"A C OMMENTARY ON KANT’S CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE"

Josef Velasquez, Ph.D

Kant is an unclear writer. There are, therefore, different interpretations about what he meant.
The notes that follow are one such interpretation — and no more than that. It would be a mis-
take to think that these notes are right for sure or the only way to construe Kant's meaning.

[Preface]

Kant begins his book by talking about the method he is going to employ. How should we go
about deriving a moral philosophy or pure ethics? What tools should we use as we build up our
theory of ethics? Should we rely on our feelings? On our experience? On our traditions? Or
what? And the (surprising) answer Kant gives to this question is that we should, at bottom, rely
on pure reasons.

More specifically, Kant says that moral philosophy has two parts. There is the part that
discovers the basic principles, and there is the part that that applies these basic principles to
life. Now when it comes to the part that applies these principles to life, we must, of course, rely
heavily on our experience. But when it comes to the part that derives the basic moral laws —
well here Kant insists that we should not rely on our experience but should rely on pure reason
alone.

As an example to make this clearer, let us think about mathematics. For mathematics also has
two parts: (i) a pure or theoretical part, and (ii) an applied or empirical part. And it is the pure
or theoretical part that derives the basic mathematical laws. All that the empirical part does is
take these mathematical laws and apply them to particular cases.

What Kant wants is a similar division when it comes to moral philosophy: a pure philosophy
to derive the basic laws, and an empirical moral philosophy to apply them. But he complains
here that philosophers have been mixing these pure and applied parts together, producing not
clarity and truth but what we used to call a "mell of a hess."

[The need for pure ethics]

We should talk a little about pure reason. Now Kant calls pure reason by the name "reason a

priori". What he means by this is a reason that can prove things prior to experiencing them.
This is a method not of observation but of intellectual proof.

The opposite kind of reason is "reason a posteriori". Here reason follows after experience. In
this method, reason learns something not by proving it intellectually but by actually observing
it.

An example of reason a posteriori would be biology. Take the statement "All mammals bear
live young." Now this is a statement we had to learn by actually observing — actually
experiencing — a whole bunch of mammals. It is not a statement we could prove by our reason
alone but a statement we had to prove with our eyes.

1
An example of reason a priori would be mathematics. Here we really do have proofs that work
by reason alone and not by observation. For example, I can know by reason that 82 + 45 = 127
even though I have never had the experience of counting 82 marbles and 45 marbles and coming
to the total of 127 marbles.

Another example is the statement "The interior angles of an octagon add up to 1080°." For in
geometry we prove this in a mathematical or intellectual way, and not by drawing a whole
bunch of octagons and then measuring their angles with a protractor. The method here, in other
words, is not by observation or experience but by reason alone.

And Kant's purpose in this book of his is to develop a similar "proof by reason" that will work
for moral laws. He wants to prove the basic moral laws not by experience or observation but
by reason a priori, i.e., by pure reason alone.

But why, you might ask, would he want to do such a thing? Is pure reason really such desirable
method when it comes to proving moral laws?

Well, Kant thinks so. For the thing about pure reason is that it gives us results that are absolately
true. The statement that 82 + 45 = 127, for example, is absolutely true and cannot be doubted.
It is true for everyone, everywhere, and all the time. And this sort of absolute truth, Kant thinks,
is very desirable indeed.

[First section: Passage from ordinary rational knowledge of morality to philosophy]

In this section, Kant introduces us to the basic ideas in his ethics. In later sections, he will then
go back over these basic ideas and make them more complex.

The title of this section might seem a little puzzling. I think it might be clearer if we changed
the phrase "ordinary rational knowledge" into the phrase "ordinary sense knowledge." For Kant
thinks that our common sense already has a knowledge of what morality is. He thinks that the
"ordinary plain person" does already know right from wrong. And it is this that he means by
the phrase "ordinary rational knowledge."

Now what Kant wants to do in his book is to start with this common sense knowledge and
probe deeper and deeper into the philosophy behind it. He wants to uncover the real foundations
or true sources of that right and wrong we understand already.

In this first section, Kant takes the first step in this search. He gives a first — and in some ways
superficial - formulation of the philosophy he thinks is behind our common sense knowledge
of right and wrong. He will dig down, in other words, from the surface called common sense
to the first layer of philosophy that lies beneath it. And that's why he calls this first section the
"Passage from ordinary rational knowledge to philosophy."

In any case, here is an outline of what Kant says in this first section, i.e., an outline of the "first
layer" of philosophy the basic good thing is the good will.
the principle of the good will should always be moral duty. The test for moral duty is that I
should not do something else unless I would be happy if everyone else did it too.

