Professional Documents
Culture Documents
POLITICAL LAW
EXECUTIVE
Handout No. 003
REMINDERS IN EXECUTIVE
Q: Nadine Lustre laments using Filipino resilience to ‘hide the real problem.’
Thinking that our country deserves so much better, she wants to run as a
President in the next elections. You are a new lawyer and her neighbor, so
she approaches you and asks you the following:
(b) Assuming she wins, Nadine has six years as term of office and no eligibility of
any reelection. Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution provides that the duly
elected and proclaimed President shall have a term of six years which shall begin
at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the election and
shall end at noon of the same date six years thereafter. The President shall not
be eligible for any reelection.
(c) In the event that Nadine succeeds the previous president for five years, she is
not qualified for the election of such office. According to Section 4 of Article VII of
the Constitution, it states that no person who has succeeded as President and
has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the
same office at any time. Since she has already served as President by
succession for five years, she will be disqualified for election to the same office.
(d) No, my answer will be different since in this instance, she is now qualified for
election to the office she served by succession. No less than the Constitution
provides that no person who has succeeded as President and has served as
such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at
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any time. Here, she would have only served being as a President for only a year
making her qualified for election to the same office.
(e) In the event that there would be two or more shall have an equal number of
votes, the person who shall be proclaimed as elected shall be chosen by the vote
of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting
separately in accordance to Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution.
(f) The Constitution under Section 8 of Article VII provides that in case of death,
permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the President, the
Vice-President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case
of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the
President and Vice-President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his
inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as
President until the President or Vice-President shall have been elected and
qualified.
The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President in case of
death, permanent disability, or resignation of the Acting President. He shall serve
until the President or the Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified,
and be subject to the same restrictions of powers and disqualifications as the
Acting President.
(1) The President is immune from suit during his tenure. (In re: Bermudez, G.R.
No. 76180, Oct. 24, 1986)
(2) An impeachment complaint may be filed against him during his tenure. (Art.
XI)
(3) The President may not be prevented from instituting suit. (Soliven v.
Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585, Nov. 14, 1988)
(4) There is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the
privilege. The President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege.
(Soliven v. Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585, Nov. 14, 1988)
Once out of office, even before the end of the 6-year term, immunity for non-
official acts is lost. Such was the case of former President Joseph Estrada.
Immunity cannot be claimed to shield a non-sitting President from prosecution for
alleged criminal acts done while sitting in office. (Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos.
146710-15, Mar. 2, 2001)
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The 1987 Constitution does not provide for presidential immunity from
suit. Unlike congressional immunity, presidential immunity is not expressly
stated nor prescribed by the Constitution. The basis for the immunity is only
found in jurisprudence, both in the U.S. and the Philippines, which, by virtue of
Article 8 of the Civil Code, “forms a part of the legal system of the Philippines.”
The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit
is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any
hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the
Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holder’s time, also
demands undivided attention. [Soliven vs Judge Makasiar (1988)]
The privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the
office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office, not by any other
person in the President’s behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which
the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense
to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Q: The Philippine President Rowena and the PNP Chief Rockie are close
friends. It was PNP Chief Rockie’s birthday, and the President wanted to
throw him a surprise house party. He called the Greenwich Hotline to order
several pizzas and lasagnas for delivery. Upon delivery, he received the
items ordered however he refuses and fails to pay the delivery man. The
delivery man returned to the Greenwich branch to tell the manager about
what happened. Furious of what happened, the manager asked for help
from their legal team if it is possible to sue the President for the collection
of sum of money.
The Supreme Court held that the President is immune from any civil or criminal
case during his tenure and the only way to make him accountable to the people
is through impeachment; that such absolute immunity established by
jurisprudence is based on public policy considerations. (David v. Macapagal-
Arroyo,G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160 cited in De Lima v.
Duterte, G.R. No. 227635 [Resolution], October 15, 2019) Further ruled by the
Court is that the immunity of the President from suit is concurrent only with his
tenure as an incumbent and not his term. (Estrada v. Desierto, GR No. 146710-
15, April 3, 2001)
Applying the foregoing to this case, the manager’s plans to initiate a collection
suit against President Rowena would not prosper if such is instituted while she is
still an incumbent president due to the presidential immunity from suit sourced
from case laws. In other words, the ordinary collection for the sum of money will
only be appropriate when the Chief Executive already ended her tenure.
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(2) Executive Secretary, upon proper authorization from the President. The
Executive Secretary must state that the authority is “By order of the President,”
which means he personally consulted with her.
Q: When and how can an executive official other than the President and
Executive Secretary invoke the executive privilege?
A: When an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own
judgment, might be covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded
reasonable time to inform the President or the Executive Secretary of the
possible need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary in order to provide the
President or the Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to consider whether the
matter indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege. If, after the lapse of that
reasonable time, neither the President nor the Executive Secretary invokes the
privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect the failure of the official to
appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of the necessary legal means
to compel his appearance. (Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006)
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A petition was filed with the SC which seeks to obtain a copy of the
Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process
and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto. Aquino invoked
executive privilege based on the ground that the information sought
pertains to diplomatic negotiations then in progress. On the other hand,
Akbayan for their part invoke their right to information on matters of public
concern.
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(1) Shall not receive any other emolument from the government or any other
source (Sec. 6, Art. VII)
(2) Shall not hold any other office or employment during their tenure unless:
b. The positions are ex-officio and they do not receive any salary or other
emoluments therefor (e.g. Sec. of Finance is head of Monetary Board)
(3) Shall not practice, directly or indirectly, any other profession during their
tenure
(5) Shall not be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government, including GOCCs
(1) Executive power. This power by the Constitution under Section 1 of Article
VII, which states that the executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines; and such vested power, carries with it a duty as stated under Section
17 of Article VII, which states that The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.
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This is the power to enforce and administer laws. The presidential power of
control over the Executive Branch of Government is a self executing provision of
the Constitution and does not require statutory implementation, nor may its
exercise be limited, much less withdrawn, by the legislature. [Ocampo v.
Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973 (2016)].
(2) Power of appointment. The Legislative can create office, but only the
Executive can fill it; Congress cannot circumvent this by setting very narrow
qualifications, such that only one person is qualified to hold office [Flores v.
Drilon, G.R. No. 104732(1993)].
(3) Power of control. The President may (a) nullify, modify judgments of
subordinates [Sec. 17, Art. VII]; (b) undo or redo actions of subordinates; and (c)
lay down rules for the performance of subordinates’ duties.
(4) Power of Supervision. This refers to the oversight function. The Executive
must see to it that rules, which it did not make, are followed.
(8) Residual Power. To protect the general welfare of people; founded on duty
of President as steward of the people; includes powers unrelated to execution of
any provision of law [Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211(1989)]
(1) First, (a) the heads of the executive departments; (b) ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls; (c) officers of the Armed Forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain; and (d) other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in the Constitution, such as the chairman and members of the
Commission on Elections, Civil Service Commission, the Commission on
Audit. These appointments require the consent of the Commission on
Appointments (COA).
(2) Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided by law;
(3) Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
(4) Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments Congress may by law vest
in the President alone.
NOTE: Only appointments in the first group require the consent of the COA. The
second, third and fourth groups do not require such consent.
Q: What are the limitations of the above appointing power of the President?
A: (1) Appointments extended by an acting President shall remain effective, unless
revoked by the elected President within ninety days from his assumption or re-
assumption of office. (Sec. 14, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution)
(2) Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments,
except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancy
therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. (Sec. 15, Art. VII,
1987 Constitution)
(3) The President can only appoint members of the Supreme Court and judges of
lower courts from among the list of at least three members for each position
prepared and recommended by the Judicial and Bar Council (Section 9, Article
VII, Constitution).
(4) The President cannot appoint officials and employees of the Judiciary, as the
power to appoint them belongs to the Supreme Court in accordance with the civil
service law (Section 5(6) Article VIII, Constitution). Neither can he appoint
officials and employees of the Civil Service Commission, Commission on
Elections and Commission on Audit, as the power to appoint them belongs to
these respective commissions in accordance with the civil service law (Section 4,
Article IX-A, Constitution).
(5) The President can only appoint the Ombudsman and deputies persons from
among the list of at least six nominees prepared and recommended by the
Judicial and Bar Council (Section 9, Article XI, Constitution).
(6) The officials and employees of the Office of the Ombudsman, other than the
deputies, shall be appointed by the Ombudsman according to the civil service
law, and not by the President (Section 6, Article XI, Constitution).
(7) The Commission on Human Rights shall appoint its officers and employees in
accordance with law, precluding the President from doing so (Section 17 (10),
Article XIII, Constitution).
(8) Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of lower in rank in the courts, or
in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions or boards (Section 16,
Article VII, Constitution).
