Promoting Human Rights and Democracy in the Developing World: U.S. Rhetoric versus U.S.

Arms Exports
Author(s): Shannon Lindsey Blanton
Source: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Jan., 2000), pp. 123-131
Published by: Midwest Political Science Association
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PromotingHumanRights andDemocracy
intheDeveloping
World:
U.S.Rhetoric
versusU.S.ArmsExports
ShannonLindseyBlanton
University
Scholars disagree about the determi-
nants of U.S. foreignpolicyinstru-
ments.Accordingto realpolitik, secu-
rityinterestsdeterminethe outcome
of U.S. decisions on arms transfers.
Neo-liberalscounterthatrespect for
human rightsand democraticgover-
nance are important concerns in U.S.
foreignpolicy.The objective of this
studyis to assess whetherhuman
rightsand democracy are significant
determinantsin the decision to trans-
ferarms abroad. Focusing on U.S.
arms exportsto developing countries
forthe years 1990 through1994,1
use a modifiedHeckman model to
take intoaccount a two-stagedeci-
sion-makingprocess. The findings
indicatethatin the initialdecision-
makingstage, human rightsand
democracy are importantdetermi-
nantsof the eligibilityof countriesto
receive arms. In the second stage,
democracy is significant, though
human rightsno longeraffectthe
decision on the amountof arms to be
transferred.
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ofMemphis
anyview the comingof the twenty-first centuryas "a critical
turningpoint in history"whereinWesterndemocracieshave
( an opportunity
to shape the political natureof our world"
(Diamond 1992,27). Alongtheselines,theUnitedStateshas endorsedthe
promotionof liberal democracyas a cornerstoneof its foreignpolicy.
Thus,theBushadministration calledfora "newworldorder"characterized
by freedomand justice,and the Clintonadministration soughtto enlarge
theglobal democraticcommunity. To whatextentare the instruments of
U.S. foreignpolicy used in a mannerconsistentwith proliberalization
rhetoric?I addressthisquestionby exaimining the degreeto whichU.S.
practiceson armsexportsmirroritsprofessedconcernwithhumanrights
and democracy.
Ifthisrhetoricis sincere,
theconditionsofhumanrightsand democracy
in recipientcountriesshould be relatedto patternsof U.S. armstransfers
abroad.Thisintentis embodiedin legislationsuchas theproposed"Code of
Conduct"thatwould constraintheexportof U.S. armsto thosecountries
that,amongotherthings,respecthumanrightsand havea democraticform
of government. Such effortsare based on thebeliefthatthe U.S. has a re-
sponsibility to protecthumanrights, promotedemocracy, and takethelead
in reducingregionalarmsracesthroughout theworld.Theyarealso linked
to the premisethatsince democraciesdo not go to war witheach other
(ONeal et al. 1996;Maoz and Russett1993),exportingarmsonlyto democ-
raciesreducesthelikelihoodof the"boomerangeffect."'Furthermore, as
U.S. fundsare used to subsidizemanyarmssales throughforeignaid and
off-set agreements (Neuman 1985),policymakers findit harderpubliclyto
justifysucharrangements whentherecipient abuseshumanrightsor is non-
democratic.
Criticscontendthatthesegoalsaredisregarded in practice.In thepost-
Cold War period,the UnitedStates"has subvertedhumanrightsto com-
mercialconcerns"(Wheat 1995, 16; see also Hartung1995). In a period
Shannon Blanton
Lindsey isAssistant
Professor
ofPolitical
Science, ofMem-
University
phis,437ClementHall,Memphis,TN 38152-6108
(sblanton@cc.memphis.edu).
I thankGeorgeKrause,NealBeck,Robert
Blanton,DavidKimball,Harvey and
Starr,
LauraArnoldfortheir
comments andadvice.
I amindebtedtoSarahDiel-Hunt
forher
extensive efforts.
data-entry Anyerrorsremainminealone.
1 ThisoccurswhenU.S. troopsfacean enemy
that possessesarmsofU.S. origin.
American
Journal
ofPoliticalScience,
Vol.44,No. 1,January
2000,Pp. 123-131
?2000 bytheMidwestPoliticalScienceAssociation
123
124 SHANNON LINDSEY BLANTON

markedbydefenseconversion, armstransfersareviewed As withhumanrights, thereis a lackofconsensusre-

