disease. Can
you talk a little bit about that as well?
(OFF-MIKE)
O’TOOLE: Well, the--the army in general was--was not up to anything
like a--an amphibious invasion of another country. It had been--since the end of the Civil
War it had been fighting the Indians on the frontier and fighting organized labor in the
East whenever there was a strike or other labor unrest. So Shafter, who was another Civil
War veteran, um, didn't really have an awful lot of experience with commanding troops
in the field in a--in a way that would be helpful. Uh, but he did have a--a--a historical
knowledge of Cuba and military operations there and he was mightily impressed by the--
the threat posed by the climate and by disease. And he recalled an invasion of Cuba by
the British, I guess probably during the--the Seven Years War in--in the 18th century.
And that--this invasion was--was repulsed without very much military resistance on the
part of the Spanish. Uh, simply because their ally was--was yellow fever and--and
yellow fever decimated this British force.
INT: Okay. Can you describe what Shafter looking like, what his
demeanor was?
George J. A. O’Toole Interview 8
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O’TOOLE: Shafter was a--a--a--a soft fellow. He was--he was grossly

overweight. And he--he meant well but he also was--was used to--to living well. Uh, he
had--in his--in his gear, which he brought along to Cuba, he had cases of champagne and
other luxuries that the average grunt didn't--didn't get to enjoy. Um, when he--when he
got to--when they landed at--near Santiago he remained in the--on--on his ship off the--
offshore until the--the whole 16,000 men and army landed. And when he finally got
ashore he, of course, was--he no longer had the cooling breezes of--of the Caribbean to
contend with. He had the--the tropical climate of--of Cuba in June. And it--it really
knocked him on his back. I mean, he--he--he could not lead his troops to the front. He
was--at one point he was carried to a--a staff meeting on--on a--a door that had been
taken off a farmhouse and it was used as a litter to get him--this was--this was
humiliating, of course. But it was also the only way he was going to get there. And, um,
he--he was suffering terribly from--from the--the climate. The--and the like.
(OFF-MIKE)
INT: Let's move a little bit back to Washington. If you can describe
the board room that was set--set up in the White House. You know, try to--as if we
were actually there sort of, you know, describe what it was like to be there. You
don't have to tell the whole like--
(OFF-MIKE)
O’TOOLE: Well, the--on the second floor of the White House there was a
room that was converted into a command and control center. They called it the
operations room. And it certainly wasn't much by--by today's high tech standards. But
(Clears throat) it was where the--the President and--and his advisors went when they
wanted to monitor the--the progress of the war and decide what--what was to be done.
They had maps, of course, with pins in them. And they had a couple of roll-top desks,
telephones. And I guess they probably had a--a telegraph sounder there, too. The--the
telegraph was--was vitally important, although most of the messages that the White
House needed were coming into the signal corps in the army just a block--a block away.
And, uh, because we had this very interesting communication intelligence arrangement
where we had a man in the telegraph office in Havana who was reporting to our station in
Key West and then from there back out to the signal corps, it is--the--the amazing fact is
that in 1898, 100 years ago, the President of the United States was able to keep track
almost on a minute by minute basis of significant events in the war. The arrival of
Admiral Cervera's fleet in Santiago, which was a--was a much-awaited event and, um,
other events that occurred throughout the island related to the war. Because all of these
reports were sent by the Spanish telegraphers across the island to Havana. And as soon
as the Western Union man there finished writing the--writing down a copy of the
message and sending it to the palace for the Spanish Governor General he then--he made
another copy which he--which he sent out over the 90 mile link to--to Key West and it
was not a great deal longer than it took to get it to--to Washington.
INT: Okay, great. So McKinley during the war actually, was he able
to control the strategy of the land?
George J. A. O’Toole Interview 9
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(OFF-MIKE)
O’TOOLE: Well, it--I'll--I'll answer your
INT:. He--he--he--he didn't take a lot--he didn't enter--he didn't
micro-manage things.
INT: Oh, okay.
O’TOOLE: Um, the--the, um,--the military decisions were left to the
military on the ground in Cuba. Uh, it was not like LBJ during the Vietnam War
deciding when they were going to bomb in the North and if they were going to bomb
in the North. Uh, he--he just said, you know, get the job done. The problem, um,
arose when we had--
(BACKGROUND NOISE)
O’TOOLE: ... pretty much defeated the Spanish but not completely.
