On Adequate Understanding of Daseinsanalysis

Martin Heidegger
Excerpts from Martin Heidegger's Zollikon Teaching
Translation by Michael Eldred
Introduction, Commentary, Notes by Erik Craig and Perikles Kastrinidis
Introduction
Martin Heidegger and Medard Boss first met in Heidegger's "Heimat, "
a ski-hut in the Black Forest, in 1947. For some years the two men continued
to converse in a philosophical teacher-pupil relationship which, in spite of
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their "mutual spontaneous liking," Boss himself characterized in an article

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(1979) as embodying "the enormous... disproportion" of "Heidegger's cap-

acity for fundamental thinking and the narrowness of my merely natural
scientific capacity to calculate" (p. 8). These conversations apparently
revolved around Boss's philosophical questions and the possibilities of a
phenomenological understanding of psychiatric and psychotherapeutic phe-
nomena. During these years, Boss was still quite actively involved in his
own medical activities, travel and writing, but as his relationship with
Heidegger deepened he thought it not fair to keep the philosopher's think-
ing to himself and so he invited Heidegger to his home in Zollikon, Switzer-
land to present seminars for medical doctors, psychologists and psycho-
therapists there. Heidegger agreed, Boss tells us, because he hoped that by
introducing these individuals "to a more phenomenological way of seeing
the things which most urgently concerned them in their caring for patients"
(p. 9), daseinsanalysis might "escape the confines of a philosopher's study
and become of benefit to wider circles, in particular to a large number of suf-
fering human beings" (p. 7).
In addition to the article quoted above, Boss recently edited a volume
of Heidegger's works {Zollikoner Seminare, published in 1987 in German
by Klostermann) in which a full body of transcripts from the seminars them-
selves is presented for the first time. The newly published documents in-
clude transcriptions of Heidegger's own handwritten texts and notes, records
of his lectures and continuing private conversations with Boss, and portions
of well over a hundred letters from Heidegger to Boss. The present article
by Heidegger, as well as that in the Appendix of this volume, are both com-
posed of various selections from Zollikoner Seminare. With the exception
of Boss's 1979 article, they are the only record of the seminars available to
English readers. The Klostermann Publishing House is gratefully acknow-
ledged for their permission to allow the translation and publication of these
excerpts.
The selections presented here should be of special interest to those who
wish to learn more about Heidegger's continually evolving thought, the
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13. Martin Heidegger and Medard Boss in the Zollikon seminar room, 1965
 On Adequate Understanding of Daseinsanalysis 77

philosophical content of the seminars themselves, or the implications of the

seminars for existential psychology and psychotherapy. The selections
themselves were generously offered by Professor Boss when he was asked
if he had ever received any correspondence from Ludwig Binswanger which
might shed further light on the latter's well-known "misunderstanding" of
Heidegger's Daseinsanalytik. Boss said that he hadn't but that Heidegger
himself had spoken at length about these matters in the Zollikon seminars.
Since the cost of translating and printing a more complete segment oiZol-
likoner Seminare for the present volume was regrettably prohibitive, Profes-
sor Boss took the initiative to identify several specific passages relevant to
Binswanger's so-called "creative misunderstanding" of Heidegger.
As these teachings of Heidegger have been removed from their original
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contexts, it was thought that some commentary and notes might be useful
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for American psychologists especially those new to daseinsanalylic litera-

ture. Although the supplementary commentaries and notes have been kept
to a minimum, they are still quite lengthy, especially toward the beginning
where an awareness of the didactic circumstances and historical and philo-
sophical perspectives seemed crucial for an appreciation of Heidegger's
texts.
To begin with, it should be said that the controversy regarding the dif-
ferences between Binswanger's "psychiatric daseinanalysis" and Heideg-
ger's Daseinsanalytik had revolved around two central issues. The first was
Binswanger's failure to appreciate fully the "ontological difference"3 includ-
ing the essential difference between Husserl's "phenomenology of con-
sciousness" and Heidegger's "Analytik of Dasein," and his consequent
misinterpretation of Heidegger's fundamental-ontological structure of care
(Sorge) as a melancholic ontic trait, a kind of everyday "worry" or "sorrow."
The second difference was Binswanger's maintaining, albeit in a modified
form, of the Cartesian distinction between the subject and the object which
Heidegger sought to overcome with his understanding of human existence
as Da-sein, the clearing of and for Being as which the human individual ex-
ists from the beginning.
In addition, it should be understood at the outset that our primary inten-
tion in presenting these passages is to reveal Heidegger's careful manner of
thinking about matters which concerned him. By implication, of course,
these passages support Boss's claim to be the only psychoanalyst to have
faithfully and systematically applied Heidegger's philosophy in developing
an adequate daseinsanalytic approach to psychology and psychotherapy.
But, regardless, our intention is not to cast any negative light at all on the
person of Ludwig Bi nswanger. Indeed, the very fact that Heidegger spent so
much time considering and refuting Binswanger's thought may easily be un-
derstood as a statement of regard for it. One does not spend one's time ques-
tioning what is unworthy of such expense and it was quite atypical of Heideg-
ger to make such an effort to deal with the contrary views of contemporaries.
 78 Martin Heidegger

To contemplate Parmenides, Aristotle, Hegel, Kant, and Nietzsche was one

thing, but even a contemporary as great as Freud found little place in
Heidegger's devotion to thought. Furthermore, Heidegger's own respect for
Binswanger was revealed by such behaviors as reading a paper on the oc-
casion of the latter's birthday and recommending the publication of his works
to the German publisher Günther Neske.4 Our interest in presenting these
passages from Heidegger, therefore, should not be interpreted as in any way
disparaging of Binswanger, who, though he cannot and did not claim to have
followed Heidegger as closely as Boss, still contributed richly to our under-
standing of what it means to be human. Our intent is not to emphasize the
differences between Heidegger and Binswanger nearly as much as it is to
disclose the thinking of the man, Heidegger, who was in the throes of trying
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to articulate what it was that he believed and to show how he used an engage-
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ment with a position contrary to his own to shed brighter light on the essence
of human existence itself.
In the enclosed article Heidegger discusses his own point of view with
reference to such features of human existence as Being-in-the-world, trans-
cendence and care as well as with reference to such philosophical concerns
as ontology, science and the meaning of analysis. Part One is a selection
from a November 1965 Zollikon seminar, the actual translated portions com-
ingfrom pages 150-157 of his Zollikoner Seminare (1987). Part Two is from
one of Heidegger's original handwritten texts developed in conjunction with
a conversation with Professor Boss on March 8 of the same year (ZS, pp.
236-242). Part Three is taken from Boss's dictated records of private con-
versations with Heidegger in November of 1965 (ZS, pp. 253-256). Final-
ly, the brief Part Four is from another personal conversation between Heideg-
ger and Boss, this one taking place in July of 1969, the final year of the Zol-
likon seminars (ZS pp. 286). Throughout the translations of Heidegger's
work the marginal numbering refers to the pagination of the German text
found in Zollikoner Seminare.