2
 [The only absolutely good thing is the good will]

Although this section is very brief, it is also very important. For what Kant is doing here is
deciding what the basis of ethics ought to be. He is asking himself what, ethically speaking, is
most important of all.
Philosophers have recommended various things as the basis of ethics. The ancient philosophers
have said that ethics was based on virtue and self-control. John Stuart Mill and the utilitarians
said that ethics was based on happiness. The intuitionists said that it was based on an innate
moral sense. And so on.

And how should we choose from all these recommendations? Which, among all the possible
foundations for ethics is really the best? Well, Kant wants to suggest a very simple and logical
method for making this choice. What we should do, he says, is look for that possibility which
is always good and never bad. The foundation for ethics, after all, should be something that is
absolutely and purely good. And so Kant wants to reject any possible basis that can turn out to
be bad in some circumstance or situation. And he wants to keep only possible bases that remain
good in every circumstance and situation.

And the only possible basis which — according to Kant at least — is always good, or is good
in every circumstance and situation, is the good will. And so it is the good will that Kant will
use as the basis of his ethical theory.

[The good will and its results]

A simple way to understand this is to think that it's not so much success that matters, but
whether the will tried to succeed. For it is actually this effort that is most important to look at
when we are trying to decide if a will is good or not.

Actually, it is a little more complex than this. For Kant thinks that it is not just the effort that
is important, but the principle behind the effort. What matters, in other words, is not just
whether the will is making efforts, but whether it is making these efforts for a good reason, i.e.,
out of a sense of duty or not. But more on this later.

I think it is important to note here how different Kant is from John Stuart Mill. According to
Mill, the basic goodness or badness is in the effects or consequences of our actions. If our
actions have the effect of making people happy, then our actions are good. If our actions have
the effect of making people unhappy, then our actions are bad.

Now Kant is against this way of thinking. He does not think that the basis of good and bad is
in the outward effects my actions have. Rather, he thinks that the basis is in the inward willing.
The important question is how I willed or what principles my will acted on. If my will acted
on the principles of duty, then my will acted rightly, and if my will did not act on the principles
of duty, then it acted wrongly.

And, for Kant, this right or wrong is the same whether people are happy or not. If the will acted
from moral duty, then it acted rightly, even if its action makes me, or other people, very
unhappy. We must, Kant argues elsewhere, do our moral duty even if the whole world perishes.

[The good will and duty]

3
Kant wants to distinguish two different ways of acting. The first we might call "outward
agreement with duty." Here the action does do what duty requires. But the motive behind the
action was not duty itself, but some other inclinations. The second way of acting is acting from
duty. Here the action not only does what duty requires, but the motive behind the action is duty
as well.

And what Kant wants to argue, here, is that it is only this second way of acting — only acting
from duty — that has true moral worth.

[The formal principle of duty]

This might be a little hard to understand. Kant thinks that our will experiences two different
sorts of motivations. In one way, it is motivated by its purposes — by what it desires to do or
to get. Examples of this would be the way we are motivated by the career we are pursuing, the
car we want to buy, the work we want to do for our organization, etc. But the will is also
motivated in another way, i.e., by its principles — by the rules it has decided to live by.
Examples would be the principle of chivalry, or the principle that I may always lie my way out
of trouble, or the principle of loyalty, etc.

And what Kant wants to argue here is that the real source of moral worth is in these principles
rather than in these purposes.

Here is a simple way to understand this: What Kant is saying is that morality does not depend
so much on what we do or on whether we are successful. Rather, morality depends on our doing
things in a principled way. It is not what we do, but how (on the basis of what principles) we
do it. Or, to put it a little differently, whatever our purposes might be, the important thing is to
pursue those purposes in a way that stays constantly in touch with the principles of duty.

Perhaps the example of career choice will make this clear. For morality is not going to tell me
which career to choose. It is not going to say "Be a banker!" or "Be a teacher!" or "Be a priest!"
This choice — this purpose - is up to me. But what morality will tell me, though, is that
whatever career I choose, I must pursue that career in a moral way. If I choose to become a
banker, then I must do so in a way that does not compromise my principles; if I choose to
become a teacher, then I must also do so in a way that does not compromise my principles; and
so on.

Actually, of course, Kant is also saying a little more than this. He is also saying that on its
deepest level or in its inner heart, the will should always look to its moral principles rather than
to its particular goals or purposes. It is always our moral principles that should be our number
one priority or our bottom line motive, and this role of number once priority should never be
taken over by any particular goal or purpose whatsoever.