They hadn't capitulated yet.
INT: Yeah.
O’TOOLE: And then it was not so much McKinley as it was his
Secretary of War, Algier--
INT: Yes.
O’TOOLE: ... who--who began to micro-manage things. The--General
Shafter and--and other Generals on the scene were in favor of reaching some sort of
a compromise with the Spanish. The Spanish were very concerned about the
appearances. They wanted--
(OFF-MIKE)
INT: Whose decision was it to take El Caney as well? If you could
include that. I think it was Shafter.
(OFF-MIKE)
O’TOOLE: Be--before the--the battle of San Juan, Shafter and his staff
rode up to a--an elevation from which they could see Santiago and--and the surrounding--
the--the San Juan Hills and--and El Caney, which was a fairly small village off to, I
guess, their North or their Northwest. Uh, and I don't think there was any great debate
about what had to be done. Um, they--they decided to mount a--a two-prong attack. One
on the--the San Juan Heights which stood between them and--and Santiago. And the
other off--off on their right flank to El Caney. And this may seem a little strange since El
Caney wasn't standing between them and their objective. But they were afraid that the
Spanish had amassed a sizable military force there which would be on their front--on
their right flank as they approached Santiago, as they fought in the--the San Juan Hills.
Um, so they had to neutralize that otherwise they might find themselves with this Spanish
force at their rear and then that would, you know, be a--a--a revolting development, as
they used to say. Uh, so--so that was why the--this--this battle of--of San Juan and El
Caney, um, took place simultaneously, early in July.
INT: Would you be able to describe what happened at El Caney (Inaudible)
O’TOOLE: Well, approximately. I mean, it was--
(OFF-MIKE)
George J. A. O’Toole Interview 10
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O’TOOLE: Uh, the--the--El Caney was--was bitterly fought. Uh, there

were Spanish there but not nearly as many as Shafter thought. But they were--they were
dug in very well. Um, and of course an attacking force has to have a great deal of
numerical superiority anyhow to a defending force. Uh, and these people, the Spanish
who were defending that were--were really willing to give their lives. It was--it was a
bloody battle. I mean, there was a great many casualties on the Spanish side. Um, and it
lasted all day and I think into the evening. Uh, but eventually it was--the objective was
achieved.
INT: Okay, now the--the battle of San Juan Hill itself. Can we talk
about Roosevelt's role specifically because that's what we sort of traced. But can
you, first of all, establish which hill Roosevelt stormed? You know, in (Inaudible)
San Juan. Anyway. And what--there's a story on his way out. Maybe we should
split this up a little bit. Or, you know, we'll see how it proceeds. But the story of
thinking of just how he got ahead of his men and then he--you know, they were--
they were behind--
(CUT/OFF-MIKE)
INT: So this would be where the--the river was. So (Inaudible) tried
to cross San Juan River while it was so bloody and--
(OFF-MIKE)
O’TOOLE: Well, uh, the--the army had one balloon in Cuba, an
observation balloon. And the officers who were manning it really enjoyed the--the
advantage it gave them but they felt they needed to get closer to the front. So they had
four men drag the thing by rope up to the--up to the front. And it probably looked a lot
like Macy's Thanksgiving Day in New York. Once they got up to where the action was
the--the--the Spanish--well, first of all, they shot the thing down. But it was still hanging
in the trees. And it gave the Spanish what they hadn't had before. Uh, a precise place in
which to aim at the advancing American troops. The--the--the troops were coming up
this path in the jungle and from the heights of San Juan Bridge it was--it was not very
clear where--where to shoot. But after that balloon got stuck there the--the carnage was
devastating. The--there was a New York reserve battalion, National Guard. And they--
they got really chopped up from all of the--the firing that was taking place because of this
balloon. And the--the base of--of the San Juan Ridge became a very unhealthy place to--
to--to be. So the fact that Roosevelt and the Rough Riders charged at this point is--is not
a matter of them overcoming their fear of getting shot down on the hill while climbing it.
