Ried 238 0115

CONTESTING LAND DISPOSSESSION IN CHENNAI’S PERIPHERY (INDIA)
Bhuvaneswari Raman
Éditions de la Sorbonne | « Revue internationale des études du développement »
2019/2 N° 238 | pages 115 à 139

ISSN 2554-3415
ISBN 9791035103200
DOI 10.3917/ried.238.0115
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Contesting Land Dispossession
in Chennai’s Periphery (India) 1
Bhuvaneswari Raman
KEYWORDS
land dispossession, anti-dispossession politics, Sriperumbudur-Oragadam,
SEZs, everyday politics
ABSTRACT
The Sriperumbudur–Oragadam region, on the southwestern periphery of

the Chennai metropolis, in the South Indian state of Tamil Nadu, is the
location of several projects for setting up export processing zones and
special economic zones. The implementation of these projects has led to
large-scale land acquisition. This article examines the responses of agrarian
households to the state-led land acquisition process and the outcomes of
their actions. The article argues that attending to everyday practices over
a period of time can enhance the understanding of the anti-dispossession
politics. Further, it highlights the limitations of Levien’s theory of land
dispossession and the Speculative Urbanism theory when it comes to
capturing the complexity and the nuances of anti-dispossession politics.
1 I thank the three anonymous reviewers, Professor Charlotte Guénard and Professor
Laurence Roudart for their critical comments, advice, and support with accessing
the literature which helped in substantively revising the paper.
115
Contesting Land Dispossession in Chennai’s Periphery (India)
Introduction
T he Sriperumbudur-Oragadam region, in the south-western periphery

of the Chennai metropolis, in the South Indian state of Tamil Nadu,
is projected as India’s Shenzhen. The region is located along the highways
connecting Chennai with the major cities of Tamil Nadu and with those in
the neighbouring states of Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh. The Government
of Tamil Nadu (GoTN) rolled out projects for setting up Export Processing
Zones (EPZs)/Special Economic Zones (SEZs), and Industrial Corridors (ICs)
to develop the region as a global manufacturing hub for automobiles and
electronics (Ernst and Young, 2014; Homm and Bohle, 2012). Vast tracts of
agricultural land were notified for acquisition for the implementation of
various projects. The sale of agricultural land increased and land prices soared
with the announcement of these projects. Private developers announced new
projects for the construction of gated housing complexes, malls, and luxury
apartments (Raman, 2016). The phenomenon observed in Sriperumbudur-
Oragadam is emblematic of the transformation of agricultural land in the
villages on the outskirts of the Chennai metropolis. Several scholars suggest
that contemporary processes of land transformation result in agrarian
households being dispossessed of their land and livelihoods (Levien, 2011,

2018; Vijayabhaskar and Menon, 2018). This paper explores the micro-politics
of land dispossession with a specific focus on the responses of affected
households to the phenomenon.
Drawing on qualitative research conducted in Sriperumbudur town

and the surrounding villages, the article argues that attending to everyday
practices over a period of time can enhance the understanding of the anti-
dispossession politics. Tracing agrarian households’ responses to the state-led
land acquisition process, the article highlights the limitations of the two
dominant theoretical frameworks (Levien, 2011, 2015, 2018; Goldman, 2011)
when it comes to capturing the complexity and nuances of anti-dispossession
politics. I map agrarian households’ diverse and flexible actions to subvert the
land acquisition process, and the differentiated outcomes of their actions. The
rambling trajectory of anti-dispossession politics is shaped by the reflexive
actions of affected households, by the multiple institutions of the state,
and by the socio-spatial networks embedded in everyday relations. Further,
the state’s intervention catalysed the forced sale of agricultural land in and
117
Bhuvaneswari Raman
around the affected villages resulting in agrarian households, predominantly

from the socially and economically disadvantaged Dalit caste, losing their
land and livelihoods, thereby reinforcing already existing caste- and class-
based inequalities.
Following Vijayabhaskar and Menon (2018), I suggest that Levien’s (ibid.)

definition of land dispossession as a phenomenon solely driven by the
state may be simplistic in the Indian context. As shown in this paper, land
dispossession in the Sriperumbudur-Oragadam region encompasses the forced
loss of land and livelihoods, due both to state-led acquisition and the market
process. Levien (ibid.) assumes that agrarian landowners’ participation in the
market is always voluntary. By contrast, agrarian households affected by the
implementation of SEZs and other types of urban development projects
were forced to sell their land for a variety of reasons, including the loss of
right of access, or the fear of negotiating with the state over land acquisition.
Moreover, state agencies structure the land market through their policies
and schemes to facilitate the entry of private developers under private-public
partnerships (Baka, 2013; Vijayabhaskar and Menon, 2017).
In contrast to Goldman (2011), I suggest that landholders’ engagement


in the market process is not always driven by speculative intent. Nor do
households affected by the land acquisition process benefit from the
compensation regime or the market process due to the diverse tenure forms
under which they hold land. Both Levien’s and Goldman’s theories focus
on households holding land through individual ownership tenure. Finally,
both theories (ibid.) overlook the diverse forms of anti-dispossession actions,
the role of multiple institutions, and the complex articulation of local and
extra-local forces in shaping the rambling trajectory of dispossession politics.
Revue internationale des études du développement
The rest of the paper is organized into four sections. The next section
provides a brief summary of the literature followed (Section 2) by a description
of the research location and methods. The findings from the field research on
agrarian households’ responses to the state-led land acquisition process, and
the outcomes are discussed in Section 3. The concluding section discusses
the implications of the findings.
No 238 2019~2
118
1. The Micro-Politics of Land Dispossession

Two theories are dominantly used to explain the phenomenon of land
dispossession that accompanies urban development projects in India, viz.
“Accumulation by Dispossession (AbD)” (Levien, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2015, 2018)
and Speculative Urbanism (SU) (Goldman, 2011). Levien (2011, 2012, 2013,
2015, 2018) reconstructs Harvey’s (2003, 2007) theory on Accumulation by
Dispossession (AbD) to comprehend the politics of SEZs. Drawing on the
seminal analysis of primitive accumulation (Marx, 1976), Harvey argues that
AbD is an economic process in which dispossession occurs through the
transfer of diverse types of assets, viz. land, natural commons, and labour at
a very low cost from the vulnerable class to the richer class (Harvey, 2007).
The transfer of land and natural commons to globally connected companies
under SEZ projects results in dispossessing the rural and urban population
of their land and livelihoods (Bannerjee-Guha, 2010; Sampat, 2008; Jenkins,
2007; Levien, 2011, 2015).
Levien (2011, 2012, 2015, 2018) argues that Harvey’s (ibid.) view of AbD
as an extension of the macro-economic process is simplistic, and that it is
decisively a political process. Dispossession is facilitated by a “land broker”

state, and operates through corporate developers who develop rural land
—mainly for technology IT companies and luxury real estate—and profit
from the appreciation of land values. Moreover, Harvey (2007) overlooks the
anti-dispossession struggles generated by coercive state interventions. The
struggles to counter land dispossession share some key features: a focus on a
single-issue agenda; overt collective actions; cross-class alliances; autonomy
from political parties; and an absence of ideological stance (Levien, 2013, 2015).
Actors usually embody different interests. Some are “transactional bargainers”
who are interested in higher compensation, and others, “unconditional
bargainers” who seek to protect their land.
In contrast to Levien’s (2013, 2015) scheme of collective action for

countering land dispossession, agrarian landowners in Bangalore sold their
land to developers (Goldman, 2011). Goldman argues that government
agencies using the provisions in law coercively acquire land from agrarian
households with little or no compensation, as well as extract high land rents
along with large developers. Goldman’s (ibid.) Speculative Urbanism (SU)
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Bhuvaneswari Raman
theory highlights the speculative logic driving the actions of government

agencies, large developers, and ordinary citizens in Bangalore.
Levien does not focus on the reasons for an absence of contestation to

the state-led land acquisition process in some places. Other scholars suggest
that landowners’ decisions to counter the acquisition process is influenced
by a combination of factors including declining agricultural income, lack
of space for manoeuvring decisions on land acquisition, the compensation
amount, and the availability of alternative livelihoods (Vijayabhaskar, 2010;
Chakravorty, 2013).
Agrarian households in other contexts negotiate with government

agencies (Balakrishnan, 2013) or form partnerships with private professionals
and developers (Sami, 2012) for land development. Further, affected households
try to subvert land acquisition by appropriating the provisions in law and
administrative procedures (de Flore, 2015), and mobilizing symbolic and
cultural resources (Shivam, 2017). In the light of the above-mentioned
evidence, this study explores the responses of affected households to the
land acquisition process in the Sriperumbudur-Oragadam region.

There are two suggestions in the studies reviewed regarding the
consequences of anti-dispossession political actions. One is that there is
very little or no space for manoeuvring decisions on land acquisition due to
the legal and institutional architecture undergirding SEZs and infrastructure
projects. In the Indian context, households facing the threat of eviction
or land acquisition try to influence state decisions through their elected
representatives and local governments (Benjamin, 2000). SEZ projects
are housed in parastatal institutions or project-specific special-purpose
vehicles to restrict the influence of elected representatives (Benjamin and

Bhuvaneswari, 2006; Idiculla, 2016). Moreover, government agencies mobilize
specific legal provisions such as eminent domain, administrative processes,
or administrative categories to quell the opposition to land acquisition for
SEZs and infrastructure projects (Ramanathan, 2011; Baka, 2013, Levien, 2011).
By contrast, other studies show that decisions on land acquisition are

No 238 2019~2
shaped by back and forth negotiations between various scales of the state and
the elected representatives (Balakrishnan, 2013; de Flore, 2017). In addition,
120
Chakravorty (2013) argues that the high land prices in India, together with the
high compensation provisions under the new Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation
and Resettlement Act (LARR) would make land acquisition too expensive and
stall urban development projects. Nielsen (2018) critiques Levien’s scheme
of land dispossession as a generative event of anti-dispossession politics,
explaining that it diverts attention from the broader consequences of land
acquisition on everyday life especially on caste, class, and gender relations.
In light of the competing evidence in the studies discussed above, this

paper explores the forms and effects of anti-dispossession politics and the
reasons thereof. The related findings are discussed in Section 3.
2. State Intervention in Sriperumbudur-Oragadam

Tamil Nadu was the first state to formulate an SEZ policy in 2003, before
the Government of India enacted the Act in 2005. The GoTN announced the
policy to set up special economic zones in 2000, and established Mahindra
City, the country’s first operational SEZ, under a public-private partnership
arrangement in 2002. Forty-six of the ninety-nine SEZs approved in 2012 by

the Government of India are located in and around the Sriperumbudur-
Oragadam region (GoI, 2012). Prior to forming SEZs, the GoTN created EPZs,
two of which are located in Sriperumbudur. In 2002, all EPZs were declared
as SEZs (Chandrachud and Gajalakshmi, 2014; Sashi Kumar, 2008).
The State Industries Promotion Corporation of Tamil Nadu (SIPCOT)

and the Tamil Nadu Industrial Development Corporation (TIDCO) created
the EPZs/SEZs in the Sriperumbudur-Oragadam region. The Government of
Tamil Nadu established TIDCO in 1965 and SIPCOT in 1971 for promoting
industrial growth. Both agencies were formed under the Companies Act.
Besides SEZ, TIDCO partnered with developers to form townships (Raman,
2016). While SIPCOT is a nodal agency to finance and create industrial
infrastructure, TIDCO supports the establishment of medium and large
industries in association with the private sector. TIDCO is also registered as
a non-banking financial institution with the Reserve Bank of India. Until the
mid-nineties, SIPCOT acquired land from farmers and allocated developed
land to industries. Its policy shifted in 2005 towards public-private partnerships
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Bhuvaneswari Raman
and land-based financing. Both agencies accumulate land for their banks and
also facilitate land acquisition for developers through the market process.
Until 2015, SIPCOT acquired around 7018 acres in the region (MSME-DI, 2016).
In the Indian context, the Revenue Department (RD)—a regional

government agency headed by the District Collector—is the only agency
authorized to acquire land. SIPCOT and other agencies put in a request to
the RD to acquire the identified land for infrastructure projects. The collector
appoints a special Tahsildar2 to acquire land for a specific project. The RD
initially notifies the landowners about the decision to acquire their land
after obtaining a no-objection certificate from the rural local government,
i.e. the village panchayat. The department notifies different categories for
land acquisition for SIPCOT projects, which include land under agriculture,
common land, habitation inside the village, and residential layouts formed
with the permission of the Department of Town and Country Planning
(DTCP). The RD’s notification for acquisition stands even if a residential
layout may have planning approval. The RD transfers the acquired land to
SIPCOT, which in turn transfers it to private companies after infrastructure
development, or to developers for land development under the public-private
partnership arrangement.

Findings discussed in this paper draw on research conducted in three
phases between 2013 and 2018 in Sriperumbudur town and twelve villages in
the region. In the first phase, I studied eleven villages where the RD acquired
land between 1997 and 2002 for setting up three EPZs/SEZs in Sriperumbudur,
Oragadam, and Irungattukottai. The largest automobile hub is now located
in the Oragadam SEZ and a high-tech industrial park, in Irungattukottai.
Subsequently, the Revenue Administration (RA) acquired land in other villages
of the region in 2005, 2011, and 2015. I revisited five of the eleven villages in
2016-17 and, in addition, visited seven villages which were affected by different
projects in order to map the responses to and effects of land acquisition. The
field research draws on ethnographic methods. Information was collected
through observation, interviews, and conversations. Interviews were conducted
with field officials of the Revenue Administration (village administrative
officer, Revenue Officer), village panchayat leaders, landholders, brokers and
No 238 2019~2
2 Official heading the subdistrict offices of the Revenue Administration. Each sub-
district or tehsil comprises a cluster of 100-200 villages.
122
tenants in each village, officials of a cooperative society, and investors to

gather basic information on the number of households, caste composition,
land area, categories of land, process of land acquisition, responses, history
of land sales, characteristics of landowners and tenants, and land conflicts.
Besides this, I analysed the court judgements of the land acquisition cases
in Sriperumbudur. In addition, a rapid survey of sixty farmers across five
villages was conducted in the second phase in order to map the changes in
land prices, current source of livelihoods, and shifts in landholding patterns.
I also followed a conflict between developers, landowners, and investors to
trace the market process. I conducted the interviews in Tamil and maintained
field notes in the same language.
3. Anti-Dispossession Actions: Forms, Trajectory, and Outcome

This section illustrates landholders’ diverse responses to the state’s land
acquisition process. It describes landholders’ political actions to contest
the land acquisition process, followed by the reasons for the absence of
contestation in some contexts. Further this section analyses the phenomenon
of dispossession through the market process.

3. 1. Subverting Land Acquisition: Forms of Actions
Landholders constituted a heterogeneous group, in terms of the size of

their landholdings, caste and class affiliation, and the tenure forms under
which they held land. The size of their landholdings varied from an area of
less than an acre to a maximum of fifteen acres. Agriculture was the main
source of livelihood for the different categories of landholders at the time
of land acquisition. Based on the sizes of holdings, landholders can be
categorised as large landholders who owned between ten to fifteen acres,
medium holders having between five and nine acres, and small and marginal
farmers possessing from less than an acre to a maximum of 3 acres.
The few large landowners were from the Brahmin-caste and the middle-
caste communities including Naidus and Naikkars. The Brahmin caste owners
were absentee landlords, while those from the middle-caste communities
resided in the villages and dominated local politics. The mid-size landholders
from different castes, viz. Naikkars, Naidu, and Vanniyar, cultivated the
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Bhuvaneswari Raman
owned or leased land. The marginal farmers and the landless households
were predominantly from the Dalit, with few from the middle castes. The
Dalits depended on grant land, and various categories of common land or
poramboke land3 for their livelihoods.
The RD issued an order to landowners of the Sriperumbudur–Oragadam

region ordering them to surrender their land voluntarily along with the land
documents. In addition, the department issued notifications regarding the
acquisition of the land inside the village occupied by the Dalit households.
Landholders using lease, grant, or poramboke land did not receive any
notification.
During the first round of acquisitions in 1997, resident and non-resident

households possessing agricultural land complied with the RA’s order. Those
who had invested in a plot in the private residential layouts, henceforth
referred to as plot owners, individually filed cases with the Madras High
Court contesting the acquisition order.
3. 1. 1. Individual Actions: Non-Compliance and Negotiations


In the subsequent round of the land acquisition process between 1998
and 2000, landholders across eleven villages contested the acquisition
process, engaging in a range of actions including non-compliance (Razzaz,
1994), quiet individual negotiations via their political and caste networks,
lobbying through political party leaders, collective protests, legal action, and
the sale of land. Initially, landowners assumed that their non-cooperation
would force the RD and SIPCOT to abandon their plan. Few landowners
individually attempted to influence the land acquisition officer to exempt
their land from the notification order. Facing difficulty in actually acquiring
land, RA and SIPCOT officials invited agricultural landowners and plot owners
to three rounds of negotiations. Landowners demanded the cancellation
3 The various categories of poramboke land include natham (village land used for
habitation), meichal (grazing), eri (lake), and salai (road); they are administered by
different government agencies. The village panchayat administers natham poramboke
land. The RD may hold unsurveyed waste land outside the habitable boundaries
No 238 2019~2
of the village. Eri poramboke is controlled by the village panchayat or the public
welfare department, depending on the area of the water body, and the salai, by the
highways department.
124
of the land acquisition order, but the officials insisted on negotiating only
the terms of compensation. The meetings ended in an impasse, as the
landowners refused to surrender their land. With the failure of negotiations,
the RD issued an ultimatum, threatening to acquire the land using force
and without any compensation.
Realising that losing their land was inevitable, resident landowners from
different castes across the eleven villages came together in 1999 to secure their
land (and not for compensation). An ex-panchayat chairman from one of the
villages, along with a local political activist, organized not only landowners
but also others who possessed land under different tenure forms. The group
engaged in various forms of collective actions including representations to
senior party leaders, public hearings, petitioning and lobbying the District
Collector, the land acquisition officer and SIPCOT officials, and protests.
The group drew on the support of a network of lawyers in Sriperumbudur
town, a Dalit activist organisation, and a non-governmental organisation
in Chennai. In the meantime, RA and SIPCOT officials announced an
enhanced compensation amount, which was again rejected by the villagers.
When their protests and lobbying did not yield much result, they decided
to approach the courts.

3. 1. 2. Legal Contestation
The District and the Madras High Courts adjudicated two types of cases
on land acquisition in the Sriperumbudur-Oragadam region. The first one
concerned the cases filed individually by plot owners, who appealed for
exempting their land from land acquisition. The government mobilizes the
power of “eminent domain” to acquire land for SEZs and other infrastructure
projects. Eminent domain is premised on the twin principles of public
purpose and just compensation. It allows for the compulsory acquisition of
private land for public purposes.4 When land is acquired under the eminent
domain article, the courts adjudicate the disputes within the framework
of compensation. Some landowners appealed individually for exemption,
stating that their land was already developed or that their residential layouts
4 However, there is ambiguity as to what constitutes public purpose (Ramanathan,

2011). The new land acquisition bill enacted in 2015 (second amendment) empha-
sises compensation as a redressal mechanism.
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Bhuvaneswari Raman
were approved by the planning authority, namely, the Department of Town

and Country Planning. The court judgement exempted land parcels under
industrial or religious use under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act
of 1894,5 but supported the acquisition of privately developed layouts even
though they may have had planning permission6 (Rao, 2010).
The second type of case filed by the representatives of agrarian households

in the eleven villages were pleas to cancel the acquisition order on the grounds
of loss of livelihoods and of the inability for petitioners to find alternative
jobs due to a lack of skills.7 The case was heard by the District Court and
subsequently by the Madras High Court between 2000 and 2010. In 2005,
as the High Court was hearing the case, RA-SIPCOT officials threatened to
take the land by force. By then, the Special Economic Zone Act of 2005
and a Tamil Nadu Extraordinary Gazette Order authorizing the use of force
for land acquisition had been passed. The court judgement pronounced in
2010 upheld the land acquisition for SIPCOT’s project, but ordered the RA
to enhance the compensation amount (Rao, 2010).
Landowners and government officials often disagreed on what

constituted adequate and just compensation. Landowners’ expectations

were based on the value of their agricultural land—which depended on the
type of soil (wet or dry land), crops, and irrigation facility. The market value
for wet and dry agricultural land differs. The RA fixed the compensation
amount on the basis of the market value of dry agricultural land for all
types of land. Further, the RA took into account the location of the land
in relation to the main road. A remote wet land parcel was valued less
than dry land closer to the road. There was also a disagreement about the
estimation of the market value (Rao, 2010). The RA fixed the market value
on the basis of sale prices reported in the registered sale deed, which is
often less than the actual market price of land. In their responses to a court
query, the Revenue officials stated that the market value of land at the time
5 https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1924061/ (Retrieved January 2019).

6 See also Haridoss vs Government of Tamilnadu, writ petition number W.P.No.16922
of 2007.
No 238 2019~2
7 Refer Madras High Court writ petitions numbers filed in 2000: 16922, 29294, 29090,
29113, 29707, 29708, 29709, 29710, 30019, 30020, 30021, 29575, 30255, 30256,
33294, and 30062, and 32290 of 2007, and Connected Miscellaneous Petitions.
126
of acquisition was an inflated value as by then real estate developers had

already purchased the land and hiked the price; thus, it could not be used
for fixing compensation (Rao, 2010).
In addition, thirteen Dalit households from one of the villages possessing

grant land approached the Madras High Court8 in 2008 to restore their grant
land. The court dismissed their cases due to two reasons. The grant land,
locally known as Panchami land, was allotted to Dalit households under
a land reform movement called the Bhoodan movement. The movement
encouraged landowners to gift/donate part of their land to the landless in
their respective villages through the Bhoodan Board, a government agency.
The Bhoodan Board allotted land to some households, but did not transfer
the land documents to the allottee. In other cases, large landowners who
pledged to donate their land did not actually transfer it to the board. The
inheritors from these families sold the land. Between the mid-sixties and
2001, Panchami land was exchanged three to four times and the sales were
registered (Raman, 2016). As these sale transactions happened outside the
village, Dalit households possessing Panchami land came to know about
it only after SIPCOT allotted it to companies. However, the Madras High
Court allowed the affected Dalit families to appeal again to the civil court for

compensation. Although the civil court ordered the RA to return the acquired
Panchami land to the respective households,9 the revenue officials stated
that in practice, it would be difficult to retrieve the land as the companies
had enclosed it and their operations had been in full swing since 2006.
3. 1. 3. Differentiated Outcomes
The courts’ intervention closed the possibility of further negotiation

through political or administrative channels as it is binding on the state
to implement the court order. Large landholders from the Brahmin caste
favoured the judgement as they perceived limited chances of reclaiming
their land from tenant farmers, given the state’s history of anti-Brahmin
caste politics. Both large and mid-size landowners from the Naikkar and
Naidu castes decided to settle for the enhanced compensation amount,
8 https://indiankanoon.org/doc/387324/ (Retrieved January 2019).

9 Interview with the Director of Penn Urimai Iyakkam, who facilitated the court case
of Dalit families, 16 July 2018.
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Bhuvaneswari Raman
fearing the possibility of losing both land and money. Small and marginal
farmers from the middle-caste and Dalit-caste communities resented the
decision of large and mid-level farmers as they did not benefit from the
compensation regime, and it resulted in the disintegration of their collective
action. Small and marginal farmers from the middle-caste communities
who surrendered less than three acres stated that the compensation amount
was inadequate to invest in an alternative livelihood. Although landowners
tried to re-negotiate the compensation norms, they were not successful as
by then the collective action had dissipated. In addition, developers and
investors privately developed residential layouts held substantial portions
of vacant land at the time of the land acquisition, which was acknowledged
by the land acquisition officers in their responses to court cases on land
acquisition (Rao, 2010).
3. 1. 4. Absence of Anti-Dispossession Actions
Overt collective action was absent in the subsequent rounds of land

acquisition for SIPCOT’s projects in 2005, 2008, 2011, and the most recent
one in 2016. The differentiated outcomes of the court case and collective
action in the eleven villages influenced some landholders not to contest the

land acquisition process. Further, households possessing “poramboke” land
or grant land (Panchami land) did not resist acquisition as they perceived
very little chance of any redressal. In their view, not only are legal disputes
costly and time consuming but also the chances of regaining possession of
their land is difficult even after a favourable court judgement. Interviewees
whose land was acquired stated that securing the compensation amount
from the RA and SIPCOT was a time-consuming process and that it took
them two years of regular visits to the offices and moving the files between
different desks to secure their compensation order. Even though the court
judgement for enhanced compensation was passed in 2010, several medium
landowners did not receive the compensation amount until October 2017.
Findings reported in the above sections highlight the limitation of

Levien’s (2011, 2013, 2015, 2018) scheme of anti-dispossession politics. Not
all landowners contested the state’s land acquisition process. Those who
No 238 2019~2
contested the acquisition process engaged in various forms of individual

and collective actions for which they flexibly drew on their alliances with
political parties, caste networks, professionals, and institutions. Participants’
128
interpretation of the conflict at different times influenced their engagement

in various forms of action. The affected households negotiated the land
acquisition process engaging with multiple institutions. The use of eminent
domain, the location of the projects in parastatals, the administrative
categories of land, and the entries in official records (which often do not
reflect possession on the ground as also reported by de Flore, 2017) restricted
the political and legal space that the affected households had for negotiating
the land acquisition process. The role of the courts is critical in mediating
conflicts over land acquisition. The reflexive actions of different actors and
institutions influenced the rambling trajectory of the conflict.
Second, while compensation is certainly a factor influencing the emergence

of anti-dispossession politics as some scholars suggest (Vijayabhaskar, 2010;
Chakravorty, 2013), it is not the only one. A combination of other factors
influenced the affected households’ tendency to contest the land acquisition
process, such as perceptions of space for manoeuvring government decisions,
the experience of their networks with anti-dispossession politics, the capture
of land by developers, and the land tenure forms.
Third, landholders’ actions to contest the acquisition process resulted in


differentiated outcomes reinforcing caste- and class-based inequalities about
which there is little in Levien’s (2013, 2015) scheme. Dalit households did not
benefit from the compensation regime as they depended on poramboke
(common) land, leased land, or grant land for their agriculture.
3. 2. Speculative Urbanism: Outcomes of the Market Process
The announcement of SIPCOT’s SEZ projects accelerated the sale of

agricultural land outside the village habitation. Large and medium landowners
in the villages affected by land acquisition and in the neighbouring villages
sold their land. Landowners sold their land due to a combination of factors
such as: the loss of right of access to their land and irrigation facility with
the acquisition or sale of neighbouring land; the enclosure of common
grazing land and wetlands; the fear of acquisition by the state; and the
deterioration of irrigation facilities. According to the village administrative
officer of Oragadam and the brokers in the region, land sales had peaked
since 1998 in different villages just before the RA issued the notification for
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Bhuvaneswari Raman
land acquisition. Although the sale of agricultural land and its conversion
for urban use existed in the seventies and eighties, it involved a smaller
area, between one acre and three acres at a time (Raman, 2016). The area of
land transacted increased with the entry of corporate developers (Raman,
ibid.). The sale prices10 reported by landowners suggest that the price of land
increased fivefold between 1998 and 2005, from around 13.69 USD11 per cent12
to 68.50 USD per cent, and doubled over the next two years, between 2006
and 2008, from 68.50 to 82.91 USD. Land prices quoted in 2012 were around
164 USD per cent for wetland and 109 USD per cent for dry land.
With the exception of some large to mid-level landowners from the

Brahmin-caste and the middle-caste communities, other medium and small
farmers depend on their sale proceeds or compensation amount for their
household expenses. Large landowners from both the Brahmin-caste and
the middle-caste communities ploughed the proceeds from their sale or
compensation amount in land, or built property for future gains. In addition,
landowners from the middle-caste communities benefitted from the growth
of rental markets for housing, transport, and construction equipment. They
upgraded their residences in the village and constructed new apartments
outside the village for renting to different classes of migrant labour. Besides

this, they purchased construction equipment and automobiles, which they
rented to the multinational companies.
Medium and small landowners from middle-caste communities

predominantly used their sale proceeds and compensation amount to
meet lump sum expenditures such as marriage or children’s education,
and to upgrade their houses for renting on a small scale. Those who could
not invest in upgrading their houses leased out land for small businesses.
They depend on their rental income together with wage employment and
meagre interests from bank investments to meet their household expenses.
Households which once owned 5 acres or more of agricultural land in 2000
held an acre or less in 2017. Those who sold less than an acre lost their land
and depended on daily wages. The rental market slumped with the closure of
10 Based on a survey of 60 farmers in 4 villages (Oragadam, Chettipalayam, Vadakal,

No 238 2019~2
and Senthamangalam).
11 1 USD = 73 Indian Rupees (Rs).
12 1 cent = 40.47 sq.metre.
130
Nokia and two other factories at one of the three SEZs. Apart from property
owners, the downturn affected small retail businesses.
The tenants are predominantly migrant labourers from different Indian

states including Tamil Nadu, Bihar, Jharkhand, and North-eastern states
of India. Many of them work as contract labourers in the companies at
Sriperumbudur-Oragadam SEZs. They find their jobs and accommodation
through labour contractors. Both male and female migrants are contract
labourers and move to the city alone, and between six to eight individuals
share one-room accommodation. The rental values are 21 USD per month for
a room in a thatched hut; 27 USD to 34 USD for one room with tile roofing;
and between 41 USD and 68.50 USD per month for a one-bedroom house
with a reinforced cement concrete roof. In general, there is hostility towards
inter-state migrants whom the villagers blame for rising crime in their area.
The socially and economically weaker Dalit households across the different
villages lost their grant land as well as the right of access to common land.
They are predominantly employed as daily wagers in Sriperumbudur town or
in Chennai. They do not have the capital to invest in house construction for
renting and continue to live in houses with either thatch or asbestos sheet

roofing. At the time of land acquisition, SIPCOT promised jobs in the new
companies to a number of the affected landowners. Youth predominantly
from the Naidu and Vanniyar caste households, who had completed their
college education, were offered contract labour for a year on the factory floor.
Landowners sold their land to a heterogeneous group of developers,

brokers, and investors (Raman, 2016). While developers and investors
with varying scales of operation benefitted from speculation, the scale of
speculation differed. Large developers operating at the national and global
scales and large investors benefitted the most. They control large contiguous
tracts of erstwhile agricultural land outside the habitation area of the villages.
Large investors purchase land in the region expecting assured high returns.
Both large developers and large investors prefer to purchase already assembled
land from small and medium developers to minimize the risks involved
with negotiating with several landowners for assembling a large tract of
contiguous land. Small and medium developers assembled land incrementally
over the years by mobilizing their caste and political networks. They sold
131
Bhuvaneswari Raman
the assembled land to large developers as their projects were affected by

SIPCOT’s land acquisition process and a 2015 court judgement prevented
the sale registration of plots in privately developed residential layouts.
Land market transactions are not always smooth, and conflicts between
developers, investors, and landowners are common. Developers with weak
local ties face the risk of landowners withdrawing their sale. A dominant
practice among developers and landowners is to enter into an unregistered
sale agreement and to pay the sale amount in instalments. Developers obtain
a general power of attorney from the farmers to parcel the land for sale to
retail investors. They use the amount collected from buyers partly to pay
the landowners and partly to develop the land or invest in more land in the
region. A delay in the project cycle can result in retail investors holding back
their payment, which in turn affects the developers’ payment to landowners.
Such delays in payment can extend for several years, by which time land
prices have escalated. In some villages, landowners collectively demanded
a higher price for their land and refused to register the sale deed. With the
support of local party leaders, the landowners collectively reoccupied their
land and cultivated it. There are several instances of developers not paying
the small farmers, or projects being abandoned midway, affecting retail

investors. These conflicts between landowners, developers, and investors
are neither easily audible nor visible, and play out in different politico-
administrative spaces, viz. the local government (or panchayat) and the arms
of the Regional Government namely the RD, the Department of Housing,
and the Department of Town and Country Planning (DTCP).
The findings summarised in this section call for a nuanced reading

of the land market dynamics. The speculative urbanism theory tends to
homogenize actors, their interests, and their ability to tap into speculative
markets. As can be inferred from the above discussion, the market process
has led to differentiated outcomes among landowners, developers, and
investors. It has reinforced the already existing caste and class inequalities
within the villages and introduced new inequalities—between the old and
new settlers. Large landowners from the higher castes and the middle
castes, large developers, and large investors profited from the speculative
No 238 2019~2
markets. A majority of medium and small landowners were forced to sell

their land. They moved into unstable and low-paying jobs after losing
132
their land either completely or partly. Similarly, retail investors in such

locations include households from different income groups aspiring to own
a house whose investment in land is not only driven by speculative gains.
Following Vijayabhaskar and Menon (2018, 2017), I argue that it is important
to differentiate between the reasons for engagement in the market process
and the circuits of investments in land for a nuanced understanding of the
consequences of markets on different actors.
Moreover, the bargaining power of different scales of developers vis-

à-vis one another and between a developer and an investor is neither
straightforward, nor stable over time. Land sales slowed down post 2012 and
further declined post the floods in 2015. Several large developers’ projects were
incomplete and the units built were unsold. These projects were financed
through credits from local banks and capital markets, and loans to real estate
developers pose a risk to the financial institutions (see also JLL, 2014). When
I revisited the villages in 2018, large landowners were waiting for potential
buyers so that they could sell their land. Although the quoted value of land
was as high as 50,000 to 80,000 USD per acre, investors were reluctant to
purchase land. While the court interventions curtailed the actions of small
and medium developers in 2015, another judgement in 2017 removing the

ban on registration opened up space for the formation of small- to medium-
scale private residential layouts. The Real Estate Regulation Act was also
introduced in 2017 and its impact on the market process is not yet known.
Conclusion
This paper is an attempt to broaden the discussion on the phenomenon
of land dispossession beyond a single moment of state-led land acquisition
process and overt political actions.
The findings summarised in Section 3 illustrate the limitations of the

two dominant theoretical frameworks (Levien, 2013, 2015; Goldman, 2011)
when it comes to capturing the complexity and fluidity of anti-dispossession
politics. Firstly, in contrast to Levien’s suggestion, an event of land acquisition
does not always catalyse resistance actions. Secondly, while Levien’s (2015)
scheme emphasises overt collective action, the SU theory overlooks any
133
Bhuvaneswari Raman
resistance action to the land acquisition process. Collective action is one of

the various forms of action enacted by the affected households to contest
land acquisition. The role of networks embedded in everyday relations of
caste and place is a factor influencing the mobilization for collective action.
Agrarian households in places like Sriperumbudur-Oragadam are forced

to sell their land, but their participation in the market is not always driven
by speculative intent. Landowners, developers, and investors constitute a
heterogeneous group and their ability to benefit from speculation is not
uniform. The SU theory overlooks the diversity of interests of different
players and their reasons for engagement in the market process. Following
Vijayabhaskar and Menon (2018), I argue that it is important to differentiate
various actors’ interests, the ability to speculate, and the actual gains from
the land market.
Both theories do not take into account the role of multiple institutions
shaping the outcomes of the conflict. The politics of land dispossession is not
a linear contest between a government agency and the affected households.
Through a focus on the process, the paper has shown how the trajectory
of the conflict was shaped by multiple institutions and external forces. As

noted by other scholars (de Flore, 2017 ; Balakrishnan, 2013), the discursive
trajectory of anti-dispossession politics is reflexively influenced by the
back-and-forth negotiations between the affected households, government
agencies, and the courts. The interventions of different institutions not
only introduced unexpected turns, but also reflexively influenced both
the government institutions and the agrarian households to adjust their
demands as the conflict unfolded. The political-economic shifts such as the
slump in land markets, economic downturn, and courts’ interventions can
alter the bargaining power and fortunes of the different actors, as shown in
this paper. I also highlighted the differentiated outcomes of their political
actions. Further, in contrast to the findings of other scholars (Chakravorty,
2013; Vijayabhaskar, 2010), I have shown that high compensation and the
availability of job opportunities are not the only factors for the absence of
resistance action.
No 238 2019~2
Caste as an analytical variable is limited in the existing theories. The

compensation regime benefits largely developers and large farmers from
134
upper-caste and middle-caste communities. They also benefit from the new
local economic opportunities in the forms of rental markets, real estate in
land, and retail trade. The socially and economically disadvantaged Dalits and
economically less well-off middle-caste households are adversely affected.
Land is not an inert object over which politics play out. Rather, the
materiality of land influences the forms and outcomes of anti-dispossession
political actions. The fluidity of land politics calls for a nuanced reading, as the
process is influenced by a variety of forces including market shifts, conventions,
and the state’s actions. A focus on everyday practices over a prolonged period
is important for capturing the nuances and fluidity of this politics.
135
Bhuvaneswari Raman
THE AUTHOR
Bhuvaneswari Raman
Bhuvaneswari Raman is an Associate Professor in the Jindal School of
Government and Public Policy at the Jindal Global University. Her research
focuses on urbanization, governance, and poverty in South Asian countries.
She has researched and written on urban transformation, real estate dynamics,
and the politics of urban development, informality, poverty, and urban
governance. She received her Ph.D. in Social Policy from the London School
of Economics in 2010. Her recent research focuses on transnational urbanism
in India and China, and land transformation in Indian metros and small towns.
She has consulted for international organizations including the World Bank,
the UNCHS (United Nations Centre for Human Settlements), and UNESCO
(United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization). Her work
has been published in national and international journals such as the Economic
Political Weekly, Journal of South Asian Development, Revue internationale
des études du développement, and critical planning.
Recent publications
Raman B., 2018, “Production of Land for Real Estate Markets in the Suburban
Areas of Chennai Metropolis: The Case of Sriperumbudur-Oragadam Region”,
in Harriss R., Lehrer U. (ed.), Suburban Land, Toronto, University of Toronto
Press, p. 280-299.

Raman B., 2017, “‘Speculative Spaces’: The Material Practices of Urban
Entrepreneurialism”, in Chandrasekhar S. K. (ed.), Entrepreneurial Urbanism,
Basingstoke, Springer Nature, p. 91-112.
Raman B., Benjamin S., Denis E., 2016, “From Slum to an Ordinary
Neighborhood in a Provincial Town of South India: Resident-Induced Practices
of Participation and Co-Production”, in Deboulet A. (ed.), Rethinking Precarious
Neighbourhood, Paris, AFD, p. 211-231, https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/
halshs-01386462/document (Retrieved January 2019).
Raman B., 2015, “The Politics of Property in Land: New Planning Instruments,
Law and Popular Groups in Delhi”, Journal of South Asian Development,
vol. 10, no 3, p 369-395. DOI: 10.1177%2F0973174115610186

No 238 2019~2
136
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CONTESTING LAND DISPOSSESSION IN CHENNAI’S PERIPHERY (INDIA)

Éditions de la Sorbonne | « Revue internationale des études du développement »

2019/2 N° 238 | pages 115 à 139

Distribution électronique Cairn.info pour Éditions de la Sorbonne.

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T he Sriperumbudur-Oragadam region, in the south-western periphery

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Drawing on qualitative research conducted in Sriperumbudur town

around the affected villages resulting in agrarian households, predominantly

Following Vijayabhaskar and Menon (2018), I suggest that Levien’s (ibid.)

In contrast to Goldman (2011), I suggest that landholders’ engagement

© Éditions de la Sorbonne | Téléchargé le 12/11/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 223.178.97.20)

1. The Micro-Politics of Land Dispossession

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In contrast to Levien’s (2013, 2015) scheme of collective action for

theory highlights the speculative logic driving the actions of government

Levien does not focus on the reasons for an absence of contestation to

Agrarian households in other contexts negotiate with government

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vehicles to restrict the influence of elected representatives (Benjamin and

By contrast, other studies show that decisions on land acquisition are

In light of the competing evidence in the studies discussed above, this

2. State Intervention in Sriperumbudur-Oragadam

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The State Industries Promotion Corporation of Tamil Nadu (SIPCOT)

In the Indian context, the Revenue Department (RD)—a regional

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tenants in each village, officials of a cooperative society, and investors to

3. Anti-Dispossession Actions: Forms, Trajectory, and Outcome

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Landholders constituted a heterogeneous group, in terms of the size of

The RD issued an order to landowners of the Sriperumbudur–Oragadam

During the first round of acquisitions in 1997, resident and non-resident

3. 1. 1. Individual Actions: Non-Compliance and Negotiations

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4 However, there is ambiguity as to what constitutes public purpose (Ramanathan,

were approved by the planning authority, namely, the Department of Town

The second type of case filed by the representatives of agrarian households

Landowners and government officials often disagreed on what

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5 https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1924061/ (Retrieved January 2019).

of acquisition was an inflated value as by then real estate developers had

In addition, thirteen Dalit households from one of the villages possessing

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3. 1. 3. Differentiated Outcomes

The courts’ intervention closed the possibility of further negotiation

8 https://indiankanoon.org/doc/387324/ (Retrieved January 2019).

3. 1. 4. Absence of Anti-Dispossession Actions

Overt collective action was absent in the subsequent rounds of land

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Findings reported in the above sections highlight the limitation of

contested the acquisition process engaged in various forms of individual

interpretation of the conflict at different times influenced their engagement

Second, while compensation is certainly a factor influencing the emergence

Third, landholders’ actions to contest the acquisition process resulted in

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3. 2. Speculative Urbanism: Outcomes of the Market Process

The announcement of SIPCOT’s SEZ projects accelerated the sale of

With the exception of some large to mid-level landowners from the

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