SOME PROBLEMS WITH UTILITARIANISM Norman E, Bowie and Robert L. Simon in Sweven M. Cahn et al, eds. Reatn at Work, 38 ed. (Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1996), 73 . In this brief section, Bowie and Sinton discuss three important objections to sdiktarianizm. Tie “firs obecion, dramatized by 2 su0ry inrodiced by Bernard Wilms, is that because walter ‘asm consiaors only an act? consequences, itis insnsitive to the ways in which bringing about those consequences may conpromite an agents integrity. The second objection, introduced in a quotation from John Rails (se reading 22), i that i tolerating the unbappiness of oe person to promote the grater happiness of anotber, uttarianism mistakenty teats individuals ar though they were rierely parts ofa single superpercon. Th third objection, alo introduced i a quotation rom Rass, is that because utltarianiom dots not consider what maker people happy, it assigns smeight fo the satifaction of came desires, uch as those of the racist, which ae intuitively fel should bove no weight. Pechaps the place to begin this aspect of the debate is with a hypothetical but very dramatic example described by Bernard Williams: | Jim finds himself in the central square of a small South American town. Tied up . ‘against the wall are a row of twenty Indians, most terrified, a few defiant, in front of them several armed men in uniform. A heavy man in 2 sweat-stained khaki shirt ‘mms out to be the captain in charge and, after a good deal of questioning of Jim which establishes that he got there by accident while on a botanical expedition, explains that the Indians are a random group of the inhabitants who, after recent acts of protest against the government, are just about to be killed to remind other possible protestors of the advantages of not protesting. However, since Jim is an honoured visitor from another land, the captain is hsppy to offer him a guest's pavilege of killing one of the Indians himself. If Jim accepts, then as a special mark of the occasion, the other Indians will be let off. Of course, if Jim refuses, then there is no special occasion, and Pedro here will do what he was about to do when Jim arrived, and kill all. Jim, with some desperate recollection of schoolboy fiction, wonders whether if he got hold of a gun, he could hold the captain, Pedro and the rest of the soldiers to threat, but itis quite clear from the set-up that nothing of the kind is going to work: any attempt at that sort of thing ‘will mean that all the Indians will be killed, and himself. The men against the wal, and the other villagers, understand the situation, and are obviously begging bim to accept. What should he do?! It would seem that on any utilitarian analysis ~ even on the complex versions of Branc and Braybrooke, Jim ought to kill one Indian so that nineteen others would be saved. . utilitarian of any stripe should find Jim’s question rather easy to answer. A nonutiltasia ‘ight find Jim’s question very difficult to answer, however. Whar makes the question dift cult for the nonuiilitaran is that something other than future consequences should be cor sidered. Jim must consider not only the number of dead Indians, but the fact that if } chooses one way he is a killer, whereas if he chooses another way he is not. If Jim kills 1 Besnard Williams, “A Critique of Utilitarianism,” in Usitarianim: For and Againct by J.) Smart and Bemard Williams (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993) pp. 98-99. ——————————— eo”Foundations of Moral Values - (216) Indian, then Jim himself has killed, However, if Jim refuses to kill an Indian, then we cannor say that Jim bas killed cwenty Indians; pechaps we canaot even say that Jim caused the ‘wenty Indians to be killed. What we think Williams is diving at is the fact that one’s pasition in a situation makes a difference. There is an integrity of a position or role that cannot be captured under the vtlliasian umbrella, Jim does not have the same responsibility to the twenty Indians that Pedro would kill as Jim does to the one Indian he would kil. Of course, ie may be that he should kill one to save ‘twenty, but there are complizations in that question that no utilitaian can understand, ‘The utiltarian’s fare to consider the position or role one holds in the chain of conse- ‘quences is symptomatic of a scrious deficiency in the way utiltarians consider individuals, John Rawls - at one time an adherent of rule utilitarianism — puts the criticism this way: He charges the individualist theory of utilitarianism with ignoting the distinctions ther exist among persons. Since utilitarianism has traditionally been viewed as an individualist theory