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HO M E > E XPE RT SPE A K > T HE I NE FFE CT I V E NE SS O F WE ST E RN A I D T O U KRA I NE

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RA I SI NA DEBAT ES JUL 1 2 2 0 2 2

The ineffectiveness of western aid

to Ukraine
VIVEK MISHRA JOEANA CERA MATTHEWS

As the humanitarian crisis worsens and the war in

Ukraine prolongs, the credibility of western aid is Vivek Mishra

increasingly being questioned. Vivek Mishra is a Fellow with

ORF’s Strategic Studies
Programme. His research
interests include America in the
Indian Ocean and Indo-Pacific
and Asia-Pacific regions,
particularly the role of the US in
security in South Asia, Indo-US
defence relations, and the
Indian defence sector.

Publication

HEA LT H EXPRESS
DEFENCE ECONOMY EU NATO A PR 1 0 2 0 2 0

RUSSIA UKRAINE WAR WESTERN AID

On 1 June, the US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken,

released a press statement providing insight into the
slow Russian progress in Ukraine. It read: “In the three
months since it launched its unprovoked and brutal
further invasion of Ukraine, Russia has consistently A global comparison of
COVID-19 deaths: How
failed to meet its strategic objectives.” This victor’s is India doing in
narrative painted by the United States (US) pales when counting its sick and
dead?
juxtaposed with Ukraine’s desperate call for more arms,
the US and its European partners’ limitations in moving       

arms into Ukraine at the desired speed, and Russia’s

 
ability to sustain the war while gaining ground in the
eastern parts of Ukraine. Although Ukraine’s West-
assisted defensive posture and economic sanctions
 
substantially thwarted the Russian advance, the latter’s
assault in the east continues unabated. An assessment
of the war’s current trajectory shows that Russia will
soon be in control of almost all of eastern Ukraine, with
its most recent claim of taking control of Lysychansk,
the last Ukrainian foothold in the Luhansk region.
Efforts in deterring Russia have neither helped the war
tilt in Ukraine’s favour nor has it meant that Russia has
achieved all its strategic objectives in Ukraine. However,
given the long-haul, Russian advances in the Donbas
region and potentially its ability to cut off Ukraine’s
access to the sea have not just depicted the limits in
deterring Russia but more conspicuously it has put the
credibility of western assistance to Ukraine on the line.
Much of what has come out from the battlefields
between Russia and Ukraine for close to four months
have played out at the levels of perception and
information. Russia’s inability to capture Kyiv and its
retreat from western parts of Ukraine may have been as
much a spin of information as the portrayal of Russia as
a 20th-century infantry-reliant force which was sitting
ducks for the Ukrainian TB2 Bayraktar drones. As such,
the gap between developments on the ground and
their portrayal has been as stark in the case of Ukrainian
defence capabilities, as also in the case of Russian
offensive capabilities. Despite the Russian defence
having been characterised as a combination of “poor
low-level tactics, limited air cover, a lack of flexibility,
and a command approach which is prepared to
reinforce failure,” Russia’s gains in eastern Ukraine may
have proved that quantity may be a quality of its
nature.

Efforts in deterring Russia have neither helped the

war tilt in Ukraine’s favour nor has it meant that
Russia has achieved all its strategic objectives in
Ukraine.

In the past four months, the West has overwhelmingly

come to Ukraine’s aid against Russia. In light of the
developing postures from both sides over the Russia–
Ukraine war, a few questions gain importance: What has
been the nature of western assistance to Ukraine and
whether it has been sufficient? How has it impacted the
Russian response? How has continued western
assistance to Ukraine reshaped the trans-Atlantic
alliance?

As the war in Ukraine enters its fourth month, there are

pressing questions about the benefits that western aid
may have brought to Ukraine? At best, western aid has
prevented a take-over of Kyiv and restricted Russia to
the eastern parts of Ukraine; at its worst, western aid
has been blamed for egging Ukraine on to continue the
war with Russia at tremendous costs to its economy,
people, and its future. The West has followed a strategy
of mixed approach straddling economic sanctions
against Russia and providing aid to Ukraine. Although
the total aid promised to Ukraine by the most
important donors now stands at more than 30 billion
euros in budget support, only about 6 billion euros has
been handed out since February 2022. The largest
donor in aiding Ukraine is the US, followed by the
European Union (EU). However, when the support by
countries is put in a comparative framework to their
economic size, the Baltic states and Poland continue to
contribute significantly more than large European
economies such as Germany, Italy, and France. The
following table broadly depicts western assistance to
Ukraine since the start of the war. 

Major Western Military Assistance to Ukraine

 Source: Forum on the Arms Trade, The Washington Journal

Meanwhile, the sanctions imposed against Russia by the

West are listed in the table below:

Nature of western sanctions against Russia

 Source: Peterson Institute of Economics, Al Jazeera

The effectiveness of western sanctions

remains blunted

The West has tried to create necessary deterrence to

stop Russia by working on an institutional response that
brings together sanctions against Russia and material
and financial assistance to Ukraine. Neither has proved
sufficient to stop Russia in the short term. Any severe
long-term impact of western sanctions on Russia
remains to be seen.

