Africa's Decaying Security System and the Rise of Intervention

Author(s): S. Neil MacFarlane

Source: International Security, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Spring, 1984), pp. 127-151
Published by: The MIT Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538566 .
Accessed: 13/06/2014 21:46

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

The MIT Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to International Security.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.69 on Fri, 13 Jun 2014 21:46:05 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Africas Decaying S.NeilMacFarlane
Security System and
the Rise of Intervention
A fricahas neverbeen
freeof militaryintervention,1 but this formof behavior has become increas-
ingly common in recent years (see Table I). This suggests that intervention
is of increasing significanceas a problem of regional security,and invites
enquiryinto the causes and impactof thistrend.Most studies of intervention
in Africaview the issue fromthe perspectiveof East-West relationsand the
global balance or from that of policymakersin the interveningor in rival
states.2There is no doubt much of value in these approaches. Yet the dis-
cussion of interventionis incompletewithoutattentionto itsregionalcontext,
to its local origins and consequences. An understandingof these regional
aspects is importantnot only to those in Africawho feelits forcemost directly
and to those with an academic interest in African politics. It is also of
significanceto those scholars and policymakersconcerned with assessing its
effectson Westerninterestsand with developing policy responses to the use
of forcein the region.

In the preparationof this paper, I am indebted to ProfessorSamuel Huntingtonand Dr. Dov

Ronen of Harvard University'sCenter forInternationalAffairsand to ProfessorRobertJackson
of the Universityof BritishColumbia fortheircommentson previous drafts.The research was
conducted while the author was an Olin Fellow at the Center forInternationalAffairs,Harvard
University.

Relations,the Universityof
S.N. MacFarlaneis a ResearchAssociateat theInstituteof International
BritishColumbia.

1. For the purposes of this paper, interventionrefersto coercive militaryinvolvementin civil

or regionalconflictwhich is intended to, or does, affectinternalauthoritystructuresin the target
state. For a useful discussion of the definitionof intervention,see JamesRosenau, "Intervention
as a ScientificConcept," JournalofConflictResolution,Vol. 22, No. 2 (1969), pp. 149-171.
2. See, forexample, ArthurJ.Klinghoffer,The AngolanWar: A Studyin SovietForeignPolicyin
theThirdWorld(Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1980); Gerald Bender, "Kissingerin Angola: Anatomy
of a Failure," in Rene Lemarchand, ed., AmericanPolicyin SouthernAfrica:The Stakesand the
Stances(Washington: UniversityPress of America, 1981); Colin Legum, "Angola and the Horn
of Africa,"in Stephen Kaplan, ed., DiplomacyofPozwer: SovietArmedForcesas a PoliticalInstrument
(Washington: Brookings, 1981); David S. Yost, "French Policy in Chad and the Libyan Chal-
lenge," Orbis,Vol. 26, No. 4 (Winter1983), pp. 965-998; and Daniel Bach, "La France en Afrique
Subsaharienne: Contraintes Historiques et Nouveaux Espaces Economiques," Unpublished
manuscriptdelivered to a colloquium of the Association Francaise de Science Politique, May
26-27, 1983.

$02.50/1
Security,Spring 1984 (Vol. 8, No. 4) 0162-2889/84/040127-25
International
(C 1984 by the Presidentand Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts Instituteof Technology;

127

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.69 on Fri, 13 Jun 2014 21:46:05 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Table I. Interventionsin AfricaSince 1975.
Venue Year Intervener Circumstance
1. Angola 1974-76a Zaire pro-FNLA
U.S. pro-FNLA,UNITA
Republic of pro-FNLA,UNITA
South Africa
Cuba (with Soviet pro-MPLA
support)
2. Zaire (Shaba) 1977 Morocco (with pro-Zairean government
French
logistical
support)b
3. The Horn 1977-78 Somalia pro-WSLF
South Yemen pro-Ethiopiangovernment
Cuba pro-Ethiopiangovernment
U.S.S.R. pro-Ethiopiangovernment
4. Mauritania 1977-78 POLISARIO anti-government
Moroccoc pro-Mauritanian
government
France pro-Mauritanian
government
5. Zaire (Shaba) 1978 France pro-Zairean government
Belgium pro-Zairean government
6. Chadd 1978 France pro-Chadian government
Libya pro-AcylAhmat
7. Uganda 1979 Libya pro-Ugandan government
Tanzania pro-Uganda National
Liberation Army
8. Chad 1979 Nigeria peacekeeping
Libya anti-government
9. Tunisia 1980 Libya anti-government
10. Chad 1980 Libya pro-Goukouni/Acyl/Kamony
11. Gambia 1981 Senegal pro-Gambian government
12. Chad 1981 OAU peacekeeping
13. Zimbabwe 1982 Republic of destabilization of
South Africa government
14. Mozambique 1982 Republic of destabilization, pro-
South Africa Mozambique
15. Chad 1982-83 Libya pro-Goukouni
France pro-Habr6
16. Somalia 1982 Ethiopia pro-SSDF

a
Cuban troops remain in Angola, while South Africanincursions persist.
b
Since the FLNC (Frontde Liberation Nationale Congolaise) apparentlyacted independently,
and is comprised of Zairois, it is not listed as an intervener.
c Morocco's occupation of the Western Sahara is not listed as an intervention,as King Hassan
was not intrudingon one side or another of an internal dispute. His intentwas not to
affect the internal politics, such as they were, of the former Spanish Sahara, but to
extinguish them.
dChad is entered on five occasions, because in each case the militaryintrusions were
discreet events.
Abbreviations: FNLA-Frente de Libertacao Nacional de Angola
UNITA-Uniao para e Independencia Total de Angola
MPLA-Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola
WSLF-Western Somali Liberation Front
POLISARIO-Popular Front for the Liberation of the Saguia el-Hamra and
Rio de Oro
OAU-Organization of AfricanUnity
SSDF-Somali Salvation Democratic Front
MRM-Mozambique Revolutionary Movement

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.69 on Fri, 13 Jun 2014 21:46:05 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Africa'sSecuritySystemj 129

With these concerns in mind, this paper addresses the regional causes of
interventionand, fromthe perspectiveof Africanstates,what its implications
are for regional security.3The analysis focusses on member states of the
Organization of AfricanUnity (OAU), since the Republic of South Africais
in no meaningfulsense a member of the African"society of states." It may
be viewed instead as an actor on the fringesof, but externalto, the African
system,whose foreignpolicy has importantconsequences forthe securityof
actors withinthe regional system.
The paper argues thatinterventionis at least as much a symptomof more
basic regional problems (politicaland social fragmentation, economic decay,
progressive differentiation in the distributionof power) as it is a cause of
regional instabilityin its own right.Generalization about the impact of in-
terventionon African politics is difficult,and much of the conventional
wisdom on this subject does not stand close examination. Recent trends in
the interstatepolitics of the region and in regional defense spending do,
however, suggest that the growing incidence of interventionencourages
expansion of defense establishmentsin the region. In addition,itboth reflects
and fostersan erosion of regional norms governinginterstatebehavior. Fi-
nally, it tends to complicate conflictresolutionby embroilinglocal disputes
in extra-regionalrivalries.