bypolicymakers and armsmanufacturers "as a meansof gardingthe relationshipbetweendemocracyand U.S.
preserving Americanjobs and keepingthe U.S. defense foreignpolicy.4Manycontendthatthepromotionof de-
industrialbase fromerodingtoo quickly"(Blantonand mocracyis an essentialobjectiveof U.S. foreignpolicy
Kegley1997,38). Indeed,a 1995 presidential declaration (Allisonand Beschel1992; Diamond 1992); others,that
statesthatthefinancialhealthofU.S. weaponsmanufac- self-interest is themostimportantconsideration(Harper
turersjustifiesweapon sales abroad. Thus, the U.S. 1997). Despitetheconsiderabledebateoverthemeritsof
government's professedgoals-the promotionofhuman promotingdemocracy, therehas been verylittleempiri-
rights,democracy, and global peace-and the U.S. posi- cal analysisof whetherthe instruments of U.S. foreign
tion as the largestexporterof conventionalweaponry policy,suchas armsexports,areactuallyusedto promote
maybe in conflict.2 democracy.In a studyof presidentialchoices between
"proliberalization"and "nonliberalization"policies,
Peceny(1995,398) concluded,"thepresentera is likelyto
RelevantEmpirical Research involve consistentU.S. supportfordemocracyduring
[military]interventions." Blanton and Kegley (1997)
Littleempiricalresearchdeals explicitlywiththelinkage foundthatin 1993,policymakers approvedarmstrans-
betweenU.S. armsexportsand humanrightsconditions, fers to 62 percent of the world's democracies, as opposed
but theliterature on U.S. militaryaid offersrelevantin- to 33 percent of the nondemocracies. Focusing on U.S.
sights.Moststudiesshowthathumanrightsis notofpri- foreign aid, Meernik, Krueger, and Poe (1998) found
maryimportancein determining the allocationof aid. democratic regimes more likely to receive aid and larger
For instance,Schoultzconcludedthatin themid-1970s, amountsof it.5
"UnitedStatesaid tendedto flowdisproportionately to Few of these studiesof human rightsand democ-
thehemisphere's egregiousviolatorsof funda-
relatively racy directlyaddressU.S. armsexportpractices.Never-
mentalhumanrights"(1981, 157; see also Carletonand theless, theyprovideusefulinsightsabout the determi-
Stohl 1985). In a multivariateanalysis,Cingranelliand nants and decision-making processbehindU.S. foreign
Pasquarello (1985) challengedthe conclusionthathu- policy.Drawingon thiswork,I suggestthatthemanner
man rightswereunimportant.Conceptualizingforeign in whichU.S. policymakers approvethe exportof arms
aid allocationin termsof a two-stagedecision-making involves a two-stage decision-making process.The first
process,theyuncovereda weakpositiverelationship be- stage is a "gatekeeping" stage in which policymakers
tweenhuman rightsand U.S. militaryaid at an initial make a decision about whether a countryis eligibleto
gatekeepingstage.Yet,in a replication,McCormickand receiveanyU.S. armsat all. This is followedbya second
Mitchell(1988) founda negativerelationshipbetween stage in whichpolicymakersdeterminethe amount of
militaryaid and respect for human rights.Lebovic arms to be transferred.
(1988) depicteda similarpictureunderboth the Carter Thus, thefirststagedetermines withwhomtheU.S.
and Reaganadministrations.3 will associate;thesecond stageaddresseshow close that
Usingan improvedmeasureofhumanrightsand in- associationwillbe. As Gowa arguesin herstudyof inter-
creasinglysophisticatedresearchdesigns,more recent nationaltrade,a country"cannot be indifferent to the
studiesindicatethathumanrightsconditionsdo havean potential power of either its alliesor adversaries" (Gowa
impact on aid allocation. Poe (1991), for example, 1993,38). Tradeproduces"security externalities"as itin-
showed that human rightsconditions are important creasestheproductivemight,and indirectly themilitary
determinantsof which countriesreceivemilitaryaid. capacity, of the recipient. This theory is particularly per-
Similarly,Blanton(1994) founda negativerelationship tinent to arms transfers,which directly bolsterthe coer-
betweenhuman rightsabuse and the allocationof U.S. civepowerof recipients. As such,theexportermayseek
militaryaid to LatinAmericancountries;and Poe and
Meernik (1995) concluded that human rightswere
4 Scholarsmakea distinction betweenhumanrightsand democ-
influentialin thechoiceofwhichcountriesto receiveaid. racy and do not alwayssee the two as complimentary. Yet
policymakers oftenlinkthemtogether.As formerSecretaryof
2 In1994,theU.S. exported$14.5 billionof arms.The Pentagon StateWarrenChristopher asserted,"democracies,not dictator-
predicts
thatthisdominancewillcontinue, withtheU.S. control- ships,offerthebestmeansto defendhumanrights"(Quoted in
ling50-60 percentof theglobalarmsmarketthroughtheyear "Democracyand US Aid"1993,903).
2000(Hartung1995).
5 In theMeernik, Krueger,and Poe (1998) study,thedependent
3 Therewasno relationship andmilitary
betweenhumanrights aid variableis totalbilateral aid and no distinction
foreign is madebe-
underCarterand a slightnegative
one underReagan. tweenmilitary and economicassistance.

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PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY
to constrainthe transferof armsto those identifiedas
friendsand shunthoseperceivedas enemies.Yetfriend-
ships do not always last, and today's friendmay be
tomorrow'sfoe.Accordingly, securityconcernsdictate
thatcountrieslimitarmsexportsto othersin which"they
believein the credibility
and durabilityof theirmutual
commitment" (Morrowet al. 1998,652).
Liberal democraciespossess these qualities as the
normativeand structuralcharacteristics of democracies
greatlyenhancetheirabilityto makeinternational com-
mitments(Gaubatz 1996;Maoz and Russett1993).Thus,
successfulpassagethroughthe"gatekeeping" stageprob-
ablyrequiresthata countrymeeta certainlevel of ac-
ceptabilityin termsof democraticgovernanceand re-
spectforhumanrights.In otherwords,democracyand
human rightsare "threshold"phenomena (Starr 1997,
chapter7) and are importantconsiderationsat the first
stageofthedecision-making process.Atthesecondstage
of the process,however,eitherall eligiblecountriesare
liberaldemocraciesor a country-specific decision has
been made to waivesuchconcerns.The thresholdforde-
mocracyand human rightsis satisfied,and therefore
such concernsare likelyof no furtherimportancein de-
termining theamountof armsto export.
theInquiry
Organizing
To assesstheroleof humanrightsand democracyin ac-
countingforthe transferof U.S. arms to developing
countries,I constructa two-stagemodel.6Focusingon
theyears1990through1994,1 analyzetheninety-two de-
velopingcountriesforwhichcompletedata is available.7
The year1990 represents thebeginningof thepost-Cold
War period and marksa transitionin both U.S. foreign
policy and the internationalarms-tradesystem(see
Grimmett1994); 1994is thelatestwithcompletedata.In
orderto approximate theinformationavailableto policy-
6 "Developing"countriesare thoseidentified
as suchin the UN
HumanDevelopment
Report(UNDP 1994,225).
7 Thereis possibly
somedistortion
due to theabsenceofcountries
fromthedataset,butthisis notlikelydetrimentalto theconclu-
sionsofthisanalysisas theomittedcountriesaregenerallysmall
and militarily
insignificant
(ACDA 1994).ExcludedareAndorra,
Antiguaand Barbuda,the Bahamas,Bahrain,Belize,Bhutan,
Brunei, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cape Verde,
Comoros,Djibouti,Dominica,EquatorialGuinea,Fiji,Gabon,
Grenada,Kiribati,Maldives,Mauritius,Montserrat, Mongolia,
Nauru,Papua New Guinea,Qatar,SaintChristopher and Nevis,
SaintLucia,SaintVincentand theGrenadines, San Marino,Sao
TomeandPrincipe, Seychelles,
SolomonIslands,Suriname, Tonga,
Vanuatu,andWestern Samoa.
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125
makers at the time they make decisions about arms
transfer
agreements, I lag each of theindependentvari-
ablesone year(see Meernik,Krueger, and Poe 1998).8
TheDependent
Variable:ArmsExports
Armstransfer data (U.S. Departmentof Defense'sSecu-
rityAssistanceAgency, DSAA 1995) measureU.S. foreign
militarysales (FMS) agreements to developingcountries
in termsof the"totaldollarvalue of defensearticlesand
defenseservicespurchased.. . bya foreigngovernment
or international organizationin anyfiscalyear"(DSAA
1995, iv).9 The use of FMS agreementsis important.'0
First,although arms transferswere once conducted
throughgrantprograms,since 1974 FMS has been used
extensively by the U.S. governmentto transferarms.11
Second, in accord withSection 29 of the ArmsExport
ControlAct,FMS data fortheyears1981and laterdo not
includeforeignmilitaryconstructionsales agreements
and deliveries.Sincethisstudyfocuseson armsexports,
as opposedto military assistanceand saleswritlarge,it is
desirableto use data thatmakesucha distinction as well.
Third,theDSAA data providethevalue of armstransfer
agreementsseparatelyfromthe value of itemsactually
delivered.Althoughtheuse of agreements insteadof de-
liveriesmayexaggeratethe extentof armstransfers be-
tweencountries(Louscherand Salomone 1987),myfo-
cus here is on the commitments,or intentions,of the
supplieras theoutputof a decision-making process.In-
tervening variablesthat may account for a differencebe-
tweenarmstransfer agreementsand armsdeliveriesoc-
cur aftertheapprovaland allocationaldecision.
HumanRights
I conceivehumanrightsrepressionas theviolationofper-
rights.Such humanrightsabuse includes
sonal integrity
actsof torture,
murder, abduction,and imprisonment of
8 Thus data fortheindependent
variablesare for1989through
1993.
9 Data aremeasuredin thousands
ofdollars.
10SIPRI and theACDA'sWMEATprovidedataon theamountof
armsexportedand importedbya givencountry, but unlikethe
DSAA, neitherprovidesa breakdownas to theportionof arms
thata country receives fromtheU.S.
specifically
II Commercial salesarea component oftheU.S.armstrade.How-
ever,in thisstudycommercial armsexportsareexcludedbecause
"datamaintained on U.S. commercial salesagreementsand deliv-
eriesaresignificantly
incomplete andarelessprecisethanthosefor
theU.S. ForeignMilitarySales (FMS) program.. .. Thereare no
commercial agreement datacomparableto thatfortheFMS pro-
grammaintained on an annualbasis"(Grimmett 1994,15).
126
individualsfortheirpoliticalbeliefsand is usuallycom-
mittedbygovernments in an effortto inducecompliance.
Althoughbroaderconceptualizations incorporatepoliti-
cal,social,and economicrights,thislimitedone allowsan
operationaldistinctionto be madebetweenhumanrights
and democracyand likelyreflectsthe view thata U.S.
policymakerbringsto an assessmentof human rights
conditions(Blanton1994).
Since violationsare oftenconcealedfromthe inter-
nationalcommunity, human rightsdata do not reflect
thefullextentof abuse. Thus,thereare concernsregard-
ingthevalidityand reliabilityof data (McCamant 1981).
Byusingdata frommultiplesources,theriskof bias can
be reduced.To thisend,I use standards-based data gen-
eratedby contentanalysisof boththeAmnestyInterna-
tionaland StateDepartmentreports.'2The valuesof the
scales foreach of thesedata sourcesrangefromone to
five,indicatinggreatrespectforhuman rightsto com-
pletedisregardof them.To avoid multicollinearity, the
scales werecombinedto forma singleindex of human
rightsabuse.13
Democracy
To take into account the institutionaldimension of
democraticrule (Vanhanen 1990; Huntington1984) as
wellas a regime'srecognitionofpoliticalliberties(Bollen
1993), I use the PolityIII data set and the Freedom
House index of politicalrights.The formerfocuseson
the authoritystructuresof polities (Jaggersand Gurr
1995),thelatter,
democraticpoliticalliberties.'4To mini-
I rescaledthedata fromeach in-
mize multicollinearity,
dexand thenaveragedthetwoscoresto createa six-point
democracyindexrangingfroma low of 0 to a highof 5.
Control
Variables
Severalothervariablesare likelyto influencethe export
of armsto developingcountries.
External
Conflict
Whena country in external
is involved
conflict,itsdemand forweaponsmayincrease(Pearson
1988). In turn,theU.S. mayselectively
exportarmsso as
12 Thesedatacomefrom
MarkGibneyand StevenPoe. Fora dis-
cussionofthedatacollection,
see GibneyandDalton(1996).
13 Theywerecombinedby averaging
the two scores.For cases
wheredataweremissingforone ofthesourcesbutnottheother, I Wallensteen and Sollenberg(1997) and was coded 0 fortheab-
usedtheavailabledataas thescorein theindex(see Poe and Tate
1994).
14 The important
politicalfreedomsof speechand pressare in-
cludedin thecivilrightsindex.Yetin orderto maintainthecon-
ceptualdistinction
betweendemocracy andhumanrights, onlythe
indexis used.
politicalrights
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SHANNON LINDSEY BLANTON
