Kant, Wittgenstein,

and the Performativity

of Thought
a l oi si a mose r
 Aloisia Moser

Kant, Wittgenstein,
and the Performativity
of Thought
 CONTENTS

1 Introduction: Kant’s Acts of the Mind and Wittgenstein’s

Projection Method 1

Part 1 Kant and the “I Think” as the Facticity of Thought 15

2 A Connection Between Thought and Thing A Priori 21

3 Judging as Connecting Thought and Thing 39

4 Synthesis and Bringing the Manifold of Intuition into

an Image 51

Part II Wittgenstein’s Picture Theory as a Method of

Projection 61

5 The Form of the Proposition 63

6 Projection Method 75

7 Logic Degree Zero 89

xi
xii CONTENTS

Part III Kant’s Schematizing and Wittgenstein’s Picturing

or Projecting as Performativity 103

8 Kant, Synthesis, and Schema 107

9 Wittgenstein, Meaning, and Use 119

10 Performativity and the Act of Thinking 135

11 Conclusion 147

Index 153
 CHAPTER 8

Kant, Synthesis, and Schema

In the book Figuration, Anschauung, Erkenntnis (2016) Sibylle Krämer

outlines how Kant uses intuition for orientation in thought. Krämer posits
that Kant needed something extra to explain synthetic judgments a priori,
which serve to create new cognition or knowledge without drawing from
experience. She thinks that in order to give an account of experience Kant
needed to add a movement of figuration. Figuration can be defined pre-
liminarily as a way of seeing things. In the following I will show how
Krämer arrives at a figural movement in Kant, which is especially impor-
tant in schematism; she sees it as the third or middle component between
concept and intuition in the form of a figural synthesis—a framework that
is similar to Longuenesse’s understanding of synthesis speciosa and follows
my discussion of Dickerson’s reading of “seeing something in a picture”
in Chap. 4.
For Kant schematism is a mental operation of the power of imagina-
tion—“mentale Operation der Einbildungskraft” (Krämer, p. 248). Kant
does not consider schematism to be about visible images, which are only
the product of schematism. He explains schemata as the a priori condi-
tions of possibility for having the experience of epistemic pictures; sche-
mata are not pictures or images unto themselves. Krämer underlines that
the schema is conditioned by time, not space. The question follows: if
schemata are determinations of time and thus temporal pictures, how do
we think them? What are schemata and schematizations? What is their
epistemic value and how do they fulfill their epistemic roles? Asking these

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A. Moser, Kant, Wittgenstein, and the Performativity of Thought,
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108 A. MOSER

questions, Krämer starts an examination by underscoring how Kant radi-

cally distinguishes between concepts and intuitions as two different sources
of cognition or knowledge. Space and time are part of intuition, which
results in, for example, math being part of the side of sensibility and not of
intelligibility or understanding.
Although both sensibility and understanding have to work together for
us to have experience, Krämer focuses on the former. In the Critique of
Pure Reason the chapter on schematism is preceded by the Transcendental
Deduction of the concepts, which shows that the concepts can be applied
to objects of experience (CPR B116–69). Schematism shows us how the
concepts are to be applied. Below I will show how this works through an
outline of Krämer’s reading.
Krämer elaborates that Kant gives three kinds of concepts that objects
can fall under: (1) empirical objects, such as dogs and plates; (2) mathe-
matical objects like triangles and circles and a third kind of concept (3)
categories like quantity or causality or relation, which we cannot perceive
and therefore find in intuition. In the latter, concept and intuition are
completely dissimilar, which is why we need the schema to make them
similar. But in order to have a schema, concept and intuition already need
to have something in common. The schemata are third components,
which, on the one hand, bear some similarity to the category, and, on the
other, to the appearance. They are a “mediating representation” which
needs to be “intellectual” on the one hand and “sensible” on the other (cf.
Krämer 2016, 250, my translation). “Such a representation is the tran-
scendental schema,” writes Kant (CPA B177/A 138). In order to better
understand in what way we can understand the schema as partly intellec-
tual and partly sensible, it is helpful to look at the four different aspects of
the schema as elaborated by Krämer. Going forward, I would like to stress
that the schema is simultaneously always also the method of
schematization.