TheRegionalConditionsofIntervention

In accounting for the increasing frequencyof interventionin the region, a

numberof externalfactorsare of greatimportance,most notablythe transfer
of superpower competitionin the period of detente to the peripheryof the
internationalsystem,the subsequent deteriorationin relationsbetween East
and West, and the growing insecurityof the principalmilitarypower in the
Sub-Saharan area, South Africa.But this increase cannot be fullyexplained
withoutattentionto conditions in the targetenvironment.In the firstplace,
such factorsfail to account for what is the most rapidly growing type of
intervention-that undertaken by African states themselves. Beyond this,
instabilityin the region favors interventionby both regional and extra-re-
gional actors fortwo reasons. First,states which are divided internallyhave

3. For a discussion of the meaning of regional securityfroman Africanperspective,see S. Neil

MacFarlane, "Regional Securityand AfricanIntervention,"International forthcoming.
Affairs,

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.69 on Fri, 13 Jun 2014 21:46:05 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 International
Security| 130

difficultyin mounting resistance to intrusionby outsiders. Second, parties

to internalconflictssolicitoutside assistance against theirrivals. When their
survival is threatened, they seek escalation of their external benefactor's
involvement. In this sense, internal conflictprovides an entry point for
outsidersinterestedin influencingthe policy choices of the state in question.
It may also entail perceived commitmentswhich are difficultto disavow
when a local clientis in trouble.In this context,interventionin Africais not
so much a cause of regional insecurityas it is a manifestationof more
profoundproblems. There are at least threefundamentalproblemsof African
security,leaving aside the issue of apartheid in South Africa,which is not,
strictlyspeaking, internalto the system.
The firstis political fragmentation.The profound causes of communal
conflictin Africalie to some extentin ethnicand religiousdifferenceswhich
predate the colonial period. Chad here provides an example. Before the
French arrived, Chadian Arabs had for centuriesraided black Sara villages
in the south forslaves, while the Toubous of northernChad habituallyraided
Arab trans-Saharancaravans. The arbitrarycharacterof the colonial frontiers
established in the late 19thcenturyin many cases exacerbatedthese tensions
or created new ones, by lumping togetherrival groups in single polities and
by splittingethnic groups between jurisdictionsleaving innumerablepoten-
tial irredenta. One might cite here the inclusion of large Arab and black
populations in the Sudan, and the combinationof Hausa and Ibo in Nigeria.
The Kikongo desire to reestablish the precolonial kingdom of Bakongo out
of portionsof southwesternZaire and northernAngola or the Somali designs
on Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibuti may be cited as examples of irredentist
revisionism stemming from the splittingof single ethnic groups. Finally,
colonial rule had a differentiated impact on the various ethnicgroups within
single colonies. Some groups had greateraccess to public goods provided by
the colonial powers, and some adapted more quickly than others to the
dominant colonial structure.Such groups benefiteddisproportionatelyfrom
education and were well placed to occupy positions in the colonial service
and, later, in the civil services, armies, and politicalelites of the new states.
This inequity created resentmentson the part of those leftbehind, particu-
larlywhen the individuals occupyingthese new positionsdistributedbenefits
in such a way as to favortheirown kinship groupingsand used theirpower
to exploitotherethnicgroups. Again, Chad is a good example, as is Nigeria.
Despite this legacy, there were several apparentlypromisingmovements
towards national integrationin the 1960s and early 1970s. Ghana under

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.69 on Fri, 13 Jun 2014 21:46:05 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Africa'sSecuritySystem| 131

Nkrumah (with some reservationswith respect to his treatmentof the As-

hanti) and Nigeria in the period of national reconciliationand growthfollow-
ing the civilwar are examples. But with the passage of time,it is increasingly
clear that the dominant trend in African domestic politics is towards the
disintegrationof the states created upon the departure of the European
colonialists. Evidence forthis may be seen in the continuingsectarianprob-
lems and north-south conflictin the Sudan; in the failure in Ethiopia to
extinguishthe Eritreanand Tigrean insurgenciesdespite massive application
of force;in the continuingethnicconflictin Chad; in the failureof non-ethnic
parties to emerge in Nigerian politics; in the persistentsecessionism of the
Lunda in Shaba evident in the popular response to the arrivalof Front de
LiberationNationale Congolaise (FLNC) forcesfromAngola in 1977 and 1978;
in ethnic strifeamong Kikongo, Kimbundu, and Ovimbundu in Angola; in
the growing violence between Shona and Ndebele in Zimbabwe; in unrest
among the Baganda in Uganda; in continuingKikuyu-Luo tensionsin Kenya;
and so on. There is hardlya state in black Africawhich appears more viable
today than it did on the eve of independence. Several appear much less so,
the unifyinginfluence of anticolonialismlong ago having waned and the
threatof neocolonialism being too nebulous to arouse popular enthusiasm.
Even those statesusually citedas being based upon a strongnationalidentity,
Somalia being a case in point, are rivenwith ethnicallyand regionallybased
strugglesforpower and position and forthe meager materialrewards avail-
able to those who possess them. Externaloppression has been replaced with
oppression by indigenous clan and tribalgroupings. The consequences are
almost inevitablyfissiparous.
This political fragmentationis exacerbated by the catastrophiceconomic
performanceof much of the region in the 1970s and early 1980s. At present,
almost two-thirdsof the states fallinginto the World Bank's "low income"
(per capita income less than $370 a year) categoryare African.GNP growth
per capita forSub-Saharan Africa(including rapidlygrowingcountriessuch
as Nigeria, Ivory Coast, and Kenya, but excluding South Africa) was .8
percentper year in the 1970s, down from1.3 percentin the previous decade.
The World Bank notes that output per person grew more slowly in Africain
the 1970s than in any other region. Seven countriesin Africahad negative
growthin GNP. Eight more had negative per capita rates of growth.
Volumes of exports in Sub-Saharan Africa fell at an annual rate of 1.6
percent (median for countriesin the region excluding South Africa)during
the decade. This fallin volume was accompanied by fairlyrapid deterioration

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.69 on Fri, 13 Jun 2014 21:46:05 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Security1132
International

in the termsof trade forAfricanoil importerslate in the decade (a negative

shiftof approximately8 percentin 1978-1980). Mineral exporterswere par-
ticularlyhard hit during the decade, despite a number of good years. Their
termsof trade dropped between 1970 and 1979 by an average of 7.1 percent
per year. The softeningof oil markets in the last two years has extended
these effectsto Africanoil exporterssuch as Nigeria, Gabon, and Angola.
The financialconsequences of these trendsare severe. Currentaccount def-
icits in the region climbed from $1.5 billion in 1970 to $8 billion in 1980.
Externalindebtedness went from$6 billion to $32 billion between 1970 and
1979. The situationhas, if anything,deterioratedfurthersince 1979.
Food productionin the 1970s in Sub-Saharan Africagrew in absolute terms
by some 1.5 percent per year, but, given the regional population growthof
2.7 percent annually, the per capita growth rate in food production was
negative, dropping at a rate greaterthan 1 percenta year. At present, only
six or seven countries in Africa are self-sufficient in food.4 Commentaries
fromaround the continentstressendemic shortagesof staples, both in urban
areas and in the hinterland,and severe inflationin food prices.5
Much of this poor economic record may be explained in terms of prior
underdevelopmentwithattendantundercapitalization,absence ofsubstantial
domesticmarkets,and shortagesof technicallyskilledindigenous personnel,
the legacies of the precolonial and colonial eras. The inefficiencyof many
foreignassistance programs-the result of poor planning and coordination,
insufficientattentionto characteristicsof the local environmentand the con-
straintsthese impose on the development effort,and bureaucratization-is
another importantfactor.A thirdis the relativelylow level of the flow of
private capital to Africa,and the outward flow of Africancapital to safer
havens. A fourthis the crippling effectof OPEC price increases on the
region's oil-importingeconomies. In addition, the incompetence, irrespon-
sibility,and acquisitiveness of many of the continent'sleading political fig-
ures and of the elites fromwhich they emerge and which they serve cannot
be ignored.