to influencethe outcomeof an internationalconflict-
exportingarmsto thecountriesit supportsand banning
themfromthoseitopposes.Thus,externalconflictlikely
influencesU.S. armstransferdecisions,thoughtheexact
directionof the relationshipis uncertain.The external
conflictvariable indicatesthe numberof monthsin a
yearin whicha potentialrecipientwas involvedin either
an internationalwaror intervened intoa civilwarin an-
othercountry.'5
InternalWar Whenfacedwithinternalthreats, a govern-
ment may importarms to suppress domestic dissent
(Blanton1999;Pearson1988).IftheU.S. seeksto prevent
the topplingof the regimein power,internalwar may
spurgreatertransfers of U.S. arms.Alternatively,
theU.S.
maybe reluctantto supporta regimeifthereis uncer-
taintyabout itsclaimofdomesticsupport.'6Thoughthe
precise directionof the relationshipis uncertain,it is
likelythata potentialrecipient's
involvement in an inter-
nal waraffectsU.S. armstransfer decisions.
Trade U.S. foreign policyincreasingly emphasizestheex-
pansion of freemarketsand thebolsteringof economic
prosperity.In makingdecisionsregarding thetransferof
arms abroad, U.S. policymakersmaybe influencedby
trade ties with the potential recipient.Furthermore,
countrieswithvigorousinternational tradeare morefi-
nanciallyable to purchasearms(Pearson1989).To assess
U.S. economicinterests, I use a tradeindicatorthataddi-
tively combines U.S. commercial exportsand imports
witha country.'7
GNPper Capita If profitis a motivationbehindthe ex-
portof arms(Hartung1995;Blantonand Kegley1997),
thencountriesin thedevelopingworldwithgreatereco-
nomic resourcesare likelyto be favoredas tradepart-
ners-for weapons and otherwise.To takethisinto ac-
count,I includeGNP percapitain themodel."8
15 Data for 1989-1992 are fromthe Correlates of WarProject
(Singerand Small1994).However, as COW dataarenotavailable
beyond1992,data for1993 weredrawnfromWallensteenand
Sollenberg(1997) following
the 1000battle-relateddeathcriteria.
Becausethedateof initiationand termination of conflictis not
providedbyWallensteen and Sollenberg,for1993thevariablewas
coded0 fortheabsenceofconflict and 12 foritspresence.
16 COW data for1989-1992reflects thenumberof monthsin a
yearin whicha country experiencedcivilwaron itsownterritory
(Singerand Small1994).For 1993,theindicator was drawnfrom
senceofcivilwarand 12 foritsoccurrence.
17ObtainedfromtheIMF's Direction ofTradeStatistics,
data are
measuredin millionsofU.S. dollars.
18 ObtainedfromtheACDA's World
and
MilitaryExpenditures
dataaremeasuredin one-dollarunits.
ArmsTransfers,
PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY
PopulationAs a proxyforsize,thereis likelya positive
relationshipbetweena recipient'spopulation and U.S.
arms transfers.This is due to the U.S. desireto access
those countrieswherea largeexternalmarketforU.S.
goods can be developed.Largercountriesmayalso need
morearmsthando smallerones.19
Presenceof U.S. Troops The U.S. maytransferarmsto
countrieswhereU.S. troopsare stationedso as to build
and trainthe nativemilitaryforces,maintaina regime
friendlyto theU.S., or rewardcountriesforallowingthe
presenceof U.S. militaryforces.I identifydeveloping
countrieswherethereare at least 100 U.S. militaryper-
sonnel stationed on a long-termbasis (see Meernik,
Krueger, and Poe 1998).20
MiddleEast Due to strategic thebulkofAmeri-
interests,
can armsexportsgo to countriesin theMiddle East.Be-
tween1992and 1994,theregionreceivedover$17 billion
in U.S. arms,comprising45 percentoftotalU.S. armsex-
ports(ACDA, 1995). Indeed,countriesin theregionthat
pass throughthe gatekeepingstagelikelyreceivea large
amountof arms.However,the Middle East is a conten-
tiousarea oftheworld,and theUnitedStatesalignsitself
withselectcountriesin the region.Therefore, whileit is
anticipatedthatregionalmembershipaffectsU.S. arms
