I

Midterm Assignment

Topic:
“Powers of UN Security Council”

Submitted By:
Muhammad Kazim Roll: 1235

Submitted to:
“Professor Manzoor Ilahi”

Introduction
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The security council is responsible for maintaining peace and security when it breaks down.
Its decision is binding over all UN members states. It has tremendous amount of power to
define the existence and nature of threat. Since 1945, it has passed more than 2230
resolutions for the resolving of world various security disputes and even recommending the
admission of new states to UN. Five permanent members of the council are most important
members and what they can agree on, generally the world must go along with. And issue on
which they can disagree can quickly become contentious. They are even important that the
resolution required 9 votes from among the 15 but a no vote by any permanent member
defeat the resolution. And the past 20 years, the use of the veto has dropped abruptly, to just
25 vetoes. 14 of which has been vetoed USA and the remain by Russia and China. There are
15 members of security council. There are five permanent members including USA, China,
France, Russia and UK. These five permanent members were selected on the bases of their
creation of UNO. On new year day 1942, president Roosevelt, p.m. Churchill, Maxim
Litvinov of USSR and TV Soong of the Republic of China signed a short document based on
the Atlantic charter or London declaration. In 1943 following “the big four” delegation met in
Moscow and in Tehran in 1944 after joining by several states. After joining by 50 states, they
summoned Dumbarton oaks conference in Washington DC to negotiate the UN structure. The
composition of the permanent members was issue but Big four were selected. And letter
France was Selected on the recommendation of China and USSR. America wanted Brazil 6th
permanent member to add but this suggestion was opposed. Currently non-permanent
members include Albania, Brazil, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway and
UAE.
African states=3, Asian pacific=3, Eastern Europe=2, Latin America=2, Western Europe and
others=5 non-permanent members are elected on a regional basis for term of two years. They
are selected 5 each year by G.A and its list prepared by regional caucuses in G.A. Its
members campaign for the seat on the council, producing books, advertisement and memos to
gain mandate from others.1
The UN Security Council has the only directive of upholding international peace and
security, as it is the only institution which is accepted throughout the globe. So far, it has
achieved to do so with the upkeep of law and order in different countries like Afghanistan,
Cambodia, Namibia, and some similar others. Its record has witnessed the maintenance of
peace and policing of truces to end some of the most brutal world conflicts however, It has
also helped rebuild nations’ economies after wars, conflicts and certain acts of terrorism. It
has brought Libya to account for its bombings in Pan Am 103 which resulted in 270 deaths,
and the endorsement of Colonial Rhodesian leaders of their war crimes during a long
enduring tyrannical regime they let flourish under their rule.
Earlier events, particularly in the Gulf, have placed serious doubt on the council's ability to
preserve global peace and security. One major incident was the council's inability to prevent
the recent US invasion of Iraq in 2002, under former President Bush's administration.
Furthermore, the council was unable to end hostilities in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda,
allowing opponents to portray the council as incompetent and riddled with blunders. In this
context, the UN Security Council has been endangered by the ability of willing states to
conduct military operations in other territories before receiving approval from the council.
Nonetheless, the UN Security Council is the only organisation with the authority to grant
1
https://www.un.org/en/
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legitimacy to any Military Operation, even though some nations may not acknowledge its
decisions, as it may clash with their selfish interests. In other words, the council is recognized
globally for the authorization of armed forces in international conflicts.
Nevertheless, the council as a body has frequently encountered difficulties in implementing
its judgments in major international crises, as seen by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in the 1990s.
Some of the difficulties encountered stem from legal concerns and the interpretation of its
mandate in preventing global wars. Some of its powers in imposing military activities are
specified in Article 39 of the UN Charter; however, before the body may exercise its
authority, it must first assess certain criteria such as a threat to peace, breaches of the peace,
and acts of aggression by one of the warring states. Furthermore, the activities of the UN
Security Council are defined under articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter as either coercive or
non-forcible. This research tries to identify the breadth and powers of the UN regarding the
authorization of armed force by the UN charter, which dictates its powers in carrying out
military action against rogue states. This will be done, however, with specific reference to the
Iraq-Kuwait invasion in 1991 and the council's decision (678) that resulted in the withdrawal
of Iraqi soldiers from Kuwait. This research will dig further into the form and substance of
this resolution during the war, as well as its implications for future council acts in
international wars.