4. The above data are taken from World Bank, AcceleratedDevelopmentin SubsaharanAfrica
in food, see also J. Gus
(Washington: World Bank, 1981), pp. 3, 18, 19, 45. On self-sufficiency
Liebenow, "AfricanPolicy in Africa:The Reagan Years," CurrentHistory,Vol. 82, No. 482 (1983),
p. 98.
5. Gerald Bender, "The Continuing Crisis in Angola," CurrentHistory,Vol. 82, No. 482 (1983),
p. 128; W. Skurnik, "Continuing Problems in Africa's Horn," in ibid., p. 121; and Jon Kraus,
"Revolution and the Militaryin Ghana," in ibid., pp. 116, 131.

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.69 on Fri, 13 Jun 2014 21:46:05 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Africa'sSecuritySystem| 133

In periods when the pie is growing, it is possible to contain communal

and class tensions by sharingout the benefitsof development. When the pie
is not growing or is shrinking,while the numbers of those tryingto eat it
are expanding, communal conflictover resources becomes an ever more
serious problem.
This may be of greatest import in those states which have had some
economic success, as subsequent failurenecessarilyinvolves the disappoint-
ment of expectationsformedin the good years. In this context,Nigeria, once
considered one of the region's few success stories,seems at the moment to
be in a particularlyparlous state, given its fallingoil revenues, government
expenditurecutbacks,and risingunemployment.The recentreductionin the
price of Nigerian oil in violation of OPEC price guidelines is an indicationof
its distress,as are the expulsion early this year of 1.5-2 millionillegal aliens,
and the recent cutoffof scholarship funds to between 15,000 and 20,000
students in the United States.
The link between internalcommunal conflictand externalinterventionis
clear throughoutthe region-the Zairean involvementin northernAngola in
support of Holden Roberto's FNLA, the Somali link with theirethnic kin in
the Ogaden, the Ethiopian exploitationof clan rivalriesin Somalia, and the
Libyan connectionwith Chadian Arabs all being cases in point. Of the eleven
venues of interventionsince 1974 listed in Table I, interventionis to some
extent linked to ethnic rivalriesin nine. Cross-frontierethnic or religious
affinitiesprovide both opportunityand justification(however spurious) for
militaryintrusionsby contiguous states. The ethnic and communal dimen-
sion is one aspect of the broader principle that political instabilitywithin a
given state encourages interventionby externalactors with an interestin the
outcome of its political process (as with Senegalese interventionin behalf of
Gambia's PresidentJawarain 1981 and Tanzanian interventionin Uganda in
1979).
But this is not the only causal link between politico-economicdifficulties
and intervention.Those sufferingfrominternalinstabilityare not only po-
tential targets. They are also potential interveners,in that regimes often
attemptto compensate for their incapacity to cope with pressing internal
problemsand fortheirillegitimacyin the eyes of theirown publics by success
in foreignpolicy. The Moroccan involvementin the WesternSahara is a case
in point. One could also cite here the impact of Somalia's irredentistforeign
policy in divertingthe public's attentionfromsuccessive regimes' failureto
stimulate sustained development, the irrationaland wasteful character of

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.69 on Fri, 13 Jun 2014 21:46:05 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 International
Security| 134

much of the country's economic planning, and the obvious inequities in

allocationof public goods and distributionof rewards. A thirdexample might
well be the militantPan-Islamic policy of Colonel Qaddafi-the behavioral
manifestationsof which are the repeated invasions of Chad, the sponsorship
of subversionin Tunisia, Senegal, and Nigeria,and the defense ofIdi Amin-
one consequence of which is to defuse internal opposition to his rule. A
fourthis Mobutu's occasional manipulation of the Bakongo issue and his
attemptsto annex Cabinda.
Beyond this, regimes may attemptthroughinterventionsof theirown to
preempt or to terminate effortsby outsiders to take advantage of or to
exacerbate internal instability.Here one can cite Ethiopian incursions into
Somalia or the Ethiopian support of Ansari dissidents in Sudan. An example
on the fringeof the system is South Africandestabilizationof Angola, Le-
sotho, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique through direct militarypressure and
throughits support of insurgentgroups operatingin these countries.6
The thirdfactorwhich deserves mentionis the growingregional disparity
in militaryand other forms of power. I.W. Zartman, in a seminal article
discussing the Africanstates system,described the mid-1960sregional con-
figurationof power as one of highlydiffusedand unhierarchicaldistribution
at uniformlylow levels.7 Data fromthe 1960s concerningforcelevels, arms
procurement,and militaryexpenditures support this characterization.8The
past decade, however, has witnessed the emergenceof a number of regional
powers whose military(and in some cases economic) capacities faroutstrip
those of most states in the region. Libya, Ethiopia, Algeria, Morocco, and
Nigeria are all examples of the militarydimension of this imbalance. This
differentiation in militarycapabilitiesrendersit increasinglypossible forthese
states to contemplateinterventionin the affairsof neighboringstates. Libya
has displayed a pronounced tendencyto employ its new militarypower and
the financialresources lyingbeneath it to acquire a position in regionalaffairs
commensurate with its inflated self-image. Morocco has used its military
capabilities to absorb the economically importantsections of the Western

6. For an account of the South Africanpolicy of destabilizationin southern Africa,see Chris-

topherCoker, "South Africa:A New MilitaryRole in SouthernAfrica,1968-1982," Survival,Vol.
25, No. 2 (1983), pp. 62-64.
7. I. William Zartman, "Africaas a Subordinate State System in InternationalRelations," Inter-
nationalOrganization,Vol. 21, No. 3 (1967), p. 550.
8. Cf. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, WorldMilitaryExpenditures and ArmsTransfers,
1964-1973 (Washington: ACDA, 1976).

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.69 on Fri, 13 Jun 2014 21:46:05 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Africa's
Security 1135
System

Sahara and to take on the role of regional policeman in the Shaban crises.
Algeria, meanwhile, has financed and provided sanctuary, training,and
materielto POLISARIO, which ituses as a proxyin resistingwhat itperceives
to be Moroccan expansionism. Ethiopia has recentlyused forceagainst So-
malia in order to destabilize the Siad Barre regime,attemptingto remove its
principal subregional rival. Nigeria, finally,recentlydeployed its forces in
Chad, not only as a contributionto regional conflictresolution,but in order
to influencethe course of the Chadian conflictin a manner consistentwith
its national interest.In otherwords, all of these new regionalpowers display
a willingness to use theirstrengthto furthertheirperceived interests.
To sum up, the weakness of state structuresand, underlyingthis, the
frailtyof national consciousness in the face of subnational ethnicchallenges
are criticalpermissive conditions for interventionin Africa. They are also
active stimuliof intervention.As the economic situationworsens and com-
munal conflictintensifies,these effectsstrengthen.The growingdisparityof
militarypower in the regiongives some regionalactorsa capacitywhich they
did not previously possess to respond to or take advantage of these condi-
tions or to pursue their intereststhrough the projection of force. In this
sense, the growing frequencyof interventionin the region is a consequence
of the continent'sgrowing political and economic crises and of the increas-
inglyhierarchicalcharacterof Africaninternationalpolitics.

TheImpactofIntervention
on African
Regional
Security

From the point of view of member states of the OAU, the common denom-
inatorof regional securitypresumablyconcerns the capacity of states in the
region to pursue their core values without external hindrance. While any
attemptto enumeratethe core values of a region as culturally,economically,
and politicallydiverse as OAU Africawill of necessitybe somewhat arbitrary,
most politicallyaware people in the region and a majorityof Africangovern-
ments would probablyput forwardsets of values approximatingthe follow-
ing: internalpolitical stability9and national integration;self-determination

9. Stabilityis here defined as a situation in which a regime or political system is free from
serious challenge (originatingwithin the country)to its existence, as it attemptsto cope with
and adapt to evolving internaland externalpolitical realities. For a discussion of the meaning
of stability,see Samuel P. Huntington, "Remarks on the Meaning of Stabilityin the Modern
Era," in Seweryn Bialer and Sophia Sluzar, eds., Strategies
and ImpactofContemporary Radicalism:
Radicalismin theContemporary Age, Vol. 3 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1977).