PART ONE
Commentary
The first selection is taken from a seminar held in Zollikon at the home
of Medard Boss on November 25,1965. Heidegger opened the seminar by
acknowledging that almost five months had passed since the group's pre-
vious gathering and suggested that they think about what they had been dis-
cussing at that lime and that from this consideration they turn to "the problem
of the method." Then Heidegger asserted his basic intention in meeting with
this group of medical doctors and psychologists. He said, roughly translated,
"I'm quite sure you have observed that I do not want to make philosophers
of you but that I only want to make you able to be attentive (achtsam) to that
which approaches the human being unavoidably (unumgänglich) and which
 On Adequate Understanding of Daseinsanalysis 79

at the same time is not readily accessible (zugänglich)" (free translation, ZS

p. 147). He acknowledged that this attentiveness calls for a special metho-
dological attitude which requires practice and he proposed to approach the
subject of method by first discussing some objections which had been raised
against daseinsanalysis and by determining whether these objections had
been directed toward Binswanger's psychiatric daseinsanalysis or Heid-
egger's own Daseinsanalytik or both. Heidegger listed these three criticisms
of daseinsanalysis as being that daseinsanalysis is opposed to science, that
it is opposed to objectivity, and that it is opposed to conceptualization.
At this point, as was typical in Heidegger's teaching, the philosopher
suggested that even before considering these objections it would be neces-
sary to clarify what is to be meant by the terms "analysis," "Analytik" and
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"to analyze." Following a brief exchange with seminar members about

Freud's use of the term analysis, Heidegger stated that Freud, in his inves-
tigations of neurotic symptoms, used the term analysis to suggest a reduc-
tion (Zurückführung) to elements which both cause and explain the ap-
pearance of the symptom. Heidegger went on to note, however, that this was
not the only meaning which analysis may have with respect to reduction and
then pointed to the oldest use of the term analysis, which he found in Homer's
second book of the Odyssey, where the Greek word for analysis, analyein,
had been used to describe what Penelope did every night, namely, to unravel
the fabric of a shroud which she had been weaving by day. Heidegger also
noted that analyein had been used to denote the loosening or untying of a
bound man or the freeing of someone from captivity or imprisonment. Final-
ly Heidegger mentioned the use of this same word to refer to the striking of
tents when breaking camp and preparing to move on. (It is also worth noting,
though Heidegger did not, that analyein was also used by the Greeks to
describe the unmooring of a ship, the untying of ropes in order to cast off,
to set sail for some destination. While Heidegger himself did not pause to
reflect further on the fundamental significance of these early uses of the term
analysis, it can be seen that each of them refers to a loosening, an unbinding
or freeing of something which has been occupied in one way or for one pur-
pose, just in order that the wider possibilities of the bound thing may be in
some way taken up or carried out once again or even further.)
Heidegger himself proceeded to point out that Kant had also used the
term Analytik in his Critique of Pure Reason and that it was from there that
he himself had taken the term Analytik in the title Daseinsanalytik. Although
Heidegger immediately commented that this fact should not be taken to
imply that his own Daseinsanalytik was only a continuation of Kant's posi-
tion, he went on to discuss briefly what he considered to be significant points
of concurrence between Kant and himself. To begin with, Heidegger af-
Grmed Kant's recognition that scientific knowledge is not merely a matter
of sense perception but, rather, that all scientific experience and observation
is always based on "perception which is determined by thinking" (ZS, p. 149),
 80 Martin Heidegger

even if Kant conceived of this scientific knowledge in terms of the mathe-

matical, natural scientific prototype of Galilei and Newton. Heidegger then
discussed the significance of Kant's Transcendental Logic in addressing this
crucial component of knowledge, thinking. Heidegger said that the first part
of Kant's answer to the question of thinking is seen in the fact that his
(Kant's) Transcendental Logic was analytic in the sense of reducing the very
possibility of scientific experience to a singular coherent unity or whole,
namely, to "the capability of mind" (Verstandesvermögen). In this sense,
Heidegger added, Kant's meaning for the Transcendental was similar to his
own understanding of the ontologie as differentiated from the ontic (see
footnote 3).
Heidegger then suggested that Kant's conception of Analytik referred
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to "a splitting up (Zergliederung) of the capability of mind", not in the sense

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of a dissolution into elements but rather in the sense of a reduction (Zurück-

fürung) to a oneness or a synthesis of the ontologie enablement of the Being
of beings (Sein von Seiendem), though in Kant's (and not Heidegger's)
meaning of this term (sein von Seiendem). Therefore, Heidegger suggested
that "the goal of the Analytik is...to point out the original functional unity of
the capability of mind" (free translalion.ZS p. 150) or, in other words, that
the Analytik returns us to the coherence and co-relation of a unified system.
"The Analytik," he said, "has the task to bring to light the whole of a unity
of ontologie conditions" (ibid.).
Having thus prepared the way for an understanding of the significance
of his own title "Analytik," Heidegger went on to discuss the relation of this
Analytik to the psychiatric daseinsanalysis of Binswanger and at this point,
we shall allow him to speak for himself through this translation by Michael
Eldred. (Asterisks throughout the article indicate where bracketed material
has been inserted by the editor or translator.)
On Adequate Understanding of Daseinsanalysis - Part I
by Martin Heidegger
Martin Heidegger Seminar
23 November 1965
at the home of Medard Boss
150 Martin Heidegger: As an ontological analysis, the Analytik is not a
decomposing into elements but the articulation of the unity of a com-
plex structure (Strukturgefüge). This is the aspect that is also essen-
tial in my concept, "the Analytik of Dasein." In the course of this
Daseinsanalylik in Being and Time I also speak about Daseinsanalyse,
by which I mean the execution of the Analytik in each particular case.
But what now is the difference between Daseinsanalytik and dasein-
sanalysis?
151 Seminar Participant: If one understands by daseinsanalysis Ludwig
Binswanger's "psychiatric daseinsanalysis" then one may say that he
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14. Martin Heidegger in the Zollikon seminar room, 1965

 82 Martin Heidegger

too speaks of structural elements and has the idea of a whole of Dasein.
Heidegger: So then would Ludwig Binswanger's "psychiatric dasein-
sanalysis" form a part of Heidegger's Daseinsanalytik? But as Ludwig
Binswanger himself had to admit some years ago, he was subject to a
misunderstanding of Daseinsanalytik, even if it was, as he called it, a
"productive misunderstanding." You will be able to recognize this al-
ready in the fact that in Binswanger's voluminous book [Grundformen
und Erkenntnis Menschlichen Daseins, 1942]* on the fundamental
forms of Dasein there is a "complement" (Ergänzung) to Heidegger's
"sombre care" (düstere Sorge), namely a treatise on love, which Heid-
egger himself is supposed to have forgotten.8
What comes to expression in this attempt at a complement? What
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is missing for Binswanger regarding the thinking in Being and Time that
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he should attempt such a complementation? In Being and Time it is said

that the Dasein is essentially concerned with it's Dasein itself.9 At the
same time, this Dasein itself is determined (bestimmt)10 as a primordial
being-with-one-another. Therefore, Dasein is always also concerned
with the others. The Daseinsanalytik thus has nothing at all to do with
a solipsism or a subjectivism. But Binswanger's misunderstanding does
not consist so much in the fact that he wants to complement "care" with
love, but in the fact that he does not see that care is an "existential," that
11
is, an ontological sense (pntologischen Sinn) and that consequently
the Analytik of Dasein asks after its ontological (existential) fundamen-
tal constitution and does not aim at a mere description of ontic pheno-
mena of Dasein. Already the all-decisive casting (Entwurf) of human-
being (Menschseww) as Dasein in the ecstatic sense is an ontological
casting, with which the ideation (Vorstellung)12 of human-being as the
"subjectivity of consciousness" is overcome. This casting renders the
understanding-of-Being (Seinsverständnis)13 visible as the fundamen-
tal constitution of Dasein. The perspective on this is however neces-
sary to enable the question to be discussed at all: in what relation does
the human as existing stand to the Being of beings (of the non-dasein
beings as well as of be-ing Dasein itself)? The question just raised
however arises from the problematic which asks for the sense of Being
at all (Sinn von Sein überhaupt).
152 Thus when Ludwig Binswanger writes of Being and Time that it is a
highly consistent further development of the theories of Kant and Hus-
serl, he could not be further from the truth, because the question posed
in Being and Time is posed by neither Husserl nor Kant and in fact has
never been posed before in the history of philosophy.
Commentary
At this point in the seminar Heidegger reviewed the philosophical his-
tory of "the question of Being" (die Seinsfrage) beginning with the Greeks,
 On Adequate Understanding of Daseinsanalysis 83

in particular Parmenides and Aristotle. He traced the question through the

Romans and the middle ages to the decisive position of Descartes in whose
work the split between the Subject, "I," and the Object, "World," found its
most eloquent and enduring embodiment. It is a fascinating albeit brief tour,
highlighted by quotations from Nietzsche and Aristotle and designed to
reveal nothing less than the radical historic changes in humankind's fun-
damental relation to Being itself, to all that is.
For example, in a brief reflection on the utilitarianism of modern life,
Heidegger lamented the fact that human beings had "mostly lost their hear-
ing" for Nietzsche's comment: "Thoughts which come with dove's feet, they
guide the world" (free translation, p. 153). Later Heidegger spoke of the
"lightning" which "struck" him and inspired his own question of the mean-
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ing of Being-ness, that lightning being the single sentence from Aristotle:
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"The Beings are announced (ausgesagen, literally, "spoken out") in manifold

ways" (free translation, p. 155).
Finally, Heidegger returned to a discussion of his question of the mean-
ing of Being-ness as such and to his own Analytik of Dasein. He showed
how, in contrast to Freud's approach to analysis, his Analytik inquires after
characteristic determinations, that is, the fundamental ontological constitu-
ents of the Being of Dasein with respect to its relation to Being-ness. He
also then contrasted this with Husserl's "phenomenology of consciousness"
which continued to emphasize the subjectivity of the human being particular-
ly with its conception of a "transcendental ego consciousness." Heidegger
emphasized his own effort to get away from this kind of "anthropology"
which asks "What is man, just for himself?" (ZS, p. 156) and, instead, to in-
quire into the meaning of human existence for Being-ness as such.
Heidegger then extended his discussion to comment on the misunder-
standing of Dasein by the French existentialists as Being-Here and under-
scored the fundamental constitution of "Dasein" as "Being-the-There" (être
le là) before coming to the following conclusion.

157 Heidegger: At the conclusion of the first hour, however, we must come
back to the question concerning the difference between Daseinsanalytik
and daseinsanalysis. In doing so, we leave Ludwig Binswanger's
"psychiatric daseinsanalysis" to one side. Husserl's phenomenology,
which remains a phenomenology of consciousness and which continues
to influence Binswanger, hinders the clear insight into the phenomeno-
logical hermèneulics of Dasein.14 The relationship of Dasein and con-
sciousness requires a special investigation which is marked out in ad-
vance by the question concerning the grounding relation between Being-
in-the-world as Dasein and the intentionality of consciousness. But this
question would lead us too far from our proper topic.
 84 Martin Heidegger

PART TWO
Commentary
In addition to having kept careful records of the Zollikon seminars them-
selves, Medard Boss also documented his private conversations with Heid-
egger. These conversations usually took place either during Heidegger's
visits to Boss's home in conjunction with the seminars or during the holiday
trips which they occasionally took together. The following passage is a
direct translation of a handwritten text by Heidegger. It is dated 8 March
1965, two days prior to one of the Zollikoner Seminars and eight and a half
months prior to the seminar described and presented in Part I of this article.
Again, Heidegger has turned his attention to Ludwig Binswanger's psychi-
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atric daseinsanalysis, this time focusing more intensively on Binswanger's

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subjectivistic understanding of Being-in-the-world and of transcendence,

that capacity of human being which Binswanger took as the basis for "bridg-
ing" the human subject with the world of objects.
Boss, in his publication Zollikoner Seminare, includes at the end of this
passage several pages of notes which were written by Heidegger on various
small leaves of paper. The reader will find these notes printed separately in
the Appendix under the Title "Marginalia on Phenomenology, Transcen-
dence and Care" by Martin Heidegger.
On Adequate Understanding of Daseinsanalysis - II
by Martin Heidegger
Heidegger Conversation with Boss
(Handwritten Text by Heidegger)
8 March 1965
Zollikon, Switzerland
236 Binswanger's "psychiatric daseinsanalysis" has extracted from the fun-
damental-ontological Analytik of Dasein and has taken as the sole basis
of its science that fundamental constitution which in Being and Time is
called Being-in-the-world. This however is only that structure that is to
be made visible in the first steps of the fundamental ontology. It is by
no means the only structure and, above all, it is not that structure which
fundamental ontology has solely in its sights. Because fundamental on-
tology focuses entirely on the sustaining structure (tragende Struktur)
for Dasein and its essential be-ing; and this sustaining structure is named
distinctly and often enough in the introduction [to Being and Time]*: it
is the understanding-of-Being (Seinsverständnis). The extent to which
this [understanding-of-Being]* distinguishes Dasein as such, in which
it is itself grounded and to which it stays related in itself, this is the sole
concern of Being and Time.
If one pays attention to this fundamental characteristic of Dasein
from the start, then two things become clear. One: everything which
 On Adequate Understanding of Daseinsanalysis 85

the Analytik achieves by way of throwing light on Dasein serves to

determine the understanding-of-Being (Being-in-the-world, care, tem-
porality, being-towards-death). Two: because the understanding-of-
Beingasecstatic-projectingin-standing(ad-jecting in-standing) in the
illuminated clearing (Lichtung) of the-There properly constitutes Da-
sein, Da-sein as such reveals itself to be something that is in itself, as
the being of the-There, the relation to Being-ness as such.
So little can this relation to Being-ness be omitted from the lead-
ing and all-important determination of Dasein that by overlooking
precisely this relation [as happens in the "psychiatric daseinsanalysis"]
we are prevented from ever thinking adequately of Dasein as Dasein.
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The understanding-of-Being is not a determination relevant only to the

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thematic of fundamental ontology but is the fundamental determination

of Dasein as such. An Analysis of Dasein therefore that omits this rela-
tion to Being-ness as such which is essential in the understanding-of-
Being is not an Analysis of Dasein.
237 The consequence of this omission of the essential fundamental-ontologi-
cal determination of Dasein by the "psychiatric daseinsanalysis" is then
the inadequate interpretation of Being-in-the-world and of transcen-
dence. Although [in psychiatric daseinsanalysis]* these phenomena are
posited as fundamental phenomena, they are nevertheless phenomena
of a Dasein that is isolated on its own by the anthropological ideation
of the human being as subject. The "psychiatric daseinsanalysis" oper-
ates with a truncated Dasein, from which the fundamental trait [i.e., un-
derstanding-of-Being]* has been cut out and from which it has been cut
off.17
It is thus only a small step [with this truncated understanding of
Dasein]* to seeing the fundamental-ontological interpretation of Dasein
as only an extended and more useful designation of the subjectivity of
the subject. Whereas the previous doctrine of the subject is based on a
subject-object split, the perspective on Being-in-the-world [in the trun-
cated view of psychiatric daseinsanalysis] allows a removal of the split
in the sense of an unmediated bridging.18 [By contrast, proceeding from
the properly understood understanding-of-Being, one never arrives at
an ideation of subject and object, so it follows that no split between them
has to be bridged at all.]
And because care is seen merely as the fundamental constitution
of an isolated Dasein subject and because it is construed as a merely
anthropological determination of Dasein, it [care]* shows itself for good
reason, due to the melancholic interpretation of Dasein, to be one-sided,
requiring a complementation by "love."1
Care, however, is properly, i.e. fundamental-ontologically, under-
stood, never in contradistinction to love but as the name for the ecstatic-
temporal constitution of the fundamental trait of Dasein, namely, the
 86 Martin Heidegger

understanding-of-Being.
Love is grounded just as decidedly in the understanding-of-Being
as anthropologically conceived care. It can even be expected that to
determine the essence of love by seeking a guiding thread in the fun-
damental-ontological determination of Dasein would provide a substan
238 tially deeper and more far-reaching determination than that charac-
terization of love which sees in it merely something higher relative to
care.
The exclusion of fundamental-ontology from the "psychiatric da-
seinsanalysis" [initiated by Binswanger], which at first sight seems jus-
tified, is in truth a misunderstanding of the relation between fundamen-
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tal-ontology and regional ontology, the latter being presupposed in

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every science, including psychiatry.

Fundamental ontology is not merely the universal-general vis-à-vis
the regional ontologies, a higher sphere floating above [or a basement
situated underneath], so to speak, in relation to which the regional on-
tologies could encapsulate themselves. Fundamental ontology is that
thinking which moves in the ground of each and every ontology. No
regional ontology can surrender this ground - least of all the regional
ontology of psychiatry as a research that moves within the essential
realm of the human being.
PART THREE
Commentary
The following conversations between Heidegger and Boss took place
over three days from November 28-30,1965, that is, just five days after the
seminar reported in Part I of this article. The two men had apparently last
met in early July of the same year and on this November visit it seems that
Heidegger had stayed in Boss's home for at least a week. From this stay we
are given accounts of seminars from the twenty-third to the twenty-sixth (ZS,
pp. 147-173) and of personal conversations from the twenty-eighth to the
thirtieth (ZS, pp. 253-260).
In the following passages, references are made to two new figures Heinz
Hafner and Wolfgang Blankenburg. In the first part of his discussion with
Boss, Heidegger comments on the work of Hafner, who was a follower of
Binswanger and who carried on his work, first at the Heidelberg Psychiatric
Clinic and then later at the University of Mannheim. Hafner (1961) wrote
a monograph using Binswanger's approach to existential analysis to inves-
tigate the so-called psychopathic personality. This monograph was quite
widely known in Europe and contained a lengthy preface by Binswanger
himself. According to Spiegelberg (1972) Hafner considered "the main
yield" of his own research to be "the discovery of an essential characteristic
of the psychopathic form of Dose« which he calls Fassade - i.e., the kind
 On Adequate Understanding of Daseinsanalysis 87

of false front which the psychopath erects in his relation to himself and to
others as his style of existence" (p. 106).
On Adequate Understanding of Daseinsanalysis - III
by Martin Heidegger
Heidegger Conversation with Boss
28 November 1965, Zollikon
253 As critique of Häfner's book on psychopaths it should be said: When
Hafner claims that the psychiatric daseinsanalysis takes its method from
Heidegger, he thereby claims something impossible, because Heid-
egger's fundamental-ontology is an ontological method whereas psy-
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chiatric daseinsanalysis is not an ontology.

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Continuity, materiality, consistency are not determinations of a

world-projection (Weltentwurf);20 these things can only reveal them-
selves in various ways in the particular beings disclosed within a world-
projection. Binswanger means here the beings which are made acces-
sible and made to appear in such and such a way through the world-
projection. This particular appearance is not a distinct world-projec-
tion. Binswanger confuses the ontological of the world-projection with
what is disclosed in the world-projection as possible beings that appear
in such and such a way, i.e. with the ontical.
World-projection is ambiguous: To project world and what appears
on the ground of this projection. One can call this the Projected [das
Entworfene, what is projected]*. Binswanger erroneously calls what is
projected the world-projection.
Commentary
The following day Heidegger and Boss continued their conversation,
this time focusing on an article by Wolfgang Blankenburg, a phenomeno-
logical psychiatrist who seems to have followed both Binswanger and Hus-
serl, though in an apparently independent way (see Spiegelberg, 1972, pp.
109-110). Blankenberg's article, which offered a critique of the "Boss
School" of daseinsanalysis originally appeared in the Yearbook of Psychol-
ogy, Psychotherapy and Medical Anthropology (Volume 12). Heideggerwas
especially concerned with Blankenburg's understanding of the clearing
(Lichtung) as a place for the mediation (Vermittlung) of the appearance of
Being. The following passage picks up very near the beginning of Heid-
egger's remarks.

29 November 1965, Zollikon

Comments on Blankenburg's Critique
254 Blankenburg, in contrast to Binswanger, does indeed see the ontologi-
cal difference, but he interprets it erroneously because he also takes
Being-ness as something which is, which then has to be mediated with
 88 Martin Heidegger

the other. Binswanger's phrase about the "path between Daseins-

analytik and the individual object-domains of psychiatry" can in itself
only stem from an erroneous idea. It stems from the idea that ontology
is something like the sun up above, underneath which are the concrete
object-domains. Then he wants to run back and forth between the two
domains, between above and below. In reality there is no upward and
downward movement because it is nothing separate and apart. For the
ontological difference is not a division at all, it is precisely the opposite.
When Blankenburg moreover speaks of "impulsions"
(Anstösse), then in this lies the same misunderstanding as in "ap-
proach in thinking" (Denkansatz), namely the misunderstanding that the
ontological is a thing apart and for itself.
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The existentials are thus not initial thrusts (Anstösse) for dasein-
sanalytic seeing in psychiatry. Rather, they are precisely content (In-
halt), they co-determine precisely the concrete description of an anxiety-
state in a particular person. Anxiety is e.g. not an impulse, but I see an
anxiety from the start - in the way which the existential, attunement
(Gestimmtheit), characterizes it - as an exceptional mode of being at-
tuned.22
When, finally, Blankenburg tells us that "an extremely strained
relation of tension exists between science and ontological reflection [on-
tologische Besinnung]*, then there can in reality be no talk of such an
extremely strained relation. For every ontological reflection relates to
something that belongs imminently to science, namely, it relates to that
which science can in no way evade (Unumgängliche). When, I say that
it [the ontological]* is inaccessible (unzugänglich) for science, it re-
mains nevertheless that which cannot be evaded.23 There can thus be
no talk here of a strained relation. What kind of scientific structure then
does the particular domain, psychiatry, have? Binswanger never said
anything about the scientific structure of his daseinsanalysis.
When Blankenburg speaks of a "preservation of the demarcation
line in principle between science and ontology," then he means that the
ontological is not accessible to an ontically scientific way of viewing.
Precisely this line, however, Binswanger did not respect; rather he
reinterpreted the ontological ontically.
One could say it more clearly: Science has the possibility of view-
ing ontological structures from its own standpoint, but it cannot grasp
256 them as such nor think them. But when that happens, namely, when the
essential thematic arises for an ontological reflection (ontologische Be-
sinnung) that does not mean that it becomes isolated as a separate
domain, so that a gulf develops between it and the so-called factical
(das Faktische).24 On the contrary, the ontological remains that which
determines the factical itself, and this is precisely what is seen in its own
right through the ontological reflection.
 On Adequate Understanding of Daseinsanalysis 89

Commentary
At this point there seems to have been a break in the conversation (in
the German text a large asterisk separates the preceding paragraph from what
follows). This time when Heidegger continues he concentrates on Bins-
wanger's own work and, in particular, on a case which he (Binswanger)
reports of a twenty-one year old female patient for whom an apparently in-
nocuous experience as a child initiated a "heel phobia." When the woman
was only five years old the heel of her shoe got stuck on her skate and
separated from her shoe. She immediately experienced "a puzzling attack
of anxiety and fainting" (Binswanger, 1958, p. 202) and thereafter "suffered
spells of irresistible anxiety whenever a heel of one of her shoes appeared
[sic] to loosen or when someone touched the heel or spoke of heels " (p. 203).
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Binswanger understood this young woman's suffering, her "heel

phobia," on the basis of the category oicontinuity suggesting that the "world-
design of our little patient" was constituted around this single category, par-
ticularly in the patient's relation to her mother, such that the entire world sig-
nificance of the patient was "submitted to the rule of that one category which
alone supports her 'world' and being" (ibid.). As Binswanger put it, "the
skating incident assumed its traumatic significance because, in it, the world
suddenly changed its face, disclosed itself from the angle of suddenness, of
something totally different, new, and unexpected" (ibid, p. 204).

256 Heidegger: With respect to Binswanger's article about a "heel-phobia":

How does Binswanger arrive at all at "continuity"? In reality this
category is a modus of fallenness (das Verfallen) and the fallen (das
Verfallene).26 Falling is always a falling toward non-Dasein beings. In
this non-Daseinness (Nicht-Daseinsmässiges) of beings one could make
out something like continuity. It would thus be a reification [Ver-
dinglichung] through falling. The girl's anxiety regarding a break in
continuity means that she already lives in fallenness with things and ex-
periences the things in their stability and their connection with each
other. It is a question of unbroken being-as-self, of being-assembled
(Versammeltsein). Anxiety is associated with (hängt mit) the security
of togetherness with the mother. This is a characteristic (bestimmtes)
being-with, not a formal unity (Einheit). One has to investigate how the
sick person's relation to the world is disturbed by the disturbance of the
interconnection between things [in this case, the heel with the shoe]*.
The "ready-to-handedness" (Zuhandenheit) is interfered with. Dasein
is immersing itself in a particular everyday world. But that is not a
world-projection with a view to continuity.
The fixation on the shoe is a question in itself. The girl has, for ex-
ample, no anxiety about breaking a chair leg. The chair does not have
the same nearness to the girl's body as the heel, which belongs to body-
 90 Martin Heidegger
ing, almost like a button on a piece of clothing. One must therefore in-
vestigate carefully how single things such a heel, chair leg, button or
spittle affect the girl. To speak here of a break in continuity or of a
characterization of the world-projection by means of the category of
continuity, as Binswanger does, is a formalization of existing that
empties that existing of all factical content [faktischer Gehalt].
Commentary
Apparently, on this particular visit, Heidegger and Boss had one more
brief conversation which Boss had taken the care to document. This brief
record is given here in its entirety.
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259 30 November 1965, Zollikon

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Heidegger: Consciousness always presupposes Dasein, not the other

way round. Knowing and consciousness always already move in the
openness of the There (Offenheit des Da) and is completely impossible
without it. Binswanger's "Daseinsanalysis" is, in its fundamental char-
acter, an ontical interpretation, that is, an existentiell (existenzielle)
interpretation of the factical Dasein under consideration. The relation
of ontical interpretation and ontology is, viewed historically, always
correlative insofar as from ontical experience new existentials are dis-
covered. Out of this interpretation it follows: daseinsanalysis as onti-
cal science would be a completely new science. Science means the sys-
tematic ordering of interpretations of experience. Every science is
rigorously bound to its own area, but not every rigor is exactness in the
sense of calculation. The unifying pole in psychotherapeutic science is
the existing human.

PART FOUR
Commentary
The final passage from Heidegger comes from another conversation
with Boss at his home in Zollikon. This conversation was noted to have oc-
curred on July 14,1969, nearly four months after the last reported Zollikon
Seminar, which took place on March 21,1969. That seminar was, in fact,
the only one for which there is any record subsequent to March of 1966. Zol-
likoner Seminare, however, contains records of ten more personal visits by
Heidegger between March, 1966 and July, 1969. The record below is from
that tenth visit, which is also the last reported visit until one final reported
visit in March of 1972. Again, this report of Heidegger's discussion, which
summarizes and emphasizes much of what has preceded it, is given in its en-
tirety.
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1963
. • • ; : • • - . - ,
••--•'-::-":•[-'.•:.-

looking toward Misskirch (Heidegger's birthplace)

15. Medard Boss and Martin Heidegger on the "Feldweg"
 92 Martin Heidegger

On Adequate Understanding of Daseinsanalysis - IV

by Martin Heidegger
28614 July 1969, Zollikon
If Binswanger thinks he can overcome the "cancerous growth of
psychiatry," as he calls it in referring to the subject-object split, by let-
ting a subjectivity "transcend" out of itself to the things in the external
world, then, first, either he has not read my piece On the Essence of the
Ground [1929]* or he has misunderstood the transcendence discussed
there and, second, he does not tell us how a transcending in the above-
mentioned sense could occur, namely how a subjectivity modelled
primarily as immanence could gain the slightest impression of an exter-
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nal world. For Being-in-the-world is never a property of a subjectivity

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modelled in thought (vorgestellt) in some way, but is from the start the
existing of the human being itself.
Binswanger demonstrates most strikingly his complete miscom-
prehension of my thinking in his gigantic book Grundformen und Erken-
ntnis menschlichen Daseins. In it he believes he has to complement the
care and caring-for of Being and Time with a "dual mode of being" and
with a "being-over-and-beyond-the-world." With this he merely an-
nounces that he mis-understands the fundamental existential called care
as an ontic mode of behavior in the sense of a gloomy or a troubled-
caring way of acting of a particular person. Care as existential fun-
damental constitution of the being-there of the human in the sense of
Being and Time is however nothing more nor less than the name for the
entire essence of Dasein insofar as it is always already dependent on
something which reveals itself to it, and insofar as it always, from the
beginning, immerses itself in an individual relation to this something,
no matter what form this relation takes. All ontic modes of the relating
of lovers, of haters, as well as of sober natural scientists, are thus equal-
ly primordially grounded in such Being-in-the-world as care. Just as lit-
tle then does one need to talk - if one does not confuse, like Binswanger,
287 ontological insights with onlical things - of a "being-over-and-beyond-
the-world." The "world" in the sense of the Daseinsanalytik of Being
and Time also lets, within its domain, that become visible which for
Binswanger lies beyond world, so that worlding [Welten] properly un-
derstood, in connection with human existing, as indicated for example
in On the Essence of the Ground, not only does not require a "being-
over-and-beyond-the-world," but does not allow such a thing to become
at all possible.
Footnotes
1. Boss tells readers, in his editor's forward to Zollikoner Seminare (1987, sub-
sequently referred to in notes andreferencesas ZS), exactly how these records
 On Adequate Understanding of Daseinsanalysis 93

of seminars and conversations were developed. In his own notetaking, Boss

strove to make a precisely literal transcription of everything that Heidegger
said. These notes were always immediately dictated directly onto a dictaphone
and then typed by a secretary. The transcripts were then sent to Heidegger
who corrected them and, here and there, added supplementary material. The
private conversations, which took place before, after or between the actual
seminars, were a bit more problematic. Nevertheless, immediately after each
conversation Boss faithfully dictated onto a dictaphone what he could remem-
ber of each of these discussions. A secretary then typed these dictations as
well. Boss adds here that one "can imagine that I was able to record only a
small portion of what was said" during these conversations (Boss, 1987, p. XII).

2. By using the term Daseinsanalytik which retains the German spelling we wish
to distinguish Heidegger's philosophical method or approach to unfolding the
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components or structures of the fundamental ontological constitution (oh-

tologische Grundverfassung) of Dasein. This German spelling will also be
retained for the synonymous titles Analytic of Dasein or, simply, the Analytik
as well as for the term Daseinsanalyse, the latter term being used here to desig-
nate, in keeping with Heidegger's practice, the use of the Analytik of Dasein
in each particular instance. Juxtaposed to these German spellings we shall use
the English spelling to designate Binswanger's Daseinsanalyse and therefore
shall refer to it throughout this article as either "daseinsanalysis
(Binswanger's)," "psychiatric daseinsanalysis," or "existential analysis" as it
has come to be known in the United States (see R. May, 1958, pp. 191-425).
Finally, in contrast to this, in referring to Medard Boss's application of
Heidegger's Daseinsanalytik, Boss's Daseinsanalyse, we shall use the term
"psychotherapeutic daseinsanalysis" or, simply, "daseinsanalysis."

3.In Heidegger's Analytik of Dasein and consequently in Boss's

psychotherapeutic daseinsanalysis an important distinction is made between
the two fundamental characteristics of Being, the "ontic" (ontisch) or "ontical"
and the "ontologic" (ontologisch) or "ontological." The ontical refers to that
characteristic of Being which appears to us in a more "mundane" or "vulgar"
sense; that is, the pre-reflective Being of so-called ordinary everyday life, the
unconsidered Being of manifest and "unpenetrated" appearances, or the mere
(unexamined) surface of life, persons and things. In contrast to this ontical
characteristic, though actually contained by and "hidden" within it, is the on-
tological characteristic, the fundamental "meaning-fullness" of beings, the fun-
damental structure of Being, of things, persons and happenings. This is the
special characteristic of Being which may be approached and fully understood
through thoughtful consideration (Besinnliches Denken) and which is the
sought after "prize" of Heidegger's Daseinsanalytik and, of course, Boss's
daseinsanalysis. Given these distinctions it becomes clear that ontic descrip-
tion and research stays with the immediately manifest appearances of things,
of beings, whereas ontological investigation tries to penetrate this surface to
discover its fundamentally meaning-full constitution. This ontological task is
accomplished in Heidegger's Analytik and Boss's daseinsanalysis, by a
phenomenological hermeneutic approach which seeks after the essence of
 94 Martin Heidegger
things through phenomenologic "interpretation" (Auslegung, literally, "laying
out" in full view). From one perspective, then, ontical research in human
science may be said to be that inquiry which stays with the "particular being"
(das Seiende or Seiendes) whereas ontological research seeks to penetrate not
only the meaning-full constitution of these beings, their "being-ness"
(seiendheit), but also the general question of Being-ness as such (Seyn), the
significance of the eternal puzzle and wonder that there is any Being at all. In
short, "ontic looking" remains with the so-called "mundane" appearance of par-
ticular being whereas "ontological seeing" reaches for an understanding of the
"being-ness" and the "Being-ness" of this being by disclosing or laying out its
essential nature through the phenomenological hermeneutic approach.

4. The particular paper referred to here (Heidegger, 1984) was published posthu-
mously by Heidegger's son, Hermann Heidegger, and was originally presented
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at a birthday feast in honor of Binswanger's eighty-fifth year. The feast was

held on October 30,1965, barely three months before Binswanger's death on
February 5 of the following year. Binswanger would have actually turned
eighty-five on April 13,1966. This paper is also the very one which Medard
Boss (1987a) quotes in his preface to the fourth edition of his book on India to
indicate Heidegger's eventual concurrence with ancient Indian thought on the
matter of a so-called "pre-human clearing." In addition, the publisher Günther
Neske, in a telephone conversation in April of 1988, confirmed Heidegger's
recommendation that he (Neske) publish Binswanger's books. As Neske
described the moment, Heidegger was smiling and speaking in a manner which
clearly acknowledged the uniqueness of the situation as he said something to
the effect that "even though he (Binswanger) didn't understand what I have
written, he is a very intelligent man and you should publish his work." Neske
added that Heidegger called the present situation "kuinzig," an essentially un-
translatable adjective used, in the region where Heidegger lived, to describe
the kind of serene and gladsome awareness of the changing of seasons in which
there is a recognition of the gathering of that which is ordinarily considered to
be separate (see Heidegger, 1949, p. 40).

5. Strukturgefuge may also be translated "structural complex" or "structural tex-

ture" meaning the whole, unified pattern of elements and their relationships to
one another.

6. Heidegger points here to the distinction between his overall project of fun-
damental-ontologic analysis or the Daseinsanalytik and the conduct of different
aspects of the analysis, called Daseinsanalyse. The Daseinsanalytik refers to
the entire analysis of Dasein whereas Daseinsanalyse refers to the analysis of
various fundamental structures of Dasein, for example, temporality, spatiality,
attunement, etc.

7. Remember, an asterisk (*) is used to indicate where bracketed material has been
inserted by the editor or the translator. Other brackets are those of either
Heidegger or Boss.
 Martin Heidegger 95

8. As Spiegelberg (1972) points out, the full first three chapters of this work by
Binswanger (1942), considered by many to be his magnum opus, are dedicated
to an exploration of the dual mode of love which reveals itself in human being-
together (Miteinandersein) or we-hood (Wirheit) and which is brought forward
as a compensation for Heidegger's understanding of care which Binswanger
took to be an isolated, "derivative, if not defective, mode of authentic social
existence in loving we-hood" (Spiegelberg, p. 207). The discussion which fol-
lows here in Heidegger's text focuses on Binswanger's interpretation, or one
should say misinterpretation of Heidegger's understanding of "Dasein-as-
care"; that is, of Dasein as a being whose very be-ing is always concerned with
or related to something. Binswanger, interpreting Heidegger's care in an ontic
rather than ontologic sense, understood this care to be a dark, somber,
melancholic and, therefore, deficient care. Thus arose his need to augment
Heidegger's care with love. Binswanger once summarized his point of view
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in this single sentence found in Rollo May's Existence (1958): "I have to men-
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tion that my positive criticism of Heidegger's theory has led me to its exten-
sion: being-in-the-world as being of the existence for the sake of myself (desig-
nated by Heidegger as 'care') has been juxtaposed with 'being-beyond-the-
world' as being of the existence for the sake of ourselves (designated by me as
'love')" (1958, p. 195). But for Heidegger care was not an attitude or mood, it
had no valence or value and was completely neutral. Care meant, for Heideg-
ger, the fundamental constitution of Dasein as always and already absorbed in
its relation to the world, as always existing in anticipation of Being, not only
of its own Being but also of the Being of all that it encounters in its world.
Finally the word "Ergänzung" (complement), from the root, Ganze, meaning a
whole or a totality, may also be translated completion, supplement, restoration
or replenishment. Although in other places (Needleman, 1963, p. viii; Spiegel-
berg, 1972, p. 224) Binswanger's critical augmentation of Heidegger's under-
standing of care is described as a "supplement," the translation as complement
has been chosen here specifically for its connotation of "that which completes
or makes perfect; the completion, perfection, consummation" (Oxford English
Dictionary).

9. As Heidegger himself points out a bit further on in this paragraph, this concern
of Dasein "with its Dasein itself" (um dieses sein Dasein selbst) must not be
understood in an egotistical-fashion since to be concerned with Dasein means
to be concerned with its being-there. Remember Dasein is worldly, that is to
say, Dasein's world, in Heidegger's words, "is always the one that I share with
others. The world of Dasein is a with-world [Mitwelt]" (1962, p. 155).

10. The German word "bestimmt" does not necessarily imply determination only
in the natural scientific sense but also may have the connotation that something
is directed, defined, destined or even attuned in a certain way. Heidegger tells
us that Dasein is destined to exist in primordial relation with other beings.

11. Sinn is often rendered in English as "meaning" but this misses the connotation
which Sinn may have in German of "taking a specific direction." In a recent
article Boss (1988) notes that, "the word 'sense' (sinn) stems from the Old High
 96 On Adequate Understanding of Daseinsanalysis

German verb sinnan. In the old days sinnan meant: to be on the way towards
a goal" (p.115). The translation of Sinn as "sense" retains this significance of
purpose and motion.

12. Vorstellung is often rendered "conception" or "representation" but neither of

these words contain both the connotations of a so-called "mental construct" and
of a putting something out in firent of one, as on a stage, which are present in
the German. Aftersome discussion with the translator, therefore, the term idea-
tion was chosen speciGcally for its connotation of "the formation of ideas or
mental images of things not present to the senses" {Oxford English Diction-
ary).

13. The understanding-of-Being is an existential or fundamental-ontologjc con-

stituent of Dasein. This means that Dasein basically exists as relatedness to
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Being-ness as such, as being-related to Being-ness as such. The human being

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exists most essentially as a being who always has an understanding about the
fact that there is something, and not nothing, and that this something is in it-
self constituted by meaning. Dasein is concerned in its being for its being: its
basic condition is to exist as understanding-of-Being, first of all, of the fact that
there is something at all and, secondly, of what this something means. The
mere presence of language reveals human existence as an existence which dis-
closes the meaningfulness of things.

14. For Heidegger, Husserrs conception of consciousness is still a metaphysical

one by which human beings remain trapped in subjectivity. Such a concep-
tion, according to Heidegger, interferes with a genuine understanding of Dasein
as a Being which, in its very constitution, is related to Being as understanding-
of-Being. It is on these same grounds that Heidegger criticizes Husseri's and
Binswanger's concept of transcendence as the bridge which permits human
beings to escape their subjectivity and apprehend the objectivity of the objects
of their world. With Heidegger's understanding of Dasein as always and al-
ready thrown into the world, such a bridge is unnecessary.

15. In other words all of these fundamental constituents of Dasein (being-in-the-

world, care, temporality, being-towards-death) are in the service of under-
standing-of-Being (Seinsverständnis).

16. The German here is "erwerfendes Innestehen." "Erwerfend" is a neologism.

The Heideggerian terms around "Wurf" (the throw) are usually translated into
English with a term on the basis of the root "ject," from the Latin "jacere," to
throw. The prefix "er-" in "erwerfen" carries the meaning of something com-
ing toward one, as in, for example, "erhalten" (receive) as opposed to "halten"
(hold) or "erwarten" (expect) as opposed to "warten" (wait). The "ad-" in ad-
ject suggests a throwing toward one, whereas "entwerfen" (project) means a
throwing out from oneself. — Translator

17. In other words, with the truncated ideation of Dasein found in psychiatric
 Martin Heidegger 97

daseinsanalysis, Dasein has been discourteously exiled from understanding-of-

Being, its own-most essential and sustaining possibility for illuminating Being.

18. In other words, Binswanger's psychiatric daseinsanalysis reduces the Cartesian

alienation of subject and object by offering a bridge between the two with its
conception of a Being-in-the-world which may transcend the split.

19. Here and above, Heidegger summarizes his interpretation of Binswanger's in-
terpretation of Heidegger! The emphasis is on the impoverished understanding
of Dasein as an isolated anthropological subject. This Dasein of Binswanger's
is thus cut off as a subject from its world (of "objects") and it is also
anthropologically determined, that is, entirely concerned with being-human
and not with Being-ness as such, with all Being. Therefore, Heidegger is saying,
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Binswanger had to understand care as a melancholic characteristic of human

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beings because he did not properly understand Heidegger's understanding of

human existence as Dasein, as being primordially "one-with" its world.

20. Binswanger's concept of world-projection, in contrast to Heidegger's, refers to

the basic way, ontically speaking, that the individual experiences and deals
with his world. Therefore one may speak of the Weltentwurf of the
schizophrenic, the anorexic, the compulsive neurotic and so forth. It is some-
what similar to the anthropological term die Fehlhaltung. Haltung means one's
bearing, carriage or posture, one's typical demeanor in relation to the world.
For Binswanger, continuity, materiality and consistency were basic categories
which constitute the frame of reference for the "inner world" of the individual.

21. The German word Anstoss also means "impulse" or "impetus" and, in sports, it
denotes a "kick-off" in soccer or a "jerk" in weight lifting. The verb, Anstos-
sen, means to push, strike, knock, bump or nudge. Heidegger's use of the word
here seems to imply something like the impetus of leaping or starting off on
something, the initial movement toward something, in this case, a dasein-
sanalytic perspective in psychiatry. Another connotation of the German word
which may be of interest here is the suggestion of something which is uncon-
ventional, provocative or oppositional.

22. This entire preceding paragraph has been moved up ahead of the subsequent
paragraph which, in the original German text, it actually follows. Although
something may be lost in terms of faithfulness to the original text, much seems
to be gained by way of continuity in the train of thought for the reader.

23. Here Heidegger reiterates the same perspective which we had reported earlier
in our introduction to his Zollikon seminar of November 25, 1965. For Heideg-
ger the fundamental-ontological structure of things was that which unavoidab-
ly (unumganglich) approaches human beings in all of their scientific endeavors
and yet, at the same time, remains inaccessible (unzuganglich). In other words,
lying hidden within the mundane (ontic) appearance of things is an essence, an
essential meaningfulness, that is at once both bold and shy; on the one hand
 98 On Adequate Understanding of Daseinsanalysis

this essence demands to be acknowledged and on the other hand it seems dif-
ficult to see, almost as if it were reluctant to be seen, reserved or standoffish.

24. Heidegger used "das Faktische" to refer to the "'factuality' of the fact" of
Dasein's Being as one which has been "thrown into" its there. This was dis-
tinguished from the word "tatsachlich" which was reserved to refer to the fac-
tual occurrence of objects or things. (See Heidegger, 1962, pp. 27, 82, 174)

25. This case was originally reported by Binswanger (1946) in his article "Ober die
daseinsanalytische Forschungsrichtung in der Psychiatrie," Schweizer Archiv
für Neurologie und Psychiatrie, Vol. 57, pp. 209-239 and was reprinted in his
own book (1947) Ausgewählte Vorträge und Aufsätze, Vol. I, pp. 190-217.
This article has also been translated into English by Ernest Angel and may be
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

found in Rollo May's Existence (1958, pp. 191-213). Jacob Needleman (1963)
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

also discusses this particular case (pp. 90-93, 112-113) in his lengthy "Critical
Introduction to Ludwig Binswanger's Existential Psychoanalysis" found in
Binswanger's Being-in-the-World.

26. Fallenness (Verfallen) is another of Heidegger's "Existentials." Fallenness

refers to the individual's inevitable absorption in the world of mundane (ontic)
appearances as well as the world of others, the "they" [das Man]. Heidegger
is quick to point out that fallenness, used in this sense (the term fallenness in
Heidegger's work has a number of differentiated meanings), "does not express
any negative evaluation" (1962, p. 220) but rather that fallenness is only one
manner of being, that particular one in which Dasein forgets not only the ap-
peal of its own-most self (eigentliches Selbstsein) but also its very essence as
Da-sein, as a Being-there in the ontological sense. Although Heidegger also
sees this fallenness as the "inauthenticity of Dasein" (ibid.), one must remem-
ber that such inauthenticity is also "one's own" and an unavoidable, fundamen-
tal characteristic of Dasein. In this sense Heidegger's distinction is somewhat
reminiscent of Buber's differentiation of the I-Thou and the I-It.

27. Zuhandenes was Heidegger's term for referring to all those things that are
"ready-to-hand," available to us in order to carry out our everyday concernful-
ness with things. It is also often translated as "equipment" and taken as a whole,
in its essence, is called "readiness-to-hand" (Zuhandenheit). The "ready-to-
hand" is distinguished from all that which is "merely" "present-at-hand" (Vor-
handenes) and which constitutes the "presence-at-hand" (Vorhandensein).
The latter term, is used to designate what Heidegger calls the "essentia" or the
essence of a being, that is, its simply "Being-what-it-is" (Was-sein). (See
Heidegger, 1962, pp. 67-68.) In this context, therefore, Heidegger is saying
that for this patient the whole world-order of things which were ready-to-hand
for her had been disturbed.

28. Heidegger used the term existentiell (existenzielle) to designate Dasein's onti-
cal concerns in going about its life on a daily basis. Existential (existential)
was reserved for referring to the ontological structure of Dasein, the fundamen-
tal-ontologic constituents of Dasein's existence as Da-sein.