VICARIOUS LIABILITY

PARENTS AND GUARDIANS

MARIA TERESA CUADRA, minor represented by her father ULISES CUADRA et al vs
ALFONSO MONFORT
Facts:

• Maria Teresa Cuadra, and Maria Teresa Monfort were classmates in grade 6, their
teacher assigned them, together with 3 other classmates to weed the grass in the
school premises.
• Maria Monfort then found a plastic headband, which is an ornamental object
commonly worn by young girls over their hair and jokingly she said aloud that she
had found an earthworm and frighten Maria Cuadra and tossed the object to her.
• That the latter turned around to face her friend and the object hit her right eye, she
rubbed the injured part and treated it with powder, then her eyes became swollen
and she told her parents about the incident and took her to a doctor.
• She underwent operation twice but despite medical efforts, she completely lost the
sight of her right eye.
• The parents of Cuadra instituted a civil suit against respondent herein and he was
ordered to pay the petitioners.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent herein is liable for the death of Maria Cuadra.
Ruling:
No. In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the defendant
could have prevented the damage by the observance of due care, or that he was in any way
remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which
caused it. On the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty to send her and where
she was, as he had the right to expect her to be, under the care and supervision of the teacher.
And as far as the act which caused the injury was concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual
among children at play and which no parent, however careful, would have any special reason to
anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any
trait in the child's character which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the
blame could be attributed to her parents.
OWNER AND MANAGER OF ENTERPRISES
ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL, as represented by SPS. FERNANDO NANTES AND ROSARIO
LACANDULA, BENJAMIN ILUMIN, TIRSO DE CHAVEZ, LUISITO VINAS, CONNIE ARQUIO
AND PATRIA CADIZ, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ELEVENTH DIVISION and DR. ROMULO
CASTILLO and LILIA CADIZ, respondents.
Facts:

• Ferdinand Castillo, a freshman student of Section 1-C at St. Francis Highschool

wanted to join a school picnic undertaken by Class I-B and Class I-C at the beach
in Quezon.
• Ferdinand's parents, respondents’ spouses, because of short notice, did not allow
their son to join but merely allowed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic,
with the directive that he should go back home after doing so. However, because
of persuasion of the teachers, Ferdinand went on with them to the beach.
• During the picnic and while the students, including Ferdinand, were in the water,
one of the female teachers was apparently drowning. Some of the students,
including Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but in the process, it was Ferdinand
himself who drowned. His body was recovered but efforts to resuscitate him ashore
failed. He was brought to a certain Dr. Luna in Sariaya, Quezon and later to the
Mt. Cannel General Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival.
• Respondents filed a complaint against St. Francis High School, Benjamin Illumin
(its principal), and the teachers: Tirso de Chaves, Luisito Vinas, Connie Arquio,
Nida Aragones, Yoly Jaro, and Patria Cadiz, for Damages.
• The trial court found in favor of the respondents and against petitioners-teachers
Arquio, de Chaves, Vinas, Aragones, Jaro and Cadiz, ordering all of them jointly
and severally to pay respondents.
• On the other hand, the trial court dismissed the case against the St. Francis High
School, Benjamin Illumin and Aurora Cadorna.
• Both petitioners and respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners herein are liable for the death of its student under Article
2180 of the NCC.
Ruling:
No. Under Article 2180 par 4, it is clear that before an employer may be held liable for the
negligence of his employee, the act or omission which caused damage or prejudice must have
occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned tasks. In the case at bar, the
teachers/petitioners were not in the actual performance of their assigned tasks. The incident
happened not within the school premises, not on a school day and most importantly while the
teachers and students were holding a purely private affair, a picnic. It is clear from the beginning
that the incident happened while some members of the I-C class of St. Francis High School were
having a picnic at Talaan Beach. This picnic had no permit from the school head or its principal,
Benjamin Illumin because this picnic is not a school sanctioned activity neither is it considered as
an extra-curricular activity. Mere knowledge by petitioner/principal Illumin of the planning of the
picnic by the students and their teachers does not in any way or in any manner show
acquiescence or consent to the holding of the same. The application therefore of Article 2180 has
no basis in law and neither is it supported by any jurisprudence. no negligence could be
attributable to the petitioners-teachers to warrant the award of damages to the respondents-
spouses. Petitioners Connie Arquio the class adviser of I-C, the section where Ferdinand
belonged, did her best and exercised diligence of a good father of a family to prevent any
untoward incident or damages to all the students who joined the picnic. In fact, Connie invited co-
petitioners Tirso de Chavez and Luisito Vinas who are both P.E. instructors and scout masters
who have knowledge in First Aid application and swimming. Moreover, even respondents'
witness, Segundo Vinas, testified that "the defendants (petitioners herein) had life savers
especially brought by the defendants in case of emergency." The records also show that both
petitioners Chavez and Vinas did all what is humanly possible to save the child.
PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, JUAN D. LIM, BENJAMIN P.
PAULINO, ANTONIO M. MAGTALAS, COL. PEDRO SACRO and LT. M.
SORIANO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGINA ORDOÑEZ-BENITEZ, in her capacity as Presiding
Judge of Branch 47, Regional Trial Court, Manila, SEGUNDA R. BAUTISTA and ARSENIA
D. BAUTISTA, respondents.
Facts:

• A stabbing incident which caused the death of Carlitos Bautista while on the 2 nd
floor of the premises of PSBA prompted the parents of the deceased to file a suit
for damages against the said PSBA and its corporate officers. At the time of his
death, Carlitos was enrolled in the 3rd year commerce course at the PSBA and his
assailants were not members of the school's academic community but were
elements from outside the school.
• The suit impleaded the PSBA and the following school authorities: Juan D. Lim
(President), Benjamin P. Paulino (Vice-President), Antonio M. Magtalas
(Treasurer/Cashier), Col. Pedro Sacro (Chief of Security) and a Lt. M. Soriano
(Assistant Chief of Security) for their negligence, recklessness and lack of security
precautions, means and methods before, during and after the attack on the victim.
• Petitioners sought to have the suit dismissed, but was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not PSBA may be held liable under quasi-delicts.
Ruling:
No. Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between
the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. A perusal of Article
2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual
obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or
implied. When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a
contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply
with. For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would
presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or
a profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school’s academic
requirements and observe its rules and regulations. Necessarily, the school must ensure that
adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent
the breakdown thereof. In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as
yet, no finding that the contract between the school and Bautista had been breached thru the
former’s negligence in providing proper security measures. This would be for the trial court to
determine. And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally to a
breach of contractual obligation only.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RODRIGO ARNAIZ, REGINA LATAGAN, RICARDO
GENERALAO and PAMPANGA SUGAR DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC.,
CORPORATION, Respondent.
Facts:

• (PASUDECO) transports sugarcane from Mabalacat and Magalang, Pampanga.

When the Mount Pinatubo eruption of 1991 heavily damaged the national bridges,
it requested permission from the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) for its trucks to enter
and pass through the NLEX.
• The TRB furnished the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) with
a copy of the said request for it to comment thereon.
• TRB and PASUDECO entered into a MOA where the latter was allowed to enter
and pass through the NLEX based on the following terms and conditions.
• Alex Sendin, the PNCC security supervisor, and his co-employees Eduardo
Ducusin and Vicente Pascual were patrolling Km. 72 going north of the NLEX.
They saw a pile of sugarcane in the middle portion of the north and southbound
lanes of the road.
• They placed lit cans with diesel oil in the north and southbound lanes, including
lane dividers with reflectorized markings, to warn motorists of the obstruction.
Sendin, Ducusin and Pascual proceeded to the PASUDECO office, believing that
the pile of sugarcane belonged to it since it was the only milling company in the
area.
• Thereafter, Sendin and company went back to Km. 72 and manned the traffic. At
around 4:00 a.m., five (5) PASUDECO men arrived, and started clearing the
highway of the sugarcane. They stacked the sugarcane at the side of the road.
The men left the area at around 5:40 a.m., leaving a few flattened sugarcanes
scattered on the road. As the bulk of the sugarcanes had been piled and
transferred along the roadside, Sendin thought there was no longer a need to man
the traffic. As dawn was already approaching, Sendin and company removed the
lighted cans and lane dividers.
• Rodrigo S. Arnaiz, a certified mechanic and marketing manager of JETTY
Marketing, Inc. was driving his two-door Toyota Corolla along the NLEX at about
65 kilometers per hour.
• As the vehicle ran over the scattered sugarcane, it flew out of control and turned
turtle several times. The accident threw the car about fifteen paces away from the
scattered sugarcane.
 • Arnaiz, Latagan and Generalao filed a complaint for damages against PASUDECO
and PNCC.
• RTC rendered its decision in favor of Latagan, dismissing that of Arnaiz and
Generalao for insufficiency of evidence. CA affirmed but with modification.
Issue:
Whether or not PASUDECO and PNCC are negligent and therefore both liable.
Ruling:
Yes. Negligence is the conduct which creates undue risk of harm to another, the failure to
observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance that the circumstance justly demand,
whereby that other person suffers injury. In the case at bar, it is clear that the petitioner failed to
exercise the requisite diligence in maintaining the NLEX safe for motorists. The lighted cans and
lane dividers on the highway were removed even as flattened sugarcanes lay scattered on the
ground. The highway was still wet from the juice and sap of the flattened sugarcanes. The
petitioner should have foreseen that the wet condition of the highway would endanger motorists
passing by at night or in the wee hours of the morning. Both defendants, appellant PASUDECO
and appellee PNCC, should be held liable. PNCC, in charge of the maintenance of the
expressway, has been negligent in the performance of its duties. The obligation of PNCC should
not be relegated to, by virtue of a private agreement, to other parties. PNCC declared the area
free from obstruction since there were no piles of sugarcane, but evidence shows there were still
pieces of sugarcane stalks left flattened by motorists. There must be an observance of that degree
of care, precaution, and vigilance which the situation demands. There should have been sufficient
warning devices considering that there were scattered sugarcane stalks still left along the tollway.
PASUDECO’s negligence in transporting sugarcanes without proper harness/straps, and that of
PNCC in removing the emergency warning devices, were two successive negligent acts which
were the direct and proximate cause of Latagan’s injuries and therefore where their concurring
negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are
solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code.
KHRISTINE REA M. REGINO, Assisted and Represented by ARMANDO REGINO, petitioner,
vs.
PANGASINAN COLLEGES OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, RACHELLE A. GAMUROT
and ELISSA BALADAD, respondents.
Facts:

• Khristine Rea M. Regino was a first-year computer science student at PCST.