* * *

Krämer shows us four different aspects of the schema(tization) found in

Kant (Krämer 2016, 253f). First, she describes it is as a method of imagi-
nation; it is how the imagination affords its concept a picture. The domain
of the schema is in the imagination. (This is similar to my discussion of
Dickerson in Chap. 4 and his account of imagination as “seeing in.”)
Imagination works where there is no object and perception cannot
 8 KANT, SYNTHESIS, AND SCHEMA 109

happen. Imagination has qualities similar to perception, which enable it to

deliver a perception-like image. “The schema is not an image” (Krämer
2016, 254) insists Krämer, underscoring that this is essential for under-
standing what schematization is.
Second, schematism is a general method, a synthesis, that is, a figural
synthesis to be exact. Through a synthetic act the productive power of
spontaneity brings connection to the manifold of intuition. This connec-
tion is understood as figure, as order, as structure.1 It is the categories that
draw the manifold of intuition into unities in what Kant calls intellectual
synthesis. But since the categories lack an intuitive component, this needs
to be completed by a “figural synthesis” that is rooted in imagination.2
Figurality in the transcendental sense is something that Dickerson does
not address, and it is this figurality that is brought about in schematism.
On the transcendental level, figurality is the connection that is brought to
the manifold through intuition. For Krämer it is the task of schematization
to bring about this kind of synthesis, which is figural. The question then
arises: how is figural synthesis connected to the rule-like character of gen-
eral concepts? Krämer explains this by playing through the three kinds of
concepts that objects can fall under. One of these is the empirical concept.
The concept of a dog, for example, is a rule according to which my imagi-
nation can generally build the Gestalt of a four-legged animal, without
being limited to any particular Gestalt that experience or even a possible
picture would provide. If the concept of dog consists in being four-legged
and having fur, it is not said how long the legs are or which color the fur.
Dogs we experience can only be examples for the empirical concept of dog.
“To have the schema of the empirical concept means to be capable of the
epistemic act of identifying individual things as examples for a concept”
(Krämer 2016, 255, my translation). The same applies with a priori math-
ematical concepts. Kant’s example is the triangle, for which a picture
would not be adequate, because the generality of the concept cannot be
reached. It is only a recipe (Vorschrift) for construction. Krämer shows
that the figural synthesis by which we bring about the form of the triangle
in the intuition a priori is the same as the synthesis with which we discover
1
I roughly translated what Krämer writes: “Mit ihr [der Schematisierung] wird es möglich,
‘Verbindung’ in das Mannigfaltige der Anschauung hineinzubringen (CPR B162),
Verbindung, begriffen als Figur, ist Anordnung, ist Struktur” (Krämer 2016, 254).
2
The original reads: “Doch da den Kategorien jegliche anschauliche Komponente fehlt,
muss diese intellektuelle Synthesis durch eine in der Einbildungskraft verwurzelte ‘figürliche
Synthesis’ (CPR B151f) komplettiert werden” (Krämer 2016, 254).
110 A. MOSER

triangularity in real existing objects. Both syntheses have the same form.
And finally, the last type of concept that Kant describes to warrant applica-
bility to experiences is the category of the pure concepts of the under-
standing, which “can never be found in any intuition” (CRP B176/
A137). These pure concepts are quantity, quality, relation, and modality,
which form the structure for everything that can be experienced as given.
This is the red thread running through Krämer’s reading of the sche-
matism; she shows how pure concepts can be applied to appearances as
such. With the examples that Krämer gives, we will see that the the prin-
ciple for the schematization of all concepts, the “Gestalt” given, is a tem-
poral figurality. This means that schemata are determinations of time a
priori according to rules that “concern the time-series, the content of
time, the order of time, and finally the sum total of time in regard to all
possible objects” (CPR B184-5/A145). Krämer spells out the example of
quantity. The pure schema for quantity or magnitude, as a concept for the
understanding, is number. For example, if we try to represent the number
3 through different symbolizations, for example, through dots “…” or
though “III” or through a dash “- - -” or, as Kant also describes, with our
fingers, and so on, then none of these constellations for the number 3 is
the schema, since the schema relates only to the rule of how to bring
about the symbolizations. What counts is the operation that is made in
which homogenous unities are put after one another in the succession of
time. In the heart of quantity lies “the successive addition of one (homo-
geneous) unit to another” (CPR B182/A142). The addition is an act
which is executed in the form of a successive operation.
Third, Krämer asks whether the schemata are then nothing but deter-
minations of time. She goes on to discuss Eva Schaper’s interpretation of
temporality outlined in the article Kant’s Schematism Reconsidered
(Schaper 1964). Schaper thinks that via schemata human beings discover
their own nature and the nature of that in which we are—the world, since
we are, as Heidegger phrases it, “being-in-the-world” (see Schaper 1964,
281). Krämer’s reading of Schaper shows that Schaper does not treat the
schematism as “merely” underlining a constructivism. The schematism
shows that there is something in the world itself, which allows it to be
suited to the form of our experience.3 Krämer continues to show that
3
The last sentence is a rough translation of the following quote from Krämer: “Doch Eva
Schaper will zeigen, dass der Schematismus bei Kant mehr ist als ‘nur’ die Bestärkung eines
ihm so häufig zugeschriebenen Konstruktivismus. Der Schematismus führe vielmehr vor
Augen, dass es etwas in der Welt selber gebe, was diese an die Form unserer Erfahrung ange-
passt sein lässt” (Krämer 2016, 260).
 8 KANT, SYNTHESIS, AND SCHEMA 111

