Espiritu, Erin George

Jose D. Filoteo, Jr. vs Sandiganbayan and the People of the Philippines

G.R. 79543, October 16, 1996

Facts

Petitioner Jose D. Filoteo, a police investigator of the Western Police District in Metro, Manila, alongside Martin
Mateo, Jr, PC/SGT Bernardo Relator, Jr., CIC Ed Saguindel, Ex-PC/SGT Danilo Miravalles and civillians Ricardo
Perez, Reynaldo Frias, Raul Mendoza, Angel Liwanag, Severino Castro, and Gerardo Escalada were accused of the
crime of robbery. In June 19, 1987, Sandiganbayan convicted the Filoteo of the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway
Robbery Law of 1974. Thus, the latter filing this petition to assail the decision and resolution of the former.

The facts of the case are as follows:

• On or about the 3rd day of May, 1982, in the municipality of Meycauayan, the said accused, two of whom
were armed with guns, conspiring, confederating together and helping one another, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent of gain and by means of violence, threat and intimidation,
stop the Postal Delivery Truck of the Bureau of Postal while it was travelling along the MacArthur Highway
of said municipality, at the point of their guns, and then take, rob and carry away with them the following, to
wit: 1) Postal Delivery Truck 2) Social Security System Medicare Checks and Vouchers 3) Social Security
System Pension Checks and Vouchers 4) Treasury Warrants 5) Several Mail Matters from abroad.
• The amount of the aforementioned items totaled to P253,728.29 more or less, belonging to US Government
Pensionados, SSS Pensionados, SSS Medicare Beneficiaries and Private Individuals from Bulacan,
Pampanga, Bataan, Zambales and Olongapo City.
• On separate dates, accused Filoteo, Mateo, Saguindel, Relator and Miravalles, assisted by their respective
counsel, pleaded not guilty. Their co-accused Perez, Frias, Mendoza, Liwanag, Castro and Escalada were
never arrested and remained at large. Accused Mateo escaped from police custody and was tried in absentia
in accordance with Article IV, Section 19 of the 1973 Constitution. Accused Saguindel and Relator failed to
appear during the trial on February 21, 1985 and on March 31, 1986, respectively, and were thus ordered
arrested but remained at large since then. Like in the case of Mateo, proceedings against them were held in
absentia. Only Filoteo filed this petition, after the respondent Court rendered its assailed Decision and
Resolution.

Issue

In this petition, Filoteo raises the following “errors”:

1. Are the written statements, particularly the extra-judicial confession executed by the accused without the presence
of his lawyer, admissible in evidence against him?
2. Were said statements obtained through torture, duress, maltreatment and intimidation and therefore illegal and
inadmissible?
3. Was petitioner's warrantless arrest valid and proper?
4. Is the evidence of the prosecution sufficient to find the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt?

Ruling

First Issue: Uncounselled Waiver

Petitioner contends that respondent Court erred in admitting his extrajudicial confession notwithstanding
uncontradicted testimony and documentary proof that he was made to sign the same through torture, maltreatment,
physical compulsion, threats and intimidation and without the presence and assistance of counsel. He also claims that
in executing the extrajudicial confession, he was denied the right to counsel in the same way that his waiver of he said
right was likewise without the benefit of counsel. Petitioner therefore questions the respondent Court's admission
evidence of his extrajudicial confession on the strength of cases upholding the admissibility of extrajudicial
confessions notwithstanding the absence of counsel "especially where the statements are replete with details and
circumstances which are indicative of voluntariness.

• Article IV, Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution

Espiritu, Erin George

No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the commission
of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such rights. No force,
violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Any
confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.

• Article 3, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution

1. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his
right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
2. No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation; or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used
against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited.
3. Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him. (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as
well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices and their families."
(emphasis supplied. Obviously, the 1973 Constitution did not contain the right against an uncounselled
waiver of the right to counsel which is provided under paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, above underscored.)

• Magtoto vs Manguera and People vs. Luvendino

In the case of Magtoto vs Maguerra, the Court categorically held that the aforequoted provisions of the 1973
Constitution (which were not included in the 1935 Charter) must be prospectively applied. This Court said:

We hold that this specific portion of this constitutional mandate has and should be given a prospective and not a
retrospective effect. Consequently, a confession obtained from a person under investigation for the commission
of an offense, who has not been informed of his right (to silence and) to counsel, is inadmissible in evidence if
the same had been obtained after the effectivity of the New Constitution on January 17, 1973. Conversely, such
confession is admissible in evidence against the accused, if the same had been obtained before the effectivity of
the New Constitution, even if presented after January 17, 1973, and even if he had not been informed of his right
to counsel, since no law gave the accused the right to be so informed before that date.

