Literal Bases For Metaphor and Simile

Metaphor and Symbol
ISSN: 1092-6488 (Print) 1532-7868 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/hmet20
Literal Bases for Metaphor and Simile
Dan L. Chiappe & John M. Kennedy
To cite this article: Dan L. Chiappe & John M. Kennedy (2001) Literal Bases for Metaphor and
Simile, Metaphor and Symbol, 16:3-4, 249-276, DOI: 10.1080/10926488.2001.9678897
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/10926488.2001.9678897
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METAPHOR AND SYMBOL, 16(3&4), 249–276
Copyright © 2001, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Literal Bases for Metaphor and Simile

Dan L. Chiappe
Department of Psychology
SUNY College at Fredonia
John M. Kennedy
Department of Psychology
University of Toronto
A literal base theory of figurative language holds that figurative claims are modeled
on literal forms of expression. They use surface features of literal forms but relax their
constraints. We test this theory on metaphors (“Rumors are weeds”) and similes
(“Rumors are like weeds”), which have forms of literal categorization and similarity
claims, respectively. Consistent with the literal base theory, we report the metaphor
form is preferred over the simile form when the similarity between the topic (rumors)
and the vehicle (weeds) is quite high. Indeed, similarity was found to be more impor-
tant than familiarity, another potential factor that might affect preference for one form
or the other. Our explanation is that in literal language, the categorical form (“That is
an apple”) is used when there many common properties, whereas the similarity form
(“That is like an apple”) is used when there are few common properties.
What is the basis of figurative language? In contrast to recent theories that look to
metaphor as the basis for the literal, here we offer a literal base theory that claims
the roots of figures of speech are in literal language.
There are perplexing differences between types of nonliteral language. Our the-
ory explains that these differences follow from straightforward and indispensable
aspects of literal claims.
By way of example, “Education is like a stairway” is a figurative claim, in con-
trast to a literal claim such as “Limes are like lemons.” The literal and the figura-
tive are indeed different, but, as many scholars have pointed out, it is surprisingly
Requests for reprints should be sent to Dan L. Chiappe, Department of Psychology, California State
University–Long Beach, 1250 Bellflower Boulevard, Long Beach, CA 90840.
250 CHIAPPE AND KENNEDY
difficult to explain the basis of the distinction (Frisson & Pickering, 2001/this is-
sue; Gibbs & Gerrig, 1989). In Gibbs’s (1994) terms, we are aware of the differ-
ences in the products, but are unaware of the processes underlying the differences.
If we are correct that figurative language capitalizes on literal language, it follows
that part of the difficulty in explaining the difference between the two comes from
the figurative being modeled on the literal.
Let us examine two prominent, common, useful, and closely related kinds of
figurative claims to show the force of our argument that all figurative claims capi-
talize on essential types of literal statements. We focus on metaphors and similes.
These two tropes use nearly identical wording (Chiappe & Kennedy, 1999,
Glucksberg & Keysar, 1990; Kennedy & Chiappe, 1999; Roberts & Kreuz, 1994).
Because they are virtually twins, one might wonder why figurative language re-
tains both. Why not simplify our language and eliminate one? And yet, we are not
aware of any language that does not have both metaphors and similes. In our ac-
count, figurative language has these fraternal twins because the literal language to
which they are related has two indispensable and very distinct forms: Literal lan-
guage has ways of expressing similarity and ways of classifying.
As will become evident, our account makes three predictions. First, the classifi-
cation form is used when the topic and the vehicle share many properties, whereas
the similarity form is used when the topic and vehicle share fewer common proper-
ties. Second, figurative use of the forms of literal language involves loosening re-
strictions on classification and similarity claims. Third, similarity is the decisive
term here, and we argue that it is more important than familiarity with a compari-
son in determining preferred form.
We offer three experiments to test our predictions. In the General Discussion
section we note how our analysis integrates ideas developed by Glucksberg and
Keysar (1990), ideas about “salience” of features (Giora, 1997; Katz & Ferretti,
2001/this issue; Ortony, 1979; Peleg, Giora, & Fein, 2001/this issue), ideas about
the nature of the comparison process (Chiappe, 1998; Medin, Goldstone, &
Gentner, 1993), and ideas about “aptness” (Liu & Kennedy, 1997).
METAPHOR AND SIMILE
“A rumor is a weed” is a metaphor. It has the form “A P is a Q.” This is the same
form used in “A Ford is a car,” which is a claim about the category to which “a
Ford” belongs. Hypothetically, then, “A rumor is a weed” might be modeled on lit-
eral categorization claims. If the rumor example is a good guide, metaphors assert
that the topic (rumor) belongs in the category referred to by the vehicle term (weed).
In contrast, similes, such as “Rumors are like weeds,” have a form that is identi-
cal to “A lime is like a lemon.” This form enables us to make claims that a P and a
Q are similar. Presumably they share a significant property. Notice that a claim
METAPHORS AND SIMILES 251
about similarity does not assert that P is a Q. That is, a lime is not a lemon. We pro-
pose that the model for similes in literal language is a claim about similarity: a
claim that asserts a similarity relation between the topic and vehicle.
If figurative claims use literal claims as their models, one consequence is that
they cannot be distinguished from literal claims solely on the basis of their form.
The difference has to be found elsewhere.
We suggest that when people determine that a statement is figurative, the statement
is interpreted by loosening some of the restrictions placed on the literal forms on which
it is based. Some of these are restrictions on words, whereas others are restrictions on
the use of certain kinds of expressions (e.g., categorization and similarity claims).
Literal language is a highly rule-governed system. Some restrictions are local con-
ventions (Dascal, 1987), and some are universal, found in all language users (Devitt &
Sterelny, 1987). For instance, although all words have some significance because of
universal matters of semantics, individual words mean what they mean because there
is some local agreement on how these words can be used (Devitt & Sterelny, 1987).
To take an example, by convention the word weeds refers to undesirable plants.
The term is also associated with other properties. They include the fact that weeds
need water and sunshine to grow, that they are green and leafy, that some are ed-
ible, that they spread very quickly and in an uncontrolled fashion, that they are
hard to get rid of, and so on. These various properties may differ in their salience,
some being called to mind much more readily than others (Giora, 1997; Ortony,
1979). If something truly is a weed, it follows automatically that it is a plant, but
only some weeds would be edible, leafy, and so on.
Figurative language relaxes many of the restrictions on literal uses of language,
at least pro tem. For example, an essential property of weeds, one that is highly sa-
lient, is that they are plants (see Kornblith, 1993; Medin & Ortony, 1989; Rips,
1989, for discussions of “psychological essentialism”). They are a kind of flora.
When the word weeds is used figuratively, however, this restriction on the use of
the term is dropped. For instance, we can use the expression “Rumors are weeds”
to convey that rumors spread very quickly and uncontrollably and are hard to get
rid of, without committing ourselves to the claim that rumors are plants.
Ideally, in literal language words have automatic entailments, irrespective of con-
text, whereas in figurative language, these entailments may fail to hold. Indeed, figu-
rative uses of words often involve relaxing some of the most fundamental
restrictions on the use of terms (Chiappe, 2000). An essential component of volca-
noes is that they are created from the eruption of lava through the earth’s crust. This
is dropped when one says “Rage is a volcano.” We can rage without being crusty.
Likewise, an essential component of whirlpools is that they are created from a liquid
subjected to a certain force. This requirement is dropped when we say “Indecision is
a whirlpool.” We can be indecisive without having liquid thoughts.
In sum, expressions are figurative when the restrictions placed on their literal forms
are temporarily eased. In many cases this involves shifting reference toward properties
that are not essential, less salient, or merely associated with a vehicle term. For in-
stance, a less salient property of volcanoes is that they can lie dormant for quite some
time without erupting, much like rage. Less salient properties of whirlpools are that
they can be at times irresistible and lead quickly to our demise, much like indecision.
In literal language, if you say of some object “That object is an apple,” you imply
that the object in question has all of the properties needed to be a member of the cate-
gory “apple.” However, if you say of some object “That object is like an apple,” you
imply that the object only has some of those properties. Thus, there is a connection
between having some properties and processes of comparison and classification.
More specifically, categorization claims imply that an object possesses certain
essential properties, although they usually also suggest the possession of certain
nonessential ones as well. As Rips (1989) showed, certain properties are more cru-
cial to classification than others. Under certain conditions, people will assign an in-
stance to a category if it has certain “underlying” or “hidden” properties, even
though it has the superficial features associated with another category. For instance,
knowing that an object has the genetic structure of apples would be sufficient for it to
be included in the category “apple,” even though the object has been made up to look
like another type of object. What about similarity claims? They imply that the object
in question either only has a few of the essential properties (e.g., “Limes are like or-
anges”—both are citrus fruits) or possibly only some of the nonessential ones. Thus,
an object would be said to be like an apple if it was red, round, small, and firm.
If metaphors and similes are modeled on literal categorization and similarity
statements, respectively, they support an analogy: If attention is drawn to the dif-
ferences in form, preference for the metaphor form may be connected to greater
similarity, whereas preference for the simile form may be connected to lower simi-
larity. It is important to note, however, that there are several ways in which the
analogy could be cashed, depending on how closely the metaphors, similes, and
their contents follow the literal models.
One possibility is that as the similarity between topics and vehicles increases, pref-
erence for the metaphorical form of expression increases as well. Another possibility
is that not only is preference (in speakers) for metaphors increased by similarity, but in
addition the perceived similarity (in receivers) that is generated by metaphors is
greater than that which is generated by similes. That is, it may be metaphors are pre-
ferred when the topic–vehicle similarity is quite high, and seeing a statement as a met-
aphor may also imply a greater similarity than seeing a statement as a simile.
We should caution that, strictly speaking, the one effect here does not entail the
other. It is logically possible that people prefer to use the metaphor form when the
similarity between the topic and vehicle is quite high, but the perceived similarity
generated by metaphors and similes is the same. For instance, at times people may
weigh offering a metaphor rather than a simile when expressing the relation be-
tween a topic and a vehicle, but recipients receiving one form may only entertain
that form, without weighing one against another. If so, when they are on the receiv-
ing end, people may interpret metaphor-form statements in the same way as simi-
les—simply taking into account the relevant set of common properties of the topic
and the vehicle. Thus, saying “Crime is a disease” or “Crime is like a disease”
may yield the same interpretations on the part of recipients, even though people
may prefer the former if they entertain both forms, perhaps choosing the metaphor
because the similarities between crime and disease seem substantial.
The issues at hand here cannot be fully settled a priori precisely because metaphors
and similes do not inherit all of the features associated with literal categorization and
similarity statements. Which features are used in practice? Experiments can suggest
the answer. However, as will be discussed more fully in the following, the results of
experiments do need to be reconciled with a priori factors. Just such an a priori matter,
for example, is that in literal language, a categorization claim cannot be meaningfully
converted into a similarity claim (e.g., “Dogs are animals” cannot be transformed into
“Dogs are like animals”). In contrast, metaphors (e.g., “Crime is a disease”) can
meaningfully be expressed as similes (i.e., “Crime is like a disease”).
FAMILIARITY AND PREFERENCE FOR

