The danger of eth!

cs
w!thout empathy
Remov!ng empathy from eth!cs !s a
m!stake

The relat!onsh!p between moral!ty and emot!on has

d!v!ded th!nkers for centur!es. Most contemporary eth!cal
systems demand !mpart!al!ty; that we should not allow
emot!on, part!cularly empathy, to d!stract us from do!ng
what !s morally r!ght. In th!s art!cle, He!d! L. Ma!bom
rejects th!s pos!t!on. Here, she argues that empathy !s
both an essent!al and necessary tool to understand!ng
human nature, and prov!des a bluepr!nt for how we should
dev!se our moral systems.

To most people, !t seems obv!ous that empathy has

someth!ng !mportant to do w!th moral!ty. After all, when
we feel w!th someone who suffers, we often th!nk !t
!s wrong that the person suffers, and !f someone has
caused the!r suffer!ng, we tend to th!nk they were wrong
to do so. Sa!nts, l!ke Sa!nt Franc!s or Mother Theresa, are
typ!cally moved by the!r concern for the suffer!ng of
others. And I, at least, use my empathy as a moral gu!de. If
I empath!ze w!th the suffer!ng of caged an!mals, say, I
beg!n to th!nk that cag!ng an!mals !s wrong. Morally
wrong.  

It m!ght therefore come as a surpr!se to real!ze that a

handful of ph!losophers and psycholog!sts have
concluded that s!nce we somet!mes don’t feel empathy
when we judge someth!ng to be wrong or act morally, and
s!nce we can empath!ze w!thout judg!ng a wrong to have
been comm!tted or, !ndeed, w!thout be!ng mot!vated to
act morally towards someone, empathy has no role !n
moral!ty. And not just that, Jesse Pr!nz and Paul Bloom
cla!m empathy actually !s bad. Why? Because empathy
focuses our attent!on on just a handful of people whereas
moral!ty requ!re us to care equally for all, !tmakes us make
worse cho!ces. 

___

The key d!sagreement about the role of empathy !n

moral!ty bo!ls down to th!s quest!on. Can we truly
understand what matters to other people, what moves
them, what damages the!r wellbe!ng, and so on w!thout
empath!z!ng w!th them?

___

Cons!der!ng these powerful cr!t!c!sms, !t seems surpr!s!ng

that ph!losoph!cal heavywe!ghts, such as Dav!d Hume and
Adam Sm!th, could have thought empathy was
foundat!onal to moral!ty. It !s, Sm!th argued, because
others’ suffer!ng makes us suffer that we come grasp
the!r suffer!ng as suffer!ng, and through our own suffer!ng
come to care about !t and regard !t as a pr!ma fac!e case
of someth!ng wrong. Sm!th also thought that the way we
avo!d b!as and part!al!ty !s by tak!ng the perspect!ve of a
so-called Impart!al Spectator. Such a spectator !s not
emot!onally !nvolved !n what !s happen!ng, knows all the
relevant facts about !t, and !s !nd!fferent to the goals and
!nterest of the people !nvolved. Th!s, Sm!th cla!ms, allows
us to make true moral judgments and !t would avo!d the
charge of b!as, s!nce she cares no more for one person
than any other.  

The key d!sagreement about the role of empathy !n

moral!ty bo!ls down to th!s quest!on. Can we truly
understand what matters to other people, what moves
them, what damages the!r wellbe!ng, and so
on w!thout empath!z!ng w!th them? Empathy skept!cs say
“yes, of course.” I’ve sa!d so myself !n the past. Empathy
enthus!asts, on the other hand, !ns!st that no, you
cannot.  Of course, they do not deny that one can th!nk, !n
a superf!c!al and detached way, about the fact that others
suffer, are !n pa!n, have the!r l!ves ru!ned, or the!r dreams
squashed. What they do tend to !ns!st on !s that to
apprec!ate other’s pl!ght the way we would apprec!ate our
own, that !s really apprec!ate !t, we need empathy. We
cannot—and th!s !s a po!nt stressed by Sm!th—apprec!ate
the suffer!ng of our fellow man w!thout exper!enc!ng
someth!ng s!m!lar ourselves as we are exposed to that
suffer!ng. W!thout th!s k!nd of sens!t!v!ty, moral!ty would
not move us because moral!ty !s centrally concerned w!th
the wellbe!ng of people. 

SUGGESTED READING Paul Bloom:

The Pleasure of Suffer!ng By PaulBloom

Much of the debate has centered on emot!onal empathy.

