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Main page Further information: Constitution of Pakistan

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Current events The Objectives Resolution ((Urdu
Urdu:: ‫ )قرارداد َم ق اِص د‬was adopted by the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on March 12, 1949. Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan,
Khan, had presented it in the
Random article assembly on March 7, 1949. Out of 75 members of the assembly, 21 voted for opposing it.[1] All the amendments proposed by minority members were rejected. Consequently, all ten of
About Wikipedia them voted against it.
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The resolution proclaimed that the future constitution of Pakistan would not be modeled entirely on a European pattern, but on the ideology and democratic faith of Islam. The resolution,
in its entirety, has been made part of the Constitution of Pakistan under Article 2(A).
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Community portal 2 Criticism
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Objectives Resolution ​[ edit ]

Permanent link The Pakistani Objectives Resolution

Page information
Cite this page Sovereignty over the entire Universe belongs to Allah Almighty alone and the authority which He has delegated to the state of Pakistan, through its people for being exercised within the
Wikidata item limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust.[2]

1. This Constituent Assembly representing the people of Pakistan resolves to frame a constitution for the sovereign independent state of Pakistan.
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2. The state shall exercise its powers and authority through the chosen representatives of the people.
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Printable version 3. The principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice, as enunciated by Islam, shall be fully observed.
4. The Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran
Languages
and Sunnah.
বাংলা
5. Adequate provision shall be made for the minorities to freely progress and practice their religions and develop their cultures.
Français
हिन्दी 6. Pakistan shall be a federation and its constituent units will be autonomous.
Bahasa Indonesia 7. Fundamental rights shall be guaranteed. They include equality of status, of opportunity and before law, social, economic and political justice, and freedom of thought, expression,
Italiano belief, faith, worship and association, subject to (the) law and public morality.
‫سنڌي‬ 8. Adequate provisions shall be made to safeguard the legitimate interests of minorities and backward and depressed classes.
‫اردو‬
9. The independence of the judiciary shall be fully secured.
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10. The integrity of the territories of the federation, its independence and all its rights, including its sovereign rights on land, sea and air shall be safeguarded.
11. The people of Pakistan may prosper and attain their rightful and honored place among the nations of the world and make their full contribution towards international peace and
progress and happiness of humanity.

Purportedly combining the features of both Western and Islamic democracy, it is considered one of the most important documents in the constitutional history of Pakistan. It was strongly
supported by Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, Dr. Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi, Dr. Omar Hayat Malik, Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar, Noor Ahmad, Begum Shaista Suhrawardy Ikramullah,
Muhammad Hussain and others. At the time it was passed, Liaquat Ali Khan called it "the most important occasion in the life of this country, next in importance only to the achievement
of independence". However, not everyone in Pakistan had such as high praise and unbounded admiration for it.

Criticism ​[ edit ]

Non-muslims ​[ edit ]

The non-Muslim members of the constituent assembly vigorously opposed it, and all of them voted against it. Birat Chandra Mandal said that Jinnah had unequivocally said that
Pakistan would be a secular state. Sris Chandra Chattopadhyaya, the Dhaka-born leader of the opposition, said in the constituent assembly on March 12, 1949:

In my conception of (the) state where people of different religions live there is no place for religion in the state. Its position must be neutral: no bias for any religion. If
necessary, it should help all the religions equally. No question of concession or tolerance to any religion. It smacks of inferiority complex. The state must respect all religions:
no smiling face for one and askance look to the other. The state religion is a dangerous principle. Previous instances are sufficient to warn us not to repeat the blunder. We
know people were burnt alive in the name of religion. Therefore, my conception is that sovereignty must rest with the people and not with anybody else....[T]he words "equal
rights as enunciated by Islam" are—I do not use any other word—a camouflage. It is only a hoax to us, non-Muslims. There cannot be equal rights as enunciated by Islam. It
goes without saying that by introducing the religious question, the differences between the majority and the minority are being perpetuated, for how long, nobody knows. And,
as apprehended by us, the difficulty of interpretation has already arisen. The accepted principle is that the majority, by their fair treatment, must create confidence in the
minority. Whereas the Honorable mover of the resolution promises respect, in place of charity or sufferance for the minority community the deputy minister, Dr. Qureshi,
advises the minority to win the goodwill of the majority by their behavior. In the House of the Legislature also we find that, while the prime minister keeps perfectly to his
dictum, others cannot brook that the opposition should function in the spirit of opposition. The demand is that the opposition should remain submissive. That is Dr. Qureshi's
way of thinking. The minorities must be grateful for all the benevolence they get and must never complain about the malevolence that may also be dealt out to them. That is
his solution to the minority problem.[3]