FORM OF EXPRESSION
To this point we have considered the role of similarity in determining preference for the
metaphor and simile form. However, similarity is not the only contender for the role of
kingmaker, determining how people choose to express the relation between a topic and
a vehicle. Another significant factor is a person’s familiarity with an expression.
When people are unfamiliar with a topic–vehicle pair, they have to derive the rel-
evant properties that make up the ground of the statement. To do so, they have to en-
gage in a comparison process. Because a comparison process is involved, it could be
argued that the simile form is the most appropriate as, on the surface, it best reflects
the processes required in deriving an interpretation. When a person has encountered
the topic–vehicle pairing several times, however, surely the relevant category—the
set of relevant properties forming the ground of the statement—would often be
stored as a chunk in long-term memory. In this case, the set of properties constituting
the meaning of the statement would not have to be derived de novo. They would be
accessible directly from memory. Hence, if the relevant properties are stored as a
chunk, the topic–vehicle pairings could be understood via a categorization process,
making the metaphor form the most appropriate.
In short, in this argument, familiar topic–vehicle pairings are related via catego-
ries stored in memory, whereas unfamiliar pairings are related through a compari-
son process that produces novel groups of features. (A related argument has been
made by Gentner & Wolff, 1997, and Wolff & Gentner, 2000, and we discuss their
argument more fully later.)
Let us note, however, that an alternative line of argument could lead to the conclu-
sion that familiar tropes are preferred as metaphors. In our initial encounter with a
comparison, the set of relevant features may not be rich. As it becomes more familiar,
we may be able to discern the set of key features more readily. The number of features
used in a comparison may grow with use. And, because of this increase in similarity
that accrues with familiarity, people may be more likely to prefer the metaphor form.
Of interest, the two theories—number of features versus familiarity with a
topic–vehicle pair—make slightly different predictions. The role of familiarity
outweighs the role of number of features in one theory. Familiarity leads to
well-established categories, and secondarily some increase in the number of rele-
vant features, one theory holds. The other holds that the role of number of features
is primary. Although there may be some grouping of features into chunks or cate-
gories with an increase in familiarity, the primary role of familiarity is to make
many features relevant.
EXPERIMENTS
Metaphors may be related to class inclusion and similes to claims about similarity.
Categories involve “all” the relevant properties, and similarity involves “some”
shared properties. By analogy between some and all, metaphors may be stronger
claims in some respects.
One way to assess the number of features relevant to a comparison is to ask
about the “aptness” of a comparison. In Chiappe and Kennedy (1999), we reported
participants prefer to express some comparisons as metaphors (e.g., “Cigarettes
are time bombs”) and some as similes (e.g., “Highways are like snakes”). Further-
more, we found that comparisons that participants rated as highly apt were pre-
ferred as metaphors, whereas those that were lower in aptness were preferred as
similes. Aptness was defined as the extent to which a comparison captures impor-
tant features of the topic. However, we did not measure perceived similarity, al-
though we argued our criteria reflect similarity.
To test our conjectures, in Experiments 1 and 2 we assessed similarity judgments
directly. In Experiment 1, participants saw pairs of topics and vehicles and rated
their similarity. In Experiment 2, participants again saw pairs of topics and vehicles
and rated them for their similarity, but in this study the terms were embedded in met-
aphors and similes. In the first experiment, the pairs were simply presented on their
own. Both studies allow us to test whether there is a relation between similarity of
topics and vehicles and preference for metaphors or similes. In addition, however,
the studies allow us to examine, first, whether differences in similarity affect the
form in which a statement is expressed, and, second and conversely, whether per-
ceived similarity is a function of the form in which a statement is expressed.
Experiment 3 assessed two rival accounts, similarity and familiarity, and the
possibility that they may have subtly different effects on our preferences for the
metaphor or simile form of a statement.
EXPERIMENT 1
The first experiment tested the prediction that, as the similarity between the topic
and the vehicle increases, preference for the metaphor form increases. This predic-
tion is consistent with the literal base theory. Metaphors have the form of class-in-
clusion claims, implying all the key properties for a category are satisfied, whereas
similes have the form of similarity statements and suggest some properties are rele-
vant. Consequently, as similarity between the pairs of concepts increases, prefer-
ence for the metaphor form should increase as well.
Let us briefly note an alternate view, known as the comparison theory, which makes
a different prediction. This is a classical theory that holds metaphors are elliptical simi-
les. This time-honored view holds metaphors are similes with the term of comparison,
the “like,” left out (Aristotle, 1926, 1941; Fogelin, 1988; Kintsch, 1974; Miller, 1979).
The comparison theory contends that metaphors are not categorization statements be-
cause, taken as such, they assert something absurd. Rumors, not being plants, cannot be-
long in the category “weeds.” They can, however, be like weeds in certain respects.
Thus, in this view, “Rumors are weeds” is a short form for “Rumors are like weeds.” As
Aristotle said, “[the] simile … is a metaphor differing only by the addition of a word”
(1926, p. 397). In short, this theory holds that metaphors are nothing more than abbrevi-
ated similes, and, thus, they mean the same thing. Consequently, the comparison theory
does not predict an increase in preference for the metaphor form as similarity increases.
Method
Participants. Twenty-four participants (19 women and 5 men) with a mean