par excellence, how is it possible that it ignores personalities? Rawls says that utilirari- anism extends to society the principle of choice for one man: It is customary to think of utilitarianism as individualistic, and certainly there are good reasons for this. The utiltarians were strong defenders of liberty and free- dom of thought and they held that the good of society is constituted by the ad- vantages enjoyed by individuals. Yet utilitarianism is not individualistic, at least when arrived at by the more natural course of reflection, in that, by conflatng all systems of desires, it applies to the society the principle of choice for one man. .. ‘There is no reason to suppose that the principles which shonld regulate an associa- tion of nien ate simply an extension of the principle of choice for one man? What Rawls seems to be saying is this. Under utilitarian theory, each person strives to maximize his net happiness with due account given to the intensity of his desires. So far, the utilitarian analysis is individualistic in the accepted sense. We then ask what policies a sociery should pursue, At this point, the utilitarian treats society as a single person. The satisfactions and frustrations of desires of the individuals in society are summed up, with the frustrations ‘of some individuals canceling out the happiness of others. The policy that ought to be adopted is the one that maximizes net happiness. This answer looks at society as an indivic. ‘ual who has balanced the gains and losses in order to achieve the greatest balance of app: ness. Note the contrast in point of view, however. When Jones's desite for a third martin is denied because Jones wishes to avoid a headache tomorrow, both the desice frustrated and the desire falfled aze desires of the same individual, However, when policy X, which leads to the greatest happiness on balance, cancels out the wants of Jones in favor of the wants of Smith, the analogy with a single individual is no longer legitimate. The frustration of Smith is not like the frustration of Jones's desire for a third martini Just as the utliarians make no distinctions among persons they also make no distine- tions among desires. Utiitarians make much of the fact that utilitarianism is committed to equality, since each person’s desices are given consideration, The important questioh, how- lever, is how much each person’s desires should count. The only factor most utilitarians con- sider is intensity. Those with moze intense desires are provided with proportionally more pleasure. However, this is hardly the only difference that should enter in. Consider a racist society, for example. On stcictly uslitarian grounds, the intense desizes of the racist majority 2 Joha Raves, A Tévoy of Jasin (Cambridge, Mascachusetts: Harvard University Prese, 1971), pp. 28.29:Usilitarianism ~ Critique - (2077) would count more than the more passive desires of the oppressed. Surely that is unjust Indeed, the reader might ask, “Should certain desizes be counted at all?” For example, would it be unjust not to count the racist’s hatred? Many would think not. In ublitarianism the satisfaction of any desire has some value in itself which must be taken into account in deciding what is right In calculating the greatest balance of satisfaction it does not matter, except indirectly what the desires are for. We are to arrange institutions so as to obtain the greatest sum of satisfactions, we ask no ‘questions about their source or quality but only how their satisfaction would affect the total of well-being. Socia! welfare depends directly and solely upon the levels of satisfaction or dissatisfaction of individuals. Thus, if men take a certain pleasure in discriminating against one another, in subjecting others to a lesser liberty as a means of enhancing their self-respect, then the satisfaction of these desires must be weighed in our deliberations according to their intensity, or whatever, along ‘with other desires To conclude this discussion, one might ack what would motivate an individual to sacri- fice his good for the public good even if those who goin are elceady better off. Traditionalir the utiltasians have appealed to smpathy. However, to expect one to sacrifice farther for those who are already better off is to place a heav burden on sympathy indeed! Would aor the less fortunate be extremely bitter at having to sacrifice even more for the benefit of the more fortunate? Rewls believes that sympathy cannot supply the complete motivation for vllitasian behavior on the part of individuals and that as a result a society with a utilitarian, morality and political philosophy would be highly unstable. 2 Thid, pp. 30.31