Bohol Institute of Technology- International College

College of Law

Subject: CONSTITUTION
Academic Year: 2022-2023
Student: MILA A. FUEGO
Professor: Atty. ANINO

JAVIER v. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. Nos. 147026-27
September 11, 2009
Justice Del Castillo
FACTS OF THE CASE:

Carolina R. Javier (JAVIER) was the private sector representative in the National Book Development Board (NBDB) and a
member of the Governing Board.
 
Part of her functions as a member of the Governing Board was to attend book fairs to establish linkages with international
book publishing bodies. On September 29, 1997, she was issued by the Office of the President a travel authority to attend
the Madrid International Book Fair in Spain on October 8-12, 1997. Based on her itinerary of travel, she was paid
P139,199.00 as her travelling expenses. Unfortunately, petitioner was not able to attend the scheduled international book
fair.

Demands were made upon her to return the amounts that she received. She was issued a Summary of Disallowances from
which the balance for settlement amounted to P220,349.00. Despite said notice, Javier still failed to return the amount.

A complaint was filed against her before the Ombudsman for Malversation of Public Funds and Properties. Subsequently,
an Information was filed against her before the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. This was docketed
as Criminal Case No. 25867 before the First Division.

The Commission on Audit also filed a Complaint against Javier for Malversation of Public Funds under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code. Another Information was filed against her before the Sandiganbayan docketed as Criminal Case No.
25898 before the Third Division.

These two cases were later on consolidated upon Motion by JAVIER.

JAVIER filed a Motion to Quash the Information for Criminal Case No. 25867 on the ground that she was not a public
officer, only a private sector representative. This was denied by the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUES:
1. WON JAVIER is a public officer?
2. WON the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the present case?
3. WON there is double jeopardy?

RATIO:

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 1. JAVIER IS A PUBLIC OFFICER

A perusal of the above powers and functions leads us to conclude that they partake of the nature of public functions.
A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by
law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public
officer.32

Notwithstanding that petitioner came from the private sector to sit as a member of the NBDB, the law invested her with
some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, so that the purpose of the government is achieved. In this
case, the government aimed to enhance the book publishing industry as it has a significant role in the national
development. Hence, the fact that she was appointed from the public sector and not from the other branches or agencies
of the government does not take her position outside the meaning of a public office. She was appointed to the Governing
Board in order to see to it that the purposes for which the law was enacted are achieved. The Governing Board acts
collectively and carries out its mandate as one body. The purpose of the law for appointing members from the private
sector is to ensure that they are also properly represented in the implementation of government objectives to cultivate the
book publishing industry.

Moreover, the Court is not unmindful of the definition of a public officer pursuant to the Anti-Graft Law, which provides
that a public officer includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the
classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government. 33

Thus, pursuant to the Anti-Graft Law, one is a public officer if one has been elected or appointed to a public office.
Petitioner was appointed by the President to the Governing Board of the NDBD. Though her term is only for a year that
does not make her private person exercising a public function. The fact that she is not receiving a monthly salary is also of
no moment. Section 7, R.A. No. 8047 provides that members of the Governing Board shall receive per diem and such
allowances as may be authorized for every meeting actually attended and subject to pertinent laws, rules and regulations.
Also, under the Anti-Graft Law, the nature of one's appointment, and whether the compensation one receives from the
government is only nominal, is immaterial because the person so elected or appointed is still considered a public officer.

On the other hand, the Revised Penal Code defines a public officer as any person who, by direct provision of the law,
popular election, popular election or appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the performance of public
functions in the Government of the Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said Government or in any of its branches
public duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or classes, shall be deemed to be a public officer. 34

Where, as in this case, petitioner performs public functions in pursuance of the objectives of R.A. No. 8047, verily, she is a
public officer who takes part in the performance of public functions in the government whether as an employee, agent,
subordinate official, of any rank or classes. In fact, during her tenure, petitioner took part in the drafting and
promulgation of several rules and regulations implementing R.A. No. 8047. She was supposed to represent the country in
the canceled book fair in Spain.

2. THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE

Notably, the Director of Organization, Position Classification and Compensation Bureau, of the Department of Budget
and management provided the following information regarding the compensation and position classification and/or rank
equivalence of the member of the Governing Board of the NBDB, thus:

Per FY 1999 Personal Services Itemization, the Governing Board of NDBD is composed of one (1) Chairman (ex-officio),
one (1) Vice-Chairman (ex-officio), and nine (9) Members, four (4) of whom are ex-officio and the remaining five (5)
members represent the private sector. The said five members of the Board do not receive any salary and as such their
position are not classified and are not assigned any salary grade.