age of 22.4 years participated. Participants were volunteers from a 3rd-year course
in psychology. All the students were from Simon Fraser University. Participants
were tested individually.
Stimuli and apparatus. The items for this study were the topics and vehi-
cles of 30 figurative statements. The statements were ones that we used in a previ-
ous study on metaphor comprehension (Chiappe & Kennedy, 1999). In our previ-
ous study, these items were rated in terms of whether they are best expressed as
metaphors or similes. We calculated the proportion of people that prefer them as
metaphors and the proportion that prefer them as similes. Despite a moderate pref-
erence for the simile form overall, the preferences per item varied greatly. They
ranged from 3% of the participants preferring the metaphor form to 97% preferring
the metaphor form. This is important because we want to investigate the factors that
affect preference for one form over the other. The statements, along with the pro-
portion of participants preferring the metaphor form, are listed in Table 1.
TABLE 1
Preferences for the Metaphor Form of 30 Comparisons
Comparison Metaphor Preference
life–journey† .97
cigarettes–time bombs† .87
genes–blueprints† .87
education–stairway† .70
crime–disease .67
encyclopedias–gold mines .60
nature–laboratory .60
alcohol–crutch .57
friends–anchors .53
roosters–alarm clocks .47
ideas–diamonds .47
indecision–whirlpool .43
surgeons–butchers .40
mosquitos–vampires .40
arguing–war .37
deserts–ovens .33
sermons–sleeping pills .33
words–daggers .33
salesmen–bulldozers .33
hearts–closets* .23
desks–junkyards* .23
man–wolf* .20
billboards–warts* .20
jobs–jails* .17
giraffes–skyscrapers* .13
smiles–razors* .10
tree trunks–straws* .10
trees–umbrellas* .10
people–doors* .07
highways–snakes* .03
Note. Preference ratings are from “Aptness Predicts Preference for Metaphors or Similes, as Well
as Recall Bias,” by D. L. Chiappe and J. M. Kennedy, 1999, Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 6.
Copyright 1999 by the Psychonomics Society. Reprinted with permission. Only metaphor preference is
listed, because simile preference is the inverse of metaphor preference. Comparisons marked with an
asterisk had a significant preference for their simile form (Critical Ratio = 2.01, p < .05), and
comparisons marked with a dagger had a significant preference for the metaphor form (Critical Ratio =
2.01, p < .05).
In this study, the pairs of topics and vehicles from these statements were shown
to the participants. However, they were not shown embedded in metaphors or sim-
iles. For instance, the participants saw crime paired with the vehicle disease, but
they were not put in the form of a metaphor or simile. Participants were presented
the pairs of topics and vehicles in booklets, 15 pairs of terms per page.
Procedure. Participants saw 30 pairs of topics and vehicles, such as ru-

mors–weeds, crime–disease, and so on. The items were presented in random order,
with a unique order for each participant. The participants were asked to read each item
and judge similarity using a scale ranging from 1 (not similar at all) to 10 (extremely
similar). For instance, they were asked, “How similar are rumors to weeds?” Then they
wrote down a number from 1 to 10 in the space provided beside the question.
Results and Discussion
The results of the experiment (summarized in Table 2) were as follows: The mean
similarity rating for the pairs of topics and vehicles was 3.22 (SD = 1.24). The range
was from 1.33 for the comparison between smiles and razors to 7.17 for the compari-
son between life and journey. Thus, although the similarity ratings were on average
low, there was a considerable range in similarity ratings across the pairs of items.
We were interested in whether the similarity ratings obtained from the pairs of
topics and vehicles were able to predict the preference for the metaphor and simile
form that we obtained in Chiappe and Kennedy (1999). Despite the fact that the sim-
ilarity ratings were on average restricted to the lower half of the similarity-rating
scale, the ratings predicted preference for the metaphor or simile form of the state-
ments. The correlation between the similarity ratings and the preference ratings was
+.61 (p < .01). Instructively, as the similarity increased, so too did preference for the
metaphor form. For instance, genes was rated as highly similar to blueprints, and
people generally prefer “Genes are blueprints” to “Genes are like blueprints.”
These results suggest that similarity affects the preferred form of expression.
As similarity increases, so too does preference for the metaphor form. This is con-
sistent with the literal forms on which metaphors and similes are based. However,
these results leave unanswered the question of whether expressing the relation be-
tween a topic and a vehicle as a metaphor or as a simile has an effect on the per-
ceived similarity. The one effect does not entail the other. Although people may
prefer to express a statement as a metaphor if the similarity is high, it does not fol-
TABLE 2
Similarity and Metaphor Preference
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Mean similarity rating 3.22 5.13

Standard deviation 1.24 1.48
Correlation between similarity and metaphor preference +.61 +.75
Note. The difference between the similarity ratings for Experiment 1 and 2 was statistically
significant, p < .001. The correlation between similarity and metaphor preference was significant in
Experiment 1 and in Experiment 2, p < .01.
low that, on the recipient’s side, the perceived similarity between a topic and a ve-
hicle will be affected by whether a statement is expressed as a metaphor or simile.
EXPERIMENT 2
Two issues were addressed in Experiment 2. Metaphors and similes are figurative
expressions, and figurative language loosens the bonds on literal language. This
could have consequences for judgments of similarity. Presenting topics and vehi-
cles in the context of metaphors and similes could boost similarity above the levels
reached when the items are presented on their own. That is, if figurative language
loosens restrictions placed on literal uses of words, people should generally give
higher similarity ratings for the pairs of topics and vehicles when they are presented
in metaphors and similes than when they are presented on their own, as they were in
Experiment 1. Hence, the similarity ratings should be generally higher in Experi-
ment 2 than they were in Experiment 1.
Figurative forms may use relaxed criteria, but does one form imply more than an-
other? This was the second focus of Experiment 2. By offering more than one figura-
tive context, it tested whether the perceived similarity between a topic and vehicle is
affected by the form in which a statement is expressed. In literal language, categori-
cal statements seem to imply a greater degree of similarity than likeness statements.
Consequently, this may also apply in the case of metaphors and similes. Alterna-
tively, this feature of literal statements may fail to affect recipients dealing with figu-
rative counterparts. Speakers may choose between figurative forms, but recipients
may mostly attend to the content of the comparisons. Although higher similarity
may lead to a general preference for metaphors over similes, the perceived similarity
that is generated by the two tropes may be the same.
Experiment 2 presented participants with metaphors and similes and had them assess
the similarity between the topics and vehicles. Thus, the pairs of concepts were embed-
ded in metaphors and similes. This allowed us to determine whether the similarity rat-
ings were affected by the form used to express the relation between a topic and vehicle.
Method
Participants. Seventeen participants (14 women and 3 men) with a mean age
of 21.9 years participated in this experiment. Participants were volunteers from a
2nd-year course in psychology. All of the students were from the University of To-
ronto at Scarborough. Participants were tested individually.
Stimuli and apparatus. In this experiment, we used 30 statements in both

their metaphor and simile form. The topic–vehicle pairs from Experiment 1 were used
to create the metaphors and similes used in this study. Each participant only saw one
version of each of the statements.
Procedure. Participants saw 15 metaphors and 15 similes, mixed, not

blocked, in a booklet with 10 items per page. The items were presented in random
order, with one order for each participant. The participants were asked to read each
statement and then enter their similarity rating for it using a scale ranging from 1
(not similar at all) to 10 (extremely similar). For instance, they were asked, “In the
statement ‘Mosquitoes are vampires,’ how similar are mosquitoes to vampires?”
Then they wrote down a number from 1 to 10.
The mean similarity rating for the metaphors was 5.18 (SD = 1.45) and for the simi-
les was 5.08 (SD = 1.69), for a difference of only .10 on the 10-point scale, t(29) =
.56, p > .05. Evidently, the form of expression did not affect the perceived similarity
of the topic and vehicle. Thus, although one might expect a greater sense of similar-
ity for metaphors than similes because of the literal forms on which they are based,
this feature of the literal forms did not transfer to figurative usage. Of importance,
however, the results of this study predicted those of Experiment 1. Specifically, the
similarity in Experiment 2 between the topics and vehicles was related to the form
in which the statements were preferred in Experiment 1. To assess this, we created
mean similarity ratings for each topic–vehicle pair. We collapsed the similarity rat-
ings across statement type. The mean for these ratings was 5.13 (SD = 1.48). We
compared the similarity ratings to the mean metaphor preference ratings in Chiappe
and Kennedy (1999). The results of the comparison are summarized in Table 2. The
correlation between the mean similarity ratings for each comparison and their mean
metaphor-preference ratings was +.75 (p < .01). Thus, as similarity increased, so
too did preference for the metaphor form. For instance, genes were once again rated
as very similar to blueprints, and as Chiappe and Kennedy found, people generally
prefer “Genes are blueprints” to “Genes are like blueprints.”
In short, this experiment found that preference for metaphors is positively related to
the similarity between the topic and vehicle. This follows from the view that metaphors
take class-inclusion statements as a model, and similes take literal similarity statements.
A particularly suggestive result is that the similarity ratings in Experiment 2, M
= 5.13, SD = 1.48, were noticeably higher than those in Experiment 1, M = 3.22,
SD = 1.24; t(29) = 8.96, p < .001. These results are consistent with our claim that
figurative language instructs us to set some differences aside, allowing other fea-
tures to become significant. Metaphorically, one might say relevant features are
“enhanced,” and irrelevant ones are “suppressed” (Gernsbacher, Keysar, & Rob-
ertson, in press).
EXPERIMENT 3
The purpose of the third study was to examine the role that familiarity plays in determin-
ing whether people prefer to express the relation between a topic and a vehicle using a
metaphor or a simile. When people are unfamiliar with a topic–vehicle pairing, they may
have to derive an interpretation through a comparison process, making the simile form
most appropriate. When people are familiar with a pairing, the relevant properties may be
stored as a chunk in long-term memory, and, consequently, the pairing could be under-
stood by including the pairs of terms in the category already stored in memory.
A closely related point was made by Gentner and Wolff (1997), who argued that
there is an evolution to the way metaphoric vehicles are understood—the career of
metaphor hypothesis. Specifically, they argued that metaphoric vehicles that are
conventional (e.g., blueprints, gold mines) are associated with stable metaphoric cat-
egories. Consequently, they can be paired with many different topics, and in each
case the pairing can be understood through a categorization process. In contrast,
when vehicles that are not conventional (e.g., zero-sum game) are paired with differ-
ent topics, the pairing has to be understood through a comparison process.
It is important, however, to distinguish our use of “familiarity” from conven-
tionality (Bowdle & Gentner, 1995; Wolff & Gentner, 2000). Familiar figures of
speech are ones where the topic and vehicle concepts have been encountered to-
gether many times in the past. An example of a familiar metaphor would be “Life
is a journey.” In contrast, conventional metaphors are ones that contain stock vehi-
cles—vehicle terms that are closely associated with a stable metaphoric category.
In a conventional metaphor, the topic and vehicle pairing may be novel, even
though the vehicle term is quite strongly associated with a metaphoric category.
The distinction is important because a figure of speech can be familiar without be-
ing conventional (e.g., “Life is like a box of chocolates”) and conventional without
being familiar (e.g., “Pawnshops are gold mines”).
This study addressed the familiarity of an expression and the role that it plays in
determining whether people prefer to express the relation between a topic and a ve-
hicle as a metaphor or simile. The conventionality of the vehicle terms was not as-
sessed. We examined the possibility that familiar topic–vehicle pairings are
preferred as metaphors and unfamiliar pairings as similes. These preferences
would reflect different operations required to understand the pairings.
Another possibility, however, is that what changes with an increase in familiarity is
the similarity between the topic and vehicle. As we become more familiar with a com-
parison, the salient differences between the concepts may become less prominent and
relevant common features more prominent. This second position predicts that the sim-
ilarity (measured in terms of number of relevant common features) of the topic and ve-
hicle will be the more important determinant of how a comparison is expressed, with
familiarity playing a secondary role. The first position predicts that familiarity could
lead to a preference for the metaphor form of a comparison, irrespective of the number
of features involved. Thus, it predicts that familiarity is a more important determinant

of the form of expression than number of common features.
Method
Participants. Sixteen individuals participated in this experiment, run by N.

Sookhai. Participants were volunteers from a 2nd-year course in psychology. All
the students were from the University of Toronto at Scarborough. (Gender and age
information is not available, but it was akin to that in Experiment 2.)
Stimuli and apparatus. The participants were provided with booklets con-
taining the instructions and experimental tasks. Thirty comparisons were used
throughout the experiment. The same statements were used as in Experiment 1.
Procedure. This experiment consisted of three parts. The first assessed the par-
ticipants’ familiarity with the comparisons. The second gauged the participants’ prefer-
ence for either the metaphor or simile versions of the comparisons. The third assessed
their rating of the number of common features between the topic and vehicle.
For the familiarity part of the experiment, participants were asked to rate how
familiar they were with the comparison between one concept and another. For in-
stance, they were asked, “How familiar are you with the comparison between ru-
mors and weeds in the statement ‘Rumors are (like) weeds’?” The familiarity scale
ranged from 1 (very unfamiliar) to 7 (very familiar). Participants were asked to cir-
cle the number that best captured their rating.
In the preference section, participants were shown both simile and metaphor
versions of the 30 comparisons, and they were asked to indicate which form they
preferred. The metaphor and simile forms of a statement were presented at oppo-
site ends of a 10-point scale. For instance, “Life is a journey” was presented at one
end, and “Life is like a journey” was presented at the other. Participants were re-
quired to indicate their preference by circling a number close to the version of the
comparison they preferred. Higher numbers indicated preference for the metaphor,
lower numbers preference for similes. Numbers 5 or 6 were used to indicate a
weak preference for the simile or metaphor, respectively.
Half of the participants received the familiarity section of the experiment first,
and half the preference section first. In both the familiarity and preference section,
the order in which the 30 comparisons were given was randomized. There were six
different random orders for the comparisons.
In the third and final part of the experiment, participants were given the 30 com-
parisons and asked to rate the number of important common features that they
thought the elements of the comparison had in common. For example, they were
told, “‘Life is (like) a box of chocolates’ suggests life has features in common with
a box of chocolates. Both may be viewed as unpredictable, sweet, fun, pleasing,
organized, and fragile.” Participants were given the 30 comparisons, expressed as
“X is (like) Y,” and they were asked to rate the number of important common fea-
tures the elements of the comparison have in common. The comparison was given
with the scale ranging from 1 to 10. A number close to 10 was used to indicate that
there are many relevant features. A number close to 1 was used to indicate that
there is only one or very few relevant common features. Numbers 5 or 6 indicated
that there were an intermediate number of relevant common properties. The num-
ber-of-properties task was always last.
The results of the study were as follows: The mean familiarity rating across the 30
comparisons was 4.21 (SD = 1.17) on the scale from 1 to 7. However, there was a con-
siderable range in familiarity ratings across the comparisons, with the comparison
between billboards and warts receiving a mean familiarity rating of 2.31, and the
comparison between life and journey receiving a mean familiarity rating of 6.56.
For the preference-rating task, the mean preference rating across the 30 com-
parisons was 4.67 (SD = 1.10), revealing a slight, but not significant, preference
overall for the simile form of the statements, t(29) = –1.67, p > .05. However, there
was a considerable range in the preference ratings. For example, the mean prefer-
ence rating for the metaphoric form of the comparison between life and journey
was 7.93 out of 10, whereas the comparison between trees and umbrellas yielded a
mean preference rating of 3.18 out of 10.
For the number-of-features task, the mean rating across the 30 comparisons was
5.24 (SD = 1.44) out of 10. As with the previous two tasks, the ratings also dis-
played a considerable range. The comparison between billboards and warts had a
mean rating of 2.44 out of 10 (i.e., few relevant common features), whereas the
comparison between life and journey had a mean rating of 8.50 out of 10 (many
relevant common features).
The correlation between familiarity and preference was +.57 (p < .001). That is,
as familiarity increased, so too did preference for the metaphor form of the com-
parison. The correlation between the number of relevant common features and
preference was +.69 (p < .001). The greater the number of relevant common fea-
tures, the greater the preference for the metaphor form. The correlation between
the number of relevant common features and familiarity was +.84 (p < .001).
To further examine the key relations here, commonality analysis was undertaken.
Commonality analysis permits the examination of unique and common variance that
familiarity and number of common properties contributed to the preference scores.
The number of common properties displayed a squared multiple correlation with the
mean preference scores of .47 (p < .001). The 47% of the variance in the preference
scores explained by the number of common properties ratings decomposes into 14%
unique variance (p < .001) and 33% common variance (p < .001)—that is, variance
shared with familiarity. The familiarity ratings displayed a squared multiple correla-
tion with mean preference scores of .33 (p < .001). The 33% of the variance in the
preference scores explained by familiarity is decomposed into 0% unique variance
and 33% (p < .001) variance shared with the number of common properties ratings.
In short, much of the explained variance in the preference ratings was shared be-
tween the number of common properties ratings and the familiarity ratings. How-
ever, the number of common properties ratings contributed variance independent of
the familiarity ratings, although the converse was not true.
Experiment 3 supports the argument that familiarity plays a role in determining
preference for the form in which a comparison is expressed, but the number of rel-
evant common features is more important.
The results suggest familiarity may have its effect by enhancing similarity.
When we first encounter a comparison, the set of relevant features we consider
may not be as elaborate as the ones that we consider when we have had repeated
experience with a comparison. Familiarity’s role may lie in making some features
relevant that might not have been considered relevant initially. Familiarity does
not lead to a preference for the metaphor form in this view, unless it also has an ef-
fect on the perceived similarity.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Evidently, the form in which a comparison is expressed is related to the similarity

between the topic and vehicle concepts. Experiment 1 found that, as the similarity
between topics and vehicles increases, people tend to prefer the metaphor rather
than the simile form of a statement. Experiment 2 found that, although preference
for metaphors did increase with an increase in similarity, the perceived similarity
was not affected by the form in which a statement was expressed. However, the
similarity ratings were greater when the topics and vehicles were presented in meta-
phors and similes than when they were presented on their own.
Furthermore, these studies also found that preference for the metaphor form of a
statement is related to higher familiarity. Topic–vehicle pairings that are familiar are
more likely to be preferred in their metaphor form than are pairings that are unfamil-
iar. However, the relation between familiarity and preference for form of expression
appears to be mediated by similarity. Although we found a positive correlation be-
tween familiarity and metaphor preference, all the variance explained by familiarity
was shared with similarity. Thus, similarity, not familiarity, is the main factor. Fa-
miliarity’s role is to enhance similarity, it may be. If so, as we become more familiar
with a figurative statement, our appreciation of the common features between the
concepts involved increases. And this affects the likelihood that the statement will
be preferred as a metaphor or simile. Familiarity does not play an independent role in
determining the way a comparison is expressed. If “Juliet is the sun!” seems apt to
us on first hearing, we would prefer it to “Juliet is like the sun!”
Wolff and Gentner (2000) described some metaphors as “conventional.” These use
standard, well-known vehicles such as a virus or a pig or a gold mine, as in “A rumor
is a virus,” “He has the manners of a pig,” and “His findings are a gold mine.” Wolff
and Gentner pointed out that claims with highly conventional vehicles (e.g., parasite)
and relatively neutral topics (e.g., some towns) may function much like standard cate-
gory claims. If so, “Some towns are parasites” would be processed like “Some cars
are Fords.” Our experiments here assessed familiarity of topic–vehicle pairs, not the
familiarity of conventional vehicles, irrespective of topics. The distinction is impor-
tant, because “In romance, man is a wolf” offers a rather different meaning than “In
war, man is a wolf.” We could easily be familiar with one vehicle meaning and one
topic–vehicle pair, but not the other. Our conclusions therefore apply directly to
topic–vehicle pairs, but, logically, they may not apply fully to conventional vehicles.
However, we suggest that if the conventional vehicle is used in its most standard
sense, it will be preferred as a metaphor, because it seems apt (uses many relevant fea-
tures), and as it is used in less and less standard ways, it will often net fewer relevant
features, and the fewer there are, the more the simile form will be preferred.
Our results do not fit the Aristotle (1926, 1941) take on metaphor. In it, meta-
phors are elliptical similes, with no difference in content between a metaphor and a
simile. Nothing in this theory predicts that as the similarity increases people prefer
the metaphor form.
The results can be explained by our literal base thesis. In this view, figurative
claims borrow some of their features from the literal forms on which they are based. In
literal language, we say that an object belongs in a category when it possesses many if
not all of the properties associated with the category. When the object only has a few
of those properties, we use a similarity statement to express the relation. Figurative
language appears to borrow this feature from literal language. People choose the meta-
phor form when the similarity is high and the simile when the similarity is low.
Of interest, metaphors did not yield greater similarity ratings than similes. Al-
though the similarity ratings were overall higher when the topics and vehicles were
presented in metaphors and similes than when they were presented alone, there
was no difference between the two types of statements. Chiappe and Kennedy
(2000) reported a similar effect using a property-listing task. Participants did not
list more common properties for metaphors than they did for similes. This is con-
trary to what might be expected on the assumption that figurative statements gain
their properties from the literal statements on which they are modeled. However,
figurative language is looser than literal language, and entailments of the literal
forms do not automatically hold in the figurative forms. To make some entail-
ments relevant may require extra factors, such as arranging the possible forms as
contrasting pairs: “The guitarist isn’t just like Elvis! He is Elvis, as far as I am con-
cerned!” Also, surely the recipient of a figurative claim will often pay attention
chiefly to the topic and vehicle, and the fact that the figurative claim is a metaphor
rather than a simile may play a relatively minor role, if any.
In our Elvis example, a metaphor corrects a simile. Chiappe and Kennedy
(2000) found that speakers correcting similes with metaphors were judged to be at-
tributing a greater number of vehicle properties to the topics. Thus, when used as
corrections, metaphors serve to convey a greater sense of similarity than similes
(Black, 1979; Chiappe & Kennedy, 2000; Glucksberg & Keysar, 1990, 1993; Ken-
nedy & Chiappe, 1999; Morgan, 1979). How is this possible if metaphors and sim-
iles used on their own do not differ in terms of the perceived similarity that they
generate? We do know that the form of expression is sensitive to similarity, as sim-
ilarity affects preference for form of expression. We suggest that the corrective
context draws attention to the differences between the two forms. It makes their
differences salient and relevant. It suggests the differences between categorization
and comparison are relevant and draws attention to the fact that metaphor is mod-
eled on the first and simile on the second. By making the difference in form perti-
nent, a speaker conveys that the similarity between the topic and the vehicle is
even greater than what one might expect hearing either the metaphor or simile on
its own. Hence, corrective uses of tropes may serve to increase similarity beyond
that which is usually conveyed by either trope used separately.
In short, metaphors and similes inherit some features of literal categorization and
similarity statements, but some features are latent until made relevant. The metaphor
form is used when the similarity between topic and vehicle is high. However, unlike
literal categorization statements and literal similarity statements, metaphors do not
always entail a greater degree of similarity than similes. This feature of the literal
forms is not automatically induced in the figurative forms. It only arises when spe-
cial attention is drawn to the differences between metaphors and similes, as when
one is used to correct the other. In our view, then, figurative uses of language relax
some of the constraints associated with their literal twins, and some of what is re-
laxed can be retightened while still remaining in the figurative realm.
In the figurative’s loose life, some features are borrowed from the literal form,
whereas others are unconstrained. For instance, hyperbolic claims are modeled on
literal propositional statements. The statement “She ran faster than a speeding
bullet” has the form of a factual assertion X is faster than Y. It can be used to con-
vey the fact that the woman ran remarkably fast. The only mark that it is figurative
is that it violates constraints on what we know about humans and speeding bullets.
We know the former cannot literally outrun the latter. Nonetheless, we relax this
constraint when we use the statement figuratively.
In short, in our view, a central cue that people use to determine whether a state-
ment is literal or figurative is if it has to be understood by relaxing some of the con-
straints associated with the literal forms. Of course, sometimes we need the
discourse or situational context to determine whether a statement has to be inter-
preted by loosening some constraints, and which constraints need to be loosened.
Let us again consider the statement “She ran faster than a speeding bullet.” If she
refers to a person, we would interpret the statement as hyperbole. However, if she
refers to a space shuttle at takeoff, the statement might not be interpreted hyperbol-
ically at all. However, the words she and ran would have to be taken loosely.
Our experiments found the aptness of a comparison has to be high for it to war-
rant expression as a metaphor. Liu and Kennedy (1997) offered a related claim about
symbols and analogies. They noted that we can symbolize softness with a circle and
hardness with a square. They argued that the analogy “Softness is to circle as hard-
ness is to square” is acceptable. But they pointed out we cannot say “Softness is a cir-
cle” or “Hardness is a square.” They argued similarity has to be higher for metaphors
than for symbols and analogies. Likewise, here we have found that the use of a meta-
phor requires a higher similarity than the use of a simile.
We also found that similarity ratings were much lower when people were asked
to rate the similarity of the concepts when they were not embedded in metaphors and
similes than when they were. Likely, the presence of the metaphor or simile signals
us to “loosen up,” to discount obvious differences between the essential features of
the kinds involved, and to look at commonalities across the broader range of proper-
ties associated with the concepts. For instance, most of us do not think of a bulldozer
and Margaret Thatcher as being particularly similar. However, if we hear “Margaret
Thatcher is a bulldozer,” we discount obvious essential differences (Fogelin, 1988).
We discount features of the bulldozer, such as the fact that they are large, tracked ve-
hicles. Instead, we note they are very good at removing obstacles and it is best not to
get in their way, and we are reminded of Mrs. Thatcher’s talents.
Glucksberg and Keysar’s (1990) Class-Inclusion Theory
Our arguments about metaphors, similes, and loosening restrictions owe much to
Glucksberg and Keysar’s (1990, 1993) class-inclusion theory of metaphor. Ac-
cording to this theory, the vehicle terms have “dual reference.” They refer to two
categories—namely, a conventional category and an ad hoc one. An ad hoc cate-
gory is a category that at the moment does not possess a conventional label
(Barsalou, 1983, 1991). An example is “Things I need but might not be able to put
into this elegant but slim briefcase I am tempted to buy.” However, the ad hoc cate-
gory can be referred-to using the vehicle term (things like “heavy-duty staplers”)
because the vehicle is a prototypical exemplar of that category. In the case of “Ru-
mors are weeds,” the word weeds refers to both a conventional category—that is, to
certain undesirable plants—and also to the ad hoc category—the set of things that
spread very quickly and uncontrollably and are hard to get rid of. The latter does not
have a conventional label, but weeds is a good example, and so it can be used to put
us in mind of the category.
An ad hoc category is typically superordinate to the conventional category as-
sociated with the vehicle term because it usually consists of a subset of the proper-
ties associated with the conventional category (Gernsbacher, Keysar, &
Robertson, in press). However, we occasionally mention the general to mean a
subset, as in using “America” for the government of the United States when we say
“America’s policy is tax before you spend.” In the cases discussed by Glucksberg
and Keysar (1993), only a subset of the conventional category’s properties are in-
cluded, and so the category includes the topic. In our terms, by only involving a
subset of the properties, the restrictions on the use of the term can be relaxed and
the term can be used to refer to a more general class, one that might perhaps in-
clude the lower level categories of “rumors” and “weeds.”
In our introduction, we noted that literal language is not free to exchange the
