PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.

DELA CRUZ
G.R. No.100386, December 11, 1992
FACTS
Clarito Olivares and Alfredo Dizon went to Marlow’s, a pub, on July
2, 1985 where they drank and stayed until 9 o’clock in the evening. They
later on proceeded to a radio station and had some drinks. At around 9:30
that same evening, Dizon heard Olivares arguing with someone at the gate
of St. Louis University Girls High. Dizon called Olivares and told him that
it was time to go home. It was at this point that Dizon saw Olivares crying.
They proceeded to the 456 Restaurant which was along Session Road and
about one hundred (100) meters away from the radio station. They had
coffee there and stayed for about twenty to thirty minutes.

Dizon testified that Olivares looked depressed and told the former
that he was in trouble but did not reveal the reason why he was bothered.

At around 10 o'clock that same evening, they went home walking

down Session Road towards the Pines Theater. Upon reaching the
Development Bank of the Philippines, which is about ten (10) meters away
from the Pines Theater, Olivares was greeted by a townmate and both
talked for about ten (10) minutes. After which Dizon and Olivares
proceeded down the road and were met suddenly by three men, one of
whom is the accused-appellant, who immediately drew a fanknife and
stabbed Olivares in the stomach. Olivares in his attempt to elude the knife
thrust of appellant accidentally warded off Dizon and in doing so, the
former landed on top of the latter. Olivares tried to get up but accused-
appellant stabbed him again on the chest.

Because of the successive thrusts, Olivares fell down once more but
was able to kick accused-appellant on his right foot. In so doing he got
stabbed a third time below the knee. Dizon was able to free himself as soon
as Olivares tried to stand up. He tried to fight accused-appellant but the
latter lunged at him with his knife. Dizon stepped backward and with his
left hand grabbed appellant's right wrist and in so doing Dizon's finger got
lacerated. Then, accused-appellant and his companions ran away. Olivares
was brought to the Baguio General Hospital but was pronounced dead on
arrival

Two days after the incident, Dizon went to the police station and
gave a written statement. He described the killer as a man between the ages
of 28 and 32, about 5 feet 7 inches in height, of regular build, with an
oblong face, pointed nose, sported a mustache, wore a checkered polo shirt,
a blue-green jacket with straight collar, and a blue wool hat. Thereafter,
accused-appellant, who answers to the name of Eduardo de la Cruz, was
picked up by the police authorities and brought to the police station where
Dizon identified him again as the assailant of Olivares.

On the other hand, accused-appellant denies involvement with the

killing of Olivares and predicated his defense on alibi. Finally appellant's
argument that even assuming his conviction of the crime of Murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty imposable should have
been only 18 years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years and not reclusion
perpetua.
ISSUE
Whether or not there should be modification in the other periods of
penalties as a result of the prohibition against the death penalty.
HELD
The interpretation and hold that Art. III, Sec. 19(1) does not change
the periods of the penalty prescribed by Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code
except only insofar as it prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and
reduces it to reclusion perpetua. The range of the medium and minimum
penalties remains unchanged.

The Court realizes that this interpretation may lead to certain

inequities that would not have arisen under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code before its modification. Thus, a person originally subject to the
death penalty and another who committed the murder without the
attendance of any modifying circumstance will now both be punishable
with the same medium period although the former is concededly more
guilty than the later. True enough. But that is the will not of this Court but
of the Constitution. That is a question of wisdom, not construction. Of
some relevance perhaps is the parable of the workman who was paid the
stipulated daily wage of one penny although he had worked longer than
others hired later in the day also paid the same amount. When he
complained because he felt unjustly treated by the householder, the latter
replied: "Friend, I do you no wrong. Did you not agree with me for a
penny?"

The problem in any event is addressed not to this Court but to the
Congress. Penalties are prescribed by statute and are essentially and
exclusively legislative. As judges, we can only interpret and apply them
and have no authority to modify them or revised their range as determined
exclusively by the legislature. We should not encroach on this prerogative
of the lawmaking body.

Coming back to the case at bar, we find that there being no generic or
mitigating circumstance attending the commission of the offenses, the
applicable sentence is the medium period of the penalty prescribed by
Article 248, which conformably to the new doctrine here adopted and
announced, it is still reclusion perpetua.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LATUPAN

G.R. Nos. 112453-56, June 28, 2001
FACTS

On April 29, 1991, at around 4:00 in the afternoon, Ceferino

Dagulo suddenly heard the shouts of a woman and a child coming from
the north. Moments later, Ceferino saw accused Gerardo Latupan y Sibal
walking in his direction, carrying a thin, bloodied knife. Accused Latupan
entered the house of Ceferino and started chasing Ceferino's wife, who was
able to run to another house nearby. Unable to catch Ceferino's wife,
accused Latupan turned to Ceferino and said, "I will kill you all." At that
time, accused Latupan's clothes, chest, hands and legs were full of blood.
Accused Latupan attempted to thrust the knife into Ceferino, who was able
to parry it. Later on, accused Latupan told Ceferino to bring him to the
authorities and tried to give the knife to Ceferino. Ceferino refused to touch
the knife and told accused to go to the authorities by himself. Hearing this
advice, accused ran away.

The house of Emilio Asuncion (hereafter Emy) was 100 meters from
Ceferino's house. At around 4:00 in the afternoon of the same day, Emy
Asuncion was returning to his house from a store. He reached his house
and found his wife, Lilia, dead on the ground with several stab wounds on
her body. His one-year old son, Leo, was lying on top of Lilia Asuncion.
Emy picked up Leo and saw that the left side of Leo's face was lacerated.
He saw Jaime, his three-year old son and asked where Jose, his eldest son,
was. At that moment, Emy heard the voice of Jose from upstairs of the
house, asking for medicine. He ran upstairs and saw that Jose was
wounded. He asked Jose who stabbed him. Jose replied, "Uncle Jerry,
Tatang." Seeing that Jose needed immediate medical treatment, Emy
brought him to the house of Ceferino and then returned to his house to get
his two other children, Leo and Jaime. They left the corpse of Lilia
Asuncion inside Emy's house.

During the trip to the hospital, Emy's son, Jose, saw accused Latupan
inside the jeep. Jose pointed to accused Latupan as the one who stabbed
him. At the hospital, the doctors treated the injuries of Leo and Jaime.
However, the doctors advised Emy and Ceferino to bring Jose to another
hospital due to the seriousness of his wounds. So, they proceeded to
Cagayan Valley Regional Hospital. Sadly, Jose was dead on arrival.

Jaime, 5-year-old son of Emy Asuncion, testified that he was three

years old when the incident occurred. He stated that accused Latupan
stabbed his mother, stepped on him, threw his brother, Leo, outside the
window and stabbed his other brother, Jose.

ISSUE
Whether or not Lacutan should suffer the sentence of life
imprisonment.
HELD
The trial court, however, erred in convicting accused-appellant of the
"complex crime of double murder" and separate offenses of serious
physical injuries. Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides: "When a
single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the
most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period." The instant case does not fall under any of the two
mentioned instances when a complex crime is committed. The killing of
Lilia Asuncion and Jose Asuncion and the wounding of Jaime and Leo
Asuncion resulted not from a single act but from several and distinct acts
of stabbing. "Where the death of two persons does not result from a single
act but from two different shots, two separate murders, and not a complex
crime, are committed."
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for murder
at the time of the commission of the crime in April 1991 was reclusion
temporal maximum to death. The trial court convicted accused-appellant of
murder and sentenced him to "life imprisonment." The proper imposable
penalty is reclusion perpetua, not life imprisonment. Obviously, the trial
court intended to impose reclusion perpetua.

However, the penalty of life imprisonment is not the same

as reclusion perpetua. They are distinct in nature, in duration and in
accessory penalties. First, "life imprisonment" is imposed for serious
offenses penalized by special laws, while reclusion perpetua is prescribed
under the Revised Penal Code. Second, "life imprisonment" does not carry
with it any accessory penalty. Reclusion perpetua has accessory penalties.
Third, "life imprisonment" does not appear to have any definite extent or
duration, while reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30)
years after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon, although the
maximum period thereof shall in no case exceed forty (40) years.

We likewise note that the trial court sentenced accused to "ten days of
imprisonment" for each count of slight physical injuries. We reiterate the
rule that it is necessary for the courts to employ the proper legal
terminology in the imposition of penalties because of the substantial
difference in their corresponding legal effects and accessory penalties.The
appropriate name of the penalty must be specified inasmuch as under the
scheme of penalties in the Revised Penal Code, the principal penalty for a
felony has its own specific duration and corresponding accessory
penalties.a Thus, the courts must employ the proper nomenclature specified
in the Revised Penal Code, such as "reclusion perpetua," not "life
imprisonment" or "ten days of arresto menor," not "ten days of
imprisonment."

Hence, the proper penalty for each murder committed in April 1991,
considering the absence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances,
is reclusion perpetua, with its accessory penalties. Further, accused-appellant
is liable for two counts of slight physical injuries and must be sentenced to
twenty (20) days of arresto menor, each, likewise with its accessory penalties
under the Revised Penal Code.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JARUMAYAN

G.R. Nos. 13200-R, 52 OG 248, August 30, 1955
FACTS
This a case of bribery. Defendants are municipal policeman of
Calamba, Laguna.
 In the afternoon of May 15, 1952, De Lina and Gecolea met
Jarumayan; after having been informed that Gecolea was ready with P20,
said appellant instructed them to proceed to the road crossing of Calamba
and look for a policeman who would lead them to the place where the
horse was; at said crossing, they met appellant policeman Pedro Tauro.
Tauro led them to barrio Mayapa, Calamba, where the horse was found
and the amount of P20 was given by De Lina to Tauro.
ISSUE
Whether or not subsidiary imprisonment is included in the term
“accessories of law”.
HELD
Article 73 of the Revised Penal Code provides that “Whatever the
courts shall impose a penalty which, by provision of law, carries with its
other penalties, according to the provisions of Articles 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, and
45 of this Code, it must be understood that the accessory penalties are also
imposed upon the convict”. Subsidiary imprisonment, however, is not an
accessory penalty. Rather, it is a personal penalty prescribed by law in
substitution of the pecuniary liability when the latter cannot be satisfied
because of the culprit’s insolvency. But subsidiary imprisonment cannot be
served unless the judgment condemns the accused to suffer the same in
case of inability to pay the fine imposed upon him. The judgment, therefore,
should include the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment.

GLORIA v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 131012, April 21, 1999
FACTS
Abad, Bandigas, Somebang and Margallo, private respondents, are
public school teachers. Some time in September and October 1990, during
the teacher’s strikes, they did not report for work. For this reason, they
were administratively charged with 1) grave misconduct; 2) gross violation
of Civil Service Rules; 3) gross neglect of duty; 4) refusal to perform official
duty; 5) gross insubordination; 6) conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
service and; 7) AWOL. They were placed under preventive suspension.
Investigation ended before the lapse of the 90-day period. Margallo was
dismissed from the service. The three others were suspended for 6
months. On appeal to the CA, the court mitigated the punishment to
reprimand only. Hence their reinstatement. Now the reinstated teachers
are asking for back wages during the period of their suspension and
pending appeal (before the CA exonerated them).
ISSUE
Whether or not the teachers are entitled to backwages for the period
pending their appeal if they are subsequently exonerated.
HELD
Yes, they are entitled to full pay pending their appeal. To justify
the award of back wages, the respondent must be exonerated from
the charges and his suspension be unjust. Preventive suspension pending
appeal is actually punitive, and it is actually considered illegal if the
respondent is exonerated and the administrative decision
finding him guilty is reversed. Hence, he should be reinstated with
full pay for the period of the suspension. Section 47 (4) of the Civil Service
Decree states that the respondent “shall be considered as under preventive
suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins.” On
the other hand, if his conviction is affirmed the period of his suspension
becomes part of the final penalty of suspension or dismissal. In the case at
bar the respondents won in their appeal, therefore the period of suspension
pending their appeal would be considered as part of the preventive
suspension, entitling them to full pay because they were eventually
exonerated and their suspension was unjustified. They are still entitled to
back salaries even if they were still reprimanded.
There are thus two kinds of preventive suspension of civil service
employees who are charged with offenses punishable by removal or
suspension: (1) preventive suspension pending investigations and (2)
preventive suspension pending appeal if the penalty imposed by the
disciplining authority is suspension or dismissal and, after review, the
respondent is exonerated.
Preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty. It is a
measure intended to enable to enable the disciplining authority to
investigate charges against respondent by preventing the latter from
intimidating or any way influencing witnesses against him. If the
investigation is not finished and a decision is not rendered within that
period, the suspension will be lifted and the respondent will automatically
be reinstated. If after investigation respondent is found innocent of the
charges and is exonerated, he should be reinstated.
Suspension from Public Office

Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 128055, 18 April 2001

FACTS:
The Court is called upon to review the act of the Sandiganbayan, and
how far it can go, in ordering the preventive suspension of petitioner, Mme.
Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, in connection with pending in criminal
cases filed against her for alleged violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
There were several cases filed against Santiago, leading to her suspension
from her position as Senator the Republic of the Philippines.

ISSUE:
The petition assails the authority of the Sandiganbayan to decree a
ninety-
day preventive suspension of Mme. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, a Senator
of the Republic of the Philippines, from any government position, and
furnishing a copy thereof to the Senate of the Philippines for the
implementation of the suspension order.

RULING:
The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive
suspension of an incumbent public official charged with violation of the
provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential
support.
 SEC. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. - any incumbent public
officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information
under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for
any offense involving fraud upon... government or public funds or
property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever
stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be
suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall
lose all retirement or... gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is
acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and
benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the
meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.” It is
not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings.
In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement
and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during
suspension.
In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the
Sandiganbayan
merely adhered to the clear an unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as
the jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once, upheld
Sandiganbayan’ authority to decree the suspension of public officials and
employees indicted before it.
The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be
established in a pre-suspension proceeding before trial on the merits
Proceeds. All it secures to the accused is adequate opportunity to challenge
the validity or regularity of the proceedings against him, such as, that he
has not been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation, that the
acts imputed to him do not constitute a specific crime warranting his
mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of Republic Act No.
3019.
Effect of Penalties;

People v. Eduarte, G.R. No. 88232, 26 February 1990;

Facts:

Alma T. Aggabao filed with the RTC, an information against private

respondents Elvino Aggabao and Villa Suratos for the crime of
concubinage. Upon being arraigned, private respondents entered a plea of
not guilty. During the trial, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

They argued that concubinage, under Art. 334 of the RPC is

punishable with prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods,
which is equivalent to imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day to
four (4) years and two (2) months, well within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court, and not of the RTC.

The prosecution filed an opposition to the motion contending that the

RTC has jurisdiction over the crime of concubinage because destierro, the
imposable penalty on the concubine has a duration of six (6) months and
one (1) day to six (6) years.

Issue:
 Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has original jurisdiction over
the crime of concubinage.

Ruling:

That a crime punishable with the penalty of destierro is within the

jurisdiction of the inferior courts. This is so because of the scale of penalties
outlined in Art. 71, destierro comes after arresto mayor. * And since under
the Judiciary Act of 1948 [Republic Act No. 296], crimes punishable with
arresto mayor are within the jurisdiction of the inferior courts, it follows
that crimes punishable with destierro are also within the jurisdiction of
such courts. In explaining its conclusion that destierro is lighter than
arresto mayor and therefore cognizable by the inferior courts.
 People vs Lucas, GR Nos. 108172-73, May 25, 1994 (233 SCRA 537)

Facts:
Chanda Lucas, 17 years old, charged her natural father, Jose Conrado
Lucas, of attempted rape committed February 1991. She revealed that she
was first raped by him when she was nine years old Chanda, filed two
separate sworn criminal complaints for rape 2 and for attempted rape 3
against her father. The commission of the crime of rape directly by overt
acts by then and there taking advantage of complainant's tender age and
innocence, by putting his hand inside the panty of the undersigned and
mashing her vagina while his other hand was pressing her nipples and at
the same time kissing her on the lips, face and neck, thereafter accused
placed himself on top of her but said accused did not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the said offense of rape by reason of the
fact that the brother and sister was awakened and shouted upon the
accused, a cause other than the spontaneous desistance. The accused
testified that he and Chanda's mother are not married; however, since 1969,
they had been living together as husband and wife until 1972, when he was
detained for alleged gunrunning and when Ofelia and the children moved
to Cotabato. He denied having raped his second daughter and alleged that
the brothers and sisters of Ofelia, particularly Leonardo Austria, were all
angry at him and instigated the filing of the fabricated charges against him.

Issue:

Whether aggravating circumstance is offset by the mitigating

circumstance and that the lesser penalty will be the one imposed.
Held:
Yes, If there is an aggravating circumstance, but there is also a
mitigating circumstance, then generally speaking, that aggravating
circumstance is offset by the mitigating circumstance in which case the
lesser penalty which is reclusion perpetua will be the one imposed

Considering, however, that the complaint for this incident subject of

Criminal Case No. Q-91-18466 charges the accused with the crime of
attempted rape, then, as correctly pointed out by the accused in his second
assigned error and concurred in by the Office of the Solicitor General, he
cannot be convicted of consummated rape.
Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court provides that "[w]hen there
is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information,
and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged
is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall
be convicted of the offense proved included in that which is charged, or of
the offense charged included in that which is proved." The offense charged
in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18466 (attempted rape) is necessarily included
in the offense that was proved (consummated rape). Accordingly, the
accused should be convicted of attempted rape only. The penalty for
attempted rape is prision mayor, which is two degrees lower than that
provided by law for rape. The accused is entitled to the benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, and for attempted rape he may be sentenced
to a penalty whose minimum should be within the range of prision
correccional and whose maximum should be within the range of prision
mayor, taking into account the modifying circumstances. The alternative
circumstance of relationship provided for in Article 15 of the Revised Penal
Code should be appreciated against the accused considering that the
offended party, Chanda, is his descendant. In crimes against chastity, such
as rape, relationship is aggravating.
 Prior to R.A. No. 7659, the presence of modifying circumstances
would not affect the penalty of reclusion perpetua prescribed for the crime
of rape because such a penalty was then indivisible and under Article 63 of
the Revised Penal Code, when the law prescribes a single indivisible
penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the
deed. However, pursuant to Section 21 of R.A. No. 7659, which amended
Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, reclusion perpetua has now a defined
duration, i.e., from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years.
There is, however, no corresponding amendment to Article 76 of the same
Code for the purpose of converting reclusion perpetua into a divisible
penalty with three specific periods -- minimum, medium, and maximum --
and including it in the table provided therein showing the duration and the
time included in each of the periods.
It may thus be said that although the law has now fixed the duration
of reclusion perpetua, it did not make explicit its intention to convert it into
a divisible penalty. In any event, Article 65 of the Code which provides:
"ART 65. Rules in cases in which the penalty is not composed of three
periods. -- In cases in which the penalty prescribed by law is not composed
of three periods, the courts shall apply the rules contained in the foregoing
articles, dividing into three equal portions of time included in the penalty
prescribed, and forming one period of each of the three portions." may be
applied. Accordingly, the time included in the penalty of reclusion
perpetua (twenty [20] years and one [1] days to forty [40] years) can be
divided into three equal portions, with each composing a period. The
periods of reclusion perpetua would then be as follows:

minimum - 20 years and 1 day to 26 years and 8 months

medium - 26 years, 8 months and 1 day to 33 years and 4 months

maximum - 34 years, 4 months and 1 day to 40 years

 Taking into account the presence of the aggravating circumstance of
relationship in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18465, the accused may finally be
sentenced to thirty-four (34) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
reclusion perpetua.
Considering again such aggravating circumstances, the accused may
be sentenced in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18466 to an indeterminate penalty
ranging from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional maximum as minimum to ten (10) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor maximum as maximum.
There should also be awards for damages in each of the two cases.
 People v. Bon, G.R. No. 166401, 30 October 2006;

Facts:
8 informations were filed against Alfredo Bon charging him with
rape of AAA and BBB, the daughters of his brother. The rape allegedly
happened many times in the span of 6 years starting in 1994 were the
victims were still minors.

RTC convicted Bon on all 8 counts of rape, denying the alibi

presented by Bon. RTC considered qualifying circumstances of minority of
the victims and the relationship of the victims and Bon.

On appeal on the penalty, CA ruled affirming the 6 counts rape but

modified the 2 as attempted rape. According to the CA, the evidence on the
2 rapes was insufficient to make Bon guilty beyond reasonable doubt. CA
then reduced the penalty for the 2 counts of rape from death to
indeterminate penalty of 10 years as minimum to 17 years and 4 months of
reclusion temporal as maximum for attempted rape.

Issues:
Whether the Court should affirm the conviction of appellant Alfredo
Bon (appellant) for six counts of rape and two counts of attempted rape,
the victims being his then-minor nieces.
Whether his penalty for attempted qualified rape, which under the
penal law should be two degrees lower than that of consummated
qualified rape, should be computed from death or reclusion perpetua.
Ruling:
Court affirms. The Court thus affirms the conclusions of the Court of
Appeals that it has been established beyond reasonable doubt that
appellant is guilty of six (6) counts of rape and two (2) counts of attempted
rape. However, in light of Rep. Act No. 9346, the appropriate penalties for
both crimes should be amended.

We close by returning to the matter of appellant Alfredo Bon. By

reason of Rep. Act No. 9346, he is spared the death sentence, and entitled to
the corresponding reduction of his penalty as a consequence of the
downgrading of his offense from two (2) counts consummated rape to two
(2) counts of attempted rape. For the six (6) counts of rape, we downgrade
the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for parole,
pursuant to Rep. Act No. 9346. For each of the two (2) counts of attempted
rape, we downgrade by one degree lower the penalty imposed by the
Court of Appeals. We hold that there being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, the penalty of prision mayor should be imposed in it
medium period. Consequently, we impose the new penalty of two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.
 People v. Carpo, G.R. No. 132676, April 4, 2001

Facts:

On 25 August 1996 at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening while he was

watching television with his family his dogs barked. He stood up, took his
flashlight and trudged the unpaved path towards his cow to check them.
The noise grew louder, arousing his suspicion that something was really
wrong. After transferring his cow nearer to his house, he went inside the
kitchen, stood atop the concrete washbasin, hid himself behind the bamboo
slats and peeked outside to observe. The darkness helped conceal him from
outside. A few minutes later, he saw Carpo together with Warlito
suspiciously stooping near his barn. Warlito's son Roche was also there; he
was standing by the mango tree. They were all looking in the direction of
Florentino Dulay's house which was about a meter to the south from where
he was. He also saw Oscar Ibao, another son of Warlito, striding towards
Dulay's hut. As soon as he reached the hut Oscar lifted the sawali mat near
the wall and hurled something inside. Oscar then scurried off towards the
nearby creek with Roche following him. Seconds later, a loud explosion
shook the entire neighborhood and Teresita Dulay's screams broke into the
night.

Ruben Meriales, rushed outside. He ran towards Florentino's hut but

was deterred by darkness. He returned home to take his flashlight and
raced back to lend aid to Teresita. Inside the hut he was stunned by the
terrifying gore that greeted him - a bloodied Florentino cradled in the arms
of his weeping widow, Norwela and Nissan lying side by side on a cot
both doused in blood, and a motionless Norma whose head was oozing
with blood.

Issue:
 Whether the crime is a complex crime murder qualified by explosion.

Decision:

The crime committed may otherwise be more approriately

denominated as murder qualified by explosion rather than by treachery.
However, since it was treachery that is alleged in the Information and
appreciated by the trial court, the explosion of the grenade which resulted
in the death of Florentino, Norwela and Nissan, and the wounding of
Noemi can only be multiple murder complexed with attempted murder.

There is only one penalty for complex crimes. The penalty for
complex crimes for the most serious crime in the maximum period. Such
penalty is beneficial to the accused for he is given a single penalty instead
of as many penalties as there are crimes committed. The reason for the
single penalty is that the basis of the felony is the singularity of the act. For
instance, in the single act of shooting with a high-powered gun killing two
persons with one bullet, without Article 48, the offender would have been
penalized with two reclusion temporal. But with the provision on complex
crimes, the penalty would be one reclusion temporal in the maximum
period. What is the effect of R.A. 9346 on the penalty for complex crimes?
The effect of the abolition of the death penalty on complex crimes is that
the maximum period cannot be imposed on complex crimes punishable
with reclusion perpetua to death.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
MARIO TABACO, accused-appellant
G.R. Nos. 100382-100385 March 19, 1997

Facts:
Tabaco entered the cockpit with a fully loaded M-14 sub-machine gun. He
fired the weapon, which contained 20 rounds of bullets in its magazine,
continuously. When the rifle was recovered from Tabaco, the magazine
was already empty. Four persons died.

Issue: whether there is a complex crime.

Ruling:
Supreme Court held that the trial court was in error in imposing only a
single penalty of reclusion perpetua for all four murder cases. The trial court
holding that a complex crime was committed since “the evidence shows
that the four (4) victims were FELLED by one single shot/burst of fire
and/or successive automatic gun fires, meaning continuous (emphasis ours)”
does not hold water.

The law provides, Art. 48, penalty for complex crimes. When a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious
crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period, as
amended by Art. No. 400, Art. 48, Revised Penal Code.

This article provides for two classes of crimes where a single penalty is to
be imposed, first, where the single act constitutes two or more g rave or
less grave felonies (delito compuesto), and second, when the offense is a
necessarily means for committing the other (delito complejo) and/or complex
proper.

In the cases at bar, the Provincial Prosecutor filed four (4) separate
Informations of murder, which should have been otherwise, as the
shooting to death of the four (4) victims should have been prosecuted
under one information, involving four (4) murder victims.

Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable because the death of
each of the five persons who were killed by appellant and the physical
injuries inflicted upon each of the two other persons injured were not
caused by the performance by the accused of one simple act as provided for
by said article. Although it is true that several successive shots were fired
by the accused in a short space of time, yet the factor which must be taken
into consideration is that, to each death caused or physical injuries inflicted upon
the victims, corresponds a distinct and separate shot fired by the accused, who thus
made himself criminally liable for as many offenses as those resulting from every
single act that produced the same. Although, apparently, he perpetrated a
series of offenses successively in a matter of seconds, yet each person killed
and each person injured by him became the victim, respectively, of a separate crime
of homicide or frustrated homicide. Except for the fact that five crimes of
homicide and two cases of frustrated homicide were committed
successively during the tragic incident, legally speaking there is nothing
that would connect one of them with its companion offenses.

The doctrine enunciated in said case only applies when it is impossible to

ascertain the individual deaths caused by numerous killers. In the case at
bench, all of the deaths are attributed, beyond a shadow of a doubt, to the
accused-appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
JIMMY SABREDO y GARBO, accused-appellant
G.R. No. 126114 May 11, 2000
En Banc

Facts:
Imposed the penalty of death on accused-appellant, Jimmy Sabredo y
Garbo, for the complex crime of abduction with rape of complainant
Judeliza Sabredo. Appellant is the uncle of complainant.

In 1993, Jimmy arrived from Masbate to reside with Judeliza's family in

Cebu where he stayed with them for more than a year.

On June 27, 1994, Judeliza went to the well near their house to take a bath.
There, Jimmy grabbed and forcibly dragged her at knife's point to the
highway where he made her board a truck for Bogo, Cebu. Impelled by
fear, she complied since Jimmy continuously poked a knife under cover of
his jacket at her. From Bogo, he took her by passenger motorboat to Placer,
Masbate.

On July 4, 1994, at around midnight, Jimmy, armed with a blade, sexually

assaulted Judeliza.

Contention of accused: Jimmy admitted having sexual relations with

Judeliza, but insisted that it was consensual. He claimed that they were
lovers.

Issue: Whether the court is correct in convicting the accused of forcible

abduction with rape.
Ruling:
No. When a complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is
charged, such as forcible abduction with rape, it goes without saying that
the prosecution must allege and prove the presence of all the elements of
forcible abduction, as well as all the elements of the crime of rape. When
the appellant, using a blade, forcibly took away the complainant for the
purpose of sexually assaulting her, as in fact he did rape her, the rape may
then absorb forcible abduction. Hence, the crime committed by appellant is
simple rape only.

It may appear at first blush that forcible abduction, as defined and

penalized by Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code was also committed, we
are not totally disposed to convict appellant for the complex crime of
forcible abduction with rape. It is note that while the information
sufficiently alleges the forcible taking of complainant from Cebu to
Masbate, the same fails to allege "lewd designs." When a complex crime
under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is charged, such as forcible
abduction with rape, it is axiomatic that the prosecution must allege and
prove the presence of all the elements of forcible abduction, as well as all
the elements of the crime of rape. When appellant, using a blade, forcibly
took away complainant for the purpose of sexually assaulting her, as in fact
he did rape her, the rape may then absorb forcible abduction.

Hence, the crime committed by appellant is simple rape only.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

RADEL GALLARDE, accused-appellant
G.R. No. 133025, February 17, 2000

Facts:
Radel Gallarde was charged with the special complex crime of rape with
homicide in an information whose accusatory portion reads as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of May 1997, in the evening, amidst the field
located at Brgy. Trenchera, Tayug, Pangasinan, the above-named accused,
and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one
Editha Talan, a minor-10 years of age, against her will and consent, and
thereafter, with intent to kill, cover the nose and mouth of the said minor
resulting to her death and then bury her in the field, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of said Editha Talan.

The trial court found Gallarde guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of murder.

Issue:
Whether the trial court erred in convicting him of murder in an
information charging him of rape with homicide.

Ruling:
Court sustain Gallarde’s contention that the trial court erred in convicting
him of murder in an information charging him of rape with homicide. A
reading of the accusatory portion of the information shows that there was
no allegation of any qualifying circumstance.

Although it is true that the term homicide as used in special complex crime
of rape with homicide is to be understood in its generic sense, and includes
murder and slight physical injuries committed by reason or on the occasion
of rape, it is settled in this jurisdiction that where a complex crime is
charged and the evidence fails to support the charge as to one of the
component offense, the accused can be convicted of the other.

In rape with homicide, in order to be convicted of murder in case the

evidence fails to support the charge of rape, the qualifying circumstance
must be sufficiently alleged and proved. Otherwise, it would be a denial of
the right of the accused to be informed of the nature of the offense with
which he is charged. It is fundamental that every element of the offense
must be alleged in the complaint or information. The main purpose of
requiring the various elements of a crime to be set out in an information is
to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. He is presumed to
have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.

In the absence in the information of an allegation of any qualifying

circumstance, Gallarde cannot be convicted of murder. An accused cannot
be convicted of an offense higher than that with which he is charged in the
complaint or information under which he is tried. It matters not how
conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, but an accused
cannot be convicted of any offense, unless it is charged in the complaint or
information for which he is tried, or is necessarily included in that which is
charged. He has a right to be informed of the nature of the offense with
which he is charged before he is put on trial. To convict an accused of a
higher offense than that charged in the complaint or information under
which he is tried would be an unauthorized denial of that right.

Homicide, which we find to be the only crime committed by Gallarde, is

defined in Article 249 of the RPC and is punished with reclusion temporal.
In the absence of any modifying circumstance, it shall be imposed in its
medium period. Gallarde is entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.

The assailed decision of the RTC finding accused-appellant guilty of the

crime of murder is hereby modified.
Radel Gallarde is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as
principal, of the crime of Homicide, defined under Article 249 of the RPC.

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs.

HON. JUSTICE FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, et. Al., respondents
G.R. No. 109266, December 2, 1993

Facts:
Petitioner, while being the Commissioner of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation was charged with violation Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, allegedly committed by her favoring unqualified
aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program. 32 different
informations were file corresponding with the 32 names approved.

Petitioner avers that while hypothetically admitting that the allegations

were true the 32 informations should be consolidated because of the
concept of delito continuado.

Issue:
Whether the crimes charged in the 32 informations filed constitute only one
crime.

Ruling:
The 32 Amended Informations aver that the offenses were committed on
the same period of time, example, on or about October 17, 1988. The strong
probability even exists that the approval of the application or the
legalization of the stay of the 32 aliens was done by a single stroke of the
pen, as when the approval was embodied in the same document.

For delito continuado to exist there should be a plurality of acts performed

during a period of time; unity of penal provision violated; and unity of
criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or more violations of the
same penal provisions are united in one and same instant or resolution
leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim.

Amended Informations charged the accused with what is known as delito

continuado or “continued crime” and hence, there should only be one
information to be filed against Santiago.
The concept of delito continuado is applicable to crime penalized under
special laws.
Complex crimes vi-vii
GARCIA-PADILLA vs. ENRILE
G.R. No. L-61388 April 20, 1983

FACTS:
The (14) detainees were all detained at the PC/INP Command
Headquarters, Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya until their transfer to an
undisclosed place.

Josefina Garcia-Padilla filed the writ of habeas corpus and mandamus, a

mother of detained petitioner Sabino G. Padilla, Jr.
The mandamus aspect of the instant petition has, however, become moot
and academic, the where abouts of petitioners having already become
known to petitioner Josefina Garcia-Padilla.

The PC/INP raiding team which made the arrest were only armed with a
search warrant. Warrant was authority given to make arrests, much less
detention that the search warrant which authorized respondents to
seize "subversive documents, firearms of assorted calibers, medicine and
other subversive paraphernalia" in the house and clinic of Dra. Aurora
Parong was a roving and general warrant and is, therefore, illegal per se
because it does not state specifically the things that are to be seized no
criminal charges have as of yet been filed against any of the detainees there
is no judgment, decree, decision or order from a court of law
which would validate the continued detention of the petitioner that
while it is true that a purported telegram stating the issuance of a
Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) was shown to the detainees.
Respondents are denying the detainees their constitutional right to counsel,
averring that the detainees were allowed regular visits by counsel and
relatives during their period of detention.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Arrest of petitioners was patently unlawful and illegal.
2. Whether or not the issuance of a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO)
has provided the legal basis of the detention.

RULING:
1.No. The Court held that prior thereto to the arrest, the detainees were
identified as members of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CCP)
engaging in subversive activities and using the house of detainee Dra.
Aurora Parong in Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya, as their headquarters.

The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting

armed elements or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of
the rebellion is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed
conflict to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately
prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense.

2. Yes. The absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment

to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence
against go arrest and detention of persons ordered by the President
through the issuance of Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) is
merely preventive Government forces, or any other milder acts but equally
in pursuance of the rebellious movement.

The supreme mandate received by the President from the people and his
oath to do justice to every man should be sufficient guarantee, without
need of judicial overseeing against commission by him of an act of
arbitrariness in the discharge particularly of those duties imposed upon
him for the protection of public safety which in itself includes the
protection of life, liberty and property.

SANTIAGO IBASCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

GR NO. 117488 SEPTEMBER 5, 1996

FACTS:
The Ibasco spouses requested credit accommodation for the supply of
ingredients in the manufacture of animal feeds from the Trivinio spouses.
Ibasco issued 3 checks for 3 deliveries of darak. The checks bounced and
the Ibasco spouses were notified of the dishonor. Ibasco instead offered a
property in Daet. The property being across the sea the Trivinio spouses
did not inspect the property. For the failure of the Ibasco spouses to settle
their account, the Trivinio spouses filed criminal cases against the former
for violation of BP22.

ISSUE:
Whether the checks for accommodation or guarantee to acquire the benefits
of the interpretation of Ministry Circular 4 of the Department of Justice in
relation to BP 22.

RULING:
Yes. The Court ruled that Ministry Circular 4, issued December 1, 1981 by
the Department of Justice, provides that where a check is issued as part of
an arrangement to guarantee or secure the payment of the obligation, pre-
existing or not, the drawer is not criminally liable for either estafa or
violation of BP 22.
It must be noted, however, that BP22 does not distinguish and applies even
in cases where dishonored checks were issued as a guarantee or for deposit
only. The erroneous interpretation of Ministry Circular 4 was rectified by
the repealing Ministry Circular 12, issued on 8 August 1984.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. TOLENTINO

G.R. No. L-48740 August 5, 1942

FACTS:
Appellant pleaded guilty to the charge of theft of seven shirts valued at P14
belonging to one Cosnic Famora. Being recidivist, he was sentenced in
the Court of First Instance to suffer two months and one day of arresto
mayor and to pay civil indemnity. Appellant was further sentenced to
suffer an additional penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor for
habitual delinquency.

The trial court sentenced the appellant under paragraph 5 (b) of article 62
of the Revised Penal Code, as if this were only his fourth and not his fifth
conviction.

The Solicitor General recommends the affirmance of that sentence, on the

theory that appellant's fourth previous conviction alleged in the
information should be disregarded because the date of his release in
connection there with was not shown.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is a recidivist.

RULING:
The Court ruled that habitual delinquent is necessarily a recidivist, and in
imposing the principal penalty upon him the aggravating circumstance of
recidivism has to be taken into account. In fixing the penalty provided by
law for the last crime " as required in paragraph 5 (a) (b), and (c) of article
62 of the Revised Penal Code, the court cannot disregard articles 14 (9) and
Revised Penal Code, which respectively define recidivism as
an aggravating circumstance and lay down the rule for the application of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. For the purpose of fixing the
additional penalty, recidivism cannot be taken as an aggravating
circumstance for the reason it is inherent in habitual delinquency.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE vs. MASONSON

G.R. No. L-45249 December 29, 1936

FACTS:
Appellant was charged with the crime of theft and, upon a plea of guilty,
he was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Manila to suffer one
month and one day of arresto mayor, and to pay the costs. He was further
sentenced to an additional penalty of ten years and one day of prision
mayor for habitual delinquency.
The only question raised by this appeal relates to the correctness of the
imposition of the additional penalty upon the following allegation
contained in the information:
That said accused is a habitual delinquent under the provisions of article 62
of the Revised Penal Code, he having been previously convicted four (4)
times of the crime of theft, by final judgments of competent courts, his last
date of conviction of the crime of theft being October 8, 1935.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the conviction of the appellant should be considered a
Recidivism.
RULING:
The Court held that a finding of habitual delinquency cannot be predicated
upon a plea of guilty to an information which fails to specify the dates of
the commission of the alleged previous offenses, the appellant's convictions
thereof, and his release thereunder. However, a general allegation of a
previous conviction is sufficient to sustain a finding of the existence of the
aggravating circumstance of recidivism.

In the view we have taken of the case, the appellant must be found guilty
of the crime of theft penalized with arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods. The aggravating circumstance of recidivism having been
offset by the modifying circumstance of plea of guilty, the penalty
prescribed should be imposed in its medium period, that is to say, from
two months and one day to three months of arresto mayor.
PEOPLE vs. BRUSOLA

G.R. No. 210615, July 26, 2017

FACTS

In the Information, appellant Abenir was charged with the killing of his wife, Delia
Brusola as follows, that accused, being the husband of DELIA BRUSOLA, with intent to
kill and with the use of ball hammer, feloniously hit his said wife, with the said ball
hammer on her head, thereby causing fatal injury to the latter which directly caused her
death.

For his defense, appellant claimed that on the night of the incident, Abenir came
home. While he was preparing things, Delia went outside. She appeared to be waiting
for somebody. After taking a bath, she fixed her face. When Abenir asked if Delia was
going somewhere, she said it was none of his business. Abenir went to the bathroom for
his personal effects. While inside, he heard people talking outside and looked out
through a crack in the plywood wall. He saw a man and a woman kiss and identified
the woman as Delia, who told the man, "Huwag muna ngayon, nandiyan pa siya." The
man embraced her, and groped her breast and private parts. Abenir picked up the maso,
went outside, and approached them, who were surprised to see him. Abenir attacked
the man who used Delia as a shield and pushed her toward Abenir. He asserted that he
planned to attack the man whom he saw was with his wife but accidentally hit Delia
instead.

ISSUE

Whether or not appellant is guilty of parricide.

RULING
 Yes. Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of
parricide.

Here, there was no dispute as to the relationship between the accused-appellant and
the victim. As for the act of killing, their daughter Joanne clearly testified that she
suddenly saw her father hit the head of her mother with a small mallet. Joanne's
straightforward and candid narration of the incident is regarded as positive and
credible evidence, sufficient to convict the accused.

Ratio Decidendi: Well settled is the rule that it is unnatural for a relative, in this case the
accused's own child, who is interested in vindicating the crime, to accuse somebody else
other than the real culprit. For her to do so is to let the guilty go free.

Gist: This resolves the appeal of the CA’s Decision, affirming the Decision of the RTC,
which found Abenir Brusola guilty of parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal
Code.

