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What was Britain's “East of Suez Role”?

Reassessing the Withdrawal, 1964–1968
David M. McCourt
Published online: 03 Nov 2009.

To cite this article: David M. McCourt (2009) What was Britain's “East of Suez Role”? Reassessing the
Withdrawal, 1964–1968, Diplomacy & Statecraft, 20:3, 453-472, DOI: 10.1080/09592290903293787

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ISSN: 0959-2296 print/1557-301X online
DOI: 10.1080/09592290903293787

What was Britain’s “East of Suez Role”?

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Reassessing the Withdrawal, 1964–1968

DAVID M. MCCOURT
Britain’s
D. M. McCourt
“East of Suez Role”

Although often considered an objective fact, Britain’s “East of

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Suez role” was actually a rhetorical construction. As such, it was

dependent on the continued ability of Britain to “make” that role
and other important players to “cast” Britain into it. But the Wilson
government’s initial support for East of Suez had the paradoxical
effect of bringing its coherence into question. Without a British
future in Aden, East of Suez was increasingly linked solely to the
Far East, where, with the end of Confrontation in 1966, the argu-
ment for staying lost much of its force. Other interested Powers
were also increasingly unable to cast Britain into the role: the
nationalist tide and the United States’ tribulations in Vietnam
being primary factors. The article thus shows that thinking
through the implications of this realisation provides a better
understanding of the withdrawal than by resting on economic or
domestic political factors alone.

In January 1968, after over three years of agonising debate, the British
Labour Government under Harold Wilson announced the relinquishment of
Britain’s “East of Suez role.”1 Withdrawal left Britain’s contribution to the
defence of Europe and its nuclear deterrent as its only two remaining
“roles”: the leftovers of the post-Second World War defence posture
inspired by Churchill’s notion of the “three circles.”2 A number of interpreta-
tions and assessments of this watershed in Britain’s post-war history have
been put forward. It has been most often noted that the role was renounced
in the face of severe pressure to cut overseas defence spending.3 The
January 1968 decision took place in the wake of the devaluation of Sterling
on 18 November 1967, which itself had followed intermittent and often
intense speculative attack against the British currency.4 By 1968, it has thus
been argued, it was clearly no longer in Britain’s interests to expend such
effort—material and financial—in an area where its immediate security was
not endangered. When domestic political factors are included as part of the

453
 454 D. M. McCourt

story,5 particularly the appointment of the Europhile Roy Jenkins to the

Treasury, the explanation for the decision is seemingly complete. Also
thereby complete is our understanding of the meaning of the readjustment:
“Britain had decided to come home after 500 years”;6 she had chosen
“Europe” over the “world.”7
This analysis challenges both the predominant interpretations of the
withdrawal and the assessments of its significance. Whilst economics and
domestic politics are crucial elements of any complete account, they do not
provide an adequate view of the events. This is because current treatments
do not question what Britain’s East of Suez “role” was, which has resulted in
the meaning of the events being neglected whilst the search for fundamen-
tal causes of particular decisions is prioritised. Although often considered by
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historians to be an objective fact, Britain’s “East of Suez role” was in fact a

rhetorical construction, dependent on the ability of policy-makers to “make”
that role and other important players to cast Britain into it. By focusing on
the nature of roles in international affairs, this article offers a more complete
account of the withdrawal, and also one that can more adequately appraise
the significance of the events for Britain’s post-1945 experience. It draws
attention to the manner in which the Labour Government became increas-
ingly less able, and less willing, to continue to construct this role, on the
one hand, whilst important others—especially nationalist leaders in the
region—became less capable of supporting it, on the other. Even the United
States, powerful enough to persuade Britain to go on enacting the role long
after it had become deeply problematic, was unable to support “East of
Suez”—largely because of its own troubles in Vietnam. The withdrawal
therefore did not represent a relinquishment of Britain’s role on the world
stage, nor a straightforward choice between “Europe” and “the world”; it
was, instead, the result of a realisation that Britain’s desire to play a mean-
ingful world role no longer required, nor could include, the construction of
the specific role “East of Suez.”

BRITAIN’S WITHDRAWAL FROM EAST OF SUEZ

Despite the grandiose label “East of Suez,” the possessions and commit-
ments that constituted that “role” were actually a diverse set of remnants
from Britain’s Imperial past, located in Southern Arabia, the Persian Gulf,
and in the Far East: literally, therefore, eastwards of the Suez Canal. It com-
prised two large sovereign bases, one at Aden, the other at Singapore, in
addition to a collection of smaller posts in the Persian Gulf at Sabah,
Sarawak, and Hong Kong, and in the Far East at Sharjah, Bahrain, and
Masirah. In total, it numbered some 80,900 men.8 This infrastructure was
associated with a set of treaties with and promises of protection to a num-
ber of fledgling states, protectorates, and tribal organisations. In the Far
 Britain’s “East of Suez Role” 455

East, these were focused upon the Malaysian Federation, created in 1963,9
and included the oil-rich sultanate of Brunei. In the Middle East, they cov-
ered the Trucial States, Qatar, Bahrain, and the Sultanate of Muscat and
Oman, and included also Kuwait, which had signed a defence treaty with
Britain in 1961.10
The process of withdrawing from this region took the form of an
almost constant review of defence strategy and expenditure, under the
direction of Denis Healey as Minister of Defence.11 Although it was
expected that the new government would launch such a review upon enter-
ing office,12 the process was given added impetus by the news that the
economy was in far worse shape than foreseen, including a projected
balance of payments deficit in the order of £800 million.13 Healey’s immedi-
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ate aim was “to put our defences on a sound basis and ensure the nation
gets value for money.”14 Consequently, the first broad phase of the review
was characterised by attempts to obtain quick economies by cutting expen-
sive armaments projects—including TSR 2 in April 1965.15 More controver-
sially, the aircraft carrier programme was also cancelled, triggering the
resignations of First Sea Lord David Luce and Navy Minister Christopher
Mayhew.16 Yet despite the bruised egos, the savings produced enabled
Healey to announce a successful cost-cutting exercise upon the publication
of his Defence White Paper of February 1966.17
In seeking to maintain the East of Suez role, he was aided by the
announcement that Britain intended to withdraw completely from the base
at Aden upon independence for the Federation of South Arabian States,
which was to be achieved before 1968.18 The Federation was a British
scheme that policymakers hoped would be able to allow a smooth transfer
of power and to withstand the influence of Nasserite Yemen.19 However,
severe civil strife made a post-independence presence problematic, and it
was decided to run down the base at the same time as the handover to the
Adenis.20 Nonetheless, as of March 1966—and Labour’s re-election with a
strengthened majority—Britain retained the East of Suez role that Wilson
had inherited eighteen months earlier, although it would be discharged with
significantly streamlined forces.
The conclusions of the White Paper had barely been fully digested,
however, before renewed pressure on Sterling on international markets,
culminating in the crisis of Summer 1966,21 brought defence again under
review. Despite severe measures to deflate the domestic economy, includ-
ing increased duties on key consumer goods, a pay pause, together with a
large loan secured from the United States and several European Central
Banks,22 bankers were not sufficiently satisfied to desist speculating against
the British currency. As a result, Healey was asked to take a fresh knife to
the defence budget: this time commitments and not merely capacities would
have to be cancelled.23 This second period of the withdrawal lasted broadly
from the autumn of 1966 until January 1968. It included the publication of
 456 D. M. McCourt