categorical form for the similarity form. “Tin is like copper” is a fair comment, but
not “Tin is copper.” Likewise, we can say “Tin is metal,” but not “Tin is like
metal.” We cannot morph a literal similarity statement into a literal categorization
statement. Literal categorization statements have to be made between concepts ex-
isting at different levels of a taxonomic hierarchy, in the correct order, reflecting
subordinate–superordinate structure (e.g., “Tin is metal”). Similarity statements
are made between concepts that are at the same level of a taxonomic hierarchy
(e.g., “Copper is like tin”), as Medin, Goldstone, and Gentner (1990) noted.
As Glucksberg and Keysar (1990, 1993) pointed out, however, one of the inter-
esting features of metaphors and similes is that the categorical form can often be
expressed in the form of a similarity claim, and vice versa. We can say “Rumors
are weeds” or “Rumors are like weeds.” Although we may prefer one form over
the other (due to factors such as aptness, similarity, etc.), both forms are sensible.
Hence, any category theory of metaphors and similes has to explain why a key dif-
ference between literal category claims and similarity claims has lost its force in
their figurative siblings.
Glucksberg and Keysar (1990, 1993) offered an interesting explanation, rea-
soning that similes are disguised class-inclusion statements. Although they have
the surface form of similarity statements, they actually have the subordi-
nate–superordinate structure of metaphors. “Metaphoric comparisons involve
items at different category levels and thus are implicit categorization statements”
(Glucksberg & Keysar, 1993, p. 416). In this view, the class-inclusion form is the
more basic one. People use the simile form when they feel that the relevant cate-
gory does not capture features of the topic adequately.
The categorical form is the basic one because both similes and categorical rela-
tions (e.g., “All Fords are cars”) are nonreversible (Glucksberg & Keysar, 1990,
1993; Glucksberg, McGlone, & Manfredi, 1997). Not all cars are Fords. In literal
language, although people prefer to express similarity statements in one order,
they do generally tolerate expressions following either order (Medin et al., 1993;
Ortony, 1979; Tversky, 1977). Although people prefer “Limes are like lemons,”
one can say “Lemons are like limes.” This is not the case with categorical state-
ments. Although it is true that “All pianos are musical instruments,” it is not true
that “All musical instruments are pianos.” In a hierarchical structure, one category
includes the other. Reversing the order produces statements that are incorrect.
Seizing on nonreversibility, Glucksberg and Keysar (1990, 1993) claimed simi-
les function like categorization statements, not similarity statements. Consider the
simile “Alcohol is like a crutch.” Can we reverse this? No. We are entitled to ac-
cept “Alcohol is like a crutch” and reject “A crutch is like alcohol.” In the
Glucksberg et al. (1997) theory, in the original order the word crutch is not a ba-
sic-level term. It refers to the higher order category “things unfortunate people rely
on in times of need.” This category is also superordinate to alcohol. Ergo the terms
in the simile cannot be reversed. The ad hoc category labeled by crutch includes al-
cohol, but it is more general than crutch or alcohol. Alcohol may be “used as a
helpful aid by some needy people” but, unlike a crutch, it is not a prototypical
member of the category. As Glucksberg and Keysar (1993) said, “As implicit
class-inclusion statements, metaphoric comparisons simply obey the ordering
constraint on such statements. They are non-reversible” (p. 415).
Nonreversibility, Common Features, and Comprehension
The Glucksberg and Keysar argument (1993) is intriguing and effective, but ulti-
mately, we consider, incomplete. We reject the conclusions Glucksberg and Keysar
derive from the nonreversibility of metaphors and similes, and we offer an alterna-
tive explanation.
First, let us take issue with the characterization of similes as implicit categoriza-
tion statements and give an alternate explanation for metaphors being paraphrased
as similes and vice versa. In particular, we can base an alternative account on a
straightforward observation that applies with special force to figurative claims:
Both types of figurative statements are claims about common properties of the
topic and vehicle. If so, it is these properties that matter. The notion of categories is
less relevant. That is, the form of metaphor and simile sentences may differ, but ul-
timately their comprehension simply involves identifying relevant common prop-
erties. For instance, “Metaphors are like weeds and rumors” and “Metaphors are
weeds and rumors” both mean metaphors are as common as weeds and rumors and
spread as such. Whether we categorize metaphors as “rumors and weeds” at some
point in entertaining the sentence is to a large extent irrelevant to comprehension.
In short, while deriving metaphors and similes from category and similarity
claims, we retain some distinctions, but the models have differences from the orig-
inals, and at some point in our argument those key differences have to be respected
and given their place in the sun.
If we failed to note key differences, our argument would easily be taken by
some to be undermining the very distinction between literal and figurative expres-
sion and, by extension, the purported difference between claims about categories
and claims about similarity! One could, after all, argue that in literal usage, claims
about categorization and claims of similarity both involve making claims about
common properties. Being water, or being like water, is a matter of possessing cer-
tain properties. So why is the literal similarity form not interchangeable with the
literal categorization form? The reason has to do with whether the properties at is-
sue are essential properties. To be water is a matter of possessing certain key prop-
erties that define the natural kind (Kornblith, 1993; Rips, 1989)—and all of these
properties, not just some. To a chemist, the substance in question has to have a cer-
tain molecular structure composed of hydrogen and oxygen. To be like water does
not require these properties. Although similarity statements can involve possess-
ing some of the essential properties, this is not required. A substance may be like
water if it is a clear liquid, found in plentiful supply in Scottish hills. In this respect,
alcohol can be like water, although it cannot be water.
As we mentioned, however, metaphors and similes do not often trade in essen-
tial properties of the vehicle terms. The full set of key properties is not at issue. In-
deed, typically both metaphors and similes often focus on the nonessential,
perhaps less salient properties of the kinds in question. And, whether the state-
ments are framed as metaphors or similes, the goal is to discover these properties.
That is, the final goal of the processes involved in comprehension is to arrive at the
key properties that are the same for both metaphor and simile. And comparisons of
the kind involved in processing similarity claims in general are involved in the
comprehension of metaphors and similes (Gentner, 1983, 1989; Gentner &
Markman, 1997; Gentner & Wolff, 1997; Holyoak & Thagard, 1989, 1997; Medin
et al., 1993; Wolff & Gentner, 2000).
Consider as a case in point the metaphor “Jobs are jails,” an example used to
good effect by Glucksberg and Keysar (1990). On their class-inclusion view, this
is a categorization statement where the relevant category is some superordinate ad
hoc category. But we stress that this would not be the end point of comprehension.
Realizing that an ad hoc category might be involved is not the same thing as deter-
mining the key properties. The realization is not what that ad hoc category is (Ken-
nedy & Chiappe, 1999). Rather, the work of comprehension is done by
determining properties that make up the ad hoc category. In this view, we can ac-
cept that the properties making up the ad hoc category are ones exemplified by the
vehicle term. But which ones? For “Jobs are jails” people would likely infer the
relevant properties include the predicates “constraining,” “confining,” and “where
people are held against their will.”
The realization that an ad hoc category is relevant sends us on the same search
as the instruction “find appropriate common properties.” The two do the same
work. Hence, the category is surplus to the requirements.
How are the properties identified? Clearly not just any vehicle properties will
do for “Jobs are jails,” because many of them are irrelevant to the ground of the
statement (e.g., “have bars on the windows,” “the sky visible from the yard is just a
little tent of blue”). Hence, in discovering the relevant properties, generally one en-
gages in a comparison process that takes into account the topic, the vehicle, and the
context in which the statement is made.
A critic may wonder whether the comparison process requires the Glucksberg
and Keysar (1993) category scheme at some time. After all, the topic and vehicle
play different roles (Wolff & Gentner, 2000), and it was this asymmetry that
Glucksberg and Keysar explained was due to the asymmetry of the category for-
mat “X is one of the kinds of Y.” It is important to examine the asymmetrical roles
for any residual unexplained effects that might show we cannot entirely dispense
with a theory about ad hoc categories.
In a comparison process, one seeks to establish the basis of the similarity between
the topic and vehicle. To do so, one looks for properties of the vehicle that either
match properties of the topic, or that can be attributed to the topic after some process
of “alignment” has taken place (Gentner & Wolff, 1997; Wisniewski, 1997; Wolff
& Gentner, 2000). That is, both metaphor “X is a Y” and simile “X is like a Y” are in-
structions to take properties known to be relevant to Y and to consider X having those
properties. This is quite a general instruction, in several respects. Notice how this
claim relates to matters of salience and the fact that metaphors often deal with what
is inessential, or low salient (Giora, 1997; Goldvarg & Glucksberg, 1998; Pexman,
Ferreti, & Katz, 2000; Turner & Katz, 1997).
Consider cases where properties are crucial to the topic and cases where they are
lesser in significance. Sometimes we know topic X has the properties vehicle Y makes
us entertain, and they are highly salient, and what the instruction provided by the state-
ment is doing is ensuring the properties are being considered. An example is “As a
speaker, Hitler cast evil spells.” That Hitler was a propagandist is not in doubt. But of
all his properties, the claim ensures, it is those as a speaker that are now relevant. In
like vein, “Churchill was a British bulldog” makes relevant what we know well: He
was British and tenacious. Both statements highlight what we already know.
In general, we can take the most salient of any of a topic’s properties and use a
metaphor to ensure that the feature is relevant for the moment. Metaphors and sim-
iles, in this view, are ways of making features relevant—they are a way of high-
lighting which features associated with the topic are pertinent to the current
discourse context. It is this matter of relevance pro tem that enables both meta-
phors and similes to be concerned with common properties, categories, salience of
properties, the order of terms, and many other factors. Comparisons control rele-
vance. This may or may not involve telling us something new and may or may not
involve features essential or salient to the topic or vehicle. The control of relevance
is achieved once the pertinent common properties are known.
In many cases, we wish to do more than express the common view of a topic.
When we go beyond what we know is well understood, the relevant vehicle prop-
erties often are ones that are represented in the topic, but with low salience. For in-
stance, the property “confining” may be something that is known about jobs, but it
may not be something that readily comes to mind when we hear the term. How-
ever, pairing this topic with the vehicle “jail” may serve to increase the salience of
this property and make it relevant.