People v. Mendoza

G.R. No. 123186, 9 July 1998

FACTS

The undersigned Assistant Provincial Prosecutor accuses Eric Mendoza and

Angelito Balagtas of the crime of robbery with rape, penalized under the provisions of
Art. 294, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

That on or about the 23rd day of August, 1991, in the municipality of Sta. Maria,
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with a knife, conspiring, confederating together and
mutually helping each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with intent of [sic] gain and by means of violence, threats and intimidation enter the
house of one Andrelita Sto. Domingo and once inside, take, rob and carry away with
them. with the total value of P12,500.00, belonging to the said Andrelita Sto. Domingo,
to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the total amount of P12,500.00 and that
simultaneously or during the commission of robbery, the above named accused
Angelito Balagtas by means of violence, threats and intimidation have carnal
knowledge of the said Andrelita Sto. Domingo against her will and by means of force.
 That in the commission of this crime the aggravating circumstances were present, to
wit: (1) nocturnity, (2) superior strength and (3) with a [sic] use of a knife.

ISSUE

Whether or not the accused-appelants accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the special complex crime of robbery with rape

RULING

Yes. Robbery with rape is a special complex crime punished under the second
paragraph of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code which reads:

Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons —Penalties. — Any
person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person
shall suffer:

2. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion

perpetua, when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional
mutilation, or if by reason or on occasion of such robbery, any of the physical injuries
penalized in subdivision 1 or article 263 shall have been inflicted: Provided, however,
That when the robbery accompanied with rape is committed with the use of a deadly
weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

When two or more persons are charged as co-conspirators in the crime of robbery
with rape, the conspiracy to rob is all that is needed to be proven to punish them all as
principals in the crime of robbery with rape. The rape may have been perpetrated by
only one of them, but they will all be convicted of robbery with rape, because the rule in
this jurisdiction is that whenever a rape is committed as a consequence, or on the
occasion of a robbery, all those who took part therein are liable as principals of the
crime of robbery with rape, although not all of them actually took part in the rape. 42 It
is enough that robbery shall have been accompanied by rape to be punishable under the
The Revised Penal Code which does not differentiate whether the rape was committed
before, during or after the robbery. 43 Thus, we have held in one case that where one of
the accused acted as guard while rape was being committed on the occasion of the
robbery, he is guilty as co-principal of the crime of robbery with rape. 44 As we
explained in the 1918 case of United States v. Tiongco:
 The robbers seizing the money and the other effects they found in said house, two
of them sullied the honor of the two women living therein, and the companions of the
two men who committed the rape made no opposition nor prevented these latter from
consummating this other crime, apparently unconnected with and unrelated to that of
robbery, but which, as well as sanguinary crimes, is often committed on such occasions,
and it is for this reason that the penal law, in odium of such offenses against property
and chastity, has considered them complex and punished them by one single penalty.

People v. Sarcia,

G.R. No. 169641, 10 September 2009

FACTS

A complaint for acts of lasciviousness was filed against accused-appellant and upon
review of the evidence by the prosecutor the charge was upgraded to rape.

The prosecution alleged that accused-appellant committed the crime of rape against
AAA who was then 5 years old.

AAA was playing with her cousin and two other children in a neighbor’s house
when accused invited her to the backyard of the house and raped here. AAA’s cousin
witnessed what happened.

The RTC found accused-appellant guilty and imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua as well as civil indemnity of P50,000.00 and moral damages of P50,000.00.

The record of the case was forwarded to the SC for automatic review and then
transferred to the CA for appropriate action and disposition.

Accused-appellant denied having committed the crime and interposed the following
defenses:

1.The inconsistency in the testimonies of AAA and her cousin

2. The inability of AAA to recall the exact date when the crime was committed

3. The delay in filing the case (the case was filed 4 years after the alleged rape was
committed

4. Absence of proof of force or intimidation

5. Medical report on negative lacerations

 The CA affirmed the conviction but modified the penalty imposed to death and
increased the civil indemnity to P75,000.00 and awarded exemplary damages of
P25,000.00 aside from the P50,000.00 for moral damages.

The case was elevated to the SC for further review.

RA 9344 took effect while the case was pending before the SC.

ISSUES

1. Whether or not accused-appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

If so, whether or not the penalty imposed was proper.

2. Can accused-appellant avail of the retroactive effect of RA 9344 with regard to

automatic suspension of sentence.

RULING

1. Guilty as charged.

Inconsistency in the testimonies of AAA and her cousin – Inconsistencies in the

testimonies of witnesses, which refer only to minor details and collateral matters, do not
affect the veracity and weight of their testimonies where there is consistency in relating
the principal occurrence and the positive identification of the accused. Slight
contradictions in fact even serve to strengthen the credibility of the witnesses and prove
that their testimonies are not rehearsed

Inability of AAA to recall the exact date when the crime was committed – Discrepancies
regarding exact dates of rapes are inconsequential and immaterial and cannot discredit
the credibility of the victim as a witness. Failure to specify the exact dates or time when
the rapes occurred does not ipso facto make the information defective on its face. As
long as it is alleged that the offense was committed at any time as near to the actual date
when the offense was committed the information is sufficient.

Delay in filing the case (the case was filed 4 years after the alleged rape was
committed) – The rape victim’s delay or hesitation in reporting the crime does not
destroy the truth of the charge nor is it an indication of deceit. In the absence of other
circumstances that show that the charge was a mere concoction and impelled by some
ill motive, delay in the filing of the complainant is not sufficient to defeat the charge.
Here, the failure of AAA’s parents to immediately file this case was sufficiently justified
by the complainant’s father in the latter’s testimony (they had to wait until they saved
enough amount of money for litigation).

Absence of proof of force or intimidation – Proof of force, intimidation or consent is

unnecessary, since none of these is an element of statutory rape. There is a conclusive
presumption of absence of free consent when the rape victim is below the age of twelve.

Medical report on negative lacerations – A medical report is not indispensable in a

prosecution for rape. What is important is that AAA’s testimony meets the test of
credibility that is sufficient to convict the accused.

2. Penalty improper. The proper imposable penalty for accused-appellant is

reclusion perpetua.

Under Art. 335 of the RPC, the imposable penalty for statutory rape is death.
However, accused-appellant is entitled to privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority because he was 18 years old at the time of the commission of the offense. Since
the prosecution was not able to prove the exact date and time when the rape was
committed, it is not certain that the crime of rape was committed on or after he reached
18 years of age in 1996.

In assessing the attendance of the mitigating circumstance of minority, all doubts

should be resolved in favor of the accused, it being more beneficial to the latter.

Civil indemnity maintained. Imposition of exemplary damages proper. For

exemplary damages, the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton,
fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner.

3. No suspension of sentence. The promulgation of the sentence of conviction of

accused-appellant by the RTC cannot be suspended as he was about 25 years of age at
that time.

Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides for the automatic suspension of sentence of a child
in conflict with the law, even if he/she is already 18 years of age or more at the time
he/she is found guilty of the offense charged.

However, Sec. 40 of the same law limits the said suspension of sentence until the said
child reaches the maximum age of 21.

Thus, the application of Secs. 38 and 40 to the suspension of sentence is now moot
and academic.
 However, accused-appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Sec.
51 of R.A. No. 9344 which provides for confinement of convicted children.

Sec. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. – Once the child who is under eighteen
(18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the
offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may
have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the
judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under
suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension
of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) of age or
more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.

Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the
child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the
Supreme Court on Juvenile in Conflict with the Law.

Sec. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. – If the court finds
that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with
the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed
to comply with the condition of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child
in conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment.

If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while
under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in
accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended
sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of
twenty-one (21) years.

Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other

Training Facilities. – A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon
order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular
penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be
established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with
the DSWD.

People v. Arpon,

G.R. No. 183563, 14 December 2011;

FACTS

Accused-appellant Arpon was charged with one count of statutory rape and seven
counts of rape. The RTC and CA convicted accused-appellants of all counts of rape
charged.

Records show that the first count of rape against private complainant AAA was
committed by accused-appellant in the house of the former when she was still eight
years old (1995). In July 1999, she was again raped by accused-appellant for five times
on different nights. She avers that accused-appellant was then drinking alcohol with
BBB, the stepfather of AAA, in the house of AAAs neighbor. He came to AAA’s house,
took off her panty and went on top of her. When asked again how the accused-
appellant raped her for five nights in July of the said year, AAA narrated that accused-
appellant pulled down her panty, went on top of her and pumped. She felt pain as he
put his penis into her vagina. Every time she urinated, thereafter, she felt pain.

AAA further related that the accused-appellant raped her again twice in August
1999 at nighttime. He kissed her and then he took off his shirt, went on top of her and
pumped. She felt pain in her vagina and in her chest because he was heavy. She related
that the accused-appellant was her uncle as he was the brother of her mother. AAA said
that she did not tell anybody about the rapes because the accused-appellant threatened
to kill her mother if she did. She only filed a complaint when he proceeded to also rape
her younger sister, DDD

Accused-appellant interpose alibi and denial as his defense. He further assails the
credibility of AAA for having inconsistencies in her testimony.

ISSUE

Is the accused-appellant guilty of all counts of rape charged against him?

RULING

NO, the testimony of AAA was only able to establish three instances when the
accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of her.

The first incident of rape was alleged to have occurred in 1995 when AAA was only
eight years old. Article 266-A (1)(d) spells out the definition of the crime of statutory
rape, the elements of which are: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman;
and (2) that such a woman is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented. Contrary to
the posturing of the accused-appellant, the date of the commission of the rape is not an
essential element of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal
knowledge of a woman. Inconsistencies and discrepancies in details which are
irrelevant to the elements of the crime are not grounds for acquittal. As regards the first
incident of rape, the RTC credited with veracity the substance of AAA’s testimony and
the Court sees no cogent reason to disturb the finding of the RTC.

Anent the five incidents of rape that were alleged to have been committed in July
1999, the Court disagrees with the ruling of the trial court that all five counts were
proven with moral certainty. AAA’s testimony merely described a single incident of
rape. She made no reference whatsoever to the other four instances of rape that were
likewise supposedly committed in the month of July 1999. The same is also true for the
two (2) counts of rape allegedly committed in August 1999.

Accused-appellants defense of alibi cannot stand. Hence, accused-appellant is

proven to have committed three counts of rape against AAA. He is, however, exempted
from criminal liability for the first count of rape (statutory) on account of him being a
minor when he committed the crime. As such, he is only guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of two counts of qualified rape with his relationship as an uncle to the victim as a
qualifying circumstance.

Dorado v. People

G.R. No. 216671, 3 October 2016;

FACTS

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the
August 8, 2014 Decision1 and the January 29, 2015 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33581, which affirmed the July 5, 2010 Decision3 of the
Regional Trial Court, Taguig City, Branch 163 (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 127784,
finding accused Jerwin Dorado (Dorado) guilty of the crime of Frustrated Murder.
On or about the 15th day of March 2004, in the Municipality of Taguig, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, in conspiracy with one another and with Jerwin Dorado y Felipe @
Ewing who is a 16 year old minor, and with two (2) unidentified companions whose
true identities and present whereabouts are still unknown, with intent to kill by means
of the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation, aggravated by
the circumstances of nighttime and with the use of an improvised shotgun (sumpak), a
deadly weapon and unlicensed firearm, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot with said deadly weapon, one Ronald Bonion y
Bozar, thus performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime
of murder as a consequence, but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the accused, that is due to the timely and able medical
assistance rendered to said victim which prevented his death.

ISSUE

Whether or not the accused-appellants are guilty with the crime of frustrated
murder

RULING

The Court finds merit in the petition.

Dorado was a minor at the time of the commission of the crime.
A perusal of the records will readily show that Dorado was a sixteen (16) year
old minor at the time of the commission of the crime on March 15, 2004. The
Informations filed against him consistently stated his minority.11 For said reason, he
must benefit from the provisions of R.A. No. 9344, or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare
Act of 2006, as amended. Even though the said law was enacted on April 28, 2006, the
same must still be retroactively applied for the benefit of Dorado pursuant to the well-
entrenched principle in criminal law — favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa
restrigenda (penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect).
Curiously, neither the RTC nor the CA paid much attention to Dorado's minority
and how it affected his criminal responsibility. Thus, the Court deems it proper to lay
down the salient provisions of R.A. No. 9344 regarding the prosecution of a Child In
Conflict with the Law (CICL).13chanrobleslaw
One of the significant features of R.A. No. 9344 is the increase of the minimum
age of criminal responsibility, to wit:

SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. — A child fifteen (15) years of age or
under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal
liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to
Section 20 of this Act.
A child is deemed to be fifteen (15) years of age on the day of the fifteenth
anniversary of his/her birthdate.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall
likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program,
unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to
the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include
exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.
In sum, Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that the following minors shall be
exempt from criminal liability:

Those below fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the commission of the crime;
and ,Those above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age who
acted without discernment.

Thus, if a child falls under the above-cited ages, he or she shall be released and shall
be subjected to an intervention program as may be determined by a local social welfare
and development officer, pursuant to Section 20 of the said law.
Consequently, under R.A. No. 9344, only a child above fifteen (15) years but
below eighteen (18) years of age who acted with discernment shall not be exempted
from criminal responsibility.15 Nevertheless, the said child does not immediately
proceed to trial. Instead, he or she may undergo a diversion, which refers to an
alternative, child-appropriate process of determining the responsibility and treatment of
the CICL without resorting to formal court proceedings. If the diversion is unsuccessful
or if the other grounds provided by law16 are present, then the CICL shall undergo the
appropriate preliminary investigation of his or her criminal case, and trial before the
courts may proceed.
Once the CICL is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall not
immediately execute its judgment; rather, it shall place the CICL under suspended
sentence. Notably, the suspension shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already
eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his or her guilt.
During the suspension, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as
provided in the Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law. If the
disposition measures are successful, then the court shall discharge the CICL.
Conversely, if unsuccessful, then the court has the following options: (1) to discharge
the child, (2) to order execution of sentence, or (3) to extend the suspended sentence for
a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21)
years.

People v. Arpon, G.R. No. 183563, 14 December 2011

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Arpon was charged with one count of statutory rape

and seven counts of rape. The RTC and CA convicted accused-appellants
of all counts of rape charged.

Records show that the first count of rape against private complainant AAA
was committed by accused-appellant in the house of the former when she
was still eight years old (1995). In July 1999, she was again raped by
accused-appellant for five times on different nights. She avers that accused-
appellant was then drinking alcohol with BBB, the stepfather of AAA, in
the house of AAAs neighbor. He came to AAA’s house, took off her panty
and went on top of her. When asked again how the accused-appellant
raped her for five nights in July of the said year, AAA narrated that
accused-appellant pulled down her panty, went on top of her and pumped.
She felt pain as he put his penis into her vagina. Every time she urinated,
thereafter, she felt pain.

AAA further related that the accused-appellant raped her again twice in
August 1999 at nighttime. He kissed her and then he took off his shirt,
went on top of her and pumped. She felt pain in her vagina and in her
chest because he was heavy. She related that the accused-appellant was her
uncle as he was the brother of her mother. AAA said that she did not tell
anybody about the rapes because the accused-appellant threatened to kill
her mother if she did. She only filed a complaint when he proceeded to also
rape her younger sister, DDD

Accused-appellant interpose alibi and denial as his defense. He further

assails the credibility of AAA for having inconsistencies in her testimony.

ISSUE:

Is the accused-appellant guilty of all counts of rape charged against him?

HELD:

NO, the testimony of AAA was only able to establish three instances when
the accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of her.

The first incident of rape was alleged to have occurred in 1995 when AAA
was only eight years old. Article 266-A (1)(d) spells out the definition of the
crime of statutory rape, the elements of which are: (1) that the offender had
carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such a woman is under twelve
(12) years of age or is demented. Contrary to the posturing of the accused-
appellant, the date of the commission of the rape is not an essential element
of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of
a woman. Inconsistencies and discrepancies in details which are irrelevant
to the elements of the crime are not grounds for acquittal. As regards the
first incident of rape, the RTC credited with veracity the substance of
AAA’s testimony and the Court sees no cogent reason to disturb the
finding of the RTC.

Anent the five incidents of rape that were alleged to have been committed
in July 1999, the Court disagrees with the ruling of the trial court that all
five counts were proven with moral certainty. AAA’s testimony merely
described a single incident of rape. She made no reference whatsoever to
the other four instances of rape that were likewise supposedly committed
in the month of July 1999. The same is also true for the two (2) counts of
rape allegedly committed in August 1999.