To take up our example again, what should never happen is that our career goals - banker,
teacher, priest — should never become the number one priority of our wills. This number one
priority should always be the moral law. And if our career goals do take over priority from it
— well, then, all sorts of bad things are liable to happen. And the Kantian point in this is that
our number one priority — our bottom line motive — should never be the purpose we are
pursuing but must always be the moral law.

4
And Kant wants to say that this is true even when our purpose is a good one. Even if we are
trying to save the world, we must never let this goal become our basic motivation. Our basic
motivation must still be conformity to moral duty.

To take a specific example, Kant would say that Robin Hood (who stole from the rich to give
to the poor) was making a basic moral mistake. He was treating his goal (giving to the poor) as
more important than his moral principles. And this - whatever else it may have accomplished
— was corrupting the basic goodness of his will.

[Reverence for the law]

Previously, Kant proved that the moral law must be my bottom line motive and my number
one priority. The moral law is, in a very real way, my "ultimate commander." And as my
ultimate commander it is something I will — something I must — respect.

Kant talks about respect more fully in another book (Critique of Practical Reason, Part I, Book
I, Chapter III). Here he says that it is not so much that I respect the moral law as that the moral
law makes me respect it. The moral law, so to speak, commands my respect. And it does this
in two ways:

First of all, the moral law checks or controls my desires. I want to do something, but then the
moral law says to me "No, you may not do that." And so the moral law controls what I am
allowed to want and to do. It puts a limit on the ways I am allowed to seek my happiness. And
because of this, Kant says, the moral law will produce in me a feeling of pain - the pain of not
being able to get what I want. And since the moral law controls me in this way, since it is
allowed to give me such pain, it is also something I will treat with a certain respect — the sort
of respect, perhaps, that a servant gives a master who controls him, a master who can decide
when he will be happy or not.

Secondly, the moral law humiliates my pride. We like to think that we are good. And we esteem
ourselves for a whole variety of reasons — wealth, intelligence, popularity, success, etc. But
then the moral law comes along and tells us "If you were really good — really worthy of esteem
— then you would have always followed the moral laws. But just think of the time when you
. . . " And when confronted with the moral law, who can really claim to have fulfilled his or
her duties? And so the moral law also shatters our pride or strikes down our self-conceit. In
this way, too, its effect on us is a sort of pain. And in this way, too, it commands a certain
respect from us - the sort of respect we should give a judge who has discovered us in our crimes.

[Categorical Imperative]

A note about Kant's terminology might help at this point.

Maxim: By the word "maxim" Kant means whatever principle of action a person actually does
follow. A maxim can be good or bad; it can be particular for one person or it can be shared by
many. Any principle that I act on - no matter what kind or how good it may be - is called a
maxim. Some examples would be Joe's early morning maxim which says "eat two egg sand-
wiches" or Don Juan's maxim which says "always seduce virtue when you can" or St. Francis'
maxim which says "live without possessions." • A maxim, as Kant will say later, is a "subjective
principle of action."

5
Law. By the word "law" Kant means a principle that is right for everybody. It is the principle
that everyone should follow. "Do not kill" and "Do not lie" would be examples. Kant calls the
law "an objective principle valid for every rational being."

The rule of duty that Kant comes up with can sound a bit complex. But it is actually a very
simple idea. When Kant says "I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will that
my maxim should become a universal law," what he means (to put it a bit over-simply) is that
I should not do something unless I would be happy to have everybody else do it too.

This section is very important because it removes one of the dangers that a duty-based ethic
can run into. The danger is that duty could actually lead us to do horrible things. An example
would be Nazi soldiers who "did their duty" even when this meant killing innocent people.
"But look," they said afterward, "We were soldiers and a soldier's duty is to obey orders."

Kant removes this danger by giving us a rational test of duty. The principle that "I ought never
to act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law"
now becomes the ultimate judge of what my duties really are. And so it is no longer true that
whatever your officer tells you to do is automatically your duty. If he tells you to do something
that violates this test for duties, then it actually becomes your duty to disobey him. Kant's test,
in other words, becomes a sort of "higher law" we can use to decide when our social laws are
unjust and so no longer duties but actually "anti-duties" that need to be changed rather than
followed.

In some ways, Kant's principle is similar to the Christian principle "Do unto others as you
would have them do unto you." And I think that Kant was no doubt happy about this similarity
— glad to be proving something very like Christian morality.

There is, however, a difference here too. For Kant is not exactly saying "Do unto others as you
would have them do unto you." Rather, he is saying something like, "Do unto others as you
would have everyone do unto everyone." For it is this "everyone unto everyone" that would
result from making my maxim into a universal law.