another White Paper on Defence in February 1967, and a more expansive

Supplementary Statement on Defence Policy issued in July 1967.24 The
February White Paper did little more than re-inforce the East of Suez con-
clusions of a year earlier, but the Six-Day War of July 1967 led to a severe
hike in world oil prices and renewed attacks on Sterling that soon initiated
another round of defence cuts. With the end of Confrontation in Malaysia in
August 1966, a similar situation to the one policy-makers had been pre-
sented in Aden seemingly opened up, allowing Britain the opportunity to
scale down its presence in the Far East.25 Upon the publication of the
Supplementary Statement it was announced that a decision had been taken
to authorise the run-down of the Singapore base by the mid-1970s.26 Once
again, however, at least the notion of a special “role” for Britain East of Suez
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had been retained: in addition to a planned base in the British Indian Ocean
Territories, alternative facilities in the Far East were to be examined,
possibly on the west coast of Australia.27 Moreover, Britain was to retain a
“special capability” for use in the area.28
It was not until January 1968—after the eventual devaluation of the
pound on 18 November 1967 added some £50 million to the defence budget
overnight—that a complete withdrawal was announced. British troops
would be out off the mainland of Southeast Asia by March 1971, and no
alternative arrangements were to be made to act in the area. Britain had
finally given up East of Suez.

WHY DID BRITAIN WITHDRAW? TRADITIONAL EXPLANATIONS

The dominant narratives of Britain’s withdrawal from East of Suez recount

how the economic pressures were paramount when it came to the deci-
sions over Britain’s future of the region. Peter Calvocoressi’s is typical in this
regard: “Until 1967,” he notes, “both the main political parties were assert-
ing the need and their determination to maintain considerable British forces
east of Suez and the Labour Party’s about-turn in that year was abrupt and
the consequence, not of a strategic review, but of economic stringency.”29
East of Suez and the fate of the pound, in particular, were “somewhat
mixed up together,” in the words of Diane Kunz.30 Wilson’s refusal to coun-
tenance immediate devaluation upon taking office in October 1964 led to a
lengthy and bitter struggle to maintain the parity of Sterling at its rate of
$2.80 against the speculative attacks of international bankers, and to main-
tain the solvency of Britain31—a decision that has long has been identified
as the single biggest mistake of his political career.32 The battle over Sterling
was eventually lost, with the government devaluing by 14%, to $2.40, on
18 November 1967. In short, it was Britain’s economic plight during these
years that forced policy-makers to reassess its role in the Middle East and
Far East.
 Britain’s “East of Suez Role” 457

The predominance of economic explanations in the East of Suez

literature is understandable—as the overview of events above shows33—not
least because the economic imperatives felt by policy-makers themselves
are clearly visible in the documentary record, and in their memoirs and dia-
ries.34 Wilson, for example, opens his account of Labour’s first two adminis-
trations with the observation that the book “is a record of a Government all
but a year of whose life was dominated by an inherited balance of pay-
ments problem which was nearing crisis at the moment we took office.”35
However, because they focus on the policy-maker’s responses to
economic exigencies, any particular outcome can in a sense be explained
with reference to fiscal necessity. A simple counter-factual proves the
point: the Labour government could, hypothetically, have carried through
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its pre-election promise and renounced Britain’s nuclear deterrent in 1964.

This would have significantly eased the defence burden and, thereby, the
pressure on the pound without needing to touch Britain’s “world role” or its
expensive conventional weapons projects. The substantive reasons why
they did not—the desire to have “influence” with the United States, being
one—are of little concern here, since the important point is exactly that
these are not economic reasons but political ones. Any economic interpreta-
tion thus must either ignore these counterfactuals or, more often, include
non-economic factors.
In this vein, Jeffrey Pickering has argued that domestic political factors
add another important dimension to understanding the withdrawal.36 A
focus on the Cabinet reshuffle of November 1967 provides a corrective to
earlier accounts that ignored the political impact of the devaluation upon
the final decision of January 1968. Following the resignation of George
Brown as foreign secretary, his replacement by James Callaghan and the
promotion of Roy Jenkins to the Treasury, the withdrawal from East of Suez
became not only politically easier and but also perhaps inevitable. Jenkins
was able to act as an entrepreneur of the idea that East of Suez should be
relinquished sooner and was able to form a winning coalition to support
this policy.
But whilst important decisions were taken by the government following
the devaluation and the reshuffle, and were initiated by particular individuals,
Pickering focuses closely on the events of November 1967 to January 1968
and tends to ignore the issue of why this was the case. He downplays the
fact that East of Suez had become problematic earlier, and that momentum
had developed in favour of relinquishment over the previous two years—if
not longer.37 It is thus necessary to draw back from the narrow focus on
particular individuals and to re-instate the longer-term context of the with-
drawal from “East of Suez.” The government’s decision to withdraw com-
pletely, announced in January 1968, was thus more than just the result of
the domestic-political consequences of the devaluation of Sterling in
November 1967. The unwillingness of those who have considered the
 458 D. M. McCourt

withdrawal to ask first what it means to claim that Britain had a “role” east
of Suez has led to this narrow focus on either economics or domestic poli-
tics; it is only by first asking this question that a proper understanding can
be gained of what the withdrawal from East of Suez was and, hence, how
and why it took place.

THE ROLES NATIONS PLAY

As noted above, although often considered by historians as an objective fact,

Britain’s “East of Suez role” was in fact a rhetorical construction. In a sense,
this is not saying anything new—that East of Suez was a name used to
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describe, and also thereby to justify, Britain’s possessions and commitments

in the Middle East, the Far East, and the Indian Ocean, and that its basis was
a reference to Rudyard Kipling’s poem Mandalay. But its constructed nature
does not make the concept unimportant: quite the contrary, the existence of
East of Suez as a role construction had a powerful hold over those con-
cerned with British foreign policy between 1964 and 1968. What is crucial,
therefore, is the specific effect of the construction of a role to describe
Britain’s considerations with regard to the area in these years. That entails a
brief discussion of the concept of role in relation to world politics.
In trying to conceptualise what roles are and how they work in interna-
tional affairs more generally, it might be expected that the discipline of
International Relations would have numerous theoretical approaches to
offer; in fact, the concept has been largely neglected. Interest in the social
bases of state action in international affairs has been a relatively recent
development, focussing more on the concept of state “identity” rather than
on the “roles” they play.38 This is largely because the “anarchical” interna-
tional system is considered to breed self-interested behaviour, unlike the
strong social pressures individuals in domestic society feel, often through the
requirements of specific social roles. As Kal Holsti has noted: “Generally, the
expectations of other governments, legal norms expressed through custom,
general usage, or treaties, and available sanctions to enforce these are
ill-defined, flexible, or weak compared to those that exist in an integrated
society and particularly within formal organisations.”39 Yet social roles also
exist in the international sphere, since, as Le Prestre reminds us, “defining a
role and having it accepted by other actors remain basic objectives of
states.”40 The roles nations play may be clearly more constructed in nature
than roles such as “wife” or “professor” in everyday life, but they still have
an impact on state behaviour.
It is not necessary here to develop a full-blown role-based theory of
international politics to prove this case; rather, consideration of three key
concepts allows us a preliminary grip on how roles function, and how we
might begin to rethink East of Suez. First, role-making refers to the
 Britain’s “East of Suez Role” 459