By parity of reasoning, the specific provision of the 1987 Constitution requiring that a waiver by an accused of his
right to counsel during custodial investigation must be made with the assistance of counsel may not be applied
retroactively or in cases where the extrajudicial confession was made prior to the effectivity of said Constitution.
Accordingly, waivers of the right to counsel during custodial investigation without the benefit of counsel during the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution should, by such argumentation, be admissible. Although a number of cases held
that extrajudicial confessions made while the 1973 Constitution was in force and effect, should have been made with
the assistance of counsel, the definitive ruling was enunciated only on April 26, 1983 when this Court, through
Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, issued the guidelines to be observed by law enforcers during custodial investigation. The Court
specifically ruled that "(t)he right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the
assistance of counsel. 66 Thereafter, in People vs. Luvendino, the Court through Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano
vigorously taught:

The doctrine that an uncounseled waiver of the right to counsel is not to be given legal effect was initially a
judge-made one and was first announced on 26 April 1983 in Morales vs. Enrile and reiterated on 20 March
1985 in People vs. Galit

While the Morales-Galit doctrine eventually became part of Section 12(1) of the 1987 Constitution, that
doctrine affords no comfort to appellant Luvendino for the requirements and restrictions outlined in Morales
and Galit have no retroactive effect and do not reach waivers made prior to 26 April 1983 the date of
promulgation of Morales.
Espiritu, Erin George

Pursuant to the above doctrine, petitioner may not claim the benefits of the Morales and Galit rulings because he
executed his extrajudicial confession and his waiver to the right to counsel on May 30, 1982, or before April 26, 1983.

Petitioner's contention that Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution should be given retroactive effect for being
favorable to him as an accused, cannot be sustained. While Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "(p)enal
laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal,"
what is being construed here is a constitutional provision specifically contained in the Bill of Rights which is obviously
not a penal statute. A bill of rights is a declaration and enumeration of the individual rights and privileges which the
Constitution is designed to protect against violations by the government, or by individuals or groups of individuals. It
is a charter of liberties for the individual and a limitation upon the power of the state. Penal laws, on the other hand,
strictly and properly are those imposing punishment for an offense committed against the state which the executive of
the state has the power to pardon. In other words, a penal law denotes punishment imposed and enforced by the state
for a crime or offense against its law.

Hence, petitioner's vigorous reliance on People vs. Sison to make his extrajudicial confession inadmissible is
misplaced. In that case, the extrajudicial confession was executed on May 19, 1983, clearly after the promulgation of
Morales on April 26, 1983.

The admissibility of petitioner's uncounselled waiver of the right to counsel notwithstanding, the Court has still to
determine whether such waiver was made voluntarily and intelligently. The waiver must also be categorical and
definitive, and must rest on clear evidence.

It should be emphasized that petitioner could not have been ignorant of his rights as an accused. He was a fourth year
criminology student and a topnotch student in the police basic course. Having been in the police force since 1978,
with stints at the investigation division or the detective bureau, he knew the tactics used by investigators to incriminate
criminal suspects. In other words, he was knowledgeable on the matter of extrajudicial confessions.

Second Issue: Illegal Arrest?

Petitioner's claim that he was tortured into signing the confession appears incredible, or at least susceptible to serious
doubts. The allegation of torture was negated by the medical report 81 showing no evidence of physical injuries upon
his person. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, there is no reason to maltreat him in particular when the
record shows that the investigating team respected the right of the other suspects to remain silent. When he was
presented before Judge Mariano Mendieta of the municipal court in Meycauayan, petitioner even waived his right to
present evidence82 instead of impugning his confession on account of the torture allegedly inflicted upon him. If
indeed he had been tortured, he would have revived the case he filed against his alleged torturers upon learning of its
dismissal.

Furthermore, an examination of his signatures in the different documents on record bearing the same discloses an
evenness of lines and strokes in his penmanship which is markedly consistent in his certification, extrajudicial
confession and waiver of detention. Human experience has proven that the lines and strokes of a person's handwriting
reflect his disposition at a certain given time. In the present case, no handwriting expert is needed to declare that
petitioner's signatures were written voluntarily and not under compulsion of fear immediately after he had been
subjected to maltreatment. In view of the foregoing, his extrajudicial confession is presumed to have been voluntarily
made, in the absence of conclusive evidence showing that petitioner's consent in executing the same had been vitiated.

Third Issue: Illegal Arrest?

Petitioner questions the manner of his arrest, stating that the arresting officers "invited" him without a warrant of arrest
and brought him to Camp Crame where he was allegedly subjected to torture almost a month after the commission of
the crime. 84 Petitioner's claim is belatedly made. He should have questioned the validity of his arrest before he
entered his plea in the trial court. On this point, this Court explained in People vs. Lopez, Jr.:
Espiritu, Erin George

Finally, it is much too late for appellant to raise the question of his arrest without a warrant. When accused-
appellant was arrested and a case was filed against him, he pleaded not guilty upon arraignment, participated
in the trial and presented his evidence. Appellant is thus estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest.
It is well-settled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in the acquisition by the court
of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection
is deemed waived. Besides, this issue is being raised for the first time by appellant. He did not move for the
quashal of the information before the trial court on this ground. Consequently, any irregularity attendant to
his arrest, if any, was cured when he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by
entering a plea of not guilty and by participating in the trial. Moreover, the illegal arrest of an accused is not
sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from
error.