Schaper wants “to bring about” and “to discover” to be a close fit, and
schematism shows the family resemblance between what is subjective and
what is objective (see Krämer, 260). Krämer sees the temporal order as
building the “hinge”4 for Kant. We will see this in more detail in the next
part and Soboleva’s reading of Kant.
Finally, the fourth definition of schematism is “a hidden art in the depth
of the human soul” (CPR A141/B180), which indicates that schematiza-
tion is not a conscious activity. Nature is part of schematism, but it is unclear
how. Krämer holds that it is “vor-begrifflich” (2016, 266)—pre-conceptual
and unconscious—and repeats one of Schaper’s fundamental ideas, that the
forming intellectual acts on the part of the subject only lead to the experi-
ence of objects, because that which is given to the senses is constituted in a
certain way. The question is thus not what the subject must do in order to
cognize the appearances of the world but how the experiences must be con-
stituted in order for cognition of them to be possible (ibid.).
The question as to how objects can be subsumed under concepts is
necessarily linked with the nature of schematism as a hidden art. Something
must be found that makes the object and the concept homogeneous. This
third is then introduced as a third on top of concept and intuition, but
which still unites the properties of both (CPR B177/A138). Schematism
is thus a third component, the giving of structure; this is not merely
reduced to an act on the part of the subject (Krämer 2016, 265). Ultimately
what this offers us is an underlining of the nonintentional. Krämer argues
further that as subjects we do not stand opposite nature, but we discover
that we are of the same kind (“vom selben Holz geschnitzt,” ibid., 66). The
manifold of the world of senses is not just simply structured by the subject;
it already has structure, and that is why we can cognize nature. This is
what differentiates nature from fictions, phantasies, and illusions.
At this juncture it becomes clear that schematization is not a kind of a
priori intentionality, but instead it turns out to have an unconscious, pas-
sive aspect. This is not merely a naturalized kind of intentionality, as I will
show in the following section of this chapter through a look at the work
of Maja Soboleva, who underlines the importance of intuitions in a realist
reading of Kant.

* * *

4
Krämer uses the German term Scharnier, which is best translated as “hinge,” to stand for
the schematism as the temporality ensuring the categories can be applied to phenomena,
which can make a connection between intuition and concept. This can be brought in con-
nection with Moyal-Sharrock’s (cf. 2004) interpretation of hinge concepts or propositions.
112 A. MOSER

Next, I introduce Soboleva’s interpretation of the role of schematism in

Kant’s theory of thinking that she develops in an article in the publication
Das Denken des Denkens (The Thinking of Thinking), which she edited in
2016.5 “Braucht man Anschauung um zu denken” is the title of the arti-
cle, which in English reads: “Do we need Intuition for Thinking?”
Soboleva answers this question in the affirmative, offering an insightful
take on how Kant builds the architecture of our thinking activity. Soboleva
develops Kant’s conditions of possibility of experience and shows how
they are coequal with the possibilities of the experience of the object of
thinking, thus providing both a monist and realist theory.
Soboleva’s starting point is the fact that there is a difference between
experience and the judgment of experience. She contests that intuition is
already conceptual and provides us with a notion of intuition that is rooted
in perception and not yet in judgment. In order to do so she stresses the
notion of experience and shows that the two parts to experience are devel-
oped in the transcendental aesthetics and the transcendental analytic
respectively. In both, Kant investigates the specific a priori forms of human
sensibility and of human understanding and he writes that “the a priori
conditions of a possible experience in general are at the same time condi-
tions of the possibility of the objects of experience” (CPR A 111). Soboleva
points out that the paradox of Kant’s account here is that we get at the
same time the object that we are to cognize and the process of cognition
in which this object is even constituted as an object of cognition (Soboleva
2016, 89). In earlier chapters I have called this a performative account of
thinking because it brings about the object of thought in the course of
thinking. This is how we get the difference between appearances and
things in themselves in Kant, which according to Soboleva has led to dif-
ferent readings of Kant.6 Soboleva’s theory is ultimately a monist theory,
which aligns with theories asserting that appearances and things in them-
selves do not form two different worlds but two different aspects of one
world. However, I want to show to what extent Soboleva’s theory is actu-
ally a realistic one, as she claims.