Muslims ​[ edit ]

Ayaz Amir, a prominent media commentator and a former member of Pakistan's parliament, has criticized the constituent assembly for lavishing attention on this "piece of rhetoric"
which was "of no practical benefit to anyone."[4] Even Maulana Maududi, a big supporter of the resolution, was disappointed with the fact that it did not produce any positive results.
According to him, it was such a rain which was neither preceded by a gathering of clouds nor was it followed by vegetation.

According to Ms. Rubina Saigal, an eminent Pakistani intellectual, Maulana Maududi's theory of divine sovereignty was incorporated into the resolution. According to her:

Subsequent to the passage of the Objectives Resolution, all of Pakistan’s constitutions contained religious provisions and the name of the country was changed from (the)
Republic of Pakistan to (the) Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The national debates over the kind of nation, state and society envisaged led to compromises being made with the
liberal, secular as well as the religious lobby. As a result, the Constitution of 1973, a consensus document, became riddled with internal contradictions regarding citizenship.
For example, Article 25 says that all citizens are equal before law while Article 2 says that Islam shall be the state religion. When one religion, to the exclusion of all others, is
 established as the state religion, how can the followers of other religions be equal citizens? And if they cannot be equal citizens, is democracy possible without citizenship
equality? The denial of the right of non-Muslim citizens to become the head of state or government also violates Article 25, which requires equality before the law.[5]

As mentioned above, the resolution is included in the Annex of the current Constitution of Pakistan by virtue of Article 2A of the Constitution.[6]

References ​[ edit ]

1. ^ Khan, Hamid Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan (Karachi: OUP, 2017)
2. ^ "The Objectives Resolution" . www.pakistani.org. Archived from the original on 29 March 2016. Retrieved 27 March 2017.
3. ^ "ARCHIVES: Chattopadhyaya against Objectives Resolution" .
4. ^ Clerics on the march – Ayaz Amir . Thenews.com.pk. Retrieved on August 3, 2013.
5. ^ "Strangers in the house | Herald" . herald.dawn.com. Archived from the original on 24 May 2013.
6. ^ Annex – Text of the Constitution of Pakistan , Pakistani.org

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WHAT DOES INDIA THINK?

INTRODUCTION
China, India, Pakistan and a India's Foreign Policy
Happymon Jacob IDENTITY & POLITICS
stable regional order ECONOMY & SOCIETY
FOREIGN POLICY
CONCLUSION

Three powers – China, India, and Pakistan – hold the keys to the future of south Asia. As
the West withdraws from Afghanistan and US influence in the region declines, this DOWNLOADS & MEDIA
triangular strategic relationship will become more complicated unless China and India – ECFR ASIA & CHINA
the two major powers – can define the parameters of a new regional order.

The strategic landscape of the sub­region is defined by the complex interactions between
these three: a rising “superpower” with a commercially defined unilateral approach to the
region’s strategic fault lines; a reluctant emerging power unwilling to commit political or
diplomatic resources to stabilise the region or even to preserve the status quo; and a
deeply dissatisfied revisionist power intent on redrawing the regional order, with the not­
so­explicit approval of the rising superpower.

China’s engagement with the region serves as a good
More in this chapter
For over three decades now, template for speculation on how its rise will change
India’s primary security concern the international order. Will it begin to engage from a
has been Pakistan’s attempts at more normative and conflict­resolution perspective,
destabilisation or will it continue to approach the region from its
unilateral, self­seeking, commercial and strategic
positions? By reaching out to the Taliban, Beijing has India's strategic opportunities
Manish Tewari
demonstrated that it is not averse to sponsoring conflict­resolution processes, though
this may be mostly aimed at safeguarding its own commercial interests in mineral­rich
Afghanistan. Will China follow the historical trajectory of rising powers by attempting to
dominate its “near abroad”? If so, how will India and other stakeholders in the region
respond?