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.69 on Fri, 13 Jun 2014 21:46:05 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Security1136
International

and the consolidation of the externalsovereigntyof existingterritorialenti-

ties; and economic development.10
Within the region, governments and political commentatorsfrequently
condemn interventionin an undifferentiatedfashion, maintainingthat its
impact on regional securityis negative.1"It is itselfa securityproblem rather
than a solution to problems of security.This conclusion is apparentlybased
upon several implicit or explicit judgments with respect to the effectof
externalmilitaryinterferenceon the values enumeratedabove: thatinterven-
tion both prolongs and intensifiesthe conflictwhich provoked it, increasing
the number of casualties and refugees and the level of physical destruction
in the targetenvironment;thatit therebyjeopardizes economic development;
that it erodes national sovereignty;and that it is politicallydestabilizingfor
the target.
This assessment is reflectednot only in attitudes towards intrusionsby
non-Africanactors,but in prevailingAfricanopinion even when the intrusion
is undertakenby an Africanactor in pursuit of objectiveswhich enjoy wide-
spread sympathyin the region. The Tanzanian interventionin Uganda in
1979 in response to Ugandan militaryprovocations and in order to remove
a regime widely considered to be destabilizingin the regional context is a
case in point. The action met with widespread condemnation and received
almost no support at the Monrovia OAU summitlater in the year.12
This rejectionin principleof interventionreflectsthe jealousy with which
the attributesof internaland externalsovereigntyare guarded by stateswhich
have only recentlygained theirindependence. The implicationinherentin
foreigninterventionthat the targetstate is incapable of managing its own
affairsor that it is a neocolonial appendage of an outsider is particulary
noxious in these circumstances.This attitudetowards interventionalso in-

10. For a similarcharacterizationby an Africanstatesman,see the speech of General Obasanjo

at the KhartoumOAU summitin 1978, reprintedin Survival,Vol. 20, No. 6 (1978), pp. 268-269.
See also I. William Zartman, International Relationsin theNew Africa(Englewood Cliffs,N.J.:
PrenticeHall, 1966), Chapter 4, and in particularpp. 149-151.
11. The clearest indications of this regional assessment may be found in various resolutionsof
OAU summits, such as "On Interferencein the Internal Affairsof African States" (1977),
reprintedin AfricaContemporary Record(1977-1978) (New York: Africana,1978), p. C4; and "On
MilitaryInterventionsin Africaand on Measures to Be Taken against Neocolonial Manoeuvres
and Interventionsin Africa,"AfricaContemporary Record(1978-1979), p. C19. Nolutshungu refers
in this context to a "reflexand often effeteimperativeagainst intervention"among African
states. Sam Nolutshungu, "AfricanInterestsand Soviet Power," SovietStudies,Vol. 24, No. 3
(1982), p. 405.
12. For an account of the Monrovia debate on Uganda, see Colin Legum and Zderek Cervenka,
"The OAU," in AfricaContemporary Record(1979-1980), pp. A61-A62.

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.69 on Fri, 13 Jun 2014 21:46:05 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Africa'sSecuritySystem1137

dicates an awareness of the weakness of national cohesion characteristicof

Africanstates and, consequently,of theirhigh susceptibilityto foreignpen-
etration.Finally, it is in some respects a legacy of early post-independence
crises in Africa (e.g., the Congo) where external interventiondrew into
question the degree, indeed the reality,of Africanindependence, entangled
Africanconflictsin East-West disputes, and was perceived to have length-
ened and intensifiedlocal hostilities.
None of the generalizationsupon which this negative assessment is based
stands up to close examination. Moreover, several are rejected, in specific
situationswhere national interestsor ideological commitmentsare at stake,
by Africanstates which otherwisesubscribeheartilyto the condemnation of
interventionin Africanaffairs.

INTERVENTION AND THE SCOPE OF LOCAL CONFLICT

The argument concerning interventionand the intensityand duration of
conflictis as follows. In theory,the introductionof well-equipped units of
an external power increases the quantityof firepowerdeployed and often
altersthe qualityof conflictsthroughthe deploymentof technologicallymore
sophisticated weapons systems. Moreover, such intrusions can prolong a
conflict,in thatappeals formore considerable support oftencome fromlocal
actors close to exhaustion. Finally,interventionmay bring counterinterven-
tion in support of other parties to the conflict.The cycle of intervention,
counterintervention, and escalation in the Angolan conflictis well known. It
is quite plausible that the result was a far higher intensityof conflictthan
would otherwise have obtained. In Chad, Libyan interventionand the con-
sequent competitive involvement of Sudan, Egypt, and, indirectly,the
United States in support of Hissene Habre significantly enhanced the military
capabilitiesof local actors and widened the scope of the conflict.
But thereare also cases in which interventionat a level sufficientto deter-
mine the outcome of a conflictterminatedhostilitiesor drasticallyreduced
their scale far earlier than would otherwise have been the case. In such
instances, it mightwell be asked whether a short relativelyintense conflict
was not preferablein termsof totalnumbersof militaryand civiliancasualties
and numbersof displaced persons and of the degree of disruptionof national
life,to a prolonged conflictat a lower level. In Angola, forinstance, thereis
good reason to believe that,once the Alvor Accords collapsed in early 1975,
conflictbetween the threeliberationmovementsand the ethnicgroups sup-
portingeach one would have dragged on more or less indefinitely.In the

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.69 on Fri, 13 Jun 2014 21:46:05 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 International
Security1138

Horn, Soviet and Cuban assistance to the Ethiopians broughtthe 1977-1978

Somali-Ethiopian conflictto an end farearlierthan was likelyin the absence
of thisintervention.Soviet bloc logisticalsupportalso enabled the Ethiopians
to contain the Eritreaninsurgencyat a much lower level than would other-
wise have been possible. Generalizationabout interventionand the intensity
and duration of conflictis, therefore,suspect.

INTERVENTION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The argument concerning effectson economic development derives from
that with regard to the intensityand duration of conflict.The more intense
a civil war is, the greater the disruption of agricultural,commercial,and
industrialactivity.But ifthe assumption concerningthe relationshipbetween
externalparticipationand the intensityand duration of conflictis question-
able, so too are its implications concerning the effectsof interventionon
economic activity.
In specificinstances, the effectsof interventionon economic activitycan
cut eitherway. In Angola, forinstance, the South Africanincursionin 1975
resultedin the miningof most roads in southernAngola and in the destruc-
tion of almost everybridge in thatpart of the country.CurrentSouth African
support of UNITA allows that group to attack the Benguela railroad with
impunity. This deprives the Angolans of a vital transportarteryand an
importantsource of foreignexchange, the railroadin bettertimes servingas
a major conduit forZairean and Zambian copper. South Africanattacks on
Kassinga, ostensiblydirectedat SWAPO camps in the area, have prevented
the reopening of the iron mines there, with the result that Angola, once a
major producer of iron ore, now produces and exportsnone. South African
militaryactivityhas forced Angola to devote more than 50 percent of gov-
ernmentexpenditureto defense. Coker has argued in thiscontextthatSouth
Africa'smain concern in Angola is not the support of Savimbi's attemptsto
unseat the MPLA, but the economic dislocation of Angola.13
On the otherhand, Gulf's oil productionfacilitiesin Cabinda survived the
1975-1976war and subsequent unrestbecause theywere protectedby Cuban
troops. French and Moroccan interventionin Mauritania in 1977-1978 in
response to POLISARIO guerrillaactivityin all likelihood prevented serious

13. Coker, "South Africa,"p. 62. On the economic effectsof South Africanmilitaryincursions
into Angola, see also Keesing'sContemporaryArchives(1982), p. 31419; and AfricaConfidential,
Vol. 22, No. 9 (1981), pp. 2-3.