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For purposes however of determining the rank equivalence of said positions, notwithstanding that they do not have any
salary grade assignment, the same may be equated to Board Member II, SG-28.36

Thus, based on the Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 25898, petitioner belongs to the employees classified as
SG-28, included in the phrase "all other national and local officials classified as 'Grade 27' and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989."

3. THERE IS NO DOUBLE JEOPARDY

Records show that the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 25867 and 25898 refer to offenses penalized by different
statues, R.A. No. 3019 and RPC, respectively. It is elementary that for double jeopardy to attach, the case against the
accused must have been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon valid information sufficient in form and substance and the accused pleaded to the charge. 37 In the
instant case, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the Information for violation of the Anti-Graft Law. She was not yet
arraigned in the criminal case for malversation of public funds because she had filed a motion to quash the latter
information. Double jeopardy could not, therefore, attach considering that the two cases remain pending before the
Sandiganbayan and that herein petitioner had pleaded to only one in the criminal cases against her.

It is well settled that for a claim of double jeopardy to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) there is a
complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the same is
filed before a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) there is a valid arraignment or plea to the charges; and (4) the accused is
convicted or acquitted or the case is otherwise dismissed or terminated without his express consent. 38 The third and
fourth requisites are not present in the case at bar.

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 Bohol Institute of Technology- International College
College of Law

Subject: CONSTITUTION
Academic Year: 2022-2023
Student: MILA A. FUEGO
Professor: Atty. ANINO

SAGUISAG et al v. OCHOA
G.R. No. 212426, G.R. No. 212444, G.R. No.
January 12, 2016
JUSTICE CERENO

FACTS:  petitioners respectfully pray that the Honorable Court RECONSIDER, REVERSE, AND SET - ASIDE its Decision
dated January 12, 2016, and issue a new Decision GRANTING the instant consolidated petitions by declaring the
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) entered into by the respondents for the Philippine government, with
the United States of America, UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND INVALID and to permanently enjoin its implementation.    
petitioners claim this Court erred when it ruled that EDCA was not a treaty.[5] In connection to this, petitioners move that
EDCA must be in the form of a treaty in order to comply with the constitutional restriction under Section 25, Article XVIII
of the 1987 Constitution on foreign military bases, troops, and facilities.[6] Additionally, they reiterate their arguments on
the issues of telecommunications, taxation, and nuclear weapons.[7]    Petitioners assert that this Court contradicted itself
when it interpreted the word "allowed in" to refer to the initial entry of foreign bases, troops, and facilities, based on the
fact that the plain meaning of the provision in question referred to prohibiting the return of foreign bases, troops, and
facilities except under a treaty concurred in by the Senate    Secondly, by interpreting "allowed in" as referring to an initial
entry, the Court has simply applied the plain meaning of the words in the particular provision.[10] Necessarily, once
entry has been established by a subsisting treaty, latter instances of entry need not be embodied by a separate treaty. After
all, the Constitution did not state that foreign military bases, troops, and facilities shall not subsist or exist in the
Philippines. 

ISSUE:  Whether or not the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the Republic of the Philippines
and the United States of America (U.S.) constitutional 

DECISION:  Yes 

RATIO DECIDENDI:  The EDCA did not go beyond the framework. The entry of US troops has long been authorized
under a valid and subsisting treaty, which is the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).[14] Reading the VFA along with the
longstanding Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT)[15] led this Court to the conclusion that an executive agreement such as the
EDCA was well within the bounds of the obligations imposed by both treaties.    Thus, we find no reason for EDCA to be
declared unconstitutional. It fully conforms to the Philippines' legal regime through the MDT and VFA. It also fully
conforms to the government's continued policy to enhance our military capability in the face of various military and
humanitarian issues that may arise. This Motion for Reconsideration has not raised any additional legal arguments that
warrant revisiting the Decision.    Principles:    On verba legis interpretation... verba legis    Petitioners' own interpretation
and application of the verba legis rule will in fact result in an absurdity, which legal construction strictly abhors.     The
settled rule is that the plain, clear and unambiguous language of the Constitution should be construed as such and should
not be given a construction that changes its meaning    With due respect, the Honorable Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A.
Sereno's theory of "initial entry" mentioned above ventured into a construction of the provisions of Section 25, Article
XVIII of the Constitution which is patently contrary to the plain language and meaning of the said constitutional
provision.  