  India's strategic diffidence

Bharat Karnad

India’s (in)security perceptions

For over three decades now, India’s primary security concern has been Pakistan’s
attempts at destabilisation, be it in Kashmir, Punjab, or other parts of the country.
Pakistan’s inconclusive and unsatisfactory trial of the perpetrators of the 2008 Mumbai
terror attack, and the intermittent ceasefire violations along the border, continue to Modi's approach to China and
dominate New Delhi’s perception of its security situation. Pakistan
Rahul Roy­Chaudhury

Another of India’s major security concerns is also
India’s disputed borders with linked to Pakistan – the issue of post­NATO
Pakistan and China continue to Afghanistan, where Pakistan is attempting to control
generate insecurity for the the Kabul regime through proxies, and where the
country Our useTaliban is gaining ground. For New Delhi, the near­
of third‐party tools and cookies The FTA: a strategic call for the EU
certain return of the Taliban to Kabul, in one form or
We use third­party tools to improve your experience on our website. We ask for yourand India?
another, brings back memories of the 1999 hijacking
consent to use these tools and for them to collect some personal data and set cookies.
Sangeeta Khorana
These third parties may combine your data with other information that they may have
of Indian Airlines flight IC­814 by a Pakistani Islamist group, when the Indian People’s
collected from your use of their services, and may transfer it to servers outside the EU.
Party (Bharatiya Janata Party, BJP) government was forced to release high­ranking
Find out more in our privacy notice.
terrorists in order to get its passengers released from Taliban­controlled Kandahar
 province. Another BJP government is in power today, led by the more resolute Narendra
Reject Allow selection Allow all
Modi, and it has stated more than once that New Delhi will deal with Pakistani
aggression with far greater resolve.Necessary Preferences Statistics Marketing Details

Thirdly, India’s disputed borders with Pakistan and China continue to generate
insecurity for the country. No comprehensive agreement seems to be forthcoming, Tweets by @ECFRAsiaChina
despite 18 rounds of border talks with China, and there have been occasional Chinese
military incursions into Indian­controlled territory, increasing political tensions between
the two capitals. The border with Pakistan is far more complicated because sovereignty
over an entire state (Jammu and Kashmir, J&K) has been historically disputed.
Pakistan’s attempts to directly and indirectly wrest J&K from India have not been
successful, but it is unclear whether the Pakistani army has completely given up on its
aggressive Kashmir policy. Finally, Islamic State (IS) poses a potential threat to India
because it has the ability to gain an ideological foothold in the country and provide a
rallying call for disaffected, though disparate, elements. The jury is still out on whether
Pakistan and Afghanistan would be a fertile breeding ground for the group, given the
anti­IS stand taken by the Afghan Taliban and by the Pakistani government.

For many decades now, India has expressed concerns about the clandestine strategic
engagement between China and Pakistan, through which Beijing has provided a great
deal of assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear weapon and missile programmes. In recent years,
however, it appears as if New Delhi has made peace with this, preferring to ignore the
Sino­Pak partnership and strengthen its own strategic ties with the United States and
various Western states, while improving its economic relationship with China.

What worries New Delhi today is the increasing Chinese presence in the Pakistani part of
J&K, including Gilgit­Baltistan. However, on a positive note for India, China has been
less supportive of Pakistan’s Kashmir policy. Notably, it did not support its “all­weather
friend” during the 1999 India–Pakistan Kargil conflict, either materially or politically.

The third aspect of contemporary Sino­Pak ties that bothers India is the strengthened
three­way partnership between Pakistan, Afghanistan, and China. China is steadily
increasing its influence in the region with its innovative “New Silk Road” strategy, and by
offering economic and development assistance to Pakistan. Beijing is also increasingly
engaged in regional “conflict management” initiatives, mediating between Kabul and the
Taliban, and organising trilateral strategic engagements with Afghanistan and Pakistan.
For example, in November 2014, representatives of the Taliban from its Doha­based
office met in Beijing for talks. In February this year, China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan
initiated a new trilateral strategic dialogue in Kabul. Then, in July, Pakistan hosted a
meeting in Murree, as part of the “Murree Peace Process”, between the Afghan
government and representatives of Tehreek­e­Taliban Pakistan (TPP), the Pakistani
branch of the Taliban, which was also attended by representatives of China and the US.