• PCST held a fundraising campaign dubbed as the Rave Party and Dance
Revolution, the proceeds of which where to go to the construction of the school’s
tennis and volleyball courts.
• Each student was required to pay two tickets, P100 each. Students who purchased
tickets with additional points in their test scores, and those who refused were
denied the opportunity to take their final examinations.
• Khristine refused to pay for the tickets because she and her family were financially
challenged and her religion prohibited her from attending dance parties and
celebrations.
• Respondents Gamurot and Baladad, her teachers in logic and statistics,
respectively, disallowed her from taking her exams.
• Khristine filed, as a pauper litigant, a Complaint for Damages against PCST,
Gamurot, and Baladad.
• Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss: petitioner failed to exhaust administrative
remedies. Jurisidiction should have been with CHED because the question raised
involved a determination of the wisdom of the policy of PCST.
• RTC: dismissed the Complaint for lack of cause of action. It was CHED, and not
the courts, that had jurisdiction over the controversy.
• Khristine filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45.
Issue:
Whether or not the complaint stated sufficient cause/s of action.
Ruling:
Yes. There were two causes of action, first, breach of contract, second, liability for tort.
The first cause of action was for breach of contract. It was already ruled in Alcuaz v. PSBA and
Non v. Danes II, that a contractual relationship subsists between the school and the student. This
relationship gives rise to bilateral or reciprocal rights and obligations. Thus, students expect that
upon their payment of tuition fees, satisfaction of the set academic standards, completion of
academic requirements and observance of school rules and regulations, the school would reward
them by recognizing their “completion” of the course enrolled in. In the present case, PCST
imposed the assailed revenue raising measure belatedly, in the middle of the semester. It exacted
the dance party fee as a condition for the students’ taking the final examinations, and ultimately
for its recognition of their ability to finish a course. The fee, however, was not part of the school-
student contract entered into at the start of the school year. Hence, it could not be unilaterally
imposed to the prejudice of the enrollees. The second cause of action is based on liability for tort,
an academic institution may be held liable for tort even if it has an existing contract with its
students, since the act that violated the contract may also be a tort. The acts of respondents
supposedly caused her extreme humiliation, mental agony and “demoralization of unimaginable
proportions” in violation of Articles 19, 21 and 26 of the Civil Code. In the case at bar, she was
made to sit out her logic class while her classmates took the exam, and in her statistics class,
Baladad announced to the whole class that she wasn’t allowing petitioner and another student to
take their exams, and then ejected them from the classroom.
EMPLOYERS
AGUSTIN Y. GO and THE CONSOLIDATED BANK AND TRUST CORPORATION (Solidbank),
vs IAC and FLOVERTO JAZMIN
Facts:

• Respondent Floverto Jazmin is an American citizen, and retired US government

employee who has been a visitor in the Philippines since 1972, residing at 34
Maravilla Street, Mangatarem, Pangasinan. He receives annuity checks as
pension. He used to encash said checks at the Prudential Bank in Clark Air Base
Pampanga.
• In January 1975, Jazmin failed to receive one check which prompted him to inquire
from the post offices at Mangatarem and Dagupan. Unsatisfied, he then wrote to
the US CSC about the delays. T
• hereafter, he received a substitute check. Meanwhile in April 1975, petitioner
Agustin Go, branch manager of the then Solidbank (now Consolidated Bank) in
Baguio allowed one “Floverto Jazmin” to open a savings account by depositing two
US treasury checks.
• This depositor indicated in the information sheet that he was “Floverto Jazmin”
with mailing address in Mangatarem, Pangasinan, and home address at Maravilla
St., Mangatarem Pangasinan; and that he was a Filipino citizen and a security
officer of the US Army.
• He then left all the other fields of the information sheet such as the telephone
number, residence certificate, etc blank. Next, the checks this depositor submitted
were sent to the drawee bank for clearance.
• After 3 weeks, the depositor was allowed to withdraw the amounts in the check.
Two-dollar checks were returned to Solidbank with the notation that the amounts
were altered. Hence, Go reported it to the Philippine Constabulary.
• Meanwhile, Jazmin was required to appear at the Philippine Constabulary
headquarters for investigation regarding the complaint filed by Go against him for
estafa.
• Jazmin was then investigated, and he denied that he was the person whose name
appeared on the checks, and that he was the one who opened an account with
Solidbank. Eventually, the investigators found that the depositor using Jazmin’s
name. Jazmin then filed with the CFI a complaint against Go and Consolidated
Bank and exemplary damages.
• The court ruled in favor of Jazmin. The CA affirmed the decision.
Issue:

Whether or not petitioners are liable for damages due to the negligence in failing to
exercise more care, caution, and vigilance in accepting the checks for deposit and encashment

Ruling:

YES, Go is liable for damages. Indeed, it would be unjust to overlook the fact that
petitioners’ negligence was the root of all the inconvenience and embarrassment experienced by
the private respondent albeit they happened after the filing of the complaint with the constabulary
authorities. Petitioner Go’s negligence in fact led to the swindling of his employer. Had Go
exercised the diligence expected of him as a bank officer and employee, he would have noticed
the glaring disparity between the payee’s name and address on the treasury checks involved and
the name and address of the depositor appearing in the bank’s records. The situation would have
been different if the treasury checks were tampered with only as to their amounts because the
alteration would have been unnoticeable and hard to detect as the herein altered check bearing
the amount of $913.40 shows. But the error in the name and address of the payee was very patent
and could not have escaped the trained eyes of bank officers and employees. There is therefore,
no other conclusion than that the bank through its employees (including the tellers who allegedly
conducted an identification check on the depositor) was grossly negligent in handling the business
transaction herein involved.

In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural
and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such
damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant. As Go’s
negligence was the root cause of the complained inconvenience, humiliation and embarrassment,
Go is liable to private respondents for damages.

Anent petitioner bank’s claim that it is not “co-equally liable” with Go for damages, under the fifth
paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, “(E)mployers shall be liable for the damages caused
by their employees x x x acting within the scope of their assigned tasks.” Pursuant to this
provision, the bank is responsible for the acts of its employee unless there is proof that it exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. Hence, the burden of proof lies
upon the bank and it cannot now disclaim liability in view of its own failure to prove not only that
it exercised due diligence to prevent damage but that it was not negligent in the selection and
supervision of its employees.
CASTILEX INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
VICENTE VASQUEZ, JR. and LUISA SO VASQUEZ, and CEBU DOCTORS' HOSPITAL, INC.,
respondents.
Facts:

• Romeo So Vasquez, was driving a Honda motorcycle and was traveling counter-
clockwise but without any protective helmet or goggles. He was also only carrying
a Student's Permit to Drive at the time.
• Benjamin Abad was a manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation,
registered owner of a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up.
• Abad drove the said company car out of a parking lot but instead of going around
the Osmeña rotunda he made a short cut against the flow of the traffic in
proceeding to his route and in the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the
pick-up of Abad collided with each other causing severe injuries to the former.
Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital
and later to the Cebu Doctor's Hospital.
• Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctor's Hospital. It was there that Abad signed an
acknowledgment of Responsible Party wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital
bills, professional fees and other incidental charges Vasquez may incur.
• Then a Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was subsequently
dismissed for failure to prosecute.
• The trial court ruled in favor of private respondents Vicente and Luisa Vasquez
and ordered Jose Benjamin Abad and petitioner Castilex Industrial Corporation to
pay jointly and solidarily to the Spouses Vasquez.
• Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court holding ABAD and CASTILEX
liable but held that the liability of the latter is "only vicarious and not solidary" with
the former.
Issue:
Whether or not an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the
negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle.
Ruling:
No. As a General Rule, under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged
in any business or industry, an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within the
scope of his assigned tasks. But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship;
once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee was
acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. It is only
then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of the employee. The mere fact that Abad was using a service vehicle
at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the
negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the
course or scope of his employment. An employee who uses his employer's vehicle in going from
his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily
acting within the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special business
benefit to the employer. Evidence that by using the employer's vehicle to go to and from meals,
an employee is enabled to reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his
duties supports the finding that an employee is acting within the scope of his employment while
so driving the vehicle. In the case at bar, it is undisputed that Abad did some overtime work at the
petitioner's office, which was located in Cabangcalan, Mandaue City. Thereafter, he went to
Goldie's Restaurant in Fuente Osmeña, Cebu City, which is about seven kilometers away from
petitioner's place of business. A witness for the private respondents, a sidewalk vendor, testified
that Fuente Osmeña is a "lively place" even at dawn because Goldie's Restaurant and Back Street
were still open and people were drinking thereat. Moreover, prostitutes, pimps, and drug addicts
littered the place. Abad was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose
not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident. It was then about 2:00 a.m.
of 28 August 1988, way beyond the normal working hours. ABAD's working day had ended; his
overtime work had already been completed. His being at a place which, as petitioner put it, was
known as a "haven for prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and addicts," had no connection to
petitioner's business; neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager. Rather, using his
service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks
attached to his position. That petitioner Castilex had no duty to show that it exercised the diligence
of a good father of a family in providing Abad with a service vehicle. Thus, justice and equity
require that petitioner be relieved of vicarious liability for the consequences of the negligence of
Abad in driving its vehicle.
VICTORY LINER, INC. petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF ANDRES MALECDAN, respondents.

Facts:

• Petitioner is a common carrier while private respondent Elena Malecdan is the

widow of the deceased.
• Andres Malecdan was a 75-year-old farmer, while he was crossing the National
Highway on his way home from the farm, a Dalin Liner bus on the southbound lane
stopped to allow him and his carabao to pass.
• As Andres was crossing the highway, a bus of petitioner Victory Liner, driven by
Ricardo C. Joson, Jr., bypassed the Dalin bus. In so doing, respondent hit the old
man and the carabao on which he was riding. As a result, Andres Malecdan was
thrown off the carabao, while the beast toppled over. The Victory Liner bus sped
past the old man, while the Dalin bus proceeded to its destination without helping
him.
• Malecdan sustained a wound on his left shoulder, from which bone fragments
protruded. He was taken by Lorena and another person to the Cagayan District
Hospital where he died a few hours after arrival. The carabao also died soon
afterwards.
• Private respondents brought this suit for damages and the RTC rendered
judgement and it found the driver guilty of gross negligence in the operation of his
vehicle and Victory Liner, Inc. also guilty of gross negligence in the selection and
supervision of Joson, Jr. Petitioner and its driver were held liable for damages.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in
the selection and supervision of its employee.

Ruling:

Yes. Article 2176 provides: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there
is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter. Article 2180 provides for the solidary liability of an employer for
the quasi-delict committed by an employee. The responsibility of employers for the negligence of
their employees in the performance of their duties is primary and, therefore, the injured party may
recover from the employers directly, regardless of the solvency of their employees. The losses
caused by the torts of employees, which as a practical matter are sure to occur in the conduct of
the employer's enterprise, are placed upon that enterprise itself, as a required cost of doing
business. They are placed upon the employer because, having engaged in an enterprise, which
will on the basis of all past experience involve harm to others through the tort of employees, and
sought to profit by it, it is just that he, rather than the innocent injured plaintiff, should bear them;
and because he is better able to absorb them and to distribute them, through prices, rates or
liability insurance, to the public, and so to shift them to society, to the community at large.
Employers may be relieved of responsibility for the negligent acts of their employees acting within
the scope of their assigned task only if they can show that "they observed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent damage." In the selection of prospective employees, employers
are required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience and service records. With
respect to the supervision of employees, employers must formulate standard operating
procedures, monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary measures for breaches thereof.
These facts must be shown by concrete proof, including documentary evidence. In the instant
case, petitioner presented the results of Joson, Jr.'s written examination, actual driving test x-ray
examination, psychological examination, NBI clearance, physical examination, hematology
examination, urinalysis, student driver training, shop training, birth certificate, high school diploma
and reports from the General Maintenance Manager and the Personnel Manager showing that he
had passed all the tests and training sessions and was ready to work as a professional driver.
However, as the trial court noted, petitioner did not present proof that Joson, Jr. had nine years
of driving experience. Petitioner also presented testimonial evidence that drivers of the company
were given seminars on driving safety at least twice a year. Again, however, as the trial court
noted there is no record of Joson, Jr. ever attending such a seminar. Petitioner likewise failed to
establish the speed of its buses during its daily trips or to submit in evidence the trip tickets, speed
meters and reports of field inspectors. The finding of the trial court that petitioner's bus was
running at a very fast speed when it overtook the Dalin bus and hit the deceased was not disputed
by petitioner. For these reasons, we hold that the trial court did not err in finding petitioner to be
negligent in the supervision of its driver Joson, Jr.
ERNESTO PLEYTO and PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioners,
vs.
MARIA D. LOMBOY and CARMELA LOMBOY, respondents.
Facts:

• PRBL is a public carrier, engaged in carrying passenger and goods for a fare while
petitioner Ernesto Pleyto was a bus driver employed by PRBL at the time of the
incident in question.
• Respondent Maria D. Lomboy of Calasiao is the surviving spouse of the late
Ricardo Lomboy, who died in a vehicular accident.
• The accident was a head-on collision between the PRBL bus driven by petitioner
Pleyto and the car where Ricardo was a passenger. Respondent Carmela Lomboy
is the eldest daughter of Ricardo and Maria Lomboy. Carmela suffered injuries
requiring hospitalization in the same accident which resulted in her father’s death.
• Herein respondents, as pauper-litigants, filed an action for damages against PRBL
and its driver, Pleyto, and judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and
against the defendants. CA affirmed with modifications.
Issue:
Whether or not Pleyto is negligent and thus making PRBL Bus liable.
Ruling:
Yes. The negligence and fault of appellant driver is manifest. He overtook the tricycle
despite the oncoming car only fifty (50) meters away from him. Defendant-appellant’s claim that
he was driving at a mere 30 to 35 kilometers per hour does not deserve credence as it would
have been easy to stop or properly maneuver the bus at this speed. The speed of the bus, the
drizzle that made the road slippery, and the proximity of the car coming from the opposite direction
were duly established by the evidence. The speed at which the bus traveled, inappropriate in the
light of the aforementioned circumstances, is evident from the fact despite the application of the
brakes, the bus still bumped the tricycle, and then proceeded to collide with the incoming car with
such force that the car was pushed beyond the edge of the road to the rice field. Petitioner Pleyto
violated traffic rules and regulations when he overtook the tricycle despite the presence of an
oncoming car in the other lane. Article 2185 of the Civil Code lays down the presumption that a
person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating
any traffic regulation. As found by both the Court of Appeals and the trial court, petitioners failed
to present any convincing proof rebutting such presumption. A driver abandoning his proper lane
for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that
the road is clear and not to proceed if he cannot do so in safety. When a motor vehicle is
approaching or rounding a curve, there is special necessity for keeping to the right side of the
road and the driver does not have the right to drive on the left-hand side relying upon having time
to turn to the right if a car approaching from the opposite direction comes into view. In the present
case, petitioners presented several documents in evidence to show the various tests and pre-
qualification requirements imposed upon petitioner Pleyto before his hiring as a driver by PRBL.
However, no documentary evidence was presented to prove that petitioner PRBL exercised due
diligence in the supervision of its employees, including Pleyto. It has not however, shown to the
satisfaction of the Court that it has maintained proper supervision of its employees, especially
drivers while in the actual operation of its buses. While it has a list of procedures and testing when
it comes to recruitment and another list of what should be done with its buses before they are
allowed to run on the road, it has no list of procedures and duties to be followed by a driver while
he is operating a vehicle to prevent injury to persons and damage to property. Neither has it
proved to the Court that there are people employed by it to supervise its drivers so that it can be
seen to it that all the safety procedures to prevent accident or damage to property or injury to
people on the road have been in place. It is in this aspect of supervising its employees where this
Court has found the defendant PRBL deficient.
STATE
SPOUSES JOSE FONTANILLA AND VIRGINIA FONTANILLA, petitioners, vs.
HONORABLE INOCENCIO D. MALIAMAN and NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION,
respondents.
NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION, appellant, vs.
SPOUSES JOSE FONTANILLA and VIRGINIA FONTANILLA.
Facts:

• A pickup owned and operated by respondent National Irrigation Administration, a

government agency is driven officially by Hugo Garcia, an employee of said
agency as its regular driver, bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla, son
of herein petitioners, and Restituto Deligo.
• As a result of the impact, Francisco Fontanilla and Restituto Deligo were injured
and brought to the San Jose City Emergency Hospital for treatment. Fontanilla was
later transferred to the Cabanatuan Provincial Hospital where he died.
• Garcia was then a regular driver of respondent National Irrigation Administration
who, at the time of the accident, was a licensed professional driver and who
qualified for employment as such regular driver of respondent after having passed
the written and oral examinations on traffic rules and maintenance of vehicles
given by National Irrigation Administration authorities.
• The petition was instituted by petitioners-spouses on April 17, 1978 against
respondent NIA.
• The trial court rendered judgment directed respondent National Irrigation
Administration to pay damages to petitioners.
• Instead of filing the required brief in the aforecited Court of Appeals case,
petitioners filed the instant petition with this Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the award of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees is
legally proper in a complaint for damages based on quasi-delict which resulted in the death of the
son of herein petitioners.
Ruling:
Yes. The liability of the State has two aspects. namely: 1.) Its public or governmental
aspects where it is liable for the tortious acts of special agents only. 2.) Its private or business
aspects (as when it engages in private enterprises) where it becomes liable as an ordinary
employer. The National Irrigation Administration is an agency of the government exercising
proprietary functions. That NIA is a government corporation with juridical personality and not a
mere agency of the government. Since it is a corporate body performing non-governmental
functions, it now becomes liable for the damage caused by the accident resulting from the tortious
act of its driver-employee. In this particular case, the NIA assumes the responsibility of an ordinary
employer and as such, it becomes answerable for damages. This assumption of liability, however,
is predicated upon the existence of negligence on the part of respondent NIA. The negligence
referred to here is the negligence of supervision.
At this juncture, the matter of due diligence on the part of respondent NIA becomes a crucial issue
in determining its liability since it has been established that respondent is a government agency
performing proprietary functions and as such, it assumes the posture of an ordinary employer
which, under Par. 5 of Art. 2180, is responsible for the damages caused by its employees provided
that it has failed to observe or exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of the driver.
The accident happened along the Maharlika National Road within the city limits of San Jose City,
an urban area. Considering the fact that the victim was thrown 50 meters away from the point of
impact, there is a strong indication that driver Garcia was driving at a high speed. This is confirmed
by the fact that the pick-up suffered substantial and heavy damage as above-described and the
fact that the NIA group was then "in a hurry to reach the campsite as early as possible", as shown
by their not stopping to find out what they bumped as would have been their normal and initial
reaction. There was negligence in the supervision of the driver for the reason that they were
travelling at a high speed within the city limits and yet the supervisor of the group, Ely Salonga,
failed to caution and make the driver observe the proper and allowed speed limit within the city.
Under the situation, such negligence is further aggravated by their desire to reach their destination
without even checking whether or not the vehicle suffered damage from the object it bumped,
thus showing imprudence and recklessness on the part of both the driver and the supervisor in
the group. Even if the employer can prove the diligence in the selection and supervision (the latter
aspect has not been established herein) of the employee, still if he ratifies the wrongful acts, or
take no step to avert further damage, the employer would still be liable.
Quezon City Government and Engr. Ramir Tiamzon vs Fulgencio Dacara
Facts:

• Fulgencio Dacara Jr, son of Fulgencio Dacara Sr. and owner of the 87 Toyota
Corolla while driving the said vehicle rammed into a pile of earth/street diggings
which was then being repaired by the QC government.
• That as a result, Dacara allegedly sustained bodily injuries and the vehicle suffered
extensive damage for it turned turtle when it hit the pile of the earth.
• Indemnification was sought but the government did not heed to their request so
Fulgencio Dacara filed a complaint for damages against petitioners.
• RTC rendered judgement ordering to pay them actual/compensatory, moral,
exemplary, attorney’s fee and other cost of suit. CA agreed with RTC’s findings
that petitioner’s negligence was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by
respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners are negligent.
Whether or not respondents are entitled to moral damages.
Whether or not respondents are entitled to exemplary damages.
Ruling:
1. Yes. Proximate cause is defined as any because that produces injury in a natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any intervening cause, such that the result would not
have occurred otherwise. The negligence of petitioners was the proximate cause of the
accident that on the day of the accident, which caused almost the life and limb of Fulgencio
Dacara Jr when his car turned turtle was the existence of a pile of earth from a digging
done relative to the base failure of Maharlika street that there should be a lighting device
or a reflectorize barricade or sign which could have served as an adequate warning to
motorist especially during the thick of the night. That under Art. 2180 the responsibility of
the government relative to the maintenance of roads and bridges since it exercises the
control and supervision and failure of the QC government to comply is tantamount to
negligence which renders them liable.
2. No. To award moral damages, the requisites must be present: 1) an injury, whether
physical, mental or psychological- clearly sustained by the claimant; 2) culpable
act/omission factually established; 3) wrongful act/omission of the defendant as the
proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; 4) award of damages predicated
on any of the cases under Art. 2219. In the present case, the complaint alleged that
respondent’s son sustained physical injuries however, no other evidence was presented
such as medical certificate/proof of medical expenses to prove that he sustained physical
injuries and since no credible proof was shown award of moral damages cannot be given.
3. Yes. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right and that the claimants
must show their entitlement to moral, temperate/compensatory. In the case at bar,
respondents sufficiently proved that petitioner’s negligence was the proximate cause of
the incident, which established his right to actual/compensatory. With respect to
exemplary damages, it may be recovered if the defendant acted with gross negligence,
that the QC government have failed to show that medium of responsibility, much less, the
care expected of them by the constituents of the City. That the exemplary damages is
meant to be a deterrent to socially deleterious actions and that the local government and
their employees should be responsible not only for the maintenance of the road and
streets but also the safety of the public and must secure construction areas with adequate
precautionary measures.
Liwayway Vinzon Chatto vs Fortune Tobacco Corporation
Facts:

• This is a case for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code filed by Fortune against
Liwayway as CIR.
• On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which provided that locally
manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55% shall be charged
an ad valorem tax of “55% provided that the maximum tax shall not be less than Five
Pesos per pack.” Prior to effectivity of RA 7654, Liwayway issued a rule, reclassifying
“Champion,” “Hope,” and “More” (all manufactured by Fortune) as locally manufactured
cigarettes bearing foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. Thus, when RA 7654
was passed, these cigarette brands were already covered.
• In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune contended that the issuance of
the rule violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process
of law and the right to equal protection of the laws.
• For her part, Liwayway contended in her motion to dismiss that respondent has no cause
of action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official
function and within the scope of her authority. She claimed that she acted merely as an
agent of the Republic and therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts. She also
contended that the complaint states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or
bad faith.
• The order denying the motion to dismiss was elevated to the CA, who dismissed the case
on the ground that under Article 32, liability may arise even if the defendant did not act
with malice or bad faith.
Issue:
Whether or not a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done
in connection with the discharge of the functions of his/her office
Whether or not Article 32, NCC, should be applied instead of Sec. 38, Book I,
Administrative Code
Ruling:
On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a
person may suffer arising from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope of
his assigned tasks. An officer who acts within his authority to administer the affairs of the office
which he/she heads is not liable for damages that may have been caused to another, as it would
virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for monetary claims
without its consent. However, a public officer is by law not immune from damages in his/her
personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are
no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions. Specifically, under Sec. 38,
Book I, Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where there is bad faith, malice, or gross
negligence on the part of a superior public officer. And, under Sec. 39 of the same Book, civil
liability may arise where the subordinate public officer’s act is characterized by willfulness or
negligence. In Cojuangco, Jr. V. CA, a public officer who directly or indirectly violates the
constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code
even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith. Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is
that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in the course of
the performance of the functions of the office, where said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad
faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff.
On the second issue, SC ruled that the decisive provision is Article 32, it being a special
law, which prevails over a general law (the Administrative Code). Article 32 was patterned after
the “tort” in American law. A tort is a wrong, a tortious act which has been defined as the
commission or omission of an act by one, without right, whereby another receives some injury,
directly or indirectly, in person, property or reputation. There are cases in which it has been stated
that civil liability in tort is determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of the tortfeasor,
and there are circumstances under which the motive of the defendant has been rendered
immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the rule is that otherwise, the mental attitude of the
alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine whether the act was wrongful.
Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act
which is otherwise an invasion of another’s legal right; that is, liability in tort in not precluded by
the fact that defendant acted without evil intent.
TEACHERS AND HEADS OF ESTABLISHMENTS
Spouses MOISES P. PALISOC and BRIGIDA P. PALISOC, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
ANTONIO C. BRILLANTES and TEODOSIO V. VALENTON, owner and President,
respectively, of a school of arts and trades, known under the name and style of "Manila
Technical Institute" (M.I.T.), VIRGILIO L. DAFFON and SANTIAGO M.
QUIBULUE, defendants-appellees.
Facts:

• Plaintiffs-appellants as parents of their sixteen-year old son, Dominador Palisoc,

and a student in automotive mechanics at the Manila Technical Institute had filed
an action for damages arising from the death f their son at the hands of a fellow
student, defendant Virgilio L. Daffon, at the laboratory room of the said Institute.
• During recess, an altercation transpired between the deceased and the defendant.
At the time of the incident, Dominador was sixteen years old while Virgilio was
already of age. Virgilio was working on a machine with Dominador looking at them.
• The situation prompted Virgilio to remark that Dominador was acting like a
foreman. As a result, Dominador slapped Virgilio on the face. Virgilio retaliated by
inflicting severe blows upon Dominador’s stomach, which caused the latter to
stumble upon an engine block and faint. The latter died, the cause of death being
“shock due to traumatic fracture of the ribs”.
• The parents of Dominador filed an action for damages against (1) Virgilio, (2)
Valenton, the head/president of MTI, (3) Quibule who was the teacher in charge at
the time of the incident, and (4) Brillantes who is a member of the board of directors
and former sole proprietor of MTI.
• The trial court held Virgilio liable but absolved the other defendants-officials. It
stated that the clause “so long as they remain in their custody” contained in Article
2180 of the Civil Code applies only where the pupil lives and boards with the
teachers, such that the control or influence on the pupil supersedes those of the
parents., and such control and responsibility for the pupil’s actions would pass from
the father and mother to the teachers.
• This legal conclusion was based on the dictum in Mercado v. CA, which in turn
based its decision in Exconde v. Capuno.
• The trial court held that Article 2180 was not applicable in this case, as defendant
Virgilio did not live with the defendants-officials at the time of the incident. Hence,
this petition.
Issue:
Who must be held liable for damages for the death of Dominador together with the
defendant?
Ruling:
The head/president and teacher of MTI (Valenton and Quibule respectively) were held
liable jointly and severally with the Virgilio for damages. No liability attaches to Brillantes as a
mere member of the MTI board of directors. Similarly, MTI may not be held liable since it had not
been properly impleaded as party defendant. The phrase used in Article 2180, “so long as the
students remain in their custody” means the protective and supervisory custody that the school
and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time. There is nothing in the law that requires that for
such liability to attach the pupil or student who commits the tortuous act must live and board in
the school. The dicta in the cases of Mercado as well as in Exconde v. Capuno on which it relied
are deemed to have been set aside. The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers
for the tortious acts of their pupils and students, so long as they remain in their custody, is that
they stand, in loco parentis to a certain extent to their pupils and students and are called upon to
“exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child.” In this case, the unfortunate death
resulting from the fight between the protagonists-students could have been avoided, had said
defendants complied with their duty of providing adequate supervision over the activities of the
students in the school premises to protect their students from harm. Since Valenton and Quibule
failed to prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage,
they cannot likewise avail of the exemption to the liability. The judgment of the appellate court
was modified, while claim for compensatory damages was increased in accordance with recent
jurisprudence and the claim for exemplary damages denied in the absence of gross negligence
on the part of the said defendants.
Jose S. Amadora, Loreta A. Amadora, Jose S. Amadora, Jr., Norma A. ylaya, Pantaleon A.
Amadora, Jose A. Amdora III, Lucy A. Amadora, Rosalinda A. Amadora, Perfedto A.
Amadora, Serreca A. Amadora, Vicente A. Amadora and Maria Tiscalina A. Amdora,
petitioners, vs. Court of Appeals, Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, Victor Lluch Sergio P.
Damaso Jr., Celistino Dicon, Aniano Abellana, Pablito Damon thru his parents and natural
guardians, Mr. and Mrs. Nicanor Gumban, and Rolando Valencia, thru his guardian, A.
Francisco, respondents.
Facts:

• Alfredo Amadora, seventeen years old was about to graduate, however while in
the school, Colegion de San Jose-Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a
gun that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life as well.
• Damon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence.Herein petitioners,
as the victim's parents, filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school
principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with Damon and two
other students, through their respective parents.
• The complaint against the students was later dropped.
• The trial court held the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs. On appeal to
the respondent court, however, the decision was reversed and all the defendants
were completely absolved.
• The petitioners contend that their son was in the school to show his physics
experiment as a prerequisite to his graduation; hence, he was then under the
custody of the private respondents.
• The private respondents submit that Alfredo had gone to the school only for the
purpose of submitting his physics report and that he was no longer in their custody
because the semester had already ended.
Issue:
Whether or not Art. 2180 can be applied in this case.
Ruling:
No. The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable
because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as previously defined. Colegio de San Jose-
Recoletos cannot be held directly liable under the article because only the teacher or the head of
the school of arts and trades is made responsible for the damage caused by the student or
apprentice. Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. Lastly, teachers
or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils
and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. The responsibility treated of
in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. After an exhaustive examination of the
problem, the Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question should apply to all
schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where the school is academic rather than technical
or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher
in charge of such student, following the first part of the provision. This is the general rule. In the
case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held
liable as an exception to the general rule. As stated in the dissent of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in the
Exconde Case, under Art. 2180, he said, was imposed on (1) teachers in general; and (2) heads
of schools of arts and trades in particular. The modifying clause “of establishments of arts and
trades” should apply only to “heads” and not “teachers.” But of course, as long as the defendant
can show that he had taken the necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of, he
can exonerate himself from the liability imposed by Article 2180, as stated in its last paragraph.
In this connection, it should be observed that the teacher will be held liable not only when he is
acting in loco parentis for the law does not require that the offending student be of minority age.
Unlike the parent, who wig be liable only if his child is still a minor, the teacher is held answerable
by the law for the act of the student under him regardless of the student’s age In any event, it
should be noted that the liability imposed by this article is supposed to fall directly on the teacher
or the head of the school of arts and trades and not on the school itself. If at all, the school,
whatever its nature, may be held to answer for the acts of its teachers or even of the head thereof
under the general principle of respondeat superior, but then it may exculpate itself from liability
by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias. The school can show that it
exercised proper measures in selecting the head or its teachers and the appropriate supervision
over them in the custody and instruction of the pupils pursuant to its rules and regulations for the
maintenance of discipline among them. The other matter to be resolved is the duration of the
responsibility of the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades over the students. Is such
responsibility co-extensive with the period when the student is actually undergoing studies during
the school term, as contended by the respondents and impliedly admitted by the petitioners
themselves? This does not necessarily mean that such, custody be co-terminous with the
semester, beginning with the start of classes and ending upon the close thereof, and excluding
the time before or after such period, such as the period of registration, and in the case of
graduating students, the period before the commencement exercises [During such periods, the
student is still subject to the disciplinary authority of the school and cannot consider himself
released altogether from observance of its rules.]In the view of the Court, the student is in the
custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school
and within its premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended. As long
as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student
objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate
student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of the
school authorities over the student continues. Indeed, even if the student should be doing nothing
more than relaxing in the campus in the company of his classmates and friends and enjoying the
ambience and atmosphere of the school, he is still within the custody and subject to the discipline
of the school authorities under the provisions of Article 2180.

NOTES:
The reason for the disparity [distinction of who should be responsible for students between
academic and arts and trades schools] can be traced to the fact that historically the head of the
school of arts and trades exercised a closer tutelage over his pupils than the head of the academic
school. The old schools of arts and trades were engaged in the training of artisans apprenticed to
their master who personally and directly instructed them on the technique and secrets of their
craft. By contrast, the head of the academic school was not as involved with his students and
exercised only administrative duties over the teachers who were the persons directly dealing with
the students. The head of the academic school had then (as now) only a vicarious relationship
with the students. Consequently, while he could not be directly faulted for the acts of the students,
the head of the school of arts and trades, because of his closer ties with them, could be so blamed.
It is conceded that the distinction no longer obtains at present in view of the expansion of the
schools of arts and trades, the consequent increase in their enrollment, and the corresponding
diminution of the direct and personal contract of their heads with the students. Article 2180,
however, remains unchanged. In its present state, the provision must be interpreted by the Court
according to its clear and original mandate until the legislature, taking into account the charges in
the situation subject to be regulated, sees fit to enact the necessary amendment.
BENJAMIN SALVOSA and BAGUIO COLLEGES FOUNDATION, petitioners,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, EDUARDO B. CASTRO, DIOMEDES B. CASTRO,
VIRGINIA B. CASTRO and RODOLFO B. CASTRO., respondents.
Facts:

• Baguio Colleges Foundation is an academic institution. However, it is also an

institution of arts and trade because BCF has a full-fledged technical-vocational
department offering Communication, Broadcast and Teletype Technician courses
as well as Electronics Serviceman and Automotive Mechanics courses.
• Within the premises of the BCF is an ROTC Unit. The Baguio Colleges Foundation
ROTC Unit had Jimmy B. Abon as its duly appointed armorer.
• As armorer of the ROTC Unit, Jimmy B. Abon received his appointment from the
AFP. Not being an employee of the BCF, he also received his salary from the AFP,
as well as orders from Captain Roberto C. Ungos. Jimmy B. Abon was also a
commerce student of the BCF.
• On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF, Jimmy B.
Abon shot Napoleon Castro a student of the University of Baguio with an
unlicensed firearm which the former took from the armory of the ROTC Unit of the
BCF.
• As a result, Napoleon Castro died and Jimmy B. Abon was prosecuted for, and
convicted of the crime of Homicide.
• Subsequently, the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages, impleading Jimmy
B. Abon and the BCF.
Issue:
Whether or not BCF is subsidiarily liable.
Ruling:
No. Under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and
trades are liable for “damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they
remain in their custody.” The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student remains in
the custody of a teacher, the latter “stands, to a certain extent, in loco parentis as to the student
and is called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the student.” Likewise,
“the phrase used in Art. 2180 — ‘so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the
protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the
pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time.”
Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to have been “at attendance in the school,” or in the custody
of BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro. Logically, therefore, petitioners cannot under Art. 2180
of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages resulting from his acts.