Conceptual Analysis
A few years before the Iraq-Kuwait invasion, the United Countries Security Council
discovered a new spirit of collaboration among member states, inspiring many supporters of
the Council's efforts to publicly brag of the Council's potential to ultimately stop the scourge
of war among nations. The council's five permanent seating members had finally decided to
consult with each other on a regular basis during the process of resolving world conflicts, by
maintaining a cordial working relationship under the system of rotating chairmanship in the
council's leadership; however, the Iraq-Kuwait conflict cast a lot of doubt on the council's
ability to deal with conflicts, especially after the council demonstrated a lack of preparedness
to deal with Saddam Hussein's aggressor.
The UN capitals saw Saddam's gathering of tankers near the Kuwait border as a bluff, and
they never expected him to make his threats a reality. His subsequent invasion of the country
put the newly discovered cooperation spirit of the council's member states to the test. The
council's major flaw during the fight was that it was well aware of the issue yet was not
excessively worried about it. The council's post-war procedures revealed both a good and a
negative side to the fight; the good news was that the council had clear reports on the reasons
behind the conflict and their subsequent outcomes, but the bad thing was they had no plan to
tackle the conflict.

Article 39
Before authorising armed force in international conflicts, the UN Security Council must first
determine whether there is a threat to peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression
under Article 39 of the UN Charter; then it must determine the course of action to be
followed by Articles 41 and 42 of the charter. Article 39, which is located in Chapter VII and
defines the recommendations the council is to make about military or nonmilitary action in
any crisis, regulated the council's activity in the Iran-Kuwait war. This article specifies the
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procedures to be followed by military personnel in determining the steps to be taken by the

council in the event that military force is required. Which is at the disposable of the UN
because of the Military cooperation by the different nations in Peace-keeping missions.2
An examination of Article 39 becomes crucial in the Iran-Kuwait issue since it allows the use
of force to prevent Iraq from wreaking additional damage in Kuwait. However, the council's
intervention is only effective on UN member states since, under article 39, the council can
interfere to prevent conflicts between member states because the provision prohibits one state
from attacking another. Articles 39, 41, and 42 were extensively used to moderate the soaring
relationships between Iraq and Kuwait because, under article 39, the UN Security Council
could use force to quell violence if it was established that either of the two nations had
committed acts of aggression or a breach of the peace. Acts of aggression and breaches of
peace all poses certain consequences under article 39.
In the context of Iraq – Kuwait, breach of peace indicates that one of the sides had to
destabilise the peace that existed prior to the conflict by engaging in disorderly behaviour in
another country. Trespassing into another country's territory to commit acts of violence is a
typical expression of a breach of the peace. Saddam's actions precisely met the breach of
peace because his invasion of Kuwait was illegal, and his use of military force to destabilise
the incumbent government enabled the council's measures to use force to stabilise Kuwait
again under article 39.3
Because of the instability of the peace and the subsequent exile of the royal clan from the
nation, Saddam's actions created widespread popular anger in Kuwait. When assessed under
article 39, Saddam's conduct suggested that he should have faced arrest or expulsion, as
described in articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter, which detail the process of action to be
taken by the council following the creation of a breach of peace in a conflict.
The danger to peace is difficult to define under UN standards, hence the council does not
have a blanket definition of the act of a threat to peace. Instead, the council decides on a case-
by-case basis whether a quarrel poses a threat to peace. The consequences of a danger to
peace and an act of aggression are the same, and they all call for the use of force in conflict
regions to be stabilised. Aggression may also be associated with Saddam Hussein's conduct
in Kuwait, because Iraq's invasion and ouster of the incumbent regime constituted a blatant
act of aggression. The issue was exacerbated by the impression that Kuwait had a
considerably smaller and weaker army than Iraq, casting Iraq as an aggressive country,
especially given Iraq's desire to take over the country as one of its provinces. According to
article 39, Iraq committed acts of aggression, violated the peace, and posed an equivalent
threat to regional peace. Depending on the course of action to be taken under Articles 41 and
42, this justified the use of force or other means.
Nonetheless, under article 41 of the UN charter, the use of armed forces is not completely
guaranteed of the council unless it is established in the words of Higgins that armed forces