And the difference between these might look small and unimportant at first. But I think this
difference might actually be bigger than it looks. For I think it points to two different formula-
tions.

Behind the Christian formulation "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you" is, I
think, a notion of charity. The formulation is designed to talk about the relationship between
myself and another person. This comes through clearly in the alternate formula "Love your
neighbor as yourself."

In contrast, behind the Kantian formula, "Do unto others as you would have everyone do unto
everyone" is, I think, a notion of universal reasonableness. The issue here is not charity between
two persons but laws fit to govern every rational being. We are not talking now about an "I"
and a "Thou" but about a world and the principles it should run by. And what Kant is calling
us to is not so much love as it is behavior that is reasonable in the sense of being even-handed
and the same for all.

[Chapter II: Passage from Popular Moral Philosophy to a Metaphysic of Morals]

6
Again, I think it might be good to begin by trying to explain the title of this section. And the
basic idea in the title is that Kant wants to keep digging deeper and deeper down into the
foundation of morality.

The phrase "popular moral philosophy" refers to the philosophy that Kant himself produced in
section one. Remember that in section one Kant dug from our common sense knowledge down
to the first layer of philosophy beneath it. Now since this is just the first layer, it will still be
pretty close to common sense. And so Kant calls this first layer the "popular (or common-
sensical) moral philosophy.

And what Kant is going to do in chapter 2 is to dig down beneath this first layer, beneath this
popular moral philosophy. He wants to find the basic idea or the primary principles on which
this popular moral philosophy is based - the philosophy behind the philosophy, so to speak.
And it is these basic ideas or primary principles that Kant calls "the metaphysic of morals."

This chapter has two parts. The first part defines some basic terms and lays out some logical
distinctions; it sort of "sets the stage." I have (mostly) just summarized this part for you instead
of quoting from it. The second part then goes on to discover three big ideas or principles behind
our popular moral philosophy, i.e., three big ideas in the metaphysic of morals.

Definitions and Distinctions.

[The mill and freedom]

Kant defines the will in these sentences: "Everything in nature works in accordance with laws.
Only a rational being has the power to act in accordance with his idea of laws — that is, in
accordance with principles — and only so has he a will."

What is most important about this definition is what Kant does not say. He does not say that
everything in nature follows laws but that we humans have free will and so we do not follow
laws. He does not say that freedom of will means freedom from law or rules.

Rather, what Kant does say is that freedom of will is freedom to follow those laws that we,
with our freedom, have decided upon. We are not free from laws, but we are free to bind our-
selves to whatever law we think is best. Will (and therefore also freedom) are here defined as
"acting according to principles" and principles that are in us by "rational conception."

Kant's idea here is different than one that is now current in Western culture. According to this
current idea, freedom is a sort of "spontaneity". We are free when we are uninhibited, when we
express our desires and do what we want. Or, to take a somewhat different version, we are free
when we respond to life not according to a set of rules but in a way that is original, creative,
and personal.

Now Kant would, I think, be against such ideas. He would see them as too impulsive and
anarchical to be worthwhile. A spontaneity that followed no rules would, he says somewhere,
soon make itself absurd.

Instead of this, Kant wants to think of freedom as the freedom to live out a principle. We are
free because we can give our lives a law — the law of Christian charity, perhaps, or the code

7
of chivalry and honor, or whatever. Freedom, in any case, means the freedom to stick to the
principles we have chosen.

But, to take it a little further, we should talk a bit about how this basic law is chosen. How
should I choose what principle to live out?

And here Kant wants to say that we should follow our reason. We should not choose our basic
principles in some "spontaneous" way. Rather, we should choose whatever principle our reason
judges to be best. And Kant thinks that this method of choosing by reason will actually increase
our freedom. We are more free if we are able to follow out what we think is best. And we are
less free if we are merely following out some spontaneous impulse. Freedom means the
freedom to follow our own rational insight.

[Hypothetical Imperative]

Hypothetical imperatives tell me to do something as a means to something else.

The general form of hypothetical imperative is "If you want x, then you ought to do I." An
example would be: "If you want complete physical satisfaction, then you ought to eat at
Jollibee."

What's important to notice here is that eating at Jollibee is being recommended as a means to
something else, i.e., complete physical satisfaction. Eating at Jollibee, in other words, is actu-
ally not being recommended on its own account, but only on account of the satisfaction that it
leads to. And this is what Kant means by a hypothetical imperative.

[Categorical Imperative]:

Categorical imperatives tell me to do something not as a means to something else but because
this something is necessary or good in itself.