construction of roles—both specific regional roles and general international

roles—on the part of a state or other actor.41 The premise of this analysis
that Britain’s attempts to make “East of Suez” or the “world role” is an exam-
ple, but international politics is full of instances of actors attempting to play
particular roles on the international stage: from France’s mission civilatrice
to the European Union’s normative power orientation.42 Second, role-taking
refers to the assumption of the perspective or standpoint of others as to the
appropriateness of a state’s role-making.43 In the case of East of Suez, this
meant the assumption of the perspective of the United States, and Britain’s
allies in the region, by policy-makers in London when considering their
potential courses of action. This notion reminds us that rarely, if ever, in
international affairs does an actor have sufficient power resources to
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completely ignore the views of others; like in everyday life, “putting on

another’s shoes” is a fundamental part of any decision. Finally, alter-casting
refers to the process by which states attempt to case others into roles that
support their own role conceptions.44 Throughout the years under consider-
ation here, the United States attempted to cast Britain as a Power capable of
playing an expansive role such as East of Suez, as did other allies like
Australia. Why these attempts failed is an interesting part of the story.
These concepts need not be explicated further here. They serve instead
to highlight the simple idea that the roles nations play are not real things, but
shared understandings that require a degree of agreement and coherence in
order to remain meaningful. In the case of East of Suez, however, the role
became less meaningful and coherent as time went on. In applying these
insights to the events of 1964–1968, the following exegesis demonstrates
how a small conceptual rethink of the East of Suez role produces a more
comprehensive understanding of Britain’s withdrawal.

A ROLE RELINQUISHED, A ROLE REDEFINED

Immediately upon taking office, Wilson’s government began a stiff defence

of the central elements of the so-called East of Suez role, despite the exist-
ence of financial pressures for retrenchment at home and overseas. Wilson
told the Commons shortly before Christmas 1965 that “I want to make it
quite clear that whatever we may do in the field of cost-effectiveness, we
cannot afford to relinquish our world role, our role which, for shorthand
purposes, is sometimes called our ‘east of Suez’ role. . . .”45 This statement
was based on decisions reached at a weekend meeting on defence at
Chequers on 21–22 November 1964.46 The meeting acknowledged that
large-scale savings would be required, and that balance-of-payments
problems in particular pointed to the need for economies overseas. But,
crucially, although this was not translated into a desire to relinquish East of
Suez altogether, Wilson’s commitment had the unintended effect of making
 460 D. M. McCourt

it a matter of intense scrutiny and debate. With continued economic

problems, no sign of a change in international attitudes to Europe’s colo-
nial-style military presence abroad, and despite the support of key allies, the
recognition of the artificiality of “East of Suez” eventually led to breakdown
in the government’s willingness to carry on its construction.
At this early stage, though, what is more apparent are the “dogs that
did not bark in the night” at Chequers. First, since the need for savings was
borne upon the British defence establishment as a whole, it is of signifi-
cance which elements of those forces were left untouched. Notable among
these was the nuclear deterrent; another of Britain’s supposed defence
“roles.”47 Healey won the battle to save Polaris at the Chequers weekend,
noting how cheap the deterrent was—accounting for less than 10% of the
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defence budget.48 It was also made clear that no fundamental changes

would occur to Britain’s contribution to the defence of Western Europe in
the form of the British Army of the Rhine [BAOR]. As in the United States,
the continued presence of a substantial number of British troops in Europe
had its opponents;49 but it was felt that the commitment represented by
BAOR was a necessary one.50 Significantly, therefore, Britain’s nuclear
deterrent and commitments in Europe were placed above East of Suez
when foreign commitments were ranked over the course of the defence
review.
These decisions now appear an entirely natural ordering of things.
Indeed, many saw this as the case at the time: “It is elementary prudence,”
J. D. B. Miller argued, “to assume that, if Britain were involved in war both
in Europe and East of Suez, Europe would take precedence; and it is
reasonable to keep in mind that, if the problem of confrontation is resolved,
there will be no obvious need to keep British troops in South-East Asia,
whatever may be decided about shops and planes, or may be conjectured
about submarines.”51 But this was perhaps not so clear cut as he suggested,
as there were those arguing for East of Suez to take priority over the limited
contribution British forces could make in Europe.
However, the determination to proceed with the East of Suez role on a
reduced budget,52 and as the least important of the three roles, marks not
merely a shift in priorities, but an acknowledgement that Britain’s position
in this area was in some senses optional. As such, it was a tacit recognition
of the fact that East of Suez did not encroach upon vital national interests in
the same way as the defence of Europe and Britain’s possession of an
advanced nuclear deterrent. This is not to imply, of course, that the argu-
ments in support of Britain’s continued presence in the area suddenly lost
force—these remained prescient to many even after the announcements of
January 1968; it is rather to suggest that certain elements intrinsic to the process
of assessing Britain’s foreign commitments with such intense scrutiny—as
was required in the first eighteen months of the Labour Government—led to
a weakening of East of Suez as a specific role conception.
 Britain’s “East of Suez Role” 461

The issue of the geographical coherence of East of Suez is a case in

point. Despite their diverse locations, Britain’s bases and commitments in
the Indian Ocean and in the Far East were conflated into a single region by
the role. This reasoning might not have been problematic, but in the event
of differing political circumstances at Aden and the Persian Gulf, on the one
hand, and Singapore and the Far East, on the other, the conflation of the
two would have serious unintended consequences for the East of Suez role.
Although Confrontation ended in August 1966 in a perceived success for the
British, the conflict in Aden did not end happily. The decision was taken for
complete withdrawal of the Aden base upon the independence of the Aden
colony in 1967, and violence continued almost until the last soldier left in
November 1967.53 As a result, since Aden was to be given up for reasons of
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political expediency, the role as a whole came under increased scrutiny

when consideration focused on Southeast Asia.54
As Britain’s complete withdrawal from its commitments east of Suez
became a political issue during the second round of the defence review,
from the summer of 1966, the possible implications of such a move on Britain’s
dependents in the region and its interested allies became more pressing. In
some cases, notably with respect to the United States and Britain’s economic
problems, the views of others already had significant impact. However, the
opinion that Britain’s role in the region was not merely a matter of its own
interests, but also accorded well with the views of these others, was notably
more prominent than in the first phase. The position of the United States, in
particular, is deserving of detailed discussion.
Between 1964 and the announcement of January 1968, the Lyndon
B. Johnson administration pursued a consistent strategy that sought to bolster
the major elements of Britain’s East of Suez role.55 This strategy had two broad
aspects. The first was moral and financial support for Britain’s efforts to maintain
Sterling at its rate of $2.80, and, importantly as a reserve currency in the world
economic system. The second, pursued concurrently, concerned the attempts of
Johnson and his foreign policy advisers to persuade Britain to continue to play
its expansive role in the world, including in the Far East and Middle East. That
the Americans ultimately failed in preventing Britain’s withdrawal would thus
seem surprising, especially given that the opinion of Washington regarding all
aspects of the defence review was never far from the minds of policy-makers
and planners in London.56 Concerns about the effect of far-reaching changes in
British strategy east of Suez demonstrate that the American perspective was
consistently “taken” by London when the future of Britain’s defence structure
was considered. Wilson was thus pleased to be able to inform the Commons in
December 1965, upon his return from the United States, that there was
“complete agreement in Washington with the British Government’s decision to
continue to maintain a world-wide defence role, particularly to fulfil those
commitments which, for reasons of history, geography, Commonwealth associa-
tion and the like, we, and virtually we alone, are best fitted to undertake.”57
 462 D. M. McCourt

The United States failed in its alter-casting attempts not because British
policy-makers were unconcerned with its view, but because its position
actually succeeded in making Britain’s retention of its commitments and
physical presence in the region more problematic. To see how and why this
is the case, it is important to remark on the fact that Washington’s staunch
defence of Britain’s East of Suez role would appear to represent one of the
most paradoxical turnarounds in international politics since the end of the
Second World War. Only eight years before Wilson’s election, the Eisenhower
Administration had effectively vetoed what it saw as an “imperial”-type inter-
vention in Suez.58 But by 1964, American opposition to British Imperialism
had given way to a belief that it was the United States own interests for its
junior ally to maintain the last vestiges of a global military infrastructure.
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Within the context of the Cold War, a political vacuum in almost any corner
of the world represented a potential “loss” to Communism, as the politics of
America’s involvement in the Vietnam war came to demonstrate.
United States views on Britain’s potential withdrawal from East of Suez
were intimately connected to the former’s involvement in Vietnam.59 As
Healey caustically remarked: “The United States, after trying for thirty years
to get Britain out of Asia, the Middle East and Africa, was now trying des-
perately to keep us in; during the Vietnam war it did not want to be the
only country killing coloured people on their own soil.”60 But for Johnson,
the domestic political repercussions of a British withdrawal from East of
Suez—and South East Asia in particular—were of at least similar impor-
tance. On one hand, throughout the period, the President was aware that
Congress was “hawkish” on the issue of fighting Communist expansion in
South East Asia,61 and he did not want to be the president “who lost Vietnam”
like Truman had “lost China.” On the other, he was well aware that support
for the war did not run to paying for the large-scale conflict it had become
by late 1965. Whilst wanting the war, Congress would not raise the necessary
taxes to pay for it at the same time as Johnson needed public revenues to
underwrite his cherished “Great Society” legislation.62 As a result, he was
forced to fight what became an increasingly unpopular war without being
able to mount an effective domestic campaign in search of consensus for
the war’s central purposes.
Between 1964 and early 1968, therefore, the United States attempted to
avoid withdrawing from Vietnam by supporting Britain’s “world role”—East
of Suez—and by making moves to secure Sterling, the financial base of
London’s ability to play that role. It did this because despite the opposition
in Washington to a British withdrawal, Johnson’s advisers were more aware
of the acute problems driving the defence review. On a number of occasions
men close to the president, like his Special Adviser McGeorge Bundy and
Secretary of State Dean Rusk, reminded him that Britain remained the
United States best and most reliable ally.63 Considerations over a possible
British withdrawal should not, thereby, be considered a simple betrayal; the
 Britain’s “East of Suez Role” 463

strategy that Johnson’s Administration undertook was a more nuanced and

sensitive one than betrayed by the traditional accounts of this period.64
Johnson’s unwillingness to risk valuable moral support for his policy over
Vietnam—to force the British to shelve any withdrawal plans they were
formulating—was typical of his government’s reaction to Britain’s defence
review. But the strategy that sought not to strong-arm London into maintaining
commitments it could not afford left Washington with few means by which
it could compel Britain to comply with its wishes. Whilst not explaining by
itself the failure of the United States to alter-cast its junior ally, Johnson’s
Vietnam travails were inherently connected to the failure of his policy on
Britain East of Suez.
These remarks should not, however, lead to an underestimation of the
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impact of the United States on the process. American economic support of

the pound, in particular—in the form holding Sterling, together with help in
negotiating large-scale multilateral loans—was extremely influential: without
it, devaluation—perhaps by more than the 14.8% finally settled on in
November 1967—might have been carried out by the government signifi-
cantly earlier. Dumbrell is less reserved in his judgement: “Without any
question, American pressure—and support for Sterling—was an important
factor in Britain’s postponement of devaluation until late 1967.”65 Clive
Ponting has even suggested that an explicit “deal” existed from Summer
1965 by which the two issues were explicitly linked.66 Historians now agree
that no such overt deal existed;67 yet as Wilson’s comment to Cabinet on 14
February 1966 made clear, the two issues were separate, but not separable.
Although East of Suez was not connected to the United States, he made
clear: “Nevertheless don’t let’s fail to realize that their financial support is not
unrelated to the way we behave in the Far East: any direct announcement of
our withdrawal, for example, could not fail to have a profound effect on my
personal relations with L.B.J. and the way the Americans treat us.”68
Beyond the conflation of the Far East and East of Suez again being on
display here, and Wilson’s emphasis on the implications of withdrawal for
his personal relations with the president, the confession that American inter-
ests were deeply implicated in British policy is telling. In fact, it was not
until early 1967 that a formal agreement was mooted by which a long-term
multi-billion support package for the pound would be formally linked to
Britain’s remaining at Singapore and the Persian Gulf for the foreseeable
future.69 This offer was refused by the British Cabinet in what Ponting con-
siders a key turning point in the history not only of the battle to avoid the
devaluation, but also the decision-making process on Britain’s East of Suez
role as a whole.70 Once the offer had been turned down, he argues, Wilson
felt himself free of the earlier linkages between the future of the pound and
the continuation of Britain’s military commitments east of Suez.71
Certainly, strong pronouncements by the Americans as to the dire con-
sequences of a decision to withdraw were by this point unable to convince
 464 D. M. McCourt

the British Government to backtrack on the decisions already reached. What

this demonstrates is that America’s other strategies for persuading Britain to
remain “East of Suez” had also been unsuccessful. Along with less subtle
forms of coercion, these included blunt statements about what the United
States expected. Robert McNamara, Johnson’s secretary of Defence, stressed
to British Ambassador Patrick Dean that Britain should assume that it had
“an impeachable role in the region for at least another ten years.”72 In
Spring 1967, “John Killick of the British Embassy urged Jeffrey Kichen of the
State Department that Johnson should ‘absolutely knock the pants off’ Wilson
on the East of Suez question.” It was “important that the President really hit
Wilson hard,” to discourage Britain’s contraction of the global role.73
Yet, although various members of Wilson’s Cabinet had consistently
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been looking for ways to placate the Americans long after the withdrawal
had become a probability, Britain’s policy changes were clearly still being
driven by London and not Washington. American support for a continued
presence at Singapore, or alternatively in Australia, and in a new installation
in the Indian Ocean, was not enough to convince the Cabinet to change
course. In short, it was British initiatives to re-evaluate the efficacy of the
“East of Suez role” that dominated American preferences. As Jonathan
Colman makes clear: “The President and his colleagues accepted the British
decision with equanimity, as they had little choice but to do so.”74 This
acceptance occurred largely because of the inherent contradictions in their
views over Britain’s role in the world as a whole, as strong support from
Washington for elements of a more limited British “Far Eastern” role had
actually strengthened the case of those wishing to wind up Britain’s East of
Suez role entirely.
Another contradiction in America’s position is visible with respect to
the issue of Britain’s potential entry to the European Economic Community
[EEC], any success of which was to a considerable extent based on the
assumption that it would follow a removal from Britain’s extra-European
commitments. The Johnson Administration, like Kennedy’s before it, saw no
fundamental contradiction between membership of “Europe” and the main-
tenance of the East of Suez role. Most British policy-makers also hoped this
was the case. However, a growing number of British Cabinet ministers saw
it in just those terms, notably Barbara Castle and Tony Benn, but crucially
so, too, did the new Chancellor, Jenkins.75 The same was true of Anthony
Crossman; as he noted in his diary, he saw not that “‘Little Englandism’ was
the opposite of Europeanism, but its very pre-condition.”76 American support
for the EEC, therefore—personified in George Ball, an assistant under-secretary
of State77—hindered rather than helped its case on East of Suez.
Thus far, the argument has focused on Britain’s attempts to “make” East
of Suez, its “taking” of the United States position, and the attempts of
Washington to alter-cast Britain into that role; but a similar story can be told
regarding the states in the region to which Britain was committed. These,
 Britain’s “East of Suez Role” 465

too, were unable to provide East of Suez with the coherence required for
Britain to keep on playing the role. Key among these Powers was Australia
and New Zealand, for whom Britain’s presence in Malaysia, and at Singapore,
provided an essential element of their forward defence.78 The possibility of
British withdrawal from those bases, consequently, not only explicitly
affected the defence postures of the two South Pacific dominions, including
also their future defence expenditure; it also had the potential to cast them
both into regional roles of greater proportion than they played at the time.
Although coming to accept the inevitability of Britain’s departure, they were
obviously keen either to prevent it altogether or delay it as long as possible.
The situation was even more immediate for the states directly affected. In
the Far East, Malaysia and Singapore were both fiercely opposed to what
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they perceived as a hasty British withdrawal and also sought to delay it. In
the Middle East, meanwhile, the situation was even more complex, with the
British attempting to create a federation of the Trucial States—perhaps also
including the traditional rivals of Qatar and Bahrain—before it could safely
extradite itself.
Notwithstanding a degree of in-built positive feeling for Arab peoples
within the British foreign policy establishment, and the natural affiliation
with Australia and New Zealand as “kith and kin,” the political influence of
all these states carried little weight when it came to the negotiation of
Britain’s role in the world into the 1970s. This was because, like the United
States, they were each concerned with the future of Britain’s East of Suez
role only to the extent that it had an impact upon what they perceived to be
their own interests and appropriate engagements in the area. The leaders of
these Powers were pleased when they heard that the British were deter-
mined to continue to play their traditional “East of Suez” or “world” role, not
because they thought it right and proper that it should do so for her own
sake, but because it accorded with their own preferred futures. As with the
United States, rather than creating a uniform and overwhelming case for
Britain to disregard “East of Suez” when seeking major defence cuts, it
served to highlight both the divergent issues involved in British consider-
ations with regard to the region as a whole and the associated difficulties of
finding a defence posture that could provide for widely differing needs on a
much reduced budget.
Once again, Healey was convinced that he had managed this difficult
task in his White Paper of February 1966: facilities at Singapore, then per-
haps in Australia, together with those in the Indian Ocean, were thought
able to provide the infrastructure for Britain’s continued close participation
of affairs in the area.79 He thus confidently announced to the National Press
Club in Canberra on 2 February 1966 that “we shall remain fully capable of
carrying out all the commitments we have at the present time including
those in the Far East, like the commitments to Malaysia and Singapore.”80
Crucially, however, this posture was based on ideas among British planners
 466 D. M. McCourt

as to the types of future conflict in which Britain might become involved.

Vietnam was an example, but Britain’s own experience during the Indone-
sian Confrontation, and previously in Malaya, were more instructive.81 The
received wisdom from these conflicts helped to persuade analysts that
there would be serious political and military problems associated with sus-
taining a conflict of even limited scope without significant allied—that is,
American—involvement.82 The level of sophistication of weaponry available
to potential enemies in the Far East, exemplified by the Indonesians during
Confrontation, made it clear to the British that the force levels they could
afford to maintain in the Far East could only be viable as part of a multilat-
eral security and peacekeeping effort.83 These adversaries were not the
same as Britain had faced in trying to keep the peace in the hinterland of
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Aden. The differences envisaged by the Defence Review, therefore, would

merely streamline forces that would be unable to engage dangerous ene-
mies alone. Initially, these considerations helped Healey and his team reach
the conclusion that “it is right that Britain should continue to maintain a mil-
itary presence in this area.”84 But with the end of Confrontation in August
1966, the idea that it would be prudent for Britain to maintain a peacekeep-
ing military presence in the area, used to underpin a role based on the need
to commit such actions, seemed increasingly unwise.
Whilst this belief accorded with other British impulses favouring a
scaling-down of commitments, it also had serious alter-casting effects on the
regional roles of Australia and New Zealand. Britain’s intention to withdraw
left them with no effective forward defence and inevitably pushed them
further towards the United States, which could offer them more substantial
security guarantees.85 This fact may also help explain the Australian govern-
ment’s unwillingness to help finance alternative British facilities in Western
Australia to replace Singapore: paying for a base for Britain when it consis-
tently refused to commit troops to Vietnam, where Australian troops were
fighting alongside the Americans, would be politically problematic. More
importantly, however, Britain’s withdrawal brought into the open serious
questions of an ideological character associated with Australia’s and New
Zealand’s international orientation in the longer-term. Just as Healey had
argued that Britain did not want to settle for a European role solely on the
basis of geography, withdrawal made it stark that the former Common-
wealth countries were naturally to have a South East Asian role in the
future, and they would sooner or later have to come to terms with the fact.
As Miller then argued: “Nature has placed Australia east of Suez, and she
will remain there. So her problem is not whether to have an ‘East of Suez’
policy, but which one to have—which possible enemies to guard against,
which allies to seek and which countries to try and influence.”86
Understandably, therefore, both Canberra and Wellington chose to
argue against British conclusion that “white faces” would not be welcome,
instead imploring policy-makers in London to continue to play their historic
 Britain’s “East of Suez Role” 467

role in the region.87 Others in Britain still agreed: as Eddie Shackleton—Minister

of Defence for the Royal Air Force—noted to Benn in July 1966: “the thing
is that most of them want us there.”88 His view was borne out by an offer of
the sheikhs of the Trucial states to finance from oil revenues Britain’s
continued presence in the region, and it was powerfully expressed in a last
minute visit by Lee Kuan Yew, the Singapore leader, in January 1968;89
based on his fear for his personal safety perhaps as much as the future of
Singapore, his efforts won a reprieve for the base until December 1971.90
However, by 1968, neither the United States, Australia, New Zealand, nor
Singapore, had any mechanisms by which the readjustment of Britain’s role
in the world away from East of Suez could be halted. Like the United States,
the interests of those intimately influenced by the decisions that British
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policy-makers took between 1964 and 1968 only served to highlight the
unfeasibilty for Britain to continue to conceive of itself as having a real role
East of Suez.

CONCLUSION

Although the language of roles is frequently used by foreign policy-makers,

rarely has the analogy been as prominent as in the case of Britain’s with-
drawal from East of Suez. Indeed, the image is so strong here that it has pre-
vented historians from questioning what the term “role” meant in this
context, and what, if any, were the implications of its invocation. This analysis
has corrected this situation. In concluding, therefore, it is worthwhile dis-
cussing what this means for understanding the withdrawal in a wider sense,
since few have attempted to interpret what withdrawal meant for Britain’s
international position at the end of the 1960s.
Saki Dockrill is one notable exception to this trend.91 She suggests that
the events represent something more than relinquishing a set of bases and
commitments or a single defence role. It was instead a genuine and painful
reassessment of Britain’s future role in the world; a fundamental reorienta-
tion of Britain’s engagement with the international system, away from the
so-called “world,” towards “Europe.” What remains unclear from this notion
of a “retreat to Europe” is exactly what Britain’s international role could be
without East of Suez since, following the logic outlined here, Britain’s
“roles” in Europe and the nuclear deterrence are equally constructed.
The Americans, for their part, made it plain on more than one occasion
that a withdrawal would signal to them a British exit from the stage of inter-
national politics; despite the American wish for Britain to go into Europe, a
“purely” European role was not seen as any role at all. George Brown,
presenting the Cabinet’s viewpoint on the decision of January 1968 in
Washington, received not only the rebuke “for God’s sake George, be
Britain,”92 but the opinion “that British policy is now inspired by the title of
 468 D. M. McCourt

the play ‘Stop the World I Want to Get Off.’”93 Britain’s other allies did not
help with re-definition either: a genuine “European” role for Britain also
seemed a distant possibility, as France rejected Britain’s second application
to the EEC in November 1967, only eight months after it had been formally
made. The French rejection capped what was a miserable month for the
Wilson Government.94 Once again, London’s desire to enter the EEC had
been vetoed by Paris on the grounds that Britain was still insufficiently
aligned to Europe to be deserving of entry.
Crucially, Charles de Gaulle was not incorrect in this judgement.
Despite the withdrawal and the second application, Britain had not “chosen
Europe over the world.” First, the Conservative Party led by Edward Heath
had strongly opposed the Wilson government’s decisions and promised
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thoroughly to review them if they were elected—the Conservatives took

power in June 1970. But, second, and more important, although Britain no
longer planned to have a “capacity for use” east of Suez, it was not envisaged
that it would be entirely unable to act in the area should circumstances so
require. The Cabinet meeting of 4 January 1968 made it clear that “the
general capability which we retained in Europe would be available to be
deployed overseas; and we could assure our Commonwealth partners and
allies that in this way we should retain the ability to help them if circum-
stances in our own judgement demanded it.”95 Just as the Australians had
supported Britain during the War “because they had had the capability to
get there in any emergency,” Wilson explained to Rusk in June 1967, that is
“precisely the policy which we intend to pursue in relation to the area East
of Suez.”96 Indeed, over the next three years, British policy-makers would
continue to create adequate political arrangements for the various Gulf
States, a process that included dispatch of combat missions to the civil war
in the Yemen97 and culminated in the creation of the United Arab Emirates
in 1971.98
It is thus clear, that policy-makers did not conceive of the decisions
taken in early January 1968 as signifying a retreat from world affairs. Wilson
made this point in his reply to Johnson’s letter of 15 January: the decisions,
he argued, were not driven by “little Englandism”—as Rusk thought and
Crossman would have liked—but were the manifestation of “a blend of
exasperation at our inability to weather the successive storms of the past
twenty years, and determination, once and for all to hew out a new role for
Britain in the world at once commensurate with her real resources yet wor-
thy of her past.”99 Hence, whilst Britain now had no specific “capability for
use” east of Suez, her economic and political interests in a safe and secure
world beyond Europe remained, and the feeling that Britain might have to use
military force as well as diplomatic influence there did not entirely dissipate
from early 1968. Indeed, the British army undertook peacekeeping duties in
East Timor during the civil war in 1999, and British troops are currently on
active duty in Afghanistan.100 Four decades after the withdrawal, therefore,
 Britain’s “East of Suez Role” 469

Britain’s role in world politics remains decidedly more international than

would be betrayed by the simple notion of a retreat to Europe.
Withdrawal was more a result of a realisation of the fact that Britain had
no genuine “role” to play east of Suez in the 1960s and beyond. Healey
himself had made this plain as early as November 1965 when he argued to
Philip Kaiser at the United States Embassy in London that there was “no real
national role for the UK East of Suez.”101 Indeed, Lord Selkirk, a former first
Lord of the Admiralty, had questioned the efficacy of British troops in the area
to Harold Macmillan as early as 1963. “[W]hy are we continuing to retain
armed forces in this area at all?,” he asked: “I put this question to one of the
shrewdest Chinese in Singapore.” He went on, “[a]fter a little thought he said:
first, in the interest of Malaysia; secondly in the interest of America; thirdly,
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in the interest of Australia; fourthly, in the interest of New Zealand; and

lastly in the general interest of the United Kingdom.”102 Between 1964 and
early 1968 the Wilson Government attempted to make an East of Suez role for
Britain based on its traditional presence and commitments in the area, but
despite support from influential others over key elements of that role, it was
unable to overcome the fact this was not a real role, try as Britain might to
make it one.

NOTES

I am grateful to the European University Institute, Florence, for helping to fund the research for
this paper. Thanks also go to Chris Brown, Friedrich Kratochwil, Richard Little, Niklas Rossbach, Alun
Gibbs, and Pascal Vennesson for useful comments on an earlier draft, in addition to audiences at confer-
ences held at the Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge, and the British International
Studies Association at Exeter University.
1. The main works on the withdrawal are Phillip Darby, British Defence Policy East of Suez 1947–
1968 (London, 1973); Jeffrey Pickering, Britain’s Withdrawal from East of Suez: The Politics of Retrench-
ment (Houndmills, 1998); Saki Dockrill, Britain’s Retreat from East of Suez: The Choice between Europe
and the World (Houndmills, 2002). To minimise capitalisation, throughout the paper, “East of Suez” will
refer to the role conception and “east of Suez” to the geographical area.
2. Britain’s place in the post-Second War world, Churchill believed, was best characterised in
terms of her position at the intersection of three interlocking circles: Europe, the Commonwealth, and
the North Atlantic. See Dockrill, Britain’s Retreat, pp. 27–36. In the context of east of Suez, see Saki
Dockrill, “Britain’s power and influence: dealing with three roles and the Wilson Government’s defence
debate at Chequers in November 1964,” Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 11 (2000), pp. 211–240.
3. Michael Dockrill, British Defence since 1945 (Oxford, 1988), pp. 82–98.
4. On the devaluation, see Alec Cairncross and Barry Eichengreen, Sterling in Decline: The
Devaluations of 1931, 1949, 1967 (Oxford, 1983).
5. Jeffrey Pickering, “Politics and ‘Black Tuesday’: Shifting Power in the Cabinet and the Withdrawal
from East of Suez, November 1967–January 1968,” Twentieth Century British History, Vol. 13(2) (2002),
pp. 144–170.
6. Bruce Reed and Geoffrey Williams, Denis Healey and the Policies of Power (London, 1991), p. 11.
7. Referring to the subtitle of Dockrill, Britain’s Retreat.
8. Hugh Hanning, “Britain East of Suez—Facts and Figures,” International Affairs, Vol. 42
(1966), p. 253.
9. Dockrill, Britain’s Retreat, 35. See also A. J. R. Stockwell, ed. British Documents on the End of
Empire: Malaysia (London, 1994).
 470 D. M. McCourt

10. Dockrill, Britain’s Retreat, p. 33.

11. On Healey at the Ministry of Defence, see Denis Healey, The Time of My Life (London, 1990),
pp. 213–223. See also Reed and Williams, Denis Healey.
12. Reed and Williams, Denis Healey, p. 166.
13. UK Economic Situation: minute by Sir W. Armstrong, 16 October 1964, PREM [Prime Minister’s
Office Archives, National Archives, Kew, London] 13/32.
14. See Reed and Williams, Denis Healey, p. 167.
15. See Derek Wood, Project Cancelled: The Disaster of Britain’s Abandoned Aircraft Projects
(London, 1986); Geoffrey Williams, F. Gregory, and J. Simpson, Crisis in Procurement: A Case Study of
the TSR-2 (London, 1969)
16. See Christopher Mayhew, Britain’s Role Tomorrow (London, 1967).
17. See Healey’s statement to the Commons, 22 February 1966, in Hansard, Vol. 725, Col. 240.
18. Indeed, relinquishing the Aden base by 1968 had been an assumption upon which the Long-
Term Study Group had been considering Britain’s future in the Middle East. See Report, 12 October 1964,
CAB [Cabinet Archives, National Archives, Kew, London] 148/10. See also Dockrill, Britain’s Retreat, p. 34.
19. Dockrill, Britain’s Retreat.
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20. On Aden see, Stephen Harper, Last Sunset: What Happened at Aden (London, 1978); Karl
Pieragostini, Britain, Aden and South Arabia: Abandoning Empire (Basingstoke, 1991); Julian Paget, Last
Post: Aden, 1963–67 (London, 1969).
21. For a first-hand view, see James Callaghan, Time and Chance (London, 1987), pp. 197–201.
22. Dockrill, Britain’s Retreat, 119–21. For a good discussion of American views on the pound and
Britain’s overseas commitments, see John Dumbrell, “The Johnson Administration and the British Labour
Government: Vietnam, the Pound and East of Suez,” Journal of American Studies, Vol. 30 (1996), pp. 211–231.
23. Dockrill, Britain’s Retreat, pp. 166–167.
24. Cmnd. 3357: Supplementary Statement on Defence.
25. Cabinet Defence and Overseas Policy Committee [chaired by Sir B Trend] memorandum,
“Implications of the end of confrontation,” 14 June 1966, CAB 148/28.
26. Cmnd. p. 3357.
27. Healey, Time of My Life, p. 290.
28. See Dockrill, Britain’s Retreat, pp. 190–193.
29. Peter Calvocoressi, The British Experience, 1945–75 (London, 1979), p. 214.
30. See Diane Kunz, “Cold War Dollar Diplomacy,” in Diane Kunz, ed., The Diplomacy of the
Crucial Decade (New York, 1994); and idem., “‘Somewhat Mixed up Together’: Anglo–American
Defence and Financial Policy during the 1960s,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 27
(1994), pp. 213–232. See also, Darby, British Defence Policy; Paul Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplo-
macy: Background Influences on British External Policy, 1865–1980 (London, 1981), Pickering, Britain’s
Withdrawal; idem., “‘Politics and ‘Black Tuesday’.”
31. For a first-hand record of the struggle, see Callaghan, Time and Chance.
32. As Robert Holland, The Pursuit of Greatness: Britain and the World Role, 1900–1970 (London,
1991), p. 318 notes: “It has become virtually an orthodoxy that the Wilson Government’s basic error was
not to devalue the currency within the first week of office..”
33. See also John Young’s discussion of “Economics, defence and withdrawal from east of Suez,”
in his The Labour Governments 1964–70, Volume 2: International Policy (Manchester, 2003).
34. The Wilson Government had three devout diarists at its upper levels, including Tony Benn,
Barbara Castle, and Richard Crossman. See Tony Benn, Out of the Wilderness, Diaries 1963–1967
(London, 1987); Barbara Castle, The Castle Diaries, 1964–70 (London, 1984); Richard Crossman, The
Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Volume I: Minister of Housing, 1964–66 (London, 1975), and Volume II:
Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons, 1966–68 (London, 1976).
35. Harold Wilson, The Labour Government, 1964–1970: A Personal Record (London, 1971), p. xvii.
36. See Pickering, “Politics and ‘Black Tuesday’.”
37. Although Pickering’s Britain’s Withdrawal does provide a more contextual argument, beginning
his account in 1945.
38. See, for example, Peter J. Katzenstein, ed, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity
in World Politics (New York, 1996); Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, eds, The Return of Culture
and Identity in IR Theory (Boulder, CO, 1996); Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics
(Cambridge, 1999).
 Britain’s “East of Suez Role” 471