5
The article (Soboleva 2016, 87–111) develops in great detail Kant’s theory of experience,
paying special attention to the act of drawing into a unity. In the citations of this article all
English translations are my own.
6
Soboleva distinguishes between two kinds of interpretations: Zwei-Welten (two-worlds)
and Zwei-Aspekte (two-aspects) interpretations. Naming Guyer (1987) as exemplary of the
former and Prauss (1974) of the latter, she sees herself as aligned with the two-aspects faction
(Soboleva 2016, 89).
 8 KANT, SYNTHESIS, AND SCHEMA 113

How does Soboleva justify her realistic approach to Kant’s transcen-

dentalism? Kant thought he proved the objective reality of the outer word
as given by the special character of human cognitive experience (Soboleva
2016, 90). This realism is founded on what Krämer elaborates as the fit
between the forms of intuitions and the forms of concepts, which consti-
tutes the transcendental schema of time. Soboleva shows that our experi-
ence is not just imagination—which would make it idealist—but that the
outer sense and the inner sense are connected. She specifically refers to the
B-introduction of the Critique of Pure Reason:

This consciousness of my existence in time is thus bound up identically with

the consciousness of a relation to something outside me, and so it is experi-
ence and not fiction, sense and not imagination, that inseparably joins the
outer with my inner sense; for outer sense is already in itself a relation of
intuition to something actual outside me; and its reality, as distinct from
imagination, rests only on the fact that it is inseparably bound up with inner
experience itself, as the conditions of its possibility, which happens here.
(CPR B XL)

According to this passage the certainty of the subject of itself runs par-
allel to the subject’s certainty of the outer world: I know of myself, and am
sure I exist. The reality of the outer world is sensibly immediate in the
same way. Outer affections are always connected to inner affections. We
are rooted in the world, says Soboleva, thanks to the essential, immanent
coordination of inner and outer sense, of consciousness and self-
consciousness (Soboleva 2016, 90). Since the reality of the outer world
cannot be proven in the way that we are able to discursively or conceptu-
ally prove things, it is possible to refute material idealism. Kant says: “the
reality of the outer sense with that of the inner belongs to the possibility
of experience” (CPR B XLI). Soboleva considers human beings and the
world as falling under the same Kantian ontological category, that of real-
ity. Soboleva thinks that a core concern and contribution of Kant is his
understanding of the structure of consciousness as enabling both cogni-
tions of the world and that of the human self.
Soboleva takes a close look at Kant’s problematic notions of “the thing
in itself” and “appearance” from which she facilitates a realist and monist
reading of Kant’s transcendental theory of cognition. She subsequently
shows by reconstructing the transcendental structure of cognition that it
is a necessary and general structure a priori that makes experience
114 A. MOSER

possible. Experience is composed of “a) objects are given in intuition; b)

the categorization of intuitions in productive imagination on the basis of
the schematism of time in relation to the unity of the consciousness of the
subject” (Soboleva 2016, 92). Soboleva spends quite some time with the
notion of something as “given” and how our sensibility is affected by this.
Ultimately, she reads the given as a transcendental affect; a subject does
not initiate perceptions but is affected. This understanding bears similarity
with Krämer’s reading of Schaper. However, “sensibility once affected by
the object affects the concept of the object and the understanding affects
the inner sense” (ibid., 95).
Affect is important for experience. It is the relation between inner sense
and the transcendental unity for apperception. It is the relation between
the “I” that simultaneously intuits itself and thinks itself: “Sensibility that
is affected by the object affects the concept of the object and the under-
standing affects the inner sense, that is, the intuitions of the ‘I’ itself in its
synthesizing activity” (see Soboleva, ibid.). This is how each intuition is
taken up into the unity of the whole of representations of the logical “I”
as its representation, which ensures this intuition a position as a part of
reality. Cognition now is a unitary system of experience that is holistically
united. World and “I” are constituted through the forms of sensibility,
both as appearances (Soboleva 2016, 96).
What is the given? Is it “raw sensory data,” as Henry Allison thinks
(2006, 120), or individual sensations in the form of sensory data? Kant says
it is a manifold. The understanding only thinks in connection to the repre-
sentation (Vorstellung). Experience is about the constitution of reality as a
connected whole. To have intuitions then means having an object of
appearance as contained in a moment (Augenblick), writes Soboleva, and
having that represented. Another important point for Soboleva is that tran-
scendental cognition does not subsume different representations under a
concept but brings the pure synthesis of representations to a concept (gath-
ers them in a concept). This is how we attain the unity of experience.
In distinction to Krämer, Soboleva does not think that intuitions are
proto-concepts (Vor-Begriffe); instead, she underlines that if we dissolve
intuitions into conceptual activity, then we lose the model of two different
sources of cognition: intuition and concepts.7 In literature on Kant a

7
Soboleva distinguishes between the nonconceptualists, like Henry Allison and Robert
Hanna, and their opponents, namely Wilfrid Sellars and J. McDowell, Christian H. Wenyel,
Hannah Ginsborg, and others (2016, 97n11).
 8 KANT, SYNTHESIS, AND SCHEMA 115

distinction is generally made between the layer model and the two-step
model, she says. The former says you can have one without the other,
whereas the latter describes logical consciousness as built upon sensible
consciousness. The categories are here the original and primitive concepts
of the pure understanding that relate to thinking and to sensibility.
Soboleva argues for putting the notion of “coincidence” at the foun-
dation of Kant’s interpretation of the transcendental theory of experi-
ence. “Coincidentally” we can apply the categories of the understanding
to both intuitions and judgments. For Soboleva, the central argument
takes up the idea of a universal applicability of the categories of the under-
standing to intuitions as well as judgments—and this is underscored by
Kant: “The same function which gives unity to different representation in
a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of different representa-
tions in an intuition” (CPR A79/B104–5). The categories are thus “the
primitive ur-concepts of the pure understanding” (CPR A81/B107).
They relate to thinking and to sensibility in the same primordial way
(Soboleva 2016, 99).
This means that Soboleva’s understanding of how the understanding
“transforms” intuition into an object approximates A.  B. Dickerson’s
“seeing something in a picture” as discussed in Chap. 4. Her take is that
intuition is not yet an object, since “the object is only ‘something in rela-
tion to it being a possible cognition’” (Soboleva 2016, 99). Intuition
becomes the object or the representation of the object by being subsumed
under the transcendental unity of the understanding. Designating the cat-
egorized intuition as conceptual simply means that it is used as a represen-
tation of the object. This is Soboleva’s most important point: “the object
gets its primary determination not in relation to other objects, not thanks
to discursive judging, but in relation to the transcendental unity of the
consciousness of the subject alone, that is in a topological way” (ibid.). By
topological she means that the concept is not a general representation, but
a singular one, is mere identity. Which is why intuition is determined
through concepts but not by being ordered in a genus-species relation, or
through being subsumed under a linguistic concept. Instead, its concep-
tuality consists in it mimicking (I take the liberty of translating darstellen
in this old Platonic way) an object for the human understanding. Intuition
as categorized is not the formula “S is p,” but the formula “S is S.” We do
not subsume under a concept but bring to a concept (auf einen Begriff
bringen, gather in a concept).
116 A. MOSER

Kant’s argument, Soboleva continues, is that the understanding does

not yet judge in its primary activity; it “shows” as the ability to make rules.
It makes possible the formation (Bildung) of experience thanks to the
unification of individual intuitions into a unitary system of representations
(ibid., 100). Experience for Kant is nothing but the result of the synthetic
judgments a priori, “which creates what we call today a natural image of
reality” (ibid., 101). The categorical synthesis of intuition may be catego-
rized and objectified, but it is still an intuition. When we look at experi-
ence from the transcendental philosophical point of view, it is a unity of
objective representations and not of propositional judgments of experience:

The word “picture” used by Kant is not just a metaphor, because if one
interprets experience as a system of statements and not a system of pictures,
then one does not understand his idea that our cognition must be aligned
with the objects given in experience. (Soboleva 2016, 101)

Soboleva underlines that Kant uses the term Bild for “picture” (or
“image”) because it is not a system of propositions but a system of images.
Experience has to be oriented toward the objects given in experience.
Experience is thus not what we say or think, but that about which we
speak and think.