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(9) An elective official may be appointed by the President to another position, but
he has to vacate his elective post. He cannot be appointed to another position
and, at the same time, maintain his elective position. On the other hand, an
appointive official may be appointed or designated by the President to another
appointive position, thus occupying two or more appointive positions, if a specific
law so allows or where his primary functions so require in an ex officio capacity
(Flores v. Drilon, 223 SCRA 268[1993]).
(10) Except as may be expressly provided by the Constitution, (i.e., the Vice
President may be appointed Cabinet member) Section 13, Article VII of the
Constitution prohibits the President from appointing a Cabinet member, any of
his deputies or assistants to another position(s). However, such constitutional
provision does not prohibit these executive officials from holding additional
positions in ex-officio capacities and as required by their primary functions but
without additional compensation or per diems in whatever form (De la Cruz v.
COA, GR 138489, November 29, 2001).
(11) Administrative Code of 1987 (Section 31, Executive Order 292) expressly
grants the President continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the President
in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.
(12) The President, during his tenure, cannot appoint his or her spouse and
relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree as: a) Members
of the Constitutional Commission b) Ombudsman c) Secretaries or
Undersecretaries d) Chairman or heads of bureaus of offices, including
government-owned-or-controlled corporations and their subsidiaries (Section 13,
Article VII, Constitution)
Q: What are the four groups of officers whom the President shall appoint?
A: There are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint:
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest
in the President alone. (Sarmiento III v. Mison, GR No. 79974,December 17,
1987)
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If the appointment is bypassed and the appointee was not re-appointed he can
no longer re-assume as career ambassador because by accepting an ad interim
appointment he is deemed to have waived his right to hold his old position as ad
interim appointment is permanent. (2010 Bar, Question No. XXIII)
Q: Sec. 15, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibits the President from
making appointments two months before the next presidential elections
and up to the end of his term. To what types of appointment is said
prohibition directed against?
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(1) Those made for buying votes – refers to those appointments made within two
months preceding the Presidential election and are similar to those which are
declared election offenses in the Omnibus Election Code; and
(2) Those made for partisan considerations – consists of the so-called “midnight”
appointments. (In Re: Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta,
A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC Nov. 9, 1998)
Q: Does an outgoing President have the power to appoint the next Chief
Justice within the period starting two months before the presidential
elections until the end of the presidential term? Discuss thoroughly.
A: Yes. Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it
lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential
power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article.
Article VIII is dedicated to the Judicial Department and defines the duties and
qualifications of Members of the Supreme Court, among others. Section 4(1) and
Section 9 of this Article are the provisions specifically providing for the
appointment of Supreme Court Justices. In particular, Section 9 states that the
appointment of Supreme Court Justices can only be made by the President upon
the submission of a list of at least three nominees by the JBC; Section 4(1) of the
Article mandates the President to fill the vacancy within 90 days from the
occurrence of the vacancy.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15,
Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have
explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the
provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made
explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition
against the President or Acting President making appointments within two
months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s
or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII,
there is no doubt that the Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to
appointments made in the Executive Department. The framers did not need to
extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their
establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening of
candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of
the JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the
Judiciary. (De Castro v. JBC, G.R. No. 191002, Mar. 17, 2010)
Q: On 3 May 1992, while Congress is on a short recess for the elections, the
president appoints Renato de Silva to the rank of General (4-star) in the
Armed Forces. She also designates him as Chief of Staff of the AFP. He
immediately takes his oath and assumes that office, with the rank of 4-star
General of the AFP.
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The President maintains that she has submitted to the Commission all that
the Constitution calls for.
(b) Gen. Renato de Silva did not violate the Constitution when he immediately
assumed office before the confirmation of his appointment, since his appointment
was an ad interim appointment. Under Article VI I, Sec. 16 of the Constitution,
such appointment is immediately effective and is subject only to disapproval by
the Commission on Appointments or as a result of the next adjournment of the
Congress.
(c) The appointment and designation of Gen. de Silva are valid for reasons given
above. However, from another point of view they are not valid because they were
made within the period of the ban for making appointments. Under Article VII,
Sec. 15 the President is prohibited from making appointments within the period of
two (2) months preceding the election for President and Vice President. The
appointment in this case will be made on May 3, 1992 which is just 8 days away
from the election for President and Vice President on May 11, 1992. For this
reason the appointment and designation of Gen. de Silva are after all invalid.