In other cases, the relevant properties may not be represented in the topic at all.
In these cases, the similarity between the topic and the vehicle is established by at-
tributing certain vehicle properties to the topic, rather than simply increasing the
salience of a property already represented with a concept. For instance, if our
friend Joan has a spouse that we have never met, and someone was to say “Her
partner is a pig,” we would be able to make various attributions. We may attribute
to him the properties “dirty” and “self-indulgent.” This attribution underwrites the
unfortunate but hitherto-unknown lad’s similarity to a pig.
In short, in determining the properties constituting the ad hoc categories, it
seems plausible to suggest that a comparison process of some sort is involved, and
its essential goal is the establishing of a set of features as the relevant ones. This
process is involved in the comprehension of both similes and metaphors.
One objection to the argument that tropes attribute features of the vehicle to the
topic is that the features used in many tropes are “emergent” (Becker, 1997; Black,
1979; Camac & Glucksberg, 1984; Tourangeau & Rips, 1991). That is, some of the
features pertinent to the trope are not found in the topic or vehicle before the trope
presents them together. The chairman of a meeting might whisper to us “See that
critic? He is a thorn.” We might realize that the chair wants rid of the critic. But
“get rid” is not a feature of thorn. If we hear Desmond Tutu described as a wizard
of peace, we might realize Tutu was openly and dramatically creative in peace-
time, but for many listeners who share this realization, being public and creative is
not a feature of wizard. This could be taken to mean that tropes create meaning, in
addition to increasing perceived similarity (Gineste, Indurkhya, & Scart, 2000).
However, the argument for emergent features may be confusing two matters.
Besides attributing features of vehicles to topics, tropes have uses or purposes in
particular contexts. In considering the ground or rationale of a comparison, the ar-
gument for emergent features may have confused the features being attributed
with the broader purpose of the comparison.
Often indeed the purpose of a comparison is not evident when we consider its
topic and vehicle separately. So it might be argued that something new has
emerged from the combination, and what emerged was in the form of entirely new
features of the vehicle. But actually the novelty lies elsewhere than the features of
the vehicle. Our two examples can be reinterpreted to show the pertinent features
are straightforward, but do not belong to the vehicle. They belong to the trope’s
purpose, and the purpose only becomes apparent once the comparison is offered.
“He is a thorn” can condemn someone and suggest we should get rid of him. In
this instance, “getting rid” is not a feature of thorn. It is a purpose of the sentence’s
user. It is akin to saying “The window was left open” to imply “Please close it.”
One can get rid of thorns, but this is just one of the infinite number of things one
could do to thorns. One could stand on thorns, increase their number, paint them
blue, and so on. But these are not specific to thorns. Similarly, one could get rid of
thorns, but this is not specific to them and, hence, not a feature of thorns. What is
distinctive about thorns includes being sharp and, hence, hurtful and dangerous.
This is why some might want rid of them, some might want to study them, some
might want to leave them alone, and so on. The comparison makes the negative
qualities relevant, and the reason they are made relevant is to motivate a course of
action. The course of action is not part of the meaning of thorn, though it is a rele-
vant implication of the sentence in a particular context (Sperber & Wilson, 1995).
“Bishop Tutu is a wizard of peace” is a summary of his originality in South Af-
rican politics. To bring political stability and a brighter future, he used highly pub-
lic confession and honesty, which brought immunity and offered opportunities for
forgiveness and reconciliation. Many do not usually associate wizardry with
peace. Or with immunity and reconciliation. Or with heroic personal creativity on
the world stage. For many people, wizardry involves the repetition of time-hon-
ored, secret magic rituals in privacy. The public creativity shown by Tutu is there-
fore an emergent feature if we concentrate on wizard and its standard reference. If
we understand that Tutu’s tactics with a “truth and reconciliation” commission
avoided the usual concomitants of the justice system, such as winners and losers,
punishment and long, drawn-out, defensive court battles, then he can be seen as
highly creative, a political wizard inventing entirely new and unexpected vehicles
to ease painful memories and prepare the way to the future for a society with hor-
rors in its immediate past.
The emergent features are in the use of wizard and not in the term wizard itself.
The emergent features are related to the sentence, not the individual words. Tutu is
“magical” in being like a wizard, showing us unexpected products. But the con-
nection to publicity and peace comes from context. Likewise, “Where is the salt?”
is used to ask for the salt to be passed. Use is not the same as the meaning of the
words. In sum, the connections made between wizard and peace seem emergent if
we only look at the preexisting associates for wizard and neglect the context.
To summarize, in our view the fundamental reason why metaphors can be para-
phrased as similes and vice versa may be that both are claims about common prop-
erties. The properties are not the full set of properties that define the vehicle’s
standard category. Metaphors and similes both involve attributing some vehicle
properties to the topic. For both novel metaphors and similes, the relevant proper-
ties may be derived through the same comparison process. Because both are under-
stood by finding relevant properties that the topic and vehicle share, one form may
be expressible as the other.
Uninterpretable Versus False Reversals
Now that we have established our view of categories and paraphrase, we may be able
to unsettle the Glucksberg and Keysar (1990, 1993) account of nonreversibility.
The factors underlying the nonreversibility of literal categorization statements
may be different from those underlying the nonreversibility of similes. For start-
ers, it seems as though reversing categorization statements has a different effect
than reversing similes. As Glucksberg et al. (1997) pointed out, reversed similes
often become uninterpretable. In contrast, it seems to us that reversed literal cate-
gorization statements are interpretable, but false. (Wolff & Gentner, 2000, said
“pointless,” p. 529, but we think the reason they are pointless is they are false.)
Our argument is as follows: Anyone can assign a meaning to a reversed categoriza-
tion statement, such as “All musical instruments are pianos” or “All animals are cats.”
It is just that the statements are false. The crux of the matter is we could not make a
judgment of their truth value unless we could assign a meaning to the statements. In
contrast, with the case of the reversed similes, we cannot make the claim that they are
false because we simply do not know what they mean. We do not perceive “A crutch
is like alcohol” to be false. We regard it as simply impossible to interpret.
This difference in effect suggests that different causes might be involved in the
nonreversibility of similes and categorization statements. The nonreversibility of
categorization statements seems to be a clear consequence of their subordi-
nate–superordinate structure. In a reversed categorization claim, we understand
the claim being made, but we are also aware of the inclusion relation between the
two categories. We understand the statement “All musical instruments are pianos”
as well as knowing that the category “musical instrument” includes the category
“piano,” not the other way around. That is how we know what the statement
means, and that the statement is false.
In contrast, for the reason similes are nonreversible—that is, the reason why
they become uninterpretable when reversed—we may need to look into the nature
of the comparison process. When we engage in a comparison, we look for proper-
ties associated with the vehicle that we can match with the topic (Medin et al.,
1993; Ortony, 1979; Tversky, 1977; Tversky & Gati, 1978). The properties that
form the interpretation, however, are generally more strongly associated with the
vehicle term than with the topic, if they are currently associated with the topic at all
(Ortony, 1979). Indeed, the aim of a similarity statement is often to make these
properties more salient in the topic.
This imbalance in the salience of the properties in the topic and the vehicle is
what underwrites the asymmetry of literal similarity statements (Ortony, 1979).
For instance, people prefer the statement “Olives are like cherries” to “Cherries
are like olives.” Why the asymmetry? One possibility is the relevant property “has
pits” is more strongly associated with cherries than with olives. Thus, when cher-
ries is the vehicle, it is easier to find the relevant property for the comparison. It
makes the statement easier to understand. When olives is the vehicle, it is more dif-
ficult to access relevant common properties. Cherries do not provide oil, a major
use of olives. If an inventor found a way to get oil from cherries, he or she might
announce “Cherries are now like olives!”
It is possible that similes may feature a much more extreme version of this
asymmetry inherent in all similarity relations (Ortony, 1979). In the case of
“All weeds are like rumors,” for instance, the property “spreads very quickly”
does not as readily come to mind for rumors as for weeds. With rumors as the
vehicle, it may take us a lot of time to figure out the claim, or we may just give
up and decide that there is no relevant similarity. At any rate, this does not deny
the simile its status as a similarity statement. The asymmetry inherent in simi-
les is simply a much more extreme version of that found in literal similarity
statements. Reversed, the relevant properties may be so inaccessible the state-
ment is incomprehensible.
A statement is incomprehensible when we cannot find any relevant vehicle
properties that we can use as a basis for the similarity between the topic and
the vehicle. It is possible, however, that someone may suggest a property to
us, which we could then use to understand the statement. For instance, if we
concluded that “Weeds are like rumors” is incomprehensible, and someone
suggested to us a property such as “spreads very quickly,” we would likely
change our minds and claim that the statement is comprehensible after all,
and possibly true.
Hints can make similes apt, but they cannot make reversed literal categorization
statements true. In a world with many kinds of musical instruments, no hints make
“All musical instruments are pianos” true. The important difference in the
nonreversibility of similes and literal categorization statements is that the former is
due to the vagaries of the comparison process, the latter due to the hierarchical na-
ture of taxonomic relations.
To conclude, we hold that metaphors and similes are both claims about the sim-
ilarity between the topic and vehicle. They are both instructions to find relevant
common properties. By analogy with literal claims on which their surface forms
are modeled, people prefer to express those similarities using categorization state-
ments if the similarities are quite marked, and they choose to express them using
the similarity form if they are not quite as marked. The statements are
nonreversible because the relevant properties for a comparison may not be
strongly associated with the topic concept, and when that concept appears as the
vehicle term, the relevant properties may not be accessible. This does not have to
do with a subordinate–superordinate structure.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Dan L. Chiappe is now at California State University–Long Beach.
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Literal Bases For Metaphor and Simile