India’s policy of limited engagement

Indian responses to the above events and developments have been suboptimal and
poorly thought­out. New Delhi is used to adopting a strategy of limited engagement when
it comes to dealing with China – whether it is resolving border tensions or finalising an
agreement on the disputed border. While on the one hand India seeks to engage China
on the trade front, on the other hand it fights shy of engaging China on larger regional
security issues. With Pakistan, New Delhi also shows a tendency to indefinitely postpone
the resolution of the troublesome issue of Kashmir. Limited engagement, then, seems to
be New Delhi’s preferred policy option when it comes to dealing with complex issues.

Policymakers in New Delhi also
exhibit a tendency to deal with
what they can, rather than with
what they should
thinking.
New Delhi also avoids addressing various emerging
threats, failing to recognise them politically. For
instance, IS hardly figures on New Delhi’s list of
strategic priorities, and nor does the geopolitical
transformation of Afghanistan. This head­in­the­
sand, inward­looking strategic posture is clearly not
the exception but the rule in India’s strategic

Policymakers in New Delhi also exhibit a tendency to deal with what they can, rather
than with what they should. New Delhi’s response, for instance, to the two­pronged
 problem that it faces with Pakistan and China has been to give disproportionate attention
to Pakistan, attempting to shame and isolate the country rather than engaging in a
sustained and high­level politico­strategic engagement with China to normalise the
strategic triangle. A strategically wise leadership in New Delhi would have catered to
Pakistani concerns in Kashmir and moved on to addressing bigger regional issues, rather
than getting boxed into a never­ending action­reaction game of “Tu Tu Main Main” (a
Hindi phrase for constant bickering) with Islamabad.

Finally, Indian diplomacy has failed to think beyond bilaterally engaging with its
neighbours, or the great powers, for that matter. While India has engaged with Beijing on
a variety of bilateral issues, it has not been able to join forces with China and other
neighbours in fighting terror, stabilising Afghanistan, addressing the IS threat, or even
bringing Iran into the mainstream. Modi’s government has not yet brought pressing
regional security issues to the table in its bilateral relationship with China.

A wider strategic perspective

India is uncomfortably placed at the heart of a geopolitical landscape – the India–China–
Pakistan strategic triangle – that is beset with multiple strategic challenges. Even if one
were to interpret China’s attempts to engage in the reconciliation process in Afghanistan
as commercially driven but benign, the perceived Indo­Pak rivalry in Afghanistan and
the Sino­Pak partnership would effectively keep India out of the Afghan reconciliation
process, hampering New Delhi’s regional aspirations.

The question, therefore, is whether the Chinese
India, for its part, must view the leadership can think beyond the false necessities
region from a wider, long-term imposed by its partnership with Pakistan to consider
strategic perspective and avoid the region as a security complex (i.e. acknowledging
getting tied down in petty fights that the security of each state cannot be considered
with Pakistan separately from that of the others), and manage its
relations with India in a cooperative manner.
Beijing’s tacit approval of Pakistan’s revisionist
agenda could prove costly for China and may even hamper its rise. The Chinese
leadership cannot ignore the need to pacify the region and stabilise ties with India while
it pursues its global ambitions.

India, for its part, must view the region from a wider, long­term strategic perspective and
avoid getting tied down in petty fights with Pakistan – for its own sake and for the sake of
promoting a stable regional order. Such an order could lead to peaceful coexistence
between India and China and conciliatory management of the region’s problems. It could
even produce the first signs of a peaceful Asian superpower on the rise.

Finally, Pakistan needs to adjust its strategic priorities, in light of its growing inability to
act as a modern, functioning state. Its deep­seated obsession with India, and the use of
non­state actors as a tool of statecraft, need to end if it wants to get back on its feet as a
viable nation state and contribute to a stable regional order.

Go back to the collection

"What does India think?"

Introduction
Identity & Politics
Economy & Society
Foreign Policy
Conclusions

ECFR Asia and China Progamme

Edited by: Francois Godement; Web: Lorenzo Marini and Richard Speight; Audio: Katharina Botel-Azzinnaro

Photo credits: Introduction: Flickr/Ville Miettinen; Identity & Politics: Flickr/kkoshy; Economy & Society: Pixabay; Foreign Policy: Wikimedia/Antônio Milena ; Conclusion: Flickr/David Gil
 
Comparison of:1956,1962,1973
Constituent Assembly
 Sovereignty
 Islamic Democracy
 Minorities Protection
 Federal Form
 Fundamental Rights
 Outline