39. Kal Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy,” International Studies
Quarterly, Vol. 14 (1970), p. 243.
40. Philipe G. Le Prestre, “Author! Author! Defining Foreign Policy Roles after the Cold War,” in
Philippe G. Le Prestre, ed., Role Quests in the Post-Cold War Era (Montreal, 1997), p. 4
41. See Ralph Turner, “Role-Taking, Role Standpoint, and Reference-Group Behavior,” American
Journal of Sociology, Vol. 61 (1956), pp. 316–328.
42. See Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?,” Journal of Common
Market Studies, Vol. 40 (2002), pp. 235–258.
43. See George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self and Society (Chicago, 1934).
44. See Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power
Politics,” International Organization, Vol. 46 (1992), pp. 391–425.
45. Ben Pimlott, Wilson (London, 1992), p. 385.
46. “Defence policy”: minutes of a meeting of ministers, service chiefs and senior officials at
Chequers on Britain’s three defence roles, 21 November 1964, CAB 130/213.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid. See also Reed and Williams, Denis Healey, p. 169.
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49. Indeed, Healey himself notes that: “At the time I myself believed that our contribution to stability
in the Middle and Far East was more useful to world peace than our contribution to NATO in Europe.”
Ibid., p. 279.
50. Cabinet Defence and Oversea Policy (Official) Committee Long-Term Study Group, “Report of
the Long-Term Study Group, Note by the Chairman,” 12 October, 1964, CAB 148/10.
51. J.D.B. Miller, “An Australian View,” International Affairs, Vol. 42 (1966), p. 234.
52. Michael Leifer, “Some South-East Asian Attitudes,” International Affairs, Vol. 42 (1966), p. 219.
53. See Harper, Last Sunset.
54. See Matthew Jones, “A Decision Delayed: Britain’s Withdrawal from South-East Asia Reconsidered,
1961–68,” English Historical Review, Vol. 117 (2002), pp. 569–595.
55. See Kunz, “Anglo–American Defence”; Thomas A. Schwarz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe: in
the Shadow of Vietnam (London, Cambridge, MA, 2003).
56. “An Anglo–American balance sheet—Memorandum by Planning Staff,” no date, FO [Foreign
Office Archives, National Archives, Kew, London] 371/177830.
57. Reed and Williams, Denis Healey, p. 175.
58. The most comprehensive history of Suez remains Keith Kyle, Suez: Britain’s End of Empire in
the Middle East (London, 1991).
59. On Vietnam in the context of transatlantic relations, see Schwarz, Lyndon Johnson; Dumbrell,
“The Johnson Administration and the British Labour Government.” On LBJ’s increasingly troubled
involvement more generally, see David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York, 1972).
60. Healey, Time of My Life, pp. 280–281.
61. For an interesting recent discussion of LBJ’s quandary, see Francis M. Bator, “No Good
Choices: LBJ and the Vietnam/Great Society Connection,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 32 (2008), pp. 309–340;
see also Halberstam, Best and the Brightest.
62. Kunz, “Anglo–American Defence,” p. 213.
63. Jonathan Colman, “A Special Relationship?” Harold Wilson, Lyndon B. Johnson and Anglo–
American relations “at the summit,” 1964–68 (Manchester, 2004), p. 45.
64. Schwarz, Lyndon Johnson, pp. 1–8.
65. John Dumbrell, A Special Relationship: Anglo–American in the Cold War and After (Houndmills,
2001), p. 68.
66. Ibid.
67. See Colman, “Special Relationship?” p. 83. See also Dockrill, Britain’s Retreat, pp. 119–121.
68. Crossman, Diaries, I, p. 456.
69. Clive Ponting, Breach of Promise: Labour in Power, 1964–1970 (London, 1989), pp. 105–106.
70. Ibid., p. 106.
71. Ibid.
72. Patrick Dean to Sir Paul Gore-Booth, 10 June 1965, PREM 12/25.
73. Colman, “Special Relationship?” p. 137.
74. Ibid., p. 141.
75. See Pickering, “‘Politics and ‘Black Tuesday’.”
76. Crossman, Diaries, II, p. 83.
 472 D. M. McCourt

77. See George W. Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern (London, 1982); Pascaline Winand,
Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the United States of Europe (New York, 1993).
78. See Miller, “Australian View.”
79. “The £ s d of defence: Michael Howard analyses last week’s White Paper,” Sunday Times, 27
February 1966.
80. British statements about the retention of forces in South East Asia, various dates, PREM
13/1323.
81. See Michael Dewar, Brush Fire Wars: Campaigns of the British Army Since 1945 (London, 1984).
82. Record of a Meeting between the Foreign Secretary and Defence Secretary and the United
States Secretary of State and Defense Secretary, Washington, 27 January 1966, FCO [Foreign and
Commonwealth Office Archives, National Archives, Kew, London] 371/190785.
83. Zuckerman to Prime Minister, 14 November 1965, PREM 13/216.
84. Quoted in Michael Carver, Tightrope Walking: British Defence Policy Since 1945 (London,
1992), p. 76.
85. Discussion has usually focused on the Australian response to the withdrawal. See, for example,
Andrea Benvenuti, “A Parting of the Ways: the British Military Withdrawal from Southeast Asia and its
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Critical Impact on Anglo–Australian Relations, 1965–68,” Contemporary British History, Vol. 20 (2006),
pp. 575–605; Jeppe Kristensen, ““In Essence still a British Country”: Britain’s Withdrawal from East of Suez,”
Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 51 (2005), pp. 40–52.
86. Miller, “Australian View,” p. 230.
87. On George Brown’s “white face” theory, see Dockrill, Britain’s Retreat, pp. 87–88.
88. Tony Benn, Out of the Wilderness, p. 457.
89. “Lee: I’m sure I’m not too late,” Sunday Times, 14 January 1968.
90. Dockrill, Britain’s Retreat, p. 207.
91. Ibid, pp. 209–226.
92. “Public expenditure: post-devaluation measures”: telegram from Mr Brown on his discussions
in Washington about the East of Suez defence cuts, 12 January 1968, CAB 129/135.
93. “LBJ to Wilson: you go too far,” Sunday Times, 14 January 1968.
94. On Britain’s second bid see Oliver J. Daddow, ed., Harold Wilson and European Integration:
Britain’s Second Application to join the EEC (London, 2003); Helen Parr, Britain’s Policy Toward the
European Community: Harold Wilson and Britain’s World Role, 1964–1967 (London 2006).
95. Cabinet Conclusions, 4 January, 1968, CAB 128/43.
96. “British Defence Policy East of Suez,” Extract from Record of Conversation between Prime
Minister and President Johnson at the White House, 2 July 1967 FCO 46/28.
97. On British involvement in the Yemen civil war, see Clive Jones, Britain and the Yemen Civil
War, 1962–1965 (Brighton, 2004).
98. See S.R. Ashton and W. Roger Louis, East of Suez and the Commonwealth 1964–1971
(London, 2004).
99. Colman, “Special Relationship?” p. 157.
100. On Britain’s recent foreign policy activities, see Paul Williams, British foreign policy under
New Labour, 1997–2005 (Houndmills, 2005).
101. Colman, “Special Relationship?,” pp. 77–78.
102. Stockwell, British documents on the end of Empire: Malaysia, p. xlvii.