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.69 on Fri, 13 Jun 2014 21:46:05 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Africa'sSecuritySystem1139

and prolonged disruptionof iron ore productionat Zouerate, the export of

which is Mauritania's major source of foreignexchange.14The presence of
French troops in Djibuti and the virtualcertaintythat theywould intervene
activelyif the governmentof that countrywere seriously threatenedfrom
withinor withoutcreatea favorableclimateforthe foreignprivateinvestment
the governmentis attemptingto attract.15
In other cases, interventionhas no obvious economic effects.Here one
could cite Chad, where what littleeconomic activitythere had been in the
north and center of the country had been so disrupted prior to Libyan
interventionthat the Libyans, even had they desired to do so, could inflict
littledamage. The production in the south of cotton, the country's major
export crop, was little affectedby the Libyan action of 1980-1981. Again,
therewould not seem to be any justificationforbroad generalizationat this
level about the impact of intervention.

INTERVENTION AND SOVEREIGNTY

The view thatinterventioncompromisesnational sovereigntyand self-deter-
minationrests on the argumentthat intrusionin behalf of a partyto a civil
war createsa relationshipof dependency such thatthelocal clientis incapable
of independent action in internaland internationalaffairswhere his interests
or preferencesdiverge fromthose of his patron. In otherwords, intervention
constitutesa new kind of colonialism.
This may be true in some instances. French militaryinterventionin Africa
comes quicklyto mind here, though it is probable thatpoliticaland economic
ties are far more importantin accounting for dependency in much of fran-
cophone Africathan is Frenchmilitaryactivity.But thiseffectof intervention
is by no means necessary. Britishinterventionon behalfof Nyererein 1964,
forexample, broughtlittlein the way of politicalreliability.One year later,
Tanzania broke relations with Great Britainover Rhodesia's unilateral dec-
larationof independence.
Nor is it absolute. Both Angola and Ethiopia are governed by regimes
which have benefitedconsiderablyfromCuban interventionwith substantial
Soviet support. While theyboth display a tendencyto support the U.S.S.R.
on issues which are to them peripheral-for example, their voting on the

14. See StrategicSurvey(1979) (London: InternationalInstituteforStrategicStudies, 1980), pp.

93, 96.
15. See Skurnik,"Continuing Problems in Africa'sHorn," p. 123.

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.69 on Fri, 13 Jun 2014 21:46:05 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 International
Security1140

Afghan and Kampuchean issues at the United Nations-on issues more

central to their interests,they show considerable independence of mind.
Angola has rebuffedSoviet requests forbases and cooperates with the West-
ern Contact Group's effortsto resolve the Namibian question.16Ethiopia
refuses to compromise on the Eritreanissue, engages in interventionof its
own in Somalia, and resists Soviet pressure to restructureits political insti-
tutionsalong more ideologicallyacceptable lines.17
Nor is such influence permanent. The removal or disappearance of the
threatoccasioninginterventionremovesthe source ofa regime'sdependence,
weakening the basis of influence.The case of Britishinterventionin Tangan-
yika again comes to mind. Elsewhere, it is probable that an accommodation
between South Africa and Angola would reduce considerably the level of
Cuban and Soviet influencein Angola, a large part of which is derived from
the protectionprovided to the Angolan regimeby these two powers against
South Africanaggression and sponsorship of UNITA guerrillas.A settlement
of differencesbetween the MPLA and UNITA would reduce this influence
further.The availabilityof alternativesources of external support has the
same effect,as is evident in Egyptianbehavior in the aftermathof the 1973
war, or in Goukouni's foreignpolicy in the aftermathof Hissene Habre's
expulsion from Chad by Libyan troops in late 1980. The improvementin
Franco-Chadian relations in the summer of 1981 made it possible for Gou-
kouni to request the withdrawalof Libyan forces.Along similarlines, it could
be argued that a more receptive American attitudeto overturesfromboth
Angola and Ethiopia could do much to underminethe position of the Soviet
Union in both these countries.
Moreover, interventionmay preserveand enhance sovereigntyratherthan
eroding it. Soviet-Cuban interventionmaintained the external sovereignty
and territorialintegrityof Ethiopia in the face of Somali invasion. It is prob-

16. On the Angolan attitudetowards Soviet bases, see JohnMarcum, "Angola," in Gwendolyn
Carter and PatrickO'Meara, eds., SouthernAfrica:The ContinuingCrisis (Bloomington:Indiana
UniversityPress, 1979), pp. 193-194. DmitriVolsky, "Local Conflictand InternationalSecurity,"
New Times,No. 5 (1983), p. 5, gives a succinctSoviet view of the contactgroup's initiativeson
Namibia.
17. There is ample reason to doubt Soviet complicityin the Ethiopian intrusionsinto Somalia,
therebyriskingthe alienation of otherAfrican
as they constitutean assault on Somali territory,
states. On Ethiopian independence fromthe Soviet Union in internalpolicy, see Paul Henze,
"Communism and Ethiopia," Problemsof Communism,Vol. 30, No. 3 (1981), pp. 63-64; Oye
Ogunbadejo, "Soviet Policies in Africa," AfricanAffairs,Vol. 79, No. 316 (1980), p. 125; and
Nolutshungu, "AfricanInterests,"p. 410.

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.69 on Fri, 13 Jun 2014 21:46:05 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Africa'sSecuritySystem1141

able thattheirinterventionin Angola preventedor postponed thatcountry's

eventual disintegrationor dismemberment.Finally,even those in the region
most adamant in theiropposition to interventionin Africanaffairsgenerally
accept that the involvementof externalactorsin the strugglefor"liberation"
can furtherthe cause of self-determination.18
It is clear in this context that underlyingthe general condemnation of
interventionmentioned above is a wide range of mutually incompatible
positions on interventionin Africanconflict.The 1978 Khartoum summitof
the OAU, which dwelt at length on the subject of intervention,was split
between, on the one hand, moderate and conservativegovernmentswhich
supported actions such as those taken by France, Belgium, and Morocco in
Shaba to preserve a weak regimeagainst a "radical" opposition, and, on the
other, "progressive" regimes which displayed great reluctanceto condemn
Soviet and Cuban activitiesin Africawhile bitterlycriticizinginvolvementby
Western powers and the position of those Africanstates which cooperated
with France in Shaba and in subsequent proposals fora "Pan-Africanpeace-
keeping force." In this instance too, then, thereis littlebasis fora sweeping
condemnation of intervention.

INTERVENTION AND POLITICAL STABILITY

Finally,thereis the question of politicalstability.A look at cases of interven-
tionin Africasuggests that,in the shortterm,interventionmay be stabilizing
or destabilizingin intentand consequences. By way of illustration,there is
littleto argue with in the assertionthatSouth Africaninterventionin Angola
since 1976, and in particularits support of UNITA, has been destabilizingin
both intentand consequences, creatingsevere difficultiesforthe regime in
the Bie, Moxico, Cuando Cubango, and Cunene districts,fosteringdissension
withinthe ranks of the MPLA, and impeding the government'sattemptsto
meet the needs of the population and to integratethe diverse ethnic groups
inhabitingthe countryinto one nation.
By contrast,the recent Ethiopian incursionsinto western Somalia in sup-
port of the Somali Salvation Democratic Frontwere intended to undermine
the Siad Barre regime, but in all likelihood have had the opposite effectby
mobilizingnationalist support behind the totteringBarre and inducing the
northernIsaaq clans to reduce theirpressure on the centralgovernment.