 Constitution


Constitution of Pakistan
 Forms of Constitution
 Salient features of Constitutions
 Comparison of Constitution
 Islamic Provisions of 1973 constitution
 Conclusion
 Constitution

Constitution is a system of fundamental laws and
principles that prescribes the nature, functions, and limits
of a government or another institution.
Constitution
of Pakistan

 In Muslim states, particularly Pakistan, laws are
notd erived from the constitution but constitution is
framed according to :

 Almighty Allah
 Prophet Muhammad (SAW)
 Holy Quran Constitution in Pakistan
• Legislature • Executive

Asad Imran
Qaisar Kha

• Judiciary

Asif Saed
Khosa
Government of Pakistan

Senate National Assembly

100 seats 342 seats

4 Provinces
23 seats General
272 seats

Islamabad
4 seats Women
60 seats

Fed. Administered Tribal Areas

Non-Muslim
8 seats
10 seats
 Comparative Analysis


1956 Constitution 1962 Constitution 1973Constitution

Constitution-making : • Enforced on June 8, • Enforced on August 14,

• Enforced on 23 March 1962 to March 25, 1973 till now.
1956 to October 7, 1969.
1958.

• 280 articles 12
• 234 Articles and 6 • 250 articles, 5 Schedules
Schedules. schedules.

• Written Constitution • Written Constitution • Written Constitution

 Comparative Analysis

1956 Constitution

Form of Government:

1962 Constitution

Constitution of 1962
1973 Constitution

Parliamentary form of
Constitution of 1956 introduced presidential Govt.
introduced form of Govt.
parliamentary form of
Govt.

Referendum: Constitution of 1962 The Constitution of 1973

Constitution of 1956 introduced an institution has authorized President
introduced no institution known as referendum in to hold Referendum on
the country any national issue.
PM------- any important
issue.
Method of Election: Constitution of 1962 Direct method.
Constitution of 1956 introduced indirect
introduced direct election.
election.
1956 Constitution
Islamic Institutions:
There was no such institute
in the constitution of 1956.
Executive Powers:
Most of the executive
powers were exercised by
the prime minister under
the constitution of 1956.
List of Subjects:
Constitution of 1956
contains three lists of
subject i.e. federal,
provincial and concurrent
matter.
1962 Constitution
Constitution of 1962
introduced two Islamic
institution i.e. advisory

council of Islamic ideology
and Islamic research
institutions.
Most of the executive
powers vested in the
president under the 1962
constitution.
Constitution of 1962
provided only two list of
subjects i.e. central and
provincial.
1973 Constitution
• Council of Islamic
Ideology
• Federal Shariat Court
• Principles of Policy-----
Islamic clauses
PM exercised all executive
authority.
• power to dissolve the NA.
• powers of appointment of
caretaker PM.
• assent to bills passed by the
parliament or returns these.
• Two lists are given in the
constitution: Federal list and
Concurrent list.
• Residuary powers belong to
provinces.
1956 Constitution
Presidential Powers:
In the constitution of 1956
the powers were
reasonable.
Supreme judicial
council: There was no
such institution in the
constitution of 1956.
House Parliament :
One house of Parliament
National Assembly
1962 Constitution 1973 Constitution
Under the constitution of In the constitution
1962 president had great of 1973 the powers
power. were reasonable.

Constitutions of 1962
Supreme Court --------highest
introduced a new
court.
institution supreme
One High Court-------in each
judicial council.
province
one in Azad Kashmir.
chain of lower courts ----under
the high courts.
Unicameral--------NA Two Houses named Senate
and National Assembly.
1956 Constitution 1962 Constitution 1973 Constitution

Fundamental Rights : Ensures the fundamental Ensures the fundamental

Civil and Political Rights rights to the citizens of rights to the citizens of
…….. suspended in Pakistan . Pakistan .
emergency.
 Islamic Provisions of 1973
  Islamic Republic of Pakistan
  State Religion
  Sovereignty Belongs to Allah
  Definition of a Muslim
  A Muslim to be a President and Prime Minister
  Islamic way of life
  Promotion of Social Justice and Eradication of Social Evils
  Teachings of Holy Quran
  Strengthen Bond, with Muslim World
  Council of Islamic Ideology
  Error Free Publication of Quran
  Oath to Project and Promote Islamic Ideology
  Ahmadi's A Non Muslim Minority
  Proper organization of Zakat, Auqaf and Mosques is ensured.