transferdecisions,the exact role it plays at the initial
stageofthedecision-making processis unclear.
MethodofEstimation
In thisstudy,potentialarms recipientsare included in
thesecond stageof the decision-making processonlyif
theysuccessfullypass throughthe gatekeepingstage.
Thus,selectionbias is an importantissue as certainob-
servationsaresystematicallyincludedin thesecond-stage
subsample by a precedingselection process. Because
theseobservationscomprisea nonrandomsample,least-
squaresestimationof the uncensoredobservationsmay
producebiased and inconsistent estimatesin thesecond
equation.As a result,theeffect
of errordisturbancesmay
lead an analystmistakenly to attributecausal effectsto
the independentvariables(Meernik,Krueger,and Poe
1998;Berk1983).
19ObtainedfromACDA'sWMEAT,
populationismeasuredinmil-
lions.
20 A dummy variableis usedto avoidanalytical problemsofbias theirworkhas focusedon a continuousdependentvariableand
associatedwithltheskeweddistribution
of U.S. forces(Meernik, relatively
Krueger, and Poe 1998)and does notmeasuretroopstemporarily and thougha continuousdependentvariableis examinedin the
deployed in lhumanlitarian r-eliefor discretemilitaryoperations.
21 A dichotomous dummyvariablewas createdwithMiddleEast-
erncountries coded 1 and all otherscoded0.
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127
A two-stageHeckman techniqueproduces consis-
tentestimates(Heckman 1979). In the firststage,maxi-
mumlikelihoodestimationgeneratestheselectionequa-
tion.22It also producesthe reciprocalof the Mills ratio,
knownas the nonselectionhazard rate.23In the second
stage,whichis estimatedby OLS regression, the hazard
rate is added as a variable.It providesconsistentesti-
matesforthesecondstageoutcomeequationbynormal-
izingthemeanof theerrorsto zero.24
Here I applytheHeckmantechniqueto panel data,
and thus serial correlationand heteroskedasticity are
potentialproblems.25 For thefirststage,a likelihood-ra-
tio testwitha chi-squareof 5.23 indicatesthatthe ob-
servations are temporallyindependent. Similarly,a
Durbin-Watsonstatisticof 2.03 indicatesthatserialcor-
relationis not a problemat the second stage.Based on
Cook-Weisberg and Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian
multipliertests,I conclude thatheteroskedasticity is a
problem at both stages of the model.26To controlfor
heteroskedasticity, I use the Huber/White"sandwich"
estimator.
Results
The resultsof the Heckmanmodel appear in Table 1. A
modelchi-squareof 28.71 rejectsthenullhypothesis that
in themodelare 0. Botha Waldtestofin-
all coefficients
dependentequations and the significantcoefficient for
thehazardrate(lambda) indicatethatselectionbias exists
and thatuse oftheHeckmanmodelisjustified. Hence,an
underlyingprocessexiststhatlinksthe decisionsof the
firstand secondstage.
22STATA6.0wasusedtoestimate
themaximum
likelihood
version
oftheHeckmanmodel.
23 The hazardraterepresents
"the
instantaneous
probability
ofbe-
ingexcludedfromthesampleconditional
uponbeingin thepool
at risk"(Berk1983,391).
24 The Heckmanmodel also allows
theerrortermsforthetwo
equationsto be correlated.
25 Havingshownthatgeneralized leastsquaresconsistently
un-
derestimatesstandarderr-ors
and thusinflates
estimates
ofstatisti-
cal significance,
Beckand Katz(1995) recommend OLS withad-
ditionaltechniquesto controlforheteroskedasticity
and serial
correlation.
26 Beckand Katz
(1995) havecalledfortheuse ofpanelcorrected
standarderrorsin time-seriescross-sectionanalysis.However,
numerous
years.Onlyfiveyearsareassessedinmystudy,
secondstage,thefirststageinvolvesa binarydependentvariable.
Giventhatlittleis knownabouttheproperties ofstandarderrors
whena Heckmanmodelis appliedto paneldata,it is prudentto
usethebetterknownHuber/White standarderrorestimator.
128 SHANNON LINDSEY BLANTON