END TAPE 051
START TAPE 052
O’TOOLE: Well, the Rough Riders, uh--were formed along the--a small
river that ran uh--beneath the San Juan Heights, and they didn't uh--they hadn't advanced
at this point, uh--but the, the fire was--was --was withering. Uh--At this point, Bucky
O'Neill, who was the rough rider--one of the rough riders from the Old West, who was--
really an old west type character, he was walking up and down, sort of daring the Spanish
to hit him, and they did. He died, you know, in an eye blink. Uh--but it s- soon became
George J. A. O’Toole Interview 11
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apparent to Roosevelt and--and all the rest of the Rough Riders, that uh--it wouldn't be
any more dangerous for them to charge up the hill, than it would be for them to stay
where they were. So they charged up the hill, and the hill by the way, was not San Juan
Hill. It was part of the San Juan ridge, but it was later dubbed Kettle Hill, by the
Americans, because there were two big iron kettles at the top, that were used in--in
manufacturing sugar. Uh--but, uh--Roosevelt aboard his uh--his uh--horse, I think it was
called Little Texas uh--got out in front of his men, who--who were not riding horses.
They had left most of the horses behind in Tampa because they just couldn't fit them on
the ships. Uh--so, he got up to the top, and he turned around and --and he realized that he
was--that he was still all alone; that the--most of the Rough Riders they had gotten across
the river and they were moving in the direction of uh--of the top of Kettle Hill, but they
hadn't, uh--they weren't anywhere near him. Uh--so he rode back down and started
gesturing with his pistol and uh--exhorting them --to move. It was--the one man uh--that
Roosevelt mentions in his memoirs of this uh--he was lying prone on the hill, because he
was uh--frightened, uh--as we would all be. Uh--and uh--while--while Roosevelt was
trying to get him to get up and charge, a bullet hit him, and uh--I guess it--it just
transfixed his whole body from head to-- to foot. But uh--Roosevelt managed to--to get
them all going; get them--get them up the hill. But he--he went up again and he was still
uh--ahead of the pack. He--he killed a couple of--of Spanish soldiers uh--with his pistol
and uh--then there he was; at--at the top of--of uh--Kettle Hill and he could see down
the--the uh--San Juan Ridge ahead of him; he could see his objectives; Santiago and
the--and the Spanish fleet in the harbor.
INT: Uh--from this point he was able to see the charge up San Juan Hill as
well? Uh--do you want to describe what he saw? What that charge was like? I
understand it was chaotic.
(OFF-MIKE)
O’TOOLE: Shortly after the Rough Riders got to the top of Kettle Hill, the
uh--uh--another unit, uh--began to try to attack, what actually was San Juan Hill. Uh--
Roosevelt and Rough Riders could see it; see the attack from where they were uh--
ensconced and the uh--the Spanish were very well dug in, in trenches at the top of San
Juan Hill. It wasn't like Kettle Hill. Uh--the Americans were--were being led by a man
named uh--uh--Lieutenant Ord, I believe. O-r-d, uh--who was uh--the famous name in--
in the Army. Uh--and he was killed in this uh--in this action. But uh--the--the American
force was not making much progress up the hill until uh--well, Roosevelt recalls some--
hearing something that sounded like a lot of drums going. And then they realized that
these were four Gatling guns, that had been brought up to the front, and the uh--they were
directing their fire on the Spanish trenches on the top of San Juan Hill, and I guess the
Spanish had never seen this--this kind of weapon before. But it scared them because it
was you know hundreds of rounds a minute, pouring into their positions and it--it didn't
take long before they--they just turned tail and--and ran down the other side of the hill.
Uh--of course there was still enough of them up there, uh--shooting down uh--to make it
uh--dangerous for the uh--for Ord and his people to--to--to charge and--and as I say, Ord
George J. A. O’Toole Interview 12
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was killed. And--and it was a relatively costly battle for--for us, but uh--it--it didn't take
that long before the--the Americans were uh--were on top of the hill, and had taken it.
INT: Okay, can you talk a little bit about--you started to go into this
earlier, about the surrender under the--the negotiations for the surrender and the
treaty, and what the Spanish were really after. We actually went to the tree, and
filmed underneath it. Roger can vouch for that. So we have this beautiful footage of
the tree, so you gotta mention the tree (LAUGHS), just so we can see it. Ready?