Tinampay 4
 Bohol Institute of Technology- International College
College of Law

Subject: CONSTITUTION
Academic Year: 2022-2023
Student: MILA A. FUEGO
Professor: Atty. ANINO

Belgica, et al. vs. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. Nos. 208566, 208493 & 209251, November 19,
2013

FACTS
HISTORY of CONGRESSIONAL PORK BARREL
 The term “pork barrel”, a political parlance of American-English origin, refers to an
appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or
primarily to bring money to a representative’s district.
 The earliest form of the pork barrel system is found in Section 3 of Act 3044, otherwise known
as the Public Works Act of 1922. Under this provision, release of funds and realignment of
unexpended portions of an item or appropriation were subject to the approval of a joint
committee elected by the Senate and the House of Representatives.
 In 1950, members of Congress, by virtue of being representatives of the people, also became
involved in project identification.
 The pork barrel system was temporarily discontinued when martial law was declared.
 It reappeared in 1982 through an item in the General Appropriations Act (“GAA”) called
“Support for Local Development Projects” (“SLDP”). SLDP started the giving of lump-sum
allocations to individual legislators. The SLDP also began to cover not only public works project
or “hard projects” but also covered “soft projects” such as those which would fall under
education, health and livelihood.
 After the EDSA People Power Revolution and the restoration of democracy, the pork barrel was
revived through the “Mindanao Development Fund” and the “Visayas Development Fund”.
 In 1990, the pork barrel was renamed “Countrywide Development Fund” (“CDF”). The CDF
was meant to cover small local infrastructure and other priority community projects.
 CDF Funds were, with the approval of the President, released directly to implementing agencies
subject to the submission of the required list of projects and activities. Senators and congressmen
could identify any kind of project from “hard projects” such as roads, buildings and bridges to
“soft projects” such as textbooks, medicines, and scholarships.
 In 1993, the CDF was further modified such that the release of funds was to be made upon the
submission of the list of projects and activities identified by individual legislators. This was also
the first time when the Vice-President was given an allocation.
 The CDF contained the same provisions from 1994-1996 except that the Department of Budget
and Management was required to submit reports to the Senate Committee on Finance and the
House Committee on Appropriations regarding the releases made from the funds.

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  Congressional insertions (“CIs”) were another form of congressional pork barrel aside from the
CDF. Examples of the CIs include the DepEd School Building Fund, the Congressional Initiative
Allocations, and the Public Works Fund, among others.
 The allocations for the School Building Fund were made upon prior consultation with the
representative of the legislative district concerned and the legislators had the power to direct
how, where and when these appropriations were to be spent.
 In 1999, the CDF was removed from the GAA and replaced by three separate forms of CIs: (i)
Food Security Program Fund, (ii) Lingap Para sa Mahihirap Fund, and (iii) Rural/Urban
Development Infrastructure Program Fund. All three contained a provision requiring prior
consultation with members of Congress for the release of funds.
 In 2000, the Priority Development Assistance Fund (“PDAF”) appeared in the GAA. PDAF
required prior consultation with the representative of the district before the release of funds.
PDAF also allowed realignment of funds to any expense category except personal services and
other personnel benefits.
 In 2005, the PDAF introduced the program menu concept which is essentially a list of general
programs and implementing agencies from which a particular PDAF project may be
subsequently chosen by the identifying authority. This was retained in the GAAs from 2006-
2010.
 It was during the Arroyo administration when the formal participation of non-governmental
organizations in the implementation of PDAF projects was introduced.
 The PDAF articles from 2002-2010 were silent with respect to specific amounts for individual
legislators.
 In 2011, the PDAF Article in the GAA contained an express statement on lump-sum amounts
allocated for individual legislators and the Vice-President. It also contained a provision on
realignment of funds but with the qualification that it may be allowed only once.
 The 2013 PDAF Article allowed LGUs to be identified as implementing agencies. Legislators
were also allowed to identify programs/projects outside of his legislative district. Realignment of
funds and release of funds were required to be favorably endorsed by the House Committee on
Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be.
MALAMPAYA FUNDS AND PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND
 The use of the term pork barrel was expanded to include certain funds of the President such as
the Malampaya Fund and the Presidential Social Fund (“PSF”).
 The Malampaya Fund was created as a special fund under Section 8 of Presidential Decree
(“PD”) No. 910 issued by President Ferdinand Marcos on March 22, 1976.
 The PSF was created under Section 12, Title IV of PD No. 1869, or the Charter of the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (“PAGCOR”), as amended by PD No. 1993. The PSF is
managed and administered by the Presidential Management Staff and is sourced from the share
of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.
PORK BARREL MISUSE
 In 1996, Marikina City Representative Romeo Candozo revealed that huge sums of money
regularly went into the pockets of legislators in the form of kickbacks.
 In 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF but the Supreme Court
dismissed the petition for lack of evidentiary basis regarding illegal misuse of PDAF in the form
of kickbacks.