18. Cf. the Nigerian position as elaborated by General Obasanjo in the speech cited in note 10.

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.69 on Fri, 13 Jun 2014 21:46:05 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Security1142
International

Anothercontrastingexample is thatof Soviet-Cuban interventionin Ethio-

pia, which was intended to prop up the socialistEthiopian governmentand
did just that. The intrusionneutralized the principal externalthreatto the
Dergue, provided the Ethiopians with the means to contain the Eritreanand
Tigrean insurgencies,and gave the regime the breathingspace necessary to
consolidate its hold on power in the capital and in centralEthiopia.
In the longer term,thereare good reasons to expect thatmilitaryinterven-
tion is unlikelyto enhance a targetstate's stability.While interventionmay
bring militaryvictoryforone of the parties to a civil or regional dispute, so
long as the political and social roots of the conflictwhich occasioned inter-
vention are not addressed, the solution will remain at best a temporaryone
and one which is fraughtwith dangers of deeper entanglement for the
externalactor.19
Externalinterferencemay in fact reduce the likelihood of conflictresolu-
tion. In the Angolan, Ethiopian, and Chadian cases, externalassistance con-
vinced its internalbeneficiariesthat negotiationwith their opponents was
unnecessary, that militarymeans were sufficientto resolve the civil conflicts
in which they found themselves embroiled. In Angola, the Soviet-Cuban
presence has apparently strengthenedthe MPLA's resolve not to share po-
liticalpower with UNITA. In Ethiopia, and despite Soviet and Cuban advice
to negotiate with and to grantlimitedautonomy to the Eritreans,20 military
interventionhas made it possible forthe regime to survive withoutcompro-
mise and to pursue indefinitelyits campaign against the Eritreaninsurgency.
In Chad, Libyan and OAU interventionin behalf of Goukouni Oueddei's
transitionalgovernmentconvinced Goukouni that he could consolidate his
controlof Chad withoutany attemptto achieve a politicalsolution involving
his principalopponent, Hissene Habre.
Moreover, interventionand a sustained foreignrole in defending a gov-
ernmentagainst its internalopposition may discreditthatgovernmentin the
eyes of the broader populace, which comes to see the regimeas an instrument
of a foreignpower and as betrayingthe nation which it purportsto serve.21
In other words, it may undermine furtherthe legitimacyupon which the

19. On the permanence of militarysolutions in the Horn, for example, see Nolutshungu,
"AfricanInterests,"p. 411.
20. Ogunbadejo, "Soviet Policies in Africa,"p. 125.
21. Rene Lemarchand, "The CIA in Africa:How Central? How Intelligent?"JournalofModern
AfricanStudies,Vol. 14, No. 3 (1976), p. 418, makes a similar point with referenceto regime
dependence on covertassistance.

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.69 on Fri, 13 Jun 2014 21:46:05 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Africa'sSecuritySystem1143

stabilityof a governmentultimatelyrests. In Angola, the Soviet and Cuban

presence has evoked a hostile nationalistreactionwithin the MPLA and in
the population at large.22In Chad, Goukouni's recourse to massive Libyan
support in late 1980 redounded to Habre's favor,as the formercame to be
seen by many Chadians as the puppet of a foreignoccupier with designs on
Chad's sovereignty.23
However, it is again not necessarily the case that interventionwill have
these effects.It may on the contraryset the stage forlonger termstabilityby
removing short-livedthreats to basically popular and legitimateregimes.
Britishinterventionin the face of army mutinies in east Africain the mid-
1960s may be cited in this context. One might also cite here the recent
Senegalese interventionin Gambia.
Moreover, foreigninterventionand sustained militarypresence need not
discreditan incumbent government.There is littleevidence to support the
view, forexample, that the French presence in Senegal, the Ivory Coast, or
Gabon has rendered the governmentsof these countriesillegitimatein the
eyes of their publics. Whether interventionhas this impact depends on a
number of factors: the comportmentof foreignpersonnel, the degree to
which militaryinvolvementis accompanied by economic benefitsto the target
state,the performanceof the incumbentgovernmentin meetingthe economic
and social aspirations of the indigenous population, the effectivenessof the
opposition in mobilizingpublic opinion, and so on.
In short, it would appear that it is neither easy nor very productive to
generalize about interventionand its impact on securityin the senses men-
tioned above. Interventionin Africais not a homogeneous phenomenon. To
treat it as such impedes understanding of Africanaffairs.More generally,
the Africanexperiencecalls into question the undifferentiated condemnation
of forceprojectioninto ThirdWorld conflictcommon among westernliberals.

22. See AfricaConfidential,Vol. 23, No. 15 (1982), pp. 5-6, and Vol. 24, No. 2 (1983), pp. 7, 8,
for accounts of factionalconflictwithin the MPLA between pro-Sovietideologues and "prag-
matic" nationalists. Xan Smiley, "Inside Angola," The Nezv YorkReviewofBooks,February 17,
1983, p. 40, commentson popular resentmentof the Cubans in Angola. The rumor,afterNeto's
death, that the Russians had killed him is indicative of the widespread suspicion of Soviet
intentions(ibid., p. 42).
23. Habr6 repeatedlycalled attentionto Goukouni's connectionwith the Libyan "conquerors."
That Goukouni's relationshipwith the Libyans worked to his disadvantage is evident in the
defectionsof several leading officialsin his governmentafterthe announcementin January1981
of the mergerof the two countries. Keesing'sContemporanyArchives (1981), pp. 31161, 31162.

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.69 on Fri, 13 Jun 2014 21:46:05 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 International
Security1144

THE REGIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF INTERVENTION

That said, it is possible to accept a numberof more carefulconclusions about
the relationshipbetween interventionand regional security.First,there ap-
pears to be a clear connection between interventionand increased defense
spending and weapons procurementin contiguous states. The South African
defense budget, forinstance, doubled and then doubled again in the after-
math of the Angolan affair,going from335 millionrand in 1972-1973to 1,564
million rand in 1979-1980. While some of this may be accounted for by
inflationin militarycosts, this corresponded to a rise in the defense share of
GNP from2.1 percent to 4.5 percent and in the defense share of central
governmentexpenditure from 11.8 percent to 16.8 percent.24It would be
inaccurate to ascribe this substantial real increase in defense expenditure
solely to Soviet-Cuban militaryactivities in Angola. The collapse of the
Portuguese empire in southern Africa and the increasing pressure on the
Smith regime in Rhodesia would have altered the basis of the republic's
securitywhetheror not externalforceshad intervened.Moreover,the specter
of growinginternalunrestfavoredexpansion in the republic's defense estab-
lishment. But it is true nonetheless that these processes were particularly
disturbingfromthe white South Africanperspective,given the close involve-
mentin themof communistpowers fromoutside the region.As Robin Hallett
has observed, the South Africanpreoccupation with and fear of the "com-
munist menace" should not be belittled,but taken at face value.25
The Kenyan response to the growingconflictin the Horn was to increase
defense expenditure from $113 million in 1977 to $255 million in 1979.26
Again, this should perhaps not be ascribed principallyto Soviet and Cuban
involvement,given the long historyofproblemsin relationsbetween Somalia
and Kenya. But as a regionalpower committedto capitalistdevelopmentand
to close ties with the West, Kenya could not have been indifferentto the
rapid growth in the regional presence of the Soviet Union and Cuba.27
Moreover, the factthat this shiftin Kenyan policy was a response primarily
to a "Somali threat" does nothing to diminish the causal connection to

24. SouthAfricanYearbook(1981), p. 286.

25. Robin Hallett, "South AfricanInterventionin Angola, 1975-1976," AfricanAffairs,Vol. 77,
No. 308 (1978), p. 363. In this context,Coker has argued that the failureof the United States to
prevent Soviet interventionin southern Africapushed South Africainto developing itselfinto
an independent militarypower. Coker, "South Africa,"p. 59.
26. ACDA, WorldMilitaryExpenditures, 1970-1979, p. 64. Figures are in 1978 constantdollars.
27. For the perceived link between Kenyan securityand the activityof communistpowers in
the Horn, see WeeklyReview(Nairobi), February27, 1978, pp. 8-9, 11.