The general form of categorical imperatives is "Do x" or "You ought to do x." An example
would be: "Tell the truth" or "You ought to tell the truth." What's important to notice in this
example is that truth is not being recommended as a means to some other end; rather, telling
the truth is being commanded as something necessary in itself. In terms of the general formula,
there is no "if you want" condition attached to the command. The command sort of ignores our
wants and just tells us what we must do. And this is what Kant means by a categorical
imperative.

[How are imperatives possible?]

We come now to the big, big, big question: how are these imperatives possible. This is, in fact,
the question that will be the sort of secret driving force behind the rest of Kant's book.

When he talks about the "possibility of imperatives" what Kant means is how the imperatives
get their binding force. For these commands really do exercise a power over us. When we say
"You ought to . . . ", we feel this word "ought" as something pushing us and making us do
things.

8
And the big, big, big question is where this force comes from. How does the "ought" manage
to get such strength over us?

(i) Hypothetical imperatives Here the question is actually pretty easy. For it is obvious that, in
hypothetical imperatives, the strength of the "ought" comes from our wants. For example, look
at this hypothetical imperative: If you want complete physical satisfaction, then you ought to
eat three Boston creme doughnuts. Now in this case, the "ought to be" has force because of the
want for complete physical satisfaction. It is, to put it in a slogan, the "want to" that produces
the "ought to."

(ii) Categorical imperatives: Here the question is not so easy. For unlike the hypothetical
imperatives, the categorical imperatives are not based on wants. They do not say "If you want
x, then you ought to . . . " but just say straight out 'You ought to . . . " And this means that the
strength of the categorical "ought" can not be coming from our wants.

Nor does it seem to be coming from the greatest happiness. These categorical imperatives don't
say "If you want the greatest happiness, then you ought to . . . " but just 'You ought to . . . "
And as Kant made it clear in chapter one, we are supposed to obey these categorical commands
even if we and the other people involved all become unhappy by it.

But where, then, does the strength of these commands come from? Why are these commands
so forceful? Something in us says, for example, "You ought to tell the truth," and we feel we
must obey. But why? There is no payoff offered here in terms of our wants. There is not even
a payoff offered in terms of the happiness of others. But why then, when it is offering us so
little, should we feel so bound to obey this command? In terms of what does it bind us so?

And what Kant says to these questions is that — they have him puzzled. When he stops to think
about them, this "why" really does look a bit mysterious and figuring out where it comes from
does not look so easy. And so instead of going forward, he suggests that we go sideways
instead. Maybe we can't figure out where these categorical imperatives come from, but maybe
we can figure out a little more what they are like. And so Kant decides to look for general
formulas or descriptions of these categorical imperatives or moral rules. And maybe, he says,
these general formulas will give us some clue to the question "why so binding."

II. The Basic Moral Ideas

According to Kant, there are four basic moral ideas, four big principles in what he calls the
metaphysics of morals. These four ideas are : the universal law humanity as an end in itself
autonomy the kingdom of ends

Kant expresses each of these four ideas in a different version of the categorical imperative:

(i) Formula one: Act only on that maxim through you can at the same time will that it should
become a universal law. (Act on principles that are valid for everyone.)

(ii) Formula two: Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own
person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as
an end. (Respect every person as valuable in himself or herself.)

9
(iii) Formula three: Act so that the will is self-legislating, i.e., not just subject to the law but
actually prescribing it. (Follow the moral law not as a rule that is forced on you from outside
but as -a law that you have set for yourself.)

(iv) Formula four. Act so as to refer your action to the legislation in an ideal kingdom of ends.
(Aim toward a world where all are free.)

[Universal law]

The formulations of the categorical imperative are very close to the rule of duty that Kant gave
in chapter one. This makes sense because Kant thinks that moral duty and the categorical
imperative are actually one and the same thing.

[Humanity as an end in itself]

One of the problems with Kant's theory is the problem of ends or goals. His method is very
good for telling us what rules to follow. But it does not seem so good when it comes to telling
us what purposes to pursue. In fact, in chapter one, Kant insisted that, when it comes to moral
worth, only the rule or principle mattered and that the purpose or goal was simply irrelevant.

But doesn't morality itself have a purpose or goal? Isn't there some end or aim to the moral life?
Surely we are doing more than just following rules for the sake of following rules.

We must be hoping to achieve something by all this rule following. But what is this something
— this goal or end — we are trying to achieve?

Kant tries to fill in this gap in his theory in his discussion of "humanity as an end in itself." And
what he says is that the goal of moral life is to treat each person with respect.