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  In July 2013, the National Bureau of Investigation probed the allegation that a syndicate
defrauded the government of P10 billion using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and
various government agencies for scores of ghost projects.
 In August 2013, the Commission on Audit released the results of a three-year audit investigation
detailing the irregularities in the release of the PDAF from 2007 to 2009.
 Whistle-blowers also alleged that at least P900 million from the Malampaya Funds had gone into
a dummy NGO.
ISSUE/S
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
 Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable
controversy, (b) the issues raised are matters of policy not subject to judicial review, (c)
petitioners have legal standing to sue, (d) previous decisions of the Court bar the re-litigation of
the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel system.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
 Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel laws are
unconstitutional for violating the constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers, (b) non-
delegability of legislative power, (c) checks and balances, (d) accountability, (e) political
dynasties, (f) local autonomy.
RULING
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
(a) There is an actual and justiciable controversy
 There exists an actual and justiciable controversy in the cases. The requirement of contrariety of
legal rights is satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties regarding the constitutionality
of the pork barrel system.
 The case is ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the laws allowing for their
utilization are currently existing and operational and thereby posing an immediate or threatened
injury to petitioners.
 The case is not moot as the proposed reforms on the PDAF and the abolition thereof does not
actually terminate the controversy on the matter. The President does not have constitutional
authority to nullify or annul the legal existence of the PDAF.
 The “moot and academic principle” cannot stop the Court from deciding the case considering
that: (a) petitioners allege grave violation of the constitution, (b) the constitutionality of the pork
barrel system presents a situation of exceptional character and is a matter of paramount public
interest, (c) there is a practical need for a definitive ruling on the system’s constitutionality to
guide the bench, the bar and the public, and (d) the preparation and passage of the national
budget is an annual occurrence.
(b) Political Question Doctrine is Inapplicable
 The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System” is not an issue dependent upon the
wisdom of the political branches of the government but rather a legal one which the Constitution
itself has commanded the Court to act upon.
 The 1987 Constitution expanded the concept of judicial power such that the Supreme Court has
the power to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality on the part of the government.
(c) Petitioners have legal standing to sue
 Petitioners have legal standing by virtue of being taxpayers and citizens of the Philippines.
 As taxpayers, they are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds.

Tinampay 7
  As citizens, the issues they have raised are matters of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest.
(d) The Petition is not barred by previous cases
 The present case is not barred by the ruling in Philconsa vs. Enriquez because the Philconsa case
was a limited response to a separation of powers problem, specifically on the propriety of
conferring post-enactment identification authority to Members of Congress.
 On the contrary, the present cases involve a more holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation
between the CDF and the PDAF Articles with each other, and (b) the inter-relation of post-
enactment measures contained within a particular CDF or PDAF article, including not only those
related to the area of project identification but also to the areas of fund release and realignment.
 Moreover, the Philconsa case was riddled with inherent constitutional inconsistencies
considering that the authority to identify projects is an aspect of appropriation and the power of
appropriation is a form of legislative power thereby lodged in Congress. This power cannot be
exercised by individual members of Congress and the authority to appropriate cannot be
exercised after the GAA has already been passed.
 The case of Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty vs. Secretary of Budget and Management
does not also bar judgment on the present case because it was dismissed on a procedural
technicality and hence no controlling doctrine was rendered.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON CONGRESSIONAL PORK BARREL
(a) The separation of powers between the Executive and the Legislative Departments has been
violated.
 The post-enactment measures including project identification, fund release, and fund realignment
are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene
and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution, which belongs to
the executive department.
 Legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in the various operational
aspects of budgeting, including ―the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual
activities and the ― regulation and release of funds in violation of the separation of powers
principle.
 Any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is
thus unconstitutional.
 That the said authority to identify projects is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does
not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition covers any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law.
 Respondents also failed to prove that the role of the legislators is only recommendatory in nature.
They even admitted that the identification of the legislator constitutes a mandatory requirement
before the PDAF can be tapped as a funding source.
(b)The principle of non-delegability of legislative powers has been violated
 The 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to
individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are
effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which – as settled in
Philconsa – is lodged in Congress.
 That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from Section
29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: ― No money shall be paid out of
the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.

Tinampay 8
  The legislators are individually exercising the power of appropriation because each of them
determines (a) how much of their PDAF fund would go to and (b) a specific project or
beneficiary that they themselves also determine.
(c) Checks and balances
 Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective
allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who
would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed,
effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion.
 This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the
creation of a ―budget within a budget which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment
and consequently impairs the President‘s power of item veto.
 It forces the President to decide between (a) accepting the entire PDAF allocation without
knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his
national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with
legitimate projects.
 In fact, even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article
would remain constitutionally flawed since it would then operate as a prohibited form of lump-
sum appropriation. This is because the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes
of the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a
discernible item which may be subject to the President‘s power of item veto.
(d) The Congressional Pork Barrel partially prevents accountability as Congress is incapable of
checking itself or its members.
 The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the
budget makes it difficult for them to become disinterested observers when scrutinizing,
investigating or monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law.
 The conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-
enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves
participate.
 The concept of post-enactment authorization violates Section 14, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, which prohibits members of Congress to intervene in any matter before any office
of the Government, because it renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own
office.
 The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority and/or the
individual legislator‘s control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetuate himself in
office.
 The use of his PDAF for re-election purposes is a matter which must be analyzed based on
particular facts and on a case-to-case basis.
(e) The constitutional provision regarding political dynasties is not self-executing.
 Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that the state shall prohibit
political dynasties as may be defined by law, is not a self-executing provision.
 Since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for
enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this issue.
(f) The Congressional Pork Barrel violates constitutional principles on local autonomy
 The Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the constitutional principles on local autonomy since
it allows district representatives, who are national officers, to substitute their judgments in
utilizing public funds for local development.

Tinampay 9
  The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without
taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents.
 The allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters of equality, wherein
economic or geographic indicators have been taken into consideration.
 This concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of
the various Local Development Councils (“LDCs”) which are already legally mandated
to―assist the corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social
development, and coordinating development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction.
 Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions are essentially geared towards
managing local affairs, their programs, policies and resolutions should not be overridden nor
duplicated by individual legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making authority
except only when acting as a body.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON PRESIDENTIAL PORK BARREL
(a) Section 8 of PD No. 910 and Section 12 of PD No. 1869 are valid appropriation laws.
 For an appropriation law to be valid under Section 29 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
which provides that “No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law”, it is enough that (a) the provision of law sets apart a determinate or
determinable amount of money and (b) allocates the same for a particular public purpose.
 Section 8 of PD 910 is a valid appropriation law because it set apart a determinable amount: a
Special Fund comprised of ― all fees, revenues, and receipts of the [Energy Development]
Board from any and all sources.
 It also specified a public purpose: energy resource development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President.
 Section 12 of PD No. 1869 is also a valid appropriation law because it set apart a determinable
amount: [a]fter deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of
the Government in the aggregate gross earnings of [PAGCOR], or 60%[,] if the aggregate gross
earnings be less than P150,000,000.00.
 It also specified a public purpose: priority infrastructure development projects and x x x the
restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and
authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines.
(b) Section 8 of PD No. 910 and Section 12 of PD No. 1869 constitutes undue delegation of
legislation powers.
 The phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under
Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not
lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority
with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used.
 This phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose
he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the
purview of the law.
 This notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the
use of the Malampaya Funds ―to finance energy resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government, remains legally effective and subsisting.
 Section 12 of PD No. 1869 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative powers because it lies
independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law.

Tinampay 10
  The law does not supply a definition of “priority infrastructure development projects” and hence,
leaves the President without any guideline to construe the same.
 The delimitation of a project as one of “infrastructure” is too broad of a classification since the
said term could pertain to any kind of facility.

Bohol Institute of Technology- International College

College of Law

Subject: CONSTITUTION
Academic Year: 2022-2023
Student: MILA A. FUEGO
Professor: Atty. ANINO

PEOPLE v. JUDGE DACUYCUY

 
173 SCRA 90
FACTS:  Private respondents were charged with violating RA 4670 (Magna Carta for Public School

Tinampay 11
Teachers), for which they have been convicted of. The penal provision, Section 32 of said Act, states
that "x x x upon conviction, [they] may be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred pesos, or
by imprisonment, in the discretion of the court." Respondents posited that said penalty merely
indicated as imprisonment is too broad and should not be enforced. 

ISSUE:  Whether or not the case constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, the duration of
the penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court as if the latter were the
legislative department of the Government 

DECISION:  Decision and resolution of respondent judge are REVERSED and SET ASIDE 

RATIO DECIDENDI:  There is undue delegation of legislative powers. Section 32 of RA 4670

provides an indeterminable period of imprisonment, with no maximum or minimum period set by
legislative authority. The courts are thus given a wide latitude of discretion, without benefit of
sufficient standard. This cannot be allowed, as it vests in the courts a power and a duty essentially
legislative in nature and is thus violative of the rules on separation of powers as well as non-
delegability of legislative powers.  

Tinampay 12