The only move petitioner made in regard to his arrest was to file a complaint for "grave coercion, grave threat &
maltreatment"

Fourth Issue: Sufficiency of the Prosecution’s Evidence

Contrary to petitioner's claim, his culpability has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. He borrowed a car to use in
the hijacking knowing fully well that his owner-type jeep would give away his identity. Hecould not be identified by
the postal employees in the postal van simply because after overtaking said vehicle and forcing its driver to pull over,
he gave up driving the Mercedes Benz where the postal employees were made to ride, and commandeered the van.
That the checks were not found in his own home is of no moment. Before the arrest and upon learning that the
authorities had begun to nail down the identities of the malefactors, hehad entrusted them to his "kumare". It was
petitioner himself who led the team of Lt. Pagdilao back to his place after he had admitted to Sgt. Arsenio Carlos that
his share of the checks were in the possession of his "kumare" in the neighborhood.

In view of these facts, it is beyond dispute that petitioner was a direct participant in the commission of the crime. His
alibi has been correctly considered by the Sandiganbayan to be weak and implausible. The distance between Kalvario,
Meycauayan, Bulacan and downtown Manila where petitioner claimed to have been at the crucial time was between
fifteen (15) to twenty (20) kilometers, which, through first-class roads, could be negotiated during that time in
approximately thirty (30) minutes. It could not therefore have been physically impossible for him to be at the crime
scene or its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed.

Having already ruled on the admissibility of petitioner's confession, this Court holds that the full force of the totality
of the prosecution's evidence proves his guilt well beyond reasonable doubt. Weighing heavily against the defense is
the well-settled doctrine that findings of facts of the trial courts — in this case, the Sandiganbayan itself — particularly
in the assessment of the credibility of witnesses, is binding upon this Court, absent any arbitrariness, abuse or palpable
error.

The prosecution's evidence that respondent Court opined that even without the "inter-locking confessions of Filoteo,
Mateo and Liwanag" the remaining evidence would still be sufficient for conviction.

We are likewise convinced that there is sufficient evidence of conspiracy as convincing as the evidence of the
participation of each of the accused. As ratiocinated in the assailed Decision:

The participation of accused Filoteo, Mateo, Relator and Saguindel in the criminal conspiracy have (sic) been
proved beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence on record and which evidence not only confirms the
existence of the conspiracy between them as easily discernible from their conduct before, during and after
the commission of the offense, but also their participation therein as co-principals by direct participation
and/or indispensable cooperation. Their concerted efforts were performed with closeness and coordination
indicating their common purpose. Hence, there being collective criminal responsibility, the act of one is the
act of all, and each of the participants are responsible for what the others did in all the stages of execution of
the offense.

Final Question: Brigandage or Robbery?

Espiritu, Erin George

The respondent Court convicted the accused of brigandage punishable under Presidential Decree No. 532

Justifying the above disposition, the assailed Decision ratiocinates: Accused herein are charged with the
violation of Presidential Decree No. 532, otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery
Law of 1974. Under said decree, with respect to the highway robbery aspect, the offense is committed on a
"Philippine Highway" which under Section 2 (c) thereof has been defined as "any road, street, passage,
highway and bridges or any part thereof, or railway or railroad within the Philippines, used by persons or
vehicles, or locomotives or trains for the movement or circulation of persons or transportation of goods,
articles or property or both", while under Section 2 (e) thereof "Highway Robbery/ Brigandage" has been
defined as the "the seizure of any person for ransom, extortion or other unlawful purposes or the taking away
of property of another by means of violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things or other
unlawful means, committed by any person on any Philippine Highway".

The offense described in the information and established by the evidence presented by the prosecution
properly falls within the ambit of the aforesaid special law. Therein, it was conclusively proven that a postal
van containing mail matters, including checks and warrants, was hi-jacked along the national highway in
Bulacan by the accused, with the attendant use of force, violence and intimidation against the three (3) postal
employees who were occupants thereof, resulting in the unlawful taking and asportation of the entire van and
its contents consisting of mail matters. Also the evidence further showed that the crime was committed by
the accused who were PC soldiers, policeman (sic) and private individuals in conspiracy with their co-
accused Castro and Escalada who were postal employees and who participated in the planning of the crime.
Accordingly, all the essential requisites to constitute a consummated offense under the law in point are
present.