Accused-appellants defense of alibi cannot stand. Hence, accused-appellant

is proven to have committed three counts of rape against AAA. He is,
however, exempted from criminal liability for the first count of rape
(statutory) on account of him being a minor when he committed the crime.
As such, he is only guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of
qualified rape with his relationship as an uncle to the victim as a qualifying
circumstance.

Dorado v. People, G.R. No. 216671, 3 October 2016;

“ Whether the term "discernment," as used in Article 12(3) of the Revised

Penal Code (RPC) is synonymous with"intent."

FACTS:

On April 15, 2004, at around 11:00 o'clock in the evening, Ronald was
talking to his friends Raniel, Delon Busar, Annan Luna, Jerome Amergo
and a certain Erwin (Ronald's group) along A. Reyes Street, Lower Bicutan,
Taguig. At that very time, Dorado, carrying a sumpak, and his friends,
Confessor and Cabiaso (Dorado's group), arrived and threw stones and
bottles at Ronald's group.Ronald's group scampered for shelter toward the
talipapa and hid inside to avoid being hit by the stones and bottles. When
Ronald thought that Dorado's group was no longer-in the vicinity, they
came out of hiding. Dorado's group, however, was out there waiting for
them. When they finally surfaced, Dorado's group resumed throwing
stones at Ronald's group. During the commotion, Dorado fired his sumpak
and hit Ronald between the eyes. Ronald fell unconscious for about ten (10)
minutes while Dorado'sgroup ran away. Thereafter, Ronald was brought to
the Rizal Medical Center by Raniel and Delon Busan.The RTC, nevertheless,
appreciated the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority in Dorado's
favor as he was still a minor at the time of the incident. It, however, stated
that Dorado was not entitled to a suspension of sentence because he was
above twenty-one (21) years old at the time of the pronouncement of guilt.
Aggrieved, Dorado elevated an appeal before the CA but his motion was
denied by the CA in its assailed resolution.

ISSUE:

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN

AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF THEPETITIONER WHO IS A
MINOR FOR THE CRIME CHARGED.

RULING :

The judgment of conviction of Jerwin Dorado was reversed and set aside
by reason of the exempting circumstance of minority. He is hereby referred
to the local social welfare and development officer of the locality for the
appropriate intervention program.

The Court finds that the prosecution did not make an effort to prove that
Dorado, then a sixteen (16)-year old minor, acted with discernment at the
time of the commission of the crime.The RTC decision simply stated that a
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority in favor of Dorado must be
appreciated as it was proven that he was a minor at the time of the incident.
Glaringly, there was no discussion at all on whether Dorado acted with
discernment when he committed the crime imputed against him.
Discernment cannot be presumed even if Dorado intended to do away with
Ronald. Discernment is different from intent. Considering that there was
no determination of discernment by the trial court, the Court cannot rule
with certainty that Dorado was criminally responsible.
Celestial v. People, G.R. No. 214865, 19 August 2015

Applying article 70 of the RPC, such maximum period shall in no

case exceed forty years. Therefore, in spite of the six (6) penalties of forty
(40) years of reclusion perpetua, petitioner shall only suffer imprisonment
for a period not exceeding 40 years.

Facts:

Celestial was convicted of six counts of qualified theft through

falsification of commercial document. The issue of conviction has
attained finality after the failure of Celestial’s counsel to file
her appellant brief. The court now only delves on the issue of the
imposition of proper penalty.

Issue:

What is the proper penalty for Celestial’s conviction of six

counts of qualified theft with the total amount of $50, 000.00.

Ruling:

In ascertaining the proper penalty, we are guided by our

pronouncement in People v. Mercado:

First, we get the value of the property stolen as determined by the trial
court.

Second, we determine the imposable base penalty under Art. 309 of

the RPC. Here, since the totality of the stolen amounts for each case
exceeds P22,000.00, the imposable base penalty for each count, as per Art.
309 (1), is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods to be
imposed in the maximum period, which is eight (8) years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day to ten (10) years of prision mayor, had the crime charged
been simple theft.

Third, since the value of the stolen goods exceeds P22,000.00, We

compute for the additional years of maximum imprisonment under Art.
309 (1) by deducting P22,000.00 from each case, and by subsequently
dividing each difference by P10,000.00, disregarding any remainder
amount.

Fourth, we add the maximum of the base penalty to the above-

determined quotient to arrive at the maximum imprisonment term
imposable had the crime committed been simple theft.

Fifth, the maximum imprisonment term should not exceed the 20-year cap
under Art. 309 (1), and any imprisonment term in excess of the cap should
be disregarded. In this case, since all sums exceeded 20 years, the proper
penalty -the maximum period adverted to in Art. 309 (1) -would have
been 20 years of reclusion temporal, before the application of the
indeterminate sentence law, for each count, had petitioner been convicted
of simple theft.

Sixth, the penalty for qualified theft is two degrees higher than that for
simple theft. Under Art. 25 of the RPC, two (2) degrees higher than
reclusion temporal-the penalty following reclusion perpetua.

Lastly, since petitioner is convicted of six (6) counts of qualified theft

through falsification of commercial documents with corresponding six
(6) penalties of forty (40) years of reclusion perpetua, Art. 70 of the RPC
on successive service of sentences shall apply.

In the Matter of The Petition For Habeas Corpus Of Pete C. Lagran, Pete C.
Lagran, G.R. No. 147270, 15 August 20
DECISION

PUNO, J.:

- On April 18, 1994, petitioner Pete C. Lagran was convicted by the

Regional Trial Court of Quezon City of three (3) counts of violation of
Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22.
- He was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of one (1) year for each
count and to pay a fine of P125,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency.
- He appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals
but the appeal was dismissed on July 11, 1997 for failure to file
appellant's brief.
- The decision became final and executory on August 6, 1997 and entry
of judgment was made on March 5, 1998.
- On April 3, 1999, he was transferred to the New Bilibid Prison.
- Petitioner filed the instant petition for Habeas Corpus on March 19,
2001. He prayed for his immediate release as he had allegedly
completed the service of his sentence. Citing Article 70 of the Revised
Penal Code, he argued that if the penalties or sentences imposed on
the accused are identical, and such penalties or sentences emanated
from one court and one complaint, the accused shall serve them
simultaneously. He stated that he has been incarcerated for two (2)
years and four (4) days, counted from February 28, 2001, thus, his
detention in the New Bilibid Prison is now without legal basis.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the penalties or sentences imposed on the accused are

identical, and such penalties or sentences emanated from one court and
one complaint, the accused shall serve them simultaneously.

RULING:
The petition was dismissed.In the case at bar, petitioner was sentenced to
suffer one year imprisonment for every count of the offense committed.
The nature of the sentence does not allow petitioner to serve all the prison
terms simultaneously. Applying the rule on successive service of sentence,
we find that petitioner has not yet completed the service of his sentence as
he commenced serving his sentence only on February 24, 1999. His prayer,
therefore, for the issuance of a writ of Habeas Corpus has no basis.

Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code allows simultaneous service of two or

more penalties only if the nature of the penalties so permit. The penalties
that can be simultaneously served are:

1. perpetual absolute disqualification.

2. Death,
3. Reclusion perpetua,
4. Reclusion temporal,
5. Prision mayor,
6. Prision correccional,
7. Arresto mayor,
8. Arresto menor,
9. Destierro,
10.Perpetual absolute disqualification,
11.Temporary absolute disqualification,
12.Suspension from public office
13.The right to vote and be voted for
14.The right to follow profession or calling
15.Public censure
16.Fine and bond to keep the peace,
17. Civil interdiction
18.Confiscation and payment of costs.
Notwithstanding the provisions of the rule next preceeding, the maximum
duration of the convict's sentence shall not be more than threefold the
length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed
upon him. No other penalty to which he may be liable shall be inflicted
after the sum total of those imposed equals the same maximum period.
Such maximum period shall in no case exceed forty years.

In applying the provisions of this rule the duration of perpetual penalties

(penal perpetua) shall be computed at thirty years."

These penalties, except destierro, can be served simultaneously with

imprisonment. The penalties consisting in deprivation of liberty cannot be
served simultaneously by reason of the nature of such penalties. Where the
accused is sentenced to two or more terms of imprisonment, the terms
should be served successively.