Some estimates are being made about the long-term

impact of sanctions on Russia. Meanwhile, the EU has
been an indirect deterrent to Russian advances in
Ukraine. A consequential portion of Russian trade
happens within Europe; implementing financial
sanctions against Russian trade and businessmen has
significantly hit Russia’s economy. As Matina Stevis-
Gridneff noted in an article in May this year, the latest
blow to the Kremlin economy was the EU’s adoption of
its sixth economic sanctions package inclusive of the
long-delayed Russian oil embargo. The package’s
adoption suggests that by the end of 2022, the EU
would block Russian oil imports by sea. Despite
Hungary’s exemption from the embargo, this remains a
costly step for both Europe and Russia. Once the
embargo comes into effect, the EU is set to witness
steeper energy prices while the Russian economy will
march into further decline.
 A consequential portion of Russian trade happens
within Europe; implementing financial sanctions
against Russian trade and businessmen has
significantly hit Russia’s economy.

Apart from the political support provided by NATO, the

practical assistance it offered has been feasible via the
Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP) that was part
of the 2016 Warsaw Summit. The CAP has been key in
delivering Ukraine with the best practices on security
and defence reforms based on Euro-Atlantic principles.
The Warsaw Pact nations which are now a part of NATO
have also contributed ammunition and spares.
Meanwhile, there have been widespread calls to arm
Ukraine with NATO-standard equipment. Despite NATO
holding a major role in aiding Ukraine, it is crucial to
note that NATO is a defensive alliance and its intentions
lie in preventing the conflict and not escalating it
further.

The Biden administration, in the meantime, has

managed to militarily aid Ukraine while imposing hurtful
sanctions against Russia. The US approval of the request
for long-range multiple-launch rocket systems was a
major contribution to the US’ effort to militarily aid
Ukraine. However, this was granted after the Pentagon
received assurances that the systems would not be
directed toward Russian territory. President Putin had
warned that such an event would be tantamount to
“crossing a red line” for the West.

The rocket systems are part of the US’ 11 th security aid

package for Ukraine, valued at US $700 million.
Including their latest addition, the total US military
assistance to Ukraine since the start of the war
accounts for the staggering US $5.6 billion (15 June
2022). Separately, on 21 May, Congress approved an
Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act of
2022 allowing for more than US $40 billion in new
funding for the US response to the crisis. Concerns
regarding sustained congressional approval were wiped
away with this act that ensures continued military
assistance.

US assistance to Ukraine

Source: US Department of Defense, Congressional Research Service

Trans-atlantic convergences

The West has united in its effort to bolster Ukraine

against Russian aggression. However, these provisions
are rapidly depleting indicating the growing need for
strengthened resupply efforts. Some of the new
systems provided by the US include over 1,400 Stinger
anti-aircraft systems, 700 Switchblade Tactical
Unmanned Aerial Systems, 108 155mm Howitzers and
over 220,000 155mm artillery rounds, 121 Phoenix
Ghost Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems. Several of
these systems require Ukrainian personnel to be trained
by the US. At the outset of the invasion, the US’ training
mission to Ukraine—the Joint Multinational Training
Group-Ukraine—was suspended. However, it resumed
activities in April 2022 after the DOD announced its
decision to train Ukrainian personnel outside Ukraine to
operate the US and allied systems. Meanwhile, the
European endeavour to provide Ukraine with weaponry,
arms, as well as ammunition has been steadfast. Poland
and the Baltic states have been extremely
accommodating with their territory; providing land for
stationing NATO troops and as corridors for fleeing
refugees. Building on these efforts, a concerted
European attempt has been witnessed via the
acceptance of Ukrainian refugees into the mainland.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is, without a doubt,

threatening Euro-Atlantic security. Nevertheless, this
threat has also strengthened transatlantic unity. Russia
had justified its invasion of Ukraine as being a response
to NATO’s attempts at enlargement. However, four
months into the war, its efforts at halting the alliance’s
enlargement faced a major setback with historically
neutral countries like Denmark, Finland, and Sweden
applying for NATO membership and Ukraine obtaining a
‘candidate’ status for joining the EU. During the initial
days of the invasion, transatlantic consolidation was
seen as a preparatory ground for a counteroffensive.
However, recent trends indicate Western support to
have transitioned from an offensive to a defensive
position, seeking peace over “territorial integrity and
sovereignty”. Eventually, re-establishing stability
remains the utmost concern for the global order.

Poland and the Baltic states have been extremely

accommodating with their territory; providing land
for stationing NATO troops and as corridors for
fleeing refugees.

Despite the convergence between trans-Atlantic

partners, bringing Russia and Ukraine to the diplomatic
table has not been possible. On the contrary, the war
may lead to an arms race. Equipping Ukraine with
weapons essentially implies engaging in that very race.
The war’s humanitarian cost has been heavy: 15,000
deaths, 6 million refugees, 7.7 million internal
displacements, widespread unemployment, and at least
US $100 billion in infrastructural damage. While a
Ukrainian victory is not the need of the moment, a
Russian victory will aggravate the crisis. The West has to
equip Ukraine with a sustained security assistance plan
to ward off potential Russian advances into Ukrainian
territory.

Conclusion
 The war is expected to be a long-drawn one. The
growing humanitarian crisis and the looming global
food crisis indicate that the credibility of western
assistance to Ukraine is at stake. Even if the war did
stop, Russia has captured essentially most of the
Donbas region. This gives Moscow a strategic victory
enabling it to create regional instability via protracted
civil and proxy wars. Even the materialisation of
ceasefire talks would occur only based on the existing
terms of territorial gains and losses. Some inbuilt
caveats have blunted the effectiveness of western aid to
Ukraine. If for Europe, its dependence on Russian energy
has blunted the impact of sanctions, the US’
compulsion to avoid an escalatory risk cycle with Russia
directly has dulled its assistance to Ukraine.

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