Obviously, the Court a quo labored under the belief that because the taking or robbery was perpetrated on a national
highway (McArthur Highway), ergo, Presidential Decree No. 532, otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-
Highway Robbery Law of 1974, must have been the statute violated.

• People vs Isabela Puno

The following salient distinctions between brigandage and robbery are succinctly explained in a treatise on the subject
and are of continuing validity:

The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the formation of bands of robbers. The heart of the
offense consists in the formation of a band by more than three armed persons for the purpose indicated in art.
306. Such formation is sufficient to constitute a violation of art. 306. It would not be necessary to show, in a
prosecution under it, that a member or members of the band actually committed robbery or kidnapping or
any other purpose attainable by violent means. The crime is proven when the organization and purpose of the
band are shown to be such as are contemplated by art. 306. On the other hand, if robbery is committed by a
band, whose members were not primarily organized for the purpose of committing robbery or kidnapping,
etc., the crime would not be brigandage, but only robbery. Simply because robbery was committed by a band
of more than three armed persons, it would not follow that it was committed by a band of brigands. In the
Spanish text of art. 306, it is required that the band "sala a los campos para dedicarse a robar." (Emphasis
ours.)

In fine, the purpose of brigandage, is inter alia, indiscriminate highway robbery. If the purpose is only a particular
robbery, the crime is only robbery, or robbery in band if there are at least four armed participants. The martial law
legislator, in creating and promulgating Presidential Decree No. 532 for the objectives announced therein, could not
have been unaware of that distinction and is presumed to have adopted the same, there being no indication to the
contrary. This conclusion is buttressed by the rule on contemporaneous construction, since it is one drawn from the
time when and the circumstances under which the decree to be construed originated. Contemporaneous exposition or
construction is the best and strongest in the law.

Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway robbery or brigandage only acts of robbery perpetrated
by outlaws indiscriminately against any person or persons on Philippine highways as defined therein, and not acts of
Espiritu, Erin George

robbery committed against only a predetermined or particular victim, is evident from the preambular clauses thereof,
to wit:

WHEREAS, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless elements are still committing acts of
depredation upon the persons and properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one
place to another, thereby disturbing the peace, order and tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic
and social progress of the people:

WHEREAS, such acts of depredations constitute . . . highway robbery/brigandage which are among the
highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries:

WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from perpetrating such acts of
depredations by imposing heavy penalty on the offenders, with the end in view of eliminating all obstacles
to the economic, social, educational and community progress of the people;

Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery against a particular person chosen by the accused as their
specific victim could be considered as committed on the "innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one
place to another," and which single act of depredation would be capable of "stunting the economic and social progress
of the people" as to be considered "among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all
countries, and would accordingly constitute an obstacle "to the economic, social, educational and community progress
of the people, such that said isolated act would constitute the highway robbery or brigandage contemplated and
punished is said decree. This would be an exaggeration bordering on the ridiculous.

From the above, it is clear that a finding of brigandage or highway robbery involves not just the locus of the crime or
the fact that more than three (3) persons perpetrated it. It is essential to prove that the outlaws were purposely organized
not just for one act of robbery but for several indiscriminate commissions thereof. In the present case, there had been
no evidence presented that the accused were a band of outlaws organized for the purpose of "depredation upon the
persons and properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another." What was duly
proven in the present case is one isolated hijacking of a postal van. There was also no evidence of any previous
attempts at similar robberies by the accused to show the "indiscriminate" commission thereof.

Upon the other hand, the Information did not specifically mention P.D. 532. The facts alleged therein and proven by
the evidence constitute the offense of robbery defined in Art. 293 in relation to Art. 295 and punished by Art. 244,
par. 5, all of the Revised Penal Code. From the facts, it was duly proven that:

* personal property (treasury warrants, checks, mail, van, tools, etc.)

* belonging to another were

* unlawfully taken by the accused

* with intent to gain (animo lucrandi)

* with intimidation against three persons (Art. 293)

* in an uninhabited place, or

* by an band, or

* by attacking a moving motor vehicle

* on a highway; and

* the intimidation was made with the use of firearms (Art. 295)
Espiritu, Erin George

Hence, the offender shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty provided under paragraph 5 of Art. 294,
which is, "prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period". Effectively, the penalty
imposed by the Court a quo should be lightened. However, such lighter penalty shall benefit only herein petitioner
and not his co-accused who did not contest or appeal the Sandiganbayan's Decision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, but the first paragraph of the dispositive portion of the assailed Decision is
partially MODIFIED to read as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Jose Filoteo, Jr. y Diendo GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as co-principal in the crime of robbery as defined in Arts. 293 and 295 and penalized under
Art. 294, paragraph 5, of the Revised Penal Code Code IMPOSING on him an indeterminate sentence of four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor as
maximum, and to pay his proportionate share of the costs of the action.