(1991 Bar, Question No. 3)
Q: A complaint for rape and concubinage was filed against Mayor X before the
Presidential Complaints and Action Committee. When the Assistant
Executive Secretary turned over the case to the provincial governor and
provincial board, the governor suspended Mayor X and the board
proceeded hearing the charges against him. Mayor X filed a writ of
prohibition against the governor and board, but the governor argued that
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B. No. The department head as agent of the President has direct control and
supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for in
section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, but he does not have the same
control of local governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and offices
under his jurisdiction. Likewise, his authority to order the investigation of any act
or conduct of any person in the person in the service of any bureau of office
under his department is confined to bureaus under his jurisdiction and does not
extend to local governments over which the President exercises only general
supervision as may be provided by law (section 10, paragraph 1, Article VII of the
Constitution). (Mondano v. Silvosa, G.R. No. L-7708, [May 30, 1955], 97 PHIL
143-150)
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Does the DENR Secretary have the authority to reorganize the DENR?
A: Yes. Applying the doctrine of qualified political agency, the power of the
President to reorganize the National Government may validly be delegated to his
cabinet members exercising control over a particular executive department.
In the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by
ordering the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to
Koronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by the DENR
Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be the acts of the President for the
latter had not expressly repudiated the same. (Department of Environment and
Natural Resources v. DENR Region 12 Employees, G.R. No. 149724, August 19,
2003)
General Supervision over Local government units and the autonomous regions :
(1) The President shall exercise general supervision over local governments.
[Sec 4, Art X]
(2) The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to
ensure that laws are faithfully executed. [Sec 16, Art X]
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(6) The Supreme Court may review the factual sufficiency of the proclamation,
and the Supreme Court must decide the case within thirty (30) days from the time
it was filed;
(7) Martial law does not automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or the operation of the Constitution. It does not supplant the functioning of
the civil courts and of Congress. Military courts have no jurisdiction over civilians
where civil courts are able to function.
B. Based on the Constitution and jurisprudence, the following are the limitations
in the president’s exercise of the pardoning power:
• Cannot be granted in cases of impeachment [Sec. 19, Art. VII]
• Cannot be granted in cases of violation of election laws without the
favorable recommendation of the Commission on Elections [Sec. 5, Art.
IX-C]
• Can be granted only after conviction by final judgment
• Cannot be granted in cases of legislative contempt or civil contempt
• Cannot absolve the convict of civil liability
• Cannot restore public offices forfeited
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Q: The President is granted under Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution
with pardoning power. Enumerate and define the forms of executive
clemency.
A: Section 19, Article VII provides that “Except in cases of impeachment, or as
otherwise provided in the Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by
final judgment. He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress.”
Based on this provision, the following are the forms of executive clemency:
• Pardon: It is an act of grace which exempts the individual on whom itis
bestowed from the punishment that the law inflicts for the crime he has
committed.
• Commutation: It refers to the reduction or mitigation of the penalty.
• Reprieve: It is the postponement of a sentence or stay of execution.
• Parole: It refers to the release from imprisonment, but without full restoration
of liberty, as parolee is still in the custody of the law although not in
confinement.
• Amnesty: It is an act of grace, concurred in by the legislature, usually
extended to groups of persons who committed political offenses, which puts
into oblivion the offense itself.
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(6) Decide that a diplomatic officer who has become persona non grata be
recalled
(7) Recognize governments and withdraw recognition.
Q: On 15 Jan 1992, some provisions of the Special Provision for the Supreme
Court and the Lower Court’s General Appropriations were vetoed by the
President because a resolution by the Court providing for appropriations
for retired justices has been enacted. The vetoed bill provided for the
increase of the pensions of the retired justices of the Supreme Court, and
the Court of Appeals as well as members of the Constitutional
Commission. Is the veto of the President on that portion of the General
Appropriations bill constitutional?
A: No, the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations bill is
not constitutional.
The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to
them in accordance to Republic Act 1797. The president has no power to set
aside and override the decision of the Supreme Court neither does the president
have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors
much less to the repeal of existing laws. The veto is unconstitutional since the
power of the president to disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill
does not grant the authority to veto part of an item and to approve the remaining
portion of said item. (Bengzon v. Drilon, G.R. No. 103524, A.M. No. 91-8-225-
CA, [April 15, 1992], 284 PHIL 245-275)
This rule corrects the Presidential practice under the 1935 Constitution of
releasing veto messages long after he should have acted on the bill. It also
avoids uncertainty as to what new laws are in force. Except under the par (2),
Section 27 of Art 6 of the Constitution which grants the President power to veto
any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill. The veto in
such case shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.
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