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.69 on Fri, 13 Jun 2014 21:46:05 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Africa'sSecuritySystem| 145

intervention,forit was a Somali militaryintrusioninto Ethiopia in support

of insurgentsin the Ogaden which occasioned the Ogaden War and which
provided the Kenyans with graphic evidence of continuingSomali irreden-
tism.
Finally, in a directresponse to Libyan interventionin Chad and to what
the Nigerians believed to be Libyan involvement in sectarian violence in
Kano in late 1980, Nigeria adopted a five-yeardefense procurementplan
valued at $6.4 billion and increased its projected defense budget for 1981-
1982 by 35 percent.28This reversed the post-civilwar downward trend in
Nigerian defense spending and in the size of the country'sdefense estab-
lishment.29
In this sense, interventionis a major contributorto what is a region-wide
growthtrendin size of forces,militaryexpenditure,and arms procurement.
In 1968, Africa accounted for only 7 percent of developing country arms
imports. In 1978, the correspondingfigurewas 32 percent.30This occurred
despite a substantial drop in the dollar value of the purchases of Egypt-
which was in the late 1960s and early 1970s the continent's largest arms
importer-afterthe October War. Africanpurchases were somewhat lower
(around 26 percent of developing countryarms imports) in 1979. This re-
flectedprimarilythe curtailmentin Ethiopian demand forarms31ratherthan
any significantimprovementin the securitysituationofthe regionas a whole.
It remained the case that imports were approximately3.5 times higher in
constant dollars at the end of the period than at the beginning and that
regional defense spending had virtuallydoubled (going from$5,553 million

28. Cf. JuanDe Onis, International HeraldTribune,January16, 1981. De Onis ascribes thisincrease
to worries over Libyan activityin Chad and quotes President Shagari as saying that "Nigeria
was -beingforcedby world events to reassess its securityand defense expenditure." In view of
substantialshortfallsin oil revenues and cutbacksin governmentexpendituresacross the board,
it is unclear whether these targetshave been or will be met. On Nigerian defense spending,
see also Karen Thapar, London Times,April 14, 1981.
29. On the downward trendin Nigerian defense expenditureand manpower in the mid-1970s,
see Edward Kolodziej and RobertHarkavy, "Introduction,"pp. 2, 7, and JohnOstheimer and
Gary Buckley, "Nigeria," in Kolodziej and Harkavy, SecurityPolicies of DevelopingCountries
(Lexington,Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1982).
30. ACDA, WorldMilitanyExpenditures,1963-1973 (Washington: ACDA, 1975), Table 4; and
WorldMilitaryExpenditures, 1970-1979, Table 2. If one omits Egypt, whose primarysecurity
preoccupation was the Middle East and not Africa,the figurefor 1968 would have been 3.5
percent.
31. Ethiopian importsfellfrom$1.1 billion in 1978 to $192 millionin 1979 (both figuresin 1978
constantdollars). This drop largelyaccounts forthe decrease in regional spending from1978 to
1979 ($1.2 billion).

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.69 on Fri, 13 Jun 2014 21:46:05 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Security1146
International

in 1970 to $9,090 millionin 1979), while therewere approximately2.5 times

as many indigenous militarypersonnel in the region in 1979 as in 1970, this
again despite declines in the size of the Nigerian and Egyptianarmed forces.
This shiftin resource allocation is a response to a continental climate of
growing violence-internal and external-of which interventionis a promi-
nent part. While it is perhaps simplisticto maintainwithoutqualificationthat
arms races lead to war, it is nonetheless true thatthe betterarmed a state is,
the more able it is to contemplatethe use of force.The increasingavailabilitv
in the region of the instrumentsof violence removes what was an important
constrainton inter-Africanconflict.Moreover, the growing prominence of
militaryexpenditure in national budgets and of militarytasks in national
policy diverts scarce resources, human, financial, and material, from the
pursuit of other objectives such as health, development, and social welfare
in societies which are already forthe most part desperatelypoor.
Second, the increasingincidence of interventionin the late 1970s and early
1980s in Africareflectsan erosion of the normativebasis of interstaterelations
in the region. For most of the 1960s and the firstyears of the 1970s, Africa
was distinguished for having a structureof norms which limited intra-re-
gional conflict,inhibitedintrusionby externalactors, and conduced to mul-
tilateralconflictresolution.Among the most importantof these norms were:
1. non-interference in the internalaffairsof Africanstates;
2. non-recourseto forcein inter-African relations;
3. non-recourse to extra-regionalmilitaryassistance in the resolution of
regional disputes (i.e., Africansolutions to Africanproblems);
4. respectforthe territorial statusquo establishedby the colonial powers.32
The recentfrequencyof interventionin the region suggests in the firstplace
that regional actors are increasinglywilling to seek militaryassistance from
external actors. Moreover, the great majorityof instances of intervention
since the mid-1970s (14 of the 16 cases since 1974 listed in Table I) have
involved African actions against fellow Africans. This indicates a greater
proclivityon the part of regionalactorsto involve themselvesin civilconflicts
in otherstates (e.g., Libya in Chad, Tunisia, and Uganda; Somalia in Ethiopia
and vice versa; Zaire in Chad; and Senegal in Gambia), to use forcein their
relationswith fellowOAU members(e.g., Libya and Chad, Libya and Sudan,

32. On these points, see Zartman, "Africaas a Subordinate State System," pp. 559-561.

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.69 on Fri, 13 Jun 2014 21:46:05 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Africa'sSecuritySystem| 147

Somalia and Ethiopia, Zaire and Angola, Tanzania and Uganda), and to
challenge the territorialstatus quo (once again Libya vis-a-vis Chad, Zaire
vis-a-vis Cabinda, Somalia vis-a-vis the Ogaden, and Morocco vis-a-vis the
WesternSahara). Many of the disputes and claims cited here are by no means
new. The point is that fora substantialperiod of time they were muted or
diverted into other channels by the existence of a widely accepted body of
principlesgoverningthe conduct of regional actors. The evidence cited here
suggests that the impact of these principles on the behavior of states is
weakening.
The increasingnumbers of interventionsin this period not only reflectbut
fosterthis erosion of previously accepted norms, for, in the absence of a
supranationalauthoritycapable of enforcingrules, compliance is based upon
mutual interest and upon the expectation that others will comply. Each
violation of these norms challenges this expectation. As the latterbecomes
increasinglyuntenable, regional actors will move furthertowards seeking
other means of guaranteeingtheirsecurityand pursuing theirinterests.
For these reasons, it is legitimateto question whether the conventional
characterizationsof inter-African relationsin termsof principlessuch as the
non-use of force,non-interference in internalaffairs,general acceptance of
the territoriallegacy of imperialism,the commitmentto Pan-Africanism,and
multilateralconflictresolution are still valid, and, if they remain so, how
long this will last. It is not coincidentalthat this period has witnessed suc-
cessive crises in the OAU and the immobilityof thatorganizationwithregard
to basic national and regional securityissues. Too many of its memberstates
no longer take seriously the organization's constitutiveprinciples in situa-
tions where the latter impinge upon the pursuit of fundamental national
objectives. It is as an element of this growing regional disorder that the
impact of interventionon Africaneconomic development should be seen.
Regional unpredictabilityand disarraymake the continentas improbable an
economic investmentforprivate interestsboth withinAfricaand outside it
as it is an unpromisingpoliticalinvestmentforexternalactorsseeking lasting
influenceand strategicgain.33
Lastly, while it was argued in a previous section that generalizationwith
respectto interventionand the intensityand durationof militaryconflictwas

33. On this point, see Xan Smiley, "Misunderstanding Africa," AtlanticMonthly,September

1982, p. 79.