Experience as the product of synthesis a priori builds a sphere of semanti-

cally undetermined but necessary objects, which will only get their qualita-
tive characteristics thanks to the judgments of thinking. This sphere is an
area of determined-undetermined objects, of not-knowing, that humans try
to cognize. (ibid., 101).8

Understanding has a dual function: in relation to sensibility it is the

capacity to come up with rules for intuitions while in relation to thinking
it is the capacity to judge as we saw in detail in Chap. 3 and the discussion
of Longuenesse’s position.
The question remains: how exactly do the categories relate to the
world? The understanding is not free, but it is “restricted” (restringiert)
according to Kant (CPR A 146/B186). “The concept must contain that
which is represented in the object that is to be subsumed under it, for that
is just what is meant by the expression ‘an object is contained under a
concept’” (CPR A 137/B176). There must be homogeneity of intuitions

8
The German reads: “Die Erfahrung als Produkt der Synthesis a priori bildet die Sphäre
der semantisch noch unbestimmten, aber notwendigen Objekte, die ihre qualitativen
Charakteristika erst dank dem urteilenden Denken erhalten. Sie ist ein Bereich der bestimmt-
unbestimmten Gegenstände, des Nicht-Wissens, die der Mensch zu erkennen sich bemüht.”
 8 KANT, SYNTHESIS, AND SCHEMA 117

and concepts. In order to arrive at this point, we need a common constitu-

ent that can mediate between the categories and intuitions. As Soboleva
writes: “This schema is given or specified (better even simulated or mim-
icked) to the understanding from the side of intuition” (2016, 102).9 We
have already outlined in detail how this plays out by looking at Krämer’s
reading. Now we have reached the most complicated part of the sche-
matism of time. The transcendental schemata show how things appear in
time, and these rules give the instructions for the categorizing perfor-
mances of the understanding (see Soboleva 2016, 102).
This ability (Vermögen) of the schemata to mediate between sensibility
and understanding is what Kant calls the transcendental imagination. But
it is an operation unfolding before discourse or discursivity. Experience as
the product of the cognition a priori is one of images and not of language
or concepts within the frame of the transcendental theory of cognition. It
is not verbal (Soboleva 2016, 103). There is an immanent correspondence
between sensibility and understanding through imagination in relation to
the unity of apperception. Soboleva ends her exegesis of Kant with the
statement that the processes of givenness, of the categorization of intu-
ition in relation to the transcendental unity of apperception, and finally of
the application of the resulting concepts of objects in judgment are only
structurally distinct in theory, but belong together in reality. They are the
conditions of possibility of the specific human cognition.
Soboleva sums up her reading as follows: Kant’s transcendental unity of
apperception cannot be read as “that p” or “I think that p” but as “I think
that I think that p” (Ich denke, dass ich denke, dass p). The self-reflexive
structure of the transcendental unity of apperception is thus explicit.
Soboleva’s interpretation is simple: the condition of the possibility of objec-
tifying thinking is the unity of self-consciousness, since the structure of self-
reflexivity contains in itself the structure of objectivation. What this means
is that the world is not opposed to us as something situative and associative
but is related to us as something connected and as a whole. Soboleva reads
the “I think” as the act of transcendental apperception, as the connection of
intuition through understanding in one experience. The “I think” is syntax
and not thought. Soboleva concludes that Kant’s cognition is thus embod-
ied cognition, since human cognition is dependent on sensibility, under-
standing, and imagination, that is, on the cognition of the cognizer.

* * *

9
In this context I point to a theory of the act of thinking that starts with Freud’s notion of
the unconscious act and investigates from the act of thinking to action. This acting is deliber-
ate but also compelled by the body and put in relation to poetic mimesis (see Pechriggl 2018).
118 A. MOSER

In this chapter I have shown how schema is already schematization and

how the cognizing and cognized object hang together. It is now time to
look at a notion of performativity of thought that can be found in Kant
and Wittgenstein, which I will do in Chap. 9.

REFERENCES
Allison, Henry. 2006. Kant’s Transcendental Idealism. In A Companion to Kant,
ed. Graham Bird, 111–124.
Dickerson, A.B. 2004. Kant on Representation and Objectivity. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Guyer, Paul. 1987. Kant and the Claims of Knowledge. Cambridge and New York:
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