O’TOOLE: Well, the American and Spanish commanders uh--had to find a
place to meet, to discuss what would happen next, and they picked uh--a luxurious, a
luxuriant tree, uh--in whose shade they could uh--shelter while they--while they talked.
Uh--and the uh--Spanish, realized what they were going to lose and that they had very
few choices left. Uh--they didn't--they certainly didn't expect uh--military success at
this--at this point. Uh--they--they wanted to preserve their honor however, and uh--
instead of simply--well, first of all they didn't like--they didn't like the word surrender.
They wanted to call it capitulation. Uh--and nobody seem to have any problem with that
on the American side. Uh--then--the--the next thing is they did not want to uh--to come
out with their hands up. Uh--as P.O.W.'s. They wanted to be permitted to leave the area
of San--Santiago, but take their weapons with them, and uh--move off to some other
place in Cuba, where uh--it wasn't specified what--what would happen next. Uh--the uh--
the American commander, Shafter and the other Generals uh--thought, well this is not a
bad idea. At least, you know, it uh--it gets--we'll have--we'll have Santiago. By this
time, of course uh--the uh--the entire civil--civil--civil population of uh--Santiago had left
the city, and were now in El Caney, where they had become our responsibility and there
were 20 thousand of them and we couldn't care for them. So, uh--this--this proposal on
the part of the Spanish seemed attractive. You know, get out of Santiago and then we can
let the civilians back in, and they can take care of themselves. But, Alger didn't, uh--the
Secretary of War, uh--didn't think this--this was what we should do, and there was a--a
fairly long uh--debate on this. There were finally--I think they finally settled on the idea
that they would surrender their weapons but we would send them back uh--to uh--Spain,
aboard the same ships that we--that we would send the prisoners. And I think that was
basically the way it was--it was uh--settled and agreed upon.
INT: In the book, (Inaudible) as Yellow Jack, uh--this whole yellow
fever as being a delayed ally for the Spanish. You could talk about what you meant
exactly by that. There's also an interesting quote where you talk about the uh--the
bugles echoing the hills; where there was a Taps being played all day.
O’TOOLE: Oh--oh--oh yeah.
INT: Uh--and eventually it sounded like it was echoing back and forth.
You know, just talk about what that image means.
(OFF-MIKE)
O’TOOLE: Well, pri---prior to the battle of Santiago, San Juan and El
Caney, uh--yellow fever hadn't been uh--much of a--a problem. But the uh--the summer
was wearing on. It was now the--the middle of--of July and uh--Yellow fever began to
George J. A. O’Toole Interview 13
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explode through the ranks. Uh--and this put a great deal of pressure on the Americans to
accept whatever compromise the--the Spanish could live with. Uh--the uh--uh--the--the
mortality rate from the disease was far greater than uh--the combat casualties uh--that had
taken place thus far. And uh--after a while the sound of uh--bugles in the hills at the
funerals for the--the American victims of--of the disease, seem to go on all day, as they
were echoing back and forth, rather than individual ceremonies of--of uh--funerals. So,
that uh--uh--that I think finally had uh--the decisive force to uh--lead to the acceptance of
the uh--the Spanish proposal.
INT: Okay, let's move out of Cuba for a little bit. We're not going to
stay in the Philippines for that long, but this one particular--you said you painted a
very nice picture of Shafter. And I was hoping that you'd do a little bit for Otis, in
terms of comparing him as a you know, as a general to Shafter.
O’TOOLE: Well, I'm not sure that you can do that very easily,
because uh--by the time the uh--the American expediti---expeditionary force from
the West Coast reached the Philippines, uh--it--it was pretty much over. I mean,
uh--it was .. the Spanish again with their sense of appearances and honor, wanted to
have uh--uh--some sort of a battle ...
INT: Uh-huh.
O’TOOLE: ... which they could lose honorably, rather than again
putting their hands up and coming out and saying I surrender. Uh--so it was not the
kind of military challenge that uh--Shafter had to face.
INT: Yeah, well not in terms of a challenge. But just in terms of like,
here we are--this is our first overseas venture by the United States and our--the
representation of the United States are these two guys; these sort of Civil War
veterans, you know veterans of the Indian War, who've have never negotiated with
anyone who hasn't been white before. And they're both sort of relatively unfit. You
know, they're both--you know they don't know how to handle these--you just these
old, older men.
O’TOOLE: I don't know that much about Otis. I mean I didn't--I
didn't really pursue this because it was pretty much a charade. Uh--the--the
interesting thing to me about the Philippine situation was the interplay between
Dewey and the German fleet. And how that was foreshadowed events in the--in the
20th Century; that uh--we nearly went to war with Germany; at least, we nearly
had uh--Dewey declaring war unilaterally on German in uh--in Manilla Bay.
INT: Yeah.
O’TOOLE: And--and subsequently he became uh--essentially the uh--
the Naval Chief of Staff, uh--during uh--many--most of the planning that went on
and--and war planned black which was the--plans for a war with the--with
Germany. And he had uh--he had a definite bias against--it wasn't so much a uh--
uh--I don't like Germans because they eat sauerkraut. It was--it was I don't like
Germans because they are uh--overbearing and they try to--to--they try to kick me
out of uh--out of Manila and--and ...that's a worry about in addition to everything
George J. A. O’Toole Interview 14
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else. But it definitely had a plan--had part of it. But as far of the uh--the stuff in
uh--the Battle of Manila--what? It lasted what? One day? Two days?
INT: Yeah.
O’TOOLE: And it was uh--it was like a reenactment, like one of these
Civil War Re-enactments.
(OFF-MIKE)
O’TOOLE: The Battle Of Manila was not really much of a--a battle being
fought in earnest. It was another one of these things where the Spanish did not want to
simply raise their hands in the air and come out surrendering. They wanted to at least--
to--to be blooded by a--a--an adversary, so they could--they could go out with honor.
Uh--so the Battle of Manila, which took place after the American uh--expeditionary force
arrived to--to uh--relieve uh--Admiral Dewey's squadron, was--was I think it lasted about
two days and uh--it--it was not (Clears Throat)--it was not a terribly big battle, and it was
almost a charade. It was almost like the uh--the re-enactments that you see today of Civil
War battles, uh--although people were killed in it, but uh--there was no uh--there was no
tension as to, you know, who's going to win. Everybody knew who was going to win and
the only question was, what it--what it would take to satisfy the uh--Spanish uh--desire to
retain their honor.
INT: Can you set up the Treaty of Paris; set up the negotiations. What
was at stake in terms of--what the Americans wanted and what the Spanish were
willing to give?
(OFF-MIKE)
(SOUND CUT)
INT: ... Uh by referring to General Sherman. Uh--
O’TOOLE: Yeah, that--that .. that justification actually was not
uttered by Weyler.
INT: Yeah.
O’TOOLE: It was uttered by O'Donald who was the Foreign Minister
of Spain at the time. He was one--another one of these Irish wild geese who went
and settled in Spain after the Battle of the (Inaudible).
INT: Yeah.
O’TOOLE: So, uh--it was true that he--that Weyler admired Sherman
but uh--he wasn't going to reply to--to some diplomatic uh--complaint by--by uh--
Sherman's brother. It wasn't his job. He was a governor general of--of Cuba and
uh--he was, his job was to keep things in order, in Cuba. So uh--the--it may not
make as good a story that way but that's ...
INT: Yeah, that's sort of a problem. (Inaudible) Is there anything else
on Weyler that you ...? I mean you mentioned earlier that he was German.
O’TOOLE: Yeah, well he--well he was born in Spain but his parents
were immigrants.
George J. A. O’Toole Interview 15
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INT: Yeah. What about the Spanish government at the time. Can
you sort of set up what the Spanish, how the Spanish system worked you know with
the Prime Minister ...
O’TOOLE: Maybe uh--maybe this would--would solve both
requirements. Weyler was--was a convenient figure to hate, because uh--the--
leadership ...
(OFF-MIKE)
O’TOOLE: Weyler was a convenient figure for Americans to hate. They
needed somebody to per- personify Spain, and of course the--the King of Spain at this
time, Alfonso the 13th was a--a 14 year old kid. Uh--his mother, who was Queen Regent
was an Austrian princess, not very Spanish. Uh--and uh--the uh--the leadership of the
government--the--the civil leadership was a part of this uh--rotating system that
confused everybody. So the fact that--here we had Weyler uh--who was on the scene
in Cuba and was ordering these concentration camps ...
(OFF-MIKE)
O’TOOLE: Uh--the Americans needed somebody to personify the
perfidious uh--Spanish and uh--they couldn't look to the--the Spanish king because he
was a young boy; hadn't yet come of age. A... and the--the monarchy was consisted of
the Queen Regent who wasn't Spanish. She was an Austrian princess. Uh--and the
American knowledge of the politics in Madrid was not extensive. They could not point
fingers at this person or that person but here was this uh--this Weyler, Butcher Weyler,
they called him. The--the governor general who was uh--Spanish only because he was
born in Spain. His parents had immigrated there from Germany. Prussian, he was a
Prussian. So uh--that's why they uh--they judged him that way. That was why they said,
this is--this is the figure that we need.
(OFF-MIKE)
O’TOOLE: Well, uh--the--the peace treaty to tie up all the loose ends in
the war, was to take place in Paris I think, early in October. Uh--we sent a five person
delegation consisting of three senators and I forget who the other two were, uh--and uh--
they were uh--to represent our uh--interests and what we wanted out of it. Uh--by this
time uh--McKinley had--had swung around to the idea of making America a--an
Imperialistic power and taking the Filipinos. Uh--he--he said that uh--this came to him
pretty much uh--as--as directions from the Lord. But it--it--I think a lot of what
happened--had to do with it was a--a tour he took during the campaign of that year, where
he would address people in the Midwest and uh--address groups. And they all seemed
to--to respond favorably to uh--the idea of keeping the Philippines. So, that was the--the
instructions--the marching orders that the--the uh--American mission to this peace treaty
had. Uh--and they ended up getting the agreement of--of Spain for--for the U.S. to take
uh--the Philippines and Puerto Rico. Uh--the--the Spanish said why don’t you take Cuba
too, knowing that--that there was something like 400 million dollars of indebtedness
involved in whoever owned Cuba, and we said, No thanks. But, uh--that is how we--we
came to uh--agreed to--to uh--to taking the Philippines. A curious side line on this. Uh--
George J. A. O’Toole Interview 16
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the--I mentioned before that the uh--uh--the Spanish had refused the use of the telegraph
cable to uh--Dewey, and he had therefore cut it. Well, uh--that meant that neither side in
the Philippines knew what was going on in the rest of the war. And the uh--in August,
there was a--a cease fire. Uh--both sides uh--stopped shooting, except in--in the Phili,
where they didn't know that the cease fire had been signed and therefore, the--the famous
so-called Battle of Manila, was fought a day after the uh--the cease fire. Uh--and of
course, if uh--if the cable hadn't been cut, uh—there would have been no question. We
wouldn't have demanded the Filipinos. We wouldn't have had fought the battle. Uh--and
if you think about the--the subsequent events in the 20th Century or involvement in uh--
East Asia and--and that part of the Pacific, it--it really is food for thought. It really makes
you stop and think. And would there have been Pearl Harbor, for example. Uh--but that
uh--the uh--the treaty was a--signed in uh--in December and although by this time there
was a lot of Anti---Imperialist sentiment in the United States. Let's not get involved and--
and these are the kinds of entanglements that Washington warned us about. And we
shouldn't do it. But uh--the uh--the Pro-Philippines people went out and uh--uh--we had
uh--we had our--our first overseas colony.
(OFF-MIKE)
INT: Would you be able to tell the story of his assassination?
O’TOOLE: (Overlap) Well there's--there's not a hell of a lot to tell
but, yeah.
INT: (Inaudible) Give it a shot.
O’TOOLE: Well McKinley went to uh--address the uh--I think it was the
Pan American exposition in Buffalo. And uh--at the, at the time the Presidential security
was sort of a--a catch as catch can. The Secret Service uh--did not have the responsibility
for--for Presidential security. It basically has a force that was formed after the Civil War
to catch counterfeiters. Uh--I think there were Secret Service personnel present at the
uh--the exposition. But uh--they--they certainly didn't uh--they did not have metal
detectors at the time. And this man who was a--a--an anarchist had decided simply as
anarchists did in those days to uh--to go and kill some uh--leading official. And he got
in--into a line of people waiting to shake McKinley's hand, and when he got up to
McKinley, it turned out he had a revolver, and he--he uh--he shot him. Uh--now, it didn't
immediately kill uh--his target, because uh--in those days, well--for example, when
Garfield was shot, in Washington, he lingered for about four months. He lingered
through the entire summer. They--the White House became the first air conditioned
building in Washington uh--before he finally died. Uh--McKinley took a little longer. It
took a couple of weeks for him to die. Uh--uh--Roosevelt thought that--that he wasn't
going to die and he went off on a camping trip with his family in the Adirondacks. Uh--
but eventually uh--the, the wound and uh--its effects on him, uh--took his life.