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.69 on Fri, 13 Jun 2014 21:46:05 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Security| 148
International

questionable, it appears that the involvementof the superpowers or of pow-

ers perceived to be acting in concertwith them complicates the attemptto
resolve the political questions underlyinghostilitiesby stimulatingthe inter-
est of and counteractionby rival actors. This adds an additional dynamic of
conflictto regional crises and renders them even more intractablethan they
might otherwise be. Angola is a clear case of this. When Zairean troops
armed and trainedby the Americansand Chinese enteredAngola in February
1975, this evoked a mild Cuban and Soviet response (arms deliveriesand the
arrivalof small numbersofCuban advisers). Competitiveescalation involving
both superpowers and their allies within and beyond the region ensued.
While Soviet-Cuban assistance was sufficientto guarantee the MPLA's mil-
itaryvictory,a durable solution to the Angolan problem,difficultas it would
be to achieve even withoutthe global dimension, is furtherimpeded by the
residue of East-West competition.The U.S. continues to refuseto recognize
the Luanda regime and supports, verbally if not materially,the UNITA
challenge to the MLPA. The legacy of East-West competitionin Angola has
effectsbeyond that country'sborders as well, with the U.S. seeking to link
a settlementof the Namibian question to the withdrawal of Cuban forces
fromAngola.
In the Horn, this effectwas and is less evident, though the United States
persistsin its refusalto normalize relationswith Ethiopia, while close Amer-
ican allies in the region (Somalia, Egypt, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia) finance,
arm, and give sanctuary to secessionist movements contesting Ethiopia's
controlof Eritrea,Tigre, and the Ogaden.
In the case of Chad, the perceived close connectionbetween Libya and the
Soviet Union was instrumentalin inducing the United States, in conjunction
with Sudan and Egypt, to arm and financeHissene Habre's challenge to the
Libyan-backed Goukouni regime in 1980-1981. This support made possible
Habre's victoryin 1982 and contributedto the demise of OAU effortsto
obtain a political settlement.Now the shoe is presumablyon the other foot,
Habre&s close connections with the West being one factoramong several
motivatingLibya's renewed support for Goukouni and Soviet acquiescence
in this Libyan policy.
In brief,interventionby aligned regional powers or by outside forces on
one side or the other of the East-West competitiontends to embroil local
conflictsin global rivalries.This conflictswith the oft-statedAfricanobjective
thatthe continentshould not become a terrainon which extra-regionalactors
fighttheirbattles. Moreover, while recognizingthatprospects forresolution

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.69 on Fri, 13 Jun 2014 21:46:05 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Africa'sSecuritySystem| 149

of many African disputes may be small in any case, there is evidence to

support the conclusion that the intrusionof global variables into regional
conflictsmakes conflictresolutioneven more difficult.
To summarize, growing numbers of interventionsin Africafosterthe mil-
itarizationof the continent,reflectand furtherthe corrosionof the normative
basis of regional security,and contributeto a climateof unpredictabilityand
riskwhich discourages development. Moreover, in a number of cases, inter-
ventionby actors with close ties to the Soviet Union or the United States has
blurred the distinctionbetween regional concerns and global rivalriesand,
as such, has complicated conflictresolution.In these senses, interventionis
not only a symptomof basic problems of regional security,but itselfcontrib-
utes to a furtherdeteriorationof securityin the region.

Conclusionand Prospect

For these reasons, it is clearly in the interestof the Africancommunityto

minimize the incidence of intervention,whetheror not in specificinstances
it may be consistentwith regional or national core values. In this context,
one may hope that the realizationthatthe fabricof Africansecurityis begin-
ning to fraywill stimulateeffortsto repairit throughthe revitalizationof the
OAU role in conflictresolution,in a renewal of memberstates' commitments
to the organization and its charter.There is some ground for optimism on
this score in the determinationwith which states in the region sought to
avoid the collapse of the OAU in 1982. Most regimesin the regionapparently
continue to perceive a shared interest-based on a general awareness of the
precariousness of state structuresand consequent fearof the implicationsof
a serious breakdown in regional order-in the norms upon which the orga-
nization is based.
However, a revitalizationof the regional organization would have little
impact on the basic problems outlined in the firstsection of this paper. At a
sufficientlevel of intensityin a sufficientnumber of countries,these trends
of political fragmentationand economic decay could cause not only the
internalbreakdown of the states affected,but also a collapse of the African
interstatesystem. Ultimately,nothing short of a redraftingof the territorial
map will effectivelyaddress the problem of politicalfragmentation.Yet any
large scale movement in this directionwould in all likelihood create a level
of disorderin the regionwhich is betteravoided. Improvementin the regional
economic situation may mitigate some of these disintegrativepressures.

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.69 on Fri, 13 Jun 2014 21:46:05 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Security| 150
International

Leaving aside utopian solutions along the lines of the program for a new
internationalorder or the Brandt Commission report,it would appear that
only sustained and strongrecoveryin the industrialeconomies which con-
sume primaryexports will significantly improve the regional economic pic-
ture. Large scale write-offsof Africandebts would also be a constructive
contribution.
With regard to power projection by extra-regionalactors, to the extent
thattheyshare an interestin regional securityin Africa,caution is advisable
in consideringthe option of intervention.Potentialbenefitsto both the target
state and to the intervenermust be weighed against the impact of this kind
of activityon regional security.Tacit or explicitagreement among non-re-
gional actorson mutual restraintin theirresponse to local conflictis desirable,
not only in the usually mentioned sense that Third World confrontation
between East and West carrieswith it the danger of escalation and may do
considerable damage to relations between the two blocs, but also from a
regional securityperspective. Given that the United States continues to face
severe domestic constraintson force projection and policymakers in the
currentAdministrationapparentlydo not perceive vital American interests
to be at stake in Africancrises, while the Soviet Union has gained little.and
at considerable expense fromits involvementin Africanconflict,prospects
for restraintby the superpowers may be brighterthan at firstglance they
mightappear.34
Concerning interventionby local actors, restraintis all the more desirable
since it is upon compliance by OAU members that the strengthof the com-
munity'snormsconcerningthe use offorceand interference in internalaffairs
is based.
However, in attemptingto put forwardpolicy prescriptionsdesigned to
cope with the increasing use of forcein the region, one should not depart
too farfromregionalrealities.The currentstate of regionalpoliticsgives little
ground for enthusiasm. Economic decay, political fragmentation,growing
disparitiesin militarypower, the acceleratingimportof arms, an increasing
recourse to forcein regional disputes, the erosion of regional norms govern-
ing interstaterelations, the manifestincapacity of the OAU as presently

34. For a wider discussion of these points, see S. Neil MacFarlane, Interventionand Regional
Security,Adelphi Paper (London: InternationalInstituteforStrategicStudies, forthcoming);and
S. Neil MacFarlane, "Soviet Interventionin Third World Conflict,"PSIS Occasional Paper #2
(Geneva: ProgrammeforStrategicand InternationalStudies, 1983), pp. 35-43.

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.69 on Fri, 13 Jun 2014 21:46:05 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Africa'sSecuritySystem1151

constitutedto deal with internaland regional conflicts,and its near demise

over the Western Sahara and Chad questions all justifypessimism. The
prospect for the region is one of increasingfrustration,disintegration,and
civil and interstateconflict.Perhaps the most that can be hoped for is the
eventual coalescence of a new concertof power out of this morass, with the
strongcollectivelyassuming responsibilityforregional security,or, alterna-
tively,the emergence of a definiteand recognized balance of power discour-
aging revisionistchallenges to regional order.

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.69 on Fri, 13 Jun 2014 21:46:05 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions