Spontaneous Generation and Generation by Chance

Outline

I. Introduction
1. Topic: Generation ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου in Aristotle
2. Problem: there is a disagreement between Biology and Metaphysics
2.1. Biology: Generation ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου is the regular generation ἄνευ
σπέρματος of specimens belonging to species whose members always come to
be ἄνευ σπέρματος.
2.2. Metaphysics (Standard Interpretation): Generation ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου is the
exceptional generation ἄνευ σπέρματος of specimens belonging to species
whose members for the most part come to be ἐκ σπέρματος.
3. Traditional Explanations of the Disagreement
3.1. Developmental hypothesis
3.1.1. The difference exposes an inconsistency: same phenomenon, different
properties
3.1.2. Regular vs. Random spontaneous generation.
3.2. Equivocal hypothesis
3.2.1. The difference exposes an equivocity: different phenomenon, same name.
3.2.2. Spontaneous generation vs. chance generation
4. Problems with traditional hypotheses
4.1. Problems with equivocal hypothesis
4.1.1. There remains a doctrinal disagreement
4.1.2. Developmental solution again
4.2. Problems with developmental hypothesis
4.2.1. Developmental hypothesis is arbitrary
4.3. Problems with equivocal solution again
4.3.1. Equivocal solution is irrelevant
5. Impasse and Project

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 II. Sources of the problem
A. Metaphysics – Argument of the Standard Interpretation
1. Common Assumption: Metaphysics is grounded in Physics
1.1. Things produced ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου are unusual.
1.2. Things produced ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου could be produced by art
1.3. Hence (2+3) things produced ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου are produced by chance:
exceptional production, without art, of things that for the most part are
produced by art.
2. Productions ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου offer a model to understand generations ἀπὸ
ταὐτομάτου.
2.1. Hence (2+1.1) things generated ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου are unusual.
2.2. Hence (2+1.2) things generated ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου could be generated from seed.
2.3. Hence (2.1+2.2) things generated ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου are generated by chance:
exceptional generation, without seed, of organism that for the most part are
generated from seed.
B. The Key Text of the Standard Interpretation: Metaph. Z 7, 1032b 25-32.
[T1] οὕτω μὲν οὖν γίγνεται τὰ γιγνόμενα διὰ τὴν φύσιν, αἱ δ’ ἄλλαι γενέσεις λέγονται
ποιήσεις. πᾶσαι δὲ εἰσὶν αἱ ποιήσεις ἢ ἀπὸ τέχνης ἢ ἀπὸ δυνάμεως ἢ ἀπὸ διανοίας. τούτων
δέ τινες γίγνονται καὶ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης παραπλησίως ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἀπὸ
φύσεως γιγνομένοις· ἔνια γὰρ κἀκεῖ ταὐτὰ καὶ ἐκ σπέρματος γίγνεται καὶ ἄνευ σπέρματος.1
This is Ross’s translation of the passage.
[T1 – Ross] Thus, then, are natural products produced; all other productions are called
‘makings.’ And all makings proceed either from art or from a capacity or from thought.
Some of them happen also spontaneously or by chance just as natural products sometimes
do; for there also the same things sometimes are produced without seed as well as from
seed.
Key Elements of the Text:
1. ἔνια – ‘neither always nor for the most part’
2. ταὐτὰ – ‘such as they could be done by nature’
3. παραπλησίως ὥσπερ – analogy between productions and generations

1
Metaph. Z 7, 1032b 25-32.
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 III. Questioning the Standard Interpretation
A. Questioning the Argument of the Standard Interpretation
1. Is Metaphysics is grounded in Physics?
1.1. The text makes no reference to the frequency of produced ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου.
1.2. The text does not state that produced ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου could be produced by
art.
1.3. Hence (1.1+1.2) there is no ground to interpret productions ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου as
productions by chance.
2. The text does not use productions ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου as a model to understand
generations ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου, but the opposite: it’s generations ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου that
offer a model to understand productions ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου.
2.1. Hence, we need see if there is any ground to interpret generations ἀπὸ
ταὐτομάτου as generations by chance.
B. Questioning the Key Text of the Standard Interpretation
Do Aristotle’s remarks concerning generation ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου in [T1] speak of generation
by chance?
[T1] οὕτω μὲν οὖν γίγνεται τὰ γιγνόμενα διὰ τὴν φύσιν, αἱ δ’ ἄλλαι γενέσεις λέγονται
ποιήσεις. πᾶσαι δὲ εἰσὶν αἱ ποιήσεις ἢ ἀπὸ τέχνης ἢ ἀπὸ δυνάμεως ἢ ἀπὸ διανοίας. τούτων
δέ τινες γίγνονται καὶ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης παραπλησίως ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἀπὸ
φύσεως γιγνομένοις· ἔνια γὰρ κἀκεῖ ταὐτὰ καὶ ἐκ σπέρματος γίγνεται καὶ ἄνευ σπέρματος.2
The standard view may be reached by two different interpretation of the text, the first
represented in Irwin/Fine tranlsation (1), the second in Apostle’s translation (2).

1. Is generation ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου is the unusual generation without seed of organims that
typically come to be from seed?