(OFF-MIKE)
INT: Can you talk a little bit about the efforts to drudge out the
Maine, briefly, you don't have to get into every single detail, but why do you think
it's so important for the United Stated to figure out exactly what blew up the
George J. A. O’Toole Interview 17
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(Inaudible), even after the events were so written in history after this point. Why it
was still ...?
O’TOOLE: Well, I'm not sure that it was that terribly important but
uh--I, you know--I can address the ...
INT: I mean you understand what I'm getting at. Just sort of to
reflect on the legacy on such a random act of faith determining history.
(OFF-MIKE)
O’TOOLE: Well, in 1911, the government and the Navy decided that it
was not what they wanted to have the Maine, uh--on the bottom of Havana harbor with
its super structure uh--sticking up out of the water. And they thought it would be more
seemly to uh--refloat the Maine, and uh--take it out to sea and sink it there. Uh--before
they did that, they built a coffer dam around the wreck so they could pump out all the
water and uh--give the--the hull a uh--a careful examination and see whether it confirmed
what the Naval Court of Inquiry had found. And this they did, and--and uh--they
concluded the same thing that the Court of Inquiry had; that--that it had been an--an
explosion exterior to the hull, that had set off the ammunition inside the hull. And that's
where things stayed until the 1970's when uh--the late Admiral Rickover, got interested in
it, for whatever reason. And he went, and got all the old records of the uh--first and
second courts of inquiry; the photographs that were taken of the second uh--uh--court
uh--investigation. And he uh--worked with several uh--experts on naval architecture;
several of the Navy's own experts. And uh--they--they uh--they spent a great deal of time
on this and they came up with the conclusion that it was not an external explosion, but
that it was probably uh--a--just the explosion of the ammunition uh--bunker, uh--which--
which was set off by a--a spontaneous combustion fire, in the coal bunker. And I think
most people, who uh--who take an interest in this agree that, the second uh--investigation
or the third investigation, the Rickover investigation really got to the truth. Now uh--it, it
...it's ironic when you think about it because there were coal bunker fires on many
American warships at this period of time. Uh ...but you might ask yourself, why did this
happen in Havana; not at Key West which was the Port of Call before it went to Havana,
or--or uh--New Orleans where it was suppose to go after it left Havana. If it had
happened at either of those places, there wouldn't have been a Spanish American War.
But, it uh--set off a uh ...a chain of events, because it happened at this particular time of
great tension between the U.S. and Spain, in Spanish waters. It set off this uh--this series
of events that transformed the United States from a isolated power in North America to a
Imperial Power with a two ocean Navy, stretching from the far Pacific, to the Atlantic
and uh--uh--it changed us uh--in ways that uh--that could never be reversed.
(OFF-MIKE)
INT: Let me ask you a general question. There has been recent
scholarship about the Spanish American war being the start of what's known as the
American Century. We don't have much time on this reel. So if you could be very
succinct, or is that too general?
George J. A. O’Toole Interview 18
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O’TOOLE: Well, I don't know what to say about it. It's true. It was--
it was the start of the American Century. I think I was alluding to this in the last
uh--shot; that uh--the uh--as I say in the book that uh--the sons of the people who--
who fought in--in the Spanish American War were the people who remembered
Pearl Harbor, uh--40 years later.
INT: Yeah.
O’TOOLE: And their sons ...
(OFF-MIKE)
O’TOOLE: It's not an overstatement to say that this was the beginning of
the America Century. Uh--you have to remember that--that sons of the people who
fought in the Spanish-American War, were the people who sang Remember Pearl Harbor,
and uh--their sons went off to fight in the--in a place called Vietnam. And, none of these
things I think would have happened, if that bunker fire, had not blown up the Maine in
Havana, in 1898.
END INTERVIEW