Kant's discussion of "humanity as an end in itself is a bit obscure and so I have decided to
explain it more clearly:

The question: The question is what the goal, or to use Kant's word, what the end of the moral
life should be.

The clues: In our search for this moral goal we already have two important clues. First of all,
we already know that morality must contain categorical and not hypothetical imperatives. Sec-
ond, we also know that morality must be objective and valid for all subjects rather than subjec-
tive and valid for some subjects only.

And we can now use these two clues as a test for goals. If a goal does produce categorical
imperatives and is valid for all subjects, then it will be the moral goal we are looking for. On
the other hand, if a goal produces hypothetical imperatives and is valid for some subjects only,
then it will not be the moral goal.

Answer part one. And the first thing Kant says is that any goal that is based on desire cannot
be the moral goal. As an example of this sort of goal, let's take the goal of eating six moon
cakes. For this is a goal that is based on the desire we call hunger. And I think it is pretty clear
that this goal will fail both of Kant's tests.

10
To begin with, it will fail the categorical/subjective test. For it will be a goal that is valid for
some subjects only, i.e., for hungry ones. It will not be a goal for subjects who have already
eaten or for angels who do not need to eat. In general, goals of desire are subjective since they
are valid only for subjects who actually have the desire.
And so, according to Kant's clues, no goal of desire can actually be the moral goal. Another
way to look at this is to think that such goals have a conditional worth only. They have worth
only because I desire them. And so if I stopped desiring them their worth would go away. And
a goal that has such a conditional worth only will obviously not be strong enough to lay down
any categorical — any absolute — commands.

Answer part two: But what sort of goal then could the moral goal be? Well, the second thing
Kant says is that it must be a goal that is valuable in itself. This goal, in other words, must have
a value of its own and not merely a value because of my desires for it. It must be, as Kant puts
it, an "end in itself."

And this sort of goal, Kant thinks, will pass the tests. The key is this: since the goal has a value
of its own it will retain this value no matter who I am or what my desires happen to be. Its value
belongs to it and so its value won't change even if people and their desires do.

And so, to begin with test one, this goal will produce the categorical imperative "Treat me as
valuable." And this imperative is categorical because there is no secret "if you want" attached.
This sort of goal does not need to prove that it is valuable by pandering to our wants. It already
simply is valuable. And so it does not need to mention our wants but can, simply and categori-
cally, say to us "I am valuable. Treat me as valuable."

Also, this sort of goal will be objective in the sense of commanding all subjects. Its value is its
own and does not depend on who I am. And so, whoever I might be, this goal could still say to
me, "I am valuable. Treat me as valuable."

And so, according to Kant's two clues, it looks like such a goal-in-itself really would be a moral
goal. For this sort of goal is both categorical and objective. And that is just what we want our
moral goals to be.

But before we go any further, perhaps it would be good to stop and give an example. Now the
example I will use is not Kant's example, and he probably would not agree with it, since he
would probably say that the goal in my example is not really valuable in itself. But I think that
the example will nonetheless be useful as a first illustration.

And so let us imagine a basketball team in the race for the league championship. And let us
imagine further that the forward has gotten lazy and does not want to practice or play hard
anymore. Now the coach is liable to tell him that the championship is an important goal no
matter who he thinks he is and no matter how he feels about it, and that he must therefore play
hard to achieve it, even if he doesn't want to.

Now in this example the championship is the end-in-itself, i.e., the goal that is valuable in itself,
valuable for all the team members and valuable no matter what their desires might be. And
what is interesting to note is that this goal does lay down a sort of categorical imperative. It
says to the forward, "Practice hard." It doesn't say "If you want. . . etc.," but just tells him, no
matter what he wants, "Practice hard." And it is this connection between things valuable in
themselves and categorical imperatives that Kant is pointing to here.

11
Answer part three: And from here Kant's argument is easy to understand and so I will give it
in barest outline only. Kant says that humanity is valuable in itself. And so, according to what
we have just said, we are categorically required to treat humanity as valuable, i.e., with respect.
And it is this categorical value or respect that Kant formulates by saying "so act as to treat
humanity never as a means only but always also as an end in itself."

[Law of Autonomy]

First of all, let us talk about the words "autonomy" and "heteronomy." "Auto" means self and
"nomos" means law. (The roots are Greek.) Hence, autonomy means self-law, or, to put it in a
fuller way, it means following a law we ourselves give. "Hetero" means other and "nomos"
means law. Hence, heteronomy means other-law, or taking the law from some source outside
ourselves.