[T1 – Irwin/Fine] Things that come to be because of nature, then, come to be in this way.
The other comings to be are called productions; these are all from either craft or
potentiality or thought. Some productions also come to be from chance or luck, similarly
to the way in which things come about from chance or luck among things that come to

2
Metaph. Z 7, 1032b 25-32.
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 be from nature; for in the latter case too the same things (ταὐτὰ) that usually come to
be from a seed also sometimes (ἔνια) come to be without any seed.3

2. Is generation ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου is the generation without seed of specimens belonging to

the same species whose members acome to be also from seed?
[T1 – Apostle] This is the way, then, in which things are generated through nature, and
the other generations are called “productions.” All productions are generations by art,
or by a power, or by thought. However, some of these are also generations by chance
or by luck, and in this manner they resemble the generations by nature: for, among
things generated, there are some (ἔνια) which are the same (ταὐτὰ) <in species>,
whether generated from seed or without seed.4

3
IRWIN & FINE [1995], p. 287.
4
APOSTLE [1966], p. 117. The Greek terms in the parentheses are mine.
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 IV. Alternative Interpretation
A. Logical and Ontological Analysis in De Generatione Animalium
Concerning the fact that no creature spontaneously generated can generate another
creature of the same kind
[T2 - ἀπόδειξις λογική] That this is so is reasonable (καὶ τοῦτο συμβέβηκεν εὐλόγως),
for if those creatures that do not come from animals went on to produce themselves by
coupling, then if the offspring were of the same kind (εἰ μὲν ὁμογενῆ), the original
generation of the parents ought also to have been produced in this way (καὶ τὴν ἐξ
ἀρχῆς τοιαύτην ἔδει τῶν τεκνωσάντων εἶναι γένεσιν). This is a reasonable claim (τοῦτο
δ’ εὐλόγως), for it is what we see happening in the other animals (φαίνεται γὰρ
συμβαῖνον οὕτως ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων).5
B. Empirical observations in Historia Animalium
[T3 – Fishes – HA VI.15] As we have said, the greatest number of fish (οἱ μὲν οὖν
πλεῖστοι τῶν ἰχθύων) is born from eggs; however, there are some (ἔνιοι) that are also
(καὶ) generated from mud and sand (ἐκ τῆς ἰλύος καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἄμμου γίνονται) even
among those kinds that reproduce from copulation and eggs (καὶ τῶν τοιούτων γενῶν
ἃ γίνεται ἐκ συνδυασμοῦ καὶ ᾠῶν).6
[T4 – Fishes/Mullet – HA VI.15] The fish in question is a certain kind of mullet
(κεστρέων τι γένος) which does not proceed from copulation at all (ὃ οὐδὲ γίνεται ἐξ
ὀχείας), about the size of a small sprat, and none of these fish (τούτων οὐδὲν) is
provided with either egg or milt.7
[T5 – Fishes/Mullet – HA VI.15] Some claim that all mullets, without exception, grow
spontaneously (ὅλως τοὺς κεστρεῖς φύεσθαι πάντας), but those who say this are
incorrect; for the female of the fish is found provided with eggs, and the male with
milt. However, there is a kind of mullet that grows out of mud and sand (ἀλλὰ γένος
τί ἐστιν αὐτῶν τοιοῦτον, ὃ φύεται ἐκ τῆς ἰλύος καὶ τῆς ἄμμου).8
[T6 – Fishes/Eel – HA VI.16] Eels are not produced by copulation, nor are they
oviparous. No eel (οὐδεμία) has ever been caught (ἐλήφθη πώποτε) which had either
milt or eggs; nor when cut open are they found to possess passages for milt or uterine

5 De Gen. An. I 1, 715b 7-12.

6
Hist. An. VI 15, 569a 10-13.
7 Hist. An. VI 15, 569a 13-19.
8
Hist. An. VI 15, 569a 21-25.
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 passages. In fact, this whole kind (τοῦτο ὅλον τὸ γένος) of blooded animals is
produced neither by copulation nor out of eggs.9
[T7 – Fishes – HA V.1] In animals where generation takes place from animals of the
same kind (ἀπὸ συγγενῶν ζῴων), wherever there is male and female, generation is due
to copulation. Within the kind of fishes (ἐν τῷ τῶν ἰχθύων γένει), however, there are
some (ἔνια) that are generated (γίνεται) neither male nor female, and these, while
they are identical in kind (τῷ γένει μὲν ὄντα τὰ αὐτά) with other fishes, differ from
them according to their species (τῷ εἴδει δ’ ἕτερα).10

9
Hist. An. VI 16, 570a 3 – 7.
10 Hist. An. V 1, 539a 25-30: “Τῶν δὴ τὴν γένεσιν ἐχόντων ἀπὸ συγγενῶν ζῴων ἐνοἷς μὲν αὐτῶν ἐστι τὸ θῆλυ
καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν, ἐκ συνδυασμοῦ γίνονται· ἐν δὲ τῷ τῶν ἰχθύων γένει ἔνια γίνεται οὔτ’ ἄρρενα οὔτε θήλεα, τῷ γένει
μὲν ὄντα ἑτέροις τῶν ἰχθύων τὰ αὐτά, τῷ εἴδε δ’ ἕτερα.”
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 V. Conclusion
1. Biology
1.1. Offers the ground to interpret the Metaphysics.
2. Metaphysics
2.1. It is concerned with spontaneous generation.
2.2. Points to a different interpretation of health.
3. Biology and Metaphysics
3.1. They are concerned with the same phenomenon.
3.2. They give the same account.
3.3. Hence, there is no disagreement, formal or doctrinal.
3.4. Consistent from the logical, ontological, and empirical viewpoints.
4. Physics and Metaphysics
4.1. They are concerned with different phenomena.
4.2. Aristotle has never endorsed the view entailed by the Physics.
4.3. The view entailed by the Physics is attributed to his opponent.
4.4. There is equivocity, but no doctrinal inconsistency.
4.5. We can dispense from developmental stories.