2
Schweigman, D. The Authority of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the United Nations Security
Charter. Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2001. Web.
3
De Wet, E. The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council. Hart, Oxford and Portland,
2004.Web.
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are to be used “only if the economic and spare the prayer rail, sea, air, postal, and others, are
partially or completely ineffective”.
As the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait ceased, Iraq constantly referred to the seventh
chapter of the UN charter in formulating its policies on Kuwait; however, provision 688 was
an exception to this chapter because to a significant degree, the resolution emphasized the
protection of human rights and political freedoms which were also to liberate them from any
forms of oppression to be perpetrated by any government. Nonetheless, some sections of the
resolution were nonbinding on Kuwait, while all resolutions against Iraq were binding, with
Resolution 678 being the most crucial. Carl confirms that Resolution 678 was passed in
connection to this resolution.
Approved on 3 April 1991, which contained the current resolution to the 34 rule and put all of
Iraq at risk of the seventh item delivered in the service of the American Zionist." Because
Iraq was also under American wing under the canopy of the United Nations, when US forces
entered Iraq in April 2003, they launched a multi-national resolution 1546 in accordance with
the UN 1483 resolution (after modification)."

Article 41 and 42
The UN charter, under articles 41 and 42, includes the use of force as a last resort in averting
war at any specific point of conflict between two states. The charter has been employed not
just in the Iraq-Kuwait conflict, but also in the prevention of civil violence in Congo. The
article empowers the Security Council to employ appropriate force in apprehending,
arresting, or deporting those who have been recognised as perpetrators of violence or conflict.
As a result, Article 41 allows the council the authority to arrest, imprison, or deport persons
without violating international norms; nevertheless, this authority runs counter to military
tactics provided in Article 42 of the UN Charter.4
The constitutional underpinning for article 41 prohibits the use of force in resolving crises,
allowing the UN Security Council to place more emphasis on its judgments. However, there
is a loophole in this restriction under article 39, which authorises the use of force to prevent
conflicts whenever a breach of peace, a threat to peace, or an act of aggression is established
(since these three conditions authorise the council to use force that may or may not be
armed). However, the absence of the use of weaponry in conflict resolution does not always
imply that such action is non-military.

UN Security Council Resolution 678:

The UN security council resolution 678 was adopted after several resolutions including 660,
661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, and 667 were ignored by Saddam;
As a result, Iraq consistently defied previous UN Security Council resolutions; however, after
the council realised Iraq's noncompliance with peace agreements, it gave the oil-rich nation a
strict deadline to implement Resolution 660, failing which member states were to use force in
marinating peace in the region. The aforementioned ultimatum was the principal condition of
Resolution 678, but in the same context, the resolution allowed member nations permission to
help with the government of Kuwait in restoring peace in the area if Iraq did not fulfil the
deadline for removing its soldiers from Kuwait. Member states were convinced to comply
4
(Schweigman, n.d.)
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with the resolution's second requirement, which was to aid Kuwait in forming peace in its
country by military means.
However, the council was to be kept aware of all member nations' activities while aiding
Kuwait to achieve peace inside its boundaries, so that no deviation from the primary aim of
achieving peace occurred.
Resolution 678, on the other hand, did not serve as a solitary ultimatum in the sense that it
supported earlier and later resolutions while also assuring legal recognition of whatever
assistance member nations were to provide Kuwait in maintaining peace inside its
boundaries. To some extent, the 678 resolution was also an act of goodwill by the UN
Security Council in averting the use of military action to evict Iraq from Kuwait, because the
accord provided Iraq an ultimatum by which it was meant to evacuate its soldiers from
Kuwait; failing which, military action would be initiated against it. Iraq might have avoided
hostilities with member states by withdrawing its soldiers from Kuwait.
The 678 resolution, on the other hand, had additional international political ramifications
because it confirmed the UN Security Council's right to declare war on other states.
Following the UN decision, the French and German governments agreed that the attack
against Iraq was justifiable. To some extent, this establishes a precedent for future use of
force in global conflicts, as Lobel and Ratner suggest.
“Despite the language and history of Resolution 687, U.S. and UK officials have asserted
since 1991 that the Resolution 678 authorization to use force remains in effect, and on
several occasions, they have deployed forces against Iraq”.5
In this context, Lobel and Ratner point out that the 678 resolution gave member states vast
rights to strike Iraq if it violated any of the resolution's provisions, even today.
In other ways, the council's resolution might be interpreted as a violation of states' rights to
protect themselves against foreign attacks, implying that Iraq is still permitted to fight the UN
under international law's right to self-defences. Higgins believes that this circumstance will
lead to increased conflict since she observes that
“…because of each state’s sovereignty over its territory under international law, the
alleged internationally “illegal” action of a discriminatory expropriation would never
justify another nation physically invading the host state….”6
In some ways, because all of the goals of the 678 resolutions were not met, the right to attack
Iraq in 2002 may have been justified. Under resolution 678, member states were allowed to
use whatever means they saw fit to establish peace in the region, and since Saddam was a key
factor in the destabilisation of peace in the Middle East, the US may have been justified in
attacking Iraq in 2002 and removing Saddam. It is worth noting that peace in the Middle East
is still a long way off, and UN Resolution 678 may still indirectly justify further acts by
member nations in achieving peace in the region.