TABLE 1 HeckmanModel-The Determinants

of U.S. ArmsExports
GatekeepingStage-The Selection Equation

Variables ProbitCoefficients RobustStandardErrors t-statistic

HumanRightsAbuse -0.15 0.06 -2.41**
Democracy 0.11 0.02 4.96**
ExternalConflict -0.04 0.02 -1.76*
Internal
War -0.01 0.01 -1.09
U.S. Troops 0.94 0.11 8.47**
MiddleEast 0.52 0.15 3.45**
Trade 0.00002 0.000005 3.69**
GNP percapita 0.00002 0.00002 1.37
Population -0.0003 0.0003 -0.97
Constant -0.34 0.27 -1.27

Amountof ArmsTransferred
-The Outcome Equation

Variables RegressionCoefficients RobustStandardErrors t-statistic

HumanRightsAbuse -145661.20 96755.33 -1.51
Democracy 113105.10 30229.48 3.74**
ExternalConflict -41019.30 28224.84 -1.45
Internal
War -11744.97 11337.48 -1.04
U.S. Troops 932653.30 309053.90 3.02**
MiddleEast 515526.40 280510.50 1.84*
Trade 16.89 7.38 2.29**
GNP percapita 22.41 12.50 1.79*
Population -332.95 361.86 -0.92
Constant -338191.50 186158.70 -1.82*
HazardRate (Lambda) 986996.90 284835.80 3.47**

SelectionEquation, N = 460
OutcomeEquation, N = 269
HeckmanModelChi-Square 28.71**
WaldTestofIndependentEquations,Chi-Square= 36292.99**
Note:
indicates
statistical
significance
fora two-tailed
testatthe.10level.
indicates
statistical
significance
fora two-tailed
testatthe.05level.

In thegatekeeping stage,severalvariablesplaya sig- Holdingtheothervariablesin themodel constantat

nificantrole in the decisionto allow the exportof U.S.
arms.Of particularinterest herearehumanrightscondi-
tionsand democracy.Human rightsabuse is negatively
relatedto U.S. armsexports.27 Thus,countrieswithbet-
terhumanrightsconditionsare morelikelyto be recipi-
entsof U.S. arms; countrieswithworse human rights
conditionstendnotto be approvedforarmsexports.De-
mocracyis positivelyrelatedto theexportof U.S. arms.
Therefore, the U.S. is morelikelyto exportarmsto de-
mocraciesthannondemocracies.
27 The resultsof a
Kleintestsuggestedthepossibilityof multi-
collinearitybetweenthe humanrightsindexand internalwar.
However, alternatively
droppingthetwovariables, as wellas add-
ingan interactionterm,caused minimalchangesin themodel.
Thus,whilethetwovariablesarecorrelated(.55), theyhavesepa-
rateeffects
on thedependentvariable.
theirmean,a countrywitha good humanrightsscoreof
1 has a 22 percentgreaterprobabilityof receivingU.S.
armsthana countrythathas a poor humanrightsscore
of 5. Similarly,a countrywiththe highestpossible de-
mocracyscore(5) has a 22 percentgreaterprobability of
passing throughthe gatekeepingstage than a country
withthelowestdemocracyscore (0). The impactof hu-
man rightsand democracyis evenmorepronouncedfor
countriesthathave good scoresforboth human rights
and democracy. A countrythathas a humanrightsabuse
score of 1 and a democracyscore of 5 has a 43 percent
greaterprobability of receivingarmsthanone witha hu-
man rightsscoreof 5 and a democracyscoreof 0.
Severalof thecontrolvariablesare also significantly
relatedto armsexportsat thegatekeeping stage.The like-
lihood of receivingarmsincreasesforthosecountriesin