And what Kant wants to say here is that morality requires us to be autonomous, to give our-
selves the law and not just take it from some outside source.
There is, I think, an issue of maturity involved in this. For heteronomy is actually a sort of
moral childhood. While only autonomy is really adult.

Children are often motivated in heteronomous ways. A child, for example, might tell the truth
because his Daddy told him he should, or because he is afraid of getting spanked if he doesn't,
or because he wants the other kids to like him. And I think we would want to say two things
about these motivations: first of all, that they are heteronomous or coming from the outside;
and, second, that they show the child has not yet, morally speaking, really grown up yet.

What needs to happen, Kant would say, is that the child needs to become autonomous. He
needs to start telling the truth not for these outside reasons but because he himself thinks that
it is right and he himself decides to follow this tightness out. And when a child does begin to
exhibit this sort of autonomous motivation, I think we would all say that he has taken a very
important step into moral maturity.

Kant also makes a big deal about heteronomy and interest. And I think he stresses this so much
because he thinks that heteronomy is always, in a sense, corrupt. To be more blunt, he thinks
that heteronomy always ends up taking bribes.

Perhaps this will be clearest in an example. And so let us imagine someone who accepts the
Ten commandments in a heteronomous way. What this means is that he does not follow these
commandments because he himself wills them, because he himself judges that they are right
and chooses to follow them. Rather, he follows them because of an outside source, because
"God said so."

Now this is a situation that will produce a "motivation deficit." If he doesn't judge and choose
these commandments himself, why should he keep following them? Sure, God says so, but so
what? Why should he keep following these rules just because someone else said so?

And it is here that the "inducement" comes in. For in order to overcome this motivation deficit,
some sort of payoff will be needed. And so this person thinks that keeping the commandments
will get him into heaven and keep him out of hell. And this will, indeed, provide an answer to
his questions "Why should I?" and "So what?"

12
But it will, Kant thinks, provide an answer that is corrupt. For this person is not treating the
moral law with the respect that it deserves, but is merely using it to get a payoff for himself —
a very big payoff, of course, but the size of the bribe doesn't make it any less a bribe. There is,
I think Kant would say, a sort of prostitution of morality here.

And the only way to get out of this corruption, Kant would say, is to go back to the beginning
and become autonomous instead of heteronomous. This person must begin following the
commandments because he himself judges that they are right and chooses to follow them. Only
in this way can the person put himself into a situation where he won't suffer a motivation deficit
and so won't need bribes. The escape from inducements is really quite simple: if this person
just began following the commandments for his own internal reasons — because he himself
wanted to — then he would no longer need to even care what inducements were being offered.
His autonomy will now keep him following the commandments purely — without the need for
payoff.

[Kingdom of Ends]

This kingdom of ends seems to be a translation of the idea of a true Church. It also seems to be
a translation of the idea of a true democracy. But let me concentrate on the true Church idea in
the remarks that follow.

I think that what Kant is proving here is actually subtle and interesting. For he is not proving
that this true Church actually exists. He is not saying that it is real and that he can show us
where it is.

Rather, he is proving that — whether it is real or not — we must believe in this true Church
and try to make it real. He is proving that every good will has a drive toward building this true
Church up. In every choice I make, Kant thinks, I hear the question "Will this choice lead to
the true Church or not?"

To put it in more theological language, Kant is not saying that the Christ's kingdom is real (or
real yet); but he is saying that each good will feels the constant command to hasten its coming.
And I think it is interesting to notice how morality is here leading us to religion. For we usually
think of it the other way around, i.e., that religion should lead us to morality. To expand on this
a little, we usually think that we should begin by proving that religion is true, that God exists,
that the soul is immortal, and so on. And, once we've done this, then we figure it will be easy
to go on and prove a morality too. We usually begin, in other words, by proving God as the
first premise, and then we just derive morality as a conclusion from this.

But Kant is here suggesting that we could also do things in the opposite order. We could start
with morality, he says, because inside morality we will find a drive that will lead us back to
God and the Church. If we accept morality, in other words, we will also accept the need to
believe. Instead, therefore, of moving from God to morality, we could also move from morality
to God.

This becomes especially important for Kant since he does not think we can prove God's
existence in a theoretical way. In an earlier book, The Critique of Pure Reason, Kant explains
why such a theoretical proof is impossible, and also produces some powerful criticisms of the
proofs that other philosophers had tried to use.

13
But if the theoretical path is closed to us, we need some other way. And that is why Kant thinks
that the path from morality to God is so important. Because even if our pure reason cannot
prove that God exists, Kant still thinks that our moral reason — our moral lives — will tell us
that we must believe.