Conclusion

5
Lobel, J. & Ratner, M. Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous Authorization to Use Force, Ceasefires
and the Iraq Inspection Regime, 1999. Web.
6
(Malone, n.d.)
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The United Nations Security Council is the only international organisation authorised for
legalising the use of military force in international disputes. The Iraq-Kuwait dispute is a
notable illustration of this provision since the council permitted member states to employ
whatever means necessary to guarantee that prior decisions were followed by Iraq and that
peace in the area was achieved. Articles 39, 41, and 42 of the UN Charter explain the
council's authority. Article 39 ensures the council's action to use armed force or not if it
establishes that a certain nation commits acts of aggression, a threat to peace, or breaches of
the peace.
In the Iraq-Kuwait dispute, Iraq demonstrated a flagrant violation of the principles in Article
39, which authorised the UN Security Council to allow member states to use force to ensure
regional peace.
After determining that the authorization of force was valid under article 39, the council had to
pick a course of action under either article 41 or 42 of the UN charter, which advocated for or
against armed force. However, because Iraq has failed to implement prior decisions to build
peace in Kuwait, the council determined that it was essential to execute Article 42, which
permitted member nations to employ force against Iraq. These procedures define the UN
Security Council's authorisation of military force in global crises, as well as legalising the
council's actions (in relation to the Iraq – Kuwait conflict).

References
De Wet, E. The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council. Hart, Oxford
and Portland, 2004.Web.
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Higgins, R. Problems and Process: International Law and how we Use it. Web.
Hodge, C. US Presidents and Foreign Policy. New York, ABC-CLIO, 2007. Web.
Lobel, J. & Ratner, M. Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous Authorization to
Use Force, Ceasefires and the Iraq Inspection Regime, 1999. Web.
Malone, D. The UN Security Council: From Cold War to the 21st Century. Lynne Reinner,
London, 2004. Web.
Martenczuk, B. Justice, Liberty, Security: New Challenges for EU External Relations. Asp /
Vubpress / Upa, London, 2009. Web.
Schweigman, D. The Authority of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the
United Nations Security Charter. Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2001. Web.
United States Congress. Congressional Record, V. 149, Pt. 10, Government Printing Office.
Washington, 2010. Web.

Bibliography
De Wet, E. H. (2004). The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council.
Malone, D. T. (n.d.).
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Ratner. ( 1999). In J. Lobel, M. Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous Authorization to

Use Force, Ceasefires and the Iraq Inspection Regime.
Schweigman, D. T. (n.d.).
Strauss, S. (Penguin, New York, 2002). The Complete Idiot’s Guide to World Conflicts.
Penguin, New York, 2002. New York: Penguin.
(Ratner, 1999)