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PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY 129

whichtheU.S. stationsitstroopsas wellas thosecountries
thatarein theMiddleEast.28Countriesthatareotherwise
engagedin external however,
conflict, arelesslikelyto pass
throughthegatekeepingstage.As evidencedbythe sig-
nificanceoftrade,theU.S. is morelikelyto exportarmsto
countriesthatitconsidersto be viabletradepartners.
The outcome equation, the second stage of the
model, includesthose countriesthatpass throughthe
gatekeeping stageand actuallyreceivearms.As shownin
Table 1,humanrightsfallshortof statistical significance.
Thus,once a countryhas been approvedas a potentialre-
cipient,humanrightsarenotgivenfurther consideration
in determining the amountof armsto be transferred.29
Democracy,however,continuesto be significant. Thus
amongthecountriesthatreceiveU.S. arms,thosethatare
leastdemocratictendto receivesmalleramountsofarms.
The controlvariablesaccountforsome of thevari-
ance in the amount of arms exportedto recipients.A
countryis likelyto receivemorearmsifAmericantroops
are stationedthere.Americanpolicymakers presumably
seek to supplementthe commitmentof U.S. troopsby
enhancingtheindigenouis militaryforces,maintaininga
regimefriendly to theU.S.,and rewarding countriesthat
allow thepresenceof the U.S. military. The Middle East
indicating
variableis also significant, thatMiddleEastern
countriesthatpass thegatekeeping stagetendto receive
largeramountsof U.S. arms.Indeed,recipientssuch as
Saudi Arabia,Egypt,and 1Kuwait are among the United
States'biggestcustomers.Additionally, significanttrade
and GNP percapitavariablesindicatethat countries that
are viabletradepartnersare likelyto receivemorearms.
It would appear that the opportunityto address eco-
nomic concerns,such as protectingthe financialhealth
of U.S. weapons manufacturesand the preservationof
Americanjobs,playsa rolein armstransfer decisions.
andImplications
Summary
Usinga two-stagedesign,I haveexaminedU.S. armsex-
to ascertainwhetherhumanrightsand
portsin an effort
democracyare meaningful variablesin armstransferde-
cisions.Atthegatekeeping stage,bothconditionsare im-
portant.When holdingconstanttheotherfactorsin the
model,a statethatabuses human rightsis less likelyto
receiveU.S. armsthanone withgood humanrightscon-
ditions.Likewise,thereis a greaterprobabilitythatcoun-
trieswithhigherlevelsof democracywill pass through
the gatekeepingstagethanare thosethatare nondemo-
cratic.Thus,at thisstage,human rightsand democracy
come into play.The findingsthereforerevealthatthe
UnitedStatesgovernment forcultivating
has a preference
relationshipswiththose countriesthatrespecthuman
rightsand abide bythe rulesand institutions associated
withdemocratic governance. These concerns are supple-
mentedby a tendencyto exportarmsto countriesthat
engagein tradewiththeU.S.,hostAmericantroops,and
are in the Middle East.Countriesthatare otherwiseen-
gaged in externalconflict,however,are not as likelyto
pass throughthegatekeeping stage.
At thesecond stage,human rightsare not a signifi-
cantconsideration. In otherwords,afterthegatekeeping
decision is made, human rightsare given no further
weightin determiningthe amount of arms to be ex-
portedto a country.This suggeststhatin meetinga cer-
tain level of respectforhuman rights,countriespass a
"threshold"of acceptability. Democracy,however,con-
tinuesto be a significant variable.Even aftera country
meetsthethresholdof acceptability, thosethatare more
democratictend to receivemore arms.Othervariables
thatinfluencethe amount of U.S. armsexportsare the
presenceofU.S. troops,tradeties,and whethera country
is in theMiddleEast.
Myfindings shedlighton therealitybehindU.S. for-
eignpolicyrhetoric. Attheclose of the20thcentury, the
UnitedStateshas paid considerablelip serviceto thepro-
motionof liberaldemocraticvalues.As theresultsindi-
cate,thereis some congruencebetweenrhetoricand real-
ity,as human rightsand democracy play a role in
decidingto whomtheU.S. exportsarms.Together, these
respectivefindingssuggesta synthesisof sortswithre-
gard to the reconciliationof potentiallydiversepolicy
goals.The U.S. is exportinglargequantitiesof arms,but
theyare being exportedin a mannerthatfavorsthose
countriesthataredemocraticand respecthumanrights.
ManuscriptsubmittedApril8, 1998.
May 7, 1999.
received
Final manuscript

28 Between1990and 1994,theperiodofthePersianGulfconflict,

theU.S. exportedarmsto thirteenoftheeighteenMiddleEastern

countriesincludedinthedataset. References
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Allison,GrahamT. Jr.,
Meernik1995)whichcontendthathumanrights arepri-
conditions UnitedStatesPromoteDemocracy?"PoliticalScienceQuar-
inthegatekeeping
marilyimportant stageofallocationdecisions. terly107:81-98.

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