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Metaphor and Symbol

ISSN: 1092-6488 (Print) 1532-7868 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/hmet20

Literal Bases for Metaphor and Simile

Dan L. Chiappe & John M. Kennedy

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/10926488.2001.9678897

Published online: 22 Jun 2011.

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Literal Bases for Metaphor and Simile

METAPHOR AND SIMILE

FAMILIARITY AND PREFERENCE FOR

Participants. Twenty-four participants (19 women and 5 men) with a mean

Comparison Metaphor Preference

Procedure. Participants saw 30 pairs of topics and vehicles, such as ru-

Results and Discussion

Mean similarity rating 3.22 5.13

Stimuli and apparatus. In this experiment, we used 30 statements in both

Procedure. Participants saw 15 metaphors and 15 similes, mixed, not

Results and Discussion

of features involved. Thus, it predicts that familiarity is a more important determinant

Participants. Sixteen individuals participated in this experiment, run by N.

Results and Discussion

Evidently, the form in which a comparison is expressed is related to the similarity

Glucksberg and Keysar’s (1990) Class-Inclusion Theory

Nonreversibility, Common Features, and Comprehension

Uninterpretable Versus False Reversals

Dan L. Chiappe is now at California State University–Long Beach.

Aristotle. (1926). The art of rhetoric. New York: Putnam.

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