What !s often !gnored !s empathy as perspect!ve tak!ng.
Th!s !s because there !s an !nsuff!c!ent apprec!at!on of the
contrast between our !mmed!ate, unreflect!ve way of
exper!enc!ng the world and our more reflect!ve way of
do!ng so. The two are not ent!rely d!st!nct, of course, s!nce
they affect one another, but there !s nonetheless an
!mportant d!fference between the way we !nteract w!th our
env!ronment as agents !n !t and the way we reflect on !t
as observers of !t. These are two aspects of a f!rst-person
perspect!ve. 

To get a sense of such a perspect!ve, we m!ght reflect

upon that fact that we usually f!nd ourselves at the center
of everyth!ng. We exper!ence the world as extend!ng out
from ourselves, as relat!ng to th!s be!ng that we are. We
see th!ngs as near or far, now or later, dangerous or
del!ghtful, often w!thout real!z!ng the egocentr!c!ty at the
heart of these judgments. The tree !s near to me, the
journey !s dangerous for me, and so on. There !s noth!ng
wrong w!th th!s or!entat!on. It may even be necessary for
surv!val. It !s one that makes us see the world !n terms of
us, !n terms of what matters to us. Our emot!ons are
prototyp!cal examples of our natural self-centeredness. I
am fr!ghtened by th!ngs that m!ght harm me, del!ghted by
th!ngs that can do me good, and surpr!sed by th!ng I d!d
not expect. R!chard Lazarus sa!d that emot!ons represent
the way the world affects our wellbe!ng. 

___

If you th!nk moral!ty !s at least about ensur!ng the greatest

amount of wellbe!ng for each person compat!ble w!th the
greatest amount of wellbe!ng for everybody else, then you
should be on board w!th empathy play!ng a central role

___

It doesn’t take much to see that a fuller understand!ng of

the world, other people, and even ourselves requ!res us to
see beyond our f!rst-person perspect!ve. How do we do
that? By tak!ng other people’s f!rst-person perspect!ves.
As !t turns out, the way we th!nk of ourselves and the way
we th!nk of other people !s subtly d!fferent. In our own
case, as agents, our thoughts are w!ndows onto real!ty,
exper!ences and emot!ons are sal!ent, act!ons are seen to
flow naturally from our reasons, wh!ch are f!rmly rooted !n
real!ty, and what !s central to who we are and what we do
!s !nternal: our good !ntent!ons, our mot!vat!ons, and so
on. When, however, we th!nk of other people, as
observers of them, the!r bel!efs are very much bel!efs,
wh!ch m!ght be m!staken, and over wh!ch they have
substant!al control; we th!nk of them as more !nfluenced
by the!r env!ronment and external rewards, we tend to
focus on why they d!d as they d!d and the overall context
and consequence of the!r act!ons. (I prov!de a fuller
explanat!on of these d!fference !n my book The Space
Between: How Empathy Really Works).  

These subtle d!fferences add up to substant!ally d!fferent,

!ntu!t!ve, p!ctures of ourselves and other people. To see
others as they would see themselves or me, for that
matter, I need to take the!r perspect!ve. Th!s !ncludes, not
only as Sm!th po!nted out feel!ng w!th them !n the!r
trava!ls, but also understand!ng what !s !mportant, or
what matters, to them !n v!rtue of represent!ng th!s !n
terms of the centr!fugal force of our egos. As opposed to
Sm!th, however, I don’t th!nk we ought to take the
perspect!ve of an Impart!al Spectator, but that balanc!ng a
range of d!fferent perspect!ves !s suff!c!ent to overcome
the natural b!as of empathy. 

SUGGESTED VIEWING The empathy trap W!th Dan Zahav!

  

Why now, we m!ght ask, does what matters to others

matter to moral!ty? There !s a long and a short answer to
th!s. I w!ll spare you from the long one. If you th!nk
moral!ty !s at least about ensur!ng the greatest amount of
wellbe!ng for each person compat!ble w!th the greatest
amount of wellbe!ng for everybody else, then you should
be on board w!th empathy play!ng a central role. One
could even argue that other moral !deas such r!ghts,
just!ce, and freedom all eventually spr!ng from the!r role !n
ensur!ng human welfare. It !s, of course, conce!vable that
there are moral!t!es !n wh!ch empathy plays l!ttle or no
role, but !t !s not our moral!ty. And !t !s not any poss!ble
moral!ty we ought to be concerned w!th, but w!th our own
or plaus!ble extens!ons thereof.