In a later book, The Critique of Practical Reason, Kant takes this moral path to God and devel-
ops it still further. But that's another book and a different chapter to the story. . . .

A clue to the big, big, question: Several pages ago, we said that the big, big question was how
categorical imperatives were possible. Where was the binding force of these imperatives
coming from? What was, ultimately, behind them?

And we said that these questions were so puzzling that Kant decided to postpone them for a
while. First, he said, we should look for different formulations of this law, for perhaps in these
formulations we might find a clue to help us out of our puzzlement

Well, Kant has now found his formulations of the moral law, and he thinks he has found his
clue as well. And this clue is autonomy. For as Kant now argues, autonomy is actually the
supreme principle of all morality.

[Concluding Part]

Kant also suggests that the four different formulations of the categorical imperative that we
have discussed are all related to each other. In other words, there is really just one categorical
imperative and four formulations of it. In part this is probably just a manifestation of Kant's
obsession with neatness. But I think he might also be trying to show that these four formulations
are all interrelated as a first step in showing that they all rest on autonomy as their common
basis.

The connection between morality and autonomy is very important. What Kant is proving is
that for autonomy to be really autonomous it is the law of morality that it must lay down for
itself, and that for morality to be really moral it must be based in a motivation that is
autonomous.

But perhaps the importance of this will be clearer if we put it into everyday terms. For what
Kant is saying here is that the only way to be really free is to be good and that the only way to
be really good is to be free.

In the next section, Kant will take this and develop it into an answer to the big, big question
about where the force of categorical imperative comes from. But I think that we have, by now,
already arrived at a sort of first or preliminary answer. For we are already in a position to say
that it is the call to autonomy — the call to true freedom — which we feel is behind the
categorical imperative. The moral ought, in other words, binds us so tightly because it is the
demands of our own freedom that are binding us here.

[Transition from the Metaphysic of Morals to the Critique of Pure Practical Reason]

But Kant is not finished digging yet. He wants to take his analysis still one step deeper. That is
why the title of this section is talking about still one more transition.

14
What we are transiting from is the metaphysic of morals. This is just the set of four big ideas
that we talked about in the last section. And what we are transiting to is the critique of pure
practical reason. This is an attempt to find an ultimate basis or ultimate proof for the four big
ideas we talked about.

Kant's method goes something like this: he starts off with the idea on which he ended the last
section, i.e., the idea that autonomy is the supreme principle of morality. And he tries now to
prove this autonomy by tracing it back to a still deeper sort of freedom — a sort of ultimate
free will belonging to our "deep souls". Now Kant thinks that this ultimate freedom and this
deep soul will always remain pretty much mysterious and unknown to us. And yet he hopes to
at least provide some clues that they — whatever exactly they may be like — really are behind
our autonomy and morality.

Kant calls this a critique or pure practical reason because there is a sort of knowledge he needs,
not exactly to deny, but at least to limit. This is the knowledge that science brings us about
human behavior. For science wants to say that our behavior is not free but determined — that
we do the things we do because of culture, previous training, personality structures, etc. And
what Kant argues here is that all this scientific knowledge can be correct and yet that there can,
nonetheless, still be a deep sort of freedom behind all this determinism.

And Kant then goes on to offer us some clues that this sort of ultimate freedom and deep soul
really are there. He says, for example, that there is a certain aspiration of the mind to go beyond
everything it sees around it and to look for the spiritual foundations beneath. The ideas of God
and soul, after all, seem to come naturally to us. And this aspiration indicates, Kant thinks, that
there is something in us that does not belong to this world merely but belongs to another and
more spiritual realm. It indicates, in other words, that we are in a deep sense free of this world
and the determinisms in it.

And now Kant thinks he will finally be able to answer the big, big question and explain where
the categorical imperatives come from and why they are so forceful. These imperatives, he
says, are the call of our own deep soul and our deep freedom. What happens is that our desires
pull us in all sorts of directions. But this deep soul "calls us back" to what is objective and
reasonable and right. And the way we feel this call is as an imperative in us that says "Don't do
that!" The content of this imperative is the universal moral law. But the speaker is our own
deepest soul. And it is this — the fact that it is our own deepest soul calling to us — that makes
these commands so binding and so strong.

But Kant adds a caution to this. He says that although we can get some clues or indications that
this deep soul and this deep freedom are there, and although we even hear them speaking to us
in the moral imperatives, we cannot actually know them — we cannot experience them or learn
what they are like. Our own souls and our own freedom will always remain mostly mysterious
to us.

15